Republic of the Philippines NOC dated 11 December 2003 and NOA dated 5 October 2004 issued over the
SUPREME COURT portion of respondent's land are valid.
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 188174 June 29, 2015
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, through its PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
OFFICER OF DAVAO CITY, and THE MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF
CALINAN, DAVAO CITY, Petitioners,
vs.
WOODLAND AGRO-DEVELOPMENT, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 seeks the nullification of the Decision 1 dated 2
February 2009 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City Branch 14 (RTC) and
its Order2 dated 8 May 2009 in Special Civil Case No. 30855-2005. The RTC nullified
the Notice of Coverage (NOC) dated 11 December 2003 and Notice of Acquisition
(NOA) dated 5 October 2004 issued by petitioner Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) over a portion of a parcel of land owned by respondent Woodland Agro
Development. Inc. (Woodland). The court also denied DAR's Motion for
Reconsideration.3
The issue before this Court is whether Republic Act No. 8532 (R.A. 8532) authorized
the DAR to issue Notices of Coverage and Acquisition after 15 June 1998, or beyond
the 10-year implementation period provided or in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 6657
(R.A. 6657) or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), which states:
SECTION 5. Schedule of Implementation. - The distribution of all lands, covered by
this Act shall be implemented immediately and completed within ten (10) years from
the effectivity thereof.
The Court rules that R.A. 8532 extended the term of the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under the CARL. Consequently, the
ANTECEDENT FACTS
Woodland is the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-113207 with an area of 10.0680 hectares located at
Subasta, Calinan, Davao City.4 On 11 December 2003, the DAR issued an NOC 5 placing
5.0680 hectares under the coverage of the CARL for having exceeded the retention
limit6provided by law. TCT No. T-113207 was canceled, and a new title covering
5.0680 hectares was issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.7 Thereafter, on 14 February 2005, Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) were issued in favor of five farmer beneficiaries.8
On 3 March 2005, Woodland filed with the RTC a Complaint 9 for "Declaratory Relief,
Annulment of the Notice of Coverage under R.A. 6657, with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction." Woodland
contended that the issuance of the NOC was illegal, because R.A. 6657 had already
expired on 15 June 1998.10 It argued that pursuant to Section 5 of the law, the agency
had a period of ten (10) years to implement the CARP from the time of its effectivity
on 15 June 1988. It further argued that the CARL's amendatory law, R.A. 8532, did not
extend the DAR's authority to acquire agrarian lands for distribution. It theorized that
the budget augmentations legislated in R.A. 8532 pertained only to the funding
requirements of the other facets of the CARP implementation and excluded the
acquisition of private agricultural lands.11
The DAR hinged its Answer12 on Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 009, Series
of 1997 issued by then DOJ Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr. He opined that Section 5
was merely directory in character; that the 10-year period of implementation was
only a time frame given to the DAR for the acquisition and distribution of public and
private agricultural lands covered by R.A. 6657.13 The schedule was meant to guide
the DAR in setting its priorities, but it was not by any means a limitation of authority
in the absence of more categorical language to that effect. 14
THE RULING OF THE RTC
The RTC ruled that the DAR's act of sending Woodland an NOC was already a breach
of R.A. 6657, since the NOC was issued beyond the 10-year period prescribed by
law.15 The trial court further ruled that R.A. 8532 only amended the CARL' s provision
on the sourcing of funds for the implementation of the CARP, and not the provision
on the period within which the DAR may acquire lands for distribution. The court held
that R.A. 8532 did not extend the 10-year period of land acquisition.16 Neither did it
overstep the DAR's jurisdiction to try agrarian matters, but only determined
Woodland's rights under the CARL.17
The dispositive portion18 of the RTC Decision reads:
Premises considered, this Court rules in favor of the plaintiff and judgment is
rendered as follows:
1. Declaring that Republic Act No. [8532] did not extend the acquisition of private
lands beyond June 15, 1998 and;
2. Nullifying the [Notice] of Coverage dated December 11, 2003 and the Notice of
Acquisition dated October 5, 2004.
After its Motion for Reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this
Court via a Petition for Review under Rule 45.
THE ISSUE
The sole issue raised by petitioner is whether it can still issue Notices of Coverage
after 15 June 1998.
THE COURT'S RULING
Article XIII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution encapsulates the people's yearning for
genuine agrarian reform. The provision states:
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right
of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively
the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the
fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just
compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of
small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary
land-sharing.
Sixteen months after the ratification of the Constitution, Congress enacted the
CARL.19 The policy of the law is to pursue a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
that shall give highest consideration to the welfare of landless farmers and
farmworkers to promote social justice; move the nation toward sound rural
development and industrialization; and establish owner cultivatorship of
economic-size farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture. To this end, a more
equitable distribution and ownership of land shall be undertaken with due regard for
the rights of landowners to just compensation and to the ecological needs of the
nation to provide farmers and farmworkers with the opportunity to enhance their
dignity and improve the quality of their lives through greater productivity of
agricultural lands.20
In Secretary of Agrarian Reform v. Tropical Homes, lnc., 21 we recognized the CARL as
a "bastion of social justice of poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to
redistribute to the underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth, and to liberate
them from oppressive tenancy." To those who seek the law's benefit, it is the means
towards a viable livelihood and ultimately, a decent life. 22
The Court is guided by these principles in the resolution of the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari.
The agrarian reform program, being one of the immutable hallmarks of the 1987
Constitution, must be faithfully implemented to meet the ends of social
justice.1wphi1 The Court cannot subscribe to Woodland's stance that the DAR's
authority to issue notices of coverage and acquisition ceased after the 10-year
implementation period mentioned in Section 5 of the CARL. Such a view runs afoul of
the constitutional mandate firmly lodged in Article XIII, Section 4, which seeks the just
distribution of all agricultural lands to qualified farmers and farm workers to free
them from oppressive tenancy agreements.
The success of the CARP depends heavily on the adept implementation by the DAR.
The agency's primordial procedural tool for realizing the law's objectives is the
issuance of Notices of Coverage and Acquisition. For us to sustain Woodland's theory
that the DAR can no longer issue those notices after 15 June 1998 despite the
enactment of R.A. 8532 would thwart the CARP's purpose. As the Court ruled in
Gonzales v. Court of Appeals:23
[O]ur laws on agrarian reform were enacted primarily because of the realization that
there is an urgent need to alleviate the lives of the vast number of poor farmers in
our country. Yet, despite such laws, the majority of these farmers still live on a
hand-to-mouth existence. This can be attributed to the fact that these agrarian laws
have never really been effectively implemented. Woodland asserts that R.A. 8532
only amended R.A. 6657 insofar as the funding requirements for the CARP are
concerned. It disputes the extension of the DAR's authority to acquire and distribute
private agricultural lands.
The first paragraph of Section 63, as originally worded and as amended, used the
phrase "this Act" to refer to CARL as a whole.
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), Extending the Acquisition and
Distribution of All Agricultural Lands, Instituting Necessary Reforms, Amending for
the Purpose Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, Otherwise Known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, As Amended, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor - reveals that the CARP was indeed extended from 1998 to 2008 via R.A.
8532. Had there been no prior extension from 1998 to 2008, how else could the CARP
have been extended by R.A. 9700 until 30 June 2014? There could have been an
extension only if the program sought to be extended had not expired.

Originally, the first paragraph of Section 63 reads:
SECTION 63. Funding Source. - The initial amount needed to implement this Act for
the period of ten (10) years upon approval hereof shall be funded from the Agrarian
Reform Fund created under Sections 20 and 21 of Executive Order No. 229.
(Emphasis supplied)
As amended by R.A. 8532, the first paragraph of Section 63 stated:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 2 February 2009
and Order dated 8 May 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City Branch 14 in
Special Civil Case No. 30855-2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The DAR's Notice of
Coverage dated 11 December 2003 and Notice of Acquisition dated 5 October 2004
are UPHELD with full effect. SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson

SECTION 63. Funding Source. - The amount needed to implement this Act until the WE CONCUR:
year 2008 shall be funded from the Agrarian Reform Fund. (Emphasis supplied)
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
In 2009, Congress again amended certain provisions of the CARL, including Section Associate Justice
63.24 The latest revision of the first paragraph recites:
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
SECTION 63. Funding Source. - The amount needed to further implement the CARP as Associate Justice Associate Justice
provided in this Act, until June 30, 2014, upon expiration of funding under Republic
Act No. 8532 and other pertinent laws, shall be funded from the Agrarian Reform
Fund and other funding sources in the amount of at least One hundred fifty billion ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
pesos (P150,000,000,000.00). (Emphasis supplied) Associate Justice

Clearly, Section 63 refers to the implementation of the CARL in its entirety, not just CERTIFICATION
the funding source. Indeed, R.A. 8532 specifically amended Section 63 of R.A. 6657,
but it does not follow that only Section 63 had been affected by the amendment. The Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
fact that Section 63 falls under the chapter on "Financing" only emphasizes its the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
general applicability. Hence, the phrase "until the year 2008" used in R.A. 8532 the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
unmistakably extends the DAR's authority to issue NOCs for purposes of acquiring
and distributing private agricultural lands. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Finally, R.A. 9700 extended the acquisition and distribution of all agricultural lands
until 30 June 2014.25 The title alone of R.A. 9700 - An Act Strengthening the Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 14-17; Penned by Presiding Judge George E. Omelio.

2
Id. at 22.

3
Id.

4
d. at 6. SECOND DIVISION

5
Id. at 33. G.R. No. 204964, October 15, 2014

6
SECTION 6. Retention Limits. - Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person
may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the
size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-size farm, such
as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fe1tility as determined by
the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case
shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be
awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (I)
that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or
directly managing the farm: Provided, That landowners whose lands have been
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the areas originally
retained by them thereunder: Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or
their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the
approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate
said homestead.
7
Rollo, p. 6.
8
The five farmer beneficiaries are Alfredo M. Sol mayor, Rolando D. Fuentes, Silvano
E. Sedentario, Frank Lloyd S. Sedentario, and Alfredo E. Sedentario.
REMIGIO D. ESPIRITU AND NOELAGUSTIN, Petitioners, v. LUTGARDA TORRES DEL
ROSARIO REPRESENTED BY SYLVIA R. ASPERILLA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Lands classified as non-agricultural in zoning ordinances approved by the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board or its predecessors prior to June 15, 1998 are outside the
coverage of the compulsory acquisition program of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law. However, there has to be substantial evidence to prove that lands sought to be
exempted fall within the non-agricultural classification.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to set aside the decision 2 dated
September 28, 2012 and resolution3 dated November 29, 2012 of the Court of Appeals.
These orders reinstated the order4dated February 19, 2004 of then Secretary of Agrarian
Reform Roberto M. Pagdanganan approving petitioner's application for exemption.
The pertinent facts are as follows:

G.R. No. 204964, October 15, 2014 - REMIGIO D. ESPIRITU AND NOELAGUSTIN,
Petitioners, v. LUTGARDA TORRES DEL ROSARIO REPRESENTED BY SYLVIA R. ASPERILLA,
Respondents.
In 1978, the City Council of Angeles City, Pampanga, enacted Zoning Ordinance No. 13,
Series of 1978, classifying areas in Barangay Margot and Barangay Sapang Bato, Angeles
City, as agricultural land.5
Pursuant to this ordinance, Lutgarda Torres del Rosario (del Rosario) allegedly requested
the City Zoning Administrator to exempt from the zoning classification Lot Nos. 854 and
855 located in Barangay Margot and Barangay Sapang Bato, Angeles City. 6 The land is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-11809 with an area of 164.7605
hectares.7 The request was allegedly approved on March 7, 1980 by Engineer Roque L.
Dungca, Angeles City Development Coordinator/Zoning Administrator, and the lots were
allegedly reclassified as non-agricultural or industrial lots.8 Acting on del Rosario's motion for reconsideration, Secretary Pangandaman found that
the certifications issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board classified the
On June 10, 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act No. 6657) was landholdings as agricultural before June 15, 1988.17 Based on the ocular inspections
enacted. conducted by the Center for Land Use Policy, Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI), the
land remained agricultural and was planted with sugar cane and corn. 18 Accordingly,
On October 10, 2000, del Rosario, through her representative Sylvia R. Asperilla Secretary Pangandaman denied del Rosario's motion in the order 19 dated March 3, 2008.
(Asperilla), filed an application for exemption with the Department of Agrarian Reform,
seeking to exempt Lot Nos. 854 and 855 from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Del Rosario filed a notice of appeal20 before the Office of the President on March 27,
Program (CARP) coverage.9 2008.

On February 19, 2004, then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Roberto M. Pagdanganan On May 7, 2009, the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary for
(Secretary Pagdanganan) issued an order granting the application for exemption. Citing Legal Affairs Manuel B. Gaite (Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite), rendered the
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, Secretary Pagdanganan stated that decision21 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.
lands classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of CARP are beyond its
coverage.10 Del Rosario filed a motion for extension of 10 days to file her motion for
reconsideration.22 Citing Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987, and Habaluyas
On March 26, 2004, farmers in del Rosario's landholdings, led by Remigio Espiritu Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon,23 the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive
(Espiritu), filed a motion for reconsideration11 of the order. They argued that under Secretary Natividad G. Dizon, denied the motion in the order24 dated July 14, 2009.
Zoning Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1978, Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
Resolution No. 705, Series of 2001, and Angeles City Council Resolution No. 3300, Series Aggrieved, del Rosario filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals arguing (1)
of 2001, the landholdings were classified as agricultural, not industrial. 12 They argued that she was denied due process when the order of Secretary Pangandaman was
that as per certifications by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board dated June 1, "erroneously sent to another address"25cralawred and (2) that the decision of.then
2001, May 28, 2001, and November 24, 2003, the landholdings were within the Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite was void since he had been appointed to the Securities
agricultural zone, and there was no zoning ordinance passed that reclassified the area and Exchange Commission two months prior to the rendering of the decision. 26
into other land uses.13
On September 28, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition.
The motion was given due course by the Department of Agrarian Reform, this time The Court of Appeals stated that del Rosario was indeed prevented from participating in
headed by Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman (Secretary Pangandaman). Hence, on June the proceedings that led to the issuance of Secretary Pangandaman's order when the
15, 2006, then Secretary Pangandaman issued an order 14 granting the motion for notices were sent to her other address on record. 27 It also found that the decision issued
reconsideration and revoking the earlier order of then Secretary of Agrarian Reform by then Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite was void since it violated Article VII, Section 13
Pagdanganan. of the Constitution.28 The dispositive portion of the decision
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Del Rosario contended that this order was sent to her through Clarita Montgomery in
Barangay Margot, Sapang Bato, Angeles City, and not at Asperilla's address in Cubao, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PETITION is GRANTED. The
Quezon City, which was her address on record. Del Rosario alleged that she only came to assailed Decision dated 07 May 2009, and the Order dated 15 June
know of the order on January 26, 2007, when the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of 2006 are hereby SET ASIDE. Perforce, with the nullity of the said
Pampanga handed her a copy of the order.15 She then filed her motion for Decision and Order, the Pagdanganan Order granting exemption to
reconsideration of the order dated June 15, 2006. The motion was dated February 9, petitioner's land is REINSTATED.
16
2007.
SO ORDERED.29chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 able to file a motion for reconsideration of Secretary Pangandaman's order, albeit
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,30 petitioners, namely Remigio beyond the allowable period to file. In Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative
Espiritu and Noel Agustin, now come before this court via a petition for review on Order No. 06,35 Series of 2000:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
certiorari, seeking to set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
RULE III
In particular, petitioners argue that respondent was not denied due process as she was Commencement, Investigation and Resolution of Cases
able to actively participate in the proceedings before the Department of Agrarian Reform
and the Office of the President.31 They also argue that respondent was not able to
....
present proof that Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite was not authorized to sign the
decision and, hence, his action is presumed to have been done in the regular
SECTION 21. Motion for Reconsideration. In case
performance of duty.32
any of the parties disagrees with the decision or
resolution, the affected party may file a written
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Court of Appeals did not commit any
motion for reconsideration within fifteen (15) days
reversible error in its decision. She argues that she was deprived of due process when
from receipt of the order, furnishing a copy thereof
Secretary Pangandaman's order was sent to the wrong address. She also argues that the
to the adverse party. The filing of the motion for
Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite's decision was void since he had' already been
reconsideration shall suspend the running of the
appointed to the Securities and Exchange Commission two months prior. 33
period to appeal.
The issue, therefore, before this court is whether the Court of Appeals correctly set aside
Any party shall be allowed only one (1) motion for
the order of Secretary Pangandaman and the decision of Deputy Secretary Gaite and
reconsideration. Thereafter, the RD or approving
reinstated the order of Secretary Pagdanganan.
authority shall rule on the said motion within fifteen
(15) days from receipt thereof. In the event that the
This petition should be granted.
motion is denied, the adverse party has the right to
perfect his appeal within the remainder of the period
Respondent was not deprived of
to appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of
due process
denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration,
the aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from
The Court of Appeals, in finding for respondent, stated that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
receipt of the resolution of reversal within which to
perfect his appeal. (Emphasis
Since she was not notified, [del Rosario] was not able to participate in
supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
the proceedings leading to the issuance of the Pangandaman Order.
The absence of notice that resulted in the inability of [del Rosario] to
be heard indubitably confirms her claim of lack of due process. [Del Despite being filed late, Secretary Pangandaman still gave due course to the motion and
Rosario] indeed was denied her day in the administrative proceedings resolved it on its merits. This is clear from his order dated March 3, 2008, which
below. And considering that [del Rosario] was not accorded due reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
process, the Pangandaman Order is void for lack of jurisdiction. Hence,
contrary to respondents' submission, it could not attain During the 50th Special CLUPPI Committee-B Meeting, held on 18
finality.34chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary December 2007, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Sylvia Espirilla
[sic] was deliberated upon and the Committee recommended the
DENIAL of the Motion for Reconsideration based on the following
The Court of Appeals, however, did not take into consideration that respondent was still
 grounds:
The certifications issued by the HLURB shows that the subject
properties were classified as agricultural before 15 June 1986
[sic]; and
Based on the ocular inspection conducted by the CLUPPI
Inspection Team, it was found out that the area remained
agricultural. In fact, it [is] still dominantly planted with sugar
cane and corn.36(Emphasis supplied)
While it may be true that respondent was prevented from filing a timely motion for
reconsideration of Secretary Pangandaman's order, it would be erroneous to conclude
that she had been completely denied her opportunity to be heard. In Department of
Agrarian Reform v. Samson:37
. . . . In administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain one's side suffices to meet the requirements of due process.
In Casimiro v. Tandog, the Court held:
The essence of procedural due process is embodied
in the basic requirement of notice and a real
opportunity to be heard. In administrative
proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural
due process simply means the opportunity to explain
one's side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
"To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments
in court; one may be heard also thru
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded,
there is no denial of procedural due process.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due
process has been recognized to include the following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the
institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be
heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to
present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to
defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to
afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty 'as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the
records or made known to the parties
affected.38 (Emphasis supplied)
When respondent filed her motion for reconsideration assailing Secretary
Pangandaman's order, she was able to completely and exhaustively present her
arguments. The denial of her motion was on the basis of the merits of her arguments
and any other evidence she was able to present. She was given a fair and reasonable
opportunity to present her side; hence, there was no deprivation of due process.
It was also erroneous to conclude that respondent was "denied her day in the
administrative proceedings below."39 Respondent was able to actively participate not
only in the proceedings before the Department of Agrarian Reform, but also on appeal to
the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals.
Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite's
decision is presumed valid, effective,
and binding
Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet;
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
. . . . (Emphasis supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is alleged that Gaite was appointed Commissioner to the Securities and Exchange
Commission on March 16, 2009.40 It is also alleged that he has already lost his authority
as Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs when he rendered the decision dated
May 7, 2009 since he is constitutionally prohibited from holding two offices during his
tenure. This, however, is not conclusive since no evidence was presented as to when he
accepted the appointment, took his oath of office, or assumed the position.
Assuming that Gaite's appointment became effective on March 16, 2009, he can be
considered a de facto officer at the time he rendered the decision dated May 7, 2009.
In Funa v. Agra,41 a petition was filed against Alberto Agra for holding concurrent
positions as the acting Secretary of justice and as Solicitor General. This court, while
ruling that the appointment of Alberto Agra as acting Secretary of Justice violated Article
VII, Section 13 of the Constitution, held that he was a de facto officer during his tenure in
the Department of Justice:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Assuming that Gaite was a de facto officer of the Office of the President after his
appointment to the Securities and Exchange Commission, any decision he renders during
this time is presumed to be valid, binding, and effective.
With Gaite being a public officer, his acts also enjoy the presumption of regularity,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption in [sic] rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable
intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of
doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction
should be in favor of its lawfulness. 43 (Fimphasis
supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having
Respondent has not presented evidence showing that the decision was rendered ultra
colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and
vires, other than her allegation that Gaite had already been appointed to another office.
whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in
Unless there is clear and convincing evidence o the contrary, the decision dated May 7,
possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of
2009 is conclusively presumed to lave been rendered in the regular course of business.
authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment,
however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere
Respondent's landholdings were
volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as
agricultural, not industrial
valid for all purposes as those of a dejure officer, in so far as the public
or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.
Prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657, lands were classified into agricultural,
residential, or industrial by law or by zoning ordinances enacted by local government
In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions
units. In Heirs of Luna v. Afable:44
of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of Justice, assuming that was his
later designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he
It is undeniable that local governments have the power to reclassify
was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. This
agricultural into non-agricultural lands. Section 3 of RA No. 2264 (The
clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity of the dealings
Local Autonomy Act of 1959) specifically empowers municipal and/or
by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from
city councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations
the State. Agra's official actions covered by this clarification extend to
in consultation with the National Planning Commission. By virtue of a
but are not limited to the promulgation of resolutions on petitions for
zoning ordinance, the local legislature may arrange, prescribe, define,
review filed in the Department of Justice, and the issuance of
and apportion the land within its political jurisdiction into specific uses
department orders, memoranda and circulars relative to the
based not only on the present, but also on the future projection of
prosecution of criminal cases.42 (Emphasis
needs. It may, therefore, be reasonably presumed that when city and
supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
municipal boards and councils approved an ordinance delineating an
area or district in their cities or municipalities as residential,
 commercial, or industrial zone pursuant to the power granted to them
under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, they were, at the
same time, reclassifying any agricultural lands within the zone for
non-agricultural use; hence, ensuring the implementation of and
compliance with their zoning ordinances. 45 (Emphasis
supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Republic Act No. 6657 became effective on June 15, 1988, and it covered all public and
private lands, including lands of the public domain suited for agriculture. 46 Upon its
enactment, questions arose as to the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to
approve or disapprove applications for conversion of agricultural land to
non-agricultural. Then Agrarian Reform Secretary Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) was
of the opinion that laws prior to Republic Act No. 6657 authorized the Department of
Agrarian Reform, together with the Department of Local Government and Community
Development and the Human Settlements Commission, to allow or disallow conversions.
In response to Secretary Abad's query, the Department of Justice issued Opinion No. 44
on March 16, 1990, written by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon. The opinion,
reproduced in full, states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
S i r:
This refers to your letter of the 13th instant stating your "position that
prior to the passage of R.A. 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform
had the authority to classify and declare which agricultural lands are
suitable for non-agricultural purposes, and to approve or disapprove
applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses."
In support of the foregoing view, you contend that under R.A. No.
3844, as amended, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is
empowered to "determine and declare an agricultural land to be suited
for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purpose"
and to "convert agricultural land from agricultural to non-agricultural
purposes"; that P.D. No. 583, as amended by P.D. No. 815 "affirms that
the conversion of agricultural lands shall be allowed only upon
previous authorization of the [DAR]; with respect to tenanted rice and
corn lands"; that a Memorandum of Agreement dated May 13, 1977
between the DAR, the Department of Local Government and
Community Development and the then Human Settlements
Commission "further affirms the authority of the [DAR] to allow or
disallow conversion of agricultural lands"; that E.O. No. 129-A expressly
invests the DAR with exclusive authority to approve or disapprove
conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial
and other land uses'; and that while in the final version of House Bill
400, Section 9 thereof provided that lands devoted to "residential,
housing, commercial and industrial sites classified as such by the
municipal and city development councils as already approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, in their respective zoning
development plans" be exempted from the coverage of the Agrarian
Reform program, this clause was deleted from Section 10 of the final
version of the consolidated bill stating the exemptions from the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
We take it that your query has been prompted by the study previously
made by this Department for Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig Jr.
and Secretary Vicente Jayme (Memorandum dated February 14, 1990)
which upheld the authority of the DAR to authorize conversions of
agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses as of June 15, 1988, the date
of effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No.
6657). [I]t is your position that the authority of DAR to authorize such
conversion existed even prior to June 15, 1988 or as early as 1963
under the Agricultural Land Reform Code (R.A. No. 3844; as amended).
It should be made clear at the outset that the aforementioned study of
this Department was based on facts and issues arising from the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). While there is no specific and express authority given to DAR in
the CARP law to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands
to non-agricultural uses, because Section 65 only refers to conversions
effected after five years from date of the award, we opined that the
authority of the DAR to approve or disapprove conversions of
agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses applies only to conversions
made on or after June 15, 1988, the date of effectivity of R.A. No. 6657,
solely on the basis of our interpretation of DAR's mandate and the
comprehensive coverage of the land reform program. Thus, we said:
"Being vested with exclusive original jurisdiction over
all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, it is believed to be the agrarian reform law's
intention that any conversion of a private agricultural
land to non-agricultural uses should be cleared
beforehand by the DAR. True, the DAR's express
 power over land use conversion is limited to cases in
which agricultural lands already awarded have, after
five years, ceased to be economically feasible and
sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has
become urbanized and the land will have a greater
economic value for residential, commercial or
industrial purposes. But to suggest that these are the
only instances when the DAR can require conversion
clearances would open a loophole in the R.A. No.
6657, which every landowner may use to evade
compliance with the agrarian reform program.
Hence, it should logically follow from the said,
department's express duty and function to execute
and enforce the said statute that any reclassification
of a private land as a residential, commercial or
industrial property should first be cleared by the
DAR."
It is conceded that under the laws in force prior to the enactment and
effective date of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR had likewise the authority, to
authorize conversions of agricultural lands to other uses, but always in
coordination with other concerned agencies. Under R.A. No. 3344, as
amended by R.A. No. 6389, an agricultural lessee may, by order of the
court, be dispossessed of his landholding if after due hearing, it is
shown that the "landholding is declared by the [DAR] upon the
recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes."
Likewise, under various Presidential Decrees (P.D. Nos. 583, 815 and
946) which were issued to give teeth to the implementation of the
agrarian reform program decreed in P.D. No. 27, the DAR was
empowered to authorize conversions of tenanted agricultural lands,
specifically those planted to rice and/or com, to other agricultural or to
non-agricultural uses, "subject to studies on zoning of the Human
Settlements Commissions" (HSC). This non-exclusive authority of the
DAR under the aforesaid laws was, as you have correctly pointed out,
recognized and reaffirmed by other concerned agencies, such as the
Department of Local Government and Community Development
(DLGCD) and the then Human Settlements Commission (HSC) in a
Memorandum of Agreement executed by the DAR and these two
agencies on May 13, 1977, which is an admission that with respect to
land use planning and conversions, the authority is not exclusive to any
particular agency but is a coordinated effort of all concerned agencies.
It is significant to mention that in 1978, the then Ministry of Human
Settlements was granted authority to review and ratify land use plans
and zoning ordinance of local governments and to approve
development proposals which include land use conversions (see LOI
No. 729 [1978]). This was followed by P.D. No. 648 (1981) which
conferred upon the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (the
predecessors of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB]
[)] the authority to promulgate zoning and other land use control
standards and guidelines which shall govern land use plans and zoning
ordinances of local governments, subdivision or estate development
projects of both the public and private sector and urban renewal plans,
programs and projects; as well as to review, evaluate and approve or
disapprove comprehensive land use development plans and zoning
components of civil works and infrastructure projects, of national,
regional and local governments, subdivisions, condominiums or estate
development projects including industrial estates.
P.D. No. 583, as amended by P.D. No. 815, and the 1977 Memorandum
of Agreement, abovementioned, cannot therefore, be construed as
sources of authority of the' DAR; these issuances merely affirmed
whatever power DAR had at the time of their adoption.
With respect to your observation that E.O. No. 129-A also empowered
the DAR to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands into
non-agricultural uses as of July 22, 1987, it is our view that E.O. No.
129-A likewise did not provide a new source of power of DAR with
respect to conversion but it merely recognized and reaffirmed the
existence of such power as granted under existing laws. This is clearly
inferrable from the following provision of E.O. No. 129-A to wit:
"Sec. 5. Powers and Functions. Pursuant to the
mandate of the Department, and in order to ensure
the successful implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program, the Department is hereby
authorized to:
1) Have exclusive authority to
approve or disapprove conversion
 of agricultural lands for residential,
commercial, industrial and other
land uses as may be provided by
-law"
Anent the observation regarding the alleged deletion of residential,
housing, commercial and industrial sites classified by the HLURB in the
final version of the CARP bill, we fail to see how this [sic] circumstances
could substantiate your position that DAR's authority to reclassify or
approve conversions of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses
already existed prior to June 15, 1988. Surely, it is clear that the alleged
deletion was necessary to avoid a redundancy in the CARP law whose
coverage is expressly limited to "all public and private agricultural
lands" and "other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture"
(Sec. 4, R.A. No. 6657). Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 6657 defines
"agricultural land" as that "devoted to agricultural activity as defined in
the Act and not classified as mineral forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land."
Based on the foregoing premises, we reiterate the view that with
respect to conversions of agricultural lands covered by R.A. No. 6657 to
non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve such
conversions may be exercised from the date of the law's effectivity on
June 15, 1988. This conclusion is based on a liberal interpretation of
R.A. No. 6657 in the light of DAR's mandate and the extensive coverage
of the agrarian reform program.47(Emphasis
supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44 became the basis of subsequent issuances by the
Department of Agrarian Reform, stating in clear terms that parties need not seek prior
conversion clearance from the Department of Agrarian Reform for lands that were
classified as non-agricultural prior to Republic Act No. 6657. The subsequent rulings are
outlined in Junio v. Secretary Garilao:48
Following the opinion of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the DAR
issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994, stating that
conversion clearances were no longer needed for lands already
classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of Republic Act
6657. Designed to "streamline the issuance of exemption clearances,
based on DOJ Opinion No. 44," the AO provided guidelines and
procedures for the issuance of exemption clearances.
Thereafter, DAR issued AO 12, Series of 1994, entitled "Consolidated
and Revised Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses." It provided that the
guidelines on how to secure an exemption clearance under DAR AO No.
6, Series of 1994, shall apply to agricultural lands classified or zoned for
non-agricultural uses by local government units (LGUs); and approved
by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before June
15, 1988. Under this AO, the DAR secretary had the ultimate authority
to issue orders granting or denying applications for exemption filed by
landowners whose lands were covered by DOJ Opinion No.
44.49 (Citations omitted)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accordingly, lands are considered exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 if
the following requisites are present:
1. Lands were zoned for non-agricultural use by the local government unit; and
2. The zoning ordinance was approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board before June 15, 1998.
In revoking the prior order of exemption, Secretary Pangandaman took note of the
following considerations:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Certification dated 18 November 2003, of Mr. David D. David,
Planning Officer IV and Zoning Administrator of the City of Angeles
states that the City Planning and Development Office, Zoning
Administration Unit (CPDO-ZAU) certifies that subject property covered
by TCI No. 11804 is classified as agricultural based on the certified
photocopy of Zoning Ordinance, Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1978,
issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, Regional Office
No. 3 (HLURB-Region III) on 03 September 2001;chanrobleslaw
Also, upon verification with HLURB-Region III, -we were informed that
as per copy of the approved Zoning Plan of 1978, the subject
properties were classified as agricultural. The said Zoning Plan of 1978
was approved under NCC Plan dated 24 September 1980; and

Based on the ocular inspection conducted by the CLUPPI Inspection
Team, it was found that the area remained agricultural. In fact, it is still
dominantly planted with sugar cane and corn. 50 (Emphasis
supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Upon respondent's motion for reconsideration, Secretary Pangandaman also took into
consideration the recommendations of the Center for Land Use Policy, Planning, and
Implementation Committee, thus:
During the 50th Special CLUPPI Committee-B Meeting, held on 18 December 2007, the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by Sylvia Espirilla [sic] was deliberated upon and the
Committee recommended the DENIAL of the Motion for Reconsideration based on the
following grounds:
The certifications issued by the HLURB shows that the subject
properties were classified as agricultural before 15 June 1986
[sic]; and
Based on the ocular inspection conducted by the CLUPPI
Inspection Team, it was found out that the area remained
agricultural. In fact, it [is] still dominantly planted with sugar
cane and corn.51 (Emphasis supplied)
Secretary Pangandaman also found that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The certifications submitted by the [respondents] which is the
Certification dated 18 November 2003, of Mr. David D. David, Planning
Officer IV and Zoning Administrator of the City of Angeles states that
the City Planning Development Office, Zoning Administration Unit
(CPDO-ZAU) certifies that the subject properties covered by TCT No.
T-11804 is classified as agricultural based on the certified photocopy of
Zoning Ordinance, Ordinance No. 13[,] Series of 1978 issued by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, Regional Office No. 3
(HLURB-Region III) on 03 September 2001.
Such certification was corroborated by a certification issued by the
HLURB Regional Director, Region III, Ms. Edithat [sic] Barrameda in its
certification dated 28 May 2001 and 24 November 2003. It was stated
in the said certification that the subject landholding is within the
agricultural zone based on Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Ordinance of the City Council of Angeles City approved 'through HLURB
Resolution No. 705 dated 17 October 2001. Also a certification was
issued by Director Barrameda on 01 June 2001, stating therein that,
"Duplicate copies of the Certification issued by this Board to Ms.
Lutgarda Torres on 18 December 1991 and 8 July 1998, respectively are
not among the files for safekeeping when she assumed as Regional
Officer on 03 July 2000.["]52(Emphasis
supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
These findings were sustained on appeal by the Office of the President, stating
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[Respondents'] argument that the land has ceased to be agricultural by
virtue of reclassification under Ordinance No. 13, series of 1978 cannot
be sustained since the records of the case or the evidence presented
thereto are bereft of any indication showing the same. In fact, nowhere
was it shown that a certified true copy of the said Ordinance was
presented before this Office or the office a
quo.53chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The factual findings of administrative agencies are generally given great respect and
finality by the courts as it is presumed that these agencies have the knowledge and
expertise over matters under their jurisdiction.5 Both the Department of Agrarian
Reform and the Office of the President found respondent's lands to be agricultural. We
see no reason to disturb these findings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated September 28, 2012 and
resolution dated November 29, 2012 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The order
dated June 15, 2006 of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the decision dated May
7, 2009 of the Office of the President are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Reyes,* JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 181370 March 9, 2011
JULIAN S. LEBRUDO and REYNALDO L. LEBRUDO, Petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS LOYOLA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition 1 for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution 2 dated
4 January 2008 and Decision 3dated 17 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 90048.
The Facts
Respondent Remedios Loyola (Loyola) owns a 240-square meter parcel of land
located in Barangay Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite, known as Lot No. 723-6, Block 1,
Psd-73149 (lot), awarded by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under
Republic Act No. 66574 (RA 6657) or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
This lot is covered by Certificate of Land Ownership5 (CLOA) No. 20210 issued in favor
of Loyola on 27 December 1990 and duly registered on 14 March 1991 under Transfer
of Certificate of Title (TCT)/CLOA No. 998.
On 27 June 1995, petitioner Julian S. Lebrudo (Lebrudo), now deceased and
represented by his son, petitioner Reynaldo L. Lebrudo, filed with the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Trece Martires City, Cavite, an
action6 for the cancellation of the TCT/CLOA in the name of Loyola and the issuance
of another for the one-half portion of the lot in Lebrudos favor.
In a Decision7 dated 18 December 1995, the PARAD dismissed the case without
prejudice on the ground that the case was filed prematurely. On 11 March 1996,
Lebrudo re-filed the same action.8
Lebrudo alleged that he was approached by Loyola sometime in 1989 to redeem the
lot, which was mortgaged by Loyolas mother, Cristina Hugo, to Trinidad Barreto.
After Lebrudo redeemed the lot for P250.00 and a cavan of palay, Loyola again
sought Lebrudos help in obtaining title to the lot in her name by shouldering all the
expenses for the transfer of the title of the lot from her mother, Cristina Hugo. In
exchange, Loyola promised to give Lebrudo the one-half portion of the lot. Thereafter,
TCT/CLOA No. 998 was issued in favor of Loyola. Loyola then allegedly executed
a Sinumpaang Salaysay9 dated 28 December 1989, waiving and transferring her rights
over the one-half portion of the lot in favor of Lebrudo. To reiterate her commitment,
Loyola allegedly executed two more Sinumpaang Salaysay10 dated 1 December 1992
and 3 December 1992, committing herself to remove her house constructed on the
corresponding one-half portion to be allotted to Lebrudo.
Thereafter, Lebrudo asked Loyola to comply with her promise. However, Loyola
refused. Lebrudo sought the assistance of the Sangguniang Barangay of Milagrosa,
Carmona, Cavite; the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Carmona, Cavite; and the
Department of Agrarian Reform to mediate. However, despite steps taken to
amicably settle the issue, as evidenced by certifications from the PNP and
the barangay, there was no amicable settlement. Thus, Lebrudo filed an action
against Loyola.
In her Answer, Loyola maintained that Lebrudo was the one who approached her and
offered to redeem the lot and the release of the CLOA. Loyola denied promising
one-half portion of the lot as payment for the transfer, titling and registration of the
lot. Loyola explained that the lot was her only property and it was already being
occupied by her children and their families. Loyola also denied the genuineness and
due execution of the two Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 28 December 1989 and 3
December 1992. The records do not show whether Loyola renounced
the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 1 December 1992.
In a Decision11 dated 13 February 2002, the PARAD of Trece Martires City, Cavite
decided the case in Lebrudos favor. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered:
a) Declaring Respondent Remedios Loyola disqualified as farmer beneficiary of the
subject land identified as Lot 723-6, Block 1, under TCT/CLOA No. 998;
b) Declaring the Deed of sales over the subject lot illegal and ordered the same set
aside;
c) Declaring Plaintiff JULIAN LEBRUDO entitled to one half () of the subject property
under TCT/CLOA No. 998 in the name of Remedios Loyola;
d) Ordering the other one half () of the subject lot ready for allocation to qualified
beneficiary;
e) Ordering the DAR PARO Office thru the Operations Division to cancel TCT/CLOA No.
998 and in lieu thereof, to generate and issue another title over the 120 square
meters in the name of JULIAN LEBRUDO;
f) Ordering the survey of the subject lot at the expense of the petitioner so that title
be issued to plaintiff herein;
g) Ordering the Register of Deeds, Trece Martires City to cancel TCT/CLOA No. 998 in
the name of Remedios Loyola;
h) Ordering the Register of Deeds, Trece Martires City to register the title in the name
[of] Julian Lebrudo as presented by the DAR or its representative over the lot in
question;
No pronouncement as to costs and damages.
SO ORDERED.12
Loyola appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).13 In a Decision14 dated 24 August 2004, the DARAB reversed the decision of
the PARAD and ruled in Loyolas favor. The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows:
1. Upholding and maintaining the validity and effectivity of TCT/CLOA No. 998 in the
name of the respondent;
2. Declaring the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated December 28, 1989 and December 3,
1992 attached to the petition as Annex C and F, null and void without legal force and
effect;
3. Directing the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City, Cavite to reinstate
TCT/CLOA No. 998 in the name of the respondent.
The status quo ante order issued by this Board on November 3, 2003 is hereby
LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.15
Lebrudo filed a motion for reconsideration which the DARAB denied in a
Resolution16 dated 12 April 2005. Lebrudo then filed a petition 17 for review with the
CA.
In a Decision18 dated 17 August 2007, the CA affirmed the decision of the DARAB.
Lebrudo filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in a
Resolution19 dated 4 January 2008.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The main issue is whether Lebrudo is entitled to the one-half portion of the lot
covered by RA 6657 on the basis of the waiver and transfer of rights embodied in the
two Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 28 December 1989 and 3 December 1992 allegedly
executed by Loyola in his favor.
The Courts Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
A Certificate of Land Ownership or CLOA is a document evidencing ownership of the
land granted or awarded to the beneficiary by DAR, and contains the restrictions and
conditions provided for in RA 6657 and other applicable laws. Section 27 of RA 6657,
as amended by RA 9700,20 which provides for the transferability of awarded lands,
states:
SEC. 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands. Lands acquired by beneficiaries under
this ACT may not be sold, transferred or conveyed except through hereditary
succession, or to the government, or to the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries
for a period of ten (10) years: Provided, however, That the children or the spouse of
the transferor shall have a right to repurchase the land from the government or LBP
within a period of two (2) years. Due notice of the availability of the land shall be
given by the LBP to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of the barangay
where the land is situated. The Provincial Agrarian Coordinating Committee
(PARCCOM), as herein provided, shall, in turn, be given due notice thereof by the
BARC.
The title of the land awarded under the agrarian reform must indicate that it is an
emancipation patent or a certificate of land ownership award and the subsequent
transfer title must also indicate that it is an emancipation patent or a certificate of
land ownership award.
If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the rights to the land may be
transferred or conveyed, with prior approval of the DAR, to any heir of the
beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as a condition for such transfer or
conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself. Failing compliance herewith, the land
shall be transferred to the LBP which shall give due notice of the availability of the
land in the manner specified in the immediately preceding paragraph. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
It is clear from the provision that lands awarded to beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) may not be sold, transferred or
conveyed for a period of 10 years. The law enumerated four exceptions: (1) through
hereditary succession; (2) to the government; (3) to the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP); or (4) to other qualified beneficiaries. In short, during the prohibitory 10-year
period, any sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights is void, except as
allowed by law, in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws.
In the present case, Lebrudo insists that he is entitled to one-half portion of the lot
awarded to Loyola under the CARP as payment for shouldering all the expenses for
the transfer of the title of the lot from Loyolas mother, Cristina Hugo, to Loyolas
name. Lebrudo used the two Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Loyola alloting to him
the one-half portion of the lot as basis for his claim.
Lebrudos assertion must fail. The law expressly prohibits any sale, transfer or
conveyance by farmer-beneficiaries of their land reform rights within 10 years from
the grant by the DAR. The law provides for four exceptions and Lebrudo does not fall
under any of the exceptions. In Maylem v. Ellano,21 we held that the waiver of rights
and interests over landholdings awarded by the government is invalid for being
violative of agrarian reform laws. Clearly, the waiver and transfer of rights to the lot
as embodied in the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Loyola is void for falling under
the 10-year prohibitory period specified in RA 6657.
Lebrudo asserts that he is a qualified farmer beneficiary who is entitled to the lot
under the CARP. DAR Administrative Order No. 3,22 series of 1990, enumerated the
qualifications of a beneficiary:
1. Landless;
2. Filipino citizen;
3. Actual occupant/tiller who is at least 15 years of age or head of the family at the
time of filing application; and
4. Has the willingness, ability and aptitude to cultivate and make the land productive.
Lebrudo does not qualify as a beneficiary because of (1) and (3). First, Lebrudo is not
landless. According to the records,23 Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Amelia
Sangalang issued a certification dated 28 February 1996 attesting that Lebrudo was
awarded by the DAR with a homelot consisting of an area of 236 square meters
situated at Japtinchay Estate, Bo. Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite. Next, Lebrudo is not
the actual occupant or tiller of the lot at the time of the filing of the application.
Loyola and her family were the actual occupants of the lot at the time Loyola applied
to be a beneficiary under the CARP.
Further, the CA, in its Decision dated 17 August 2007, correctly observed that a
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title and after the expiration
of the one-year period from the issuance of the registration decree upon which it is
based, the title becomes incontrovertible. The CA also declared that the basis of
Lebrudos claim, the two Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 28 December 1989 and 3
December 1992, were illegal and void ab initio for being patently intended to
circumvent and violate the conditions imposed by the agrarian law. The relevant
portions of the decision provide:
x x x It is undisputed that CLOA 20210 was issued to the respondent
on December 27, 1990 and was registered by the Register of Deeds
of Cavite on March 14, 1991, resulting in the issuance of TCT/CLOA imposed by the agrarian laws and their implementing rules. He
No. 998 in her name. could not, therefore, have his supposed right enforced. x x x24

Under Sec. 43, P.D. 1529, the certificate of title that may be issued
by the Register of Deeds pursuant to any voluntary or involuntary
instrument relating to the land shall be the transfer certificate of
title, which shall show the number of the next previous certificate
covering the same land and also the fact that it was previously
registered, giving the record number of the original certificate of
title and the volume and page of the registration book in which the
original certificate of title is found.
The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to
the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.
After the expiration of the one-year period from the issuance of the
decree of registration upon which it is based, the title becomes
incontrovertible.
We see no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. The main purpose of the agrarian
reform law is to ensure the farmer-beneficiarys continued possession, cultivation
and enjoyment of the land he tills. 25 To do otherwise is to revert back to the old
feudal system whereby the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land and thus
circumvent the governments program of freeing the tenant-farmers from the
bondage of the soil.26
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 17 August 2007
and Resolution dated 4 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90048.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Accordingly, by the time when original petitioner Julian Lebrudo WE CONCUR:

filed on June 27, 1995 the first case (seeking the cancellation of the
respondents CLOA), the respondents certificate of title had already PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
become incontrovertible. That consequence was inevitable, for as Associate Justice
the DARAB correctly observed, an original certificate of title issued
by the Register of Deeds under an administrative proceeding was as
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial
Associate Justice Associate Justice
registration proceeding. Clearly, the respondent, as registered
property owner, was entitled to the protection given to every holder
of a Torrens title.1avvphi1 JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
The issue of whether or not the respondent was bound by her
waiver and transfer in favor of Julian Lebrudo, as contained in the ATTESTATION
several sinumpaang salaysay, was irrelevant. Worse for the
petitioner, the DARAB properly held that the undertaking of the I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
respondent to Julian Lebrudo under the sinumpaang salaysay dated before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
December 28, 1989 and December 3, 1992 whereby she promised
to give him portion of the homelot in consideration of his helping
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
her work on the release of the CLOA to her and shouldering all the
Associate Justice
expenses for the purpose was "clearly illegal and void ab initio" for
Chairperson
being patently intended to circumvent and violate the conditions
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice