G.R. No.

L-7927 August 8, 1913

JUAN BARRAMEDA, petitioner,

vs.
PERCY M. MOIR, (Judge of First Instance) ET AL., respondents.

Nature of Action: Petition for Mandamus

FACTS:

Petitioner relates that the he was defendant in a suit brought before a justice of the peace to try
title to a parcel of land; that the case was decided adversely to him; that he appealed to the
Court of First Instance; and that the judge of that court, on motion of the appellee, dismissed
the appeal with directions to the justice of the peace to proceed with the enforcement of the
judgment. At the request of the petitioner, a preliminary injunction was issued by this court to
stay the execution of the judgment, and he now prays that the respondent judge be ordered to
proceed with the case on appeal. The said judge has demurred to the complaint on the ground
that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The basis of the demurrer
is that Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131, conferring original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to
try title to real state, are inconsistent with and repugnant to the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902.
By Act No. 2041, section 3, it was provided:

Justices of the peace shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate question of title to real
estate or any interest therein when the value of the property in litigation does not exceed two
hundred pesos, and where such value exceeds two hundred pesos but is less than six
hundred pesos the justice of the peace shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of
First Instance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Acts. Nos. 2041 and 2131 are unconstitutional.

RULING: The preliminary injunction granted by this court, staying the execution of the
judgment, will be made permanent, and the writ of mandamus prayed for must be denied.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

In the case of Weigall vs. Shuster, it was held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
Courts of First Instance, as fixed by section 9 of the Philippine Bill, may be added but to not
diminished by the Philippine Legislature.

Therefore, there will be sufficient reason for declaring the disputed provisions of Acts. Nos.
2041 and 2131 repugnant to the Philippine Bill and, consequently void if they attempt to curtail
the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance where the title to realty is involved.
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law,
while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and
be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the
invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if
they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other.Enough must
remain to make a complete, intelligence, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative
intent. The void provisions must be eliminated without causing results effecting the main
purpose of the Act in a manner contrary to the intention of the Legislature. The language
used in the invalid part of a statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose
whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will independently of the void
part, since the court has no power to legislate.