Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
RULES OF PROCEDURE
BOOK VI
National Government Budgeting
CHAPTER 1
General Provisions
SECTION 1. Constitutional Policies on the
Budget.(1) All appropriations, revenue or tariff
bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
(2) The Congress may not increase the
appropriations recommended by the President
for the operation of the Government as
specified in the budget. The form, content and
manner of preparation of the budget shall be
prescribed by law.
(3) No provision or enactment shall be
embraced in the general appropriations bill
unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation to which it relates.
(4) The procedures in approving appropriations
for the Congress shall strictly follow the
procedure for approving appropriations for
other departments and agencies.
(5) A special appropriations bill shall specify the
purpose for which it is intended, and shall be
supported by funds actually available as certified
by the National Treasurer or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal therein.
(6) No law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations. However, the
President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the
heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by
law, be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations laws for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
(7) Discretionary funds appropriated for
particular official shall be disbursed only for
public purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may
be prescribed by law.
(8) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress
shall have failed to pass the general
appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year,
the general appropriations law for the preceding
fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall
remain in force and effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
(9) Fiscal autonomy shall be enjoyed by the
Judiciary, Constitutional Commissions, Office of
the Ombudsman, Local Government and
Commission on Human Rights.
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms.When used in
this Book:
(1) Appropriation refers to an authorization
made by law or other legislative enactment,
directing payment out of government funds
under specified conditions or for specified
purposes.
(2) Allotment refers to an authorization issued
by the Department of the Budget to an agency,
which allows it to incur obligations for specified
amounts contained in a legislative appropriation.
(3) Budget refers to a financial plan required
to be prepared pursuant to Section 16(1), Article
VIII of the Constitution, reflective of national
objectives, strategies and programs.
(4) Current operating expenditures refers to
appropriations for the purchase of goods and
services for current consumption or for benefits
expected to terminate within the fiscal year.
(5) Capital outlay or capital expenditures
refers to an appropriation for the purchase of
goods and services, the benefits of which extend
beyond the fiscal year and which add to the
assets of the Government, including investments
in the capital of government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
(6) Continuing appropriation refers to an
appropriation available to support obligations
for a specified purpose or project, even when
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these obligations are incurred beyond the
budget year.
(7) Expected result means service, product, or
benefit that will accrue to the public, estimated
in terms of performance measures or targets.
(8) Fiscal year refers to the period beginning
with the first day of January and ending with the
thirty-first day of December of each calendar
year.
(9) The Government means the National
Government, including the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judicial Branches, and the
Constitutional Commissions.
(10) Department and agency and department
or agency include all departments, bureaus,
offices, boards, commissions, courts, tribunals,
councils, authorities, administrations, centers,
institutes, state colleges and universities, and all
other establishments and instrumentalities of
the National Government as defined in the
preceding paragraph.
(11) Obligation refers to an amount
committed to be paid by the Government for
any lawful act made by an authorized officer for
and in behalf of the government.
(12) Program refers to the functions and
activities necessary for the performance of a
major purpose for which a government agency is
established.
(13) Project means a component of a program
covering a homogenous group of activities that
results in the accomplishment of an identifiable
output.
CHAPTER 2
Budget Policy and Approach
SECTION 3. Declaration of Policy.It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to formulate and
implement a National Budget that is an
instrument of national development, reflective
of national objectives, strategies and plans. The
budget shall be supportive of and consistent
with the socio-economic development plan and
shall be oriented towards the achievement of
explicit objectives and expected results, to
ensure that funds are utilized and operations are
conducted effectively, economically and
efficiently. The national budget shall be
formulated within the context of a regionalized
government structure and of the totality of
revenues and other receipts, expenditures and
borrowings of all levels of government and of
government-owned or controlled corporations.
The budget shall likewise be prepared within the
context of the national long-term plan and of a
long-term budget program.
SECTION 4. Planning and Budgeting Linkage.
The budget shall be formulated as an instrument
for the attainment of national development
goals and as part of the planning-programming-
budgeting continuum. Levels of revenue,
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expenditure and debt shall be established in
relation to macro-economic targets of growth,
employment levels, and price level change, and
shall be developed consistent with domestic and
foreign debt, domestic credit and balance of
payments objectives for the budget period. The
aggregate magnitudes of the budget shall be
determined in close consultation among the
planning and fiscal agencies of government.
Budgetary priorities shall be those specified in
the approved national plans, keeping in mind
the capability and performance of the
implementing agencies concerned. Agency
budget proposals shall explicitly state linkage to
approved agency plans.
SECTION 5. National Resource Budget.The
finances of government shall be analyzed and
determined as the aggregate of revenue,
expenditure and debt of all units of government,
including the national government and its
agencies and instrumentalities, local
government units and government-owned or
controlled corporations. The national
government budget shall be evolved within the
framework of the total impact of government
activity on the national economy. The budgets of
government corporations and local governments
shall be consistent in form and timing with that
of the national government, to facilitate
comprehensive evaluation.
SECTION 6. Regional Budgeting.The budgets of
national government agencies shall take into full
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and explicit consideration the goals, plans and
requirements of their respective regional offices,
in the interest of full government response to
local thinking and initiative. The budget
preparation process shall originate at regional
and local levels, and shall be consolidated and
reviewed by the central offices of the various
national agencies. The regional development
strategies and plans, including physical
framework and resource-use plans, shall be
considered in the preparation of the budget.
SECTION 7. Long Term Budgeting.The annual
budgets of the national government shall be
prepared as an integral part of a long-term
budget picture. The long-term economic and
physical framework plans of government, multi-
year requirements of approved programs and
projects, organizational and personnel
development strategies, and other
commitments entered into or otherwise
assumed by government shall be specified in the
budget process.
SECTION 8. Development Projects.The
development process requires the
implementation of major development projects
of such size as to significantly affect the
infrastructure program, debt ceilings, the
balance of payments, domestic credit, and
government expenditure levels. The budget
process shall formally consider the timing of
major national projects, in order to ensure the
observance of established fiscal, monetary,
international payments, and other constraints.
SECTION 9. Performance and Financial
Review.The analysis of agency operating
performance, the evaluation of performance
relative to costs incurred and the review of
agency operating systems and procedures are
inherent parts of the budget process. Agencies
shall therefore design and implement (1)
management information systems yielding both
performance and financial information which
will adequately monitor and control budget
implementation, and (2) improvements in
operating systems, procedures and practices, so
as to ensure that the targets approved in budget
authorization are in fact attained at minimum
cost.
SECTION 10. Compensation and Position
Classification.The size of personnel services
expenditures relative to the total budget and the
number of agencies and personnel in
government call for an effective national
compensation and position classification policy.
The Constitutional principle of a single
compensation scheme for the government and
its instrumentalities is one of the bases of the
government budget process.
CHAPTER 3
Budget Preparation
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SECTION 11. Submission of the Budget.The
President shall, in accordance with Section
22(1), article VII of the Constitution, submit
within thirty (30) days from the opening of each
regular session of the Congress as the basis for
the preparation of the General Appropriations
Act, a national government budget estimated
receipts based on existing and proposed
revenue measures, and of estimated
expenditures.
The President shall include in the budget
submission the proposed expenditure level of
the Legislative and Judicial Branches and of
Constitutional bodies, which shall have
undergone the same process of evaluation and
which shall have been subject to the same
budgetary policies and standards applicable to
agencies in the Executive Branch.
The President may transmit to the Congress
from time to time, such proposed supplemental
or deficiency appropriations as are, in his
judgment, (1) necessary on account of laws
enacted after the transmission of the Budget, or
(2) otherwise needed in the public interest.
SECTION 12. Form and Content of the Budget.
The budget proposal of the President shall
include current operating expenditures and
capital outlays. It shall comprise such funds as
may be necessary for the operation of the
programs, projects and activities of the various
departments and agencies. The proposed
General Appropriations Act and other
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Appropriations Acts necessary to cover the
budget proposals shall be submitted to the
Congress to accompany the Presidents budget
submission.
The budget shall be presented to the Congress
in such form and content as may be approved by
the President and may include the following:
(1) A budget message setting forth in brief the
governments budgetary thrusts for the budget
year, including their impact on development
goals, monetary and fiscal objectives, and
generally on the implications of the revenue,
expenditure and debt proposals; and
(2) Summary financial statements setting forth:
(a) Estimated expenditures and proposed
appropriations necessary for the support of the
Government for the ensuing fiscal year,
including those financed from operating
revenues and from domestic and foreign
borrowings;
(b) Estimated receipts during the ensuing fiscal
year under laws existing at the time the budget
is transmitted and under the revenue proposals,
if any, forming part of the years financing
program;
(c) Actual appropriations, expenditures, and
receipts during the last completed fiscal year;
(d) Estimated expenditures and receipts and
actual or proposed appropriations during the
fiscal year in progress;
(e) Statements of the condition of the National
Treasury at the end of the last completed fiscal
year, the estimated condition of the Treasury at
the end of the fiscal year in progress and the
estimated condition of the Treasury at the end
of the ensuing fiscal year, taking into account
the adoption of financial proposals contained in
the budget and showing, at the same time, the
unencumbered and unobligated cash resources;
(f) Essential facts regarding the bonded and
other long-term obligations and indebtedness of
the Government, both domestic and foreign,
including identification of recipients of loan
proceeds; and
(g) Such other financial statements and data as
are deemed necessary or desirable in order to
make known in reasonable detail the financial
condition of the government.
SECTION 13. Budget Levels.The ordinary
income of government shall be used primarily to
provide appropriations for current operations,
except in case of a national emergency or
serious financial stress, the existence of which
has been duly proclaimed by the President.
The level of aggregate revenue expenditure and
debt shall be jointly recommended to the
President by the Department of Budget and
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Management, the Department of Finance, the
National Economic and Development Authority
and the Central Bank of the Philippines, acting
within the Development Budget Coordination
Committee of the National Economic and
Development Authority.
No appropriations for current operations and
capital outlays of the Government shall be
proposed unless the amount involved is covered
by the ordinary income, or unless it is supported
by a proposal creating additional sources of
funds or revenue, including those generated
from domestic and foreign borrowings,
sufficient to cover the same. Likewise, no
appropriation for any expenditure, the amount
of which is not covered by the estimated income
from the existing sources of revenue or available
current surplus, may be proposed, unless it is
supported by a proposal creating an additional
source of funds sufficient to cover the same.
Proposals creating additional sources of funds
shall be prepared in the form of revenue bills.
The provisions of this section shall not be
construed as impairing in any way the power of
the Congress to enact revenue and
appropriation bills, nor the authority of the
President to propose special revenue and
appropriation bills after the submission of the
budget.
SECTION 14. Budget Estimates.Each head of
department, office or agency of the National
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Government, including the Legislative and
Judicial Branches, and including government
owned or controlled corporations, shall submit
his request for appropriations to the
Department of Budget in accordance with the
budget calendar, format, and such rules and
regulations as may be issued in implementation
of this Decree.
The budget estimates of agencies include the
following information:
(1) Objectives, functions, activities, programs
and projects showing the general character and
relative importance of the work to be
accomplished or the services to be rendered,
and the principal elements of cost involved;
(2) Linkage of the work and financial proposals
to approved development plans;
(3) Estimated current operating expenditures
and capital outlays, with comparative data for
the preceding and current budget years;
(4) Identification by region, pursuant to policies
on the regionalization of government
operations;
(5) Financial sources, reflecting all revenues,
proceeds of foreign and domestic borrowings,
and other sources, particularly those which
accrue to the General Fund;
(6) Contingent liabilities, including national
government guarantees of obligations of
government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries;
(7) Brief description of the major thrusts and
priority programs and projects for the budget
year, results expected for each budgetary
program and project, the nature of work to be
performed, estimated costs per unit of work
measurement, including the various objects of
expenditure for each project;
(8) Organization charts and staffing patterns
indicating the list of existing and proposed
positions with corresponding salaries, and
proposals for position classification and salary
changes, duly supported by adequate
justification.
SECTION 15. Regional Budget.The Budgets of
national government agencies shall be prepared
taking into full and careful consideration the
opportunities and requirements specific to the
various regions of the country. Where they are
organized, regional offices shall originate agency
budget proposals, in accordance with approved
priorities and guidelines.
Agencies which are not regionalized shall
nonetheless estimate the amounts planned to
be spent for each region of the country.
The Secretary shall identify by region the
expenditure programs of the national
government agencies in the national
government budget, and release funds to
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national government agencies in accordance
with the approved regional distribution of
expenditures, specifying the region of
destination.
Departments and agencies shall sub-allot in full
and without the imposition of reserves, the
approved budget allocation of their various
regional offices, except as may be authorized by
the Secretary, in case realignment of
expenditures prove to be necessary in the
course of budget execution. The Secretary shall
issue the rules and regulations needed to
implement the provisions of this section.
SECTION 16. Budget Evaluation.Agency
proposals shall be reviewed on the basis of their
own merits and not on the basis of a given
percentage or peso increase or decrease from a
prior years budget level, or other similar rule of
thumb that is not based on specific justification.
Proposed activities, whether new or ongoing,
shall be evaluated using a zero-base approach
and on the basis of (1) relationship with the
approved development plan, (2) agency
capability as demonstrated by past
performance, (3) complemental role with
related activities of other agencies, and (4) other
similar criteria. The realization of savings in a
given budget year and the consequent non-
utilization of funds appropriated or released to a
given agency shall not be a negative factor in the
budget evaluation for a subsequent year.
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SECTION 17. Foreign-Assisted Projects.The
budgetary implications of foreign-assisted
projects shall be explicitly considered at the time
of project design and financing negotiation. The
project study shall specify the cash flow
requirements of the project, among others, for
(1) payment of principal and interest, (2) peso
component of capital costs and project
preparation, (3) infrastructure and support
facilities needed to be directly financed by
government, (4) operating and other
expenditures which will be ultimately required
for General Fund support when the project is
implemented, and (5) peso requirements
needed as counterpart. The concurrence of the
Department of Budget and Management shall
be obtained with respect to peso requirements
and implication on expenditure ceilings.
SECTION 18. Coordinating Bodies.The budgets
of coordinating agencies, councils, task forces,
authorities, committees, or other similar bodies
shall be limited to and used to fund only such
planning, coordinating and monitoring functions
as are assigned to it. Funds for implementation
shall be budgeted and released to the line
implementing agencies concerned: provided,
that the budgets of coordinating bodies may
include a lump-sum for purposes related to their
assigned functions, which lump-sum shall be
sub-allotted to implementing agencies and not
used by the agency for its own operations:
provided, further, that funds budgeted for a
given agency falling within the jurisdiction of a
coordinating body, may be subject to release
upon approval by the coordinating agency of
such release or of the agencys work program.
SECTION 19. Budgetary Requirements of
Government-Owned or Controlled
Corporations.The internal operating budgets
of government-owned or controlled
corporations and of chartered institutions shall
be approved by their respective governing
boards in accordance with a budget calendar
and format as may be approved by the
President: Provided, that such budgets shall be
subject to review and approval as part of the
budget process in cases where national
government budgetary support is needed, in
terms of (a) capital or equity inputs, (b)
operating contributions to support specific
activities undertaken by the institution as part of
its regular functions, and (c) guarantee of the
national government for obligations or contracts
entered into by the corporations: provided,
further, that the submission of interim financial
statements may be required by the Secretary.
SECTION 20. Tax and Duty Exemption.All units
of government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall pay income taxes,
customs duties and other taxes and fees as are
imposed under revenue law: provided, that
organizations otherwise exempted by law for
the payment of such taxes/duties may ask for a
subsidy from the General Fund in the exact
amount of taxes/duties due: Provided, further,
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that a procedure shall be established by the
Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of the
Budget, whereby such subsidies shall
automatically be considered as both revenue
and expenditure of the General Fund.
SECTION 21. Appropriation for Personal
Services.Appropriations for personal services
shall be considered as included in the amount
specified for each budgetary program and
project of each department, bureau, office or
agency, and shall not be itemized. The
itemization of personal services shall be
prepared by the Secretary for consideration and
approval of the President as provided in Section
23 hereof: Provided, That the itemization of
personal services shall be prepared for all
agencies of the Legislative, Executive and
Judicial Branches and the Constitutional bodies,
except as may be otherwise approved by the
President for positions concerned with national
security matters.
SECTION 22. Department Approval of Proposed
Appropriations.No legislative proposal which,
if enacted, would authorize subsequent
appropriations, shall be transmitted to the
President by any bureau or agency, without the
prior approval of the Head of the Department
concerned or by the Chairman or Chief
Executive Officer of a Cabinet level body which
coordinates the multi-sectoral formulation and
implementation of a particular program of
expenditure involving one or more departments.
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No legislative proposal involving the
appropriation of funds shall be transmitted to
the Congress without the approval of the
President.
CHAPTER 4
Budget Authorization
SECTION 23. Content of the General
Appropriations Act.The General
Appropriations Act shall be presented in the
form of budgetary programs and projects for
each agency of the government, with the
corresponding appropriations for each program
and project, including statutory provisions of
specific agency or general applicability. The
General Appropriations Act shall not contain any
itemization of personal services, which shall be
prepared by the Secretary after enactment of
the General Appropriations Act, for
consideration and approval of the President.
SECTION 24. Prohibition Against the Increase of
Appropriation.The Congress shall in no case
increase the appropriation of any project or
program of any department, bureau, agency or
office of the Government over the amount
submitted by the President in his budget
proposal. In case of any reduction in the
proposed appropriation for a project or
program, a corresponding reduction shall be
made in the total appropriation of the
department, office or agency concerned and in
the total of the General Appropriations Bill.
SECTION 25. Prohibition Against Enactment of
Additional Special Provisions.The Congress
shall not add special provisions in the budget
earmarking the use of appropriations for specific
programs or activities nor shall it increase the
amounts specified in special provisions, beyond
those proposed by the President.
SECTION 26. Automatic Appropriations.All
expenditures for (1) personnel retirement
premiums, government service insurance, and
other similar fixed expenditures, (2) principal
and interest on public debt, (3) national
government guarantees of obligations which are
drawn upon, are automatically appropriated:
Provided, that no obligations shall be incurred or
payments made from funds thus automatically
appropriated except as issued in the form of
regular budgetary allotments.
SECTION 27. Supplemental Appropriations.All
appropriation proposals shall be included and
considered in the budget preparation process.
After the President shall have submitted the
Budget, no supplemental appropriation measure
supported from existing revenue measures shall
be passed by the Congress. However,
supplemental or deficiency appropriations
involving the creation of new offices, programs
or activities may be enacted if accompanied and
supported by new revenue sources.
SECTION 28. Reversion of Unexpended Balances
of Appropriations, Continuing Appropriations.
Unexpended balances of appropriations
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authorized in the General Appropriation Act
shall revert to the unappropriated surplus of the
General Fund at the end of the fiscal year and
shall not thereafter be available for expenditure
except by subsequent legislative enactment:
Provided, that appropriations for capital outlays
shall remain valid until fully spent or reverted:
Provided, further, that continuing appropriations
for current operating expenditures may be
specifically recommended and approved as such
in support of projects whose effective
implementation calls for multi-year expenditure
commitments: Provided, finally, that the
President may authorize the use of savings
realized by an agency during a given year to
meet non-recurring expenditures in a
subsequent year.
The balances of continuing appropriations shall
be reviewed as part of the annual budget
preparation process and the preparation
process and the President may approve upon
recommendation of the Secretary, the reversion
of funds no longer needed in connection with
the activities funded by said continuing
appropriations.
SECTION 29. Loan Proceeds.Expenditures
funded by foreign and domestic borrowings shall
be included within the expenditure program of
the agency concerned. Loan proceeds, whether
in cash or in kind, shall not be used without the
corresponding release of funds through a Special
Budget as herein provided.
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SECTION 30. Contingent Liabilities.
Government agencies, particularly government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall
periodically report to the Secretary of Finance
and the Secretary of Budget on the status of
obligations they have entered into and which
are the subject of government guarantees.
SECTION 31. Liability for Unauthorized Printing
Press Revisions.It shall be unlawful for any
person to make any unauthorized revision of any
figure, text or provision in the General
Appropriations Act and in the other budget
documents during or in the process of the
printing. Any unauthorized change made either
by addition, modification or deletion, shall be
null and void.
Persons who, in violation of this section, make
any unauthorized revision in the budget
documents, shall be criminally liable for
falsification of legislative documents under the
Revised Penal Code. When the offender is a
government official or employee, he shall, in
addition to criminal prosecution, be dismissed
from the service.
G.R. No. 89687. September 26, 1990.*
MARIA B. LUPO,
petitioner, vs. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
BOARD (AAB) (Department of Transportation
& Communications Republic of the Philippines)
and JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ,
respondents.
Administrative Law; Civil Service; Decisions of
heads of departments in all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a
penalty of suspension for more than 30 days, or
fine in an amount exceeding 30 days' salary are
subject to appeal to the Civil Service
Commission.It should be noted that under
Section 37 (b) as aforequoted, the decisions of
heads of departments become final only in
cases where the penalty imposed is suspension
for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an
amount not exceeding thirty (30) days' salary. In
the case, therefore, of petitioner who had been
made to suffer the penalty of suspension for
one (1) year, such penalty should not have been
implemented without the appeal to the Civil
Service Commission for proper review. Notably,
paragraph (a) of the above Section explicitly
provides that the Commission shall decide upon
appeal all administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of
suspension for more than 30 days, or fine in an
amount exceeding 30 days' salary. Clearly, the
enforcement of the penalty imposed upon
petitioner under the resolution of the Secretary
of the Department of Transportation and
Communications was premature.
Same; Due Process; Cardinal primary
requirements of due process in administrative
proceedings.Thus, in the case of Jose Rizal
College v. National Labor Relations Commission
(G.R. No. 65482, December 1, 1987) this Court
reiterated the "cardinal primary" requirements
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of due process in administrative proceedings
and these are: (1) the right to a hearing which
includes, the right to present one's case and
submit evidence in support thereof; (2) the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) the decision must have something to
support itself; (4) the evidence must be
substantial, and substantial evidence means
such evidence as a reasonable mind must
accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (5)
the decision must be based on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected; (6) the tribunal or body or any of its
judges must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate; (7) the board or body should in
all controversial questions, render its decision in
such manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered. (Italics
supplied)
PARAS, J.:
In this petition for prohibition, petitioner seeks
the issuance of an order or writ of prohibition
which would direct public respondents
Administrative Action Board and Chairman
Onofre A. Villaluz to permanently desist from
assuming jurisdiction over Adm. Case No. AAB-
034-88 until the same is finally disposed of by
the Telecoms Office, Region V at Legaspi City
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and to refrain from issuing orders setting the
aforecited case for hearing.
Petitioner substantially assails the Resolution
dated September 30, 1988 of then Secretary
Rainerio O. Reyes of the Department of
Transportation and Communications which
suspended her for one year and disqualified her
for promotion for a period of one year and also,
the Order of July 5, 1989 of Chairman Onofre A.
Villaluz of the Administrative Action Board of
said department which set Adm. Case No. AAB-
034-88 for trial.
The prefatory facts are:
On November 5, 1987, Fructuoso B. Arroyo,
OIC/CDO, Message Center and then CDO of
Telecom Office stationed at Buhi, Camarines
Sur, filed a complaint for Dishonesty Thru
Falsification (Multiple) of Official Documents
against Maria B. Lupo, herein petitioner, as
Chief of Personnel Section, Telecom Office,
Region V at Legaspi City. The complaint was
based on the alleged exclusion of several names
from the Certification (on the list of employees)
submitted by petitioner in compliance with a
Confidential Memorandum of Director Claro
Morante.
The aforesaid complaint was actually triggered
off by the inquiry of Ignacio B. Arroyo, brother
of complainant Fructuoso B. Arroyo, into the
alleged illegal termination of the former's niece,
Nenita Arroyo Noceda, as a daily wage clerk at
Buhi Telecom Exchange in Camarines Sur, in
violation of a contract previously entered into
between a certain Gloria D. Palermo, lot donor
and former Bureau Director Ceferino S.
Carreon, donee of the lot. The lot is located at
Sta. Clara, Buhi on which the Telecom Office
was to be constructed. This inquiry of Ignacio B.
Arroyo was dismissed for lack of merit on
September 16, 1987.
It appears that the basis for the complaint of
Fructuoso Arroyo from whom Ignacio sought
assistance was petitioner's exclusion of certain
names of newly hired employees in Region V
who appeared related to certain ranking
officials of the region, for the purpose of
keeping under wraps the appointment of said
employees from Ignacio Arroyo who had
previously complained of the alleged illegal
termination of his niece Nenita A. Noceda.
Petitioner had to falsify the list which she
submitted in compliance with Regional Director
Morante's Confidential Memorandum to the
alleged prejudice of Noceda and for the
purpose of protecting her future interest in the
sense that those excluded (who should have
been included) were close relatives of ranking
officials of the Telecommunications Office of
Region V. Telecom Investigator Florencio
Calapano, acting on the unverified complaint of
Fructuoso Arroyo, conducted an informal fact-
finding inquiry and came out with a
Memorandum recommending that petitioner
be sternly warned that a repetition of a similar
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
offense in the future would be dealt with more
drastically and that the case should be
considered closed.
Based solely on the aforesaid Memorandum,
the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications handed
down a Resolution on September 30, 1988
finding petitioner "guilty as charged" and
suspending her for one year and disqualify her
for promotion for a period of one year.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
resolution but the same was denied. She thus
appealed the resolution and order of denial of
the motion for reconsideration to the Civil
Service Commission for review, anchoring her
appeal on lack of due process in the
proceedings.
On March 2, 1989 the Civil Service Commission,
thru its Merit Systems Board, issued the Order
setting aside the resolution of the Department
of Transportation and Communications and
remanding the case to the Telecom Office of
Region V for further investigation to conform
with the procedural requirements of due
process.
Instead of complying with the above order,
respondent Chairman Villaluz of the AAB issued
the Order of July 5, 1989 setting the case for
trial on August 3, 1989.
On August 2, 1989, petitioner filed a
Manifestation and Motion informing
Page 9 of 82

respondent Villaluz that no formal charge had
been instituted by the Telecommunications
Office against her and respondents, therefore,
had no jurisdiction over the case. Respondents
denied said manifestation and motion for lack
of merit in the Order of August 7, 1989 and
again set the case for hearing on August 23,
1989.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner avers that respondent AAB never
acquired jurisdiction over Adm. Case No. AAB-
034-88 because of the absence of a formal
charge against her and that the proceedings
conducted by Regional Investigator Florencio
Calapano was a mere fact-finding inquiry.
Respondent Chairman of the AAB however,
contends that the Order of the Merit Systems
Board of the Civil Service Commission was
rendered without lawful authority since
petitioner's appeal to said Board was filed when
the assailed resolution had already become
final and executory; that the Board, not having
acquired jurisdiction to entertain the appeal for
having been filed beyond the reglementary
period could not have legally rendered its
decision in the said administrative case.
Likewise, respondents claim that Regional
Office No. V could no longer take cognizance of
the case as per order of the Merit Systems
Board for the reason that the decision had
already become final and executory.
Complaints against employees, like petitioner
herein, who belong to the Civil Service Career
System are still governed by P.D. No. 807. This
mandate of P.D. No. 807 has been recognized
and implemented by respondent Administrative
Action Board when it declared in Office Order
No. 88-318 dated July 1, 1988 that the Board
shall observe the pertinent civil service rules
and policies designed to expedite action on
cases referred to it. (Emphasis supplied)
The pertinent provisions of the aforecited Civil
Service Law read as follows:
SECTION 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (a) The
Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more
than thirty days, or fine in an amount,
exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank
or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from
office. A complaint may be filed directly with
the Commission by a private citizen against a
government official or employee in which case
it may hear any department or agency or and
decide the case or it may deputize official or
group of officials to conduct the investigation.
The results of the investigation shall be
submitted to the Commission with
recommendation as to the penalty to be
imposed or other action to be taken.
(b) The heads of departments, agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. Their
decisions shall be final in case the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty
days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty
days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a
bureau or office head is appealable to the
Commission, the same may be initially appealed
to the department and finally to the
Commission and pending appeal, the same shall
be executory except when the penalty is
removal, in which case the same shall be
executory only after confirmation by the
department head.
(c) An investigation may be entrusted to
regional director or similar officials who shall
make the necessary report and
recommendation to the chief of bureau or
office or department within the period specified
in Paragraph (d) of the following Section.
(d) An appeal shall not stop the decision from
being executory, and in case the penalty is
suspension or removal, the respondent shall be
considered as having been under preventive
suspension during the pendency of the appeal
in the event he wins an appeal.
SEC. 38. Procedure in Administrative Cases
Against Non-Presidential Appointees. a)
Administrative proceedings may be commenced
against a subordinate officer or employee by
the head of department or office of equivalent
Page 10 of 82

rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of
agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn,
written complaint of any other persons.
(b) In the case of a complaint filed by any other
persons, the complainant shall submit sworn
statements covering his testimony and those of
his witnesses together with his documentary
evidence. If on the basis of such papers a prima
facie case is found not to exist, the disciplining
authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima
facie case exist, he shall notify the respondent
in writing, of the charges against the latter, to
which shall be attached copies of the complaint,
sworn statements and other documents
submitted, and the respondent shall be allowed
not less than seventy-two hours after receipt of
the complaint to answer the charges in writing
under oath, together with supporting sworn
statements and documents, in which he shall
indicate whether or not he elects a formal
investigation if his answer is not considered
satisfactory. If the answer is found satisfactory,
the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case.
(c) Although a respondent does not request a
formal investigation, one shall nevertheless be
conducted when from the allegations of the
complaint and the answer of the respondent,
including the supporting documents, the merits
of the case cannot be decided judiciously
without conducting such an investigation. . . .
Petitioner's contentions appear meritorious.
It should be noted that under Section 37 (b) as
aforequoted, the decisions of heads of
departments become final only in cases where
the penalty imposed is suspension for not more
than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty (30) days' salary. In the case,
therefore, of petitioner who had been made to
suffer the penalty of suspension for one (1)
year, such penalty should not have been
implemented without the appeal to the Civil
Service Commission for proper review.
Notably, paragraph (a) of the above Section
explicitly provides that the Commission shall
decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a
penalty of suspension for more than 30 days, or
fine in an amount exceeding 30 days' salary.
Clearly, the enforcement of the penalty
imposed upon petitioner under the resolution
of the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications was
premature.
From the very start, the basis upon which this
case was investigated had been defective and
irregular. For, the letter-complaint of Fructuoso
Arroyo was not verified and yet, the same was
haphazardly made the basis of the informal
inquiry. It should be stressed that par. (a) of
Sec. 38 mandates that administrative
proceedings may be commenced against an
employee by the head of the department or
office of equivalent rank or upon sworn written
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
complaint of any other person. It should also be
noted that under paragraph (b) of said Section,
a respondent is given the option to elect a
formal investigation of the charge against him if
his answer is not found satisfactory. In the case
of petitioner, it appears that when her answer
to the unverified complaint was found
unsatisfactory, she was never given a chance to
decide whether or not to submit herself to a
formal investigation.
The Memorandum of Telecom Investigator
Calapano to the Regional Director is merely
recommendatory since it was only the outcome
of a fact finding investigation based on the
unverified complaint. Note that the informal
investigation was only an inquiry into the
alleged dishonest acts of petitioner in which
case, the Memorandum could not be made as
the basis for any final resolution of the case.
The legal and proper procedure should have
been for the Regional Director of Region V, the
alter ego of the department secretary to initiate
the formal complaint on the basis of the results
of the inquiry of the Telecom Investigator.
Instead of observing the mandatory rules on
formal investigations as prescibed by PD No.
807, the DOTC Secretary cut corners and
apparently railroaded this case by rendering the
assailed resolution.
Even the Telecom Investigator did not know
what he was doing. He exceeded his authority
by imposing in the Memorandum a penalty in
Page 11 of 82

the form of a warning to petitioner. His job was
limited to an inquiry into the facts and a
determination on whether or not a prima
facie case existed. His findings were merely
preparatory to the filing of the necessary formal
administrative case by the Regional Director.
It should be noted with alarm that the Telecom
Director who was supposed to review the
findings of the Telecom Investigator merely
affixed his approval within the Memorandum
(p. 7 of Memorandum), thus obviously
indicating that he never reviewed the merits of
the case.
It appears highly irregular that Asst. Secretary
Sibal of the DOTC, in his letter dated August 2,
1989 to Chairman Villaluz of the Administrative
Action Board, informed the latter that his Office
did not file any administrative complaint against
petitioner nor had it filed a formal charge
against her for whatever administrative offense.
Note that even with this letter, Chairman
Villaluz proceeded to order the hearing of this
case. This is a clear indication that for lack of
coordination among the DOTC authorities and
the Regional Office, the mandatory
requirements of due process to which
petitioner was entitled were irreverently
ignored.
Thus, in the case of Jose Rizal College v.
National Labor Relations Commission (G.R. No.
65482, December 1, 1987) this Court reiterated
the "cardinal primary" requirements of due
process in administrative proceedings and these
are: (1) the right to a hearing which includes,
the right to present one's case and submit
evidence in support thereof; (2) the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented; (3) the
decision must have something to support itself,
(4) the evidence must be substantial, and
substantial evidence means such evidence as a
reasonable mind must accept as adequate to
support a conclusion; (5) the decision must be
based on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the
tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on
its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate; (7) the board
or body should in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, respondents denied petitioner her
right to a formal and full-blown administrative
proceedings which she never had.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated September
30, 1988 of the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications and the
proceedings before the Administrative Action
Board are hereby declared NULL and VOID. The
Secretary of the DOTC is hereby directed to
restore to petitioner's record of service the
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
period which she served under suspension and
to delete from her personnel file the period
within which she was disqualified for
promotion.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92285. March 28, 1994.*
PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC.,
petitioner, vs. HON. DEMETRIO M. BATARIO,
JR., Presiding Judge of Branch 48, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS and A.J. INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION, respondents.
Administrative Law; Bureau of
Customs; Enforcement of the import ban under
Sec. 36 of the Revised Forestry Code is within
the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs
and regular courts have no authority to
interfere with it.The enforcement of the
import ban under Sec. 36, par. (1), of the
Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive
realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct
recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial
Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs
to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis.
To allow the regular court to direct the
Commissioner to impound the imported
matches, as petitioner would, is clearly an
interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of
theBureau of Customs over seizure and
forfeiture cases. An order of a judge to
impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be
Page 12 of 82

based on his determination and declaration of
the invalidity of the importation, hence, a
usurpation of the prerogative and an
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Customs. In other words, the reliefs directed
against the Bureau of Customs as well as the
prayer for injunction against importation of
matches by private respondent AJIC may not be
granted without the court arrogating upon itself
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs.
Same; Same; Tariff and Customs Code; The
enforcement of statutory rights is not foreclosed
by the absence of a statutory procedure.The
claim of petitioner that no procedure is outlined
for the enforcement of the import ban under
the Tariff and Customs Code, if true, does not at
all diminish the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs over the subject matter. The
enforcement of statutory rights is not
foreclosed by the absence of a statutory
procedure. The Commissioner of Customs has
the power to promulgate all rules and
regulations necessary to enforce the provisions
of this (Tariff and Customs) Code x x x subject to
the approval of the Secretary of Finance.
Moreover, it has been held that x x x (w)here
the statute does not require any particular
method of procedure to be followed by an
administrative agency, the agency may adopt
any reasonable method to carry out its
functions.
Same; Same; Doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction; Petitioners correspondence with
the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality of
the importations may take the nature of an
administrative proceeding the pendency of
which would preclude the court from interfering
with it.But over and above the foregoing,
PTFIs correspondence with the Bureau of
Customs contesting the legality of match
importations may already take the nature of an
administrative proceeding the pendency of
which would preclude the court from
interfering with it under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Certiorari and Mandamus; Court
cannot compel an agency to do a particular act
or to enjoin such act which is within its
prerogatives, except when in the exercise of its
authority it gravely abuses or exceeds its
jurisdiction.Moreover, however cleverly the
complaint may be worded, the ultimate relief
sought by PTFI is to compel the Bureau of
Customs to seize and forfeit the match
importations of AJIC. Since the determination to
seize or not to seize is discretionary upon the
Bureau of Customs, the same cannot be subject
of mandamus. But this does not preclude
recourse to the courts by way of the
extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court if the Bureau of Customs
should gravely abuse the exercise of its
jurisdiction. Otherwise stated, the court cannot
compel an agency to do a particular act or to
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
enjoin such act which is within its prerogative,
except when in the exercise of its authority it
gravely abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In the
case at bench, we have no occasion to rule on
the issue of grave abuse of discretion or excess
of jurisdiction as it is not before us.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC.
(PTFI), is a Philippine corporation engaged in
industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in
its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it
supplies to a local match manufacturer solely
for production of matches. In consonance with
the state policy to encourage qualified persons
to engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36,
par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code 1 confers
on entities like PTFI a set of incentives among
which is a qualified ban against importation of
wood and "wood-derivated" products.
On 5 April 1989, private respondent A. J.
International Corporation (AJIC) imported four
(4) containers of matches from Indonesia, which
the Bureau of Customs released on 12 April
1989, and two (2) more containers of matches
from Singapore on 19 April 1989. The records
do not disclose when the second shipment was
released.
On 25 April 1989, upon request of PTFI,
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the
Department of Natural Resources and
Environment issued a certification that "there
Page 13 of 82

are enough available softwood supply in the
Philippines for the match industry at reasonable
price." 2
On 5 May 1989, PTFI filed with the Regional
Court of Manila a complaint for injunction and
damages with prayer for a temporary
restraining order against respondents
Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin
the latter from importing matches and "wood-
derivated" products, and the Collector of
Customs from allowing and releasing the
importations. It was docketed
as Civil Case No. 89-48836 and raffled to
respondent Judge Demetrio M. Batario, Jr. PTFI
prays for an order directing the Commissioner
of Customs to impound the subject
importations and the AJIC be directed to pay
petitioner P250,000.00 in actual damages,
P1,000,000.00 in exemplary damages, and
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
On 14 June 1989, AJIC moved to dismiss the
complaint alleging that:
(a) The Commissioner of Customs under Sec.
1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code and not
the regular court, has "exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the legality of an importation or
ascertain whether the conditions prescribed by
law for an importation have been complied with
. . . . (and over cases of) seizure, detention or
release of property affected . . . . ;" 3 (b) The
release of subject importations had rendered
injunction moot and academic; 4 (c) The prayer
for damages has no basis as the questioned acts
of the Commissioner are in accordance with law
and no damages may be awarded based on
future acts; 5 and, (d) The complaint for
injunction cannot stand it being mainly a
provisional relief and not a principal remedy. 6
PTFI opposed the motion to dismiss. On 28 July
1989, AJIC's motion to dismiss was denied.
However, on 8 February 1990, on motion for
reconsideration by AJIC and despite the
opposition of PTFI, the Court reconsidered its
28 July 1989 order and dismissed the case on
the ground that it had "no jurisdiction to
determine what are legal or illegal
importations." 7
In this present recourse, PTFI seeks to set aside
the 8 February 1990 order of respondent court
and prays for the continuation of the hearing in
Civil Case No. 89-48836. PTFI claims that what
was brought before the trial court was a civil
case for injunction, i.e., "restraining the entry of
safety matches into the country . . . for the
purpose of securing compliance with Sec. 36 (l)
of the Forestry Code" and for damages, "to seek
redress of its right which has been clearly
violated by the importation of safety matches . .
. . (which) is a denial to the petitioner of the
protection and incentive granted it by Section
36 (l) of the Forestry Code . . . ." 8 PTFI asserts
the inapplicability of the procedures outlined in
R.A. No. 1125 relative to incidents before the
Court of Tax Appeals because the instant action
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
is not a protest case where the aggrieved party
is not an importer. It then argues that since it
could not avail of the remedies afforded by the
Tariff and Customs Code, resort to the courts is
warranted, citing Commissioner of Customs v.
Alikpala. 9
On the formal requirements, we hold that the
claim of public respondent that the petition was
filed late has no basis. The records revealed that
PTFI received the assailed order of 8 February
1990 on 20 February 1990, 10 hence, it had until
7 March 1990 to file petition for review
on certiorari. On that date, PTFI filed a motion
for extension of fifteen (15) days within which
to file the petition. 11 On 19 March 1990, this
Court granted PTFI a thirty (30)-day non-
extendible period to file its petition, 12 thus
resetting the new deadline for the petition to 6
April 1990. On that date the petition was filed.
Petitioner anchors his complaint on a statutory
privilege or incentive granted under Sec. 36,
par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code. The only
subject of this incentive is a ban against
importation of wood, wood products or wood-
derivated products which is to be enforced by
the Bureau of Customs since it has, under the
Tariff and Customs Code, the exclusive original
jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
cases 13 and, in fact, it is the duty of the
Collector of Customs to exercise jurisdiction
over prohibited importations. 14
Page 14 of 82

The enforcement of the importation ban under
Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code is
within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of
Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to
the Regional Trial Court to compel the
Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is
devoid of any legal basis. To allow the regular
court to direct the Commissioner to impound
the imported matches, as petitioner would, is
clearly an interference with the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over
seizure and forfeiture cases. An order of a judge
to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be
based on his determination and declaration of
the invalidity of the importation, hence, an
usurpation of the prerogative and an
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Customs. In other words, the reliefs directed
against the Bureau of Customs 15 as well as the
prayer for injunction against importation of
matches by private respondent AJIC 16 may not
be granted without the court arrogating upon
itself the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs.
The claim of petitioner that no procedure is
outlined for the enforcement of the import ban
under the Tariff and Customs Code, if true, does
not at all diminish the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Customs over the subject matter. The
enforcement of statutory rights is not
foreclosed by the absence of a statutory
procedure. The Commissioner of Customs has
the power to "promulgate all rules and
regulations necessary to enforce the provisions
of this (Tariff and Customs) Code . . . subject to
the approval of the Secretary of
Finance." 17 Moreover, it has been held that ". . .
. (w)here the statute does not require any
particular method of procedure to be followed
by an administrative agency, the agency may
adopt any reasonable method to carry out its
functions." 18
But over and above the foregoing, PTFI's
correspondence with the Bureau of
Customs 19 contesting the legality of match
importations may already take the nature of an
administrative proceeding the pendency of
which would preclude the court from
interfering with it under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. In Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Pea, 20 we held that
. . . . under the "sense-making and expeditious
doctrine of primary
jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the
regulatory statute administered (Pambujan Sur
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc.,
94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].)
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need
for specialized administrative boards or
commissions with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and
determine promptly disputes on technical
matters or essentially factual matters, subject
to judicial review in case of grave abuse of
discretion, has become well nigh indispensable .
...
Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may
be worded, the ultimate relief sought by PTFI is
to compel the Bureau of Customs to seize and
forfeit the match importations of AJIC. Since the
determination to seize or not to seize is
discretionary upon the Bureau of Customs, the
same cannot be subject of mandamus. But this
does not preclude recourse to the courts by
way of the extraordinary relief
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
if the Bureau of Customs should gravely abuse
the exercise of its jurisdiction. Otherwise stated,
the court cannot compel an agency to do a
particular act or to enjoin such act which is
within its prerogative, except when in the
exercise of its authority it gravely abuses or
exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at bench, we
have no occasion to rule on the issue of grave
abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction as it
is not before us.
Page 15 of 82

The petitioner's claim for damages against AJIC
being inextricably linked with the legality of the
importations, must necessarily rise or fall with
the main action to bar the question that
"(e)very importation of matches by said
defendant is a denial to plaintiff of the
protection and incentives granted it by Sec. 36
(l) of the Forestry Code," 21merely indicates its
reliance on the illegality of the importations for
its prayer for damages. In other words, if the
importations were authorized, there would be
no denial of the plaintiff's protection and
incentives under the Forestry Code. Necessarily,
the claim for damages must await the decision
declaring the importations unlawful.
In Rosales v. Court of Appeals, we categorized a
similar case for damages as premature since
"(t)he finality of the administrative case which
gives life to petitioners' cause of action has not
yet been reached." 22 The pendency of
petitioner's request to the Bureau of Customs
for the implementation of the ban against the
importation of matches under the Forestry
Code is impliedly admitted; in fact, it is
apparent from the correspondence of counsel
for petitioner that the Bureau is inclined to
sustain the validity of the
importations. 23 Hence, as in Rosales, the order
of the trial court granting the dismissal of the
civil case must be upheld.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the
appealed Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila in Civil Case No. 89-48836 dated 8
February 1990, the same AFFIRMED and,
consequently, the instant petition for review is
DENIED.
DUE PROCESS
[No. 46496. February 27, 1940]
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO
TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS' BROTHERHOOD,
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
INC., respondents.
1.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER.
The nature of the Court of Industrial Relations
and of its power is extensively discussed in the
decision.
2.ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF
PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS OF LAW.The
Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act
according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal evidence but may inform
its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable (Goseco vs. Court of Industrial
Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673). The fact,
however, that the Court of Industrial Relations
may be said to be free from the rigidity of
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
certain procedural requirements does not mean
that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental
and essential requirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an administrative
character.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY
RIGHTS.There are cardinal primary rights
which must be respected even in proceedings of
this character. The first of these rights is the
right to a hearing, which includes the right of
the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. While the duty to
deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. Not only
must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. The decision must be rendered on
the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected. The Court of Industrial
Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must
act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial
Page 16 of 82

Relations should, in all controvercial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; NEW TRIAL
GRANTED.In the light of the foregoing
fundamental principles, it is sufficient to
observe here that, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the
National Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A),
the record is barren and does not satisfy the
thirst for a factual basis upon which to
predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the
concession of a new trial prayed for by the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The
interest of justice would be better served if the
movant is given opportunity to present at the
hearing the documents referred to in his
motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The
legislation which created the Court of Industrial
Relations and under which it acts is new. The
failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved
is not entirely attributable to the parties
adversely affected by the result. Accordingly,
the motion for a new trial should be, and the
same is hereby, granted, and the entire record
of this case shall be remanded to the Court of
Industrial Relations, with instruction that it re-
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
open the case, receive all such evidence as may bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with
be relevant, and otherwise proceed in the Philippine Army.
accordance with the requirements set forth in
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine
the decision.
Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed
LAUREL, J.: delay of leather soles from the States) was but a
scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the
of this bond despite the breach of his
respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
above-entitled case has filed a motion for
reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons 4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of
stated in his motion, we reconsider the ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union
following legal conclusions of the majority dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence
opinion of this Court: and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S.,
548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
XXX (Spanish)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on
rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and
the other hand, prays for the vacation of the
elective representation are highly essential and
judgement rendered by the majority of this
indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5,
Court and the remanding of the case to the
Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and
avers: 6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code
which had been (the) principal source of
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on
dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain
September 26, 1938, there was shortage of
cannot and should not be made applicable in
leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary
interpreting and applying the salutary
for him to temporarily lay off the members of
provisions of a modern labor legislation of
the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false
American origin where the industrial peace has
and unsupported by the records of the Bureau
always been the rule.
of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather. 7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty
of unfair labor practice for discriminating
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials
against the National Labor Union, Inc., and
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this
Page 17 of 82

unjustly favoring the National Workers'
Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so
inaccessible to the respondents that even with
the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits
are of such far-reaching importance and effect
that their admission would necessarily mean
the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an
opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent National
Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to
be herein after stead with reference to the
motion for a new trial of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the
opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the
motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-
General. We shall proceed to dispose of the
motion for new trial of the respondent labor
union. Before doing this, however, we deem it
necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure
in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly
procedure in cases of this nature, to make
several observations regarding the nature of the
powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and
emphasize certain guiding principles which
should be observed in the trial of cases brought
before it. We have re-examined the entire
record of the proceedings had before the Court
of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have
found no substantial evidence that the
exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to
their union affiliation or activity. The whole
transcript taken contains what transpired
during the hearing and is more of a record of
contradictory and conflicting statements of
opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion
drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that
these statements and expressions of views of
counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special
court whose functions are specifically stated in
the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No.
103). It is more an administrative than a part of
the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is
not intended to be a mere receptive organ of
the Government. Unlike a court of justice which
is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases
that are presented to it by the parties litigant,
the function of the Court of Industrial Relations,
as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is
more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not
only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions
in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions in
the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions are
far more comprehensive and expensive. It has
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
consider, investigate, decide, and settle any
question, matter controversy or dispute arising
between, and/or affecting employers and
employees or laborers, and regulate the
relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall
take cognizance or purposes of prevention,
arbitration, decision and settlement, of any
industrial or agricultural dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from
differences as regards wages, shares or
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of
tenancy or employment, between landlords and
tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the
number of employees, laborers or tenants of
farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such
industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to
the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or
both of the parties to the controversy and
certified by the Secretary of labor as existing
and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as
existing and proper to be dealth with by the
Court for the sake of public interest. (Section
4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and
in the course of such hearing, endeavor to
reconcile the parties and induce them to settle
the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph
2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the
President of the Philippines, it shall investigate
and study all industries established in a
designated locality, with a view to
Page 18 of 82

determinating the necessity and fairness of
fixing and adopting for such industry or locality
a minimum wage or share of laborers or
tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be
paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to
landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may
appeal to voluntary arbitration in the
settlement of industrial disputes; may employ
mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or
recur to the more effective system of official
investigation and compulsory arbitration in
order to determine specific controversies
between labor and capital industry and in
agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of
executive and judicial functions, which is a
departure from the rigid doctrine of the
separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial
Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint
out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al.,
G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13,
1939, we had occasion to point out that the
Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
the Act requires it to "act according to justice
and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms
and shall not be bound by any technicalities or
legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform
its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No.
103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific
relief claimed or demands made by the parties
to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may
include in the award, order or decision any
matter or determination which may be deemed
necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or of preventing further
industrial or agricultural disputes. (section
13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative
policy, appeals to this Court have been
especially regulated by the rules recently
promulgated by the rules recently promulgated
by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed
legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the
Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be
free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in
justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character.
There are primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a
hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof. In the
language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S.,
304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129,
"the liberty and property of the citizen shall be
protected by the rudimentary requirements of
fair play.
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
(2) Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in
Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80
law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court
in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right
to adduce evidence, without the corresponding
duty on the part of the board to consider it, is
vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the
person or persons to whom the evidence is
presented can thrust it aside without notice or
consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support it
is a nullity, a place when directly attached."
(Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle
emanates from the more fundamental is
contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation
upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila
vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated
November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the
evidence must be "substantial." (Washington,
Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national
labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S.
Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such
Page 19 of 82

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept
as adequate to support a conclusion."
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor
Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989;
National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson
Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-
Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . .
The statute provides that "the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not
be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative
boards from the compulsion of technical rules
so that the mere admission of matter which
would be deemed incompetent inn judicial
proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. (Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct.
563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co.,
227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed.
431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry.
Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this
assurance of a desirable flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go far as to
justify orders without a basis in evidence having
rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated
hearsay or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co.
v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206,
83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. (Interstate Commence
Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S.
Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their right to know and meet the
case against them. It should not, however,
detract from their duty actively to see that the
law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the
authorized legal methods of securing evidence
and informing itself of facts material and
relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry
may be appointed for the purpose of
investigating and determining the facts in any
given case, but their report and decision are
only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act
No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may
refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or
any matter under its consideration or
advisement to a local board of inquiry, a
provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any
public official in any part of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation, and
may delegate to such board or public official
such powers and functions as the said Court of
Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but
such delegation shall not affect the exercise of
the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section
10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its
judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
It may be that the volume of work is such that it
is literally Relations personally to decide all
controversies coming before them. In the
United States the difficulty is solved with the
enactment of statutory authority authorizing
examiners or other subordinates to render final
decision, with the right to appeal to board or
commission, but in our case there is no such
statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in
all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon
it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental
principles, it is sufficient to observe here that,
except as to the alleged agreement between
the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's
Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren
and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis
upon which to predicate, in a national way, a
conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the
concession of a new trial prayed for the by
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is
alleged that "the supposed lack of material
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
Page 20 of 82

adopted to systematically discharged all the
members of the National Labor Union Inc., from
work" and this avernment is desired to be
proved by the petitioner with the "records of
the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the
National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang
Tibay is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence
and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner
further alleges under oath that the exhibits
attached to the petition to prove his substantial
avernments" are so inaccessible to the
respondents that even within the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to
have obtained them and offered as evidence in
the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the
documents attached to the petition "are of such
far reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein." We have considered the
reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the
petition. By and large, after considerable
discussions, we have come to the conclusion
that the interest of justice would be better
served if the movant is given opportunity to
present at the hearing the documents referred
to in his motion and such other evidence as may
be relevant to the main issue involved. The
legislation which created the Court of Industrial
Relations and under which it acts is new. The
failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved
is not entirely attributable to the parties
adversely affected by the result. Accordingly,
the motion for a new trial should be and the
same is hereby granted, and the entire record
of this case shall be remanded to the Court of
Industrial Relations, with instruction that it
reopen the case, receive all such evidence as
may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth
hereinabove. So ordered.
No. L-21685. April 30, 1966.
CLETO ASPREC, petitioner and
appellant, vs.VICTORIANO ITCHON, JOSE
SUGUITAN, FELIPE P. CRUZ, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, NICANOR G. JORGE, ANTONIO
NOBLEJAS,1 and JACINTO HERNANDEZ,
respondents and appellees.
Administrative proceedings; Applicability of due
process.Due process is applicable to
administrative proceedings. (Cornejo vs.
Gabriel, 41 Phil. 188, 193; 12 Am. Jur. p. 285).
Same; Due process in quasi-criminal or criminal
proceedings.The presence of a party at a trial
is not always of the essence of due process. All
that the law requires to satisfy adherence to
this constitutional precept is that the parties be
given notice of the trial, an opportunity to be
heard. Thus, where the defendant, as in the
present case, failed to appear on the date set
for the trial, of which he was previously
notified, he is deemed to have forfeited his
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
right to be heard in his defense. This rule
applies to quasi-criminal or criminal
proceedings.
Same; Technical rules of court practice are not
applied with rigidity.Technical rules of court
practice, procedure and evidence are not to be
applied with rigidity in administrative
proceedings, considering the nature of
administrative bodies, the character of the
duties they are required to perform, the
purposes for which they are organizred, and the
persons who compose themtechnical men
but not necessarily trained law men.
Same; Board of Examiners for Surveyors may
suspend or revoke license of surveyor.Section
10 of Act 3626, as amended by Act No. 3889,
does not state that the surveyors license may
be revoked only after the said surveyor has
been suspended three times. The plain import
of the law is that ample discretion is given the
Board to suspend or revoke the license. When
the Board elected to revoke, it acted within the
law. For in a clash between statute and an
administrative order issued in pursuance
thereof, the former prevails.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The case on hand had its incipiency in an
administrative complaint2 for unprofessional
Page 21 of 82

conduct lodged with the Board of Examiners for
Surveyors3 by respondent Jacinto Hernandez
against petitioner Cleto Asprec. There,
Hernandez charged that petitioner undertook
to survey Hernandez' lot in Port Junction,
Ragay, Camarines Sur; deliver to him a plan
approved by the Director of Lands within three
months after completion of the survey, and
procure the issuance of a certificate of title to
the lot thus surveyed within six months after
the plan's approval; and that he (Hernandez)
paid the consideration agreed upon but that
petitioner did not deliver the agreed plan, the
lapse of four years notwithstanding. Petitioner
Asprec averred compliance by allegedly
executing and delivering plan Psu-148774 (Ap-
2419) duly approved. But Hernandez' reply
asserted that Psu-148774 is the plan of a survey
made by Asprec for one Damian Alhambra; that
plan Ap-2419 is merely a certified copy of sheet
2 of said plan Psu-148774; and that petitioner's
contractual obligation was to deliver to him the
plan of an original survey not a mere copy. The
Board found for Hernandez and declared; that
no actual survey of Hernandez' land was made;
but that money was paid on his belief that
Asprec really surveyed the land for him; that
Asprec was guilty of deceit and thus violated
the Code of Ethics for surveyors. The Board's
unanimous decision of October 27, 1959
revoked, and required surrender of, Asprec's
certificate of registration as a private land
surveyor. On December 1, 1959, the Assistant
Executive Secretary, by authority of the
President of the Philippines, approved the
Board's decision. On February 12, 1960, the
Board's chairman demanded surrender of said
certificate in five days. Petitioner's motion to
reconsider of March 16, 1960 was denied by the
Office of the President on October 31, 1960.
Meanwhile, on March 22, 1960, respondent
Jorge directed all offices under the Bureau of
Lands to return to petitioner Asprec unacted all
surveys executed or corrected by the latter on
or after October 27, 1959.
Petitioner, charging grave abuse of discretion,
came to the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur on certiorari to annul the orders revoking
his surveyor's certificate of registration;
mandamus to compel the Board to conduct a
formal hearing of the complaint against him;
and prohibition, to stop execution of the orders
to surrender said certificate. The preliminary
injunction prayed for was rejected below.
Upon a stipulations of facts, the Camarines Sur
court rendered judgment on August 14, 1962,
dismissing the petition, with costs. We are now
asked to review said decision.
We will now discuss seriatim the questions
raised.
1. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that he was
denied his day in court.4 Resolution of this
problem necessitates a considerate
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
examination of the following that transpired
before the Board:
(a) Hearing of March 31, 1958: Petitioner raised
the legal point that the complaint was not
under oath. The Board directed Hernandez to
submit a verified complaint. Hearing was
postponed to May 12, 1958.
(b) Hearing of May 12, 1958: Upon the
averment that the verified complaint sets forth
"new facts", petitioner asked for a 10-day
period to answer. On June 6, instead of an
answer, petitioner's counsel filed a motion to
dismiss.
(c) Hearing of August 18, 1958. Petitioner
prayed that hearing be held in abeyance until
the board shall have resolved his motion to
dismiss. The hearing was reset for March 11,
1959.
(d) Hearing of March 11, 1959: This did not pull
through although both parties and their
respective attorneys were present, because
Asprec's counsel was not feeling well. They all
agreed to transfer the hearing to May 11, 1959.
(e) Hearing of May 11, 1959: Hernandez and
counsel appeared. But petitioner and counsel
were absent. The Board was not apprised by
petitioner of the cause of his or his counsel's
failure to appear. At this juncture, counsel for
Hernandez manifested to the Board that "since
all evidence available against the respondent
Page 22 of 82

has already been submitted he would now rest
his case." He then filed with the Board a motion
for judgment on the pleadings.5
If the foregoing have any meaning at all, they
funnel down to one concrete fact: petitioner
has had more than ample opportunity to
defend himself before the Board. As he and
counsel did not appear at the last and
stipulated date of bearing, he cannot look to
the law or to a judicial tribunal to whipsaw the
Board into giving him a new one. He cannot
raise his voice in protest against the act of the
Board in proceeding in his and his counsel's
absence. And this because without cause or
reason, without any excuse at all, counsel and
client have chosen to shy away from the trial.
Presence of a party at a trial, petitioner
concedes, is not always of the essence of due
process. Really, all that the law requires to
satisfy adherence to this constitutional precept
is that the parties be given notice of the trial, an
opportunity to be heard. Petitioner had notice
of the trial of May 11th. More than this, that
date of trial (May 11) had
been previously agreed upon by the parties and
their counsel. Petitioner cannot now charge
that he received less-than-a-fair-treatment. He
has forfeited his right to be heard in his
defense.6
On top of all, petitioner did not as much as
bother to inquire as to what happened on May
11. He bestirred himself only on April 16 the
following year. Surely enough, this patent in
attention better termed gross negligence
will not carry the day for him. Indeed, no reason
exists why the other party should be hard put to
realize that he will have to undergo further
expense and trouble. After all, due process is
merely "the embodiment of the sporting idea of
fair play."7
2. But petitioner insists that the proceeding
before the Board are quasi-criminal in nature.
From this he proceeds to draw the conclusion
that no valid trial could proceed even if he
absented himself therefrom. We do not see eye
to eye with this view. It is best answered by a
reference to the opinion of the court below,
thus:
The rule applies even to quasi-criminal or
criminal proceedings. So, where the respondent
in a petition for contempt failed to appear on
the date set for the hearing, of which he was
previously notified, it was held that he was not
deprived of his day in court when the judge
ordered him arrested unless he pay the support
he was adjudged to give, he having been given
an opportunity to be heard. Embate vs. Penolio,
G.R. No. L-4942.8 Similarly, the defendant's
failure to appear with the counsel of his choice
at the trial, notwithstanding repeated
postponements and the warning that failure to
appear would be deemed a waiver of the right
to present evidence in his defense and the case
will be submitted for decision on the evidence
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
submitted by the prosecution, was a sufficient
justification for the court to proceed and render
judgment upon the evidence before it. People
vs. Angco, 54 Off. Gaz. 5703.
3. Appellant decries the fact that the Board's
decision was rendered upon a motion for
judgment on the pleadings presented on the
date of trial, May 11, 1959. He claims that there
was no basis for such decision.
A rule so long respected, because it is
buttressed upon reason and authority, is that
technical rules of court practice, procedure and
evidence are not to be applied with rigidity in
administrative proceedings. We should have in
mind the nature of administrative bodies, the
character of the duties they are required to
perform, the purposes for which they are
organized and the persons who compose them.
Here, we are concerned with members of a
board of surveyors technical men but not
necessarily trained law men. In this posture, it is
quite reasonable to assume that their
proceedings may not be conducted with that
degree of exactness or with such scrupulous
observance of the complex technical rules
expected in a legal battle before a court of
justice. Their acts should not be measured by
the same yardstick exacted of a judge of a court
of law. So much leeway is given an investigating
administrative body.9
With the foregoing legal tenet as guide, let us
now examine the facts of this case. There was
Page 23 of 82

indeed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
But not without reason. Petitioner admits that
he executed the plan, sent it to complainant.
But this plan (Ap-2419) is not the plan of an
original survey. Because it was merely copied
from another plan. Petitioner received
compensation 10 on the basis of a plan drawn
from a survey, not from a copy. Besides, the
plans the original and copied plans were
before the Board. So it is, that when counsel for
Hernandez manifested at the hearing of May
11, 1959 that all the evidence against petitioner
was submitted to the Board and that for that
reason he was resting his case, he evidently had
in mind the admissions in the pleadings and the
plans and decision and report here noted. And,
the motion for judgment on the pleadings was a
mere follow-up of the manifestation just
adverted to. As the trial court well observed,
counsel for respondent Hernandez did not
present a motion for judgment on the pleadings
in the strict sense of the word, 11 but "a motion
which for lack of another expression, he called a
motion for judgment on the pleadings." Lack of
observance of this technicality which does not
quarrel with a fair concept of justice should be
overlooked. 12 There was evidence before the
Board and the Board had acted thereon. The
Board's decision was propped up by
facts.1wph1.t
4. A review of the record fails to elicit any
representation on the part of petitioner that if
the Board's decision and the decision of the
Court below be reversed, a different result may
be obtained. He does not advance any fact or
circumstance which would constitute a
substantial defense. He does not even offer a
new matter which would tilt the scales of
justice in his favor. The net result is that if error
of procedure there was, as he claims, such error
is reduced to the level of non-prejudicial. It is
because of all of these that we now say that a
reversal of the judgment below or a new
hearing before the Board would be but an
empty ceremony. Courts do not demand or, for
that matter, suggest the performance of the
unnecessary. If only for this alone, there is no
cause or reason why the machinery
administrative or judicial should be allowed
to grind anew. 13
5. Petitioner would want to make a point out of
Surveyor's Administrative Order No. 1, dated
November 26, 1934 (which implemented Act
3626 as amended by Act No. 3889), section 19
(g) of which provides that "Any surveyor who
has been suspended three (3) times shall no
longer be authorized to practice surveying in
the Philippine Islands". Petitioner now asserts
that the Board's decision revoking his license is
an illegality. This argument overlooks the
express statutory provision contained in Section
10 of Act 3626 as amended by Act 3889
G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000.*
aforesaid, as follows:
The Board of Examiners may suspend or revoke
the license or certificate as practising surveyor
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
granted to any person in case the same has
been convicted by any court of a crime involving
moral turpitude, if he has been guilty of
immoral and dishonest conduct, if he is
mentally incapacitated, or for unprofessional
conduct. The decision of the Board shall be
rendered after an investigation in which the
accused shall be heard, and said accused may
appeal to the Department head, whose decision
shall be final administratively.
This law does not state that the surveyor's
license may be revoked, only after the said
surveyor has been suspended three times. The
plain import of the law is that ample discretion
is given the Board to suspend or revoke the
license. The Board has elected to revoke. It
acted within the law. For, a familiar rule is that
in a clash between statute and administrative
order issued in pursuance thereof, the former
prevails.
In the end, we say that the proceedings before
the Board were not infused with such
unfairness or tainted with so grave an abuse of
authority as to call for the exercise by this Court
of its corrective powers.
Upon the view we take of this case, the decision
is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON.
RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional
Page 24 of 82

Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Extradition; Due
Process; The only duty of the Secretary of Justice
is to file the extradition petition after the
request and all the supporting papers are
forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs.A strict observance of the Extradition
Law indicates that the only duty of the
Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition
petition after the request and all the supporting
papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is
authorized to evaluate the extradition papers,
to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph
[3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine
whether or not the request is politically
motivated, or that the offense is a military
offense which is not punishable under non-
military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as
expressly provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of
the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has
the ministerial duty of filing the extradition
papers.
Same; Same; Same; The evaluation process may
be characterized as an investigative or
inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding
conducted in the exercise of an administrative
bodys quasijudicial power.The evaluation
process, just like the extradition proceedings
proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui
generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is
also erroneous to say that it is purely an
exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage,
the executive authority has the power: (a) to
make a technical assessment of the
completeness and sufficiency of the extradition
papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on
its face and on the face of the supporting
documents the crimes indicated are not
extraditable; and (c) to make a determination
whether or not the request is politically
motivated, or that the offense is a military one
which is not punishable under non-military
penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-
29; Article 2 and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US
Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be
characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial
process in contrast to a proceeding conducted
in the exercise of an administrative bodys
quasi-judicial power.
Same; Same; Same; What a quasi-judicial
proceeding involve.In administrative law, a
quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking
and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining
facts based upon the evidence presented; and
(c) rendering an order or decision supported by
the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law:
Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan
vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial
power, which is also known as examining or
investigatory power, is one of the determinative
powers of an administrative body which better
enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority
(Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26).
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
This power allows the administrative body to
inspect the records and premises, and
investigate the activities, of persons or entities
coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to
require disclosure of information by means of
accounts, records, reports, testimony of
witnesses, production of documents, or
otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
Same; Same; Same; Same; An investigatory
body does not exercise judicial functions and its
power is limited to investigating the facts and
making findings in respect thereto; Its only
power is to determine whether the papers
comply with the requirements of the law and
the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the
basis of an extradition petition.In Ruperto v.
Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the
Court had occasion to rule on the functions of
an investigatory body with the sole power of
investigation. It does not exercise judicial
functions and its power is limited to
investigating the facts and making findings in
respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of
determining whether an administrative body is
exercising judicial functions or merely
investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies
the exercise of power and authority to
adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of
the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose
for investigation is to evaluate evidence
submitted before it based on the facts and
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency
is not authorized to make a final
Page 25 of 82

pronouncement affecting the parties, then
there is an absence of judicial discretion and
judgment. The above description
in Ruperto applies to an administrative body
authorized to evaluate extradition documents.
The body has no power to adjudicate in regard
to the rights and obligations of both the
Requesting State and the prospective
extraditee. Its only power is to determine
whether the papers comply with the
requirements of the law and the treaty and,
therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an
extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely
initial and not final. The body has no power to
determine whether or not the extradition
should be effected. That is the role of the court.
The bodys power is limited to an initial finding
of whether or not the extradition petition can
be filed in court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The evaluation
process is akin to an administrative agency
conducting an investigative proceeding, the
consequences of which are essentially criminal;
In essence the evaluation process partakes of
the nature of a criminal investigation.
Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent
on this respect, the provisions only mean that
once a request is forwarded to the Requested
State, the prospective extraditee may be
continuously detained, or if not, subsequently
rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US
Extradition Treaty), for he will only be
discharged if no request is submitted.
Practically, the purpose of this detention is to
prevent his possible flight from the Requested
State. Second, the temporary arrest of the
prospective extraditee during the pendency of
the extradition petition in court (Section 6,
Presidential Decree No. 1069). Clearly, there is
an impending threat to a prospective
extraditees liberty as early as during the
evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined
threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one.
Because of these possible consequences, we
conclude that the evaluation process is akin to
an administrative agency conducting an
investigative proceeding, the consequences of
which are essentially criminal since such
technical assessment sets off or commences the
procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation
of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As
described by petitioner himself, this is a tool
for criminal law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In
essence, therefore, the evaluation process
partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Test to determine
whether a proceeding is civil or criminal.There
is also the earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5
SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing
American jurisprudence, laid down the test to
determine whether a proceeding is civil or
criminal: If the proceeding is under a statute
such that if an indictment is presented the
forfeiture can be included in the criminal case,
such proceeding is criminal in nature, although
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
it may be civil in form; and where it must be
gathered from the statute that the action is
meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be
considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding
does not involve the conviction of the
wrongdoer for the offense charged, the
proceeding is civil in nature.
Same; Same; Same; Due process is comprised of
substantive and procedural due process; The
basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not
only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in
administrative proceedings as well.Due
process is comprised of two components
substantive due process which requires the
intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with
the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or
property, and procedural due process which
consists of the two basic rights of notice and
hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard
by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106). True
to the mandate of the due process clause, the
basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not
only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in
administrative proceedings as well. Non-
observance of these rights will invalidate the
proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be
notified of any pending case affecting their
interests, and upon notice, they may claim the
right to appear therein and present their side
and to refute the position of the opposing
parties.
Page 26 of 82

Same; Same; Same; Same; The notice and
hearing requirements of administrative due
process cannot be dispensed with and shelved
aside.Worthy of inquiry is the issue of
whether or not there is tentativeness of
administrative action. Is private respondent
precluded from enjoying the right to notice and
hearing at a later time without prejudice to
him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant
characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On
one hand, there is yet no extraditee, but
ironically on the other, it results in an
administrative determination which, if adverse
to the person involved, may cause his
immediate incarceration. The grant of the
request shall lead to the filing of the extradition
petition in court. The accused (as Section 2[c]
of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces
the threat of arrest, not only after the
extradition petition is filed in court, but even
during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue
of the provisional arrest allowed under the
treaty and the implementing law. The prejudice
to the accused is thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of
administrative due process cannot be dispensed
with and shelved aside.
No. L-24844. October 26, 1967.
MACARIO AROCHA, in behalf of PEDRO
GATCHALIAN,petitioner-
appellee, vs. MARTINIANO VIVO, Acting
Commissioner of Immigration, THE
DEPORTATION OFFICER and "JOHN DOE",
respondents-appellants.
No. L-24853. October 26, 1967.
MARTINIANO VIVO, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Immigration,
petitioner, vs. HON.FRANCISCO ARCA, in his
official capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch I, JOSE SAN
AGUSTIN, in his official capacity as ex-officio
Sheriff of Manila, MACARIO AROCHA,and
PEDRO GATCHALIAN,respondents.
Administrative law; Board of
Commissioners; Presumption of regularity of
official conduct; Clerical error, rectification of,
proper.Whereas the pivotal point of the case
hinges upon the true date when the Board of
Commissioners of Immigration reversed the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry for the
purpose of determining whether or not such
reversal was rendered within the one-year
period set by Sec. 27(b) of Commonwealth Act
613, as amended by Republic Act 503, which
empowers the former Board to review the
latter's decision either upon appeal or motu
proprio, otherwise the original decision
admitting immigrant petitioner-appellee would
have become final and definitive; where the
originally typewritten date of July "20" 1962
had been erased and then superimposed by "6"
so as to rectify a clerical mistake not only on the
decision of reversal but also on the notice of
appellee's counsel and on the warrant of
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
exclusion; and where there is a showing that
the reversal was actually rendered on July 6,
1962, such rectification or correction, in the
absence of any evidence on record, does not
constitute sufficient ground for holding that the
three members of the Board of Commissioners
are acting as a board, regardless of the date
when the decision in extenso was prepared,
written and signed, because such decision in
extenso must relate back to the day the
resolution was actually adopted; and where the
correction of the date July "20" to July "6" is
susceptible of an explanation that it was on July
"20" that the reasoned and extended decision
was typewritten in final form, it was error for
the lower court to rule that the reversal
decision was rendered beyond the one-year
period.
Same; Board and commissioners; Individual
action of members unlawful; Reason for the
rule; Case at bar.Where for reasons of public
interest the Secretary of Justice, in the exercise
of his powers of control and supervision as
Department Head, had issued Memorandum
Order No. 9 of January 24, 1962, setting aside
"all decisions purporting to have been rendered
or on review motu proprio of decisions of the
Board of Special Inquiry" because "for the past
several years the Board of Commissioners of
Immigration has not met collectively to discuss
and deliberate in the cases coming before it;"
and where it was argued that the decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry had become non-
Page 27 of 82

reviewable since 1961 because of its
confirmation by the majority of the preceding
Board of Commissioners two members of which
had placed "noted" over their signatures while
the third recorded his adverse opinion, such
argument is untenable, considering that
individual action by members of a board plainly
renders nugatory the purposes of its
constitution as a board. The Legislature
organized the Board of Commissioners precisely
in order that they should deliberate collectively
and their views and ideas should be exchanged
and determined before reaching a conclusion.
This process is of the essence of a board's
action, save where otherwise provided by law,
and the salutary effects of the rule would be
lost were the members to act individually,
without benefit of discussion, the principle
being that the powers and duties of boards and
commissioners may not be exercised by the
individual members separately, and where a
duty is entrusted to a board, composed of
different individuals, that board can act
officially only as such, in convened session, with
the members, or a quorum thereof, present.
Remedial law; Evidence; Untraversed facts
alleged in return of writ deemed admitted.
Where appellee did not traverse the allegation
of the Commissioners in their return on the writ
of habeas corpus that said appellee gained
entry on the strength of a forged cablegram
purportedly signed by the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs and apparently authorizing appellee's
documentation as Filipino, such failure to deny
imports admission of its truth by appellee, and
establishes that his entry was irregular.
Administrative law; Immigration; Immigrant not
entitled to be heard in review by Board of
Commissioners.The right of an immigrant to
be represented by counsel before the Board of
Immigration Commissioners arises only when
he appeals to it against the adverse decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry pursuant to Section
27(c) of the Immigration Law, and not
where, motu proprio, such reviewing Board of
Commissioners merely passes on the sufficiency
of evidence already produced before the Board
of Special Inquiry. The doctrine in the
Fernandez case (L-22696, May 29, 1964), where
the right to hearing was recognized in
connection with the attempt of a Board of
Commissioners to review a valid ruling of the
preceding Board that has previously affirmed
the findings of the Board of Special Inquiry,
cannot be invoked, considering that in the
present case there is no valid confirmatory
decision of the preceding Board of
Commissioners.
Remedial law; Habeas corpus; Improper order of
release by courts of detained
immigrants; Enforcement thereof violates Sec.
15, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Where the facts and circumstances clearly
proved that the decision of the Court of First
Instance was erroneous on the facts and the
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
law, the same should be set aside; and
considering the powers vested by statute in the
immigration authorities, the order of release
issued by such court and its enforcement,
notwithstanding the appeal interposed by the
Immigration Commissioner from the decision
under review, was plain violation of Sec. 15,
Revised Rule 102, and in patent excess of
jurisdiction.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and ORIGINAL ACTION for
certiorari and prohibition.
FORM AND PROMULGATION OF JUDGEMENT
No. L-52364. March 25, 1983.*
RICARDO VALLADOLID, petitioner, vs. HON.
AMADO G. INCIONG, Deputy Minister of Labor,
and COPACABANA APARTMENT-HOTEL,
respondents.
No. L-53349. March 25, 1983.*
J.R.M. & CO., INC. as owner and operator of
Copacabana Apartment-
Hotel petitioners, vs. HON. AMADO G.
INCIONG, as Deputy Minister of Labor; HON.
FRANCISCO L. ESTRELLA, as Regional Director
of the National Capital Region, Ministry of
Labor; and RICARDO VALLADOLID,
respondents.
Labor Law; Illegal Dismissals; Reinstatement
without back wages; Loss of confidence, a valid
Page 28 of 82

ground for dismissing an employee; Proof
beyond reasonable doubt of employees
misconduct not required.Loss of confidence is
a valid ground for dismissing an employee.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
employees misconduct is not required, it being
sufficient that there is some basis for the same
or that the employer has reasonable ground to
believe that the employee is responsible for the
misconduct and his participation therein
renders him unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded of his position.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Penalty of dismissal
for willful breach of trust too harsh where
employees misconduct is his first offense and
employee not previously admonished and
warned or suspended for his misdemeanor.
However, as this was Valladolids first offense,
as found by the Regional Director, dismissal
from the service is too harsh a punishment,
considering that he had not been previously
admonished, warned or suspended for any
misdemeanor. Besides as clerk-collector, he
need not be given access to facts relative to the
business of Copacabana, which, if divulged to
Tropicana would be to the formers prejudice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Termination without
prior clearance; When an employee was
dismissed before he was favorably notified of
his preventive suspension leading to his
dismissal, his termination is considered without
prior clearance.Moreover, we find basis for
the finding of the Regional Director that
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
Valladolid was terminated without prior position papers and resolved the case
clearance. JRM sent a memorandum to summarily thereafter.
Valladolid on February 24, 1979 advising him of
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional provision
his preventive suspension effective February 26,
requiring that decisions of court must contain a
1979 pending approval of the application for
statement of facts and the conclusions of law
clearance to dismiss him. The clearance
upon which it is based applies only to courts of
application was filed on February 28, 1979.
record, not to the Ministry of Labor; Reasons;
However, even prior to that date, or on
Proceedings in the NLRC non-litigatious and
February 22, 1979, Valladolid had already filed a
summary in nature without regard to legal
complaint for Illegal Dismissal. This shows that
technicalities.Nor is the questioned Order of
Valladolid was indeed refused admittance on
the Deputy Minister of Labor violative of
February 16, 1979 when he reported back to
Section 9, Article X of the Constitution, which
work, so that he was practically dismissed
requires a statement of the facts and the
before he was formally notified of his
conclusions of law upon which it is based. That
suspension leading to his dismissal, in violation
prescription applies to decisions of Courts of
of the requirement of Section 3, Rule XIV, Book
record. The Ministry of Labor is an
V, Rules & Regulation Implementing the Labor
administrative body with quasijudicial
Code. And as provided in Section 2 of the same
functions. Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V, ibid.,
Rule, any dismissal without prior clearance shall
states that proceedings in the NLRC shall be
be conclusively presumed to be termination of
non-litigious and summary in nature without
employment without a just cause.
regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts
Same; Same; Same; Due process, not violated; of law. As the Deputy Minister was in full accord
Summary investigation of applications for with the findings of fact and the conclusions of
clearance not denial of due process.JRM law drawn from those facts by the Regional
cannot claim that it was deprived of due Director, there was no necessity of discussing
process considering that applications for anew the issues raised therein.
clearance have to be summarily investigated
Same; Same; Same; Abandonment of work, not
and a decision required to be rendered within
a case of; Employees absences although
ten (10) days from the filing of the opposition.
unauthorized do not amount to gross neglect of
As this Court had occasion to hold there is no
duty or abandonment of work; Order of
violation of due process where the Regional
reinstatement without back wages to an
Director merely required the submission of
employee who had been absent without leave,
Page 29 of 82

proper.JRM admits that Valladolid requested
for leave for 5 days from December 30, 1978,
and thereafter for 15 days, but denies that he
notified the company of his absences
subsequent to this. The Regional Director ruled
that the absences of Valladolid were
unauthorized but did not amount to gross
neglect of duty or abandonment of work which
requires deliberate refusal to resume
employment or a clear showing in terms of
specific circumstances that the worker does not
intend to report for work. We agree. But as
Valladolid had been AWOL, no error was
committed by respondent Regional Director in
ordering his reinstatement without backwages.
PETITIONS for certiorari to review the order of
the Deputy Minister of Labor.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The Order dated December 26, 1979 of the
Deputy Minister of Labor affirming the Order of
May 2, 1979 for reinstatement without
backwages issued by Regional Director
Francisco L. Estrella in Case No. R4-STF-2-1316-
79 entitled, "Ricardo C. Valladolid, Jr. vs.
Copacabana Apartment-Hotel," is being assailed
by the parties in these petitions.
J. R. M. & Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
JRM), as petitioner in G.R. No. 53349, is also the
respondent in G.R. No. 52364 named therein as
Copacabana Apartment-Hotel. JRM originally
owned and operated not only Copacabana but
also Tropicana Apartment-Hotel. The principal
stockholders of JRM were the brothers Joseph,
Manuel, Vicente and Roman, all surnamed Yu.
Upon the death of Joseph on October 12, 1975,
although both Copacabana and Tropicana
continued technically as owned by JRM, the
controlling (70%) interest in Copacabana was
lodged in the surviving heirs of Joseph, with
brothers Manuel and Roman having a 15%
interest each. JRM was placed under the
management of the heirs of Joseph. The
brothers Manuel, Roman and Vicente were
allowed 100% equity interest in Tropicana,
which was operated separately from JRM.
Eventually, Tropicana and Copacabana became
competing businesses.
Ricardo Valladolid, petitioner in G.R. No. 52364
and respondent in G.R. No. 53349, after the
death of Joseph, was employed by JRM in 1977
as a telephone switchboard operator. He was
subsequently transferred to the position of
clerk-collector by Mrs. Lourdes T. Yu, President
of JRM.
According to the affidavit of Daniel T. Yu,
Executive Vice-President, attached to the
position paper submitted by JRM before the
Regional Director, the transfer was motivated
by the fact:
xxx xxx xxx
That as such switchboard operator numerous
telephone conversations and communications
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
relating to business and confidential matters
were intercepted and relayed to Tropicana
Apartment-Hotel, a competitor;
That to confirm suspicion on Ricardo Valladolid
as the person responsible for said interception
and relay, Mrs. Lourdes T. Yu, President of JRM
& Co., Inc. sent him on an errand to Manila
Hotel to bring flowers on the occasion of
Wedding Anniversary of Mr. & Mrs. Yu Hong Ty.
Matters which Mrs. Lourdes Yu told him in
confidence and admonitions not to tell anyone,
reached Tropicana people;
xxx xxx xxx 1
The affidavit further disclosed:
xxx xxx xxx
That while serving in his capacity as
clerk/collector, copies of Accounts Receivables,
reach Tropicana Management although said
copies were not referred to them;
That conferred (sic) on numerous confidential
matters taken in the office of Copacabana
Apartment-Hotel reached Tropicana
Apartment-Hotel;
That to finally and fully confirmed suspicions
that Ricardo Valladolid was the person
responsible for the aforementioned disclosures,
a plan for the entrapment was conceived by the
management of Copacabana Apartment- Hotel;
Page 30 of 82

That on November 9, 1979, pursuance of said
plan, a cash voucher for P500,000.00
supposedly in payment for representation
expenses to myself with the corresponding
check were prepared and issued respectively by
Juan V. Bermudo, Apartment-Hotel Manager,
who thereafter called Ricardo Valladolid and
asked the latter to bring the said cash voucher
and check to my room which he did; few
minutes later I came down to the office and
asked Mr. Ricardo Valladolid to prepare the
corresponding deposit slip to Pacific Banking
Corporation for said check;
That thereafter, the aforementioned cash
voucher, corresponding check and deposit slip
were kept in the hotel vault with no other
person other than myself, Juan Bermudo and
Ricardo Valladolid having any knowledge of
preparation and existence thereof;
That unknown to Ricardo Villadolid, the
aforementioned check, cash voucher and
deposit slip were cancelled;
That on December 4, 1978, Mr. Manuel Yu
Chua, came to Copacabana Apartment-Hotel as
minority stockholder of the latter, vehemently
demanding for an accounting of Copacabana
books;
That he strongly charged that information
reached him that I received a disbursement of
P500,000.00 from Copacabana Apartment-
Hotel as representation expenses in my capacity
as Executive Vice-President thereof;
That at this juncture, I brought out the
cancelled cash voucher, check and deposit slip
with mouth agape Manuel Yu Chua, could do
nothing else but admit that in fact, his informer
within Copacabana Apartment-Hotel was no
other than Mr. Ricardo C. Villadolid;
That I then informed Manuel Yu Chua, that
under the circumstances, I could no longer
repose any trust whatsoever on Ricardo
Valladolid and requested him to take the latter
to Tropicana Apartment-Hotel and just swap
him with someone else; Mr. Manuel Yu Chua
directed me to tell Valladolid to see him;
That after few days, Ricardo Valladolid came
back and told me that Manuel Yu Chua has no
place for him at Tropicana Apartment-Hotel; in
this conversation, Ricardo Valladolid apologized
for having betrayed the trust that we had
reposed on him, especially after Mrs. Lourdes T.
Yu had told him to stay impartial; that he then
having done this for Manuel Yu Chua, the latter
could not even accept him in Tropicana
Apartment-Hotel;
xxx xxx xxx 2
The entrapment scheme was corroborated by
the affidavits of Sofia Mo. Gianan, External
Auditor of J.R.M. & Co., Inc., and Juan V.
Bermudo, Copacabana Apartment-Hotel
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
Manager, which affidavits formed part of JRM's
position paper filed before the agency
below. 3 The cancelled Cash Voucher, the
uncashed check, and the unused deposit slip, all
in the respective amounts of P500,000.00 were
also attached to the same position paper as
Exhibits "4", "5" and "6".
On December 29, 1978, or after the entrapment
scheme had been effected, Valladolid filed a
written request for a five (5) day vacation leave
starting December 30, 1978 with the Manager
of Copacabana, stating therein that he would
report for work on January 5, 1979. 4 He did not
report for work on January 5 but sent a
telegram from Bicol on January 8, 1979
requesting for 15 days sick leave as he was
confined for flu at the Dr. Estrellado Clinic. 5 On
January 23, 1979, Valladolid's wife allegedly
called up JRM informing the company through
its accountant, Eddie Escueta, that her husband
was still sick and requested for 30 days sick
leave, which was allegedly granted. This was
denied by JRM.
Valladolid reported for work on February 16,
1979. The Executive Vice- President, Mr. Daniel
Yu, allegedly refused to admit him and instead
asked him to resign. JRM maintains that
Valladolid left the office that same day and
never returned, because he was reprimanded
for his unauthorized absences.
Page 31 of 82

On February 22, 1979, Valladolid filed a
Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with vacation
and sick leave pay. 6
On February 24, 1979, JRM sent a letter to
Valladolid signed by Daniel T. Yu, advising him
of his preventive suspension effective February
26, 1979 preparatory to the termination of his
services 10 days from receipt of a copy of the
application for clearance to dismiss him. The
grounds given were: (1) Willful Breach of Trust
for having divulged, in various instances,
confidential business matters to competitors of
the company; and (2) Gross Neglect of Duty for
having been absent without leave or notice for
more than 25 days, to the detriment of the
company. 7
On February 28, 1979, JRM filed said application
for clearance with the Ministry of Labor. 8 The
application for clearance and Valladolid's
complaint for Illegal Dismissal were
consolidated and docketed as R4-STF-2-1316-
79. The parties submitted their respective
position papers and documentary evidence. On
May 2, 1979, the Regional Director issued the
following challenged Order:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
application for clearance with preventive
suspension is hereby denied. Respondent is
hereby ordered to reinstate complainant to his
former position without backwages and without
loss of seniority rights. Let the time this case
was pending be considered as complainant's
suspension for his absences.
The claim for vacation sick leave pay is
dismissed for failure to substantiate the same.
Valladolid appealed the foregoing order to the
Minister of Labor seeking modification of the
same, praying for the award of backwages from
the time he was illegally dismissed on February
16, 1979 to the date of his actual
reinstatement. JRM also appealed the said
Order.
On December 26, 1979, the Deputy Minister of
Labor, in a succinct Order, dismissed both
appeals after finding "no sufficient justification
or valid reason to alter, modify, much less
reverse the Order appealed from."
On January 21, 1980, Valladolid filed a Petition
for certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R.
No. 52364, praying for a modification of the
Order of December 26, 1979 of the Deputy
Minister of Labor so as to grant him backwages.
This Court resolved. on February 4, 1980, to
give due course to the petition, and required
the parties to submit simultaneous
memoranda.
On March 12, 1980, JRM also filed a petition
for certiorari with this Court assailing that same
Order. This Court gave due course to the
petition and consolidated the same with G.R.
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
No. 52364. Thereafter, the parties filed their
respective memoranda.
The non-award of backwages is the only issue
being raised by Valladolid claiming that the
Orders in question are contrary to law and
evidence, and were issued arbitrarily and
capriciously with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
JRM, on the other hand, assails the said Orders
on the following grounds:
I
That respondent Deputy Minister of Labor
committed grave abuse of discretion when in
his questioned order in effect sustained the
finding of respondent Regional Director that
there is no evidence to support the dismissal of
private respondent.
II
That respondent Deputy Minister Amado
Inciong and Regional Director Francisco Estrella
committed grave abuse of discretion when they
arbitrarily failed to consider in their respective
orders under review, established jurisprudence.
III
That respondent Regional Director committed
grave abuse of discretion when he held that
preventive suspension is equivalent to
dismissal.
Page 32 of 82

IV
That the order of respondent Hon. Amado
Inciong was a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment when it failed to state the facts and
conclusion of law upon which it is based.
V first offense, as found by the Regional Director,
That respondent Regional Director Francisco
Estrella acted in excess of his jurisdiction when,
without any statutory authority or transcending
beyond his jurisdiction, he absolutely
disregarded procedural requirement in the
hearing of the present controversy, thus
depriving petitioner of its right to due process.
Valladolid, in his affidavit dated March 29, 1979,
denied having committed any breach of
trust. 9 In corroboration, he presented the
affidavits of Mr. Manuel Yu dated March 20,
1979 and March 29, 1979, wherein the latter
stated that Valladolid was "one of Copacabana's
most hard-working and efficient employees;"
that Valladolid's work is "mere routinary
collection and clerical in nature which do not
involve trust (or) confidential business or trade
secrets which he may 'divulge' to other
companies." 10
On this issue, the Regional Director ruled that
"there is no evidence on record that Valladolid
furnished copies of receivables or divulged
confidential business matters to Mr. Manuel Yu
and the 'Tropicana People' including the
P500,000.00 'entrapment scheme.'"
That finding is not supported by the records.
The affidavits attached to petitioner's position
paper adequately show that JRM did not act on
mere suspicion but on the contrary, acted
prudently when it first transferred Valladolid
from switchboard operator where he could
eavesdrop on telephone conversations, to a less
crucial position of clerk-collector. But even in
the latter capacity, JRM's fears were confirmed
as shown by the entrapment scheme. Manuel
Yu's certification as to Valladolid's
trustworthiness cannot be given much weight
not only because it was disproved by the
entrapment contrived but more so because
even Manuel Yu himself refused to employ him
at Tropicana when Daniel Yu had suggested that
Tropicana absorb Valladolid because JRM had
lost confidence in the latter. And although
Manuel Yu, who owns 15% of the equity holding
of Copacabana, and being a member of the
Board of Directors of JRM had a right to know
the business standing of said establishment,
there is basis to believe that he would not have
been able to pinpoint the particular
"disbursement" of P500,000.00, if the same had
not been leaked out to him.
Loss of confidence is a valid ground for
dismissing an employee. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct
is not required, it being sufficient that there is
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
some basis for the same or that the employer
has reasonable ground to believe that the
employee is responsible for the misconduct and
his participation therein renders him unworthy
of the trust and confidence demanded of his
position. 11 However, as this was Valladolid's
dismissal from the service is too harsh a
punishment, considering that he had not been
previously admonished, warned or suspended
for any misdemeanor. Besides as clerk-collector,
he need not be given access to facts relative to
the business of Copacabana, which, if divulged
to Tropicana would be to the former's
prejudice.
Moreover, we find basis for the finding of the
Regional Director that Valladolid was
terminated without prior clearance. J.R.M. sent
a memorandum to Valladolid on February 24,
1979 advising him of his preventive suspension
effective February 26, 1979 pending approval of
the application for clearance to dismiss him.
The clearance application was filed on February
28, 1979. However, even prior to that date, or
on February 22, 1979, Valladolid had already
filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal. This
shows that Valladolid was indeed refused
admittance on February 16, 1979 when he
reported back to work, so that he was
practically dismissed before he was formally
notified of his suspension leading to his
dismissal, in violation of the requirement of
Section 3, Rule XIV, Book V, Rules & Regulation
Page 33 of 82

Implementing the Labor Code. 12 And as
provided in Section 2 of the same Rule, any
dismissal without prior clearance shall be
"conclusively presumed to be termination of
employment without a just cause."
JRM cannot claim that it was deprived of due
process considering that applications for
clearance have to be summarily investigated
and a decision required to be rendered within
ten (10) days from the filing of the
opposition 13 As this Court had occasion to hold
there is no violation of due process where the
Regional Director merely required the
submission of position papers and resolved the
case summarily thereafter. 14
Nor is the questioned Order of the Deputy
Minister of Labor violative of Section 9, Article X
of the Constitution, which requires a statement
of the facts and the conclusions of law upon
which it is based. That prescription applies to
decisions of Courts of record. The Ministry of
Labor is an administrative body with quasi-
judicial functions. Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V,
Ibid, states that proceedings in the NLRC shall
be non-litigious and summary in nature without
regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts
of law. As the Deputy Minister was in full accord
with the findings of fact and the conclusions of
law drawn from those facts by the Regional
Director, there was no necessity of discussing
anew the issues raised therein.
JRM admits that Valladolid requested for leave
for 5 days from December 30, 1978, and
thereafter for 15 days, but denies that he
notified the company of his absences
subsequent to this. The Regional Director ruled
that the absences of Valladolid were
unauthorized but did not amount to gross
neglect of duty or abandonment of work which
requires deliberate refusal to resume
employment or a clear showing in terms of
specific circumstances that the worker does not
intend to report for work. We agree. But as
Valladolid had been AWOL, no error was
committed by respondent Regional Director in
ordering his reinstatement without
backwages. 16
WHEREFORE, both Petitions for certiorari are
hereby denied. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
No. L-24800. May 27, 1968.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS, Pio NERIA, petitioner-
appellee, vs.THE COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellant.
Immigration law; Decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry;Meaning of the term
promulgation.The Supreme Court defined
promulgation as the delivery of the decision
to the clerk of court for filing and publication
(Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368). The word
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
promulgate was viewed by the majority in
People v. Dinglasan (77 Phil. 764) as the entry
made by the clerk of a judgment or order in the
book or entries of judgments made by said
clerk. In the case at bar, the date of
promulgation is the date when the Board of
Special Inquiry voted and resolved to admit an
alien, and this date can be ascertained from the
minutes of the proceedings had before
such board.
Administrative law; Principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies; When not
applicable.The principle of administrative
remedies is inapplicable where the question in
dispute is purely a legal one, or where the
controverted act is patently illegal or was
performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction and nothing of an administrative
nature is to be or can be done thereon
(Gonzales v. Hechanova, etc., et al., L-21897,
Oct. 22, 1963, etc.)
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
CASTRO, J.:
This proceeding for habeas corpus (sp. proc.
60733) by Pio Neria seeks to inquire into the
legality of his arrest on April 23, 1965 by agents
of the respondent Commissioner of
Immigration, and his subsequent detention or
Page 34 of 82

confinement at the Bureau of Immigration's
detention station at Engineering Island, Manila.1
The petitioner claims that the warrant of
exclusion issued by the respondent is illegal
because it is based on a decision rendered by
the Board of Immigration Commissioners
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, in violation of section
27 (b), Comm. Act 613, as amended.
On July 9, 1961 the petitioner, with three other
persons, supposedly his widowed mother
(Dolores Neria) and two younger brothers (Felix
and Manuel Neria), arrived at the Manila
International Airport from Hongkong on board a
Cathay Pacific Airways plane. The petitioner was
armed with Certificate of Registration and
Identity 621, issued by the Philippine Consulate
in Hongkong (exh. 12-A). The immigration
inspector at the airport, not satisfied with the
petitioner's travel documents and those of his
companions upon primary inspection thereof,
referred the matter of their admission to the
Board of Special Inquiry for investigation "to
determine filiation and paternity to a Filipino
citizen" (exh. 12). Accordingly, the Board of
Special Inquiry No. 1 conducted a hearing on
July 14, 1961, at which time the petitioner
offered oral and documentary evidence to
support his claim for admission as a Filipino
citizen (exhs. 13, 13-A, 13-B, 13-C; pp. 342-355,
361, 362, 363, rec.). After the conclusion of the
investigation, the said board on August 2, 1961
deliberated on the case and unanimously voted
for petitioner's admission. The board on the
same date rendered its decision, declaring
Dolores Neria a Filipino citizen (I.C. 61-2311-C;
exh. A, 1), and the petitioner a Filipino citizen as
he is an illegitimate son of Dolores (IC 61-2312-
C; exh. A, 1), and allowing his admission into the
Philippines. This written decision was
subsequently submitted to the members of the
Board of Immigration Commissioners, who,
acting separately thereon on different dates,
voted as follows: Associate Commissioner
Talabis, "Noted", on August 13, 1961 (exh. 1-A);
Associate Commissioner De la Rosa, "Noted",
on August 31, 1961 (exh. 1-B); and
Commissioner Galang, "Exclude all", including
the petitioner, either on August 17, 1961 (exh.
1-C) or August 31, 1961, or even afterwards
(tsn, pp. 10-12, 18, Baria). On September 1,
1961 the Immigration authorities issued
Identification Certificate 16306 (exh. C) to the
petitioner, attesting that he "was admitted as a
citizen of the Philippines" per decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 dated August 2,
1961. On September 4 a copy of the decision
was received by petitioner's counsel (exhs. 6, 6-
A H).
On January 24, 1962, the Secretary of Justice
issued Memorandum Order 9 (exh. 7), directing
that
[i]t appearing that for the past several years,
the Board of Commissioners of Immigration has
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
not met collectively to discuss and deliberate on
the cases coming before it (Memorandum
dated January 16, 1962 of the former First
Deputy Commissioner of Immigration and the
Memorandum dated January 16, 1962 of the
former First Deputy Commissioner of
Immigration and the Memorandum dated
January 19, 1962 of the Commissioner of
Immigration), pursuant to the authority vested
in the Department Head by Section 79 (c) of Act
No. 2711, as amended, the public interest so
requiring, it is hereby ordered that all decisions
purporting to have been rendered by the Board
of Commissioners on Appeal from, or on review
motu proprio of, decisions of the Board of
Special Inquiry are set aside. The Board of
Commissioners is directed to review, in
accordance with Section 27 (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, all
decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry
admitting entry of aliens into the country and
give preference to all cases where entry has
been permitted on the ground that the entrant
is a citizen of the Philippines, following the
principle laid down in Section 30 of
Commonwealth Act 613, as amended, that 'the
burden of proof shall be upon such alien to
establish that he is not subject to exclusion' and
the ruling of this Department that "Citizenship
is a status of privilege, power and honor of
inestimable value. When doubts exist
concerning a grant of it, they should be resolved
in favor of the Government against the
Page 35 of 82

claimant" (1st Indorsement, April 12, 1947,
from Secretary of Justice Roman Ozaeta to the
Commissioner of Immigration).
In compliance with the above directive, the
Board of Immigration Commissioners,
composed of Acting Commissioners Martiniano
P. Vivo, Marcial O. Raola and Virgilio N.
Gaston, proceeded to review motu proprio the
entire proceedings had before the Board of
Special Inquiry No. 1 relative to the petitioner's
case (IC 61-2312-C) and that of his supposed
relatives. A hearing officer of the Bureau of
Immigration was directed to conduct an
investigation of the entire proceedings of and
the evidence presented before the Board of
Special Inquiry No. 1. On the basis of a
memorandum dated July 30, 1962 of the
hearing officer (exhs. 11, O), the new Board of
Immigration Commissioners found that the
petitioner had not satisfactorily established his
claim for admission as a Filipino citizen and,
consequently, reversed the decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, and ordered that
the petitioner be excluded from the Philippines
as an alien not properly documented for
admission and be returned to the port from
whence he came or to the country of which he
is a national (exh. F). On September 15, 1962
the petitioner moved for a reconsideration of
said decision (exh. 8). This motion was denied
by the new Board on October 12, 1962 (exh. 9),
and the petitioner was informed of this denial
by letter dated October 18, 1962 (exh. 10).
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
On January 23, 1963 the petitioner filed a May 6, 1965 states, among other things, that
petition for certiorari and prohibition (CC the petitioner was under lawful custody on a
52875), praying the Court of First Instance of valid process commanding his exclusion from
Manila to restrain the Commissioner of the Philippines and ordering his return to the
Immigration and the Board of Immigration port where he came from or to the country of
Commissioners from arresting and expelling which he is a national.
him, and prohibit them from taking any further
On June 18, 1965 the lower court dismissed the
steps or actions contrary to the decision
petition on the ground that "the present Board
rendered by the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1
of Commissioners did not act without due
on August 2, 1961 (exh. 15). This petition was
process of law, in excess of jurisdiction, or with
given due course, and a writ of preliminary
grave abuse of discretion, in reviewing motu
injunction was issued as prayed for (exhs. 18,
propio and reversing the decision of the Board
19). But this petition was dismissed on March
of Special Inquiry, the petitioner is legally
31, 1964, "without prejudice and without costs"
detained on a warrant issued by the respondent
(exh. 20).
Commissioner of Immigration." On June 23 the
On April 30, 1965 the present petition petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said
for habeas corpus was filed, the petitioner decision. On July 2, 1966 the respondent filed
claiming that the respondent's agents picked opposition to the motion for reconsideration, to
him up at Rosario St., Manila, in the evening of which the petitioner filed a reply.
the previous April 23 on the supposed claim
On July 20, 1965 the lower court set aside its
that he was not properly documented for
decision of June 17, 1965, and, on the same
admission as a Filipino citizen when he entered
date, rendered an amended decision
the Philippines; and that since then he "has
completely reversing its decision of June 17,
been unlawfully and illegally confined,
granted the writ of habeas corpus and ordered
restrained and deprived of his liberty in the
the immediate release of the petitioner. The
Bureau of Immigration Detention Station in the
lower court held that "the decision rendered by
Engineering Island, Manila." On the same date,
the new Board of Commissioners is null and
the lower court required the respondent to
void for lack of jurisdiction, and no
bring the petitioner before the court on May 3,
administrative action being possible because
1965 at 8:30 O'clock in the morning. The clerk
the question involved in this case is purely a
of court issued the corresponding writ
legal question, the doctrine of exhaustion of
of habeas corpus directing the respondent to
administrative remedies has no application in
submit his return. The latter's written return of
Page 36 of 82

this case." On July 22 the clerk of court issued
the corresponding writ of habeas corpus. On
July 23 the respondent perfected an appeal
from the amended decision. On July 26 the
petitioner filed an urgent motion for admission
to bail. On July 27 the lower court granted the
petition and fixed the amount of bail for the
petitioner's release at P20,000.2 On this last
date also, the lower court ordered the
transmittal of the original records of the case to
this Court.
The legality or illegality of the petitioner's
detention or confinement3 depends upon
resolution of the issue of whether the decision
of the new Board of Immigration Commissioner
is null and void for having been rendered
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, in violation of section
27 (b), Comm. Act 613, as amended, which
provides in part that
[t]he decision of any two members of the Board
[of Special Inquiry] shall prevail and shall be
final unless reversed on appeal by the Board of
Commissioners as hereafter stated, or, in the
absence of an appeal, unless reversed by the
Board of Commissioners after a review by
it, motu propio of the entire proceedings within
one year from the promulgation of said
decision....
The resolution of this issue, in turn, depends
upon the determination of the date when the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1
was promulgated, August 2, 1961 when it was
actually rendered, or September 4, 1961 when
the petitioner was actually notified thereof and
a copy received by his counsel. The date of
promulgation is important. It is from that date
that the one-year period commenced within
which the Board of Immigration Commissioners
could review motu proprio the entire
proceedings of the Board of Special Inquiry No.
1.
According to the Solicitor General, the correct
date of promulgation is September 4, 1961,
because under the Immigration Rules and
Regulations,4 the decision of a Board of Special
Inquiry "shall be rendered in writing",5 and
under section 27 (b), supra, the written decision
"shall be promulgated"; that the words
"rendition" (from "rendered") and
"promulgation" (from "promulgated") connote
two separate and distinct acts required to be
accomplished by the Board of Special Inquiry,
for rendition is the date when a judge signs his
decision and files it with the clerk of court,
whereas promulgation is the date when such
decision is published, officially announced, is
made known to the public, or delivered to the
clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to
the parties or to their counsel; and that in this
case, rendition was accomplished on August 2,
1961 when the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1
concluded its hearing on the petitioner's case
(IC 61-2312-C), deliberated thereon, voted for
his admission into the Philippines and rendered
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
its written decision, and promulgation was
accomplished on September 4, 1961 when the
petitioner was actually notified of the decision,
copy of which was received by his counsel.
No amount of hair-splitting in regard to the
words "rendition" and "promulgation" would
convey different meanings. This Court defined
promulgation as "the delivery of the decision to
the Clerk of Court for filing and
publication".6 The word "promulgate" was
viewed by the majority in People vs.
Dinglasan (77 Phil. 764) as the entry made by
the clerk of a judgment or order in the book of
entries of judgments made by said clerk.7
The petitioner's argument, at all events, is
without merit. Section 27 (b), supra, provides
that proceedings of the Board of Special Inquiry
its appraisal of a case on the merits, the
result of its deliberation, its decision and notice
thereof to an alien, and the time when an
appeal may be brought therefrom "shall be
conducted under rules of procedure to be
prescribed by the Commissioner of
Immigration." Quoted hereunder for ready
reference are the pertinent sections of the
Immigration Rules and Regulations:
All proceedings of the boards shall be made of
record. Utmost care must be exercised in taking
down the testimony of the applicant and his
witnesses, especially with regard to dates,
names, and description of persons and places.
Page 37 of 82

Doubtful and contradictory answers should, as
far as practicable, be clarified. (sec. 10)
At the conclusion of the hearing in any case, the
Board shall at once proceed to deliberate and
decide on the merits thereof. The result of such
deliberation, including the vote of each member
of the board, shall be recorded as part of the
proceedings and immediately reported for
notation to the officer in charge at the port, or
other duly authorized official. (see. 11)
If the result of the deliberation shows that at
least two members vote for landing, a note
thereof shall be made and the alien shall
without waiting for the decision to be put in
writing, be released from custody, if the other
member of the board does not dissent and give
notice of his desire to appeal; otherwise, the
alien shall remain in the detention station. If a
dissenting member appeals from the decision of
the other two members, the case shall be taken
before the Board of Commissioners for
decision. (sec. 12)
The decision of any two members of the board
shall prevail. The decision in any case shall be
rendered in writing as soon as possible, but not
later than two days from the date of the
deliberation. If for any reason the board is not
able to promulgate its decision within the above
prescribed period, the reason or reasons
therefor shall be noted in the records of the
proceedings. (sec. 13, Subdivision E, Rule 1)
When an alien is excluded by a board of special
inquiry he shall be advised of the decision
together with the reason or reasons therefor;
also of his right to appeal his case to the Board
of Commissioners. In every case the alien shall
be furnished with a copy of the decision upon
promulgation thereof. If the applicant appeals,
he shall thereupon be informed of his right to
be represented by attorney or counsel in
prosecuting his appeal. An attorney or counsel
representing an appellant shall have access to
the records of the proceedings of the board in
the particular case, and may also appear in
person before the Board of Commissioners on
behalf of his client. (sec. 14)
Appeal must be in writing and filed with the
board of special inquiry which decided the case,
within forty-eight hours from the time a copy of
the decision is furnished the applicant. No
appeal filed after this period shall be accepted.
(sec. 16, Subdivision B, Rule 2)
The record of the hearing and all documents
considered by a board of special inquiry in
reaching its decision shall be forwarded, within
two days from the date of notice of intention to
appeal is filed, to the Commissioner of
Immigration for reconsideration by the Board of
Commissioners. (sec. 17, Subdivision C, Rule 2)
If, as provided in section 12 above, "the result
of the deliberation [of the Board of Special
Inquiry] shows that at least two members vote
for landing, a note thereof shall be made and
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
the alien shall, without waiting for
the decision to be put in writing, be released
from custody", then promulgation can take
place even before a decision is actually written
and a copy thereof served upon the alien.
Again, if, as provided in section 14 above, "[i]n
every case the alien shall be furnished with
a copy of the decision upon
promulgation thereof," then notice of a
decision of the board shall be made only after
or upon promulgation, and not before. In both
sections 12 and 14, therefore, promulgation
always takes place before copy of the written
decision of the board is furnished to an alien. Of
course, section 12 contemplates an alien who is
under "custody", while section 14 contemplates
a case of an alien "excluded by a board of
special inquiry". Nonetheless, there seems to be
no reason why the same rule would not apply
to the case at bar, where the petitioner, who
was "unanimously voted" for admission by the
Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, was at liberty
pending the conclusion of the investigation of
his filiation and paternity to a Filipino citizen.
And in any of these circumstances, the date of
promulgation is the date when the Board of
Special Inquiry in question voted and resolved
to admit an alien, and this date can be
ascertained from the minutes of the
proceedings had before such board.8 This, in
effect, was our ruling in Macario Arocha etc. vs.
Martiniano Vivo, etc., et al., and Martiniano
Vivo, etc. vs. Hon. Francisco Arca, etc., et al.,9 on
Page 38 of 82

the issue of the correct date of promulgation of
a decision of the Board of Immigration
Commissioners reversing that of the Board of
Special Inquiry. This Court, speaking thru Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held that "the operative
date of the Commissioners' action is
that when the resolution of exclusion was voted
and adopted by them as a Board, regardless of
the date when the decision in extenso was
prepared, written and signed",
because the decision in extension must relate
back to the day the resolution to exclude was
actually adopted. Necessarily, the extended
opinion had to be posterior to the day when the
Commissioners voted and resolved to reverse
the findings of the Board of Special Inquiry. The
Secretary's certificate (Annex F, L-24853) shows
that the Board of Immigration Commissioners
acted upon not less than eight immigration
cases (including that of the Gatchalians) on July
6, 1962; and it was of course impracticable to
prepare and sign fully reasoned decisions in all
these cases on the same day.
In this case, August 2, 1961 was the date when
the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 concluded its
hearing of petitioner's case (I.C. 61-2312-C),
deliberated on it, and voted for his admission as
a citizen of the Philippines. August 2, 1961 was
also the date when the decision in extenso was
rendered. That date and not September 4,
1961, therefore, is the date of promulgation of
the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No.
1, which decision should "prevail and shall
be final ... unless reversed by the Board of
Commissioners after a review by it, motu
proprio of the entire proceedings within one
year from the promulgation of said
decision."10 Computing the one-year period
from August 2, 1961, the Board of Immigration
Commissioners had until August 2, 1962 within
which to review the proceedings motu proprio.
The case of the petitioner (I.C. 61-2312-C) was
included in the agenda of the Board of
Immigration Commissioners for review motu
propio for July 24, 1962. The case was referred
to the Immigration hearing officer, who, on July
30, 1962, submitted his memorandum to the
said board. The case was again included in the
agenda of the said board for August 2, 1962, the
date it was considered submitted for decision.
The minutes of the meeting of the Board of
Immigration Commissioners presented by its
Secretary Pio Noche and read into the records
of this case, however, reveal that the
petitioner's case was actually acted upon and
decided, not on August 2, 1962, as the decision
(exhs. E and 3) and the warrant of exclusion
(exh. 4) would tend to show, but on August 8,
1962. Thus:
Q. Let me clarify, Mr. Noche. You have the
agenda for the Board meetings, and you have
the [Minutes of the] actual Board meetings.
Your agenda shows that the case of Neria is
included, but the minutes itself does not show
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
that it was actually deliberated upon on August
2, 1962, am I right?
A. The case of Neria had been agendaed, as I
said, since July 24.
COURT:
Just answer the question. Does your minutes
show that the case of Neria was acted upon on
that date?
A. It does not, your Honor, (tsn, p. 57-58, May
13, 1965.)
Atty. Carag:
Your Honor please, may we just be permitted to
read on the record what appears on the
minutes, because I believe that is his personal
record and he shall take it.
"Minutes of Special Meeting held on August 8 at
4:30 P.M." And under the hearing "Admission
Cases" Paragraph No. 7 "Dolores Neria, et al.,
Admission filed as P.I. citizens, exclude" and
that this meeting was adjourned 7:30 p.m.
August 8, 1962. (tsn, p. 43, May 13, 1965.)
Q. I notice, Mr. Noche, that there had been
changes or corrections in this number
appearing between the word August and the
figure 1962 (on Exh. F). Were you the one who
made those corrections?
A. I was the one who made those
corrections. 1vvphi1.nt
Page 39 of 82

Q. Could you tell the Court what was originally
written there? Before you made the correction?
A. The original date was August 8, 1962.
Q. August 8, 1962; now, when you originally
wrote August 8, 1962 in Exhibit "F", that was
the date when the Board of Commissioners met
as a body and deliberated on and voted in this
particular case, am I right?
A. Yes. (tsn, pp. 12-14, May 13, 1965.)
Q. Will you please state why you made the
correction of the date August 2, 1962?
A. I made the correction upon the direction of
the Commissioner, although the Board of
Commissioners actually decided this case,
according to my notes, on August 8, 1962, the
case was actually submitted for resolution by
the Board on August 2, 1962, and according to
the Board of Commissioners, August 2 should
be the date of the decision, inasmuch as the
case was submitted on August 2 for resolution
by the Commissioners this date August 2, 1962,
should be the date of the decision. (See t.s.n.,
pp. 12-14; 21-22, hearing of May 13, 1965;
Baria). Apropos are the following observations
of the learned trial judge, the Hon. Luis Reyes:
The minutes of the meeting of the new Board of
Commissioners and, the testimony of its
Secretary show that as late on August 8, 1962,
the new Board of Commissioners was, only
deliberating on the case of the petitioner. The
admission of the Secretary of the new Board of
Commissioners that the case of the petitioner
was not acted upon on August 2, 1962, shows
that the alteration of the date of the decision of
the new Board of Commissioners from August
8, 1962 to August 2, 1962 was deliberate. The
fact that the case of the petitioner was
submitted to the new Board of Commissioners
for its resolution on August 2, 1962, is no
excuse for ante-dating its decision which was
actually rendered after that date. On August 2,
1962, it did not reverse the decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, because having
actually deliberated on the case of the
petitioner on August 8, 1962, it could not have
on August 2 resolved to reverse the decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry.
The alteration of the true date of the decision of
the new Board of Commissioners, made upon
instruction of the respondent Commissioner of
Immigration, is revealing: it shows that the
respondent Commissioner knew that the one-
year period was to be computed from August 2,
1961; it shows also that he knew that if the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1
had to be reversed, the new Board of
Commissioners had to act not later than August
2, 1962.
As it was on August 8, 1962 when the Board of
Immigration Commissioners as a body
deliberated on and voted for the reversal of the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1,
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
the review motu proprio was effected 6 days
beyond the one-year period fixed by section 27
(b), supra. The said decision of the Board of
Immigration Commissioners, and the warrant of
exclusion issued on the strength of such
decision, are therefore, as correctly found by
the lower court, null and void, for "lack of
jurisdiction," since the decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry No. 1 by that time had already
become "final."
The respondent also contends that the
petitioner's petition for habeas corpus was
prematurely filed, because he did not first
appeal the decision of the Board of Immigration
Commissioners to the Secretary of Justice, who,
by law, is vested with power of control and
supervision over the said Board.11 We have
already held that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is inapplicable "where
the question in dispute is purely a legal
one",12 or where the controverted act is
"patently illegal" or was performed without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction and
"nothing of an administrative nature is to be or
can be done" thereon.13 The case at bar falls
under this exceptions, as correctly found by the
lower court:
the facts are not disputed. This decision
(amended) is mainly based on the record of the
proceedings of the new Board of
Commissioners and also on the testimony of its
secretary, which is not disputed by the parties.
Page 40 of 82

The matters determined by the Court, namely:
(1) the meaning of the term "promulgation" in
relation to the Rules and Regulations of the
Bureau of Immigration, and (2) the time the
reversing decision of the new Board of
Commissioners was actually rendered, involve
questions of law.
It is of no moment that before the present
petition for habeas corpus was instituted, the
petitioner had previously filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition. The dismissal of
that petition was "without prejudice", and,
therefore, avoided the effects of the Rules of
Court provision (Rule 30, sec. 3, now Rule 17,
sec. 3) that dismissal for failure to prosecute is
equivalent to "an adjudication on the merits
[with prejudice)."14 The order of dismissal
therein did not settle the legality of the acts of
the Board of Commissioners, nor the legality of
petitioner's arrest and detention. The order
dismissing the petition for certiorari and
prohibition simply recites that the same is
"dismissed without prejudice and without
costs."
The ruling in Aurora Villamin Sy vs.
Commissioner of Immigration15 that the action
of petitioner therein is "barred by the principle
of laches" is not applicable to this case for
factual differences. In that case, the special
proceeding for habeas corpus "was not
instituted until October 4, 1962, or almost
seven (7) years after the rendition of the
decision of the Board of Commissioners on
December 8, 1955 and the issuance of the
warrant for her deportation on January 12,
1956."
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is
affirmed. No costs.
No. L-34637. February 24, 1984.*
THE POLICE COMMISSION, represented by its
Chairman, CRISPING M. DE CASTRO,
petitioner, vs.HON. JUDGE GUARDSON R.
LOOD and SIMPLICIO C. IBEA, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Due process, no denial
of; Board of Investigators, National Police
Commission, not a board of record; Proceedings
before the board, merely administrative and
summary in nature; Formalities attendant in
court hearings not present in an administrative
investigation.Respondent courts ruling
against petitioners decision as falling short of
the legal requirements of due process, because
it decided the subject administrative case
without stenographic notes (which were not
taken by the Board of Investigators) of the
proceedings of the case, was in error. Rep. Act
No. 4864 does not provide that the Board of
Investigators shall be a board of record, and
as such it does not provide for office personnel
such as clerks and stenographers who may be
employed to take note of the proceedings of
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
the board. The proceeding provided for is
merely administrative and summary in
character, in line with the principle that
administrative rules of procedure should be
construed liberally in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of their
respective claims and defenses. The formalities
usually attendant in court hearings need not be
present in an administrative investigation,
provided that the parties are heard and given
the opportunity to adduce their respective
evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Absence of transcript
of stenographic notes in the records of case
submitted by the Board of Investigators in the
administrative proceeding, not a denial of due
process; Reasons.The decision and resolution
of petitioner commission amply show that both
complainant and respondent were given the
opportunity to be heard by the board and to
adduce their respective evidence, which were
duly considered and taken into account in its
decision. The absence of the transcript of
stenographic notes (which were not taken by
the board) in the records of the case submitted
by the Board of Investigators of San Juan, Rizal
in the administrative proceeding cannot be
claimed to have deprived respondent of
dueprocess of law. The report of investigation
(which contained a summary report of what
transpired during the hearing of the case), the
affidavit-complaint, and respondents answer
Page 41 of 82

thereto, as well as the memoranda of the
parties were sufficient basis for the decision
and resolution of the commission, and
substantially and essentially constituted the
records of the investigation required in the findings of the Police Commission. In effect,
Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 4864.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative findings of
fact sufficient if supported by substantial
evidence on the record; Substantial evidence,
concept of.The record amply shows that
petitioners decision was supported by
substantial evidence consisting of the affidavit-
complaint (which was duly affirmed when
complainant Jose Lee, Jr. appeared and testified
before the board) and the documentary
evidence duly marked by the board as exhibits
for the complainant (and which were not
questioned by respondent). As uniformly held
by the Court, it is sufficient that administrative
findings of fact are supported by evidence on
the record, or stated negatively, it is sufficient
that findings of fact are not shown to be
unsupported by evidence. As expounded by
Justice Laurel in the leading case of Ang Tibay
vs. Court of Industrial Relations, substantial
evidence is all that is needed to support an
administrative finding of fact, and substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Findings of fact of
administrative agencies generally respected.
Respondent court therefore erred in choosing
to believe the theory of the defense put up by
respondent Ibea on the equally erroneous
ground that there was no evidence to support
Section 24 (d) of Republic Act No. 2260 (Civil
respondent court substituted its own judgment
for that of the Police Commission which is final,
contrary to the prevailing principle that in
reviewing administrative decisions, the
reviewing court cannot reexamine the
sufficiency of the evidence as if originally
instituted therein, and receive additional
evidence that was not submitted to the
administrative agency concerned. The findings
of fact must be respected, so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence, even if not
overwhelming or preponderant.
Same; Administrative Law; Civil Service; Civil
Service Eligibility; Temporary
Appointment; Subsequent acquisition of a civil
service eligibility does not ipso facto render
permanent the nature of an employees
temporary appointment; Continued serviceof an
employee after expiration of period of his
temporary appointment, merely an extension of
grace.Respondent court erred in holding that
the allegations on the temporary status of the
appointment of private respondent Simplicio C.
Ibea for lack of civil service eligibility had been
rendered moot and academic upon the latters
subsequent acquisition of a civil service
eligibility. Under the civil service law then in
force, the fact that private respondent
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
subsequently became a civil service eligible did
not ipso facto render permanent the nature of
his temporary appointment as to make the
question moot and academic. In fact, under
Service Act of 1959), the law in force at the time
of Ibeas appointment, a temporary
appointment could not exceed six months (now
one year under R.A. 6040). That he was allowed
by the mayor to continue in the service even
after the six-months period was merely an
extension of grace.
Same; Same: Same; Same; Same; Temporary
appointee, subject to removal at any time
without the necessity of following the procedure
set up by Republic Act 4864 for removal of
police officers; Temporary appointment,
terminable at the pleasure of the appointing
power.In fine, since respondent Ibea was
merely a temporary appointee, he was subject
to removal at any time without the necessity of
following the procedure set up by Republic Act
No. 4864, for removal of police officers, and
regardless of the complaint filed against him.
After his services were terminated by former
Mayor Sto. Domingo, his reinstatement was no
longer legally feasible in the face of incumbent
Mayor Estradas refusal to do so, considering
that he held merely a temporary appointment.
For well-settled in this jurisdiction is the
principle that when an appointment is
temporary, the same is terminable at the
Page 42 of 82

pleasure of the appointing power, and no cause
is required to be shown for such termination.
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Br. VI. Lood, J.
TEEHANKEE, Acting C.J.:
The Court sets aside respondent judge's orders
granting the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction that would order the reinstatement
with back salaries of respondents Gabriel Paile
and Reynaldo Alano in the service of the Makati
Police Department and denying petitioner
Police Commission's motion for reconsideration
thereof, on the ground that the subsequent
acquittal of respondents Paile and Alano in the
criminal action for grave coercion by the City
Court of Manila does not bar their dismissal
from the service by the petitioner, as ordered in
an earlier decision upon their having been
found administratively guilty in the
administrative proceedings, which had
proceeded independently of the criminal action
for the same acts.
The case at bar arose from the following
incidents:
On December 12, 1968 Nicolas Alcantara and
Zoilo Maranon filed with Police Commission
(Polcom) an administrative complaint charging
Captain Gabriel Paile, Corporal Reynaldo Alano
and five other members of the Makati Police
Department with grave misconduct. The
succeeding year, on September 26, Alcantara
and Maranon filed with the City Court of Manila
twin criminal cases charging the same
administrative respondents with grave coercion
based on the same acts for which they had
already been administratively charged. Four
days thereafter, with the formalized criminal
charges as basis and pursuant to the provisions
of the second paragraph of section 16 1of the
Police Act of 1966, Makati Acting Mayor Jose C.
Luciano issued a Memorandum Order effecting
the suspension from office of the seven accused
members of the Makati Police Department
effective October 1, 1969.
Due investigation by the Makati Board of
Investigators of the administrative charge
against Paile et al. continued and was
terminated with the submission of a report,
with findings and recommendation, to the
Polcom. On December 12, 1969, the Polcom
rendered its decision declaring Paile et al. guilty
of grave misconduct and ordering their
dismissal from the service. Paile et al. moved to
reconsider the decision of the Polcom to no
avail for the said Commission, on November 2,
1970, denied their motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime, the City Court of Manila,
under date of October 14, 1970, rendered
judgment in the criminal cases against Paile et
al., acquitting them of the charges for grave
coercion on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence.
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
On December 12, 1970, in implementation of
the said December 12, 1969 decision of the
Polcom and denial of reconsideration order of
November 2, 1970, finding Paile et al. guilty of
grave misconduct and ordering their separation
from the service, Acting Mayor Luciano issued
Administrative Order No. 39, Series of 1970,
ordering the dismissal of the said administrative
respondents from the service effective
December 2, 1970.
Six days thereafter, on December 18, 1970 Paile
et al. filed with the Polcom their second
"Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial."
Without awaiting any response on the part of
the Polcom to their second motion, herein
respondents, Paile and Alano, filed on January
30, 1971 the present action for mandamus,
prohibition and/or certiorari (docketed as Civil
Case No. 14335), with an application for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Branch VI) presided by respondent judge
Guardson R. Loo 2 against the Polcom, the
Mayor and the Chief of Police of Makati, and
the Makati Board of Investigators. Paile and
Alano, sought, inter alia, the issuance of the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
requiring the Mayor of Makati to immediately
reinstate them to their former positions in the
Makati Police Department on their theory that,
by reason of their acquittal of the criminal
charges for grave coercion by the City Court of
Manila, the Mayor of Makati had "the duty
Page 43 of 82

specifically enjoined to be performed by him by
the second paragraph of Section 16, R.A. No.
4864, to immediately reinstate [them] and
order the payment of the entire salary they
failed to receive during their suspension."
Herein petitioner Polcom duly opposed this
petition on February 26, 1971.
After the hearings held on the application for
preliminary mandatory injunction by
respondent judge as submitted for Resolution
on March 27, 1971, respondent judge issued his
order dated March 30, 1971 stating "that from
the pleadings and the evidences thus presented
it does not appear that there are factual issues
not otherwise covered and ventilated during
the hearing and (that) the Court believes that
the merits of the case can be resolved on the
basis of the pleadings and the evidence
adduced and giving the parties three days
"within which to file their comment or
manifestation thereon as to whether they
would prefer t submit the case for decision
together with the resolution of the petition for
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction."
Respondents (as therein petitioners) filed their
manifestation dated April 1, 1971 expressing
their "desire that only the petition for issuance
of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
be considered 3 while petitioner Polcom (and its
corespondents in the proceeding below) filed
(after securing an extension) their
manifestation dated April 12, 1971 stating that
"they prefer to submit the merits of the case for
decision together with the resolution on
Petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary
injunction on the basis of the pleadings and the
evidence heretofore adduced, provided,
however, that the parties be given a period of
thirty (30) days from receipt of the relevant
court order within which to submit their
respective memoranda." 4
On April 7, 1971, respondent judge issued his
order of the same date resolving in effect the
case on the merits and declared respondents'
dismissal from the service as without authority
of law, null and void and without force and
effect", and directed the issuance of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction upon a P500
bond ordering the Mayor of Makati "to
reinstate them to their respective positions as
Captain and Corporal in the Makati Police
Department, with all the rights and privileges
thereto appertaining including the payment of
their salaries during the period of their
suspension from office".
On April 22, 1971, the Polcom sent Paile et al. a
communication returning to them their second
"Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial"
"without action" citing the provisions of
paragraph 9.04, Section I of its Memorandum
Circular No.12 which allow, in administrative
cases brought before it, only one petition for
reconsideration and for the added reason that
the "decision on the matter has already become
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
final and executory." This communication was,
however, returned to the Polcom unclaimed.
Subsequently, on May 3, 1971, the Polcom
sought reconsideration of the challenged order
dated April 7, 1971, which reconsideration Paile
et al. opposed on May 22, 1971. On July 16,
1971, respondent judge issued an order holding
in abeyance his resolution of the Polcom's
motion for reconsideration, pending action of
this Court on an indorsement of the Secretary
of Justice relating to administrative charges
filed by Nicolas Alcantara against him as
presiding judge of the court below.
On August 24, 1971 the Polcom moved with
respondent judge for the immediate resolution
of its pending motion for reconsideration,
which motion was denied on September 8,
1971. The Polcom thus filed with this Court the
instant petition for certiorari on October 20,
1971 to assail the orders of the presiding judge
of the court a quo (1) dated April 7, 1971
granting the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction; (2) dated July 16, 1971 holding in
abeyance resolution of the Polcom's motion for
reconsideration; and (3) dated September 8,
1971 denying the said Commission's "Motion to
Resolve Motion for Reconsideration. "
During the pendency of the petition at bar, the
Court, on October 25, 1971, acting on the
administrative complaint (docketed as
Administrative Case No. 211-J) filed by
Alcantara against herein respondent judge,
Page 44 of 82

resolved to dismiss the said complaint as
premature and enjoined respondent judge to
resolve the pending motion for reconsideration
as well as to report to the Court the action
taken by him on the said motion. Pursuant
thereto, respondent judge resolved petitioner
Polcom's pending motion for reconsideration
on December 20, 1971 by denying the same.
Hence, the petition at bar now refers only to
the setting aside of respondent judge's orders
of April 7, 1971 and December 20, 1971
granting the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction and declaring respondents' dismissal
from the service as "null and void," and denying
the Polcom's motion for reconsideration
thereof, respectively.
The Court finds the petition to be meritorious
and the challenged orders are therefore
nullified and set aside.
As indicated above, respondent judge adjudged
the dismissal from service of respondents as
"without authority of law, null and void and
without force and effect" on two grounds, to
wit: (1) the acquittal of said respondents Paile
and Alano of the criminal charges for grave
coercion by the City Court of Manila on October
14, 1970; and (2) the pendency of their second
"Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial"
filed with the Polcom on December 18, 1970,
after the mayor had already implemented the
Polcom decision of dismissal of December 12,
1969 through the administrative order of
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
dismissal (six days earlier) of December 12, the Polcom's final order of November 2 denying
1970 ordering their dismissal effective reconsideration. The subsequent acquittal of
December 2, 1970. said respondents as accused in the criminal case
as per the City Court's judgment dated October
Respondent judge was in error on both counts
14, 1970 was of no consequence since such
and acted with grave abuse of discretion in
acquittal merely relieved them from criminal
adjudging respondents' dismissal to be "null
liability but in no way carried with it relief from
and void" and in issuing the writ of mandatory
the administrative liability of dismissal from the
injunction ordering their reinstatement with
service under the final order of the Polcom in
back salaries.
the administrative case.
1. It is a fundamental principle of administrative
The ruling of this Court in Gatmaitan vs. Manila
law, as reaffirmed by the Court in Philippines
Railroad Co. 8 is wholly applicable here, mutatis
National Railways v. Domingo 5 that "the
mutandis: "It is true that on September 30,
administrative case may generally proceed
1957 appellant was acquitted in the criminal
against a respondent independently of a
cases mentioned heretofore, but it is not
criminal action for the same act or omission and
denied that said acquittal was based merely on
requires only a preponderance of evidence to
reasonable doubt regarding his guilt. We have
establish administrative guilt as against proof
heretofore held that conviction in a criminal
beyond reasonable doubt of the criminal
case is not indispensable to warrant the
charge, as in the analogous cases provided by
dismissal of an employee by his employer; it
Art. 33 of the Civil Code. 6 Here, the
being enough that the latter had proof of the
administrative case against respondents did
former's guilt of breach of trust or other
proceed independently of the criminal action
sufficient reason (National Labor Union vs.
and resulted in an earlier administrative verdict
Standard, etc., 40 O.G. 3503.) Therefore,
of dismissal from the service rendered on
appellant having been duly investigated and
December 12, 1969. Admittedly, as stated in
found guilty of gross negligence and conduct
respondent judge's challenged order of April 7,
prejudicial to the interest of his employer, We
1971 itself "separate petitions for
must necessarily conclude that his conviction in
reconsideration filed by the respondents were
the criminal actions already mentioned was not
denied on November 2, 1970", 7 and the
indispensable to warrant his dismissal from the
decision was executed on December 12, 1970
service, nor did his acquittal on reasonable
with the Makati Mayor's implementing order
doubt in any way affect the previous order for
separating them from the service by virtue of
his dismissal."
Page 45 of 82

In City of Butuan vs. Ortiz 9 the Court of First
Instance had rendered judgment ordering the
reinstatement of the administrative respondent
pending termination of the administrative case
pending against him upon the Court's finding
that his suspension had been continued for
more than 60 days. However, respondent
therein had not asked for execution of the
favorable final judgment for his reinstatement
until after the administrative case had been
decided against him and he was about to be
removed from the service: The Court held that
execution of the judgment of reinstatement
was barred by the final administrative order of
dismissal, since "a supervening cause or reason
had arisen which (has) rendered the decision of
the Court ordering reinstatement no longer
enforceable. "Here, it is obvious that the
subsequent acquittal on October 14, 1970 in
the criminal case could in no way affect or set
aside the previous administrative order of
December 12, 1969 for respondents' dismissal
from the service, as reiterated in the Polcom's
order of November 2, 1970 denying
reconsideration. Respondents were found by
the Polcom, upon valid and proven charge, unfit
to remain further in the service of the Makati
Police Department and the Polcom's decision
has long become final and has been executed.
Respondent judge was without power to
reverse or modify the same in the absence of
grave abuse, fraud or oppression and none has
been alleged or shown here.
2. Respondent judge reasoned in his challenged
order that "the administrative proceedings
before the respondent Polcom had not in fact
been terminated, and as a matter of fact there
is no showing that the motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial had in fact
been resolved. The result therefore is that the
dismissal of the petitioners thus partook of the
nature of a punishment even while their case is
under consideration, a clear violation of their
constitutional right to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved."
This is patent error. The proceedings in the
administrative case before the Polcom had
been terminated with its denial of
respondents' first motion for reconsideration of
the dismissal verdict per its Order of November
2, 1970 copies of which had been admittedly
received by them. It was not necessary for
Polcom to resolve the belated second motion
for reconsideration and/or new trial, as in fact
Polcom returned the same unacted to
respondents per its communication of April 22,
1971, calling attention to its Rules allowing only
one motion for reconsideration and adding that
the decision of dismissal had already become
final and had been executed (which
communication was returned to it unclaimed by
respondents).
The Court further notes that respondents
themselves appear to have doubted the merit
and efficacy of their second motion, for they
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
abandoned the same with the filing of their
petition in the Court below on January 30, 1971.
Furthermore, the fact that respondents did not
even claim the Polcom communication of April
22, 1971 strengthens the impression that they
lacked reliance on the effectiveness of their
second motion for reconsideration and
abandoned the same. At any rate, the Polcom's
action was certainly a final denial and
termination of the proceeding, since its rules
did not allow a second motion and its dismissal
verdict had long been executed as of December
12, 1970 long before the filing of
respondents' petition in the court below.
Finally, respondents question the validity of the
Polcom rules allowing only one motion for
reconsideration and its authority to issue the
same. Assuming arguendo that the Polcom
should have considered the merits of their
second motion the same was anchored on the
fact of respondents' acquittal in the criminal
case. As already shown above, said second
motion is entirely bereft of merit since such
acquittal was an entirely separate matter and
could not affect or set aside the earlier final
administrative order for their dismissal from the
service.
Respondent judge had in his challenged orders
addressed the core issue of law (having found
no crucial factual issues) and adjudged
respondents dismissal from the service as "null
and void" on the above grounds which the
Page 46 of 82

Court has found to be in error and without basis
in law. The mandatory injunction for
reinstatement issued by respondent judge was
in excess of its jurisdiction and authority and
with this Court having now upheld the validity
of respondents' dismissal by virtue of the
Polcom's final verdict in the administrative case,
the case Below has become moot.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders of the respondent
judge dated April 7, 1971 and December 20,
1971 are hereby set aside and respondent
judge's successor as presiding judge of Branch
VI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is
hereby permanently enjoined from any further
proceedings in Civil Case No. 14335 other than
to dismiss the same.
SO ORDERED.
No. L-18091. June 29, 1963
PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
petitioner vs. ANG BISIG NG PMC, ALBERTO
TEODORO, ALEJANDRO JOAQUIN and COURT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Court of Industrial Relations; Motions for
reconsideration;Refusal to hear motion in oral
argument not necessarily a denial of due
process.The hearing of a motion for
reconsideration in oral argument is a matter
which rests upon the sound discretion of the
Court of Industrial Relations. Its refusal does not
constitute a denial of due process in the
absence of a showing of abuse of discretion.
(See Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Philippine
Labor Union, 71 Phil. 124 and Koppel [Phil.],
Inc. contra. El Tribunal de Relaciones
Industriales, et al., 51 O.G. No. 5, 2376).
Same; Same; Meaning of requirement that the
motion shall be resolved by the court en banc.
The requirement that a motion for
reconsideration shall be resolved by the court
en banc, the judges sitting together, simply
demands that all the available judges shall take
part, for as long as three at least of the judges
attending concur, it is enough for the
pronouncement of the decision or award. (San
Miguel Brewery, Inc., et al. vs. Santos, et al, L-
12682, Aug, 31, 1961.)
Eight-Hour Labor Law; Payment of additional
compensation for work done on Sundays and
legal holidays,ln ordering the payment of
extra compensation for work done on Sundays
and legal holidays, the Court of Industrial
Relations did not invalidate the agreement of
the parties that the third shift should be from
11 p.m. of one day until 7 a.m. of the following
day. It merely enforced the law, because the
question of whether work done during this shift
was to be paid only the ordinary rate or the
Sunday rate whenever the shift fell on a Sunday
or a legal holiday, is a matter governed by law,
not by the agreement between the parties.
Same; Same; Court of Industrial Relations may
order employer to pay 50% additional
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
compensation for work done on Sundays and
legal holidays.Although Section 4 of the Eight-
Hour Labor Law directs the payment to an
employee of an additional sum of of least 25%
of his regular remuneration for work done on
Sundays and legal holidays, the Court of
Industrial Relations is authorized to order the
payment of 50% additional compensation if, as
in the case at bar, such is in line with the
practice of the company and the collective
bargaining agreement of the parties.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations.
REGALA, J.:
This case comes to Us for review from the Court
of Industrial Relations.
It appears that during the period 1947 to
August 3, 1953, the schedule of shifts in the
production department of the Philippine
Manufacturing Company was from 7 a.m. to 3
p.m.; from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. and from 11 p.m.
to 7 a.m. According to the stipulation of facts of
the parties this schedule was adopted by the
company and the employees, who are members
of respondent Ang Bisig ng PMC, agreed to the
same and worked in the shifts during the period
mentioned.
In a petition filed in Case No. 364-V(5) on April
25, 1955, the union asked the Court of
Industrial Relations to order the company to
Page 47 of 82

pay 50 per cent extra compensation for work
done from 12:01 a.m. to 7 a.m. from 1947 to
August 3, 1953, whenever the period
mentioned fell on a Sunday or a legal
holiday.1wph1.t
On the other hand, the company contended in
its answer that since the company and the
union had agreed on a workday that began at 7
a.m. of one day and lasted until 7 a.m. of the
following day, the period between 12:01 a.m.
and 7 a.m. of Sunday should be considered a
part of the Saturday workday and therefore
work done during that period was not entitled
to any extra pay.
After trial, Presiding Judge Jose S. Bautista
rendered decision, ordering the company "to
pay all its workers involved herein 50%
additional compensation for work rendered
from 12:01 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. on Sundays and
legal holidays."
The company filed a motion for reconsideration
and asked that the same be set for hearing
before the Court of Industrial Relations en banc.
Without hearing the company in oral argument,
the Court of Industrial Relations en banc denied
the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated January 31, 1961. Hence, this appeal.
In its first and second assignments of error, the
company complains that the Court of Industrial
Relations "ignored the Motion for oral
argument, and without further ado, the
Presiding Judge of the respondent Court whose
order was sought to be reconsidered proceeded
to invite the minute resolution of the Court en
banc denying the Motion for reconsideration"
and "the resolution was (then) passed from
judge to judge for their signature." It is
contended that petitioner was thereby denied
due process in violation of Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 which provides in
part that
. . . Should any party aggrieved by a ruling or
decision of any of the judges, request a
reconsideration hereof, or at the request of any
of them, the judges shall sit together, and the
concurrence of at least three of the five Judges
shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a
decision, order or award.
The hearing of a motion for reconsideration in
oral argument is a matter which rests upon the
sound discretion of the Court of Industrial
Relations. Its refusal does not constitute a
denial of due process in the absence of a
showing of abuse of discretion. (See Manila
Trading & Supply Co. v. Philippine Labor Union,
71 Phil 124 and Koppel [Phil.], Inc. contra El
Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales, et al., 51
O.G. No. 5, 2376.)
Neither may it be said that the judges of the
Court of Industrial Relations did not, as required
by law, "sit together" in resolving the
company's motion for reconsideration, because
as held in Tolentino, et al. v. Angeles, et al., 52
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
O.G. No. 9, 4262, "the fact that they (the
judges) signed the resolution means that they
sat together in consultation and in passing upon
the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners." More recently, this Court ruled
that "the requirement that a motion for
reconsideration shall be resolved by the
court en banc, the judges sitting together,
simply demands that all the available judges
shall take part, for as long as three at least of
the judges attending concur, it is enough for the
pronouncement of the decision or award (C.A.
559)." (San Miguel Brewery, Inc., et al. v.
Santos, et al., G.R. No. L-12682, August 31,
1961).
For while the resolution may have been
prepared by one judge, yet it cannot be inferred
from this circumstance alone that no previous
deliberation was held. On the contrary, it is safe
to assume that the resolution was the result of
a previous consultation among the judges.
In its third, fourth and fifth assignments of
error, the company contends that its
"agreement (with the employees) was to the
effect that the hours of the arbitrary workday
which might overlap into the calendar Sunday
or holiday would be treated as part of the
workday and paid accordingly." The company,
therefore, concludes that in ordering that work
done between 12:01 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. of a
calendar Sunday be paid extra compensation
the Court of Industrial Relations in effect
Page 48 of 82

invalidated the agreement of the parties. It is
also claimed that having entered into this
agreement, the employees concerned are
estopped from claiming extra pay.
The contention is without merit. The validity of
the agreement of the parties to work between
11 p.m. and 7 a.m. of the third shift is not the
issue in this case. The issue is whether,
assuming the agreement to be valid, work done
on Sunday or legal holiday as a result of the
agreement is to be paid extra compensation. In
ordering the payment of extra compensation,
for work done on Sundays and legal holidays,
the Court of Industrial Relations did not
invalidate the agreement of the parties. It
merely enforced the law. For what the parties
agreed upon was that the third shift should be
from 11 p.m. of one day until 7 a.m. of the
following day. As to whether work done during
this shift was to be paid only the ordinary rate
or the Sunday rate whenever the shift fell on a
Sunday or a legal holiday was something else
upon which the parties did not agree. Indeed,
they did not have to, because the matter is
governed by law.
Thus, Section 4 of the Eight-Hour Labor Law
(Comm. Act No. 444, as amended) provides that
No persons, firm or corporation, business
establishment or place or center of labor shall
compel an employee or laborer to work during
Sundays and legal holidays, unless he is paid an
additional sum of at least twenty-five per
centum of his regular remuneration: . . .
and section 6 of the same expressly states that
Any agreement or contract between the
employer and the laborer or employee contrary
to the provision, of this Act shall be null and
void ab initio.
This is the reason why in Elks Club v. Rovira, 80
Phil. 272, we held that contracts between an
employer and his employees, which call for
seven days service a week on a monthly salary
basis, cannot be renewed after the enactment
of the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
Lastly, it is contended that the Court of
Industrial Relations erred in ordering the
company to pay 50 percent extra
compensation, pursuant to the collective
bargaining agreement of the parties, because
"the employees cannot in one action destroy
the validity of their agreement to the effect that
the first 7 hours of a calendar Sunday is part of
the contractual Saturday workday, and in the
same action enforce the 50% additional
compensation stipulated for "Sunday work"
provided in the same agreement sought to be
promulgate a decision of or for the
rendered void. It is contended that the
company should be required to pay only 25 per
cent as provided by law.
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
As already stated, the validity of the agreement
of the parties is not the issue here. The point
rather is whether, on the assumption that the
agreement is valid, work done on Sunday or
legal holiday as a result of the schedule is to be
paid extra compensation and we said it should
be. The Court of Industrial Relations therefore,
committed no error in ordering the payment of
50 per cent additional compensation in line
with the practice of the company and the
collective bargaining agreement of the parties.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 2,
1960 and the resolution dated January 31, 1961
of the Court of Industrial Relations are hereby
affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 91429. July 13, 1990.*
SALVADOR M. MISON, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Customs,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, CHAN
CHIU, and CHEUNG I, respondents.
Administrative Law; Commission on
Audit; Judgment; As Manager of the COA
Technical Service Office, Mr. Espiritu obviously
had no power whatever to render and
commission.In the first place the Espiritu
decision was void ab initio. As manager of the
COA Technical Service Office, Mr. Espiritu
obviously had no power whatever to render and
Page 49 of 82

promulgate a decision of or for the Commission.
Indeed, even the Chairman, alone, had not that
power. As clearly set out in the Constitution
then in force, the power was lodged in the
Commission on Audit, composed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners. It was the
Commission, as a collegial body, which then as
now, had the jurisdiction to (d)ecide any case
brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for resolution, subject to
review by the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Ratification cannot
validate an act void ab initio because done
absolutely without authority.Hence, the
adoption or ratification of the Espiritu decision
by the Acting COA Chairman was
inconsequential. Ratification cannot validate an
act void ab initio because done absolutely
without authority. The act has to be done anew
by the person or entity duly endowed with
authority to do so.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; No proper
ratification or validation could have been
effected by the Acting Chairman since he was
not the Commission and he himself had no
power to decide any case brought before the
Commission.Moreover, even conceding the
contrary, no proper ratification or validation
could have been effected by the Acting
Chairman since he was not the Commission,
and he himself had no power to decide any case
brought before the Commission, that power, to
repeat, being lodged only in the Commission
itself, as a collegial body.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of
the Commission on Audit.
NARVASA, J.:
In Customs Case No. 813, the Commissioner of
Customs rendered a decision on August 11,
1969, declaring illegal the seizure by elements
of the Philippine Navy of the M/V "Hyojin
Maru" a vessel of Japanese registry, and
ordered the release of the vessel and its cargo
to the claimants, Chan Chiu On and Cheung
I. 1 Return of the cargo as thus ordered was
effected pursuant to a directive of the Secretary
of Finance dated February 5, 1970. 2 Release of
the vessel, however, was never effected; it sank
while yet in the custody of the Bureau of
Customs, and requests by the Bureau to the
Philippine Navy and the CADA to refloat or
salvage the ship could not be complied with for
lack of funds. 3
Chan Chiu On and Cheung I then filed a claim
with the Commission of Audit for the payment
of the value of the vessel. 4 Acting thereon "(b)y
authority of the Acting Chairman," Mr. Rogelio
B. Espiritu, Manager, Technical Service Office of
the COA, denied the claim for the reasons set
forth in his registered letter to the claimant's
lawyer dated November 3, 1977-captioned
"Decision No. 77-142." 5 Another letter, dated
December 9, 1977, this time signed by Acting
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
COA Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, was also
sent to claimants' counsel, Atty. Juan David,
enclosing "a copy of Decision No. 77-142 of this
Commission, contained in a letter dated
November 3, 1977, which is self-explanatory." 6
Atty. David moved for reconsideration by letter
dated February 6, 1978. Acting COA Chairman
Tantuico denied the motion, in his own letter
dated April 17, 1978 on the ground that it had
been filed beyond the reglementary period of
30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of
the subject Decision which, in consequence,
had "already become final and executory." 7 In a
letter dated May 10, 1978, Mr. David replied
that said Decision No. 77-142-rendered only by
the Manager, Technical Service Office of the
COA, and "not (by) the Acting Chairman, much
less . . . the Commission on Audit" was void
because the matter could validly be acted upon
only by "the Commission on Audit duly
constituted, by the appointment and
qualification of its Chairman and two
Commissioners," "as specifically provided by
Section 2, Article XII-D of the (1973)
Constitution." 8 Commissioner Tantuico wrote
back on August 24, 1978 informing Mr. David
that "this Commission finds no cogent reason
that would justify a reversal of its stand on the
matter." 9
Again Atty. David moved for reconsideration, by
letter dated April 5, 1979, reiterating the view
that Acting Chairman Tantuico lacked
Page 50 of 82

constitutional authority to act on the claim on
its merits, and requesting that "the same be
submitted for resolution by the Commission on
Audit, after the appointment of the two (2)
commissioners thereof, as required by Section
2, Article XII-D of the Constitution." 10 In
another communication dated April 20, 1981,
Mr. David reiterated his request that his
application for reconsideration be acted on,
considering that "a Commissioner has (already)
been appointed as member of said
Commission." It does not appear that either
letter was acted on. 11
On November 17, 1986, the Commission on
Audit having been fully constituted with the
appointment of the Chairman and two (2)
members, Mr. David wrote still another letter to
it, 12 drawing attention once again to his clients'
claim for payment of the "nominal depreciated
value . . . (of their vessel) in the sum of US
$50,000.00, plus the amount corresponding to
legal interest." An acceptable alternative based
on "established practice," according to David,
would be the conveyance to his clients by the
Bureau of Customs of "forfeited merchandise,
the value of which shall correspond to the
nominal depreciated value of said vessel, plus
legal interest . . .
In a 4th Indorsement dated June 22, 1987
addressed "to the Auditor, Bureau of Customs,"
Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, acting "FOR THE
COMMISSION," reconsidered Decision No. 77-
142 of Acting Commissioner of Audit
Tantuico, supra. He declared that the vessel
sank while in illegal custody of the Bureau of
Customs, which "should have pre-eminently
taken adequate measures to preserve" it but
did not.; hence, he declared that "this
Commission will interpose no objection" to the
instant claim, subject to the usual auditing and
accounting requirements." 13
Petitioner Mison sought clarification of "the
legal implication of the 4th Indorsement dated
June 22, 1987," in two (2) letters dated
November 8, 1988 and November 16,
1988. 14 The response was a letter dated May
19, 1989, entitled "COA Decision No. 992,"
signed by "the full complement of three (3)
members of the Commission on Audit." 15 Said
COA Decision No. 992 pointed out that the
earlier decision, No. 77-142, was "open to
question and cannot be recognized by the
present Commission" because signed merely by
the then Manager of the Technical Service
Office," who evidently "was not acting for the
Commission but only for the then Acting
Chairman." It therefore held that the 4th
Indorsement dated June 22, 1987 should be
"deemed for all legal intents and purposes as
the final decision on the matter . . ." This letter
Decision No. 992 was received by the
Bureau of Customs on June 22, 1989. 16
The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on August 30, 1989. 17 The
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
motion was denied by letter dated October 20,
1989, denominated "COA Decision No. 1053,"
also signed by the Chairman and the two (2)
Members of the Commission, notice of which
was received by the petitioner on December 4,
1989. 18
Petitioner seasonably filed with this Court a
petition for certiorari to nullify said COA
Decisions No. 992 and 1053, pursuant to
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution. 19
1. The first point that the petitioner would
make is that COA Decision No. 77-142, although
signed only by the Manager, Technical Service
Office of the COA, was ratified or made valid
because it "was adopted in toto as a decision of
the COA in the letters dated December 9, 1977,
April 17, 1978, and August 24, 1978 of then COA
Chairman Francisco T. Tantuico, Jr. to Atty. Juan
T. David." The point cannot be conceded.
In the first place the "Espiritu decision" was
void ab initio. As manager of the COA Technical
Service Office, Mr. Espiritu obviously had no
power whatever to render and promulgate a
decision of or for the Commission. Indeed, even
the Chairman, alone, had not that power. As
clearly set out in the Constitution then in force,
the power was lodged in the Commission on
Audit, "composed of a Chairman and two
Commissioners." 20 It was the Commission, as a
collegial body, which then as now, had the
jurisdiction to "(d)ecide any case brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its
Page 51 of 82

submission for resolution," subject to review by
the Supreme Court on certiorari. 21
Hence, the adoption or ratification of the
Espiritu decision by the Acting COA Chairman
was inconsequential. Ratification cannot
validate an act void ab initio because done
absolutely without authority. The act has to be
done anew by the person or entity duly
endowed with authority to do so.
Moreover, even conceding the contrary, no
proper ratification or validation could have
been effected by the Acting Chairman since he
was not the Commission, and he himself had no
power to decide any case brought before the
Commission, that power, to repeat, being
lodged only in the Commission itself, as a
collegial body.
Parenthetically, the proposition advocated in
this connection that Chairman Domingo may no
longer question the validity of the Espiritu
Decision" (No. 77-142) because in assailing it,
he had referred to it as "a decision of the
Commission on Audit and not merely of its then
Acting Chairman," is so patently unmeritorious
as to deserve scant consideration.
2. The petitioner argues that to sanction the
foregoing principle would result in the
invalidation of "hundreds of decisions and
orders signed by or signed by authority of the
Acting Chairman Tantuico (alone)," considering
that there was an appreciable interval during
which only an Acting Chairman had been
designated and no other Commissioner had
been appointed or was otherwise acting as
such. It suffices to rule, as this Court has already
had occasion to in an analogous case, that the
principle should logically apply only to those
particular instances where there was a timely
and specific challenge to the authority of the
Acting COA Chairman to exercise the power of
adjudication or decision; it should not affect all
other cases where the parties expressly or by
implication accepted the adjudicative authority
of the Chairman. 22
3. The petitioner next contends that the
objectionthat the "Espiritu Decision" was
"technically invalid due to . . . lack of
collegiality" was waived by failure of Atty.
David to raise it in his motion for
reconsideration, in which motion he confined
his arguments to the merits of the decision, and
additionally, by his failure, after denial of his
motion for reconsideration, to appeal to the
Supreme Court, with the result that the
judgment became final and executory as of
October 7, 1978.
The contention is also without merit. The record
showsalthough the petition does not
allege 23 that in a letter dated May 10, 1978,
Mr. David did dispute Decision No. 77-142
because rendered only by the Manager,
Technical Service Office of the COA, and "not
(by) the Acting Chairman, much less . . . the
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
Commission on Audit" "duly constituted, by the
appointment and qualification of its Chairman
and two Commissioners," "as specifically
provided by Section 2, Article XII-D of the (1973)
Constitution." He reiterated the challenge to
Acting Chairman Tantuico's constitutional
authority to act on the claim on its merits, in his
letter dated April 5, 1979, and requested that
"the same be submitted for resolution by the
Commission on Audit, after the appointment of
the two (2) commissioners thereof, as required
by Section 2, Article XII-D of the
Constitution." 24 And in another communication
dated April 20, 1981, Mr. David once more
requested that his application for
reconsideration be acted on collegially,
considering that "a Commissioner had (already)
been appointed as members of said
Commission."
Furthermore, it must be made clear that the
Espiritu Decision was not merely "technically
invalid," as the petitioner describes it. It
was substantively void ab initio, because
rendered without jurisdiction. It had an
essential inherent defect that could not be
cured or waived.
5. The petitioner also maintains that if the
Espiritu Decision, or Decision No. 77-142 be
held void because adopted and signed only by
Acting COA Chairman Tantuico, then the
decision embodied in the 4th Indorsement
dated June 22, 1987, signed only by incumbent
Page 52 of 82

COA Chairman Domingo should also be
pronounced void. There is no party in situation.
In the first place, when Decision No. 77-142 was
rendered, there was no commissioner in the
Commission on Audit except the Acting
Chairman himself. On the other hand, when the
4th Indorsement dated June 22, 1987 was
rendered, there were two (2) members of the
Commission: the Chairman, and Commissioner
Fernandez, clearly a number sufficient to satisfy
the constitutional requirement for collegial
action. Moreover, it is made clear in said 4th
Indorsement that the decision therein
embodied was that of the Commission,
composed of Chairman Domingo and
Commissioner Fernandez. The phrase therefore,
by which Chairman Domingo describes the
capacity in which he acted, i.e., "FOR THE
COMMISSION," must be taken as entirely
accurate, not only because of the familiar
presumption of regularity of performance of
official functions, but because the records do
show Commissioner Fernandez' full
concurrence with the decision in said
indorsement. Besides, said 4th Indorsement
was ratified and reaffirmed by "COA Decision
No. 992" of May 19, 1989 signed by "the full
complement of three (3) members of the
Commission on Audit," 25 to the effect inter
alia that the 4th Indorsement dated June 22,
1987, (of Chairman Domingo and Commissioner
Fernandez) should be "deemed for all legal
intents and purposes as the final decision on
the matter . . .
It thus appears that not only does the petition
fail to show any grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the respondent Commission in the
rendition of its decision embodied in the 4th
Indorsement dated June 22, 1987 and its
Decision No. 992 of May 19, 1989, but that
those judgments are in fact in accord with the
relevant facts and applicable legal principles.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack
of merit, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
JURISDICTION
[No. L-4572. May. 22, 1953]
Dolorito M. Feleciano and Maximo B. Tapinio,
applicants and appellees. Meliton D.
Albasta, petitioner and appellant, vs. The
Director of Patents, respondent and appellee.
Patients ; Assignments of Patients ; Registration
of Assignments in Patients
Office; Jurisdiction thereon of Director of
Patents.Assignments of patents and
inventions covered thereby may be recorded in
books and records kept for the purpose in the
Patent Office if presented in due form (Republic
Act 165, sections 51-53). But where a person
other than the inventor files a motion with the
Director of Patents praying that the applicant-
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
inventor be compelled to sign the contract
executed by a co-applicant-inventor and both
applicant-inventors to acknowledge it before a
notary public as well as another document
which refers to the minutes of a meeting of the
organizers of a manufacturing corporation, and
then to have both documents recorded in the
Patent Office and in the office of the registrar of
deeds, the Director of Patents has no power
and authority to compel the applicant-inventors
to do what the movant is asking them to
perform. What the movant asks the Director of
Patents to do for him is essentially a judicial
function which would require the
determination of finding by a court of
competent jurisdiction as to whether there was
a meeting of the minds of the contracting
parties before it could compel any of them to
perform what the movant prays the court to
order him to do.
PADILLA, J.:
An application for patent was filed with the
Patent Office.
Pending examination of the application, Meliton
D. Albaa filed a motion to intervene claiming
that the applicant-inventors had "sold and/or
bartered and assigned to him their right to
contract or deal the sale of their invention
called Fel-Tap Meter Guard and Detector to or
though the Corporation that they were then
organizing under his direction and to fix and
decide on the purchase price of it to at least
Page 53 of 82

P200,000 in installments cash and P300,000 in
shares of stock of said Corporation . . ." and
praying that applicant-inventor Maximo D.
Tapinio be compelled to sign a contract
(Appendix I) and, together with the other
applicant-inventor Dolorito M. Feliciano who
had already signed it, to acknowledge it and
another contract (Appendix II) before a notary
public, to have both contracts recorded in the
Patent Office and in the Office of the Register of
Deeds, and that the patent for the invention be
issued in his name and in the name of the
inventors.
The motion was denied on the ground under
the provisions of the Patent Law (Republic Act
No. 165) the Director of Patents has no
jurisdiction or power to decide the question
submitted to him.
The movant filed an amended motion to
intervene claiming "that he is the assignee of
inventors Dolorito M. Feliciano and Maximo
Tapinio of the undivided part interest in the
invention for whose letter-patent the named
petitioners Dolorito M. Feliciano and Maximo
Tapinio are herein applying."
The amended motion was denied on the ground
that the assignment made to the movant is not
one of exclusive right to make, use the sell1 the
electrical contrivance for which a patent is
applied for; that it is just an authority to act as
the selling agent for the inventors of the patent,
if granted, and the invention covered thereby
and to receive compensation therefor; and that
not being entitled to have his name included as
one of the patentees, if patent for the invention
be granted, the movant has no right to
intervene in the proceedings for the grant of
the patent.
An exception to and a motion for
reconsideration of the proceeding order were
noted and denied.
From the orders denying his motions to
intervene the movant has appealed.2
What the appellant attempted to secure by his
motion to intervene is clearly beyond the
jurisdiction and authority of the Director of
Patents to grant. Despite the amendment to the
first motion to the intervene by which he claims
assignment of the invention, still it remains that
the alleged assignment is not the invention but
it is an agreement whereby he is to act as
selling agent for the inventors of the patent (if
granted) and of the invention covered thereby
and to receive compensation therefor. This
finding of the Director of Patents is supported
by the following clauses found in the contract
(Appendix I): "We (the inventors) . . . hereby
declare and ratify that both of us are the co-
inventors and joint fifty-fifty owners of the "Fel-
Tap Electric Meter Guard & Detector' . . . ." "We
are now organizing a Corporation under the
direction of Mr. Albaa (Meliton D. Albaa) to
exploit and industrialize the invention . . . which
we promise hereby to sell to said Corporation
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
with its letter-patent . . . except the Royalty
Right of the same, . . . ." "For and in
consideration of the monetary and other helps
(help) that said Mr. Meliton D. Albaa . . . has
rendered and is rendering us . . . of
approaching, interesting and looking for
subscribers and prayers to the capital stocks
(stock) of said Corporation to be . . . we hereby
promise and actually pay to said Mr. Albaa in
installment fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) of
said P200,000 installments cash purchase price .
. . ." The above quoted terms and stipulations of
the executory contract clearly show that it was
not an assignment of the invention and the
patent applied for.
Assignments of patents and inventions covered
thereby may be recorded in books and records
kept for the purpose in the Patent Office is
presented in due form;3 but the appellant does
not ask for the registration of the alleged
agreement between him and the inventors,
because as it is not in due form it cannot be
recorded, but prays that the Director of Patents
compel applicant-inventor Maximo B. Tapinio to
sign the contract executed and signed by the
other applicant-inventor Dolorito M. Feliciano
on 14 March 1950 (Appendix I) and both
applicant-inventors to acknowledge it and
another document which by all indication refers
to the minutes of a meeting of the organizers of
the Manufacturing Corporation held on 30
March 1950, before a notary public, and then to
have both documents recorded in the Patent
Page 54 of 82

Office and in the office of the Registrar of
Deeds. Under the provisions of the Patent Law
(Republic Act No. 165), the Director of Patent
has no power and authority to compel the
applicant-inventors to do what the appellant is
asking them to perform. What the appellant
asked the Director Patents to do for him is
essentially a judicial function which would
require the determination or finding by a court
of competent jurisdiction as to whether there
was a meeting of the minds of the contracting
parties before it could compel the applicant-
inventors to perform what the appellant prays
the court to order them to do. Aside from want
of authority and power, the Director of Patent
lacks the means to make such determination
and finding which would be necessary before he
could act on the appellant's motion.
The orders appealed from are affirmed, with
costs against the appellant.
No. L-42783-85. November 29, 1976.*
CARIDAD CRUZ DE SYQUIA,
petitioner, vs. BOARD OF POWER AND WATER
WORKS (formerly Public Service Commission),
RAFAEL J. RUIZ, PETER ENRIQUEZ and CYRIL D.
MOSES, respondents.
Board of Power and Water
Works; Jurisdiction; The question of how much
an apartment tenant should shoulder by way of
cost of electricity consumed in common areas
and facilities of the apartmenthouse is civil in
nature and should be adjudged by the regular
courts.The question of the proportionate
amount that each tenant should bear for the
additional electricity cost for common facilities
of the apartment building used by the tenants
in common is purely civil in character, (involving
the conditions of lease between landlord and
tenant), to be adjudged under the applicable
civil laws exclusively by the regular courts of
general jurisdiction and is beyond the
jurisdiction of respondent board.
Same; Same.Respondent board as a
regulatory board manifestly exceeded its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and
adjudicating the complaints filed by
respondents against petitioner. Respondent
board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioners
contractual relations with respondents-
complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is
not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of
electricity without permit or franchise.
Respondents complaints against being charged
the additional cost of electricity for common
facilities used by the tenants (in additional to
those registered in their respective apartment
meters) give rise to a question that is purely
civil in character that is to be adjudged under
the applicable provisions of the Civil Code x x x.
PETITION for review of the orders of the Board
of Power and Water Works.
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court sets aside respondent board's orders
ruling upon the complaints of the three private
respondents-tenants of petitioner's apartment
building that petitioner may not charge
them pro rata the extra cost of electricity
consumed for the building's common areas and
facilities such as the elevator and servants'
quarters. The question of the proportionate
amount that each tenant should bear for the
additional electricity cost for common facilities
of the apartment building used by the tenants
in common is purely civil in character, (involving
the conditions of lease between landlord and
tenant), to be adjudged under the applicable
civil laws exclusively by the regular courts of
general jurisdiction and is beyond the
jurisdiction of respondent board.
In December, 1974, private respondents filed
three separate complaints with respondent
Board of Power and Waterworks charging
petitioner as administrator of the South Syquia
Apartments at Malate, Manila with the offense
of selling electricity without permit or franchise
issued by respondent board, in that petitioner
billed respondents-complainants various
specified amounts for their electricity
consumption at their respective apartments for
the months of May to September, 1974 in
excess of the Meralco rates authorized by
respondent board.
Page 55 of 82

Petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaints
asserting that they involved contractual
obligations of respondents as apartment
tenants and were beyond respondent board's
jurisdiction was denied by the latter.
Petitioner thereupon filed her answer, wherein
she again questioned the complaints as beyond
the jurisdiction of respondent as a regulatory
board, since she is not engaged in the sale of
electric power but merely passes to the
apartment tenants as the end-users their
legitimate electric current bills in accordance
with their lease contracts, and their relationship
is contractual in nature.
Petitioner added that the tenants including
respondents had no complaint under the
contractual set-up of billings for water and
electric service consumption, whereby while
individual electric meters are installed in each
apartment, Meralco billings include all
consumption in the entire compound, including
the common areas, servants' quarters and
elevators, the payment for which was advanced
by petitioner and later collected by way of
reimbursement from the tenants pro rata; but
that respondents alone complained later when
on account of the energy crisis, additional fuel
adjustment costs were added by Meralco to
their billings which were likewise passed on by
petitioner to all the tenants pro rata.
As stated in respondent board's questioned
order of August 28, 1975, petitioner further
manifested her willingness to abide by such
computations as respondent board may
determine to be the correct electric billing that
should be charged against complainants-
respondents for their respective electric
consumption and submitted pertinent records
of the electrical consumption and Meralco
billings. Respondent board in said order
however came up with its computation which
would allow petitioner to charge respondents
only the cost of electricity registered in their
individual apartment meters and disallow the
actual cost of additional electricity charged
them pro rata by petitioner for the cost of
electricity consumed by all tenants in the
common areas.
When petitioner pointed out in her motion for
reconsideration that respondent board's
computation would not reimburse petitioner
for the cost of the electric consumption in the
common areas and elevators with a resultant
loss to her at the least of P1,250.00 a month or
P15,000.00 a year and reiterated that this was a
contractual obligation of the tenants over which
respondent regulatory board had no
jurisdiction, the board, acting through its Acting
Chairman alone, Cesar S. de Guzman, (as seems
to be the case with all the board actions herein
involved) denied reconsideration and ruled that
It is the considered opinion of this Board, that
since the tenants (complainants) are already
paying rentals for the use of their rooms and for
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
the cost of their electricity within their rooms,
they should no longer be required to pay for the
extra cost of electricity in common areas such
as the elevator and the servants' quarters, for it
is only fair and equitable that the cost of
electricity for common areas such as the
elevator and servants' quarters be shouldered
alone by the owner of the building as part of
the cost for the rentals being paid by the
tenants (complainants). ...
Hence, the petition at bar, wherein petitioner
raises the basic question of the board's lack of
jurisdiction, aside from the error of its action
based on the admitted facts.
The Court required comment and private
respondents as well as respondent board's
counsel filed their comments simply assuming
the board's jurisdiction and supported its
questioned orders.
Also required to comment, Acting Solicitor
General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. concurred with
petitioner and submitted that respondent
regulatory board acted without jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of the complaints, succinctly
stating the State's position as follows:
Since the petitioner does not operate, manage
or control the power plant and furthermore,
since electricity is directly and uninterruptedly
supplied to the end-user, it cannot be correctly
claimed that the petitioner is selling electricity
Page 56 of 82

nor can she be considered a middleman in the
electric power business.
The dispute between the petitioner landlord
and her tenants as to how much each tenant
should be correspondingly billed, for the actual
electricity consumed and as to the
proportionate amount each tenant should bear
for the common facilities used in the
apartments, if such amounts should be borne
by the tenants at all, is an issue affecting
mathematical computations and conditions of
lease between landlord and tenant.
The Court resolved to treat the petition as a
special civil action and to grant the petition.
Under the reorganization plan effected by
Presidential Decree No. 1 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 458 issued on May 16,
1974, jurisdiction, supervision and control over
public service related to electric light, power
and waterworks utilities formerly vested in the
Public Service Act 1 were transferred to
respondent board.
Respondent board as a regulatory board
manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints
filed by respondents against petitioner.
Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over
petitioner's contractual relations with
respondents-complainants as her tenants, since
petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor
in the sale of electricity without permit or
franchise.
Respondents' complaints against being charged
he additional cost of electricity for common
facilities used by the tenants (in addition to
those registered in their respective apartment
meters) give rise to a question that is purely
civil in character that is to be adjudged under
the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not
the Public Service Act) and not by the
respondent regulatory board which has no
jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general
jurisdiction.
Respondent board in resolving the complaints
against petitioner and requiring her to absorb
the additional rising costs of electricity
consumed for the common areas and elevator
service even at a resultant loss of P15,000.00 a
year arrogated the judicial function. Its orders
were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set
aside as null and void.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned orders of
respondent board are annulled and the
complaints of private respondents are ordered
dismissed. With costs against private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
No. L-23846. September 9, 1977.*
GO TEK, petitioner-appellee, vs. DEPORTATION
BOARD, respondent-appellant.
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
Aliens; Deportation law; Immigration law; The
Deportation Board has jurisdiction to
investigate an alien for illegal possession of fake
dollar even if he has not yet been convicted of
illegal possession thereof.We hold that the
Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek for
illegal possession of fake checks (as well as his
alleged guerilla activities) in spite of the fact
that he has not yet been convicted of illegal
possession thereof under article 168 of the
Revised Penal Code and notwithstanding that
that act is not among the grounds for the
deportation of undesirable aliens as
enumerated in section 37 of the Immigration
Law. The charge against Go Tek before the
Board was not premature.
Same; Same; Same; Deportation of aliens may
be ordered by the President under Section 69 of
the Revised Administrative Code or by the
Commissioner on Immigration under Section 37
of Immigration Law.So under existing law, the
deportation of an undesirable alien may be
affected (1) by order of the President, after due
investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code and (2) by the
Commissioner of Immigration, upon
recommendation of the Board of
Commissioners under section 37 of the
Immigration Law (Qua Chee
Gan vs. Deportation Board, supra.)
Same; Same; Same; State has inherent power to
deport undesirable aliens.The State has the
Page 57 of 82

inherent power to deport undesirable aliens
(Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed.
960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be
exercised by the Chief Executive when he
deems such action necessary for the peace and
domestic tranquility of the nation. . . Justice
Johnsons opinion is that when the Chief
Executive finds that there are aliens whose
continued presence in the country is injurious
to the public interest. He may, even in the
absence of express law, deport them.
Same; Same; Same; The intention of the law is
to grant the Chief Executive full discretion to
determine whether an aliens stay in the country
is undesirable.As observed by Justice
Labrador, there is no legal nor constitutional
provision defining the power to deport aliens
because the intention of the law is to grant the
Chief Executive full discretion to determine
whether an aliens residence in the country is so
undesirable as to affect or injure the security,
welfare or interest of the state. The
adjudication of facts upon which deportation is
predicated also devolves on the Chief Executive
whose decision is final and executive.
Same; Same; Same; Executive order for
deportation need not be dependent on a prior
judicial conviction in a criminal case.It is
fundamental that an executive order for
deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial
conviction in a criminal case (Ang Beng vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 100 Phil. 801,
803). Thus, it was held that the fact an alien has
been acquitted in a criminal proceeding of the
particular charge does not prevent the
deportation of such alien based on the same
charge. Such acquittal does not constitute res
judicata in the deportation proceedings.
Conviction of a crime is not necessary to
warrant deportation.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First
instance of Manila. Alikpala, J.
AQUINO, J.:
This is a deportation case. On March 3, 1964 the
chief prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed
a complaint against Go Tek a Chinaman residing
at Ilagan, Isabela and 1208-B, Misericordia
Street, Sta. Cruz Manila.
It was alleged in the complaint that in
December, 1963 certain agents of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) searched an office
located at 1439 O'Donnel Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila believed to be the headquarters of a
guerilla unit of the "Emergency Intelligence
Section, Army of the United States" and that
among those arrested thereat was Go Tek an
alleged sector commander and intelligence and
record officer of that guerilla unit.
It was further alleged that fake dollar checks
were found in Go Tek's possession and that,
therefore, he had violated article 168 of the
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
Revised Penal Code and rendered himself an
undesirable alien.
The prosecutor prayed that after trial the Board
should recommend to the President of the
Philippines the . immediate deportation of Go
Tek as an undesirable alien, "his presence in this
country having been, and will always be and a
menace to the peace , welfare, and security of
the community". Case No. R1116).
Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the complaint was premature bemuse
them was a pending case against him in the city
fiscal's office of Manila for violation of article
168 (IS 64-7267). He contended that the board
had no jurisdiction to try the case in view of the
obiter dictum in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation
Board, 118 Phil. 868, 875, that the t may deport
aliens only on the grounds specified in the law.
The Board, composed of Manuel A. Concordia,
Arturo A. Alafriz and Manuel V. Reyes, in its
resolution of April 21, 1964 denied Go Teks
motion. The Board reasoned out that a
conviction is not a prerequisite before the State
my exercise its rights to deport an undesirable
alien and that the Board is only a fact finding
body whose function is to make a report and
recommendation to the President in whom is
lodged the exclusive power to deport an alien
or a deportation proceeding.
In view of the denial of his motion to quash, Go
Tek on June 10, 1964 filed in the Court of First
Page 58 of 82

Instance of Manila a prohibition action against
the Board. On July 8, 1964 the court issued a
writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
board from hearing Go Tek's case.
After hearing, the trial court (Judge Federico C.
Alikpala presiding) in its decision of 31, 1964
granted the writ prohibition and the Board to
desist from taking cognizance of the Go Tek.
The court, citing the said obiter dictum in the
Qua Chee Gan case, held that mere ion of
forged dollar checks is not a ground for
deportation under the Immigration Law; that
under section 37(3) of the law before an alien
may be deported for having been convicted and
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one
year or more for a crime involving moral
turpitude a conviction is and that since Go Tek
had not been convicted of the offense punished
in article 168, the deportation was premature.
The Board appealed to this Court on the ground
that the decision is contrary to law. The Solicitor
General contends that the trial court erred in
assuming that the President may deport
undesirable aliens only to grounds enumerated
by law; in holding that mere possession of
forged dollar checks is not a ground for
deportation and that a criminal conviction is
necessary, and in not finding that the Board has
jurisdiction over Go Tek's case.
The parties stipulated that the Deportation
Board is an of the President of the Philippines
charged with the investigation of undesirable
aliens and to report and recommend proper
action on the basis of its findings therein."
The issue is whether the Deportation Board can
entertain a deportation proceeding based on a
ground which is not specified in section 37 of
the Immigration Law and although the aliens
has not yet been convicted of the offense
imputed to him.
We hold that the Board has jurisdiction to
investigate Go Tek for illegal possession of fake
dollar checks (as well as his alleged "guerilla"
activities) in spite of the fact that he has not yet
been convicted of illegal possession thereof
under article 168 of the Revised Penal Code and
notwithstanding that act is not the grounds for
the deportation of undesirable aliens as
enumerated in section 37 of the Immigration
Law. The charge against Go Tek before- the
Board was not premature.
The aforementioned obiter dictum the Qua
Chee Gan case invoked by Go Tek and relied
upon by the trial court, is not of this case. In
the Qua Chee Gan case the aliens were with
economic sabotage which is a ground for
deportation under Republic Act No. 503.
The ratio decidendi of the Qua Chee Gan case is
that the provision of Executive Order No. 398,
of 1951, the Deportation Board to issue a
warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal
charges against an alien, is "illegal" or
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
unconstitutional because it is contrary to the
provinsion in section 1(3), Article III of the 1935
Constitution that warrants shall issue upon to
be de by the judge after e under oath the t and
the witness he may produce. (Note that under
section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
cause may be determined "by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law". See Santos vs.
Commissioner of Immigration L-25694,
November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 96, per Fernando,
J.)
A thorough comprehension of the President's
power to deport aliens may show the
baselessness of the instant prohibition action of
Go Tek The President's power to deport aliens
and the investigation of aliens subject to
deportation are provided for in the following
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code:
SEC. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign
power. A subject of a foreign power residing
in the Philippine Islands shall not be deported
expelled, or excluded from said Islands or
repatriated to his own country by the Governor-
General except upon prior investigator,
conducted by said Executive or his authorized
agent, of the ground upon which such action is
contemplated. In such case the person
concerned shall he informed of the charge or
charges against him and he shall be allowed not
less than three days for the preparation of his
defense. He shall also have the right to be heard
Page 59 of 82

by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in
his own behalf, and to cross-examine the
opposing witnesses.
On the other hand, section 37 of the
Immigration Law Provides that certain aliens
may be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other
officer designated by him for the purpose and
deported upon the Commissioner's warrant -
"after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground
for deportation as charged against the alien."
Thirteen classes of aliens who may be deported
by the Commissioner are specified in section 37
(See Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, L-24792, February 14,
1975, 62 SCRA 363, 368).
So, under existing law; the deportation of an
undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order
of the President, after due investigation,
pursuant to section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code and (2) by the
Commissioner of Immigration upon
recommendation of the Board of
Commissioners under section 37 of the
immigration Law (Qua Chee Gan vs-
Deportation Board, supra).
The State has the inherent power to deport
undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228
U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125).
That power may be exercise by the Chief
Executive "when he deems such action
necessary for the peace and domestic
tranquility of the nation Justice Johnson's is that
there the Chief Executive rinds that there are
aliens whose continued in the country is
injurious to the public interest he may, even in
the absence of express law, deport them
(Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield 16 Phil.
534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens
because their continued presence is rental to
public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu
Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of
Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil.
949, 956).
The Deportation Board is composed of the
Undersecretary of Justice as chairman , the
solicitor General, and a representative of the
Secretary of National Defense (Executive Order
No. 455 dated June 25, 1951, 47 O.G. 28M).
SECTION 69 and Executive Order No. 398, the
Deportation Board, do not specify the grounds
for deportation Paragraph l(a) of Executive
Order No. 398 merely provides that "the
Deportation Board, motu proprio or upon
complaint of any person is authorized to
conduct investigations in the manner prescribed
in section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code to determine whether a subject of a
foreign power in the Philippines is an
undesirable alien or not, and thereafter to
recommend to the President of the Philippines
the deportation of such alien."
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
As observed by Justice Labrador, there is no
legal nor constitutes provision defining the
power to deport aliens because the intention of
the law is to grant the Chief Executive "full
discretion to determine whether an alien's
residence in the country is so undesirable as to
affect or injure the security welfare or interest
of the state. The adjudication of facts upon
which deportation is predicated also devolves
on the Chief Executive whose decision is final
and executory." (Tan Tong vs. Deportation
Board 96 Phil. 934, 936; Tan Sin vs. Deportation
Board, 104 PhiL 868, 872).
It has been held that the Chief Executive is the
sole and exclusive judge of the existence of
facts which warrant the deportation of aliens as
disclosed in an investigation conducted in
accordance with 69. No other tribunal is at
liberty to reexamine or to controvert the
sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.
(Martin vs. Mott 12 Wheat., 19, 31, cited in In
re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 62).
In the Dick case it was noted "that every alien
forfeits his right to asylum in the country in
which he resides, in the absence of treaty
provisions to the contrary when his conduct or
his mode of life renders his prance there
inimical to the public interests". "The reasons
may be summed up and co in a single word: the
public interest of the State ." (38 Phil. 41, 47,
100).
Page 60 of 82

"It is fundamental that an executive order for
deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial
conviction in a case" (Ang Bong vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 100 Phil. 801,
803). Thus, it was held that the fact that an
alien has been acquitted in a of the charge does
not prevent the deportation of such alien based
on the same charge. Such acquittal does not
constitute res judicata in the deportation
proceedings. Conviction of a crime is not n to
warrant deportation. (3 C.J.S. 743, note 40,
citing Lewis vs. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 58 L. Ed. 967
and U.S. ex.. Mastoras vs. McCandless 61 F. 2nd
366; Tama Miyake vs. U.S. 257 F. 732).
And in the Tan Tong case, supra, it was ruled
that the Deportation Board could take
cognizance of the charge of illegal importation
against an alien as a ground for deportation,
even if he of the Deportation Board is merely
recommendatory. The Chief Executive has to
approve the board's recommendatory Abuses
or rents committed by the prosecutor or by the
Board should first be brought to his attention.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is
reversed and set aside. The writ of preliminary
injunction is dissolved. The case is to the
Deportation Board for further proceedings.
Costs against the petitioner-appellee.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119877. March 31, 1997.*
BIENVENIDO ONGKINGCO, as President and
GALERIA DE MAGALLANES CONDOMINIUM
ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
FEDERICO B. GUILAS, respondents.
Corporation Law; Labor Law; A
Superintendent/Administrator who is included
in the by-laws of an association in its roster of
corporate officers is an officer of said
corporation and not a mere employee.The
contentions of public respondent lack merit.
That private respondent is an officer of
petitioner corporation and not its mere
employee cannot be questioned. The by-laws of
the Galeria de Magallanes Condominium
Association specifically includes the
Superintendent/Administrator in its roster of
corporate officers.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Securities and
Exchange Commission; The dismissal or non-
appointment of a corporate officer is clearly an
intra-corporate matter and jurisdiction properly
belongs to the SEC and not the NLRC.Based on
the foregoing, we must rule that private
respondent was indeed a corporate officer. He
was appointed directly by the Board of
Directors not by any managing officer of the
corporation and his salary was, likewise, set by
the same Board. Having thus determined, his
dismissal or nonappointment is clearly an intra-
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
corporate matter and jurisdiction, therefore,
properly belongs to the SEC and not the NLRC.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Sec. 5(c) of P.D. 902-
A expressly covers both election and
appointment of corporate directors, trustees,
officers and managers.The respondents also
attack the SECs jurisdiction over the instant
case on grounds that Guilas was not elected by
the Board of Directors but was merely
appointed. This particular argument baffles us.
P.D. 902-A cannot be any clearer. Sec. 5(c) of
said law expressly covers both election and
appointment of corporate directors, trustees,
officers and managers.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction pertains
to the SEC even if the complaint by a corporate
officer includes money claims since such claims
are actually part of the perquisites of his
position in, and therefore interlinked with his
relations with the corporation.It is of no
consequence, likewise, that the complaint of
private respondent for illegal dismissal includes
money claims, jurisdiction remains with the SEC
as ruled in the case of Cagayan de Oro
Coliseum, Inc. v. Office of the MOLE: Although
the reliefs sought by Chaves appear to fall
under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter as
they are claims for unpaid salaries and other
remunerations for services rendered, a close
scrutiny thereof shows that said claims are
actually part of the perquisites of his position in,
and therefore interlinked with his relations with
Page 61 of 82

the corporation. In Dy vs. NLRC, the Court said:
(t)he question of remuneration involving as it
does, a person who is not a mere employee but
a stockholder and officer, an integral part, it
might be said, of the corporation, is not a
simple labor problem but a matter that comes
within the area of corporate affairs and
management, and is in fact a corporate
controversy in contemplation of the
Corporation Code.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari.
G.R. No. 96681. December 2,1991.*
HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Education,
Culture 6, Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in
her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools
of Manila, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY,
JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO,
AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA
REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Commission on
Human Rights; Court declares the Commission
on Human Rights to have no jurisdiction on
adjudicatory powers over certain specific type of
cases like alleged human rights violations
involving civil or political rights.The threshold
question is whether or not the Commission on
Human Rights has the power under the
Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency,
it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over,
or the power to try and decide, or hear and
determine, certain specific type of cases, like
alleged human rights violations in volving civil
or political rights. The Court declares the
Commission on Human Rights to have no such
power; and that it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or
quasijudicial agency in this country, or duplicate
much less take over the functions of the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The most that may
be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate,
i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact
as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights.The most
that may be conceded to the Commission. in
the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make
findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual
conclusion in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to those factual conclusions to the end that
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject
to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The
Constitution clearly and categorically grants to
the Commission the power to investigate all
forms of human rights violations invoking civil
and political rights.As should at once be
observed, only the first of the enumerated
powers and functions bears any resemblance to
adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution
clearly and categorically grants to the
Commission the power to investigate all forms
of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. It can exercise that power on its
own initiative or on complaint of any person. It
may exercise that power pursuant to such rules
of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of
violations of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In the
course of any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority, it may grant immunity from
prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth. It may also request the
assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions, in
the conduct of its investigation or in extending
such remedy as may be required by its findings.
Page 62 of 82

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It cannot try
and decide cases (or hear and determine
causes) as courts of justice or even quasi-judicial
bodies do.But it cannot try and decide cases
(or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To
investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.
Whether in the popular or the technical sense,
these terms have well understood and quite
distinct meanings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The
Commission on Human Rights having merely the
power to investigate cannot and should not try
and resolve on the merits the matters involved
in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90775.
Hence it is that the Commission on Human
Rights, having merely the power to
investigate, cannot and should not try and
resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters
involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90
775, as it has announced it means to do; and it
cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against
the teachers in question, initiated and
conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or
civil or political rights had been transgressed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; T
he matters are undoubtedly and clearly within
the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Education and also within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly
within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary
of Education, being within the scope of the
disciplinary powers granted to him under the
Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION of certiorari and
prohibition to review the order of the
Commission on Human Rights.
NARVASA, J.:p
The issue raised in the special civil action
of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by
the Solicitor General, may be formulated as
follows: where the relief sought from the
Commission on Human Rights by a party in a
case consists of the review and reversal or
modification of a decision or order issued by a
court of justice or government agency or official
exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the
Commission take cognizance of the case and
grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a
particular subject-matter is placed by law within
the jurisdiction of a court or other government
agency or official for purposes of trial and
adjudgment, may the Commission on Human
Rights take cognizance of the same subject-
matter for the same purposes of hearing and
adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied
by the respondents and are hence taken as
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
substantially correct for purposes of ruling on
the legal questions posed in the present action.
These facts, 1 together with others involved in
related cases recently resolved by this
Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record,
are hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a
class day, some 800 public school teachers,
among them members of the Manila Public
School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and
Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT)
undertook what they described as "mass
concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight"
their plight resulting from the alleged failure of
the public authorities to act upon grievances
that had time and again been brought to the
latter's attention. According to them they had
decided to undertake said "mass concerted
actions" after the protest rally staged at the
DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without
disrupting classes as a last call for the
government to negotiate the granting of
demands had elicited no response from the
Secretary of Education. The "mass actions"
consisted in staying away from their classes,
converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering
in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their
representatives, the teachers participating in
the mass actions were served with an order of
the Secretary of Education to return to work in
24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum
directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate
dismissal proceedings against those who did not
Page 63 of 82

comply and to hire their replacements. Those
directives notwithstanding, the mass actions
continued into the week, with more teachers
joining in the days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted
mass actions" were the eight (8) private
respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon
Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had
agreed to support the non-political demands of
the MPSTA. 4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order,
the CHR complainants (private respondents)
were administratively charged on the basis of
the principal's report and given five (5) days to
answer the charges. They were also
preventively suspended for ninety (90) days
"pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and
temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits,
Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee
was consequently formed to hear the charges in
accordance with P.D. 807. 5
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case
No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants
Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del
Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others,
named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate
answers, opted for a formal investigation, and
also moved "for suspension of the
administrative proceedings pending resolution
by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application
for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary
restraining order." But when their motion for
suspension was denied by Order dated
November 8, 1990 of the Investigating
Committee, which later also denied their
motion for reconsideration orally made at the
hearing of November 14, 1990, "the
respondents led by their counsel staged a
walkout signifying their intent to boycott the
entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually
resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated
December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation
of the evidence as well as the answers,
affidavits and documents submitted by the
respondents, decreeing dismissal from the
service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension
for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del
Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition
for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was
dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I).
Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court
(on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said
dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of
the striking teachers" right to due process and
peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No.
95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar
petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed
as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this
Court were filed in behalf of the teacher
associations, a few named individuals,
and "other teacher-members so numerous
similarly situated" or "other similarly situated
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
public school teachers too numerous to be
impleaded."
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent
teachers submitted sworn statements dated
September 27, 1990 to the Commission on
Human Rights to complain that while they were
participating in peaceful mass actions, they
suddenly learned of their replacements as
teachers, allegedly without notice and
consequently for reasons completely unknown
to them. 10
6. Their complaints and those of other
teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . .
(DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) were
docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case
No. 90775." In connection therewith the
Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October
11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary
Cario requiring his attendance therein. 11
On the day of the "dialogue," although it said
that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cario)
received the subpoena which was served at his
office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman
presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R.
Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to
hear the case;" it heard the complainants'
counsel (a) explain that his clients had been
"denied due process and suspended without
formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not
join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the
grievances which were "the cause of the mass
leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which
Page 64 of 82

causes they (CHR complainants)
sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter
issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and
making the following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the
case and be accordingly guided in its
investigation and resolution of the matter,
considering that these forty two teachers are
now suspended and deprived of their wages,
which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro
Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school
superintendent of Manila and the Principal of
Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are
hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the
Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at
11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all
documents relevant to the allegations
aforestated herein to assist the Commission in
this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will
resolve the complaint on the basis of
complainants' evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General,
Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave
to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion
to dismiss was submitted on November 14,
1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the
complaint states no cause of action and that the
CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of
the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the
"striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2)
cases, as aforestated, viz.:
a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of
Education Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS 90-
082, decreeing dismissal from the service of
Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9)
months of Babaran, Budoy and del
Castillo; 15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated
August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590
dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to
any appeals, if still timely, that the individual
petitioners may take to the Civil Service
Commission on the matters complained
of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima
facie lawful for petitioner Cario to issue
return-to-work orders, file administrative
charges against recalcitrants, preventively
suspend them, and issue decision on those
charges." 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990,
respondent Commission denied Sec. Cario's
motion to dismiss and required him and
Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their
counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after
which) the Commission shall proceed to hear
and resolve the case on the merits with or
without respondents counter affidavit." 18 It
held that the "striking teachers" "were denied
due process of law; . . . they should not have
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
been replaced without a chance to reply to the
administrative charges;" there had been a
violation of their civil and political rights which
the Commission was empowered to investigate;
and while expressing its "utmost respect to the
Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are
different from those in the case decided by the
Supreme Court" (the reference being
unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of
August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and
95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of
December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in
behalf of petitioner Cario, has commenced the
present action of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made
clear its position that it does not feel bound by
this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445
and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its
intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e.,
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the
merits." It intends, in other words, to try and
decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise
jurisdiction over the following general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were
denied due process, and just cause exists for
the imposition of administrative disciplinary
sanctions on them by their superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were
"the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA
teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR
Page 65 of 82

complainants) sympathize," justify their mass
action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to
itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with
character of finality and definiteness, the same
issues which have been passed upon and
decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture
& Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service
Commission, this Court having in fact, as
aforementioned, declared that the teachers
affected may take appeals to the Civil Service
Commission on said matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the
Commission on Human Rights has the power
under the Constitution to do so; whether or
not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-
judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or
adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try
and decide, or hear and determine, certain
specific type of cases, like alleged human rights
violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human
Rights to have no such power; and that it was
not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence
and make findings of fact as regards claimed
human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may
be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by
law. 21 This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the
constitutional provisions specifying the powers
of the Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987
Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon
its constitution, it succeeded and superseded
the Presidential Committee on Human Rights
existing at the time of the effectivity of the
Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are
the following 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by
any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights;
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within
the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing
abroad, and provide for preventive measures
and legal aid services to the underprivileged
whose human rights have been violated or need
protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons,
or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research,
education, and information to enhance respect
for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective
measures to promote human rights and to
provide for compensation to victims of
violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's
compliance with international treaty obligations
on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any
person whose testimony or whose possession
of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any
investigation conducted by it or under its
authority;
Page 66 of 82

(9) Request the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the performance of
its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in
accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as
may be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of
the enumerated powers and functions bears
any resemblance to adjudication or
adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and
categorically grants to the Commission the
power to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. It
can exercise that power on its own initiative or
on complaint of any person. It may exercise that
power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it
may adopt and, in cases of violations of said
rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the
Rules of Court. In the course of any
investigation conducted by it or under its
authority, it may grant immunity from
prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth. It may also request the
assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions, in
the conduct of its investigation or in extending
such remedy as may be required by its
findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and
determine causes) as courts of justice, or even
quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to
adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular
or the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to
examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe
into, research on, study. The dictionary
definition of "investigate" is "to observe or
study closely: inquire into systematically. "to
search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an
official probe . . .: to conduct an official
inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of
course, is to discover, to find out, to learn,
obtain information. Nowhere included or
intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts
inquired into by application of the law to the
facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially
the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track;
to search into; to examine and inquire into with
care and accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence;
a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn
describe as "(a)n administrative function, the
exercise of which ordinarily does not require a
hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an
inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
and collection of facts concerning a certain
matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly
understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,
decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The
dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally
(the rights and duties of the parties to a court
case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass
judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as
judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or
rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-
judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially
in a case of controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To
settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in
its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To
pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or
to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a
judgment." 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human
Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and
resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters
involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-
775, as it has announced it means to do; and it
cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against
the teachers in question, initiated and
conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or
civil or political rights had been transgressed.
Page 67 of 82

More particularly, the Commission has no
power to "resolve on the merits" the question
of (a) whether or not the mass concerted
actions engaged in by the teachers constitute
and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by
law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on
and taking part in those actions, and the failure
of the teachers to discontinue those actions,
and return to their classes despite the order to
this effect by the Secretary of Education,
constitute infractions of relevant rules and
regulations warranting administrative
disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the
grievances complained of by them; and (c) what
where the particular acts done by each
individual teacher and what sanctions, if any,
may properly be imposed for said acts or
omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly
within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary
of Education, being within the scope of the
disciplinary powers granted to him under the
Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as
above narrated, already taken cognizance of the
issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears
that appeals have been seasonably taken by the
aggrieved parties to the Civil Service
Commission; and even this Court itself has had
occasion to pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the
conclusions reached by the Secretary of
Education in disciplinary cases are correct and
are adequately based on substantial evidence;
whether or not the proceedings themselves are
void or defective in not having accorded the
respondents due process; and whether or not
the Secretary of Education had in truth
committed "human rights violations involving
civil and political rights," are matters which may
be passed upon and determined through a
motion for reconsideration addressed to the
Secretary Education himself, and in the event of
an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil
Service Commission and eventually the
Supreme Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no
place in this scheme of things. It has no business
intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of
the Education Secretary or the Civil Service
Commission. It has no business going over the
same ground traversed by the latter and making
its own judgment on the questions involved.
This would accord success to what may well
have been the complaining teachers' strategy to
abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the
Education Secretary in the administrative cases
against them which they anticipated would be
adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to
be done.
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
In any event, the investigation by the
Commission on Human Rights would serve no
useful purpose. If its investigation should result
in conclusions contrary to those reached by
Secretary Cario, it would have no power
anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions.
Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil
Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The
only thing the Commission can do, if it
concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is
to refer the matter to the appropriate
Government agency or tribunal for assistance;
that would be the Civil Service
Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself
the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order
of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on
Human Rights and the Chairman and Members
thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the
case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-
775) on the merits."
SO ORDERED.
ENFORCEMENT OF AGRNCY ACTION AND
REORGANIZATION/DISSOLUTION OF AGENCIES
G.R. No. 54424. August 31, 1989.*
NASIPIT LUMBER COMPANY, INC.,
petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, EXECUTIVE LABOR ARBITER
Page 68 of 82

ILDEFONSO G. AGBUYA and JUANITO
COLLADO, respondents.
Labor Relations; Res Judicata; The principle of
res judicata may not be invoked in labor
relations proceedings considering that such
proceedings are non-litigious and summary in
nature; Res judicata applies only to judicial and
quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the
exercise of administrative powers.On the first
issue, we hold that this is one of the cases
wherein the pronouncement of this Court thru
Justice Vicente Abad Santos in Razon vs. Inciong
applies. The Court stated therein that the
principle of res judicata may not be invoked in
labor relations proceedings considering that
Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code
provides that such proceedings are non-
litigious and summary in nature without regard
to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of
law. Said pronouncement is in consonance
with the jurisprudential dictum that the
doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the
exercise of administrative powers.
Same; Same; Same; Dismissal; Batas Pambansa
Blg. 130; Dismissal proceedings are now
confined within the establishments; The
requirement of written clearance from the
Department prior to termination was abolished
by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg.
130.Be that as it may, the possibility that
there would be two conflicting decisions on the
issue of Collados dismissal may now be
considered academic. The requirement of a
written clearance from the Department prior to
termination was abolished by the enactment of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in 1981. Dismissal
proceedings are now confined within the
establishments. The NLRC or the labor arbiter
steps in only if the said decision is contested by
the employee. Same; Same; Same; Same; Proof
beyond reasonable doubt of an employees
misconduct is not required if the ground for
dismissal is loss of confidence.On the legality
of Collados dismissal, we hold that the NLRC
abused its discretion in directing his
reinstatement with two (2) years backwages.
The relation between petitioner and Collado is
now strained by the latters violation of the
trust and confidence reposed on him as a
member of the security force, a position
impressed with a high degree of trust. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt of an employees
misconduct is not required when loss of
confidence is the ground for dismissal. It is
sufficient if the employer has some basis to
lose confidence or that the employer has
reasonable ground to believe or to entertain
the moral conviction that the employee
concerned is responsible for the misconduct
and that the nature of his participation therein
rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust
and confidence demanded by his position.
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Reinstatement
; Reinstatement is not proper where termination
of employment was due to breach of trust and
confidence.In this case, petitioner supported
its application for clearance to terminate
Collados employment with sworn statements
implicating him in the theft. Such sworn
statements are sufficient to warrant the
dismissal. On the other hand, the dropping of
the qualified theft charges against Collado is not
binding upon a labor tribunal. The sensitivity of
Collados job as a security guard vis-a-vis the
cause of his dismissal cost him his right to be
rehired to the same position. Reinstatement is
not proper where termination of employment
was due to breach of trust and confidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Separat
ion Pay; Separation pay shall be allowed as a
measure of social justice only in those instances
where the employee is validly dismissed for
causes other than serious misconduct or those
reflecting on his moral character.We are
aware of Collados almost six years of service to
the petitioner as well as the hardships resulting
from the loss of his job. Compassion dictates us
to grant him separation pay as financial
assistance but we are bound by the ruling of the
Court en banc inPhilippine Long Distance
Telephone Company v. NLRC that henceforth
separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of
social justice only in those instances where the
employee is validly dismissed for causes other
Page 69 of 82

than serious misconduct or those reflecting on
his moral character.
PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to
review the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission.
G.R. No. 101426. May 17, 1993.*
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and TRANSPACIFIC TOWAGE, INC.,
respondents.
Carriage of Goods by Sea; Ships and
Shipping; Damages; Where delay in unloading
of cargo not due to negligence of carrier it
cannot be held liable for damages.The Court
of Appeals summarized the reasons which
adversely affected the completion of the
unloading of the cargo from the time the vessel
arrived at the Pasacao area on 7 September
1985, namely: first, the buoys were installed
only on 11September 1985; second, the
consignee secured the discharge permit only on
13 September 1985; third, a wooden catwalk
had to be installed and the extension of the
wharf had to be made, which was completed
only on 16 September 1985; fourth, there were
intermittent rains and the stevedores supplied
by the consignee did not work during the town
fiesta of the Virgin of Peafrancia, hence, the
unloading was not continuous.
Same; Same; Same; Same.While it is true that
there was indeed delay in discharging the cargo
from the vessel, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that neither of the parties herein could
be faulted for such delay, for the same (delay)
was due not to negligence, but to several
factors earlier discussed. The cargo having been
lost due to typhoon Saling, and the delay
incurred in its unloading not being due to
negligence, private respondent is exempt from
liability for the loss of the cargo, pursuant to
Article 1740 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Diligence shown by
shipmaster to protect cargo from typhoon and
pilferages exempts carrier from damages.The
records also show that before, during and after
the occurrence of typhoon Saling, private
respondent through its shipmaster exercised
due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss of
the cargo, as shown by the following facts: (1)
at 5:20 a.m. of 18 October 1985, as typhoon
Saling continued to batter the Pasacao area,
the shipmaster tried to maneuver the vessel
amidst strong winds and rough seas; (2) when
water started to enter the engine room and
later the engine broke down, the shipmaster
ordered the ship to be abandoned, but he
sought police assistance to prevent pilferage of
the vessel and its cargo; (3) after the vessel
broke into two (2) parts and sank partially, the
shipmaster reported the incident to the
Philippine Coast Guard, but unfortunately,
despite the presence of three (3) coast guards,
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
nothing could be done to stop the pilferage as
almost the entire barrio folk came to loot the
vessel and its cargo, including the G.I. sheets.
Same; Same; Same; Judgment; Administrative
Law; Res judicata doctrine does not apply to
courts where prior decision was done by Board
of Marine Inquiry.The resolution of the
present case is not barred by the judgment of
the Board of Marine Inquiry. One of the
requisites of the principle of res judicata is that
there must be, among other things, identity of
subject matters and causes of action between a
first and second case in order that the judgment
in the prior case may bar that in the subsequent
case. The cause of action in the marine protest
was to enforce the administrative liability of the
shipmaster/captain of M/V Crazy Horse, its
officers and crew for the wreckage and sinking
of the subject vessel. On the other hand, the
cause of action at bar is to enforce the civil
liability of private respondent, a common
carrier, for its failure to unload the subject
cargo within a period of time considered
unreasonably long by the petitioner. While it
may be true that the Court is bound to accord
great weight to factual findings of the Board, we
hold that the protest filed before it and the
present case assert different causes of action
and seek different reliefs.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 70 of 82

Linsangan Law Office for petitioner.
Misa, Castro & Associates for private
respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari,
Philippine American General Insurance
Company, Incorporated assails the decision** of
the Court of Appeals, dated 31 July 1991,
rendered in CA-G.R. CV. No. 21252, which
reversed and set aside the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 161 and
entered a new one dismissing the petitioners
complaint which sought to collect the sum of
P1,511,210.00 from the private respondent.
The facts of the case, as found by the Court of
Appeals,2are as follows:
On September 4, 1985 the Davao Union
Marketing Corporation of Davao City shipped
on board the vessel M/V Crazy Horse
operated by the Transpacific Towage, Inc. cargo
consisting of 9,750 sheets of union brand GI
sheets with a declared value of P1,086,750.00
and 86,860 bags of union Pozzolan and union
Portland Cement with a declared value of
P4,300,000.00. The cargo was consigned to the
Bicol Union Center of Pasacao, Camarines Sur,
with a certain Pedro Olivanas the Notify-
Party.
The cargo was insured by the Philippine
American General Insurance Co., Inc. under
Marine Note No. 023408 covering 86,000. of
Union Pozzolan and Portland cement for the
amount of P3,440.000.00.
The vessel M/V Crazy Horse arrived
on September 7, 1985 as scheduled at the port
of Pasacao, Camarines Sur. Upon arrival the
shipmaster notified the consignees Notify-
Party that the vessel was already (sic) to
discharge the cargo. The discharging, could not
be effected immediately and continuously
because of certain reasons. First, the buoys
were installed only on September 11, 1985;
second, the discharge permit was secured by
the consignee only on September 13, 1985;
third a wooden catwalk had to be installed and
extension of the wharf had to be made, which
was completed only on September 26, 1985;
fourth, the discharging was not continuous
because there were intermittent rains and the
stevedores supplied by the consignee did not
work during the town fiesta. (Italics ours)
On October 16, 1985, a super typhoon code
named Saling entered the Philippine area of
responsibility and was felt in the eastern coast
of the country on October 17, 1985. It had a
strength of 240 KPH and Pasacao was placed
under Storm Signal No. 3. The discharging of the
cargo had to be suspended at 11:40 A.M. on
October 17, 1985 due to the heavy downpour,
strong winds, and turbulent sea. To prevent
damage to the cargo all hatches of the vessel
were closed and secured. (Italics ours)
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
At the time the discharging of the cargo was
suspended, a total of 59,625 bags of cement
and 26 crates of GI sheets had already been
discharged.
In further preparation for the typhoon the
vessel was loaded with 22 tons of fresh water
and 3,000 liters of fuel. The shipmaster ordered
the vessel to be moved about 300 meters
seaward in order that it would not hit the
catwalk or the wooden bridge or the wharf, or
the rocks. The vessel was ready for any
maneuver that may have to be made.
According to the shipmaster who was plotting
the typhoons path in a chart, the radius was so
wide that there was no way the typhoon could
be evaded. From 8:00 P.M. of October 17, 1985
to 8:00 P.M. of October 18, 1985 the typhoon
raged in the area. It was at about 5:20 A.M. of
October 18, 1985 when the shipmaster ordered
the maneuvering of the vessel but it could not
be steered on account of the strong winds and
rough seas. The vessels lines snapped, causing
her to be dragged against the rocks, and the
anchor chain stopper gave way. The vessel
sustained holes in the engine room and there
was a power failure in the vessel. Water started
to fill the engine room and at about 6:15 A.M.
the engine broke down.
The shipmaster had no choice but to order the
ship to be abandoned. He told the crew to
secure the vessel while he went to the
Municipal Mayor of Pasacao to request for
Page 71 of 82

police assistance to prevent pilferage of the
vessel and its cargo. He was, however, unable
to get any assistance. When he returned to the
vessel he found that it was being continuously
pounded by the strong sea waves against the
rocks. This caused the vessel to break into two
(2) parts and to sink partially. The shipmaster
reported the incident to the Philippine Coast
Guard but inspite the presence of three (3)
coast guards, nothing could be done about the
pilferage done on the vessel and its cargo.
Almost the whole barrio came to loot the vessel
and its cargo and because there were so many
of them the crew and the guards were helpless
to stop the pilferage and looting. As a result of
the incident the cargo of cement was damaged
while the GI sheets were looted and nothing
was left of the undischarged pieces.
The total number of cement bags damaged
and/or lost was 26,424 costing P1,056,960.00
while there were 4,000 pieces of the GI sheets
unrecovered, the cost of which was
P454,250.00.
Because the cargo was insured by it the
Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc.
paid the shipper Davao Union Marketing
Corporation the sum of P1,511,210.00.
Thereafter, the said insurer made demands
upon the Transpacific Towage, Inc. for the
payment of said amount as subrogee of the
insured, claiming that the loss of the cargo was
directly and exclusively brought about by the
fault and negligence of the shipmaster and the
crew of M/V Crazy Horse. Because the latter
refused to pay the amount of P1,511,210.00
demanded, the Philippine American General
Insurance Co., Inc. filed the present complaint.
The lower court found that although the
immediate cause of the loss may have been due
to an act of God, the defendant carrier had
exposed the property to the accident. The court
also found the plaintiff guilty of contributory
negligence and mitigated the plaintiffs claim to
three-fourths (3/4) of its value. Thus the lower
court, in its Decision, ordered the defendant:
1. 1)To pay plaintiff the mitigated
amount of P1,133,408.00 plus 12% legal
interest per annum computed from the
date of the filing of herein complaint on
May 15, 1986, until fully paid;
2. 2)To pay P8,000.00 as attorneys fees;
and
3. 3)To pay costs of suit.SO ORDERED.
In its now assailed decision, respondent Court
of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court and
ruled instead that private respondent, as a
common carrier, is not responsible for the loss
of the insured cargo involved in the case at bar,
as said loss was due solely to a fortuitous event.
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
Petitioner in the present petition contends that
respondent appellate court erred in not holding
private respondent liable for the loss of the said
insured cargo.
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
It is not disputed that private respondent is a
common carrier as defined in Article 1732 of
the Civil Code.3 The following facts are also not
contested: (1) that the cargo-carrying vessel
was wrecked and partially sank on 18 October
1985 due to typhoon Saling; (2) that typhoon
Saling was a fortuitous event; and (3) that at
the time said vessel sank, the remaining
undischarged cargo, consisting of 26,424
cement bags and 4,000 pieces of G.I. sheets,
were still on board the vessel.
However, the Court notes the fact that as of 17
October 1985, the time when the Pasacao area
was placed under storm signal No. 3 due to
Saling, the unloading of the cargo from the
vessel was still unfinished, notwithstanding the
lapse of forty (40) days from the time the vessel
arrived in Pasacao on 7 September 1985, or the
lapse of thirty-four (34) days from the time
actual discharge of the cargo commenced on 13
September 1985.
In the opinion of the trial court, this lapse of
thirty four (34) days with private respondent
not having completed the unloading of the
goods, is tantamount to unreasonable delay,
which delay exposed the unloaded cargo to
Page 72 of 82

accident. The trial court held private
respondent liable for the loss of goods under
Article 1740 of the Civil Code which provides
that if the common carrier negligently incurs in
delay in transporting the goods, a natural
disaster shall not free the carrier from
responsibility.
On the other hand, the appellate court ruled
out any negligence committed by private
respondent and held that the delay
_______________
3
ART. 1732. Common carriers are persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in
the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or
air, for compensation, offering their services to
the public.in fully unloading the cargo from the
vessel was occasioned by causes that may not
be attributed solely to human factors, among
which were the natural conditions of the port
where the M/V Crazy Horse had docked, the
customs of the place and the weather
conditions.4
The appellate court in exempting private
respondent from liability applied Article 1739 of
the Civil Code which provides as follows:
In order that the common carrier may be
exempted from responsibility, the natural
disaster must have been the proximate and only
cause of the loss. However, the common carrier
must exercise due diligence to prevent or
minimize loss before, during and after the
occurrence of flood, storm, or other natural
disaster in order that the common carrier may
be exempted from liability for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods.
The appellate court ruled that the loss of cargo
in the present case was due solely to typhoon
Saling and that private respondent had shown
that it had observed due diligence before,
during and after the occurrence of Saling;
hence, it should not be liable under Article
1739.
Considering the undisputed fact that there
really was delay in completing the unloading of
the goods from the vessel, the Court believes
that the real issue at bar centers on the
application of Article 1740 of the Civil Code. In
short, the principal question, in determining
which of the parties in the present case should
bear the loss of the goods, is whether the delay
involved in the unloading of the goods is
deemed negligently incurred in, so as not to
free private respondent from liability,
notwithstanding the fact that the ultimate
cause of the loss of the goods was the sinking of
the vessel brought about by typhoon Saling.
Indeed, from the time the vessel arrived at port
Pasacao on 7 September 1985 up to 17 October
1985 when the Pasacao area was placed under
storm signal No. 3 due to typhoon Saling,
forty (40) days had passed. Under normal
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
conditions, a period of forty (40) days is
undoubtedly more than enough time
withinwhich the unloading of the cargo (given
its nature) from the vessel could be completed.
Hence, the question boils down further to
which party should be faulted for this delay.
Private respondent argues that its duty to
unload ceased on 7 September 1985 when the
shipmaster notified the consignees Notify-
Party that the vessel was ready to discharge
the cargo. On the other hand, petitioner
contends that the duty to unload the cargo
from the vessel continued to remain with
private respondent. Respondent appellate
court, however, ruled that the question as to
which party had the task to discharge the cargo
is actually immaterial under the circumstances,
as the delay could not be attributed to any of
the parties, but to several causes such as the
natural conditions of the Pasacao port, the
customs of the place and the weather
conditions obtaining at the time. The appellate
court made the following observations:
x x x xxx
To our mind whichever of the parties had the
obligation to unload the cargo is not material.
For, analyzing the causes for the delay in such
unloading, we find that such delay was not due
to the negligence of any party but was
occasioned by causes that may not be
attributed solely to human factors, among
which were the natural conditions of the port
Page 73 of 82

where the M/V Crazy Horse had docked, the
customs of the place, and the weather
conditions.
The wharf where the vessel had to dock was
shallow and rocky, hence it had to drop anchor
some distance away in a private port. Buoys had
to be constructed in order that the vessel may
be properly moored. After the buoys were
installed a wooden stage had to be constructed
so that the stevedores could reach the vessel.
For this they needed a floating crane which was
not immediately available. The barges that were
to load the cargo from the vessel could not go
near the wharf because of the shallow and
rocky condition. A catwalk had to be installed
between the barge and the wharf. This
necessitated the dismantling of the wooden
stage previously installed.
Apart from these preparations and
constructions that had to be made, the weather
was not cooperative. Even before the typhoon
struck there were intermittent rains, hence the
unloading was not continuous. The actual
unloading started on September 13, 1985 and
could have been finished in 4 or 5 days but
because of the rains it was delayed. Another
factor that caused further delay was the fact
that the fiesta of the Virgin of Peafrancia was
celebrated and for the length of time that the
celebrations were held, the stevedores who
were from the place
xxx x x x.5
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
The Court of Appeals summarized the reasons exempt from liability for the loss of the cargo,
which adversely affected the completion of the pursuant to Article 1740 of the Civil Code.
unloading of the cargo from the time the vessel
The records also show that before, during and
arrived at the Pasacao area on 7 September
after the occurrence of typhoon Saling,
1985, namely: first, the buoys were installed
private respondent through its shipmaster
only on 11 September 1985; second, the
exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize
consignee secured the discharge permit only on
the loss of the cargo, as shown by the following
13 September 1985; third, a wooden catwalk
facts: (1) at 5:20 a.m. of 18 October 1985, as
had to be installed and the extension of the
typhoon Saling continued to batter the
wharf had to be made, which was completed
Pasacao area, the shipmaster tried to maneuver
only on 16 September 1985; fourth, there were
the vessel amidst strong winds and rough seas;
intermittent rains and the stevedores supplied
(2) when water started to enter the
by the consignee did not work during the town
fiesta of the Virgin of Peafrancia, hence, the engine room and later the engine broke down,
unloading was not continuous. the shipmaster ordered the ship to be
abandoned, but he sought police assistance to
We respect the above-mentioned factual
prevent pilferage of the vessel and its cargo; (3)
findings of the appellate court as to the natural
after the vessel broke into two (2) parts and
conditions of the port of Pasacao where the
sank partially, the shipmaster reported the
vessel was docked, and several other factors
incident to the Philippine Coast Guard, but
which harshly affected the completion of the
unfortunately, despite the presence of three (3)
discharge of the cargo, as these findings of fact
coast guards, nothing could be done to stop the
are substantially supported by evidence.6
pilferage as almost the entire barrio folk came
While it is true that there was indeed delay in to loot the vessel and its cargo, including the
discharging the cargo from the vessel, we agree G.I. sheets.
with the Court of Appeals that neither of the
The diligence exercised by the shipmaster
parties herein could be faulted for such delay,
further supports the exemption of private
for the same (delay) was due not to negligence,
respondent from liability for the loss of the
but to several factors earlier discussed. The
cargo, in accordance with Article 1739 of the
cargo having been lost due to typhoon Saling,
Civil Code.
and the delay incurred in its unloading not
being due to negligence, private respondent is Although we find private respondent free from
liability for the loss of the cargo, we disagree
Page 74 of 82

with its contention that the doctrine of res
judicata applies in the case of bar, because the
Board of Marine Inquiry rendered a decision
dated 11 April 1988 (acting on the marine
protest filed on 19 October 1985 by the
shipmaster of M/V Crazy Horse) holding that
said shipmaster was not guilty of negligence as
the proximate cause of the grounding and
subsequent wreckage of M/V Crazy Horse,
hence, recommending that the captain, his
officers and crew be absolved from any
administrative liability arising out of the subject
incident.7
The resolution of the present case is not barred
by the judgment of the Board of Marine Inquiry.
One of the requisites of the principle of res
judicata is that there must be, among other
things, identity of subject matters and causes of
action between a first and second case in order
that the judgment in the prior case may bar that
in the subsequent case.8
The cause of action in the marine protest was to
enforce the administrative liability of the
shipmaster/captain of M/V Crazy Horse, its
officers and crew for the wreckage and sinking
of the subject vessel. On the other hand, the
cause of action at bar is to enforce the civil
liability of private respondent, a common
carrier, for its failure to unload the subject
cargo within a period of time considered
unreasonably long by the petitioner. While it
_ against the refusal or inaction of the Labor
may be true that the Court is bound to accord
great weight to factual findings of the
Board,9 we hold that the protest filed before it
and the present case assert different causes of
action and seek different reliefs.
with the execution of a final judgment of the
All told, we find private respondent not legally
liable for the loss of the insured cargo involved
in the present case.
Instance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
appealed decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 31 July 1991, rendered in CA-G.R. CV No.
21252, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
No. L-56833. July 20, 1982.*
RAMON V. MERANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE
EDUARDO C. TUTAAN, Branch V, Court of First
Instance of Quezon City; SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION, ANTONIO TRIA TIRONA, Labor
Arbiter, and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, respondents.
Labor Law; Jurisdiction; NLRC, not CFI, has
jurisdiction to interfere with a Labor Arbiters
failure to enforce an NLRC decision; NLRC has
same rank and category as the CFI.The Court
of First Instance is not the proper tribunal to
pass upon Meranos complaint against the
failure of the Labor Arbiter to enforce the
NLRCs decision to reinstate him to his former
position of sales staff assistant. His remedy
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
Arbiter, who is in charge of executing the
awards of the NLRC, is to call the NLRCs
attention to the alleged nonfeasance and not to
file a mandamus action in the Court of First
Instance which has no jurisdiction to interfere
NLRC. That labor tribunal has the same rank and
is in the same category as the Court of First
Same; Remedial Law; Special Civil
Actions; Mandamus; Mandamus does not lie if
there is another plain, speedy and adequate
remedy.Articles 217 and 223 of the Labor
Code indicate that the NLRC has jurisdiction to
review the decisions, awards and orders of the
Labor Arbiter. It is elementary that mandamus
does not lie if the petitioner has another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
PETITION for review of the order of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Pacifico B. Advincula for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law
Offices for private respondents. AQUINO, J.:
The National Labor Relations Commission in a
decision dated November 9, 1979 ordered San
Miguel Corporation to reinstate Ramon V.
Merano to his former position without loss of
seniority rights and other rights and benefits to
Page 75 of 82

which he is entitled under existing laws and
with backwages from December 16, 1977 up to
his reinstatement (Case No. 13799-T).
This Court in its resolution of April 30, 1980
dismissed the petition of San Miguel
Corporation for the review of that decision (G.
R. No. 52157). Hence, it became final and
executory.
Pursuant to that decision, Merano was paid
P53,949.16 as monetary award up to August 31,
1980 but he was not reinstated. San Miguel
Corporation opposed the reinstatement due to
his supervening physical unfitness and asked
that it be allowed to pay Merano separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement (pp. 124-125, Rollo).
The NLRC in its en banc resolution of June 11,
1981 ruled that because Merano could no
longer be reinstated due to his illness, he
should be paid his additional backwages from
September 1 to November 19, 1980, the date of
the medical evaluation made by the Chief of the
National Orthopedic Hospital, and separation
pay up to that date at the rate of one months
salary for every year of service, a fraction of at
least six months being considered as one year
(pp. 128-129, Rollo).
Even before the issuance of that NLRC
resolution of June 11, 1981, or on February 10,
1981, Merano filed in the Court of First Instance
at Quezon City a special civil action of
mandamus against San Miguel Corporation and
the Labor Arbiter who functioned as the
execution arm of the NLRC.
Merano prayed that the respondents be
ordered to execute solidarity the judgment of
the NLRC and, on failure to do so, San Miguel
Corporation should be required to pay him the
sum of P616,560 as his expected income until
he reaches the age of 60 years plus his unpaid
back salaries, to deposit in court his monthly
salary, to pay P35,000 as moral and exemplary
damages and P30,000 as attorneys fees and to
defray the expenses for his surgical operation.
After receiving the comments of the
respondents, the learned trial judge, Hon.
Eduardo C. Tutaan, in his order of April 20,
1981, dismissed Meranos petition on the
ground that he had no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the case which falls within the
competent of the NLRC.
That order of dismissal was appealed by
Merano to this Court in this petition for review
under Republic Act No. 5440 which he filed on
June 2, 1981. The appeal was given due course.
The NLRC was impleaded as a respondent.
We hold that respondent judge did not err in
dismissing Meranos petition for mandamus on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Court of
First Instance is not the proper tribunal to pass
upon Meranos complaint against the failure of
the Labor Arbiter to enforce the NLRCs decision
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
to reinstate him to his former position of sales
staff assistant.
His remedy against the refusal or inaction of the
Labor Arbiter, who is in charge of executing the
awards of the NLRC, is to call the NLRCs
attention to the alleged nonfeasance and not to
file a mandamus action in the Court of First
Instance which has no jurisdiction to interfere
with the execution of a final judgment of the
NLRC. That labor tribunal has the same rank and
is in the same category as the Court of First
Instance. (See Ambrocio vs. Salvador, L-47651,
December 11, 1978, 87 SCRA 217; Nation Multi
Service Labor Union vs. Agcaoili, L-39741, May
30, 1975, 64 SCRA 274.)
Articles 217 and 223 of the Labor Code indicate
that the NLRC has jurisdiction to review the
decisions, awards and orders of the Labor
Arbiter. It is elementary that mandamus does
not lie if the petitioner has another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
As already noted, the NLRC on June 11, 1981,
acting on the Labor Arbiters report that
Merano could not be reinstated because of the
supervening fact that he was suffering from
aseptic necrosis of the hip, held that he should
not be reinstated and should be given
separation pay in addition to his back salaries.
Another supervening fact is that on November
11, 1981 Merano and San Miguel Corporation
Page 76 of 82

executed a notarized agreement whereby, in
consideration of certain additional payments,
Merano released San Miguel Corporation from
any further liability and manifested that the
instant appeal should be dismissed because he
was no longer interested in his claim for
reinstatement and damages (pp. 199-204,
Rollo).
However, Meranos counsel said that he was
not bound by that agreement. He prayed that
this case be decided. Merano in his comment
dated June 28, 1982 asked that this case be
decided notwithstanding that settlement.
Whether that settlement should terminate the
case between Merano and San Miguel
Corporation is a point which is not decided in
this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The
order of dismissal issued by respondent Judge is
affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion
Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De
Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed. Order affirmed.
Notes.National Labor Relations Commission is
without jurisdiction to hear claims for moral
damages under Presidential Decree No. 1367
which amended Article 217 of the New Labor
Code. (Bengson vs. Inciong, 91 SCRA 248.)
Rule that when, after the judgment has become
final, facts and circumstances transpire which
render its execution impossible or unjust, there
is need for the court to modify or alter the said
judgment, applicable to National Labor
Relations Commission. (Central Textile Mills, Inc.
vs. United (CMC) Textile Workers Union,-
TGWF, 94 SCRA 883.)
An award or judgment becomes final and
executory upon the expiration of the period to
appeal and no appeal was made within the
reglementary period. (Volkchel Labor Union vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 98 SCRA
314.)
Absence of an employees appeal from the
Labor Arbiters ruling against his reinstatement
not a bar to his appeal. (Razon vs. Inciong, 101
SCRA 738.)
G.R. No. 96938. October 15, 1991.*
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(GSIS) petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION HEIRS OF ELIZAR NAMUCO, and
HEIRS OF EUSEBIO MANUEL, respondents.
Civil Service Commission; Execution; The Civil
Service Commission, like the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit, is a
constitutional commission invested by the
Constitution and relevant laws not only with
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
authority to administer the civil service but also
with quasi-judicial powers.The Civil Service
Commission, like the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit, is a constitutional
commission invested by the Constitution and
relevant laws not only with authority to
administer the civil service, but also with quasi-
judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and
decide administrative disciplinary cases
instituted directly with it or brought to it on
appeal. The Commission shall decide by a
majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from
the date of its submission for decision or
resolution, subject to appeal to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by any aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof. It has the power, too, sitting en
banc, to promulgate its own rules concerning
pleadings and practice before it or before any of
its offices, which rules should not however
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Same; Same; Same; The grant to a tribunal or
agency of adjudicatory power or the authority
to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and
logically be deemed to include the grant of
authority to enforce or execute the judgments it
thus renders unless the law otherwise
provides.In light of all the foregoing
constitutional and statutory provisions, it would
appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service
Commission the power or authority to enforce
or order execution of its decisions, resolutions
Page 77 of 82

or orders which, it should be stressed, it has
been exercising through the years. It would
seem quite obvious that the authority to decide
cases is inutile unless accompanied by the
authority to see that what has been decided is
carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or
agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority
to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and
logically be deemed to include the grant of
authority to enforce or execute the judgments
it thus renders, unless the law otherwise
provides.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The commission's
exercise of that power of execution has been
sanctioned by the Court in several cases.In
any event, the Commission's exercise of that
power of execution has been sanctioned by this
Court in several cases.
G.R. No. 84301. April 7, 1993.*
NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION,
petitioner, vs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and
VIOLETA L. GARCIA, respondents.
Public Officers; Administrative Law; Civil
Service; Abolition of position does not imply
removal.Thus, without need of any
interpretation, the law mandates that from the
moment an implementing order is issued, all
positions in the Land Registration Commission
are deemed non-existent. This, however, does
not mean removal. Abolition of a position does
not involve or mean removal for the reason that
removal implies that the post subsists and that
one is merely separated therefrom. After
abolition, there is in law no occupant. Thus,
there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this
sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of
tenure does not arise.
Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; E.O 649
abolishing the Land Registration Commission
and creating the NALTDRA is valid. Its
requirement of Bar membership for Deputy
Registers of Deed is a valid reorganization
measure.Executive Order No. 649 was
enacted to improve the services and better
systematize the operation of the Land
Registration Commission. A reorganization is
carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose
of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. To this end, the requirement of Bar
membership to qualify for key positions in the
NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing
circumstances and new development of the
times. Private respondent Garcia who formerly
held the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II
did not have such qualification. It is thus clear
that she cannot hold any key position in the
NALTDRA. The additional qualification was not
intended to remove her from office. Rather, it
was a criterion imposed concomitant with a
valid reorganization measure.
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no vested
right in a public office; Exceptions.A final
word, on the vested right theory advanced by
respondent Civil Service Commission. There is
no such thing as a vested interest or an estate
in an office, or even an absolute right to hold it.
Except constitutional offices which provide for
special immunity as regards salary and tenure,
no one can be said to have any vested right in
an office or its salary. None of the exceptions to
this rule are obtaining in this case.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the
resolution of the Civil Service Commission.
G.R. No. 103121. September 10, 1993.*
BLAQUERA VS CSC
Constitutional Law; Administrative
Law; President Corazon Aquino invested herself
under Sections 1 and 2, Article III of the Freedom
Constitution with power and authority to
reorganize the government.It may be recalled
that upon her assumption of office as President
of the Philippines after the EDSA Revolution,
President Corazon Aquino invested herself
under Sections 1 and 2, Article III of the
Freedom Constitution (Proclamation No. 3,
March 25, 1986) with power and authority to
reorganize the Government by proclamation
or executive order or by designation or
appointment and qualification of the successor
of any elective and appointive officials under
the 1973 Constitution. The reorganization was
Page 78 of 82

to be completed within one year from February
25, 1986, or by February 25, 1987.
Same; Same; Same; E.O. No. 17 provides
guidelines for the implementation of the
reorganization.However, in order to obviate
unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among
the deserving officials and employees,
particularly in the Career Civil Service arising
from the reorganization of the government, the
President issued E.O. No. 17 on May 28, 1986
providing guidelines for the implementation of
the reorganization to protect career civil
servants whose qualifications and performance
meet the standards of service demanded by the
new Government, and to ensure that only those
found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are
separated from the government service.
Same; Same; Same; Section 16 of Article XVIII of
the Constitution still allows the separation of
employees not for cause but as a result of the
reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No.
3.Section 16 of Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of the Constitution still allows the
separation of employees not for cause but as a
result of the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 x x x and the
reorganization following the ratification of this
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reorganization must
nevertheless pass the test of good faith to be
valid.E.O. No. 192 dated June 10, 1987
PROVIDING FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY retirement plans of the reorganized
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, RENAMING IT THE government agency.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
Same; Same; Same; The right of the State to
NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FOR OTHER
reorganize the government resulting in the
PURPOSES is a reorganization following the
separation of career civil service employees
ratification of this Constitution. Although
under the 1987 Constitution is beyond dispute
impliedly sanctioned under Section 16 of the
but said reorganization, ouster and
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
appointments of successors must be made in
it must nevertheless pass the test of good faith
good faith.In fact, the right of the State to
to be valid. Good faith, we ruled in Dario vs.
reorganize the Government resulting in the
Mison is a basic ingredient for the validity of
separation of career civil service employees
any government reorganization. It is the golden
under the 1987 Constitution is beyond dispute,
thread that holds together the fabric of the
but as emphasized in the Mison case (G.R. Nos.
reorganization. Without it, the cloth would
81954, 81967 and 82023, August 8, 1989) and
disintegrate.
in the cases of Bondoc vs. Sec. of Science and
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Reorganizatio Technology (G.R. No. 83025), Quisumbing vs.
n is a recognized valid ground for separation of Tupas (G.R No. 87401) and Hamed vs. Civil
civil service employees subject only to the Service Commission (G.R. No. 89069), all of
condition that it be done in good faith. which having been promulgated on July 19,
Reorganization is a recognized valid ground for 1990, said reorganization, ouster, and
separation of civil service employees, subject appointments of successors must be made in
only to the condition that it be done in good GOOD FAITH.
faith. No less than the Constitution itself in
Same; Same; Same; Same; Fact that Section 25
Section 16 of the Transitory Provisions, together
of E.O. No. 192 changed the status of all the
with Sections 33 and 34 of Executive Order No.
officers and employees of the DENR from
81 and Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6656,
permanent or regular to mere hold-overs
support this conclusion with the declaration
flagrantly violating the employees right to due
that all those not so appointed in the
process, taints the reorganization process.
implementation of said reorganization shall be
There appears to be no sufficient justification
deemed separated from the service with the
for the reorganization of the DENR, as revised
concomitant recognition of their entitlement to
by the DBM. The fact that Section 25 of E.O. No.
appropriate separation benefits and/or
192 changed the status of all the officers and
Page 79 of 82

employees of the DENR from permanent or
regular to mere hold-overs, flagrantly
violating the employees right to due process,
taints the reorganization process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court
emphasized that a reorganization does not
justify a detraction from the mandatory
requirements of notice and hearing.
In Domingo vs. DBP, 207 SCRA 766, the Court
emphasized that a reorganization does not
justify a detraction from
the mandatory requirement of notice and
hearing (italics ours) to the affected officials
and employees.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The conversion of the
petitioners from permanent to coterminous
employees is a wholesale demotion of personnel
which is tantamount to removal without cause
and without due process.The conversion of
the petitioners from permanent to
coterminous employees is a
wholesale demotion of personnel which is
tantamount to removal without cause and
without due process.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Prohibition and Mandamus.
G.R. No. 96739. October 13, 1993.*
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY,
petitioner, vs. THE CHAIRMAN AND
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
COMMISSIONERS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE Same; Same; Power to abolish public offices
COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents. vested in the legislature not absolute.In
Mendoza v. Quisumbing, we stressed that (i)t
Administrative Law; The implementation of a
is a paramount principle in Public Officers Law
reorganization in the government must pass the
that the power to abolish public offices vested
test of good faith.Whether the reorganization
in the legislature is not absolute, (and that it) is
is to be adjudged valid, or invalid, inquiry must
subject to the limitations that it be exercised in
perforce be made on the manner in which it is
good faith, should never be for personal or
implemented and the way the power is wielded
political reasons, and cannot be implemented in
by those to whom the authority is delegated.
a manner contrary to law. It may be recalled
Heretofore, this Court has repeatedly expressed
that after 02 February 1987, any reorganization
the need for extreme care and prudence in
undertaken by government is also
carrying out the reorganization process. Its
circumscribed by the provisions and safeguards
implementation, in any event, must pass the
of the new Constitution.
test of good faith.
Civil Procedure; Certiorari; Court jurisdiction
Same; Same; Rule on reorganization laid down
over cases emanating from the Civil Service
in Dario vs. Mison.In Dario v. Mison we laid
Commission limited to complaints of lack or
down the rule, thus: Reorganization in this
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
jurisdiction have been regarded as valid
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
provided they are pursued in good faith. As a
jurisdiction.Needless to state, our jurisdiction
general rule, a reorganization is carried out in
over cases emanating from the CSC is limited to
good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or
complaints of lack or excess of jurisdiction or
to make bureaucracy more efficient.
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
Same; Same; Same; Court have not deviated excess of jurisdiction that can justify certiorari
from the rule.To this date, we have not under Rule 65. Unless there is a grave abuse of
deviated from the above pronouncement, and that discretion or when the findings are
we have struck down as invalid any attempt to arbitrary and devoid of evidentiary justification,
displace civil servants on a supposed call for we must accord due respect, if not finality, to
those findings.
efficiency or economy but which in the end only
fails to properly reflect and evince that explicit
PETITION for certiorari to set aside the
objective.
resolution of the Civil Service Commission.
Page 80 of 82

G.R. No. 102976. October 25, 1995.*
IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY,
petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION,
respondents.
Actions; Parties; Pleadings and Practice; Those
who can be parties to a civil action may be
broadly categorized into two (2) groupsi.e.,
persons, whether natural or juridical, and,
entities authorized by law.Rule 3, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court specifies who may be parties
to a civil action: Section 1. Who May Be
Parties.Only natural or juridical persons or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a
civil action. Under the above quoted provision,
it will be seen that those who can be parties to
a civil action may be broadly categorized into
two (2) groups: (a) those who are recognized
as persons under the law whether natural, i.e.,
biological persons, on the one hand, or juridical
persons such as corporations, on the other
hand; and (b) entities authorized by law to
institute actions.
Administrative Law; Government Owned and
Controlled Corporations; Government Agencies
and Instrumentalities; The Iron and Steel
Authority (ISA) appears to be a non-
incorporated agency or instrumentality of the
Republic of the Philippines, or more precisely of
the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines.Clearly, ISA was vested with some
of the powers or attributes normally associated
with juridical personality. There is, however, no
provision in P.D. No. 272 recognizing ISA as
possessing general or comprehensive juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of
the Government. The ISA in fact appears to the
Court to be a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the Republic of the
Philippines, or more precisely of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is common knowledge that other agencies or
instrumentalities of the Government of the
Republic are cast in corporate form, that is to
say, are incorporated
agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with
and at other times without capital stock, and
accordingly vested with a juridical personality
distinct from the personality of the Republic.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The
term Authority has been used to designate
both incorporated and non-incorporated
agencies or instrumentalities of the
Government.It is worth noting that the term
Authority has been used to designate both
incorporated and non-incorporated agencies or
instrumentalities of the Government. Same;
Same; Same; Agency; The ISA is an agent or
delegate of the Republic, while the Republic
itself is a body corporate and juridical person
vested with the full panoply of powers and
attributes which are compendiously described
as legal personality.We consider that the
ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate
of the Republic of the Philippines. The Republic
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
itself is a body corporate and juridical person
vested with the full panoply of powers and
attributes which are compendiously described
as legal personality.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When the statutory
term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the
powers, duties and functions as well as the
assets and liabilities of that agency revert back
to, and are reassumed by, the Republic of the
Philippines, in the absence of special provisions
of law specifying some other disposition
thereof.When the statutory term of a non-
incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties
and functions as well as the assets and liabilities
of that agency revert back to, and are re-
assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in
the absence of special provisions of law
specifying some other disposition thereof such
as e.g., devolution or transmission of such
powers, duties, functions, etc to some other
identified successor agency or instrumentality
of the Republic of the Philippines. When the
expiring agency is an incorporated one, the
consequences of such expiry must be looked
for, in the first instance, in the charter of that
agency and, by way of supplementation, in the
provisions of the Corporation Code. Since, in
the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated
agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its
powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities
are properly regarded as folded back into the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and hence assumed once again by the Republic,
Page 81 of 82

no special statutory provision having been
shown to have mandated succession thereto by
some other entity or agency of the Republic.
Actions; Parties; Eminent Domain; The
expiration of ISAs statutory term did not by
itself require or justify the dismissal of the
eminent domain proceedings.From the
foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic
of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in
the expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff
in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having
expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of
ISAs statutory term did not by itself require or
justify the dismissal of the eminent domain
proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; The
non-joinder of the Republic which occurred upon
the expiration of ISAs statutory term was not a
ground for dismissal of the expropriation
proceedings.It is also relevant to note that the
non-joinder of the Republic which occurred
upon the expiration of ISAs statutory term, was
not a ground for dismissal of such proceedings
since a party may be dropped or added by order
of the court, on motion of any party or on the
courts own initiative at any stage of the
action and on such terms as are just. In the
instant case, the Republic has precisely moved
to take over the proceedings as party-plaintiff.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; The
Republic may initiate or participate in actions
involving its agents.In E.B. Marcha Transport
Administrative Procedure | Lizzette dela Pena
Company, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate President of the Philippines to exercise, or
Court, the Court recognized that the Republic cause the exercise of, the power of eminent
may initiate or participate in actions involving domain on behalf of the Government of the
its agents. There the Republic of the Philippines Republic of the Philippines.
was held to be a proper party to sue for
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court
recovery of possession of property although the
of Appeals.
real or registered owner of the property was
the Philippine Ports Authority, a government
agency vested with a separate juridical
personality. The Court said: It can be said that
in suing for the recovery of the rentals, the
Republic of the Philippines acted as principal of
the Philippine Ports Authority, directly exercising
the commission it had earlier conferred on the
latter as its agent. x x x
Same; Same; Same; No new legislative act is
necessary should the Republic decide, upon
being substituted for ISA, in fact to continue to
prosecute the expropriation proceedingsthe
legislative authority, a long time ago, enacted a
continuing or standing delegation of authority
to the President of the Philippines to exercise, or
cause the exercise of, the power of eminent
domain on behalf of the Government.While
the power of eminent domain is, in principle,
vested primarily in the legislative department of
the government, we believe and so hold that no
new legislative act is necessary should the
Republic decide, upon being substituted for ISA,
in fact to continue to prosecute the
expropriation proceedings. For the legislative
authority, a long time ago, enacted a continuing
or standing delegation of authority to the
Page 82 of 82