Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.

vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for
the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian
reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own
directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the
fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full
land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands
covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the
mechanics for its (PP131s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No.
6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier
mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent
with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution
scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and
cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are
less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for
they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from
agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the
ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific
amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this
violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just compensation.
This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds
and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of
money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the
agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars.
To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to
the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a
different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also
owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible
except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress
is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of
Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the
agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However,
there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In
fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government even
without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation
through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is
contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is
merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an
administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final
determination.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of
eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The
program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash if everything
is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e.,
shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

DAR vs Sutton
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by SECRETARY JOSE MARI B. PONCE
(OIC),
Petitioner,

DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T. SUTTON-SOLIMAN and HARRY T. SUTTON,

Respondents.

Respondent inherited a land in Aroroy, Masbate devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On
October 26, 1987, pursuant to the existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondent made
a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail incentives under the law.

On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, RA 6657 known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
of 1988 took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.

An en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms vs. Secretary of DAR, ruled that land devoted to livestock
and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land.

In view of the Luz Farm ruling, respondent filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their
VOS as their landholding was exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the
CARL. Petitioner ignored their request.
DAR issue A.O No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portion of private agricultural lands used
for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of
the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded the A.O fixed the following retention limits, viz
1:1 animal-land ratio and the ration of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of
cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operation of the CARL.

DAR Secretary Garilao issue an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption
from the coverage of CARL applying the retention limit outlined in the DAR A.O No. 9. Petitioner ordered
the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.

On October 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR. It ruled that
DAR A.O. no. 9 does not run counter to the Luz Farm case as the A.O provided the guidelines to
determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising.

Issue:
Whether of not DAR A.O No.9 is unconstitutional?

Held:

Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature. They have been granted by
Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them.
Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing
complexity and variety of public functions. However, while administrative rules and regulations have the
force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review. They may be properly challenged
before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative
discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.

The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations
must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. The
rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by
Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency
beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations.

In the case at bar, SC find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The
A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and
prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to
livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and
poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural
activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an
industrial, not an agricultural, activity.

Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution
from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.

Respondents family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in the business
of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines.
Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have
just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL
that may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that
what the CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the
effectivity of the CARL. There has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents.

It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without
substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other
hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. In the case at bar, after the
passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881 which amended certain provisions of the
CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definition of the terms agricultural activity and commercial
farming by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-
raising. With this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian
laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage
of agrarian reform.

Natalia vs. dar

Natalia is the owner of 3 contiguous parcels of land with an area of 120.9793 hectares, 1.3205 hectares
and 2.7080 hectares or a total of 125.0078 hectares, which are covered by TCT No. 31527. Presidential
Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land as townsite areas to absorb the population
overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The Natalia
properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation. Since private landowners
were allowed to develop their properties into low-cost housing subdivisions with the reservation, petitioner
EDIC as developer of Natalia applied for and was granted preliminary approval and location clearances
by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, which Natalia thereafter became Antipolo Hills
Subdivision. On June 15 1988, Ra 6657 went to effect. Respondent issed a Notice of Coverage on the
undeveloped portions of Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Natalia and EDIC immediately registered its objection
to the notice of coverage and requested the cancellation of the Notice of Coverage. Natalia and EDIC
both argued that the properties ceased to be agricultural lands when they were included in the areas
reserved by Presidential Proclamation for the townsite reservation. DAR then contended that the permits
granted were not valid and binding since they did not comply with t he implementing Standards, Rules
and Regulations of PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), and that there
was no valid conversion of the properties.

Issue:

Whether or not lands not classified for agricultural use, as approved by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board and its agencies prior to June 15, 1988 covered by RA 6657

Ruling;

No, Sec. 4 of RA 6657 provides that CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands. And agricultural lands is referred to as land
devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forst, residential, commercial or industrial
land. Thus, the underdeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot be considered as
agricultural lands for this land was intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural land by
virtue of the Presidential Proclamation No. 1637

G.R. No. 182332 : February 23, 2011

MILESTONE FARMS, INC., Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondent.

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian reform law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), took effect, which included the raising of livestock, poultry,
and swine in its coverage. However, on December 4, 1990, this Court, sitting en banc, ruled in Luz Farms
v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform that agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry,
and/or swine raising are excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Thus, in
May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare property

The DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) recommended the exemption of
petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from the coverage of CARP, which was then adopted by DAR
Regional Director Dalugdug.

Petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and company before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court. The MCTC ruled in favor of petitioner, but the decision was later reversed by the RTC. The
CA, however, reinstated the MCTCs ruling, ordering Balajadia and all defendants therein to vacate
portions of the property.

Meanwhile, R.A. No. 6657 was amended by R.A. No. 7881 which provided that private agricultural lands
devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising were excluded from the coverage of the CARL. Due to
this, DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the
316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug. This was reinstated by the Office of the
President.

Meanwhile, six months earlier, or on November 4, 2004, without the knowledge of the CA as the parties
did not inform the appellate court then DAR Secretary Rene C. Villa (Secretary Villa) issued DAR
Conversion Order No. CON-0410-0016 (Conversion Order), granting petitioners application to convert
portions of the 316.0422-hectare property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use.

ISSUE: Whether or not the use and disposition of that land is already beyond DARs jurisdiction.

HELD:

The petition lacks merit.

CIVIL LAW: DAR jurisdiction

To succumb to petitioners contention that when a land is declared exempt from the CARP on the ground
that it is not agricultural as of the time the CARL took effect, the use and disposition of that land is entirely
and forever beyond DARs jurisdiction is dangerous, suggestive of self-regulation. Precisely, it is the DAR
Secretary who is vested with such jurisdiction and authority to exempt and/or exclude a property from
CARP coverage based on the factual circumstances of each case and in accordance with law and
applicable jurisprudence. In addition, albeit parenthetically, Secretary Villa had already granted the
conversion into residential and golf courses use of nearly one-half of the entire area originally claimed as
exempt from CARP coverage because it was allegedly devoted to livestock production.
Petition is DENIED.

Facts:

President Garcia issued PP 476, granting land to CMU for school grounds while 300 Ha remaining
untitled land were distributed to cultural communities in the area. President Arroyo then issued PP310
redistributing 670 Ha of CMUs land to IPs. CMU claimed unconstitutionality of PP310

Issue:

Whether or not PP310 is valid and constitutional

Held:

*Key question: Character of the Land

*CMU vs DARAB

*Necessity for vast tract of agricultural land for expansion

*The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among the highest priorities in
the government & social economic programs. Neither need give way to another

*Lands by their character become inalienable

*IPRA- already existing and vested property rights should be respected

G.R. No. 169331 : September 5, 2011

AGAPITO ROM, PASTORA P. ROSEL, VALENTINO R. ANILA, JUANITO P. ROSEL, VIRGILIO R.

CASAL, LUIS H. BAUTISTA, CRESENCIANO M. ARGENTE, ANA M. ARGENTE, GIL B. CUENO,
ENGRACIO B. BELTRAN, ANGELITO B. AURE, ESTEBAN C. BENDO, MARIA ALBAO, GILBERT H.
DEL MUNDO, EUFRONIO H. DEL MUNDO, PASTOR H. DEL MUNDO, ANTONIO H. DEL MUNDO,
ALBERTA H. DEL MUNDO, PEDRO H. DEL MUNDO, ROLANDO B. ATIE,Petitioners, v. ROXAS &
COMPANY, INC., Respondent.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:
On September 30, 1997, respondent sought the exemption of 27 parcels of land located in Barangay
Aga, Nasugbu, Batangas, having an aggregate area of 21.1236 hectares and constituting portions of the
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44664 from the coverage of CARP, pursuant to
DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994. The application was docketed as DAR ADM Case
No. A-9999-014-98.

Respondent asserted that Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers only agricultural land
which is defined under Section 3(c) thereof as "land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." Respondent claimed that prior to the effectivity
of the CARL on June 15, 1988, the lands subject of its application were already re-classified as part of the
Residential Cluster Area specified in Zone A VII of the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4,
Series of 1982, which zoning ordinance was approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission
(HSRC [now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)]) under HSRC Resolution No. 123,
Series of 1983. Respondent cited DOJ Opinion No. 44 (1990) which provides that lands already classified
by a valid zoning ordinance for commercial, industrial or residential use, which ordinance was approved
prior to the effectivity of the CARL, no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.

Considering that the application for exemption was not accompanied by proof of disturbance
compensation, the DAR, through its Center for Land Use Policy, Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI-
II), directed respondent to submit proof of payment of disturbance compensation and/or waiver of rights of
bona fide occupants.

To comply with the directive, respondent offered payment of disturbance compensation and attempted to
obtain the required waivers from herein petitioners who are the farmer-beneficiaries of the subject parcels
of land as identified by the DAR. However, the parties failed to reach an agreement as regards the
amount of disturbance compensation, hence, respondent filed on September 28, 2001 a Petition to fix
disturbance compensation before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) of
Batangas.

In its Order of November 6, 2002, the DAR granted the application.

From this Order, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
and Second Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. Said motions, however, were dismissed by the
DAR in an Order dated December 12, 2003.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.

In a Decision dated April 29, 2005, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari it being an improper
remedy. The CA held that petitioners should have filed a petition for review under Section 1, Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. Even if the certiorari petition is considered as properly filed, the CA ruled that it would
still dismiss the same as there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DAR in issuing the
assailed Orders.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the property is exempted from coverage of the CARL?

2. Whether or not the property can be exempted without payment of disturbance compensation?

3. Whether or not the remedy of appeal is available in the case?

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.

We note at the outset that this case is intimately related to Roxas & Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
and Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW, earlier resolved by this Court on December 17, 1999 and
December 4, 2009, respectively. In fact, the present case is similar to one of the seven consolidated
petitions in Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW, except that the parcels of land involved therein are
located in Hacienda Palico, while here, they are situated in Hacienda Caylaway.

For purposes of discussion, a brief overview of said two cases is proper.

Roxas & Company, Inc. v. Court of Appealsinvolves three haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas, namely,
Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, owned by herein respondent Roxas & Company, Inc. At issue there was
the validity of thehaciendas coverage under the CARP as well as Roxas application for their conversion
from agricultural to non-agricultural use. For failure to observe due process, the acquisition proceedings
over the haciendas were nullified. With respect, however, to the application for conversion, the Court held
that DAR is in a better position to resolve the same, it being the primary agency possessing the
necessary expertise on the matter. In its Decision dated December 17, 1999, this Court ordered the
remand of the case to the DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of Roxass
application for conversion.

Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW, on the other hand, involved seven consolidated petitions, the
main subjects of which were Roxas application for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural use of
said threehaciendas and exemption from CARP coverage. Apparently, after the remand of the case to the
DAR in Roxas & Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and during the pendency of Roxas application for
conversion, it likewise filed an application for exemption of the haciendas from the CARPs coverage on
the basis of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 and DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994.

Two of the seven consolidated petitions relevant to the present case are G.R. Nos. 167505 and 179650.
Both petitions revolved around Roxas application for exemption under DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994
invoking as basis the same (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4 earlier alluded to. In resolving
them, the Court recognized the power of a local government unit to classify and convert land from
agricultural to non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL and thus upheld the validity of said
zoning ordinance. However, in G.R. No. 179650, the Court found that the DAR acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it granted the application for exemption considering that there exist uncertainties on the
location and identities of the properties being applied for exemption. It stated that Roxas should have
submitted the comprehensive land use plan and pinpointed therein the location of the properties to prove
that they are indeed within the area of coverage of the subject (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance
No. 4.

With respect to G.R. No. 167505, we quote the pertinent portions of the Courts December 4, 2009
Decision:

On DAMBA-NSFWs petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals, sustained, by Decision of December 20,
1994 and Resolution of May 7, 2007, the DAR Secretarys finding that Roxas & Co. had substantially
complied with the prerequisites of DAR AO 6, Series of 1994. Hence, DAMBA-NFSWs petition in G.R.
No. 167505.

The Court finds no reversible error in the Court of Appeals assailed issuances, the orders of the DAR
Secretary which it sustained being amply supported by evidence. In view of this, the Court ordered the
cancellation of the CLOAs issued to farmer-beneficiaries of the nine parcels of land in DAR Administrative
Case No. A-9999-008-98 subject of G.R. No. 167505, conditioned, however, on the satisfaction of the
disturbance compensation of said farmer-beneficiaries pursuant to R. A. No. 3844, as amended and DAR
AO No. 6, Series of 1994.

Remarkably, in its application for exemption in DAR ADM Case No. A-9999-014-98 subject of this case,
respondent submitted documents in support of its application for exemption similar to those submitted by
it in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 subject of G.R. No. 167505. And, having established
through said documents that the 27 parcels of land are within the coverage of the said (Nasugbu)
Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, the DAR declared as well that respondent substantially complied with
the requirements of DAR AO No. 6, series of 1994 in DAR ADM Case No. A-9999-014-98. The DAR thus
granted the application in an Order of the same date and of exactly the same tenor as that issued in DAR
Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98.

Given this backdrop, we are inclined to uphold the DARs November 6, 2002 Order which granted
respondents application for exemption in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-014-98 subject of this
case. Aside from the fact that this Court in Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW has already upheld
the grant of a similar application which, notably, was supported by the same documents submitted in
support of the application herein, our own review of the records of this case reveals that there was indeed
no error on the part of the DAR in issuing said Order. The documents submitted by respondent to support
its application for exemption as well as the Investigation Report of CLUPPI-II clearly show that the 27
parcels of land, specifically identified, were already re-classified as residential prior to the effectivity of the
CARL. "Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of x x x quasi-judicial bodies (like the DAR) which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not
only great respect but even finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave
abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of
the evidence on record."

On this ground alone we can already deny the petition. Nonetheless, we shall proceed to discuss the
issues raised by petitioners.

REMEDIAL LAW: proper mode of appeal

"Section 61 of R.A. No. 6657 clearly mandates that judicial review of DAR orders or decisions are
governed by the Rules of Court. The Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial
review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary." Hence here, petitioners should have
assailed before the CA the November 6, 2002 and December 12, 2003 Orders of the DAR through a
Petition for Review under Rule 43. "By pursuing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 rather
than the mandatory petition for review under Rule 43, petitioners opted for the wrong mode of appeal."

Petitioners assert that a certiorari petition is the proper mode since what they principally questioned
before the CA was the jurisdiction of the DAR to take cognizance of respondents application for
exemption.

We are not persuaded. It bears stressing that it is the law which confers upon the DAR the jurisdiction
over applications for exemption. And, "when a court, tribunal or officer has jurisdiction over the person
and the subject matter of the dispute, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise
of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors
of judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper
subjects of a special civil action for certiorari." Besides, petitioners basis in claiming that the DAR has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondents application for exemption is gravely flawed. The
submission of proof of payment of disturbance compensation is not jurisdictional as to deprive the DAR of
the power to act on an application for exemption. To reiterate, jurisdiction over the subject of a case is
conferred by law.

Also untenable is petitioners assertion that even assuming that a petition for review under Rule 43 is the
proper remedy, they are still entitled to the writ of certiorari. Petitioners posit that an exceptional
circumstance in this case calls for the issuance of the writ, i.e., they stand to lose the land they till without
receiving the appropriate disturbance compensation. It is well to remind petitioners, however, that the
assailed November 6, 2002 Order of the DAR granting respondents application for exemption is subject
to the payment of disturbance compensation to the farmer-beneficiaries of the subject parcels of land.
Hence, petitioners fear that they will be deprived of the land they till without payment of disturbance
compensation is totally without basis. There being no substantial wrong or substantial injustice to be
prevented here, petitioners cannot therefore invoke the exception to the general rule that a petition for
certiorari will not lie if an appeal is the proper remedy.

Thus, we are totally in accord with the CAs finding that petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy.

POLITICAL LAW: voluntary offer to sell

Indeed, respondent had previously voluntarily offered to sell to the DAR Hacienda Caylaway, where the
properties subject of this case are located. However, this offer to sell became irrelevant because
respondent was later able to establish before the DAR that the subject 27 parcels of land were
reclassified as non-agricultural (residential) by virtue of (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4 prior
to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988. "InNatalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian
Reform, it was held that lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL
including lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by
government agencies other than the DAR." This being the case, respondent is not bound by its previous
voluntary offer to sell because the subject properties cannot be the subject of a VOS, they being clearly
beyond the CARPs coverage.

POLITICAL LAW: requirements of DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1990.

Indeed, respondents application for exemption was not accompanied by proof of disturbance
compensation or by petitioners waiver/undertaking that they will vacate the subject parcels of land
whenever required. However, this Court finds that respondent has substantially complied with this
requirement found under Section III (B) of DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1990.

Records show that upon being required by CLUPPI-II to submit proof of payment of disturbance
compensation and/or waiver of rights of bona fide occupants after an evaluation of its application for
exemption revealed that it was not accompanied by the same, respondent exerted efforts to comply with
the said requirement. It offered to pay petitioners their disturbance compensation but they failed to agree
on the price. Petitioners also refused to execute a waiver/ undertaking. Respondent thus filed a Petition to
fix disturbance compensation before the PARAD. To prove these, it submitted to the DAR a (1)
Certification dated September 10, 2001, issued by Manuel J. Limjoco, Jr., MARO of Nasugbu, Batangas,
stating that there was failure to reach an amicable settlement on the matter of disturbance compensation
between the parties; and (2) copy of the Petition to fix disturbance compensation duly received by the
PARAD on September 28, 2001. To us, these constitute substantial compliance with the said particular
requirement of Section III (B), DAR AO No. 6, Series of 2002. At any rate, the lack of proof of such
payment later proved to be of no consequence since the assailed November 6, 2002 Order of the DAR
was nevertheless made subject to the condition of payment of disturbance compensation to petitioners. In
fact, the Order likewise states that 10 days from such payment, proof of payment of disturbance
compensation must be submitted to the DAR.

CIVIL LAW: estoppel

A careful review of the records reveals that petitioners raised the issues of respondents non-posting of
bond pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 4.5 of DAR AO No. 4, Series of 2003 and its non-compliance with
Section VIII thereof only in their Motion for Reconsideration of the CAs assailed Decision. While
petitioners themselves alleged that DAR AO No. 4, Series of 2003 was already in effect during the
pendency of their Motions for Reconsideration before the DAR, there is no showing that they raised these
points therein. "It is well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in
the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the
lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a reviewing court, as
they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process
impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel." Thus, petitioners
cannot now be allowed to challenge the assailed Orders of the DAR on grounds of technicalities belatedly
raised as an afterthought.

The petition for review is DENIED.

ALITA VS. CA

FACTS; Petition seeking the reversal Court of Appeals decision: 1)Declaring Presidential Decree No.27 inapplicable to
lands obtained thru the homestead law; 2) Declaring that the 4 registered co-owners will cultivate and
operate the farmholding themselves as owners; & 3) Ejecting tenants, namely; Gabino Alita, Jesus Julian, Sr.,
Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro Ricalde, VicenteRicalde and Rolando Salamar, as the owners would want to cultivate
the farmholdingthemselves.-2 parcels of land at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur acquired by
respondents Reyes through homestead patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141- Reyes wants to
personally cultivate these lands, but Alita refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D.
316 and regulations of MAR/DAR-June 18, 1981: Respondents Reyes (Plaintiff) instituted a complaint
against Minister of Agrarian Reform Estrella, Regional Director of MAR Region IX P.D. Macarambon,
and Alitaet.al for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General
nOrders inapplicable to homestead lands. Defendants Alita filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses.-July
19, 1982: Reyes filed urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the lands in litigation under
Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land transfer certificates-November 5, 1982: Court of
Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV, Pagadian City (Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial
Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its decision dismissing complaint and the motion to enjoin On January 4,
1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which defendants filed their opposition on
January 10, 1983.RTC: issued decision prompting defendants Alita et al to move for reconsideration but
wasdeniedCA: the same was sustained.
ISSUE:
whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.
--NO
We agree with the petitioners Alita et.al in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from
the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a
remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention
cannot be invoked to defeat the purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act
No. 141 to protect ones right to life itself by give a needy citizen a land wherein they could build a house
and plant for necessary subsistence.
Art XIII, Sec 6 of the Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants
guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or
stewardshipin the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of public domain under lease or concession
suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their
ancestral lands. Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise supports
the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question.

ROXAS VS. CA

MARCH 2 5, 20 11 ~ V B DIAZ

ROXAS VS. CA

G.R. No. 118436

March 21, 1997

FACTS: This is a petition for review of the CA decision dated December 8, 1994 alleging reversible error

committed by respondent appellate court when it affirmed the decision of the RTC of Cavite.

On July 1990, herein private respondent Maguesun Management and Development Corporation

(Maguesun Corporation) filed an Application for Registration of two parcels of unregistered land located in

Tagaytay City. In support of its application for registration, Maguesun Corporation presented a Deed of

Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor and indicating the purchase

price to be P170,000.00. Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from the original petitioner herein

(because she was substituted by her heirs in the proceedings upon her death), Trinidad de Leon vda. de

Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale and an Affidavit of

Self-Adjudication.

Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) on the basis of

Maguesun Corporations application for registration enumerating adjoining owners, occupants or adverse

claimants; Since Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not named therein, she was not sent a notice of the

proceedings. After an Order of general default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the land
registration case. Eventually, on February 1991 the RTC granted Maguesun Corporations

application for registration.

It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the land that petitioner Trinidad

de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of the lots in Maguesun Corporations

name.

Hence, on April 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review before the RTC to set aside the decree of

registration on the ground that Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud. She alleged that the lots

were among the properties she inherited from her husband, former President Manuel A. Roxas and that

her family had been in open, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject property in

the concept of owner for more than thirty years before they applied for its registration under the Torrens

System of land titling (in which no decision has been rendered thereon). Petitioner further denied that she

sold the lots to Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met before and that her signature was forged in

both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. She also claimed that Maguesun Corporation

intentionally omitted her name as an adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in the application for

registration submitted to the LRA such that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing.

A document examiner from the PNP concluded that there was no forgery. Upon petitioners motion, the

signatures were re-examined by another expert from NBI. The latter testified that the signatures on the

questioned and sample documents were, however, not written by the same person.

Despite the foregoing testimonies and pronouncements, the trial court dismissed the petition for review

of decree of registration. Placing greater weight on the findings and testimony of the PNP document

examiner, it concluded that the questioned documents were not forged and if they were, it was Zenaida

Melliza, and not Maguesun Corporation, who was responsible. Accordingly, Maguesun Corporation did

not commit actual fraud.

In a decision dated December 8, 1994, respondent court denied the petition for review and affirmed

the findings of the trial court. The CA held that petitioner failed to and demonstrate that there was

actual or extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of

annuling a judgment or reviewing a decree of registration.

Hence, the instant petition for review where it is alleged that the CA erred in ruling that Maguesun

Corporation did not commit actual fraud warranting the setting aside of the registration decree and in
resolving the appeal on the basis of Maguesun Corporations good faith. Petitioners pray that the

registration of the subject lots in the name of Maguesun Corporation be cancelled, that said property be

adjudicated in favor of petitioners and that respondent corporation pay for damages.

ISSUE: WON private respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud (signature forgery) in

obtaining a decree of registration over the two parcels of land, actual fraud being the only ground to

reopen or review a decree of registration.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the CA is hereby

REVERSED AND SET AS

1. The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining the

decree of registration sought to be reviewed by petitioner. A close scrutiny of the evidence on record

leads the Court to the irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed attendant in the case at bar.

Although there is no proof of respondent Maguesun Corporations direct participation in the execution and

preparation of the forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves that Maguesun

Corporation is not the innocent purchaser for value who merits the protection of the law. Even to a

laymans eye, the documents, as well as the enlarged photographic exhibit of the signatures, reveal

forgery. Additionally, Zenaida Mellizas non-appearance raises doubt as to her existence

Petitioner and her family also own several other pieces of pro

Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR

G.R. No. 86889 December 4, 1990

Facts:

On 10 June 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines, which includes, among
others, the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.

Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, avers that it would be
adversely affected by the enforcement of sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of the said law. Hence, it
prayed that the said law be declared unconstitutional. The mentioned sections of the law provies, among
others, the product-sharing plan, including those engaged in livestock and poultry business.

Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with crop or tree farming. That the
land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than 5% of the total
investments of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. That the land is incidental but not the principal
factor or consideration in their industry. Hence, it argued that it should not be included in the coverage of
RA 6657 which covers agricultural lands.
Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of RA 6657 is unconstitutional for including in its definition of
Agriculture the livestock and poultyr industry?

ISSUE: Whether the term agriculture as used in the Constitution embraces raising livestock, poultry and
swine.
Transcript of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of agriculture
clearly shows that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and
poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the
Government.
Agricultural lands do not include commercial industrial, and residential lands.

RULING: it is evident in the foregoing discussion that Sec 2 of RA 6657 which includes private
agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising in the definition of
commercial farms is INVALID, to the extent of the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be
covered by the agrarian reform program of the State.