Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
vs.
Defendant DCRCC is the formal political party for Republicans in the City and County of
Denver. DCRCC has existed in various iterations for many decades and files regular campaign
finance reports with the Colorado Secretary of State (the Secretary). All officers and
representative act on a purely voluntary basis, without salary or other compensation. In 2016,
officers discovered that reports previously filed by past volunteer officers inadvertently omitted
Page 1 of 16
some contributions and expenditures from disclosure. 1 The omitted contributions and
expenditures spanned a time-period between the beginning of 2015 and mid-2016. In an effort to
provide full transparency, even though the 2016 election had already taken place, the DCRCC
officers decided to disclose the omitted contributions and expenditures. The omitted
contributions and expenditures, subsequently disclosed voluntarily by DCRCC, form the basis of
the complaint against DCRCC. However, the Colorado Constitution sets a 180-day statute of
limitations from the day of any alleged violation to bring a complaint. The alleged violation for
all the omitted contributions and expenditures took place well over 180-days before Complainant
A. Nature of Complaint
The Complaint brought by CIW is an issue of Colorado campaign finance law. CIW filed
an incomplete Complaint with the Colorado Attorney Generals Office (the AG) on June 7,
2017. CIW subsequently filed an original complaint and cover sheet on June 9, 2017. 2 The AG
subsequently forwarded the case to the Office of Administrative Courts on June 9, 2017. CIW
claims that DCRCC violated multiple disclosure requirements. Under Colorado campaign
finance and election laws, CIW is responsible for prosecuting the case against DCRCC.
B. Issues Presented
1. Colorado Constitution Article XXVII, Section 9(2)(a) requires any person who
believes a violation of campaign finance laws has occurred to file a written complaint no
later than one hundred eighty days after the date of the alleged violation. CIWs claims
1
In its Complaint, CIW references disbursements made by DCRCC; however, the reports filed by a political party
are called contribution and expenditure reports. While expenditure is a term of art under Colorado campaign
finance law and presumably why CIW referred to disbursements instead for sake of clarity, DCRCC notes that
the terms disbursement and expenditure may be referenced interchangeably in this matter without regard to the
precise definition of expenditure used under Colorado campaign finance law.
2
See Complaint, Secretarys forwarding letter to the Office of Administrative Courts.
Page 2 of 16
involve contributions and expenditures omitted from reports filed more than 180-days
before CIWs Complaint. Are CIWs claims time-barred by the constitutional statute of
limitations?
C. Background
CIWs claims are based on contributions accepted and expenditures made by DCRCC in
2015 and early 2016. The contributions and expenditures were inadvertently omitted from
several of DCRCCs campaign finance reports due in 2015 and through November 2016. After a
thorough review of its books revealed the omitted contributions and expenditures, DCRCC
attempted to amend its prior reports through the Secretarys online campaign finance filing
system, TRACER. DCRCC wished to provide full transparency and disclosure, even for reports
long since filed. Due to the manner in which TRACER operates, the contributions and
expenditures were disclosed in DCRCCs contribution and expenditure report filed December 7,
2016, as later amended on December 26, 2016 (the December 7th Report).
II. Argument
The statute of limitations bars jurisdiction of this court over claims regarding alleged
violations occurring more than 180-days before a party files a complaint. All the contributions
and expenditures forming the basis for CIWs Complaint involve alleged violations more than
180-days in the past. Even the December 7th Report itself fell outside the 180-day statute of
limitations. Consequently, this Court should dismiss all CIW claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Page 3 of 16
A motion to dismiss properly addresses the question of whether a trial court has subject
matter jurisdiction. 3 The plaintiff has the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction in
response to a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). 4 In
considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a trial court examines the
substance of the claim based on the facts alleged and the relief requested. 5 Under such review,
the trial court is authorized to make appropriate factual findings, although it need not treat the
facts alleged by the non-moving party as true as it would under a motion to dismiss for failure to
The plain language of the Colorado Constitution sets a 180-day statute of limitations
from the date of an alleged violation for a complaint to be filed. The Colorado Constitution time-
bars any complaint based on alleged violations falling outside the 180-day window. Any alleged
violation regarding the omitted contributions and expenditures fell well outside the 180-day
window. Consequently, the Colorado Constitution requires this Court to find CIWs claims time-
determination of this Courts subject matter jurisdiction in regard to the statute of limitations.
3
Henderson v. City and County of Denver, 2012 COA 152, 21 citing Swieckowski v. City of Fort Collins, 934 P.2d
1389, 1383-84 (Colo. 1997).
4
Associated Governments of Northwest Colorado v. Colorado Public Utilities Comn, 275 P.3d 646, 648 (Colo.
2012).
5
West Colorado Motors, LLC v. General Motors, LLC, 2016 COA 103, 45 quoting Barry v. Bally Gaming, Inc.,
2013 COA 176, 8.
6
Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 451-52 (Colo. 2001) quoting City of Lakewood v. Brace, 919 P.2d 231, 244 (Colo.
1996).
Page 4 of 16
Consequently, this Court is tasked with reviewing the provision and applying the canons of
It is settled law that Colorado courts must adopt the statutory construction that best
effectuates the intent of the General Assembly and the purposes of the legislative scheme. 7 To
do so, the Court must adhere to a number of time-honored principles beginning with the plain
meaning of the words employed. 8 Such a review requires the Court to give words and phrases
effect according to their plain and ordinary meaning. 9 Additionally, the Court must give effect
to every word and may not adopt a construction that renders any term superfluous. 10
However, the Court must also regard applicable statutory provision as a whole in order to accord
consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all their parts. 11 Where the statutory language is
clear and unambiguous the Court may not resort to other rules of statutory construction or
create an exception to a statute that the plain language does not suggest or demand. 12
The clear and unambiguous language of Section 9(2)(a) bars any complaint filed more
than 180 days after an alleged violation occurred. Specifically, Section 9(2)(a) states:
Any person who believes a violation has occurred may file a written
complaint with the secretary of state no later than one hundred eighty days
after the date of the alleged violation. 13
7
Watson v. Public Service Co. of Colorado, 207 P.3d 860, 863 (Colo.App.2008) quoting State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d
493, 501(Colo. 2006).
8
Slack v. Farmers ins. Exchange, 5 P.3d 280, 284 (Colo.2000) citing Water Rights of Park County Sportsmens
Ranch LLP v. Bargas, 986P.2d 262, 268 (Colo.1999) and C.R.S. 2-4-101 C.R.S. (1999).
9
People v. District Court, Second Judicial District, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986) citing Engelbrecht v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co., 680 P.2d 23, 2231 (Colo.1984); People v. Lewis, 680 P.2d 226 (Colo.1984).
10
Slack v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 5 P.3d at 284. citing Cherry Hills Resort Dev. Co. v. City of Cherry Hills Village,
790 P.2d 827, 830 (Colo.1990).
11
Hanlen v. Gessler, 2014 CO 24, 56; see also Francen v. Colo. Dept of Revenue, 2014 CO 54, 8 (citing People
in the Interest of W.P., 295 P.3d 514, 519 (Colo. 2013); Moffett v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., 219 P.3d 1068, 1072
(Colo. 2009)).
12
Id. citing Vaughn v. McMinn, 945 P.2d 404, 408 (Colo.1997) and Scoogins v. Unigard Ins. Co., 869 P.2d 202, 205
(Colo.1994).
13
Colo. Const. art. XXVIII 9(2)(a) (2017), emphasis added.
Page 5 of 16
Consequently, the 180-day constitutional statute of limitations begins to run on the date that a
violation is alleged to have occurred. For campaign finance purposes, the date of an alleged
violation for failure to report is the date when an omitted contribution or expenditures should
have been disclosed. 14 It is not based on the date a contribution was actually accepted or an
expenditure was actually made, but rather when it should have been reported. 15 For example, an
expenditure made by a political party on May 3, 2015, should have been reported on the next
regularly filed contribution and expenditure report due July 15, 2015. 16 Failure to disclose the
expenditure on that report immediately creates a violation. A complaint filed on July 16, 2015
for failure to report the expenditure would consequently be filed one day after the date of the
alleged violation.
The alleged violations listed by CIW all fall outside the 180-day statute of limitations in
Section 9(2)(a). CIW detailed the specific contributions and expenditures forming the basis of its
Complaint in paragraphs 11(a)-11(bb) and 12(a)-12(v). In each instance, CIW cites the date
DCRCC accepted a contribution or made a disbursement; yet CIW neglects to cite the date when
the contributions or expenditures should have been disclosed on a prior report. This is a critical
omission. Because the statute of limitations begins running on the date when the alleged
violation occurred, and because violations for failure to report occur on the date when omitted
14
In the Matter of the Complaint Filed by Lang Sias and Mario Nicolais Regarding Alleged Campaign and Political
Finance Vioaltions by Christian Coalition of Colorado, National Family Coalition, Colorado Family Values and
Colorado Citizens for Right to Work (Sias v. CCC), OS 2014-0043, Final Agency Decision, p. 4-7, 9.
15
Id.
16
See attached Exhibit A - CO SOS Campaign and Political Finance 2015 county Frequent and Annual Filing
Calendar.
Page 6 of 16
contributions or expenditures should have been reported, it is critical to know the date when the
contributions and expenditures forming the basis of the Complaint should have been reported.
CIWs omission is easily rectified. By reviewing the dates for each individual
contribution and disbursement listed by CIW and cross-referencing the Secretarys campaign and
political finance calendars (attached and incorporated hereto as Exhibit A for 2015 and Exhibit
B for 2016), the dates the omitted contributions and disbursements should have been reported are
easily computed. The 180-day statute of limitations from each of those reports is also easily
computed. DCRCC undertook this analysis in the attached Table 1 DCRCC Contributions
Listed in CIW Complaint and Table 2 DCRCC Contributions Listed in CIW Complaint.
As Table 1 and Table 2 demonstrate, the statute of limitations for the proper report date and
hence, the date of any alleged violation for failure to report expired well before CIW filed its
Complaint. The latest proper report date when any of the omitted contributions or
disbursements should have been reported was October 18, 2016. The 180-day statute of
limitations on this report expired on April 16, 2017 (actually April 14, 2017 due to April 16th
falling on a Sunday). Consequently, the statute of limitations expired nearly two months prior to
Significantly, CIW is very familiar with the statute of limitations. As discussed in more
detail below, it is a part of CIWs standard procedure to file cases in close proximity to the
statute of limitations expiration. CIW does so with such regularity that Courts have found CIW
claims time-barred on multiple occasions. In two recent decisions, two different administrative
law judges (ALJ) dismissed multiple claims by CIW due to its failure to timely file
complaints. 17
17
Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Dan Thurlow/55, OS 2016-0027, Decision, p. 3-4; Campaign Integrity
Watchdog v. Friends and Neighbors for Dan Pabon, OS 2017-0004, Decision, p. 3-8.
Page 7 of 16
3. Even the December 7th Report itself falls outside the 180-day statute of
limitations.
While all the contributions and expenditures listed by CIW fall well outside the 180-day
statute of limitations as discussed above, even the December 7th Report itself falls outside the
statute of limitations. While the report was not due until December 8, 2016, DCRCC originally
filed the report on December 7, 2016. 18 However, CIW didnt file its Complaint until June 6,
2017, or 181-days later. Consequently, CIWs claims have been time-barred, even in regard to
DCRCC requests costs and attorney fees under C.R.S. 1-45-111.5 and 24-4-105(4),
and C.R.C.P. 11. CIWs Complaint lacked substantial justification while subjecting DCRCC to
the costs of litigation in order to defend itself in court. As discussed above, CIWs Complaint
lacked any basis in fact or law. Furthermore, CIW brought this action for the sole purpose of
harassing DCRCC and its officers. Because the litigation instituted by CIW was frivolous,
groundless, and vexatious, this Court should grant DCRCCs request for attorney fees.
A. Legal Standard
Under C.R.S. 24-4-105(4), a Court may award attorney fees for abuses of discovery
Consequently, it may award fees under both C.R.S. 1-45-111.5 and C.R.C.P. 11.
18
See Complaint Exhibit 2, pg. 1.
19
C.R.S. 24-4-105(4).
Page 8 of 16
Under C.R.S. 1-45-111.5(2) a respondent in an administrative action shall recover
attorney fees for defending any claim that is substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or
A party in any action brought to enforce the provisions of Article XXVIII of the
state constitution or of this Article shall be entitled to the recovery of the party's
reasonable attorney fees and costs from any attorney or party who has brought or
defended the action, either in whole or in part, upon a determination by the office
of administrative courts that the action, or any part thereof, lacked substantial
justification or that the action, or any part thereof, was interposed for delay or
harassment or if it finds that an attorney or party unnecessarily expanded the
proceeding by other improper conduct, including, but not limited to, abuses of
discovery procedures available under the Colorado rules of civil procedure.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection (2), no attorney fees may
be awarded under this subsection (2) unless the court or administrative law judge,
as applicable, has first considered the provisions of section 13-17-102 (5) and (6),
C.R.S. For purposes of this subsection (2), "lacked substantial justification"
means substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.
Under well-established law, [a] claim is frivolous if the proponent can present no rational
argument based on the evidence or law in support of the claim. A claim is groundless if the
allegations in the complaint, while sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, are not supported by any credible evidence. 21 Finally, a vexatious claim is one brought
or maintained in bad faith to annoy or harass, and may include conduct that is arbitrary,
The standards for C.R.C.P. 11 (Rule 11) are similar. Rule 11 imposes four
(1) before a pleading is filed there must be a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the
law;
20
C.R.S. 1-45-111.5(2) (2014).
21
Remote Switch Systems, Inc. v. Delangis, 126 P.3d 269, 275 (Colo. App. 2005), cert. denied, 2006 WL 380434;
see also Schmidt Const. Co. v. Becker-Johnson Corp., 817 P.2d 233, 235 (Colo. App. 1994).
22
Engel v. Engel, 902 P.2d 442, 446 (Colo. App. 1995); see also Bd. of Commrs of Boulder v. Eason, 976 P.2d 271,
273-72 (Colo. App. 1998); Bockar v. Patterson, 899 P.2d 233, 235 (Colo. App. 1994).
Page 9 of 16
(2) based on this investigation, the signer must reasonably believe the pleading is well
grounded in fact;
(3) the legal theory asserted in the pleading must be based on existing legal principles
or a good faith argument for the modification of existing law; and
(4) the pleading must not be filed for the purpose of causing delay, harassment, or an
increase in the cost of litigation. 23
While Rule 11 specifically imposes these duties upon the signature of an attorney, it also
recognizes that a party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleadings.
signing pleadings as well or a substantial loophole in the law would be created allowing
parties to evade fundamental obligations and protections of the legal system. This position is
supported by several prior rulings in divisions of this court. 24 In particular, sanctions have
been previously issued against CIW and its principal, Matt Arnold (Arnold). In CIW v.
CFBF, OS 2014-0004, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found CIWs claims were
substantially groundless, 25 noted that Arnold had brought no fewer than 35 fair campaign
practice act complaints 26 (as of the date of this Motion to Dismiss, the number is now 73),
and awarded fees against Arnold and CIW. 27 Similarly, an ALJ sanctioned Arnold for
violating the ALJs orders, noted that Arnold had brought 68 complaints, and awarded
23
Stearns Mgmt. Co. v. Missouri River Servs. Inc., 70 P.3d 629, 632 (Colo. App. 2003) citing Maul v. Shaw, 843
P.2d 139, 141-42 (Colo. App. 1992).
24
In the Matter of the Complaint Filed by Allen M. Mac Williams Regarding Alleged Violations of the Fair
Campaign Practices Act by Donetta Davidson and the Committee to Elect Donetta Davidson (Williams v.
Davidson), OS2003-024 (Office of Admin. Cts. Mar. 2003), Order Granting Request for Attorney Fees, available
at http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/CampaignFinance/complaint/2003/OS2003-024.pdf.
25
In the Matter of the Complaint Filed by Campaign Integrity Watchdog Regarding Alleged Campaign and Political
Finance Violations by Coloradans for a Better Future (CIW v. CFBF), OS 2014-0004, (Office of Admin. Cts.
Feb. 2, 2015), available at http://tracer.sos.colorado.gov/PublicSite/Reporting/IFrameImagePopUp.aspx Order
Awarding Attorney Fees, p. 2-3 (a copy of which can be provided at the Courts request).
26
Id. at p. 4.
27
Id. at p. 6.
28
Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Colorado Pioneer Action and Colorado Right Now, OS 2016-0014 & OS 2016-
Page 10 of 16
Vexations claims subject to an award of attorney fees under Rule 11 include a wide
array of potential behavior. While no single standard exists, Colorado courts have stated that
[a] vexatious claim is one brought or maintained in bad faith. 29 The courts have further
elaborated that such bad faith claims may include, but are not limited to, conduct that is
Because the 180-day statute of limitations expired for all the cited contributions and expenditures
well before CIW filed its Complaint, CIW has neither a legal nor factual basis for bringing its
claims against DCRCC. Consequently, this Court should sanction CIW by awarding DCRCC its
litigious, or disrespectful of truth 31 throughout this matter. First and foremost, Arnold has
DCRCC. As detailed in the attached and incorporated Exhibit C - Affidavit of Jake Viano
and Exhibit D - Affidavit of Jeff Krump, Arnold engaged in a telephone conversation with
DCRCC Chairman Jake Viano (Viano) in the presence of DCRCC Vice-Chairman Jeff
Page 11 of 16
Krump (Krump). During the conversation, Arnold told Viano, Jake, the only reason I
filed this complaint is because one of your vice chairs said fuck you to me. Forcing
DCRCC to defend this lawsuit because Arnold took offense to the comments of one
individual is patently abusive, litigious, and aimed at unwarranted annoyance and harassment
CIW has also maintained this lawsuit despite requests from the DCRCC to voluntarily
dismiss its claims and despite being informed during the telephone case management
conferences that DCRCC believed CIWs claims were time-barred. As a part of its pursuit,
CIW has engaged in discovery requests in violation of the Colorado Civil Rules of Procedure
unnecessary to prove its factual claims. These actions again highlight CIWs attempts to
While CIWs actions against DCRCC seem particularly abusive, they are far from
irregular for CIW. CIW publicly describes this litigious practice as political guerilla legal
divert resources (time & money), and get smeared in the (often-complicit) media. 33
Consequently, many CIW actions follow the same pattern: complaints based on minor errors are
filed in close proximity to the 180-day statutes of limitations expiration (Section 9(2)(a) and 1-
(2017) accrue at a rate of fifty dollars per day, the longer the period between the alleged
violation and the complaint, the greater the penalty. Consequently, by filing in close proximity to
32
Matt Arnold, Turning the Tables Fighting Back against the Lefts Lawfare in Colorado. Common Sense News
(Feb. 2014), B-7, https://issuu.com/avinnola/docs/csn_digital_press_ed_feb_14
33
Id., B-4.
Page 12 of 16
the statute of limitations, CIW is effectively maximizing potential penalties against political
opponents..
For example, in CIW v. Colo. Republican Party PAC, 34 , CIW filed its complaint based
on missing information related to two three dollar contributions. 35 CIW filed its complaint
exactly 180 days after the committees report had been filed, leading CIW to seek a $36,000
penalty. 36 The same pattern also played out in a set of concurrent lawsuits brought by CIW
against four candidate committees. CIW filed complaints against McLachlan for Colorado 37;
Friends of Joe Salazar 38; the Committee to Elect Brittany Pettersen 39; and Dave Young for
Colorado. 40 In each instance, CIW filed the complaints on September 23, 2015, or 154 days
after the committees allegedly deficient reports were filed on April 15, 2015. In each complaint,
CIW alleged a failure to report contributions to pay for penalties or legal services incurred by the
committees in relation to prior complaints brought by CIW. Importantly, because CIW was
directly involved in the first set of complaints that led to the second set, it had reason to review
the reports and file the second set of complaints soon after the reports were filed in April.
Instead, it filed all four complaints over 150 days after the reports had been filed and the
34
Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Colo. Republican Party Political Action Committee (CIW v. Colo. Republican
Party PAC) OS 2016-0002 (Office of Admin. Cts. Apr. 12, 2016) available at http://tracer.sos.colorado.gov
/PublicSite/SearchPages/ComplaintDetail.aspx?ID=389.
35
Id., Findings of Fact #4 and #10
36
Id., Findings of Fact #12.
37
Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. McLachlan for Colorado, OS 2015-0015 (Office of Admin. Cts. Nov. 30, 2015)
available at http://tracer.sos.colorado.gov/PublicSite/SearchPages/ComplaintDetail.aspx?ID=376)
38
Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Friends of Joe Salazar, OS 2015-0019 (Office of Admin. Cts. Dec. 3, 2015)
available at http://tracer.sos.colorado.gov/PublicSite/SearchPages/ComplaintDetail.aspx?ID=377)
39
Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Committee to Elect Brittany Pettersen, OS 2015-0018 (Office of Admin. Cts.
Jan. 13, 2016) available at http://tracer.sos.colorado.gov/PublicSite/SearchPages/ComplaintDetail.aspx?ID=378)
40
Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Dave Young for Colorado, OS 2015-0017 (Office of Admin. Cts. Jan. 13, 2016)
available at http://tracer.sos.colorado.gov/PublicSite/SearchPages/ComplaintDetail.aspx?ID=379)
Page 13 of 16
Most disconcerting, CIW regularly leverages the cost of litigation and threat of onerous
penalties to profit through settlements with the committees he brings suit against. In a case
against the Colorado Republican Committee, CIW offered to settle the case in exchange for
Defend Colorado, listed a payment of $4,500 to CIW as a Settlement in its campaign finance
reports. 42
Though CIW has not requested any settlement payments from DCRCC, its claims fit the
same litigious and abusive behavior meant to annoy and harass DCRCC. The Court should
sanction the behavior of CIW and Arnold by awarding attorney fees and costs for this
vexatious behavior.
At the time of this filing, CIW has not voluntarily withdrawn its Complaint under C.R.S.
13-17-102(5), even though it reasonably should have known it could not prevail on its claims.
Additionally, because CIW chose to continue this litigation well beyond the time when the
relevant facts were publicly available, it has substantially increased the resources in time and
cost that DCRCC has incurred in relation to this case. CIWs continued prosecution only serves
The Court also should not relieve CIW from attorney fees under C.R.S. 13-17-102(6).
Though Arnold is not an attorney, he has consciously chosen to represent CIW in this case, citing
to specific statutes allowing him to do so. 43 In fact, Arnold has brought sixty nine (69) campaign
41
Corey Hutchins, Watchdog or bully? How a $10,000 fine led to a GOP blowup, Colo. Indep. (Feb. 5, 2016),
http://www.coloradoindependent.com/157936/watchdog-or-bully-how-a-10000-fine-led-to-a-gop-blowup.
42
See http://tracer.sos.colorado.gov/PublicSite/SearchPages/ExpenditureDetail.aspx
?SeqID=583522&filingid=207719 ($4,500 settlement paid on 2/2/2016 to CIW by Protect and Defend Colorado).
43
Complaint, 1-8.
Page 14 of 16
finance complaints on behalf of CIW since January 2014. Arnold is a sophisticated consumer of
legal goods and reasonably should have known that his actions were substantially frivolous,
Williams v. Davidson. 44 CIW and Arnold are clearly well aware of the burdens they must meet
s/ Mario Nicolais
Mario Nicolais
Attorney for Respondent Denver County Republican Central
Committee
44
Williams v. Davidson, p. 5.
Page 15 of 16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 28th day of July 2017, I duly filed the above Motion to
Dismiss & Request for Attorney Fees via email, addressed to:
s/Mario Nicolais
Mario Nicolais
Page 16 of 16
January 2015 CAMPAIGN AND POLITICAL FINANCE July 2015
Exhibit A
Email: cpfhelp@sos.state.co.us Rev. 12/2014
Reporting: TRACER.sos.colorado.gov
January 2016 CAMPAIGN AND POLITICAL FINANCE July 2016
S M T W T F S
Small Donor Committees
S M T W T F S
527 Political Organizations
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Independent Expenditure Committees
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 June 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 7 21st Day before the Primary Election, Report covers: 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 October 29, 2015 through June 2, 2016 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
OR
28 29 28 29 30 31
November 29, 2015 through June 2, 2016
March 2016 24 Friday before the Primary Election - Report covers June 3, 2016 through September 2016
June 19, 2016
S M T W T F S S M T W T F S
28 Primary Election
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3
July
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
28 30th Day after the Primary Election - Report covers June 20, 2016 through
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 July 23, 2016 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
October
27 28 29 30 31 18 21st Day before the General Election, Report covers July 24, 2016 through 25 26 27 28 29 30
April 2016 October 13, 2016
October 2016
S M T W T F S
November
S M T W T F S
4 Friday before the General Election - Report covers October 14, 2016 through
1 2 October 30, 2016 1
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 8 General Election 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 December 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 8 30th Day after the General Election - Report covers October 31, 2016 through
16 17 18 19 20 21 22
December 3, 2016
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 23 24
25 26 27 28 29
30 31
May 2016 This calendar does not include the 24 Hour Notice of Major Contributor or the 48 Hour November 2016
Notice of Independent Expenditure reports that may be required based on certain
S M T W T F S activity. The period during which these reports may be required begins 30 days before S M T W T F S
the primary and general election and ends the day before the election. Electioneering
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 communications reports may also be required beginning 30 days before a Primary and 1 2 3 4 5
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 60 days before a General. Refer to the Campaign Finance manual for more information.
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Infrequent/Annual calendar Refer to Campaign Finance Rule 17:
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Candidates and candidate committees whose office will not appear
29 30 31 on the Primary or General Election Ballot in 2016 27 28 29 30
June 2016 Issue committees whose issue will not attempt access to or appear December 2016
on the November 8, 2016 General Election ballot
S M T W T F S S M T W T F S
November
1 2 3 4 1 2 3
1 Annual Report covers:
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 October 29, 2015 through October 27, 2016 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 OR
11 12 13 14 15 16 17
19 20 21 22 23 24 25
November 29, 2015 through October 27, 2016
18 19 20 21 22 23 24
26 27 28 29 30 Published by the Colorado Secretary of State 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
www.sos.state.co.us
Campaign Finance Support Team:
Election Day Report Due Dates Tel: (303) 894-2200 ext. 6383
Email: cpfhelp@sos.state.co.us
Exhibit B
Rev. 01/2016
Reporting: TRACER.sos.colorado.gov
Exhibit C
Exhibit C
Exhibit D
I, JeffKrump, declme rmder eefifiltlz of pmjury that the foXlor*,iag statements arc true and
1. I am over eighteem years of agen am c,cnape,tent ttr rnake this ltffidavi[ and have
perenal kamwledge cf the fasts stated in this ltffidalrit" I would teffi, kuthfidly to the f,acts set
{'"DCRCC*)"
3" 0* the afternaou cf Juue tr6dq 2&l?,I was present with Jacoh
6T*e?e
Viarec
spkerphone firlrc.tioa while speaki$g with Arnold, I cCIuld hear tN:th ends of,{he cqrnversatien-
4- fiteriag the telryhcne ccnferemce, Arumtrd stded r'.nake, tfue *nllt reet#Im {filed t&is
eomplaiwl is heefiu,se orue af y*wr rriee chsirs s*id -FUCK Y{}A' t$ ?ffe" - I believe tlre vice-chair
Datedt**s 2?day of
OF Cotocadr-'
STATHDISTRICT )
COLNTYOF ftrc.panoe. , '*'
lN.chowledgd sutscriUd, and surorn to before rle on this)l day of
24fi.
r
P<We'c- L*,
It{otary Public
REBECCAGROGAN
i\{y Commission Expires: Rlc \ I
r}r1}0
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF COLORADO
NOTARY lD 20164005742
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES FEBRUARY
11,2020
Table 1 - DCRCC Contributions Listed in CIW Complaint