MARIKANA MASSACRE: A TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS

The following timeline of events leading to the Marikana Massacre of 16 August 2012 is based
on the testimony and contents of the Farlam Marikana Commission report.

This compilation is not made specifically to vilify those thought responsible, but to promote
public awareness in memory of the victims on both sides. It is also hoped that the
commendable recommendations made in the Farlam Report are taken seriously, so to prevent
unfortunate events such as these in the future.

NB: This transcript excludes the testimony of Mr X, which the compiler feels is incoherent
with the rest of the report, and should thus be reviewed in isolation by interested parties.
Errors, omissions and inaccuracies, if any, are not intentional. Readers are advised of graphic
content.

7 October 2011: NUM (representative union at Implats and Lonmin) and Implats, enter into a
collective agreement, expiring on 30 June 2013, regulating wages and other conditions of
employment.

2 December 2011: NUM and Lonmin conclude an agreement which is valid for two years, stating
that certain categories of employees, including Rock Drill Operators (RDOs) will receive between
9 and 10% wage increases per annum, including house allowances of various values according to
the aforesaid categories. The agreement distinctly denounces any strike action until its date of
expiry, in September 2013.

December 2011: Implats unilaterally grants an additional wage increase of 18% effective from
January 2012 to one category of its workers.

January 2012: Rock Drill Operators at Implats become aggrieved by the Implats decision and as
a result embark on an unprotected strike in demand of a monthly basic salary of R9 000. Sixty
people are injured and four are killed during the course of the strike as a result of violence.

April 2012: Implats submits to the demands and grants increases to its entire workforce, which
brings an end to the strike. Pays are increased from R6 540 to a total of R9 991, with effect from
1 April 2012.

June 2012: Approximately 300 RDOs from Lonmins Karee mine approach management and
wage a demand for a R12 500 basic salary, presumably fuelled by the neighbouring Implants
mines recent pay increases. Despite the faceless (without union) approach, management
considers their grievance and offers a much lesser increase, which the workers reject.

9 August 2012: During a meeting of approximately 3000 miners at Wonderkop Stadium, the
workers decide to embark on an unprotected strike in demand of a basic R12 500 salary. They
decide not to go to work the next day but to march to the Lonmin Platinum Division (LPD)
offices to state their demand. Mr. Pieter Botha, a Lonmin security superintendent, describes the
gathering as peaceful.
9 August 2012: Mr. Barnard Mokwena, Lonmins Executive Vice President for Human Capital
and External Affairs, issues a warning concerning the strike and the planned protest, dubs them
as unprotected industrial action and threatens dismissal and involving the Police.

10 August 2012: Lonmin workers gather at the Wonderkop Stadium early in the morning.
Around 8 AM, the crowd of about 3000 proceeds towards LPD offices. Lonmin manager Mr. Blou
calls Provincial Commissioner Lieutenant General Mbombo and requests immediate assistance
in the form of the Public Order Police (POP), and is assured a swift response.

10 August 2012: The marching miners are met around noon near the LPD offices by Lonmin
representatives Mr Sinclair (Security) and Mr Blou, backed by the Public Order Police. They
convey to the miners that management is unequivocally unwilling to bargain, and thereby warn
the workers to return to work or face sacking.

10 August 2012: According to Messrs Sinclair and Blou, at this point the previously peaceful
mood of the strikers changes. They begin uttering threats and showing worrying signs of
agitation as they depart and disperse. Contrarily, Captain Veerasamy Velayudam Govender, the
commander of Visible Policing stationed at Marikana, observes that the crowd is peaceful and
poses no threat. It is also observed that the crowd at this point is armed only with sticks and
knobkerries.

10 August 2012: After the march, a Contingency Plan is signed by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph
Omphile Merafe, the Unit Commander of Rustenburg POP, and by Brigadier Mokhele Samuel
Seboloki, the then Acting Cluster Commander for Rustenburg. The plan involves, among others,
the deployment of reinforcements from other provinces to deal with the unfolding unrest, and it
lists Captain Govender as responsible for its Command and Control. The latter later denies
knowing anything about it or being involved in any way in its execution.

10 August 2012: As of 16:30, Lonmin begins recording cases of intimidation in its log book.
Intelligence is processed by Lonmin security and management about threats being passed to
workers not participating in the strike. Lonmin security personnel observe a gathering at
Wonderkop around 5 PM, upon whose adjournment it was agreed to meet again at Karee
Hostel.

10 August 2012: At approximately 18h15, Mr Thando Elias Mutengwane, a Lonmin employee

and another man with him are shot and injured by someone in one of Lonmin Securitys Twin
cabs as they walk past the Wonderkop Stadium. Another Lonmin employee, Mr Bulelani Kluvert
Dlomo, is reportedly shot by Lonmin security officers at about 19h40 as he walks away from the
Rowland crossing. The shootings are allegedly connected with the said intimidations of non-
strikers.

10 August 2012: At 18h25 the K3 Shaft manager reports intimidation of employees who were
going to work. Mr Botha and Mr Kellerman reportedly fire about 10 rounds at aggressive
commuters intimidating people. Later, they fire 15 rounds of rubber bullets at machetes
(pangas) and knobkerries wielding commuters intimidating nightshift workers not to go to work.

11 August 2012: At 02h19 on Saturday, NUM members inform Riaan Beukes, a Lonmin Senior
Security Officer, that they would go through the village and ask the workers to go to work,
despite rising tension. Mr Setelele (NUM Rowland shaft chairperson) and other NUM members
accordingly go around informing people to report for duty because the strike is not endorsed by
the NUM.

11 August 2012: Striking miners meet again at the Wonderkop Stadium at around 9 AM, and
they discuss the way forward. It is conveyed that the previous night, some people had been
shot, while others were forced to report to work at gunpoint by NUM members driving around
in a cab owned by Lonmin. A decision is taken to march to NUM offices to find out why they had
done that.

11 August 2012: As the 3000 or so protestors march from Wonderkop Stadium towards the
NUM office, an informant conveys to Lonmin security officers Mr Motlogelwa and Mr
Dibakoane, who are monitoring the movement, that the strikers are planning to burn down the
NUM offices. They both rush to NUM offices to warn Mr Setelele. There is an assortment of
traditional weapons at the NUM offices, some which have apparently been confiscated from
some striking miners the night before.

11 August 2012: According to Mr Motlogelwa, as protesters arrive at the NUM offices around 11
AM, some 30 NUM members charge at a section of the strikers, shots are fired, and the crowd
scatters. Two protesters, Mr Bongani Ngema and Mr Mabuyakhulu, are shot and injured in the
process. Mr Mabuyakhulu is further assaulted by NUM members as he lay bleeding from the
gunshot wound. Protesters retreat back to the stadium. Under testimony, Mr Mabuyakhulu
refutes that the strikers had planned to burn down the NUM offices. Following the violent
confrontation, strikers allegedly begin to carry what is classified as dangerous weapons.

11 August 2012: Cyril Ramaphosa, a non-executive director of Lonmin with a 9% share

ownership, also a member of the National Executive Committee of the African National
Congress, learns about the strike when he receives an e-mail from Ms Thandeka Ncube,
Shandukas representative on the Lonmin Executive Committee.

12 August 2012: Early on Sunday morning, Lonmin security personnel Mr Louw and Mr Venter
receive a notice to attend to a gathering at Eastern Platinum Limited (EPL) Hostel. They arrive to
find a crowd of about 1000, which they describe as hostile. As they claim, one miner threw a
stone, and in response they opened fire, resulting in the crowd attacking them. Both of them
manage to escape in their car, but they sustain injuries and the car is seriously damaged.

12 August 2012: At around 10 AM at Wonderkop Hostel, about five Lonmin security guards in
three vehicles attempt to blockade and disperse a crowd believed to be on their way to torch
the NUM offices. Mr Motlogelwa asks the crowd what they want. The strikers keep approaching,
clashing their weapons and gesturing for the guards to get out of the way. The security officers
fire rubber bullets at them. In the ensuing clash, two guards, Mr Fundi and Mr Mabelane, are
killed and their weapons are taken. The other guards manage to escape. Police arrive at the
scene only later.

12 August 2012: At 13h16, Mr Cyril Ramaphosa receives an e-mail from Mr Albert Jamieson, the
Chief Commercial Officer of Lonmin, attached to an e-mail Mr Jamieson had earlier sent to Mr
Thibedi Ramontja, the Director General of the Department of Mineral Resources, informing him
that a terrible and distressing situation had developed at Marikana which had resulted in the
violent deaths of two Lonmin security officers [Messrs Mabelane and Fundi] with attacks and
disruptions continuing.
Mr Ramaphosa accordingly contacts Minister Mthethwa in the course of the afternoon. In their
telephone conversation he raises the concern that Mr Jamieson had raised, that people had
died and were dying and that the situation is getting worse. He mentions that Mr Jamieson had
requested that the police presence be increased so as to prevent further loss of life. He informs
the Minister that the situation he had been told about on the ground was such that they need
help, they need more police presence on the ground. In his evidence, Mr Mthethwa said Mr
Ramaphosa also said that he did not think that what was happening was pure industrial action
in the true sense of the word: It had criminality on it and violence.

12 August 2012: At 18h47 Minister Mthethwa has a telephone conversation with the Provincial
Commissioner, which lasts for just over five and a half minutes, after he had spoken on the
telephone to Mr Ramaphosa and Mr Zokwana, the then President of NUM, who both had told
him what had happened earlier that day and that it appeared that there were not adequate
police on the ground. In his conversation with the Provincial Commissioner he tries to ascertain
whether the reports Messrs Ramaphosa and Zokwana had made to him are correct and to find
out what the SAPS are doing about the matter. Lieutenant General Mbombo confirms the
correctness of the reports and tells him what the SAPS is doing and what is happening.

12 August 2012: Around 9 PM an incident is reported at K4 Shaft. A group of about 15 balaclava

wearing and dangerous weapons wielding assailants jump over the fence (four others allegedly
use the boom gate entrance)and assault three contract workers, also murdering another
worker, Thapelo Eric Mabebe. A number of vehicles are burnt and damaged. The assailants
make off with the securitys firearms and radios.

13 August 2012: At 02h34, Mr Ramaphosa replies to an email sent by Mr Mokwena at 21h09 in

the evening, containing a press release issued by Lonmin, which recorded the deaths of the two
Lonmin security officers, Messrs Mabelane and Fundi, and reported other criminal actions which
had taken place, including incidents of intimidation and violent action against employees who
wanted to report for duty. Mr Ramaphosa mentions in his reply that he had a further
conversation with Mr Mthethwa, in which, he said, he stressed that they should immediately
take steps to ensure that they protect life and property and bring those responsible for the
terrible acts of violence and deaths to book.

13 August 2012: In the early hours of Monday morning, a Lonmin worker apparently unaffiliated
with any union, Mr Langa, is brutally killed by stabbing and hacking near EPL next to the railway
line while on his way to work. According to controversial Police witness Mr X, the striking
miners (including himself) did the killing. This brings the total number of people killed since the
strike commenced to four.

13 August 2012: A group from the miners who are now stationed at the outskirts by the koppie
(as a result of intimidation by NUM and Lonmin guards at the Stadium) is informed some people
are still working at K3 Shaft. Led by Mambush Noki, they decide to go and request management
to close the mine and allow the workers there to join the strike. On the way they are met by
Lonmin guards, who inform them there is no one at K3. They request through the guards for
management to come and meet them at the Koppie for wage negotiations. The group turns
back to the Koppie.

13 August 2012: At 14h48 Mr Ramaphosa receives a further e-mail from Ms Thandeka Ncube in
which she summarises what had happened at Marikana since the events of the morning of the
previous day and mentions the killing of two more Lonmin employees which brings us to a total
of four dead employees.

13 August 2012: Major-General Mpembe, together with Major-General Naidoo, accompany the
Provincial Commissioner, Lt.-General Mbombo, to Marikana and have a meeting with Lonmin
management. Management reiterates it does not recognize the strike, and brands the strikers as
faceless. After the meeting, the officers go to the JOC (Joint Operations Centre) established by
SAPS on 12 August 2012 at Lonmin.

13 August 2012: Whilst at the JOC they observe on a CCTV screen a group of strikers
(Mambushs group) moving from Karee along the railway line. Provincial Commissioner appoints
General Mpembe as the overall commander of the operation and instructs him to remain there
and take care of the situation. He is further instructed to go and attend to the crowd. He takes
about 70 members to accompany him.

13 August 2012: Major General Mpembe and his SAPS squadron meet the strikers near the
railway line. The approximately 200 crouching and singing strikers armed with assorted
dangerous weapons squat on the road when they see the Police. Major-General Mpembe
introduces himself and informs them they are not entitled to carry the dangerous weapons. He
informs them that the police wont arrest them but that they should hand over the weapons.
They reply that they are carrying the weapons for self-defence against NUM members. They add
that they are not fighting but they want to talk to the employer.

13 August 2012: The strikers refuse to hand over the weapons and request the police to escort
them to the mountain where they would hand over the weapons. Major General Mpembe
informs them he will not allow them to go unless they hand over the weapons but they refuse
to yield. Major General Mpembe phones Lieutenant General Mbombo and notifies her that he is
going to escort the strikers as it would not be advisable to disperse and disarm them. The
Provincial Commissioner agrees.

13 August 2012: After briefing his commanders, and apparently after receiving a call, Major
General Mpembe goes back to the crowd and peculiarly demands the strikers hand over their
weapons. He says he is going to count to ten. While Mpembe is busy counting, the strikers, led
by Mambush, rise from their squatting position and see their way through the police line in a
crouching manner, clashing their weapons together.

13 August 2012: As the Police follow behind the miners closely, Warrant Officer Kuhn fires a
teargas canister into the crowd. This triggers a commotion and a fight ensues between the
strikers and the police. Warrant Officer Kuhn later claims he heard an order to fire but cant say
from whom it was. Captain Thupe later pointedly insists Major Gen. Mpembe had ordered the
firing, which the latter vehemently denies. Captain Thupe again claims the reason the teargas
was fired was because the miners were deviating towards the informal settlements. This claim is
repudiated by Colonel Vermaak, who was flying overhead in a police chopper.

13 August 2012: The commotion results in the deaths of two police officers and three miners,
with one officer Baloyi sustaining serious injuries. Some Police members (TRT) suddenly blame
the deaths of their colleagues on General Mpembe to the point of threatening his life. Colonel
Vermaak calls the Provincial Commissioner about this and requests to remove the Major
General from the scene, which she agrees to. MG Mpembe is escorted away in one of the
Nyalas (Armoured Vehicle).

13 August 2012: National Police Commissioner, General Rhia Phiyega, arrives at Marikana at
around 16h00, and is briefed by members of the JOC. She and other senior members of the
SAPS meet with Lonmin management, who state one of the problems as originating from rivalry
between AMCU and NUM. An operational plan for 14 August 2012 is created through the
polices STF and POP unit heads, involving the encirclement of the strikers on the koppie to
search and disarm them. Colonel Scott (STF) intends for this plan to be implemented early on
the morning of Tuesday, 14 August 2012, shortly after sunrise when there are fewer strikers on
the koppie.
13 August 2012: At 18h36, Minister Nathi Mthethwa has a telephone conversation with
Lieutenant General Mbombo, lasting just under six minutes. She briefs him on the events of the
day, tells him what the SAPS is doing and says that she does not consider the SAPS incapable of
managing the situation and that more members had been deployed to the area.

14 August 2012: The previous days operational plan is abandoned early in the morning and
Colonel Scott develops a new plan and presents it to a meeting of the JOCCOM at 14h00. The
plan he presents has six phases ranging from engaging in dialogue to seek a peaceful
disarmament to a tactical option (Phase 3) to be employed if negotiations failed. The plan is
approved by the JOCCOM, with POP commanders present. At around 16h00 phase 1
deployment takes up position to the east of the koppie. This area becomes the neutral area
which the police dominate.

14 August 2012: At around 15:20 Police send negotiators to the koppie, where they find a crowd
of about 5000 strikers. Lieutenant Colonel Stephen James McIntosh addresses the crowd and
requests the bravest men to come to the police Nyalas to negotiate. Mambush leads this group
of five and tells the police the strike is about wages and demands to speak to the Lonmin
management. He also adds that the strikers are there because members of NUM had killed
some of their members on Friday 10 August 2012 at 16h40. Mr Noki then requests for
postponement of the meeting until the next day at 09h00, to allow the group to consider
options. The meeting is adjourned.

14 August 2012: According to Lieutenant Colonel Stephen James McIntosh, the police receive
information around 5 PM that there is a dead body behind the koppie, which the police request
the miners for permission to attend to. The body belongs to a NUM member by the name of Mr
Twala. Witnesses claim out of three suspected spies who had been called out, Mr Twala was
found guilty and as such taken behind the hill (koppie) and executed. A silver firearm is allegedly
also confiscated from him before he is killed. It is alleged Mr Twala was killed because of a
suspicion that he was spying on them (miners) on behalf of their employer and/or NUM.

14 August 2012: Meanwhile, at Lonmin, Lieutenant General Mbombo holds a meeting with
Lonmin management, who falsely accuse AMCU of being behind the unlawful strike and
demanding the R12 500 wages. Mbombo reveals the plan to strategically encircle the workers
so to disarm them. She further states if the workers dont surrender their arms the next day, it
is blood. She encourages management to issue an ultimatum to the workers.

14 August 2012: During the same meeting, Lieutenant General Mbombo mentions a previous
conversation with Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa, who had said Mr Cyril Ramaphosa is
pressurising him. She also mentions a conversation with the Police Commissioner the previous
night, where fears were raised that if the strike doesnt end, expelled ANCYL leader Julius
Malema could intervene as he did during the Implats unrest, thus taking all the credit. She raises
concerns over the costs of the operation as well. The meeting concludes that the next day,
Wednesday 15 August 2012, is to be D-Day.

14 August 2012: At 19h52, Minister Nathi Mthethwa has a telephone conversation with the
National Commissioner. In this conversation, which lasts two minutes and 39 seconds, she tells
him what had been happening and gives him the assurance that the SAPS have the required
capability to handle the situation.
15 August 2012: At 00h47 on Wednesday morning Mr Ramaphosa sends Mr Phillimore an e-
mail in which he summarises a telephone conversation with the Minister of Mineral Resources,
Ms Shabangu, the previous day at 18h35. The summary reads as follows: Discussion with
Minister Susan Shabangu I called her and told her that her silence and inaction about what is
happening at Lonmin was bad for her and the Government. She said that she was going to issue
a statement. She was going to be in Cape Town to attend a Joint Parliamentary Session and
would be back in Johannesburg later today to attend to the Lonmin matter. I told her that I
would also be in Cape Town and suggested that we should have a discussion and see what she
needs to do.

15 August 2012: at 06h50, Minister Nathi Mthethwa has a telephone conversation with
Lieutenant General Mbombo, which lasts for just under three minutes. He asks whether there is
anything he needs to be briefed on before he commences his duties for the day and is told that
the situation is still the same.

15 August 2012: As a result of the previous days agreement between the police and the miners
to carry on negotiating, the plan of action is temporarily suspended. Another contributing factor
is the impulsive agreement made in the morning between Mr Senzeni Zokwana of NUM and Mr
Joseph Mathunjwa of AMCU on Mr Xolani Gwalas Forum At 8 programme on SAFM, wherein
the two unions agreed to go to Marikana to talk to the workers and urge them to go back to
work. Mr Mokwena of Lonmin also seemingly expressed the desire for a peaceful resolution.

15 August 2012: At 09h43, Mr Jamieson sends an e-mail to Mr Ramaphosa, which reads as

follows: The Minister was on radio today saying shed been briefed that this was a wage dispute
and management and unions should sit down and sort it out. Not sure whos briefed her, we are
waiting to talk to her (Roger), and although not too damaging its also not too helpful. Ive had
two discussions with the DG and in each case have characterised this as NOT an industrial
relations issue but a civil unrest/destabilisation/criminal issue that could not be resolved without
political intervention and needs the situation stabilised by the police/army. I think on both
occasions he agreed with me and it reflected what was in our letter but now Im not sure I have
a call in to him this morning. We are grateful the police now have c.800 on site. Our next
challenge is sustaining this and ensuring they remain and take appropriate action so we can get
people back to work. It would be good to have some independent confirmation the police have
plans to sustain a presence for at least a week and numbers dont wane by the weekend. If you
can talk to the Minister please could you influence these things with her and encourage her to
make time to talk to Roger?

15 August 2012: At 12h18, before seeing Minister Shabangu, Mr Ramaphosa replies to Mr

Jamiesons e-mail. The email is quoted in full as saying: Thank you for your email. I am currently
in Cape Town and will have a discussion with her. I thank you for the consistent manner in which
you are characterising the current difficulties we are going through. The terrible events that have
unfolded cannot be described as a labour dispute. They are plainly dastardly criminal and must
be characterised as such. In line with this characterization there needs to be concomitant action
to address this situation. You are absolutely correct in insisting that the Minister and indeed all
government officials need to understand that we are essentially dealing with a criminal act. I
have said as much to the Minister of Safety and Security. I will stress that Minister Shabangu
should have a discussion with Roger.

15 August 2012: Not long after sending this e-mail Mr Ramaphosa meets with Minister
Shabangu and has a discussion with her after which, at 14h58 he sends another e-mail to Mr
Jamieson, Mr Mokwena, Ms Ncube, Mr Phillimore and Mr Farmer, the CEO of Lonmin, which
read as follows: I have just had a discussion with Susan Shabangu in Cape Town. She agrees
that what we are going through is not a labour dispute but a criminal act. She will correct her
characterisation of what we are experiencing. She is going into Cabinet and will brief the
President as well and get the Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa to act in a more pointed way.
She will be in Johannesburg by 5pm and would be able to speak to Roger. Let us keep the
pressure on them to act correctly.

15 August 2012: Upon arrival in Marikana, the two union leaders, Mr Senzeni Zokwana of NUM
and Mr Joseph Mathunjwa of AMCU, and Mr Mokwena are met by Major General Mpembe,
who urges them to go to the mountain to negotiate with the workers to disperse and disarm,
stressing that the police do not intend to resolve matters through bloodshed, but through
democratic means. Mr Mokwena declines the proposal to go to the koppie, reasoning that
Lonmin is only prepared to negotiate in a controlled environment and only within established
bargaining structures. He says Lonmin is not against meeting and discussing issues with
employees through the right structures.

15 August 2012: As the two union leaders get to the koppie, strikers reject Mr Zokwana of
NUMs attempt to address them, but they are receptive to AMCUs Mathunjwa. He advices
them to return to work and that the employers are ready to negotiate through their chosen
union. The workers consent but ask him to return the next day to resume discussions as its now
getting dark. Mathunjwa is optimistic of a breakthrough tomorrow as he is debriefed by police,
and urges them not to act against the miners meanwhile. But Zokwana, incensed by the cold
reception by the miners, pressures Major General Mpembe to act and disarm the lawless
strikers, but Mpembe strongly declines his suggestion.

15 August 2012: On the evening of Wednesday 15 August 2012, both the National
Commissioner and Lieutenant General Mbombo attend a meeting of the National Management
Forum (NMF) of the SAPS, held in Midrand. The meeting is also attended by the Provincial
Commissioners and various Police seniors. An extraordinary session is held after the meeting
where police seniors endorse the tactical option of ending the strike. It is agreed those who are
to assist with the necessary resources for this operation would do so. Immediately after the
extraordinary session Mbombo telephones Major General Annandale, Major General Mpembe
and Major General Naidoo and tells them of the decision that the strikers are to be disarmed
the next day if they dont voluntarily lay down their weapons.

16 August 2012: At 09h30 AM Lieutenant General Mbombo addresses a press conference. She
displays an aggressive attitude as opposed to the expected conciliatory, making strong
statements like we are ending the strike today and what I told you is today we are ending this
matter.
After the press conference she further says in an interview with Enca: The plan is that we
intend to ensure that today we end this strike. If they resist, like I said, today is a day that we
intend to end the violence.

16 August 2012: On 16 August 2012 the total SAPS deployment at Marikana is 718 members
and officers. Barbed wire Nyalas arrive at their positions on the field in front of the koppie
between 10h34 and 10h44. The arrival of the barbed wire Nyalas provokes an agitated response
from the strikers. According to Brigadier Calitz, Mr Noki at this point aggressively asks the SAPS
to remove the barbed wire Nyalas and states that he would not ask again. Either Brigadier Calitz
or Colonel Merafe orders 4000 additional rounds of R5 ammunition for delivery to Marikana.
Colonel Merafe says that Brigadier Calitz placed the order, while Brigadier Calitz denies this.
Colonel Madoda and Colonel Classens, at the insistence of Brigadier van Zyl, request the
presence at Marikana of four mortuary vehicles.

16 August 2012: Mr Mathunjwa only arrives at the Koppie at about 12h35 and leaves at about
13h25, and returns to the JOC (at Lonmin)at about 13h50 when the 13h30 JOCCOM meeting is
still in progress. Mr Ntsenyeho, one of the strikers, delivers a speech while Mr Mathunjwa is at
the koppie. He says: We said that we would leave here, after getting the money we want.
Otherwise, we will die on this mountain. None of us will be expelled, none of us will leave whilst
we are here. We would rather die. There is no way that Lonmin can hire people while we are
here. Otherwise, Lonmin must close. It must be finished with Lonmin, if it is finished with us. I
am finished.

16 August 2012: Two SAPS video operators are ordered to leave the koppie over security related
reasons. They dont retreat to the area occupied by Police to keep filming, but are recalled to
the JOC, meaning there was no filming of the incident by Police as protocol requires. According
to Col McIntosh the leader of the group, Mr Noki approaches Nyala 1 and says that the police
must sign a piece of paper stating that we are going to kill each other today. Col Mere too
reports this incident. He states that Mr Noki went on to warn these hippos would not leave this
place and you will all die today. According [to] Mr Mtshamba, Mr Noki meant that either the
strikers or the police should leave the mountain. As the police found the strikers there, the
police should leave.

16 August 2012: A JOCCOM meeting is called at 13h30 over the escalation of tension at the
koppie and the need for a decision as to whether to proceed with phase 3, the so-called tactical
phase of the plan. Lieutenant General Mbombo instructs Major General Annandale to proceed
with the implementation of phase 3 of the operational plan. It is agreed that the first approach
is to ask the miners to leave the koppie and leave their weapons behind as they do so. Those
who refused would be searched and disarmed by force and the area would be swept for
dangerous weapons.

16 August 2012: The JOCCOM resolves in the case the miners refuse to voluntarily lay down
weapons the tactical phase 3 would be implemented. The overall plan involves, among others;
enclosing an SAPS safe area with barbed wire to prevent a possible attack on the SAPS by
militant protestors; POPs and Nyalas with water cannons in the middle; the use of force
continuum; an advance line; a move to water cannons; stun grenade and tear gas; rubber
bullets; the TRT to be deployed as a back-up for POP during dispersion and to execute arrests
and secure high ground; the STF, NIU and TRT to sweep koppies after POP dispersion. The Phase
3 plan (Encircle and disarm) states if protestors do disperse into smaller groups they must be
encircled and isolated, and all persons properly searched for dangerous weapons, and arrests to
be effected. This plan is presented by Colonel Scott, who has absolutely no experience in Public
Order Policing.

16 August 2012: Angilcan Bishop of Pretoria and Chairman of SACC, Bishop Seoka, arrives at the
koppie around 13h00. He speaks to some miners leaders, including Mr Noki. They ask him to
secure the attendance of the Lonmin management to address them. He goes to the area near
the JOC, where he finds management and conveys the miners request, but is told by Mr Kgotle,
on behalf of Lonmin, that the strikers are criminals and murderers because they had killed their
people and security personnel. Mr Mokwena asks the Bishop to accompany Lonmin
management to put his proposal to Lieutenant General Mbombo, but finds her unfriendly,
anxious and uncooperative.

16 August 2012: Mr Mokwena then tells the Bishop to go back to the koppie and tell the strikers
that Lonmin management would talk to them, but only if they surrender their weapons, elect
five to eight people to represent them and disperse from the koppie. Just before the Bishop
leaves for the koppie someone whispers in Mr Mokwenas ear, whereupon he tells the Bishop
he can no longer return to the koppie as it has been cordoned off and is now a security risk
zone. The Bishop then leaves and returns to Pretoria without going back to the koppie.

16 August 2012: At around 15h30 Mr Mathunjwa addresses the miners for the last time, making
an impassioned plea to the strikers to prevent the loss of blood and to go back to work, after
which he leaves the area in front of the koppie. Mr Mathunjwa leaves just before 15h40. Shortly
after he finishes his address groups of strikers start to leave the koppie, and some of them
follow the route along the path running past the mouth of the kraal towards Nkaneng. This
path had been used by many of the strikers throughout their occupation of the koppie.

16 August 2012: The operation commences at 15h40 just after Mr Mathunjwa leaves as
Brigadier Calitz gives instructions for the uncoiling of the barbed wire. After Nyala 1 started
rolling out its barbed wire and while strikers are moving along the path to Nkaneng, Nyala 6
moves from a position on the kraal side of the path to a position on what can be described as
the SAPS side of the path. The so called militant group of strikers (incl Mambush) remains at this
stage in its position on the flat area in front of the koppie.

16 August 2012: Nyala 1 starts to roll out its wire shortly before 15:42:35. By 15:46:28 strikers
are already moving off koppie 1 in large numbers. By 15:46:40 Nyala 2 is rolling out its barbed
wire and reaches Nyala 3 at 15:46:58. Less than a minute later Nyala 4 starts moving in a
northerly direction from Nyala 3 and closer to Nyala 5. By 15:48:27 Mr Noki is leading what
appears to be the militant group of strikers off the koppie. At 15:50:08 Nyala 3 starts rolling out
its barbed wire and moving away from Nyala 2. At 15:50:22 it reaches Nyala 4 at a position some
distance south of the mast. At this stage most of the lead-group of strikers has already moved
around Nyala 5, which is now slowly moving back into the neutral zone.

16 August 2012: By 15:50:50 Nyala 5 had moved some distance south of the lead group and had
stopped within the neutral zone. At 15:50:52 Nyala 3 and Nyala 4, which had moved off
together, stop at the mast, where Nyala 3 is. At 15:51:26 Nyala 4 starts to roll out its barbed
wire and has moved away from Nyala 3 at the mast. At 15:52:03 Nyala 4 reaches the western
edge of the kraal. In doing so it cut off the strikers who had been proceeding slowly towards the
point at which the path to Nkaneng passes the kraal on its western side.

16 August 2012: According to police testimony, an attempt is made (Incident 1) by the strikers
to enter the neutral zone in front of Nyala 4 before it starts rolling out its barbed wire, which
fails because Nyala 4 cuts the strikers off by driving towards the kraal quickly, passing Nyala 5
while it is rolling out its wire. Incident 2 allegedly consists of an attempt by the strikers to enter
the neutral zone in front of Nyala 4 before it reaches the kraal, which is foiled by POP members
from Nyalas 3 and 4, who engage the strikers with rubber balls and tear gas and are assisted by
POP members from the northern flank.

16 August 2012: It is further alleged that two water cannons on the scene started spraying the
strikers to prevent them from entering the neutral zone, where after POP members apply non-
lethal force in the form of stun and tear grenades and rubber bullets. As a result of this
application of less than lethal force Nyala 4 has, so it is alleged, time to close the gap with the
remaining barbed wire. It is also alleged that the strikers fired bullets at the police Nyala, which
caused damage. But video evidence apparently refutes the SAPS allegations in respect of
incidents 1 and 2. As regards the assertion that bullets were fired at Papa 5 (Nyala), videos of
Papa 5 arriving at Marikana on 15 August were shown, from which it appears clearly that the
damage in question was there already on 15 August.

16 August 2012: After Nyala 4 reaches the south western corner of the kraal and blocks the
route to the neutral zone the TRT members move to form a line to block the gap on the other
side between the kraal and a shack which is surrounded by a wire fence. Brigadier Calitz testified
that the instruction to the TRT to form the line was given by the TRT commanders, but Captain
Loest in his evidence said when the TRT arrived at the koppie the TRT commanders received a
further briefing from Brigadier Calitz, who told them that their members would at some stage
get an instruction to form a basic line and they were to support the POP and if the strikers were
to break through and the TRT stood their ground they would not get an instruction to shoot.
Lieutenant Colonel Classen testified that he heard Brigadier Calitz say TRT move in.

16 August 2012: The Nyalas at this point are arranged in a crescent shape which leaves open the
entire passage way through passages A and B. Brigadier Calitz described the formation as a
perfekte blok, but could provide no explanation for its shape and positioning, which far from
blocking the strikers from entering the neutral zone had the effect, as things turned out, of
encouraging the lead group to go through the passage towards passage B and ultimately into
the fusillade of TRT fire.

16 August 2012: In detail, over 100 strikers approach passage A at 15:53:22. Shortly thereafter
the POP members start the use of non-lethal force. Three stun grenades are fired, eight teargas
canisters and both water cannons start spraying water. This all happens in the 20 seconds
before the shootings at a time when the lead group of strikers is already moving down the
passage way to the east of the kraal. No water is shot at, or in front of, the lead group of
strikers. All the teargas and stun grenades fired before the shootings are fired behind the
leading group of strikers with the result that if they try to move away from the teargas canisters
and stun grenades they would move towards the TRT line.

16 August 2012: After 15:53:30, when the first stun grenade is fired, from those strikers who are
ahead of the stun grenade a group of less than 40 splits off and moves forward down the
passage way away from the stun grenade. The strikers who are behind the stun grenade have
their progress down the passage way halted. The split off lead group of less than 40 appears to
be fragmented further by the use of non-lethal POP measures because at the time of the
shootings at 15:53:50 a video clip taken by an Etv camera operator shows a clear gap between
Mr Nokis group of 11/12 strikers at the front (the 11/12 leading strikers) and the rest of the
group of 40 (the kraal edge group): the former have already passed across the line of camera
through the gap between Papa 2 and Papa 4 and behind Papa 2, while the latter have not yet
reached the gap and are behind Papa 4.
16 August 2012: The kraal edge group appears to have been halted and pushed towards the
kraal by the POP interventions (possibly by the teargas that can be seen rising from behind Papa
2 at the point of the split, possibly by a combination of that teargas and the teargas canister
fired up against the POP Casspir shortly before the smoke becomes visible on the Etv clip at
15:53:42). A photograph taken just after the shooting shows the leading group split into two
sections: one on or around the path to Nkaneng (including Mr Noki and the other leading
strikers), the other close to the entrance of the kraal.

16 August 2012: The TRT line is called forward. As they come forward they can be seen drawing
and cocking their guns. They form up before the strikers come around the kraal. They all brace
themselves at the same time. Certain hand signals can be seen, including form the line and
hold the line. According to the measurements made on Google Earth photographs the distance
from the TRT line to the front line of the strikers when the shooting starts is about 18 metres.
The strikers are shot at before reaching the path that leads to Nkaneng, which the majority of
their colleagues had just used prior to the shooting, right in front of the police.

16 August 2012: According to the SAPS 328 rounds of live ammunition are fired at [scene 1]
over the course of eight or twelve seconds as strikers storm forward, either fleeing the non-
lethal assaults by police from behind them or attacking the contingent in front of them, as it is
claimed. By this time it appears that all of the front group of 10/11 strikers have either fallen
down or turned around before the dust cloud obscured them. It is common cause that some
members keep on firing multiple rounds for at least another four seconds after this. Many of the
strikers who were killed or injured have wounds on their chests or heads. Several of the TRT
members who fired at scene 1 admitted in the statements they made that their rifles were on
automatic fire.

16 August 2012: When the shootings stop at [scene 1] twelve bodies are lying on the ground
near the kraal. Eleven are grouped together in the middle of the entrance to the passage
between the kraal and the fenced road to Nkaneng: this group is the group described earlier in
this report as Mr Nokis group. The second group, described earlier as the kraal edge group, is
piled up together near the entrance to the kraal.
The latter group includes seven strikers (four of whom are dead) who have suffered injuries
from shotgun pellets. The kraal is on their right hand side and the injuries are all on their left
hand side. This is the side where, apart from strikers and journalists, members of the SAPS are
to be found. These four victims, who were all shot at substantial distances from the TRT line
could not possibly have been perceived as presenting an imminent risk to the safety of anyone.

16 August 2012: Apart from the members of Mr Nokis group and the kraal edge group who are
lying dead or wounded at scene 1 when the shooting stopped, there are four other strikers seen
lying on the ground at or near scene 1. They are Mr Ledingoane, Mr Mtshazi, Mr Nqongophele
and Mr Gwelani. Messrs Ledingoane and Mtshazi were killed in a position about 45 metres away
from the closest point to the TRT line. Both were incapacitated by the shots that killed them, Mr
Ledingoane by a single R5 shot through his spine and Mr Mtshazi by a single R5 shot through the
neck. Mr Ngongophele was killed by a single R5 bullet that ricocheted and hit him close to his
right eye and injured his brain. Mr Gwelani was found on the path to Nkaneng north of the
koppie more than 250 metres away from the TRT line but within the funnel of fire. As the
evidence leaders put it, at best for the SAPS, these are victims who were accidentally killed in
the TRT volley.

16 August 2012: After Scene 1, Brigadier Calitz stops at the dry river bed to re-organise the
operation. He then proceeds in a northerly direction to a position some 150 meters north of
Koppie 3 to supervise the arrest of strikers fleeing in that direction. At the same time, the NIU
under Colonel Modiba approaches Koppie 3 from the north east. The TRT, under Captain Kidd,
approaches Koppie 3 from the south west. Major General Naidoo, with the K9 and other units,
approach the Koppie from the south. This leads to the position where three separate units
converge on Koppie 3 without informing either Brigadier Calitz or the JOC.

16 August 2012: There is shooting from various members of each of these units in the direction
of the koppie where the surviving strikers have gathered. This results in 17 strikers being killed.
There were 14 bodies found at Scene 2, and three strikers who were wounded subsequently
died in hospital. Ten of them were killed in what can be described as a crevice in a rocky area
inside the koppie where they appear to have sought refuge during the operation.

16 August 2012: Major General Mpembe later said that he would have stopped the operation if
he had known of the shootings at scene 1. Brigadier Calitz claimed not only that he was wholly
unaware of the shootings at scene 1 but also that he was unaware of the shooting at scene 2
until after they happened. He said that he first became aware of the shootings at scene 1 at
16h47 when he spoke to Major General Annandale. But Mr Botes, the Lonmin security official
who was in the JOC at the time said that he heard on the radio the sound of shooting, a lot of
firearms being fired.
He agreed that what he heard could be described as a fusillade or volleying and that it must
have been obvious to everyone in the JOC that something quite serious had happened. Captain
Kidd, who was at FHA 2, also said that he heard the shooting on the radio, which he described as
follows: I heard commotion, the firing of ammunition, people screaming. Another
contradicting fact is the SMS message Brigadier Pretorius sent from the JOC to Mr Molatedi of
IPID at 16:03:34. It reads as follows: Having operation at Wonderkop. Bad. Bodies. Please
prepare your members as going to be bad.

17 August 2012: The National Commissioner Riyah Phiyega and the Minister of Police Nathi
Mthethwa address a parade of SAPS members. The National Commissioners speech contained
the following:
I come before you to actually say, trying as it may be, mourning as we are, let us take note of
the fact that whatever happened represents the best of responsible policing.
You did what you did, because you were being responsible, you were making sure that you
continued to live your oath of ensuring that South Africans are safe, and that you equally are a
citizen of this country and safety starts with you.
The Police Ministers speech contained the folowing: You must know that as your Minister and
on behalf of the Government, the Executive as a whole, on behalf of the President of the
Republic, Commander in Chief of all the armed forces in this country, we are all behind you. We
know what we have gone through this period, this week and we would want you to continue
ensuring that lives are saved, property is protected against anybody who would want to do bad
things in this country From the bottom of my heart as your Minister, I want to thank you on
behalf of our government. I want to thank you and commend what you are doing. Continue to
protect your country. Continue to protect the citizens of South Africa. It is your duty. It is your
constitutional obligation. And I thank you.

17 August 2012 A report is submitted by the National Commissioner to the President and the
Minister of International Relations, who are in Mozambique for a SADC gathering, containing
the following version about the massacre:
When the Police started deploying the barbed wire fencing, the group of protesters armed with
dangerous weapons and firearms, hastily flanked the vehicles deploying the wire. They were met
by members of the Police who tried to [riposte] the advance with watercannon, teargas as well
as stun grenades. The attempt was unsuccessful and the Police members had to employ force to
protect themselves from the charging group.
The dispersion action had commenced at this time and the armed protesters were driven from
their stronghold to a high bush ground in the close vicinity. The Police members encircled the
area and attempted to force the protesters out by means of water cannons, rubber bullets and
stun grenades. The militant group stormed towards the Police firing shots and wielding
dangerous weapons. Police retreated systematically and were forced to utilize maximum force to
defend themselves. The total death toll of the protesters currently stands at 34 with more than
78 injured.

18 August 2012: Brig Calitz addresses a parade of SAPS members to brief them on the tasks they
were to perform that day. The address he delivers contains the following:
I have seen yesterday afternoon and I see that again this morning, the morale of the people is
very high. So from the management side thank you. I believe most of you have listened to what
the Minister have said. Yesterday after we went from here we were addressed by the President
himself. Myself, the National Commissioner and all the Lt Generals here we were addressed by
the President. We gave him a full presentation then he announced that there will be a board of
inquiry. Some of you might wonder what is now going to happen. Remember, after any action,
there is now a board of inquiry that will sit and then take it frame by frame, minute by minute of
what happened
The police, we will give our 100% operation. Okay. At this stage we did nothing wrong. From
the planning to the execution was 110%. Exactly how we plan it and it is not often that this
happens in this large group. I have to congratulate you. Exactly how we planned it and we
briefed the commanders, exactly we executed in that line. The force continuum, we did the water
cannons, we did the stun grenades, we did the tear smoke, we did the push-back, we tried. When
it was ineffective the guys run back. N?
We tactically retreat, and you have to face the Nyala in order to get in there. So it is right, your
actions was completely right. By retreating and going back to your safe haven. Therefore we got
over to the second phase and that is where the TRT line and the NIU line was formed. And when
they become under attack, that is where the command was given by their Commanders as well
as some of them act in self-defence. Alright? So on that, nothing, nothing, nothing was wrong.
Okay? You acted? It was justified and that is exactly the commitment and co-operation that we
are going to give the people.

This timeline of events was summarised from the original

Farlam Report by Matome Letsoalo: Twitter: @JustSmartRage