Almelor vs RTC
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida
Trinidad (Leonida) were married and their union bore three
children. After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a
petition with the RTC in Las Pias City to annul their marriage on
the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations.
At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian and
his deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her
decision-making were incomprehensible to his wife.
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his
homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she
noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. Her
fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kiss another man
on the lips, and when she confronted Manuel, he denied
everything.
At this point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal
abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their
children.
The wife even asked a psychologist to prove that her husband
was psychologically incapacitated.
The husband, of course, opposed these allegations and gave
counter arguments on the allegations raised by his wife. He also
presented his brother as witness to negate his wife.
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article
36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. Manuel filed a notice of
appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he
filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA.
Instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the
marriage between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated
consent by virtue of fraud.
Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of
evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his
marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife.
It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality
per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such
concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the
other party in giving consent to the marriage.
The petition in the trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.
Villanueva vs CA
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia
Canalita-Villanueva got married on 1988. On 1992, Orlando filed
with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage
alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into
marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her
pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her
after the marriage; and that he later learned that private
respondent's child died during delivery on 1988.
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage
may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent; and (b)
whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees and costs.
The SC affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner
freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no
threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do
so.
For the issue on the moral damages: We also agree that private
respondent is entitled to attorney's fees. Article 2208 (11) of the
Civil Code provides that attorney's may be awarded where the
court deems it just and equitable under the circumstances, as in
the instant case. The SC deleted the award of moral and
exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal basis. There is
nothing in the records or in the appealed decision that would
support an award of moral damages. Hence, exemplary damages
are allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no
exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first
establishes his clear right to moral damages. In the instant case,
private respondent failed to satisfactorily establish her claim for
moral damages, thus she is not likewise entitled to exemplary
damages.
Rule: Petitioner's petition for the annulment of his marriage with
private respondent is dismissed. However, the award of moral
and exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.
 Alcazar vs Alcazar
According to petitioner, after their wedding, petitioner and
respondent lived for five days in Occidental Mindoro, the
hometown of respondent's parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds
went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner
at the latter's abode. On 2000, respondent left for Riyadh,
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in
a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not
communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter.
About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-
teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come
home to the Philippines. Petitioner further averred in her
Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the
latter did not go home to petitioner, instead, respondent
proceeded to his parents' house.
Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically
incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing
sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to
paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code).
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother, and
clinical psychologist Tayag as witnesses.
The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies
the diagnostic criteria of a disorder clinically classified as
Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC did not err in finding that
petitioner failed to prove respondent's psychological incapacity.
Other than petitioner's bare allegations, no other evidence was
presented to prove respondent's personality disorder that made
him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
the marital state.
At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed
by petitioner before the RTC was for annulment of marriage
based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code. Article 45
(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate.
Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on
the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual
intercourse.
No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that
respondent was in any way physically incapable to consummate
his marriage with petitioner.
However, as can be gleaned from the evidence presented by
petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, it appears that petitioner was actually seeking the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the
latter's psychological incapacity to comply with his marital
obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint
before the RTC to her former counsel's mistake or gross
ignorance. But even said reason cannot save petitioner's
Complaint from dismissal. Assuming for the sake of argument
that we can treat the Complaint as one for declaration of nullity
based on Article 36 of the Family Code, we will still dismiss the
complaint for lack of merit, consistent with the evidence
presented by petitioner during the trial.
Petitioner's evidence, particularly her and her mother's
testimonies, merely established that respondent left petitioner
soon after their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia. These
testimonies though do not give us much insight into
respondent's psychological state. It must be noted that the
psychologist was not able to personally examine respondent.
Mere "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities"
in no wise constitute psychological incapacity.
Rule: The petition is DENIED.
Sin vs Sin
Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese
citizen in 1987. Florence filed a complaint for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented
their respective documentary and testimonial evidence.
In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florences petition and
throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the
proceedings.
While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation
stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did
not actively participate therein. Other than having appearance
at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.
ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even
with the absence of the participation of the State in the
proceedings
Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it
to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed.
The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The
records are bereft of an evidence that the State participated in
the prosecution of the case.
Thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.
 Ancheta vs Ancheta
Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta
were married on 1959 and had eight children. After 33 years of
marriage the petitioner left the respondent and their children.
Their conjugal properties were later separated through a court-
sanctioned compromise agreement where the petitioner got
among others a resort in Cavite.
When the husband wanted to marry again, he filed before the
Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological
incapacity on 1995.
Although he knew that the petitioner was already residing at the
resort in Cavite, he alleged in his petition that the petitioner was
residing at Las Pias, Metro Manila, such that summons never
reached her. Nevertheless, substituted service was rendered to
their son at his residence in Cavite.
Petitioner was then declared in default for failing to answer the
said petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the trial court
granted the petition and declared the marriage of the parties
void ab initio.
Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial courts order
declaring as void ab initio her marriage with respondent Rodolfo,
citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her person,
among others. She alleged that the respondent lied on her real
address in his petition so she never received summons on the
case, hence depriving her of her right to be heard.
The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition so she now comes
to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.
Issue is WON the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid?
NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of
the Family Code and Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court
(now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default
is fraught with the danger of collusion, says the Court. Hence,
in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and
legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to
appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any
collusion between the parties and to take care that their
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-
spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare
him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting
attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties.
The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application
for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of
his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious
and fabricated.
Here, the trial court immediately received the evidence of the
respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment against the
petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public
prosecutor who even did not challenge the motion to declare
petitioner in default.
The Supreme Court reiterates: The protection of marriage as a
sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.
Petition is GRANTED.
De Castro vs De Castro
The parties were married on 1971. In 1996, respondent filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage with RTC
Manila. Petitioner failed to file her Answer.
Upon motion, the case was set for hearing, respondent testified,
presented his psychiatrist, and rested his case with no opposition
from public prosecutor. On 1998, the RTC annulled the marriage.
On 1998, petitioner moved for leave to file an Omnibus Motion
seeking a new trial or reconsideration of 22 June 1998 Decision.
On 11 December 1998, the RTC granted the motion.
In the Order, petitioner was required to submit a question and
answer form affidavit as her direct testimony. Further,
petitioners and witnesses cross-examination was scheduled on
February 4, 1999. On 27 December 1999, petitioner filed her
answer controverting respondents allegations.
The RTC conducted hearings on petitioner's (1) application for
support pendente lite; (2) motion for judicial deposit of
respondent's separation benefits; and (3) motion for judicial
approval of the alleged voluntary agreement on the dissolution
of conjugal partnership of gains and partition of conjugal
properties. The 1st had been resolved, but the 2nd and 3rd
remain pending. On 17 July 2002, petitioner was to present her
first witness, but was postponed twelve times.
Petitioner went to CA via petition for certiorari seeking to annul
the RTC Orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. On 4
April 2006, the CA dismissed the petition. Hence, the present
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue is WON petitioner is deemed to have waived her right to
present further evidence when she failed to appear at the 20
August 2003 hearing; thus, no violation of due process.
Rule: Yes. Petition is denied.
The court took note of the fact that all motions for
postponement by petitioner were made on the scheduled
hearing dates themselves. On the August 20, 2003 hearing,
despite previous warning that no further postponement would
be allowed, petitioner still failed to appear.
The least that petitioner could have done was to instruct her
counsel to make a timely representation with the trial court by
filing an early motion-manifestation for the resetting of the
hearing.
Obviously, the warning by the court of the consequence of
another non-appearance in the hearing fell on deaf ears. After
having been granted numerous motions for postponement,
petitioner cannot now claim that she was denied due process.
In the case at bar, petitioner's excuse that she was still in the
U.S. taking care of her newborn grandchild, while her witness,
Dr. Maria Cynthia Ramos-Leynes, who conducted a psychiatric
evaluation on her, was likewise out of the country, attending a
convention was unjustified. These reasons were "not
unavoidable and one that could not have been foreseen."
 Macadangdang vs CA
Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner
Antonio Macadangdang were married in 1946 after having lived
together for two years and had 6 children. They started a buy
and sell business and sari-sari store in Davao City. Through hard
work and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into
merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill
business, abaca stripping, real estate etc.
Their relationship became complicated and both indulged in
extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they
separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for
good.
When she returned in Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit
affairs of her estranged husband. She then decided to take the
initial action. In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal
separation. Later on, the husband died.
Issue: WON the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal
separation has effect on the legal separation.
The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has
no effect on the legal separation. When the decree itself is
issued, the finality of the separation is complete after the lapse
of the period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if the
effects, such as the liquidation of the property, have not yet
been commenced nor terminated.
The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal
separation on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the
liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects of such
final decree, the law on intestate succession should take over the
disposition of whatever remaining properties have been
allocated to the deceased spouse.
Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of
the final decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of
the Family Code provides the effects of the decree of legal
separation. These legal effects ipso facto or automatically
follows, as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal
separation, for the purpose of determining the share of each
spouse in the conjugal assets.
Ledesma vs Intestate Estate of Cipriano Pedrosa
Petitioner Angelica Ledesma's marriage to Cipriano Pedrosa was declared a
nullity by the RTC of Negros Occidental. The Court ordered that the properties
acquired by the parties at the time they were living together as common-law
husband and wife are owned by them as co-owners. With respect to the
properties acquired by them during marriage which was subsequently annulled
by the Court , they will form part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses, to
be dissolved and liquidated in accordance with the provision of the Civil Code.
Pending the order of inventory of the properties, Pedrosa died leaving a last will
and testament. A separate petition for probate of the said will was filed. Nelson
Jimena was named executor in the said proceeding and substituted the deceased
in the partition proceeding with regard to the annulled marriage of the latter.
Respondent Judge Katalbas-Moscardon considered the supplemental action for
partition (after annulment of the marriage) TERMINATED due to the death of one
of the spouses (Pedrosa) and the pendency of intestate proceedings over his
estate.
Petitioner argues that respondent judge reneged in the performance of a lawful
duty when she refrained from rendering a decision in the partition case (RE:
dissolution and distribution of conjugal properties) and considered the same
closed and terminated, due to the pendency of intestate proceedings over the
deceased husband's estate.
Issues are: (1) Whether or not it is proper to terminate the partition proceeding
on account of the death of one of the spouses and the pendency of intestate
proceeding of the deceased spouses estate. NO (2) Where will the partition of
the properties be made in the civil case where the marriage was annulled? or
in the proceeding for the settlement of estate? Civil Case
Rule: (1) The Court cited the case of Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, where
a similar issue was involved the husband also died after the legal separation
of the spouses had been finally decreed but before the actual liquidation of their
community of properties.
In the said case, the Court ruled that upon the finality of the decree of legal
separation, the absolute conjugal community property of the spouses shall be
dissolved and liquidated. Upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with
the law governing the effects of the final decree of legal separation, the law on
intestate succession should take over in the disposition of whatever remaining
properties have been allocated to petitioner. This procedure involves details
which properly pertain to the lower court.
The Macadangdang decision involved legal separation but the doctrine
enunciated therein should be applied to a marriage annulment which is the
situation at bar. The respondent presiding judge is directed to decide the
partition (liquidation) case and determine which of the properties of the conjugal
partnership should be adjudicated to the husband and the wife. Any properties
that may be adjudicated to the deceased husband Pedrosa can then be
distributed in accordance with his last will and testament in the special
proceedings involving his estate.
(2) The partition shall be done in the civil case rather than in the settlement
proceedings because the law mandates the dissolution and liquidation of the
property regime of the spouses upon finality of the decree annulling the
marriage.
Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree
of nullity. The legal effect of the decree of annulment of marriage ipso facto or
automatically follows as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing
annulment of the marriage for the purpose of determining the share of each
spouse in their assets. A division of the property in a supplemental decision is a
mere incident to the decree of annulment.
The court when acting as testate or intestate court is a court of limited
jurisdiction. It is so limited in the sense that it is only confined in the issue of
settlement or division of the properties of the deceased. It cannot extend to
collateral matters which are not related.
 Carlos vs Sandoval
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six
parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner
Juan De Dios Carlos.
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to
Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of
inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over
the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and
registered in the name of Teofilo. Parcel No. 4 was registered in the
name of petitioner.
On 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents
Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilos death, Parcel
Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-
respondent, Teofilo II.
The petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother
Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of
the required marriage license. He also said that his deceased brother
was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo
Carlos II.
Petitioner sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with
respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also
prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name
of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such
certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as
proceeds, should be re-conveyed to him.
Evidence used by respondents for existence marriage:
(1) affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage.
(2) Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. late Teofilo Carlos
and respondent Felicidad
were designated as parents.
Petitioner presented a certification from the LCR of Bulacan, certifying
that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Issues are: WON a party outside of marriage can file for nullity of
marriage; and WON the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages is applicable in this
case.
Held for first issue: It depends.
The General rule: A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
However, the exceptions are: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
before the effectivity of Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, (March 15, 2003) and (2) Marriages celebrated during the
effectivity of the Civil Code.
Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, thus can only question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts.
Beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to
bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the
Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of
their successional rights.
They can still protect their successional right, since as stated in the
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
Held for 2nd Issue: No.
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent
Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May
14, 1962.
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who
may bring an action to declare the marriage void.
Under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the
respondents were married, there is no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage. However, only a party
who can demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and
must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the Court
held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare
the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as
it affects their successional rights.
The Court instructed RTC to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack
of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate,
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased
brother of petitioner. Only surviving compulsory heirs are respondent
Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II.
Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent and the
compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. So Upon
Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory
heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the
surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants; (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate
parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants; (3) The widow or widower; (4) Acknowledged natural
children, and natural children by legal fiction; (5) Other illegitimate
children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.
A brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. If
respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then
have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased
brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral
relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the
estate if the decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the
direct line.
Thus, ruling of SC:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the
action on the status and filiation of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage
between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the
late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or
legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos,
the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of
marriage for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is
VACATED AND SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to
conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in
its calendar.
 Ablaza vs Republic
On 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a petition
for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and
Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and
Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such
license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the
marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage
license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano
who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real
properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making
him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could
impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila
at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage
being void ab initio.
On October 18, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that
petition is filed out of time and that petitioner is not a party to marriage.
Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC on the ground that
the action must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should
be filed by any of the parties to the marriage.
Question: Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest inthe action
to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased
brother?
Rule: Yes. The applicable law when marriage was contracted between
Cresenciano and Leonila on December 26, 1949, is the old Civil Code,
the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence,
the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the
right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the
petitioner. The case was reinstated and its records returned to RTC for
further proceedings.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SCexplicitly provides
the limitationthat a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish
between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized
under the regime of the Civil Code. This specifically extends only
to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August
3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application,
is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he
has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be
adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like
the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir, has the right to succeed to
the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article
1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The plaintiff must still be the
party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must
be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a proper interest
can file the action. One having no material interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the
plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the
ground of lack of cause of action.
Doctrine emphasized: The plaintiff must be the party who stands to be
benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Every
action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party
in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a proper
interest can file the action.
Bolos vs Bolos
Petitioner Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage to Respondent Danilo Bolos under Article 36 of the Family
Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for
annulment. A copy of said decision was received by the husband and he
then filed the Notice of Appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilos failure to file the
required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section
20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
Thereafter, the RTC issued the order declaring its decision declaring the
marriage null and void as final and executory and granting the Motion
for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically
capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who
should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their
children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed
orders of the RTC declaring the nullity of marriage as final and
executory. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion
for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and
Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code
took effect.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable
to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.
According to petitioner, the phrase under the Family Code in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC refers to the word petitions rather than to the word
marriages. Such that petitions filed after the effectivity of the Family
Code are governed by the A.M. Number even if the marriage was
solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his Comment, counters that
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with
Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its
effectivity.
Issue is WON A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, is applicable to the case at bench.
No, it does not.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope
in Section 1 of the Rule: Section 1. Scope.This Rule
shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for
doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by
the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8 The Court
finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation that the
phrase under the Family Code in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
word petitions rather than to the word marriages.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC
decision which denied due course to respondents appeal and denying
petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration.