John Rawis: A TheoryofJustice 1371
sic rights and duties and to determine the division of social benefits.
The Contemporary Discourse
JOHN RAWLS
A Theory ofJusL-ice (1971)
The liberal theorist John Rawls (192 12002) was the James Bryant
Conant University Professor at Harvard Universit~ where he taught
philosophy Perhaps the most important twentieth-century work of
American political philosophy Rawlss Theory of Justice provides a
philosophical justification of the modem welfare state based on the lib
eral egalitanan notion of justice as fairness as an alternative to the
utilitanan idea that society should maximize the greatest good of the
greatest number Rawls argues that it is rationally possible for individu
als to derivefimdamental principles ofjustice by putting themselves in a
hypothetical original position, -where they generate a social contract
behind a veil of ignorance to ensure the fairness of those principles
y aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes an
carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the
social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant In order to
do this we are not to think of the original contract as one to enter a p---
ticular society or to set up a particular form of government Rather, ti
guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic structure of
society are the object of the oiiginal agieement, They are the principk
that free and jational persons concerned to further their own intere
would iccept in an initial position of equality as defining the funda
mental terms of their association These piinciples are to regulate ~1
furthei agieements, they specify the lands of social cooperation th
can be entered into and the foims of government that can be estat
hshed This way of regarding the principles of justice I shall call justict
as fairness
Thus we are to imagine that those who engage in social cooperatjon~,,________
Men are to decide in advance how they are to regulate their claims
against one another and what is to be the foundation charter of their
society. Just as each person must decide by rational reflection what con
stitutes his good, that is, the system of ends which it is rational for him
to pursue, so a group of persons must decide once and for all what is to
count among them as just and unjust. The choice which rational men
would make in this hypothetical situation of equal liberty, assuming for
the present that this choice problem has a solution, determines the
principles of justice.
In justice as fairness the original position of equality corresponds to
the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract This
onginal position is not, of course, thought of as an actual histoncal state
of affairs, much less as a primitive condition of culture. It is understood
as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain
conception of justice Among the essential features of this situation is
that no one knows his place in societs his class position or social status,
nor does any one know his fortune ir. the distribution of natural assets
and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like I shall even assume
that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special
psychological propensities The principles of justice are chosen behind a
veil of ignorance This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvan
taged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the
contingency of social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and
no one is able to design pnnciples to favor his particular condition, the
principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain For
given the circumstances of the original position the symmetry of every
ones relations to each other, this initial situation is fair between individ
uals as moral persons, that is, as rational beings with their own ends and
capable, I shall assume, of a sense of justice The original position is, one
might say, the appropriate initial status quo, and thus the fundamental
agreements reached in it are fair This explains the propriety of the name
justice as fairness it conveys the idea that the principles of justice are
agreed to in an initial situation that is fair The name does not mean that
the concepts of justice and fairness ire the same, any more than the
phrase poetry as metaphor means that the concepts of poetry and meta
phor are the same
Justice as fairness begins, as I have said, with one of the most general
of all choices which persons might make together~ namel3 with the
choice of the first principles of a conccption of justice which is to regu
late all subsequent criticism and reform of institutinns. Then hnvna
1372 Pai-t V: Leviathan and Liberalism, 1 932Present
constitution and a legislature to enact laws, and so on, all in accordance
with the principles of justice initially agreed upon. Our social situation is
just if it is such that by this sequence of hypothetical agreements we
would have contracted into the general system of rules which aefines it.
Moreover, assuming that the original position does determine a set of
principles (that is, that a particular conception of justice would be cho-
sen), it will then be true that whenever social institutions satisfy these
principles those engaged in them can say to one another that they are co-
operating on terms to which they would agree if they were free and equal
persons whose relations with respect to one another were fair. They cotild
all view their arrangements as meeting the stipulations which they would
acknowledge in an initial situation that embodies widely accepted and
reasonable constraints on the choice of principles. The general recogni-
tion of this fact would provide the basis for a public acceptance of the
corresponthng principles of justice. No society can, of course, be a
scheme of cooperation which men enter voluntarily in a literal sense;
each person finds himself placed at birth in some particular position in
some particular society and the nature of this position mater ally affects
his life prospects. Yet a society satisfying the principles of justice as fair-
ness comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it
meets the principles which free and equal persons would assent to under
circumstances that are fair. In this sense its members are autonomot
and the obligations they recognize self-imposed.
One feature of justice as fairness is to think of the parties in the mi-
tial situation as rational and mutually disinterested. This does not mean
that the parties are egoists, that is, individuals with only certain kinds c
interests, say in wealth, prestige, and domination. But they are cot
ceived as not taking an interest in one anothers interests. They are t
presume that even their spiritual aims may be opposed, in the way th,
the aims of those of different religions may be opposed. Moreover; th
concept of rationality must be interpreted as far as possible in the nar
row sense, standard in economic theory, of taking the most effectit
means to given ends.
In working out the conception of justice as fairness one main t~
clearly is to determine which principles of justice would be chosen in tI
original position. To do this we must describe this situation in some dr
and formulate with care the problem of choice which it presents. 1~ , ~se principles. They express the result of leaving aside those aspects of
matters I shall take up in the immediately succeeding chapters. It may
observed, howeve~ that once the principles of justice are thought of
arising from an original agreement in a situation of equality it is an o~
ouestion whether the Drincinle of utility would be acknowledged. C _________ ~.
John flawls: A Theo,y ofJnsflce 1373
I
I
entitled to press their claims Upon one another, would agree to a princi
pie which may require lesser life prospects for some simply for the sake of
a greater sum of advantages enjoyed by others. Since each desires to pro- j
tect his interests, his capacity to advance his conception of the good, no
one has a reason to acquiesce in an enduring loss for himself in order to
bring about a greater net balance of satisfaction. In the absence of strong
and lasting benevolent impulses, a rational man would not accept a basic
structure merely because it maximized the algebraic sum of advantages
irrespective of its permanent effects on his own basic rights and inter-
ests. Thus it seems that the principle of utility is incompatible with the
conception of social cooperation among equals for mutual advantage. It
appears to be inconsistent with the idea of reciprocity implicit in the no-
tion of a well-ordered society Or, at any rate, so I shall argue.
I shall maintain instead that the persons in the initial situation would
choose two rather different principles; the first requires equality in the as-
signment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and
economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority
are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in
pathcular for the least advantaged members of society These principles
rule out justifying institutions on the grounds that the hardships bf some
are offset by a greater good in the aggregate. It may be expedient but it is
not just that some should have less in order that others may prospet But
there is no injustice in the greater benefits earned by a few provided that
the situation of persons not so fortunate is thereby improved. The intu
itive idea is that since everyones well-being depends upon a scheme of co
operation without which no one could have a satisfactory life, the division
of advantages should be such as to draw forth the willing cooperation of
everyone taking part in it, including those less well situated. Yet this can
be expected only if reasonable terms are proposed. The two principles
mentioned seem to be a fair agreement on the basis of which those better
endowed, or more fortunate in their social position, neither of which we
can be said to deserve, could expect the willing cooperation of others
then some workable scheme is a necessary condition of the welfare of all.
Once we decide to look for a conception of justice that nullifies the acci
ent of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance
as counters in quest for political and economic advantage, we are led to
he social world that seem arbitrary from a moral point of view
Justice as fairness is an example of what I have called a contract the
.

1376 Part V: Leviathan and Liberalism, 1932Present
a hypothetical initial arrangement in which all the social primary goods
are equally distributed: everyone has similar rights and duties, and in
come and wealth are evenly shared. This state of affairs provides a
benchmark for judging improvements. If certain inequalities of wealth
and organizational powers would make everyone better off than in this
hypothetical starting situation, then they accord with the general con
ception.
Now it is possible, at least theoretically, that by giving up some of
their fundamental liberties men are sufficiently compensated by the re
sulting social and economic gains. The general conception of justice
imposes no restrictions on what sort of inequalities are permissible, it
only requires that everyones position be improved. We need not sup
pose anything so drastic as consenting to a condition of slavery. Imagine
instead that men forego certain political rights when the economic re
turns are significant and their capacity to influence the course of policy
by the exercise of these rights would be marginal in any case. It is this
kind of exchange which the two principles as stated rule out; being
arranged in serial order they do not permit exchanges between basic lib
erties and economic and social gains. The serial ordering of principles
expresses an underlying preference among primary social goods. When
this preference is rational so likewisis the choice of these principles in
this order.
Now the second principle insists that each person benefit from per-
missible inequalities in the basic structure. This means that it must h~
reasonable for each relevant representative man defined by this struc-
ture, when he views it as a going concern, to prefer his prospects with the
inequality to his prospects without it. One is not allowed to justify differ-
ences in income or organizational powers on the ground that the disad-
vantages of those in one position are outweighed by the greater
advantages of those in another. Much less can infringements of liberty be
counterbalanced in this way. Applied to the basic structure, the principle
of utility would have us ma,dmize the sum of expectations of representa-
Live n-ten (weighted by the number of persons they represent, on the cia -
sical view); and this would permit us to compensate for the losses of some
by the gains of others, Instead, the two principles require that everyone
benefit from economic and social inequalities. *
To illustrate the difference principle, consider the distribution of income
among social classes. Let us suppose that the various income groups co~
rpjntpunthrpnrpcpnpntivpinjlhnrlnalc lw r~f~r~nrP I-n whnc~ o,rnpnjatinnc
I
John Rawis; A Theoiy ofJustice
1377
entrepreneurial class in property-owning democracy, say; have a better
prospect than those who begin in the class of unskilled laborers. It seems
likely that this will be true even when the social injustices which now ex
ist are removed. What, then, can possibly justify this kind of initial ine
quality in life prospects? According to the difference principle, it is
justifiable only if the difference in expectation is to the advantage of the
representative man who is worse off, in this case the representative un S
skilled worker. The inequality in expectation is permissible only if lower
ing it would make the working class even more worse off. Supposedly,
given the rider in the second principle concerning open positions, and the
principle of liberty generally the greater expectations allowed to entrepre
neurs encourages them to do things which raise the long-term prospects
of laboring class. Their better prospects act as incentives so that the eco
nomic process is more efficient, innovation proceeds at a faster pace, and
so on. Eventually the resulting material benefits spread throughout the
system and to the least advantaged. I shall not consider how far these
things are true. The point is that something of this kind must be argued if
these inequalities are to be just by the difference principle.
~
s ~ We see then that the difference principle represents, in effect, an
agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset
and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to
be. Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain
from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those
who have lost out. The naturally advantaged are not to gain merely be-
cause they are more gifted, but only to cover the costs of training and ed
ucation and for using their endowments in ways that help the less
fortunate as well. No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits
a more favorable starting place in society. But it does not follow that one
should eliminate these distinctions. There is another way to deal with
them. The basic structure can be arranged so that these contingencies
work for the good of the least fortunate. Thus we are led to the difference
principle if we wish to set up the social system so that no one gains or
loses from his arbitrary place in the distribution of natural assets or his
initial position in society without giwng or receiving compensating advan
tages in return.
In view of these remarks we may reject the contention that the order
ing of institutions is always defective because the distribution of natural
talents and the contingencies of social circumstance are unjust, and this
injustice must inevitably carry over to human arrangements. Occasionally
_________ ,-h~c ~ ;._ .or.
 1378 Part V: Leviathan and Liberalism, 1932Present
death. The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust
that persons are born into society at some particular position. These are
simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions
deal with these facts. Aristocratic and caste societies are unjust because
they make these contingencies the ascriptive basis for belonging to more
or less enclosed and privileged social classes. The basic structure of these
societies incorporates the arbitrariness found in nature. But there is no
necessity for men to resign themselves to these contingencies. The social
system is not an unchangeable order beyond human control but a pattern
of human action. In justice as fairness men agree to share one anothers
fate. In designing institutions they undertake to avail themselves of the
accidents of nature and social circumstance only when doing so is for the
common benefit. The two principles are a fair way of meeting the arbi
trariness of fortune; and while no doubt imperfect in other ways, the in
stitutions which satisfy these principles are just.
A further point is that the difference principle expresses a conception
of reciprocity. It is a principle of mutual benefit. We have seen that, at
least when chain connection holds, each representative man can accept
the basic structure as designed to advance his interests. The social order
can be justified to everyone, and in particular to those who are least fa
vored; and in this sense it is egalitarian. But it seems necessary to con
sider in an intuitive way how the condition of mutual benefit is satisfied.
Consider any two representative men A and B, and let B be the one who
is less favored. Actually, since we are most interested in the comparison
with the least favored man, let us assume that B is this individual. Now B
can accept As being better off since As advantages have been gained in
ways that improve Bs prospects. If A were not allowed his better position,
B would be even worse off than he is. The difficulty is to show that A has
no grounds for complaint. Perhaps he is required to have less than he
might since his having more would result in some loss to B. No what
can be said to the more favored man? To begin with, it is clear that the
well-being of each depends on a scheme of social cooperation without
which no one could have a satisfactory life. Secondly, we can ask for the
willing cooperation of everyone only if the terms of the scheme are rea-
sonable. The difference principle, then, seems to be a fair basis on whiel
those better endowed, or more fortunate in their social circumstances
could expect others to collaborate with them when some workable
arrangement is a necessary condition of the good of all,
There is a natural inclination to object that those better situated de-
serve their greater advantages whether or not they are to the benefit of
others. At this nnint it ic nereccnrv tn he clear nhnnt the notion ncrlpcprt
I
John Rawis: A Theory ofJustice
public rules and the expectations set up by it, those who, with the
1379
4
I
prospect of improving their condition, have done what the system an
nounces that it will reward are entitled to their advantages. In this sense
the more fortunate have a claim to their better situation; their claims are
t
legitimate expectations established by social institutions, and the com
munity is obligated to meet them. But this sense of desert presupposes
the existence of the cooperative scheme; it is irrelevant to the question
whether in the first place the scheme is to be designed in accordance with
the difference principle or some other criterion.
Perhaps some will think that the person with greater natural endow
ments deserves those assets and the superior character that made their
development possible. Because he is more worthy in this sense, he de
serves the greater advantages that he could achieve with them. This view,
however, is surely incorrect It seems to be one of the fixed points of our
considered judgments that no one deserves his place in the distnbution
of native endowments, any more than one deserves ones initial starting
place in society The assertion that a man deserves the superior character
that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his abilities is equally
problematic, for his character depends in large part upon fortunate fam
ilyand social circumstances for which IlL can claim no credit The notion
of desert seems not to apply to these cases. Thus the more advantaged
representative man cannot say that he deserves and therefore has a right
to a scheme of cooperation in which he is permitted to acquire benefits
in ways that do not contnbute to the welfare of others There is no basis
for his making this claim From the standpoint of common sense, then,
the difference pnnciple appears to be acceptable both to the more advan
taged and to the less advantaged individual, Of course, none of this is
strictly speaking an argument for the priociple, since in a contract theory
arguments are made from the point of view of the original position. But
these intuitive considerations help to clanfy the nature of the pnnciple
and the sense in which it is egalitanan
It seems clear . s that the two principles are at least a plausible con-
ception of justice. The question, though, is how one is to argue for them
more systematically Now there are several things to do. One can work out
their consequences for institutions and note their implications for funda
mental social policy In this way they are rested by a comparison with our
considered judgments of justice. Part II is devoted to this. But one can
also try to find arguments in their favor that are decisive from the stand-
point of the original position. In order to see how this might be done, it is
..~a.i -- -
 1380 Part V Leviathan and Liberalism, 1932Present
two principles and the maximin rule for choice under uncertainty. This is
evident from the fact that the two principles are those a person would
choose for the design of a society in which his enemy is to assign him his
place. The maximin rule tells us to rank alternatives by their worst pos-.
sible outcomes: we are to adopt the alternative the worst outcome of
which is superior to the worst outcomes of the others. The persons, in.
the original position do not, of course, assume that their initial place in
society is decided by a malevolent opponent. As I note below, they should
not reason from false premises. The veil of ignorance does not violate this
idea, since an absence of information is not misinformation. But that
the two principles of justice would be chosen if the parties were forced:
to protect themselves against such a contingency explains the sense in
which this conception is the maMmin solution. And this analogy suggests
that if the onginal position has been described so that it is rational for the
par ties to adopt the conservative attitude expressed by this rule, a con
clusive argument can indeed be constructed for these principles Clearly
the maMmin rule is not, in geneial, a suitable guide for choices under
uncertainty But it is attractive in situations marked by certain special
features My aim, then, is to show that a good case can be made for the
two principles based on the fact that the original position manifests
these features to the fullest possible degree, carrying them to the limit,
so to speak
Now, as I have suggested, the original position has been defined so
that it is a situation in which the maximin rule applies In order to see
this, let us review briefly the nature of this situation with these three spr
cia1 features in mind To begin with, the veil of ignorance excludes all but
the vaguest Imowledge of likelihoods The parties have no basis for deter-j
mining the piobable nature of their society, or their place in it Thus they
have stiong reasons foi being wary of probability calculations if any other
course is open to them They must also take into account the fact th_t
their choice of principles should seem reasonable to others, in pat ticular
their descendants, whose rights will be deeply affected by it - s Not
only are they unable to conjecture the likelihoods of the various possibli
circumstances, they cannot say much about hat the possible circui
stances are, much less enumeiate them and foresee the outcome of cad
alternative available
Seveial lands of arguments for the two principles of justice illustra
the second feature Thus, if we can maintain that these principles i
vide a workable theory of social justice, and that they aie compatible v,
i eaqonahip demanRc nf effieipnt~, t1,pn rhic rnnrpnnnna,,~vnnt.~pc~ia,t-
Irving Itristol: Capi:alk,ij Socialjim a,idNjhjlu,,~ 1381
do bette~ Thus much of the argument, especially in Part Two, is to show,
by their application to the main questions of social justice, that the two
principles are a satisfactory conception. These details have a philosophi
cal purpose. Moreovet- this line of thought is practically decisive if we can
establish the priority of libert3 the lexical ordering of the two principles.
For this priority implies that the persons in the original position have no
desire to try for greater gains at the expense of the equal liberties. The
minimum assured by the two principles in lexical order is not one that the
parties wish to jeopardize for the sake of greater economic and social ad
vantages.
Finally; the third feature holds if we can assume that other concep
tions of justice may lead to institutions that the parties would find intol
erable. For example, it has sometimes been held that under some
conditions the utility principle (in either form) justifies, if not slavery or
serfdom, at any rate serious infractions of liberty for the sake of greater
social benefits. We need not consider here the truth of this claim, or the
likelihood that the requisite conditions obtain. For the moment, this con
tention is only to illustrate the way in which conceptions of justice may
allow for outcomes which the parties may not be able to accept. And hav
ing the ready alternative of the two principles of justice which secure a
satisfactory minimum, it seems unwise, if not irrational, for them to take
a chance that these outcomes are not realized.
IRVING KR1STQL
~- -- -
Capitalism, Socialism, arid Ni1~iJ~5~1 (1973)
The New Yo,k political write, andformerpi o.fessor In, rig Kristol (1920)
has heart the editor of periodicals inclu~,~g Encounter Comment
and The Public Interest and is the autho, of many books on contemo..
raiy politics and ideolooy A leftist during his days as a student at the
City College of Newyork, Kristol later became one of thefounding lead-
err of the neoconse,-yatwe movement lie has been a sharp critic of
what he sees as the moral relativwm and lack of values in modern lib
eral society In this essay; a spirited defans.~ of the social sign4icance of
religion, whichfirst appeared in The Publi,. Interest in 1973, Knst~J an
alvzpd thn ,,,,,,l.~....
 1390 Part V: Leviathan and Liberalism, 1932Present
feeds upon the old, socialist yearnings for communityfor a pre
individualist societyand is therefore, if not collectivist, at least corn
munalist in its economics and politics But it is also nihilistic in its
insistence that, under capitalism, the individual must be free to create his
own morality The New Left is best seen as a socialist heresy, in that it re
fuses to think economically in any serious way One might say it is a so
cialist heresy that corresponds to the liberal heresy it is confronting: the
heresy of a free society whose individuals are liberated from the bour
geois ethos that used to bind them together in a bourgeois-liberal com
munity And as the free society produces material affluence, but also
moral and political anarchy, so the New Lefteven as it pushes individ
ual liberty beyond anarchy itselflongs for a moral and pohtical commu
nity in which thinking economically will be left to our Helots, the
machines. In all their imagined utopian communities, the free individual
who contracts for the good life has to surrender both his individualism
and his freedom.
It is in the nature of heresies to take a part for the whole. Thus, our
version of the free society is dedicated to the proposition that to be free
is to be good The New Left, though it echoes this proposition when it is
convenient for its purposes, is actually dedicated to the counter-belief
which is the pre liberal propositionthat to be good is to be free In the
first case, the category of goodness is emptied of any specific meaning; in
the second case, it is the category of freedom which is emptied of any
specific meaning. In the war between these two heresies, the idea of a
free society that is in some specific sense virtuous (the older bourgeois
ideal) and the idea of a good community that is in some specific sense
free (the older socialist ide-il as represented, say, by European social
democracy)both are emasculated, and the very possibility of a society
thai can be simultaneously virtuous and free, i e, that orgamcally weds
order to liberty, becomes evei more remote
And yet no society that fails to celebrate the union of order and liberty
In some specific and meaningful way, can ever hope to be accepted as le
gitimate by its citizenry The hunger for such legitimacy is, I should sa5,
the dominant political fact in the world todayin the free nations and
among the socialist countnes as well
I find even more pathetic the effoits of the governments of the free
world and of the socialist nations to achieve some minimum legitimacy the state? The nature of the state, its legitimate functions and its justifi
by imitating one another The free societies move haltingly toward col
lectivism, in the hope that this will calm the turbulence that agitates
them and threatens to tear them avart. The socialist nations tak
Robert Nozick: Anarchy State, and Utopia 1391
in both cases, are perverse. Each such step, so far from pacifying the
populace, further provokes themsince each such step appears as a
moral justification of the turbulence that caused it.
What medicine does one prescribe for a social order that is sick be
cause it has lost its soul? Our learned doctors, the social scientists, look
askance at this kind of imaginary illness, which has dramatic physical
symptoms but no apparent physical causes. Some, on what we conven
tionally call the right, cannot resist the temptation to conclude that the
patient is actually in robust health, and that only his symptoms are sick.
Others, on what we conventionally call the left, declare that the patient
is indeed sick unto death and assert that it is his symptoms which are the
causes of his malady. Such confusion, of course, is exactly what one
would expect when both patient and doctors are suffering from the same
mysterious disease.
ROBERT NOZICIK
Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)
The philosopher Robert Nozick (19382002) was the Joseph Peflegrino
University Professor at Harvard University In his 1974 National Book
Awardv~inning Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick developed a libertar
ian critique of Rawlss theory of justice and other defenses of state re
distribution. Nozich rejected patterned principles of distribution that
emphasize the end result in favor of an entitlement theory ofjustice that
focuses on the way that individual rights constrain the actions of others.
Nozicks analysis led him to the conclusion that the minimal state is
the most extensive state that can be justified.
M ndividuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do
It to them (without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are
these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state
and its officials may do. How much room do individual rights leave for
cations, if any, is the central concern of this book; a wide and diverse va
riety of topics intertwine in the course of our investigation.
Our main rnn.-l,,einnc ahnnF t+~i-,~-i--, -. 1...
 1392 Part V: Leviathan and Liberalism, 1932Present
Robert Nozick; Anarchy~ State, and Utopia 1393
of contracts, and so on, is justified; that any more extensive state will violate
within the compass of this hook to examine all the reasons that have
persons rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified; and
been put forth. Therefore, I shall focus upon those generally acknowl
that the minimal state is inspiring as well as right. Two noteworthy implica
edged to be most weighty and influential, to see precisely wherein they
tions are that the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of
fail. In this chapter we consider the claim that a more extensive state is
getting some citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to peo
justified, because necessary (or the best instrument) to achieve distribu
pie for their own good or protection.
tive justice. 5
Despite the Fact that it is only coercive routes toward these goals that
The term distributive justice is not a neutral one. Hearing the term
are excluded, while voluntary ones remain, many persons will reject our
distnbution, most people presume that some thing or mechanism uses
conclusions instantly knowing they dont want to believe anything so ap
some principle or cnterion to give out a supply of things Into this process
parently callous toward the needs and suffering of others. I know that re
of distributing shares some error may have crept So it is an open ques
action; it was mine when I first began to consider such views. With
tion, n least, whether edistribution should take place, whether we
reluctance, I found myself becoming convinced of (as they are now often
should do again what has already been done once, though poorly. How
called) libertarian views, due to various considerations and arguments
ever, we are not in the position of children who have been given portions
This book contains little evidence of my earlier reluctance. Instead, it
of pie by someone who now makes iast minute adjustments to rectify
contains many of the considerations and arguments, which I present as
careless cutting. There is no central distribution, no person or group en
forcefully as I can. Thereby, I run the risk of offending doubly: for the po
titled to control all the resources, jointly deciding how they are to be
sition expounded, and for the fact that I produce reasons to support this
doled out. What each person gets, he gets from others who give to him in
position.
exchange for something, or as a gift. In a free society diverse persons
555
control different resources, and new holdings arise out of the voluntary
The night-watchman state of classical liberal theory, limited to the func
exchanges and actions of persons. There is no more a distributing or dis
tions of protecting all its citizens against violence, theft, and fraud, and
tribution of shares than there is a distributing of mates in a society in
to the enforcement of contracts, ando on, appears to be redistributive.
which persons choose whom they shall marry. The total result is the
We can imagine at least one social arrangement intermediate between
product of many individual decisions which the different individuals in
the scheme of private protective associations and the night-watchman
volved are entitled to make. Some uses of the term distribution, it is
state. Since the night-watchman state is often called a minimal state, we
true, do not imply a previous distributing appropriately judged by some
shall call this other arrangement the ultrarninimal state. An ultraminimal
criterion (for example, probability distribution); nevertheless, despite
state maintains a monopoly over all use of force except that necessary in the title of this chapter [Distributive Justice], it would be best to use a
immediate self-defense, and so excludes private (or agency) retaliation terminology that clearly is neutral. We shall speak of peoples holdings; a
for wrong and exaction of compensation; but it provides protection and
principle of justice in holdings describes (part of) what justice tells us
enforcement services only to those who purchase its protection and en
(requires) about holdings. I shall state first what I take to be the correct
forcement policies. People who dont buy a protection contract from the view about justice in holdings, and then turn to the discussion of alter
monopoly dont get protected. The minimal (night-watchman) state is nate views.
equivalent to the ultraminimal state conjoined with a (clearly redistribu
tive) Friedmanesque voucher plan, financed from tax revenues. Under The subject of justice in holdings consists of three major topics. The first is
this plan all people, or some (for example, those in need), are given tax- the original acquisition of holdings, the appropriation of unheld things. This
funded vouchers that can be used only for their purchase of a protection includes the issues of how unheld things may come to be held, the process,
policy from the ultraminimal state. or processes, by which unheld things may come to be held, the things that
may come to be held by these processes, the extent of what comes to be held
The minimal state is the most extensive state that can be justified. Any by a particular process, and so on. We shall refer to the complicated truth
state more extensive violates peoples rights. Yet many persons have put about this topic, which we shall not formulate here, as the principle of
Forth reasons purporting to justify a more extensive state. It is impossible inqt-irp fi, nt-n,,~ch-4n,, Tk.,..~~___1 ~-_: .1 - -
1 III ii. .,
1394 Part V: Leviathan and Liberalism, 1932Present
from one person to anothec By what processes may a person transfer hold-
ings to another? How may a person acquire a holding from another whc
holds it? Under this topic come general descriptions of voluntary exchange,
and gift and (on the other hand) fraud, as well as reference to particuF
conventional details fixed upon in a given society The complicated trut
about this subject (with placeholders for conventional details) we shall a
the principle of justice in transfet (And we shall suppose it also includi
principles governing how a person may divest himself of a holding, pass~
it into an unheld state.)
If the world were wholly just, the following inductive definition wot
exhaustively cover the subject of justice in holdings.
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the princil
of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the prin&
of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holdii ~,
entitled to the holding.
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications
I and 2.
The complete principle of distributive justice would say simply that a di
tribution is just if everyone is entitlecf to the holdings they possess u
the distribution,
A distribution is just if it arises from another just distribution by
gitimate means. The legitimate means of moving from one distribut
to another are specified by the principle of justice in transfer. The l
imate first moves are specified by the principle of justice in acqui
tion. Whatever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself ju~
The means of change specified by the principle of justice in transf
preserve justice. As correct rules of inference are truth-preserving,
any conclusion deduced via repeated application of such rules ft
only true premisses is itself true, so the means of transition from c
situation to another specified by the principle of justice in transfer
justice-preserving, and any situation actually arising from repea
transitions in accordance with the principle from a just situation is
self just. The parallel between justice-preserving transformations
truth-preserving transformations illuminates where it fails as wel
where it holds. That a conclusion could have been deduced by trt
preserving means from premisses that are true suffices to shov
truth. That from a just situation a situation could have arisen
justice-preserving means does not suffice to show its justice. The
. -
Robert Nozick: A,zarck~ State, and Utopia 1395
does not entitle the thief to his ill-gotten gains. Justice in holdings is
historical; it depends upon what actually has happened. We shall return
to this point later.
Not all actual situations are generated in accordance with the two
principles of justice in holdings: the principle of justice in acquisition and
the principle of justice in transfer. Some people steal from others, or de
fraud them, or enslave them, seizing their product and preventing them
from living as they choose, or forcibly exclude others from competing in
exchanges. None of these are permissible modes of transition from one
situation to another. And some persons acquire holdings by means not
sanctioned by the principle of justice in acquisition. The edstence of past
injustice (previous violations of the first two principles of justice in hold
ings) raises the third major topic under justice in holdings: the rectifica
tion of injustice in holdings. If past injustice has shaped present holdings
in various ways, some identifiable and some not, what now, if anything,
ought to be done to rectify these injustices? What obligations do the per-
formers of injustice have toward those whose position is worse than it
would have been had the injustice not been done? Or, than it would have
been had compensation been paid promptly? How, if at all, do things
change if the beneficiaries and those made worse off are not the direct
parties in the act of injustice, but, for example, their descendants? Is an
injustice done to someone whose holding was itself base I upon an un
rectified injustice? How far back must one go in wiping clean the histor
ical slate of injustices? What may victims of injustice permissibly do in
order to rectify the injustices being done to them, including the many in
justices done by persons acting through their government? I do not know
of a thorough or theoretically sophisticated treatment of such issues.
Idealizing greatly, let us suppose theoretical investigation will produce
a principle of rectification. This principle uses historical information
about previous situations and injustices done in them (as defined by the
first two principles of justice and rights against interference), and infor
mation about the actual course of events that flowed from these injus
tices, until the present, and it yields a description (or descriptions) of
holdings in the society. The principle of rectification presumably will
make use of its best estimate of subjunctive information about what
would have occurred (or a probability distribution over what might have
occurred, using the expected value) if the injustice had not taken place.
If the actual description of holdings turns out not to be one of the de
scriptions yielded by the principle, then one of the descriptions yielded
must be realized.
The general outlines of the theory of justice in holdings are that the
 1396 Part V: Leviathan and Liberalism, 1932Present
justice in acquisition and transfer, or by the principle of rectification of in
justice (as specified by the first two principles). If each persons holdings
are just, then the total set (distribution) of holdings is just. To turn these
general outlines into a specific theory we would have to specify the details
of each of the three principles of justice in holdings: the principle of ac
quisition of holdings, the principle of transfer of holdings, and the pnnci
pie of rectification of violations of the first two principles. I shall not
attempt that task here. *
The general outlines of the entitlement theory illuminate the nature and
defects of other conceptions of distributive justice. The entitlement the
ory of justice in distribution is historical; whether a distribution is just de
pends upon how it came about. In contrast, current time-slice principles
of justice hold that the justice of a distribution is determined by how
things are distributed (who has what) as judged by some structural prin
ciple(s) of just distribution. A utilitarian who judges between any two dis
tributions by seeing which has the greater sum of utility and, if the sums
tie, applies some fixed equality criterion to choose the more equal distri
bution, would hold a current time-slice principle of justice. As would
someone who hada fixed schedule of trade-offs between the sum of hap
piness and equality According to a current time-slice principle, all that
needs to be looked at, in judging the justice of a distribution, is who ends
up with what; in comparing any two distributions one need look only at
the matrix presenting the distributions. No further information need be
fed into a principle of justice. it is a consequence of such principles of
justice that any two structurally identical distributions are equally just.
(Two distributions are structurally identical if they present the same pro
file, but perhaps have different persons occupying the particular slots.
My having ten and your having five, and my having five and your having
ten are structurally identical distributions.) Welfare economics is the
theory of current time-slice principles of justice.
Most persons do not accept current time-slice principles as constitut
ing the whole story about distributive shares. They think it relevant in as
sessing the justice of a situation to consider not only the distribution it
embodies, but also how that distribution came about. If some persons are
in prison for murder or war crimes, we do not say that to assess the ju
tice of the distribution in the society we must look only at what this pu
son has, and that person has, and that person has, . -at the current
. moral merit. This principle requires that total distributive shares vary di
time. We think it relevant to ask whether someone did something so that
he deserved to be punished, deserved to have a lower share. Most wil
agree to the relevance of further information with regard to punishments
Robert Nozick: AnarcI~ State, and Utopia 1397
is that workers are entitled to the product and full fruits of their labor;
they have earned it; a distribution is unjust if it does not give the workers
what they are entitled to. Such entitlements are based upon some past
history No socialist holding this view would find it comforting to be told
that because the actual distribution A happens to coincide structurally
with the one he desires D, A therefore is no less just than D; it differs
only in that the parasitic owners of capital receive under A what the
workers are entitled to under D, and the workers receive under A what
the owners are entitled to under D, namely very little. This socialist
rightly, in my vie~ holds onto the notions of earning, producing, entitle
ment, desert, and so forth, and he rejects current time-slice principles
that look only to the structure of the resulting set of holdings. (The set of
holdings resulting from what? Isnt it implausible that how holdings are
produced and come to exist has no effect at all on who should hold what?)
His mistake lies in his view of what entitlements arise out of what sorts of
productive processes.
We construe the position we discuss too nan-owly by speaking of current
time-slice principles. Nothing is changed if structural principles operate
upon a time sequence of current time-slice profiles and, for example, give
someone more now to counterbalance the less he has had earlier. A utili
tarian or an egalitarian or any mixture of the two over time will inherit the
difficulties of his more myopic comrades. He is not helped by the fact that
some of the information others consider relevant in assessing a distribution
is reflected, unrecoverably, in past matrices. Henceforth, we shall refer to
such unhistorical principles of distributive justice, including the current
time-slice principles, as end-result principles or end-state principles.
In contrast to end-result principles of justice, historical principles of
justice hold that past circumstances or actions of people can create dif
ferential entitlements or differential deserts to things. An injustice can be
worked by moving from one distribution to another structurally identical
one, for the second, in profile the same, may violate peoples entitlements
or deserts; it may not fit the actual history.
The entitlement principles of justice in holdings that we have sketched are
historical principles of justice. To better understand their precise character,
we shall distinguish them from another subclass of the historical princi
ples. Consides; as an example, the principle of distribution according to
rectly with moral merit; no person should have a greater share than anyone
whose moral merit is greater. (If moral merit could be not merely ordered
but measured on an interval or ratio scale, stronger principles could be for-
1398 Part V: Leviathan and Liberalism, 1932Present
to society for moral merit in the previous principle. Or instead of dis
tribute according to moral merit, or distribute according to usefulness to
society we might consider distribute according to the weighted sum of
moral merit, usefulness to society and need, with the weights of the dif
ferent dimensions equal Let us call a principle of distribution patterned if
it specifies that a distribution is to vary along with some natural dimension,
weighted sum of natural dimensions, or lexicographic ordenng of natural
dimensions And let us say a distribution is patterned if it accords with
some patterned principle (I speak of natuial dimensions, admittedly with
out a general cnterion for them, because for any set of holdings some arti
ficial dimensions can be gimmicked up to vary along with the distribution
of the set) The pnnciple of distribution in accordance with moral merit is
a patterned historical principle, which specifies a patterned distribution
Distribute according to I Qis a patterned principle that looks to infor
mation not contained in distnbutional matnces It is not historical, how
ever, in that it does not look to any past actions creating differential
entitlements to evaluate a distnbution, it requires only distributional ma
tnces whose columns are labeled by I Q scores The distribution in a soci
et~ however, may be composed of such simple patterned distnbutions,
without itself being simply patteined Diffeient sectors may operate differ
ent patterns, or some combination of patterns may operate in different pro
portions across a society A distnbutioRi composed in this manner, from a
small number of patterned distributions, we also shall term patterned
And we extend the use of pattern to include the overall designs put forth
by combinations of end state principles
Almost every suggested principle of distributive justice is patterned to
each according to his moral ment, or needs, oi marginal product, or how
hard he tries, oi the weighted sum of the foregoing, and so on The pnnci
pIe of entitlement we have sketched is not patterned There is no one nat
ural dimension oi weighted sum or combination of a small number of
natural dimensions that yields the distnbutions generated in accordance
with the principle of entitlement The set of holdings that results when
some persons receive their marginal products, others win at gambling, oth
ers receive a share of their mates income, others receive gifts from founda
tions, otheis receive interest on loans, others receive gifts from admirers,
othei s receive returns on investment, others make for themselves much of
what they have, others find things, and so on, will not be patterned Heavy
strands of patterns will run thiough it, significant portions of the variance
holdings will be accounted for by pattern variables If most people most
of the time choose to transfer some of their entitlements to others only in
exchange for something fiom them, then a large part of what many people
Robert Nozick: Aizarcky~ State, and Utopia 1399
vided by the theory of marginal productivity But gifts to relatives, charita
ble donations, bequests to children, and the like, are not best conceived, in
the first instance, in this manner, Ignoring the strands of pattern, let us
suppose for the moment that a distribution actually arrived at by the oper
ation of the principle of entitlement is random with respect to any pattern.
Though the resulting set of holdings will be unpatterned, it will not be in
comprehensible, for it can be seen as arising from the operation of a small
number of principles. These principles specify how an initial distribution
may arise (the principle of acquisition of holdings) and how distributions
may be transformed into others (the principle of transfer of holdings) The
-
process whereby the set of holdings is generated will be intelligible, though
the set of holdings itself that results from this process will be unpatterned.
~ Will people tolerate for long a system yielding distributions that
they believe are unpatterned? No doubt people will not long accept a dis
tribution they believe is unjust. People want their society to be and to
look just. But must the look of justice reside in a resulting pattern rather
than in the underlying generating principles? We are in no position to
conclude that the inhabitants of a society embodying an entitlement con
ception of justice in holdings will find it unacceptable. Still, it must be
granted that were peoples reasons for transferring some of their holdings
to others always irrational or arbitrary we would find this disturbing.
(Suppose people always determined what holdings they would transfer,
arid to whom, by using a random device.) We feel more comfortable up
holding the justice of an entitlement system if most of the transfers un
der it are done for reasons. This does not mean necessarily that all
deserve what holdings they receive. It means only that there is a purpose
or point to someones transferring a holding to one person rather than to
another; that usually we can see what the transferrer thinks hes gaining,
what cause he thinks hes serving, what goals he thinks hes helping to
achieve, arid so forth. Since in a capitalist society people often transfer
holdings to others in accordance with how much they perceive these oth
ers benefiting them, the fabric constituted by the individual transactions
and transfers is largely reasonable and intelligible. (Gifts to loved ones,
bequests to children, charity to the needy also are nonarbitrary compo
nents of the fabric.) In stressing the large strand of distribution in accor
dance with benefit to others, Hayek shows the point of many transfers,
arid so shows that the system of transfer of entitlements is not just spin
ning its gears aimlessly. The system of entitlements is defensible when
constituted by the individual aims of individual transactions. No over
arching aim is needed, no distributional pattern is required.
To think that the task of a theory of distributive justice is to fill in the
 1
1400 Part V; Leviathan and Liberalism, 1932Present
Robert No:dck: Anarchy Sta~, and Utopia 1401
for a pattern; and the separate treatment of from each according to
his treats production and distribution as two separate and inde people cheerfully attend his teams games, they buy then tickets, each
pendent issues. On an entitlement view these are not two separate ques time dropping a separate hven~five cents of their admission price into a
tions. Whoever makes something, having bought or contracted for all other special box ~th Chamberl uns name on it They are excited about seeing
held resources used in the process (transferring some of his holdings for him play; it is worth the total admission price to them. Let us suppose
these cooperating factors), is entitled to it. The situation is not one of some that in one season one million persons attend his home games, and Wilt
things getting made, and there being an open question of who is to get it. Chamberlain winds up with $250,000 a much larger sum than the aver
age income and larger even than anyone else has. Is he entitled to this in
Things come into the world already attached to people having entitlements
over them. From the point of view of the historical entitlement conception come) Is this new distribution D2, unjust) If so, why) There is no
of justice in holdings, those who start afresh to complete to each according question about whether each of the people was entitled to the control
to his treat objects as if they appeared from nowhere, out of noth over the resources they held in D1; because that was the distribution
ing. A complete theory of justice might cover this limit case as well; perhaps (your favorite) that (for the Pu~oses of argument) we assumed was ac
here is a use for the usual conceptions of distributive justice. ceptable. Each of these persons chose to ~ve twentyfive cents of their
money to Chamberlain. They could have spent it on going to the movies,
So entrenched are maxims of the usual form that perhaps we should
or on candy bars, or on copies of Dissent magazine, or of Monthly Review.
present the entitlement conception as a competitor. Ignoring acquisition
But they all, at least one million of them, converged on giving it to Wilt
and rectification, we might say:
Chamberlain in exchange for watching him play basketball If D1 was a
just distnbution and people voluntarily moved fiom it to D,, transferring
From each according to what he chooses to do, to each according to
parts of their shares they wert given undet D1 (what was it for if not to do
what he makes for himself (perhaps with the contracted aid of others)
and what others choose to do for him and choose to give him of what something ~th)), isnt D2 also just~ If the people were entitled to dispose
of the resoulces to which th~ were entitled (under D1), didnt this in
theyve been given previously (under this maxim) and havent yet ex
pended or transferred. dude their being entitled to give it to, or exchange it ~th, Wilt Cham
berlain Can anyone else complain on grounds of justice Each other
This, the discerning reader will have noticed, has its defects as a slogan. person already has his legitu iate share under D1 Under D1, there is
So as a summary and great simplification (and not as a maxim with any nothing that anyone has that anyone else has a claim of justice against
Mter someone transfers something to Wilt Chamberlain, third parties
independent meaning) we have:
still have their legitimate shares, their shares are not changed By what
process could such a transfer among two persons give rise to a legitimate
From each as they choose, to each as they are chosen.
claim of distribuuve justice on a portion of what was transferied by a
third par~ who had no claim of justice on any holding of the others be
fore the transfer) To cut off objections irrelevant here, we might imagine
It is not clear how those holding alternative conceptions of distributive
the exchanges occurnng in a socialist society after hours Mter pla~ng
justice can reject the entitlement conception of justice in holdings. For
whatever basketball he does in his daily work, or doing whatever other
suppose a distribution favored by one of these nonentitlement concep
daily work he does, Wilt Chamberlain decides to put in ovennije to earn
tions is realized. Let us suppose it is your favorite one and let us call this
additional money (First his woik quota is set, he works time ovei that)
distribution D1; perhaps everyone has an equal share, perhaps shares
Or imagine it is a sl~lled juggles people like to see, who puts on shows
vary in accordance with some dimension you treasure. Now suppose
after hours
Wilt Chamberlain is greatly in demand by basketball teams, being a great
Why might someone work overtime in a society in which it is assumed
gate attraction. (Also suppose contracts run only for a year, with players
their needs are satisfied Perhaps because they care about things other
being free agents.) He signs the following sort of contract with a team. In
than needs I like to ~ite in books that I read, and to have easy access to
each home game, twenty-five cents from the price of each ticket of ad
books for browsing at odd hours It would be very Dleac,nt o~A
mission goes to him. (We ignore the question of whether he is gouging
nienttnh~ ,,.n..
 1402 Part V: Leviathan and Liberalism, l932Present
like them as part of his regular allotment (under D1). Thus, persons ei
ther must do without some extra things that they want, or be allowed to
do something extra to get some of these things. On what basis could the
inequalities that would eventuate be forbidden? Notice also that small
factories would spring up in a socialist societM unless forbidden. I melt
down some of my personal possessions (under D1) and build a machine
out of the material. I offer you, and others, a philosophy lecture once a
week in exchange for your cranking the handle on my machine, whose
products I exchange for yet other things, and so on. (The raw materials
used by the machine are given to me by others who possess them under
D1, in exchange for hearing lectures.) Each person might participate to
gain things over and above their allotment under D1. Some persons even
might want to leave their job in socialist industry and work full time in
this private sector. I shall say something more about these issues in the
next chapter. Here I wish merely to note how private property even in
means of production would occur in a socialist society that did not forbid
people to use as they wished some of the resources they are given under
the socialist distribution Dr The socialist society would have to forbid
capitalist acts between consenting adults.
The general point illustrated by the Wilt Chamberlain example and
the example of the entrepreneur ma socialist society is that no end-
state principle or distributional patterned principle of justice can be
continuously realized without continuous interference with peoples
lives. Any favored pattern would be transformed into one unfavored by
the principle, by people choosing to act in various ways; for example, by
people exchanging goods and services with other people, or giving
things to other people, things the transferrers are entitled to under the
favored distributional pattern. To maintain a pattern one must either
continually interfere to stop people from transferring resources as they
wish to, or continually (or periodically) interfere to take from some per
sons resources that others for some reason chose to transfer to them.
(But if some time limit is to be set on how long people may keep re
sources others voluntarily transfer to them, why let them keep these re
sources for any period of tune? Why not have immediate confiscation))
It might be objected that all persons voluntarily will choose to refrain
from actions which would upset the pattern. This presupposes unrealis
tically (I) that all will most want to maintain the pattern (are those who
dont, to be reeducated or forced to undergo self-criticism?), (2)
that each can gather enough information about his own actions and the
ongoing activities of others to discover which of his actions will upset
the pattern, and (3) that diverse and far-flung persons can coordinate
Robert Nozick: Anareky; State, and Utopia 1403
the market is neutral among persons desires, as it reflects and trans
mits widely scattered information via prices, and coordinates persons
activities.
It puts things perhaps a bit too strongly to say that every patterned (or
end-state) principle is liable to be thwarted by the voluntary actions of
the individual parties transferring some of their shares they receive under
the principle, For perhaps some very weak patterns are not so thwarted.
Any distributional pattern with any egalitarian component is overturnable
by the voluntary actions of individual persons over time; as is every pat
terned condition with sufficient content so as actually to have been pro
posed as presenting the central core of distributive justice.
Proponents of patterned principles of distributive justice focus upon cri
teria for determining who is to receive holdings; they consider the reasons
for which someone should have something, and also the total picture of
holdings. Whether or not it is better to give than to receive, proponents of
patterned principles ignore giving altogether. In considering the distribu
tion of goods, income, and so forth, their theories are theories of recipi
ent justice; they completely ignore any right a person might have to give
something to someone, Even in exchanges where each party ~s simultane
ously giver and recipient, patterned principles of justice focus only upon
the recipient role and its supposed rights. Thus discussions tend to focus
on whether people (should) have a right to inherit, rather than on
whether people (should) have a right to bequeath or on whether persons
who have a right to hold also have a right to choose that others hold in
their place. I lack a good explanation of why the usual theories of distrib
utive justice are so recipient oriented; ignoring givers and transferrers
and their rights is of a piece with ignoring producers and their entitle
ments. But why is it all ignored?
Patterned principles of distributive justice necessitate redistributive
activities. The likelihood is small that any actual freely-arrived-at set of
holdings fits a given pattern; and the likelihood is nil that it will continue
to fit the pattern as people exchange and give. From the point of view of
an entitlement theor3 redistribution is a serious matter indeed, involving,
as it does, the violation of peoples rights. (An exception is those takings
that fall under the principle of the rectification of injustices.) From other
points of vie~ also, it is serious.
Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor. Some per
sons find this claim obviously true: taking the earnings of ii hours labor is
like taking n hours from the person; it is like forcing the person to work n
hours for anothers purpose. Others find the claim absurd. But even thpcp
1404 Part V: Leviathan and Liberalism, i932Present
work for the benefit of the needy. And they would also object to forcing
each person to work five extra hours each week for the benefit of the
needy. But a system that takes five hours wages in taxes does not seem to
them like one that forces someone to work five hours, since it offers the
person forced a wider range of choice in activities than does taxation in
ldnd with the particular labor specified. (But we can imagine a gradation
of systems of forced labor, from one that specifies a particular activity to
one that gives a choice among two activities, to . .; and so on up.) Fut
.
thermore, people envisage a system with something lilce a proportional tax
on everything above the amount necessary for basic needs. Some think
this does not force someone to work extra hours, since there is no fixed
number of extra hours he is forced to work, and since he can avoid the tax
entirely by earning only enough to cover his basic needs. This is a very nn~
characteristic view of forcing for those who also think people are forced to
do something whenever the alternatives they face are considerably wors&
However, neither view is correct. The fact that others intentionally interfl
~ene, in violation of a side constraint against aggiession, to threaten force
to limit the alternatives, in this case to paying taxes or (presumably the
woise alternative) bare subsistence, makes the taxation system one of
forced labor and distinguishes it from othet cases of limited choices which
are not forcings.
The man who chooses to work longer to gain an income more than
sufficient for his basic needs prefers some extia goods ot services to the
leisure and activities he could perform dunng the possible nonworking
hours, whereas the man who chooses not to woik the extra time prefers
the leisure activities to the extra goods or services he could acquire by
working more. Given this, if it would be illegitimate for a tax system to
seize some of a mans leisure (foiced laboi) for the purpose of serving the
needy, how can it be legitimate for a tax system to seize some of a mans
goods for that purpose~ Why should we treat the man whose happiness
requires certain inatenal goods or services differently from the man
whose preferences and desnes make such goods unnecessary for his
happiness Why should the man who prefers seeing a movie (and ~tl
has to earn money for a ticket) be open to the required call to aid th
needy, while the person who piefers looking at a sunset (and hence
cain no extra money) is ~ Indeed, isnt it surplising that redistril
tionists choose to ignore the man whose pleasures are so easily attai
able without extra labor, while adding yet another burden to the pc
unfortunate who must work for his pleasures If anything, one v
have expected the reverse A
What soit of tight over others does a legally institutionalized e
Robert Nozick. Anarchy State, and Utopia
1405
right in J( relative to which other parts of the notion are to be ex
plained, is the right to determine what shall be done with X; the right
to choose which of the constrained set of options concerning x shall be
realized or attempted. The constraints are set by other principles or
laws operating in the society; in our theory by the Lockean rights peo
ple possess (under the minimal state). My property rights in my knife
allow me to leave it where I will, but not in your chest. I may choose
which of the acceptable options involving the knife is to be realized.
This notion of property helps us to understand why earlier theorists
spoke of people as having property in themselves and their labor. They
viewed each person as having a right to decide what would become of
himself and what he would do, and as having a right to reap the kene
fits of what he did.
When end-result principles of distributive justice are built into the legal
structure of a society they (as do most patterned principles) give each cit
izen an enforceable claim to some portion of the total social product; that
is, to some portion of the sum total of the individually and jointly made
products This total product is pioduced by individuals laboring, using
means of production others h lye saved to bring into existence, by people
organizing production or creating means to produce new things or things
in a new way It is on this batch of individual activities that patterned dis
tributional pnnciples give each individual an enforceable claim Each
person has a claim to the activities and the products of other persons, in
dependently of whether the other persons enter into particular relation~
ships that give rise to these claims, and independently of whethei they
voluntanly take these claims upon themselves, in charity or in exchange
for something
Whether it is done through taxation on wages oi on wages over a cci
tam amount, or through seizure of profits, or through there being a big so
cial pot so that its not clear whats coming from where and whats going
where, patterned principles of distributive justice involve appropriating
the actions of other persons. Seizing the results of someones labor is
equivalent to seizing hours from him and directing him to carry on van
ous activities If people force you to do certain work, or unrewarded woik,
for a certain penod of time, the3 decide what you are to do and what pur
poses your work is to serve apart from your decisions This process
whereby they take this decision from you makes them a part ovine, of
you, it gives them a property right in you Just as having such partial con
trol and power of decision, by nght, over an animal or inanimate obiect
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