FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 184800

WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR., - versus -
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ,

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail the issuances of Branch 149 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent) Order [1] of April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to quash the Amended
Information indicting them for libel, and Joint Resolution[2] of August 12, 2008 denying reconsideration of the first issuance.

Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez[3] (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family (in
particular, former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan), [4] a
criminal complaint,[5] before the Makati City Prosecutors Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355 in relation to Article
353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos, who are officers of Parents
Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira
Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are
trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively, the accused), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of the
website www.pepcoalition.com.

PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) a wholly owned
subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) who had
previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder after
PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments before the Makati RTC.

Decrying PPIs refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum
by which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under
the address of www.pepcoalition.com.

Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a blogspot[6] under the website
address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-group[7] at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily
accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet.

Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various dates from August 25 to October
2, 2005, he was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13], maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the accused]
containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly,
Malayan.[8] He cited an article which was posted/published on www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which stated:

Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng
negotiation because it was done prematurely since we had not file any criminal aspect of our case. What is worse is
that Yuchengcos benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is the fact na talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan
ang mga Yuchengcos.

LETS MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP AND AMLC AND
WHEREVER. Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues to air our grievances
and call for boycott ng YGC. Let us start within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga investments and deposits natin
sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and again convince friends to do the same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay
dapat makisali na talaga ngayon specially those who joined only after knowing that there was a negotiation for
amicable settlements.

FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT BECAUSE
THEY HAD SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO KILL US NA. x x
x [9] (emphasis in the original)

By Resolution of May 5, 2006,[10] the Makati City Prosecutors Office, finding probable cause to indict the accused, filed thirteen
(13) separate Informations[11] charging them with libel. The accusatory portion of one Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-
876, which was raffled off to public respondent reads:

That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents
 Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general
circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another together
with John Does, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention
of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co.
Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing
the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and
caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com and injurious and defamatory
article as follows:

Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong
pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x

For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had successfully
lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x x

A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com is

attached as Annex F of the complaint.

That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above defamatory article are known to the
accused as trustees holding legal title to the above-cited website and that the accused are the ones
responsible for the posting and publication of the defamatory articles that the article in question was posted and
published with the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the complainant before the public.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]

Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutors Resolution by a petition for review to the Secretary of Justice
who, by Resolution of June 20, 2007,[13]reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the
Informations for libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of internet libel was non-existent, hence, the accused
could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC. [14]

Petitioners, as co-accused,[15] thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public respondent, a Motion to Quash [16] the
Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in
the Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally
defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel.

Citing Macasaet v. People,[17] petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial
courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the
alleged defamatory material was printed and first published.

By Order of October 3, 2006,[18] the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause existed, quashed the Information,
citing Agustin v. Pamintuan.[19] It found that the Information lacked any allegations that the offended parties were actually residing in
Makati at the time of the commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address in the complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower
in Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and first published in Makati.

The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information, [20] insisting that the Information sufficiently conferred
jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v. Panganiban[21] which held that the Information need not allege verbatim that
the libelous publication was printed and first published in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out that Malayan has an office
in Makati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution alleged that even assuming that the Information was deficient, it
merely needed a formal amendment.

Petitioners opposed the prosecutions motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia, that since venue is jurisdictional in
criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by
amendment.[22]

By Order of March 8, 2007,[23] the public respondent granted the prosecutions motion for reconsideration and accordingly
ordered the public prosecutor to amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue.

The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20, 2007, [24] the accusatory portion of which
reads:

That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents
 Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general
circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating together with John Does, whose true names,
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the
honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco
Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant
to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be
composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an
injurious and defamatory article, which was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati
City, as follows:

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)

Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information[25] which, they alleged, still failed to vest jurisdiction upon the public
respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were printed and first published by the accused in Makati; and the
prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article.

By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found the Amended Information to be
sufficient in form.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration[26] having been denied by the public respondent by Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008,
they filed the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition faulting the public respondent for:

1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW;

2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS CONTINUES

TO BE DEFICIENT; and

3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF CURING
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.[27]

With the filing of Gimenezs Comment[28] to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy
of courts to thus render the petition dismissible; and (2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondents admission of
the Amended Information.

The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts, [29] as a rule, requires that recourse must first be
made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.[30] A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter
should be filed in the Court of Appeals.[31] The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions.

Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but
purely legal questions.[32]

In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority, by way of exception, in
order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel
under Article 360 of the RPC whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in light of the
requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading:

Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition
of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author
thereof.

The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall
be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office
is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and
in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
 Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue
of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. [33] This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that
Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.

In Macasaet,[34] the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo[35] which laid out the rules on venue in libel
cases, viz:

For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our
earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:

In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the
complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the
offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing at that
time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first published should
likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was
printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two
places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged
defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of
the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City. In other
words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication.

The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced upon an
examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals[36] explained the nature of
these changes:

Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal libel, following the
amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code:

Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written
defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the
same was written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that
may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.

Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where
the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43
Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.

Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by
laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.

Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel
V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan
(Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).

To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of
the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the
accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Explanatory
Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc.
v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the
venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The
disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses
influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue
in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as
evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial
publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.

The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet
as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his
first access to the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that
the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that
would ensue in situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel
anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.

For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the
defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where
the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.

Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as amended, are unduly oppressive, the Courts
pronouncements in Chavez[37] are instructive:

For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule providing that a
private person must file the complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first publication, or at the
complainants place of residence. We would also have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this rule
in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no convincing reason to resort to such a radical
action. These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as they
still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which
situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was
printed and first published.

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the Amended
Information.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint Resolution of August 12,
2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended
Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and DISMISS the case.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 2012
UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, - versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City (RTC-Makati City) in
Civil Case No. 09-1038. The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of
petitioners Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas (collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the
motion to quash the information for perjury filed by Tomas.
The Antecedents
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a
Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Information against her reads:

That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements
under oath upon a material matter before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said
accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin
docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said
material statement was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood. [2]

The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin
against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed
before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed
on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the
Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely
declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or
proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,[3] citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is
the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of perjury the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood was not alleged
with particularity without specifying what the other action or proceeding commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or
agency; (b) there was no other action or proceeding pending in another court when the second complaint was filed; and (c) she was
charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the allegations in the Information make out perjury by making a false affidavit.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against
Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City.[4] The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently
charged Tomas with perjury.[5] The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas motion for reconsideration. [6]

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet[7] and Ilusorio
v. Bildner[8] which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:

[I]nsofar as the petitioners stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of [Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March
30, 2009) however, reaffirms what has been the long standing view on the venue with respect to perjury cases. In this particular
case[,] the high court reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
territory where the offense was committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. It went on to declare that since the
subject document[,] the execution of which was the subject of the charge[,] was subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court
of the said territorial jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.]
x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to state that the city court of Makati City has jurisdiction
to try and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of the complaint itself which constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner
dwells solely on the act of subscribing to a false certification. On the other hand, the charge against the accused in the case of
Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on the complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not simply the execution of the questioned documents but
rather the introduction of the false evidence through the subject documents before the court of Makati City. [9] (emphasis ours)

The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of discretion since the order denying the
Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are
different from the facts of the present case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was improper since the petitioners
can later appeal the decision in the principal case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[10]
The Petition
The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash the Information for perjury against Tomas. The
petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the present facts than our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.[11] They
argued that the facts in Ilusorio showed that the filing of the petitions in court containing the false statements was the essential
ingredient that consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were made in a General Information Sheet (GIS) that
was submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners view. In his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of
Comment (which we hereby treat as the Comment to the petition), the Solicitor General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis
mota in the crime of perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is material. The
Solicitor General observed that the criminal intent to assert a falsehood under oath only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be Makati City, where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the
perjury case against the petitioners.

Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place where the criminal action is to
be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction
of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within
its territorial jurisdiction.[12] Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused
on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available. [13]

Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences. In determining
the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the
offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]

The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which
states:

Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the
particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its
identification.

Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was
committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed
sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Information Charging Perjury

Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the requirement for a Certificate against Forum
Shopping. The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by a statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading
asserting a claim or relief; it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the
affiant is required to execute a statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any competent person authorized to
administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there
is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that
the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court
wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a
Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing
simultaneous remedies in different fora.[14]

In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for making a false Certificate against
Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.
 (c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.[15]

Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of improper venue, the allegations in the
complaint and information must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
On this basis, we find that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was committed by
Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.

The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the
Information to have been committed in MakatiCity. Likewise, the second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum
Shopping to be under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been made in Makati City:

That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful
statements under oath upon a material matter before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law requires to
wit: said accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.[16]

We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to have been committed
in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of the Information:

[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines
has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well
that said material statement was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.[17] (underscoring ours)

Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false declarations in the
Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she
subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the
perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential
elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.
Referral to the En Banc
The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the seeming conflict between the division rulings of the Court in
the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this petition, and the Sy Tiong case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.

The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases

The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements contained in verified petitions filed with the
court for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copies of certificates of title. The verified petitions containing the false statements were
subscribed and sworn to in Pasig City, but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The question posed was: which court
(Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to try and hear the perjury cases?

We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay City, the places where the verified petitions were
filed. The Court reasoned out that it was only upon filing that the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the
alleged untruthful statement found relevance or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential authority the case of United States. v.
Caet[18] which ruled:
It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from the information that the defendant, by
means of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted false evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding
pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila,
but the intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit. [emphasis
and underscoring deleted]

In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was subscribed and sworn to in Manila. We ruled that the
proper venue for the perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was subscribed and sworn to. We held that the perjury was
consummated in Manila where the false statement was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of Villanueva v. Secretary
of Justice[19] that, in turn, cited an American case entitled U.S. v. Norris.[20] We ruled in Villanueva that

Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal.
Deliberate material falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury, and the crime is complete when a witness' statement
has once been made.

The Crime of Perjury: A Background

To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the historical background of how the crime of perjury
(specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.
The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false testimony for and against the defendant in a criminal case (Articles
180 and 181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a civil case (Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases
(Article 183, RPC). Based on the Information filed, the present case involves the making of an untruthful statement in an affidavit
on a material matter.
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the parties in their respective arguments. The
cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008, harked back to the case of Caet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the
present RPC took effect.[21] Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United
States v. Norris, a 1937 American case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered after the present RPC
took effect.[22]

The perjurious act in Caet consisted of an information charging perjury through the presentation in court of a motion
accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the time the Caet ruling was rendered, the prevailing law on perjury and the rules on
prosecution of criminal offenses were found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6
of General Order No. 58[23] for the procedural aspect.

Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:

Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of
the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written
testimony, declaration, disposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes
any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two
thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years; and shall moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public
office or of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the judgment against him is reversed.
This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 5392 [24] and 5393[25] of the Revised Statutes of the United
States. Act No. 1697 was intended to make the mere execution of a false affidavit punishable in our jurisdiction. [27]
[26]

In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the venue shall be the court of the place where the crime
was committed.

As applied and interpreted by the Court in Caet, perjury was committed by the act of representing a false document in a judicial
proceeding.[28] The venue of action was held by the Court to be at the place where the false document was presented since the
presentation was the act that consummated the crime.
The annotation of Justices Aquino and Grio-Aquino in their textbook on the RPC[29] interestingly explains the history of the
perjury provisions of the present RPC and traces as well the linkage between Act No. 1697 and the present Code. To quote these
authors:[30]

Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del Pans Proposed Correctional Code, while art.
181 was taken from art. 319 of the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del Pans Proposed Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319,
together with art. 321 of the old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law, passed on August 23, 1907,
which in turn was expressly repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the express repeal of Act 1697,
arts. 318 and 321 of the old Penal Code were deemed revived. However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury
Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.

It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false testimony, whereas, under the Revised Penal
Code, false testimony includes perjury. Our law on false testimony is of Spanish origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from
sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived from American statutes. The provisions of the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace perjury
committed in court or in some contentious proceeding, while perjury as defined in Act 1697 includes the making of a false
affidavit. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false testimony are more severe and strict than those of Act 1697 on perjury.

With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which provides:

The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any
person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles,
shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath
in cases in which the law so requires. [emphasis supplied; emphases ours]

in fact refers to either of two punishable acts (1) falsely testifying under oath in a proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2)
making a false affidavit before a person authorized to administer an oath on any material matter where the law requires an oath.

As above discussed, Sy Tiong decided under Article 183 of the RPC essentially involved perjured statements made in a GIS
that was subscribed and sworn to in Manila and submitted to the SEC in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an
affidavit, not an actual testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the
place where the oath was taken, is the place where the offense was committed. By implication, the proper venue would have been the
City of Mandaluyong the site of the SEC had the charge involved an actual testimony made before the SEC.
 In contrast, Caet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and accompanied by an affidavit that contained a
falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to the submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came
at a time when Act No. 1697 was the perjury law, and made no distinction between judicial and other proceedings, and at the same time
separately penalized the making of false statements under oath (unlike the present RPC which separately deals with false testimony in
criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the same time also penalizing the making of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue
should be the place where the submission was made to the court or the situs of the court; it could not have been the place where the
affidavit was sworn to simply because this was not the offense charged in the Information.

The case of Ilusorio cited the Caet case as its authority, in a situation where the sworn petitions filed in court for the issuance
of duplicate certificates of title (that were allegedly lost) were the cited sworn statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities
stated in the sworn petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue should be the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because it was in the
courts of these cities where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement finds
relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owners duplicate copies of the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and
[Transfer Certificates of Title] may issue.[31] To the Court, whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were
subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional giving of false
statement,[32] citing Caet as authority for its statement.

The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on venue because of its very categorical tenor in pointing
to the considerations to be made in the determination of venue; it leaves the impression that the place where the oath was taken is not at
all a material consideration, forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two situations while Article 182 of the RPC likewise
applies to false testimony in civil cases.

The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the charge been Article 182 of the RPC, on the
assumption that the petition itself constitutes a false testimony in a civil case. The Caet ruling would then have been completely
applicable as the sworn statement is used in a civil case, although no such distinction was made under Caet because the applicable law
at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make any distinction.

If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling, then only that portion of the article,
referring to the making of an affidavit, would have been applicable as the other portion refers to false testimony in other
proceedings which a judicial petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a Certificate of Condominium Title is not
because it is a civil proceeding in court. As a perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site where
the oath was taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in this case, Pasig City.

Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various changes from the time General Order No. 58 was
replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on
venue of criminal actions and it expressly included, as proper venue, the place where any one of the essential ingredients of the crime
took place. This change was followed by the passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure,[33] the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure,[34] and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which all adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedures expanded
venue of criminal actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the offense was committed, but also where
any of its essential ingredients took place.

In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of two complaints for sum of money
with prayer for a writ of replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a
complaint-affidavit against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the Information that followed, the criminal act
charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.

Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be
determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who make[s] an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit;
thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.

Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of
perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes
and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is
committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony
under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written
sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as
the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall
be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.