Analysis of Brazils Decision on Choosing Bilateral Negotiation Forum ad hoc To

Settle Cotton Dispute Against United States on 2014

Nuril Putri Maulida Rahma

(Bachelor Degree, Department of International Relations, Social and Political Science
Faculty, University of Brawijaya Malang, 2017)

Abstract

This research discuss about political logic of Brazils decision on choosing

bilateral negotiation forum ad hoc in order to settle cotton dispute against United
States on 2014. Using The Choice of Institution for Trade Dispute theory from
Christina L. Davis (2003), the researcher figures out Brazils preference on choosing
that forum.

After obtaining permission of retaliation from DSB WTO on 2010, Brazil, who
agreed to postpone retaliation to United States, threaten to continue the policy on
2013. This is because United States stopped the compensation to Brazil yet it has not
approved a new cotton subsidy policy as agreed with Brazil, while termination of
compensation should be made when United States already validate a new policy.
When United States new subsidy policy was passed on 2014, Brazil plans to file a
lawsuit to the DSB WTO as some new rules failed to comply DSB WTO
recommendations and were predicted to have a greater negative impact than the
previous rule. However, a day after it was being informed, Brazil on the contrary
informed the United States government to negotiate this problem by using bilateral ad
hoc before file a lawsuit.

The results of the research shows that Brazils decision on Choosing Bilateral
Negotiation Forum ad hoc To Settle Cotton Dispute Against United States on 2014 are
affected by the characteristics of trade disputes and situation factor when the problem
occurred (timing and nature of issue), consideration of economic resources efficiency
factor (economic and legal resources), consideration of bilateral sensitivity between
Brazil and United States (diplomatic concern), and balancing factor of interest in
Brazil and United States (interest groups pressure between states). Nevertheless,
interest groups pressure between states factor influenced this case because it has
additional consideration in the form of cotton industrial production chain complexity
and Brazils retaliation plan that alter the bargaining power of interest groups in Brazil
and United States.

Keywords: Brazils Negotiation Forum Preference, United States Cotton Dispute