Opening of Succession PDF

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15088 January 31, 1961
TORIBIA FONTANILLA PACIO, SANTIAGO PACIO, ESPERANZA PACIO, and ROSARIO

PACIO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MANUELA PACIO BILLON, BRIGIDA PACIO, and DOMINGA PACIO, defendants-appellees.
Alfredo F. Tadiar for plaintiffs-appellants.

Camilo Z. Nisce for defendants-appellees.
BENGZON, J.:
In 1901, Flaviano Pacio married Severa Jucutan. Herein defendants were their children. Severa died
in 1930; and thereafter Flavio married the plaintiff Toribia Fontanilla, who bore him the other four
plaintiffs.
The dispute between the parties in the La Union court of first instance, concerned two parcels of
land which defendants allegedly retained without any right thereto. The litigants later agreed to a
partition of the first parcel, and the court so decreed.
As to the second parcel, a hearing was held, and it was awarded to the defendants, on the ground
that it had been donated propter nuptias to Severa, in 1901, by Flaviano Pacio, who was then
admittedly the owner.
According to the stipulation of facts:
. . . a donation propter nuptias was made in a private instrument by Flaviano Pacio in favor of
his first wife Severa Jucutan, before their marriage on June 4, 1901 . .;
3. That the land continued to be declared in the name of Flaviano Pacio notwithstanding this
donation propter nuptias until 1956 when the same was changed in the name of the
defendants Brigida, Manuela and Dominga, all surnamed Pacio;
4. That land taxes were paid in the name of Flaviano Pacio as shown by tax receipts for the
years 1931, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1940, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949,
1955, and 1956;
5. That Flaviano Pacio died on November 2, 1951;
xxx xxx xxx
8. That defendants lived with their father and the second wife, Toribia Fontanilla, from the
date of their marriage in 1933, except Manuela who left on the date of her marriage in 1941,
and returned in 1946, and Dominga who left in 1943 and Brigida is presently living with the
other defendants;
9. That while the plaintiffs and the defendants lived together during the said period, they
equally shared all the harvests reaped from the land in the litigation;
10. That the land taxes were paid on both parcels (a) and (b) in the names of the defendants
starting with the year 1957 when the tax declarations were changed into their names on
December 20, 1956; . . .,"
The plaintiffs-appellants contend that the donation was void, because it was not made in a public
instrument. They are right. Art. 633 of the Spanish Civil Code states that "In order that a donation of
real property be valid it must be made by public instrument in which the property donated must be
specifically described and the amount of the encumbrances to be assumed by the donee expressed
. . .." .
And this Court has held that a donation propter nuptias of real property written on a private
instrument is not valid even between the parties.1
The trial judge said "a donation propter nuptias in order to be valid between the donor and the
donee, need not be embodied in a public instrument as such formality is only necessary for
registration purposes in the Office of the Register of Deeds" so as to bind third persons. He was
obviously applying the new principles in the Philippine Civil Code effective in the year 1950.2 But in
1901 when the gift was made, the law was contained in the Spanish Civil Code, according to which,
even between the parties, the donation must be in a public instrument.
Realizing the force of plaintiffs' point, defendants emphasize that the deed of donation constituted a
title on which to base acquisitive prescription, inasmuch as Severa possessed the land from 1901 to
March 1930 when she died. The stipulation of facts says nothing about such possession. True, there
was a witness, Monica Pacio, who testified; but she stated that both husband and wife held
possession of the land, and the stipulation says that from 1933 the parties shared the harvests
equally. At any rate, it is obvious that normally, prescription by adverse possession can not exist
between husband and wife. See Article 1109 Civil Code of the Philippines.
Espique v. Espique3 on which the appellees rely is not controlling because the prescription there
mentioned did not refer to possession by the wife as against her husband.
It follows that Flaviano Pacio continued to be the owner of the land as the donation had no effect and
there was no prescription. Upon his death, the land became the joint property of his children by the
first and second marriage. Subject of course to the rights of his surviving spouse, the plaintiff Toribia
Fontanilla.
Reversing the decision in so far as this parcel is concerned, we hereby order the return of the
expediente to the court below for further proceedings on partition in accordance with these views.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and
Dizon, JJ.,concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953
MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR
NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants.
Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.

Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in
the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario
and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda,
who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands
involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However,
plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario
took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and
her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to
separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a
parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property
that may be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered decision
ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in
dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the present appeal.
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former
owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that
Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late
Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise
appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With
this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he
was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria
Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to
them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that
moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became
vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question
because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and
leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot
be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor
can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio
and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of
the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights,
however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status
and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the
latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were
declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil
Code).
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are
declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them
may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right
should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or
event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation,
provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same
origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over
the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so
because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the
new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to
the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of
pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that
they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to
assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that
this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a
donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may
be valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or
in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been
followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their
father) who represents the minors, petitioners,
vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA,
AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court
of First Instance of Abra, respondents.
Federico Paredes for petitioners.
Demetrio V. Pre for private respondents.
MARTIN, J:
This is a petition for review 1 of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Abra in Civil Case No. 856,
entitled Fortunata Barcena vs. Leon Barcena, et al., denying the motions for reconsideration of its
order dismissing the complaint in the aforementioned case.
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and
wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title
over certain parcels of land located in Abra.
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing of
the motion to dismiss, the counsel for the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint in order to include
certain allegations therein. The motion to amend the complaint was granted and on July 17, 1975,
plaintiffs filed their amended complaint.
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was
heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata
Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein;
but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person
cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.
On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of the order dismissing the complaint
and on August 23, 1975, he moved to set aside the order of the dismissal pursuant to Sections 16
and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 2
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the plaintiff
for lack of merit. On September 1, 1975, counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation
praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased
mother, but the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From the order, counsel for the
deceased plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint
claiming that the same is in violation of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court but the
same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the complaint in Civil
Case No. 856 and its orders denying the motion for reconsideration of said order of dismissal. While
it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in
pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata
Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means
that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and
therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of
Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency of the proceeding
can be substituted. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending
case dies ... it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to
give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives."
This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the
respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution
of parties in the case. The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution,
dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a
grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the
heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by
law. 3 The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. 4 The right of the heirs to the property of the
deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate
proceedings. 5 When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in
litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs
upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became
parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow
their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.
Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to
appear and be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be granted ... ." The question
as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued
for. 6 In the causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and principally
property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of
action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of
property affected being incidental. 7 Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased
plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and
principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is,
therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff
to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by
the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This
should not have been done for under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even
the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure
the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased. In the instant case the respondent Court
did not have to bother ordering the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased because her counsel has not only asked that the minor children be
substituted for her but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as guardian ad litem for them
because their father is busy in Manila earning a living for the family. But the respondent Court
refused the request for substitution on the ground that the children were still minors and cannot sue
in court. This is another grave error because the respondent Court ought to have known that under
the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is directed to appoint a guardian ad
litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant case, the counsel for the deceased plaintiff has
suggested to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be appointed to act as guardian ad
litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not
complying with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent Court dismissing the complaint in Civil
Case No. 856 of the Court of First Instance of Abra and the motions for reconsideration of the order
of dismissal of said complaint are set aside and the respondent Court is hereby directed to allow the
substitution of the minor children, who are the petitioners therein for the deceased plaintiff and to
appoint a qualified person as guardian ad litem for them. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE

BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE
BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de
Borja, appellant. .
G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA,

special Administratrix appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972
TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late Francisco de
Borja, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa Tangco, defendant-
appellant.
L-28040
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for administrator-appellee.
Quiogue & Quiogue for appellee Matilde de Borja.
Andres Matias for appellee Cayetano de Borja.
Sevilla & Aquino for appellant.

L-28568
Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for oppositor-appellant.
L-28611
Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David Gueverra for defendant-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:p
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, special administratrix of the testate estate
of Francisco de Borja,1 from the approval of a compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its Special
Proceeding No. R-7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja, Administrator".
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval of the same
compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special
Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja,
Special Administratrix".
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala
Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise agreement, as the separate and
exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of the community with his
first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate, which is
under administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
Branch II.
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October
1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-
7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946,
Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was
appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole
administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja
allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana
instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was
appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was questioned in
said proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been
plagued with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some eighteen
(18) cases remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone
has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to all these litigations,
a compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963,2 by and between "[T]he heir and
son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of
Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her
lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr." The terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are as
follows:
AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,
AND
The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.
WITNESSETH
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and settle, with finality,
the various court litigations, controversies, claims, counterclaims, etc., between them
in connection with the administration, settlement, partition, adjudication and
distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and without
any reservations to enter into and execute this agreement under the following terms
and conditions:
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties
situated in Jalajala, Rizal, presently under administration in the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more specifically described as follows:
Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del

Municipio de Pililla de la Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte
Zambrano; al Oeste con Laguna de Bay; por el Sur con los herederos
de Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con los terrenos de la Familia
Maronilla
with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30 per
square meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda.
de de Borja the total amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000)
Philippine Currency, in cash, which represent P200,000 as his share in the payment
and P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all
surnamed de Borja and this shall be considered as full and complete payment and
settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well
as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No.
7866-Rizal, respectively, and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by
the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or
Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise. The
funds for this payment shall be taken from and shall depend upon the receipt of full
payment of the proceeds of the sale of Jalajala, "Poblacion."
3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that

particular obligation incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now Development Bank of the Philippines,
amounting to approximately P30,000.00 and also assumes payment of her 1/5 share
of the Estate and Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de Borja or
the sum of P3,500.00, more or less, which shall be deducted by the buyer of Jalajala,
"Poblacion" from the payment to be made to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under
paragraph 2 of this Agreement and paid directly to the Development Bank of the
Philippines and the heirs-children of Francisco de Borja.
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly to

Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of the payment due her under
paragraph 2 of this Agreement (approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name
of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury
warrants, who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to Jose de Borja.
5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose

de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, for themselves and for their heirs, successors,
executors, administrators, and assigns, hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw,
waive, remise, release and discharge any and all manner of action or actions, cause
or causes of action, suits, debts, sum or sums of money, accounts, damages, claims
and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which they ever had, or now have or
may have against each other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and
1955, CFI-Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033, CFI
Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as the case filed against
Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, the intention being to
completely, absolutely and finally release each other, their heirs, successors, and
assigns, from any and all liability, arising wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, from
the administration, settlement, and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of
the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de
Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly and specifically
renounce absolutely her rights as heir over any hereditary share in the estate of
Francisco de Borja.
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment under
paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose de Borja all the papers, titles and
documents belonging to Francisco de Borja which are in her possession and said
heir Jose de Borja shall issue in turn the corresponding receive thereof.
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the
properties mentioned under paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon receipt of the
total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion",
otherwise, the non-fulfillment of the said sale will render this instrument NULL AND
VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their hands in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October 1963 to
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966,
to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement,
but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R.
case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval (G.R. case
No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is not
disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the
heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja;
(2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja
and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate
Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the
Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the
settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is
against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial
settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the
decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the
Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those
circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses
that at the time it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule
74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a
deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also relies on the dissenting opinion
of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed the view that if the
parties have already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is
a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different manner, the probate of the will
is worse than useless.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent
from an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco.
Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana
Ongsingco
shall be considered as full complete payment settlement of her hereditary

share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa
Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late
Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis
Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the
cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja
among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely
the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or
eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any
other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or
vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil
Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual
extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.4 Of course, the
effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.
However, the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither
does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving
order of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered
settled and should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the
contract the character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it
serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja,
Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code.
Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed
independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were
not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the
Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally
and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the
heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda.
de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon
the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same.
The only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by
the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is
explicit on the point:
8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no

definite period for its performance, the same was intended to have a resolutory
period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In support of such contention, it is averred that
such a limit was expressly stipulated in an agreement in similar terms entered into by
said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit, Crisanto, Matilde
and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja, except that the consideration was fixed at
P600,000 (Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39- 46) and which
contained the following clause:
III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation of the sale of
the property mentioned herein and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the
proceeds of the sale by the herein owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja,
namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no
sale of the said property mentioned herein is consummated, or the non-receipt of the
purchase price thereof by the said owners within the period of sixty (60) days from
the date hereof, this agreement will become null and void and of no further effect.
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to this
particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no
date, the day being left blank "this day of October 1963"; and while signed by the parties, it was
not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a proposed notarial ratification
clause. Furthermore, the compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A), provides in its par. 2
heretofore transcribed that of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco, P600,000
represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde all surnamed de Borja"
which corresponds to the consideration of P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that circumstance is
proof that the duly notarized contract entered into wit Jose de Borja under date 12 October 1963
(Annex A), was designed to absorb and supersede the separate unformalize agreement with the
other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days resolutory term in the contract with the latter (Annex 1)
not being repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the formal compromise with Jose de Borja. It is
moreover manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made
within sixty days from the date of the agreement with Jose de Borja's co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly
omitted in Annex A as improper and ineffective, since the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was
to be sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for her share formed part of the estate of
Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days
counted from the finality of the order now under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties for the
terms of the contract.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the
compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate
of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de Borja,
whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her
eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that
eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not
bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of
whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by article 1088 of
the present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser
by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of
one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could
not be forbidden.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is void because it
amounts to a compromise as to her status and marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point
is without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex "A")
describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite admission of her civil status. There is
nothing in the text of the agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as
the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the cession of her
hereditary rights.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
in its order of 21 September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on Appeal in
L-28568, page 157), that the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963 (Annex "A") had been
abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
in its order of 21 September 1964, had declared that "no amicable settlement had been arrived at by
the parties", and that Jose de Borja himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that the
proposed amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in the order and motion
above-mentioned was the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which already had been
formally signed and executed by the parties and duly notarized. What the record discloses is that
some time after its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back out from the
compromise agreement, pleading various reasons restated in the opposition to the Court's approval
of Annex "A" (Record on Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was invalid because of the lapse
of the allegedly intended resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was not preceded by
the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that
Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco's status as wife and widow of Francisco de
Borja, etc., all of which objections have been already discussed. It was natural that in view of the
widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a new settlement or novatory agreement
before seeking judicial sanction and enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter step might ultimately
entail a longer delay in attaining final remedy. That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is
apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to Jose de Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief
for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No. 28040; and it is more than probable that the order of 21
September 1964 and the motion of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a
more satisfactory compromise. But the inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the
original compromise (Annex "A") and justifies the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court order
for its approval and enforcement from the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore
described, decreed that the agreement be ultimately performed within 120 days from the finality of
the order, now under appeal.
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and, therefore, its order
should be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija should
be, and is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has affected her
unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the
value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is that her delay in receiving the payment of
the agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to her attempts to nullify the agreement
(Annex "A") she had formally entered into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney Panaguiton. And
as to the devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30
June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with
every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency and properties of the estate", is particularly
opposite in the present case.
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion),
concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is
the husband's private property (as contended by his second spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or
whether it forms part of the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that there was adequate evidence to
overcome the presumption in favor of its conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil
Code.
We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has
become moot and academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this Court in the two preceding
cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual share in
the estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the accompanying
reciprocal quit-claims between the parties. But as the question may affect the rights of possible
creditors and legatees, its resolution is still imperative.
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had been originally acquired
jointly by Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and their title thereto was duly
registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration Case No. 528 of the province of Rizal,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda
was partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong
section to Bernardo de Borja, and the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco
de Borja (V. De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena

Romero; S. Heirs of Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay; containing an area of
13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at P297,410. (Record on Appeal, pages 7
and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of

Francisco de Borja, instituted a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452)
against Jose de Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of Josefa Tangco (Francisco de Borja's first
wife), seeking to have the Hacienda above described declared exclusive private property of
Francisco, while in his answer defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was conjugal
property of his parents (Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption
established by Article 160 of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the Civil Code of
1889), to the effect that:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory, moral and exemplary,
as well as for attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held that the plaintiff had
adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late Francisco de Borja, and his Administratrix,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then
appealed to this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of the Hacienda in question
as owned by the conjugal partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the late Francisco
de Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended Inventory that, as executor of the estate of
his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended Accounting of the
same date, also filed in the proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O.
Vda. de Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted therein an inventory
dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala property among the "Conjugal Properties of
the Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more, Tasiana Ongsingco, as
administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in Special Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955, an inventory wherein she listed
the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal Property of the Deceased Spouses Francisco de
Borja and Josefa Tangco, which are in the possession of the Administrator of the Testate Estate of
the Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal" (Exhibit "4").
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain admissions against
interest made by both Francisco de Borja and the Administratrix of his estate, in the course of
judicial proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting the legal presumption in favor of
the conjugal community, the Court below declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not
conjugal property, but the private exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja. It did so on the
strength of the following evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951
(Exhibit "F") that
He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte,

337 hectareas) adjunto a mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala,
Rizal).
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the entire Hacienda had
been bought at a foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100 was contributed by
Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. by Marcelo de Borja; that upon receipt of a subsequent demand
from the provincial treasurer for realty taxes the sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his brother Bernardo
that Francisco (son of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon Bernardo's assent to the
proposal, Marcelo issue a check for P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said that the amount
would represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The witness further
testified that
Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by Francisco de
Borja when he was still a bachelor and which he derived from his business
transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965, t.s.n., pages 13-15) (Emphasis supplied)
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement overweighed the admissions
in the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant Jose de Borja since probate courts can not
finally determine questions of ownership of inventoried property, but that the testimony of Gregorio
de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the original Hacienda with his private
funds, for which reason that share can not be regarded as conjugal partnership property, but as
exclusive property of the buyer, pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and Article 148(4)
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place, witness Gregorio de
Borja's testimony as to the source of the money paid by Francisco for his share was plain hearsay,
hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was merely repeating what Marcelo de Borja
had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of ascertaining the truth of the statement, since both
Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were already dead when Gregorio testified. In addition, the
statement itself is improbable, since there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain
to Gregorio how and when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A
ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio's testimony.
As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof (ante, page 14) does not
clearly demonstrate that the "mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal) " refers
precisely to the Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits 3 and 4) disclose that there were two
real properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m., assessed at P44,600,
and a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion). To which of these lands did the affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In
addition, Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo" is plainly self-
serving, and not admissible in the absence of cross examination.
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and "7")
are not conclusive on the conjugal character of the property in question; but as already noted, they
are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the declarants, Francisco de Borja and his
executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative weight than the self-
serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal
character of the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually
confirmed by proof. Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that claims for damages should
be ventilated in the corresponding special proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the
deceased, the same requires no pro announcement from this Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case
No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are
reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3)
cases.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24434 January 17, 1968
HEIRS OF PEDRO REGANON, JOVENCIA REGANON, MENCIA REGANON, JOSEFA

REGANON, VIOLETA REGANON, and FLORA REGANON, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
RUFINO IMPERIAL, defendant-appellant.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellees.

V. Lacaya for defendant-appellant.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is an appeal from the orders dated June 9, 1964, July 14, 1964 and August 11, 1964,
respectively, of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Dipolog, Branch II).
The facts of the case are admitted by both parties.
On February 22, 1963, the heirs of Pedro Reganon filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of about one-hectare portion of a parcel of land (Lot No. 1 or Lot No. 4952, situated at
Miasi, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, covered by O.T.C. No. 1447, with an area of 7.9954
hectares), with damages, against Rufino Imperial.
Defendant not having filed an answer within the reglementary period, the plaintiffs on April 8, 1963
filed a motion to declare the former in default. The trial court granted the motion in its order dated
April 10, 1963.
On April 23, 1963, the plaintiffs presented their evidence ex parte before the Clerk of Court acting as
Commissioner. The court a quo on May 6, 1963, rendered a decision declaring the plaintiffs lawful
owners of the land in question and entitled to its peaceful possession and enjoyment; ordering
defendant immediately to vacate the portion occupied by him and to restore the peaceful possession
thereof to plaintiffs; and sentencing defendant to pay plaintiffs the amount of P1,929.20 and the
costs.
On November 29, 1963, the plaintiffs filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution. This was
granted by the trial court in its order of December 9, 1963.
The Deputy Provincial Sheriff submitted on February 8, 1964 a sheriff's return of proceedings
reporting the garnishment and sale of a carabao and goat belonging to defendant for P153.00, and
the attachment and sale of defendant's parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 4694, situated
in Sicet, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, for P500.00 both sales having been made to the only
bidder, plaintiffs' counsel Atty. Vic T. Lacaya.
On March 13, 1964, the Philippine National Bank deposited in the Philippine National Bank-Dipolog
Branch the residuary estate of its former ward, Eulogio Imperial, in the sum of P10,303.80, pursuant
to an order of Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte in Sp. Proc. No. R-145.
On May 25, 1964, the heirs of said Eulogio Imperial, one of whom is defendant, executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition of the residuary estate, wherein was apportioned P1,471.97 as defendant
Rufino Imperial's share.
Informed of this development, the plaintiffs filed on June 5, 1964 an ex parte motion for issuance of
an alias writ of execution and of an order directing the manager, or the representative, of the
Philippine National Bank-Dipolog Branch, to hold the share of defendant and deliver the same to the
provincial sheriff of the province to be applied to the satisfaction of the balance of the money
judgment. This was granted by the trial court (Branch II) in its order dated June 9, 1964.
On June 17, 1964, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff issued a sheriffs notification for levy addressed to
defendant, giving notice of the garnishment of the rights, interests, shares and participation that
defendant may have over the residuary estate of the late Eulogio Imperial, consisting of the money
deposited in the Philippine National Bank-Dipolog Branch.
Defendant, through counsel, appearing for the first time before the trial court, on June 24, 1964 filed
a motion for reconsideration of the order dated June 9, 1964, and to quash the alias writ of execution
issued pursuant to it, to which plaintiffs filed their opposition on July 6, 1964. On July 14, 1964, the
trial court denied defendant's aforesaid motion.
Defendant's second motion for reconsideration likewise having denied by the trial court in its order of
August 11, 1964, defendant appealed to Us, raising the following issues:
(1) Upon the death of a ward, is the money accumulated in his guardianship proceedings
and deposited in a bank, still considered in custodia legis and therefore cannot be attached?
(2) Is the residuary estate of a U.S. veteran, which consists in the aggregate accumulated
sum from the monthly allowances given him by the United States Veterans Administration
(USVA) during his lifetime, exempt from execution?
Defendant-appellant argues that the property of an incompetent under guardianship is in custodia

legis and therefore can not be attached.
It is true that in a former case 1 it was held that property under custodia legis can not be attached.
But this was under the old Rules of Court. The new Rules of Court 2 now specifically provides for the
procedure to be followed in case what is attached is in custodia legis. 3 The clear import of this new
provision is that property under custodia legis is now attachable, subject to the mode set forth in said
rule.
Besides, the ward having died, the guardianship proceedings no longer subsist:
The death of the ward necessarily terminates the guardianship, and thereupon all powers
and duties of the guardian cease, except the duty, which remains, to make a proper
accounting and settlement in the probate court. 4
As a matter of fact, the guardianship proceedings was ordered conditionally closed by Branch I of
the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte in which it was pending, in its order of February
8, 1964, where it stated
In the meantime, the guardian Philippine National Bank is hereby directed to deposit the
residuary estate of said ward with its bank agency in Dipolog, this province, in the name of
the estate of the deceased ward Eulogio Imperial, preparatory to the eventual distribution of
the same to the heirs when the latter shall be known, and upon proof of deposit of said
residuary estate, the guardian Philippine National Bank shall forthwith be relieved from any
responsibility as such, and this proceeding shall be considered closed and terminated. 5
And the condition has long been fulfilled, because on March 13, 1964 the Philippine National Bank-
Manila deposited the residuary estate of the ward with the Philippine National Bank-Dipolog Branch,
evidenced by a receipt attached to the records in Sp. Proc. No. R-145. 6
When Eulogio Imperial died on September 13, 1962, the rights to his succession from the
moment of his death were transmitted to his heirs, one of whom is his son and heir, defendant-
appellant herein. 7 This automatic transmission can not but proceed with greater ease and certainty
than in this case where the parties agree that the residuary estate is not burdened with any debt.
For,
The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of death, and
where, as in this case, the heir is of legal age and the estate is not burdened with any debts,
said heir immediately succeeds, by force of law, to the dominion, ownership, and possession
of the properties of his predecessor and consequently stands legally in the shoes of the
latter. 8
That the interest of an heir in the estate of a deceased person may be attached for purposes of
execution, even if the estate is in the process of settlement before the courts, is already a settled
matter in this jurisdiction. 9
It is admitted that the heirs of Eulogio Imperial, including herein defendant-appellant, have on May
25, 1964 executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. This instrument suffices to settle the entire
estate of the decedent provided all the requisites for its validity are fulfilled 10 even without the
approval of the court. Therefore, the estate for all practical purposes have been settled. The heirs
are at full liberty to withdraw the residuary estate from the Philippine National Bank-Dipolog Branch
and divide it among themselves. The only reason they have not done so is because of the alleged
illegal withdrawal from said estate of the amount of P1,080.00 by one Gloria Gomez by authority of
Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, which incident is now on appeal
before the Court of Appeals. This appeal, however, does not detract any from the fact that the
guardianship proceedings is closed and terminated and the residuary estate no longer
under custodia legis.
Finally, it is defendant-appellant's position that the residuary estate of Eulogio Imperial, a former U.S.
veteran, having been set aside from the monthly allowances given him by the United States
Veterans Administration (USVA) during his lifetime, is exempt from execution.
Any pension, annuity, or gratuity granted by a Government to its officers or employees in recognition
of past services rendered, is primordially aimed at tiding them over during their old age and/or
disability. This is therefore a right personalissima, purely personal because founded on necessity. It
requires no argument to show that where the recipient dies, the necessity motivating or underlying
its grant necessarily ceases to be. Even more so in this case where the law 11 providing for the
exemption is calculated to benefit U.S. veterans residing here, and is therefore merely a
manifestation of comity.
Besides, as earlier stated, the heirs of Eulogio Imperial, one of whom is appellant, have already
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition the end result of which is that the property is no longer
the property of the estate but of the individual heirs. And it is settled that:
When the heirs by mutual agreement have divided the estate among themselves, one of the
heirs can not therefore secure the appointment of an administrator to take charge of and
administer the estate or a part thereof. The property is no longer the property of the estate,
but of the individual heirs, whether it remains undivided or not. 12
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against defendant-
appellant. So ordered. 1wph1.t
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 75884 September 24, 1987
JULITA GO ONG, FOR HERSELF AND AS JUDICIAL GUARDIAN OF STEVEN GO

ONG, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION and the CITY SHERIFF
OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 21, 1986 Decision * of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. CV
No. 02635, "Julita Ong etc. vs. Allied Banking Corp. et al." affirming, with modification, the January 5, 1984 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-35230.
The uncontroverted facts of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
...: Two (2) parcels of land in Quezon City Identified as Lot No. 12, Block 407, Psd
37326 with an area of 1960.6 sq. m. and Lot No. 1, Psd 15021, with an area of
3,660.8 sq. m. are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188705 in the name of
"Alfredo Ong Bio Hong married to Julita Go Ong "(Exh. D). Alfredo Ong Bio Hong
died on January 18, 1975 and Julita Go Ong was appointed administratrix of her
husband's estate in Civil Case No. 107089. The letters of administration was
registered on TCT No. 188705 on October 23, 1979. Thereafter, Julita Go Ong sold
Lot No. 12 to Lim Che Boon, and TCT No. 188705 was partially cancelled and TCT
No. 262852 was issued in favor of Lim Che Boon covering Lot No. 12 (Exh. D-4). On
June 8, 1981 Julita Go Ong through her attorney-in-fact Jovita K. Yeo (Exh. 1)
mortgaged Lot No. 1 to the Allied Banking Corporation to secure a loan of
P900,000.00 obtained by JK Exports, Inc. The mortgage was registered on TCT No.
188705 on the same date with the following notation: "... mortgagee's consent
necessary in case of subsequent alienation or encumbrance of the property other
conditions set forth in Doc. No. 340, Page No. 69, Book No. XIX, of the Not. Public of
Felixberto Abad". On the loan there was due the sum of P828,000.00 and Allied
Banking Corporation tried to collect it from Julita Go Ong, (Exh. E). Hence, the
complaint alleging nullity of the contract for lack of judicial approval which the bank
had allegedly promised to secure from the court. In response thereto, the bank
averred that it was plaintiff Julita Go Ong who promised to secure the court's
approval, adding that Julita Go Ong informed the defendant that she was processed
the sum of P300,000.00 by the JK Exports, Inc. which will also take charge of the
interest of the loan.
Concluding, the trial court ruled:
Absent (of) any evidence that the property in question is the capital of
the deceased husband brought into the marriage, said property
should be presumed as acquired during the marriage and, therefore,
conjugal property,
After the dissolution of the marriage with the death of plaintiff's

husband, the plaintiff acquired, by law, her conjugal share, together
with the hereditary rights thereon. (Margate vs. Rabacal, L-14302,
April 30, 1963). Consequently, the mortgage constituted on said
property, upon express authority of plaintiff, notwithstanding the lack
of judicial approval, is valid, with respect to her conjugal share
thereon, together with her hereditary rights.
On appeal by petitioner, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification, the appealed
decision (Record, pp. 19-22). The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings

instituted by defendant against plaintiff shall be held in abeyance to await the final
result of Civil Case No. 107089 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, 6th Judicial
District Branch XXXII, entitled "IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
THE LATE ALFREDO ONG BIO: JULITA GO ONG, ADMINISTRATRIX". In
pursuance with which the restraining order of the lower court in this case restraining
the sale of the properties levied upon is hereby ordered to continue in full force and
effect coterminous with the final result of Civil Case No. 107089, the decision
appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
On April 8, 1986, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said decision (Ibid., pp. 24-29), but
in a Resolution dated September 11, 1986, respondent court denied the motion for lack of merit
(Ibid., p. 23). Hence, the instant petition (Ibid., pp. 6-17).
The Second Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated November 19, 1986 (Rollo, p. 30), without
giving due course to the petition, resolved to require private respondent to comment thereon and it
did on February 19, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 37-42). Thereafter, in a Resolution dated April 6, 1987, the
petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their respective memoranda
(Ibid., p. 43).
Petitioner filed her Memorandum on May 13, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 45-56), while private respondent filed
its Memorandum on May 20, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 62-68).
The sole issue in this case is
WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER THE PARCEL OF LAND UNDER
PETITIONER'S ADMINISTRATION IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL.
The instant petition is devoid of merit.
The well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great respect, carries
even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in the case at bar.
In brief, the lower court found: (1) that the property under the administration of petitioner the wife
of the deceased, is a community property and not the separate property of the latter; (2) that the
mortgage was constituted in the wife's personal capacity and not in her capacity as administratrix;
and (3) that the mortgage affects the wife's share in the community property and her inheritance in
the estate of her husband.
Petitioner, asserting that the mortgage is void for want of judicial approval, quoted Section 7 of Rule
89 of the Rules of Court and cited several cases wherein this Court ruled that the regulations
provided in the said section are mandatory.
While petitioner's assertion may have merit insofar as the rest of the estate of her husband is
concerned the same is not true as regards her conjugal share and her hereditary rights in the estate.
The records show that petitioner willingly and voluntarily mortgaged the property in question
because she was processed by JK Exports, Inc. the sum of P300,000.00 from the proceeds of the
loan; and that at the time she executed the real estate mortgage, there was no court order
authorizing the mortgage, so she took it upon herself, to secure an order.
Thus, in confirming the findings of the lower court, as supported by law and the evidence, the Court
of Appeals aptly ruled that Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, since the
mortgage was constituted in her personal capacity and not in her capacity as administratrix of the
estate of her husband.
Nevertheless, petitioner, citing the cases of Picardal, et al. vs. Lladas (21 SCRA 1483)
and Fernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla (10 SCRA 589), further argues that in the settlement proceedings
of the estate of the deceased spouse, the entire conjugal partnership property of the marriage is
under administration. While such may be in a sense true, that fact alone is not sufficient to invalidate
the whole mortgage, willingly and voluntarily entered into by the petitioner. An opposite view would
result in an injustice. Under similar circumstances, this Court applied the provisions of Article 493 of
the Civil Code, where the heirs as co-owners shall each have the full ownership of his part and the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership (Philippine
National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 207 [1980]).
Consequently, in the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted in ruling
that the questioned mortgage constituted on the property under administration, by authority of the
petitioner, is valid, notwithstanding the lack of judicial approval, with respect to her conjugal share
and to her hereditary rights. The fact that what had been mortgaged was in custodia legis is
immaterial, insofar as her conjugal share and hereditary share in the property is concerned for after
all, she was the ABSOLUTE OWNER thereof. This ownership by hers is not disputed, nor is there
any claim that the rights of the government (with reference to taxes) nor the rights of any heir or
anybody else have been prejudiced for impaired. As stated by Associate Justice (later Chief Justice)
Manuel Moran in Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al., 73 Phil. 618
The land in question, described in the appealed decision, originally belonged to Juan
Melgar. The latter died and the judicial administration of his estate was commenced
in 1915 and came to a close on December 2, 1924, only. During the pendency of the
said administration, that is, on July 5, 1917, Susana Melgar, daughter of the
deceased Juan Melgar, sold the land with the right of repurchase to Pedro Cui,
subject to the stipulation that during the period for the repurchase she would continue
in possession of the land as lessee of the purchase. On December 12, 1920, the
partition of the estate left by the deceased Juan Melgar was made, and the land in
question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar. In 1921, she conveyed, in payment of
professional fees, one-half of the land in favor of the defendant-appellee Nicolas
Rafols, who entered upon the portion thus conveyed and has been in possession
thereof up to the present. On July 23, 1921, Pedro Cui brought an action to recover
said half of the land from Nicolas Rafols and the other half from the other defendants,
and while that case was pending, or about August 4, 1925, Pedro Cui donated the
whole land in question to Generosa Teves, the herein plaintiff-appellant, after trial,
the lower court rendered a decision absolving Nicolas Rafols as to the one-half of the
land conveyed to him by Susana Melgar, and declaring the plaintiff owner of the
other half by express acknowledgment of the other defendants. The plaintiff
appealed from that part of the judgment which is favorable to Nicolas Rafols.
The lower court absolved Nicolas Rafols upon the theory that Susana Melgar could
not have sold anything to Pedro Cui because the land was then in custodia legis, that
is, under judicial administration. This is error. That the land could not ordinary be
levied upon while in custodia legis, does not mean that one of the heirs may not sell
the right, interest or participation which he has or might have in the lands under
administration. The ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited in
order to avoid interference with the possession by the court. But the sale made by an
heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration,
in no wise stands in the way of such administration.
The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court cannot adversely affect
the substantiverights of private respondent to dispose of her Ideal [not inchoate, for the conjugal
partnership ended with her husband's death, and her hereditary rights accrued from the moment of
the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code) share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership formed
between her and the other heirs/co-owners (See Art. 493, Civil Code, supra.). Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the
Civil Code applies in a case where judicial approval has to be sought in connection with, for
instance, the sale or mortgage of property under administration for the payment, say of a conjugal
debt, and even here, the conjugal and hereditary shares of the wife are excluded from the requisite
judicial approval for the reason already adverted to hereinabove, provided of course no prejudice is
caused others, including the government.
Moreover, petitioner is already estopped from questioning the mortgage. An estoppel may arise from
the making of a promise even though without consideration, if it was intended that the promise
should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it would be virtually to
sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice (Gonzalo Sy Trading vs. Central
Bank, 70 SCRA 570).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15499 February 28, 1962
ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.
Delgado, Flores and Macapagal for plaintiff-appellant.
Pelaez and Jalandoni for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First instance of Manila dismissing the action for legal
redemption filed by plaintiff-appellant.
It appears that Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was a co-owner of a house and lot located at
Sta. Cruz, Manila, as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52789, issued in the name of the
following co-owners: Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, 1/6; Jose V. Ramirez, 1/6; Jose E. Ramirez,
1/6; Rita de Ramirez, 1/6; and Jose Ma. Ramirez, 1/6.
On October 20, 1951, Jose V. Ramirez died. Subsequently, Special Proceeding No. 15026 was
instituted to settle his estate, that included the one-sixth (1/6) undivided share in the aforementioned
property. And although his last will and testament, wherein he bequeathed his estate to his children
and grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of the free portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte, hereinafter referred
to as plaintiff-appellant, has been admitted to probate, the estate proceedings are still pending up to
the present on account of the claims of creditors which exceed the assets of the deceased. The
Bank of the Philippine Islands was appointed judicial administrator.
Meanwhile, on December 9, 1958, Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, one of the co-owners of the
late Jose V. Ramirez in the Sta. Cruz property, sold her undivided 1/6 share to Manuel Uy & Sons,
Inc. defendant-appellant herein, for the sum of P500,000.00. After the execution by her attorney-in-
fact, Mrs. Elsa R. Chambers, of an affidavit to the effect that formal notices of the sale had been sent
to all possible redemptioners, the deed of sale was duly registered and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 52789 was cancelled in lieu of which a new one was issued in the name of the vendee and the
other-co-owners.
On the same day (December 9, 1958), Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. sent a letter to the Bank of the
Philippine Islands as judicial administrator of the estate of the late Jose V. Ramirez informing it of the
above-mentioned sale. This letter, together with that of the bank, was forwarded by the latter to Mrs.
Butte c/o her counsel Delgado, Flores & Macapagal, Escolta, Manila, and having received the same
on December 10, 1958, said law office delivered them to plaintiff-appellant's son, Mr. Miguel Papa,
who in turn personally handed the letters to his mother, Mrs. Butte, on December 11 and 12, 1958.
Aside from this letter of defendant-appellant, the vendor, thru her attorney-in-fact Mrs. Chambers,
wrote said bank on December 11, 1958 confirming vendee's letter regarding the sale of her 1/6
share in the Sta. Cruz property for the sum of P500,000.00. Said letter was received by the bank on
December 15, 1958 and having endorsed it to Mrs. Butte's counsel, the latter received the same on
December 16, 1958. Appellant received the letter on December 19, 1958.
On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, thru Atty. Resplandor Sobretodo, sent a letter and a
Philippine National Bank cashier's check in the amount of P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.
offering to redeem the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. This tender having
been refused, plaintiff on the same day consigned the amount in court and filed the corresponding
action for legal redemption. Without prejudice to the determination by the court of the reasonable
and fair market value of the property sold which she alleged to be grossly excessive, plaintiff prayed
for conveyance of the property, and for actual, moral and exemplary damages.
After the filing by defendant of its answer containing a counterclaim, and plaintiff's reply thereto, trial
was held, after which the court rendered decision on May 13, 1959, dismissing plaintiff's complaint
on the grounds that she has no right to redeem the property and that, if ever she had any, she
exercised the same beyond the statutory 30-day period for legal redemptions provided by the Civil
Code. The counterclaim of defendant for damages was likewise dismissed for not being sufficiently
established. Both parties appealed directly to this Court.
Based on the foregoing facts, the main issues posed in this appeal are: (1) whether or not plaintiff-
appellant, having been bequeathed 1/3 of the free portion of the estate of Jose V. Ramirez, can
exercise the right of legal redemption over the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez
despite the presence of the judicial administrator and pending the final distribution of her share in the
testate proceedings; and (2) whether or not she exercised the right of legal redemption within the
period prescribed by law.
The applicable law involved in the present case is contained in Articles 1620, p. 1, and 1623 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which read as follows:
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of
all the other-co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the
alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do
so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common.
(1522a)
ART. 1623. The right of legal predemption or redemption shall not be exercised except within
thirty days from the notice in writing by the respective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case
may be. The deed of sale shall not be accorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof at all
possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners. (1524a)
That the appellant Angela M. Butte is entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption is clear. As
testamentary heir of the estate of J.V. Ramirez, she and her co-heirs acquired an interest in the
undivided one-sixth (1/6) share owned by her predecessor (causante) in the Santa Cruz property,
from the moment of the death of the aforesaid co-owner, J.V. Ramirez. By law, the rights to the
succession of a deceased persons are transmitted to his heirs from the moment of his death, and
the right of succession includes all property rights and obligations that survive the decedent.
ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which
are not extinguished by his death. (659)
ART. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent. (657a)
ART. 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to the pure and simple legacies or
devisees from the death of the testator, and transmits it to his heirs. (881a)
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and
is supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the
decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment(Art. 908), and so
is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivos (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and
remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935),and
the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).
As a consequence of this fundamental rule of succession, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez acquired his
undivided share in the Sta. Cruz property from the moment of his death, and from that instant, they
became co-owners in the aforesaid property, together with the original surviving co-owners of their
decedent (causante). A co-owner of an undivided share is necessarily a co-owner of the whole.
Wherefore, any one of the Ramirez heirs, as such co-owner, became entitled to exercise the right of
legal redemption (retracto de comuneros) as soon as another co-owner (Maria Garnier Vda. de
Ramirez) had sold her undivided share to a stranger, Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. This right of
redemption vested exclusively in consideration of the redemptioner's share which the law nowhere
takes into account.
The situation is in no wise altered by the existence of a judicial administrator of the estate of Jose V.
Ramirez while under the Rules of Court the administrator has the right to the possession of the real
and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the payment of the decedent's debts and
the expenses of administration (sec. 3, Rule 85), and the administrator may bring or defend actions
for the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased (sec. 2, Rule 88), such rights
of possession and administration do not include the right of legal redemption of the undivided share
sold to Uy & Company by Mrs. Garnier Ramirez. The reason is obvious: this right of legal
redemption only came into existence when the sale to Uy & Sons, Inc. was perfected, eight (8) years
after the death of Jose V. Ramirez, and formed no part of his estate. The redemption right vested in
the heirs originally, in their individual capacity, they did not derivatively acquire it from their decedent,
for when Jose V. Ramirez died, none of the other co-owners of the Sta. Cruz property had as yet
sold his undivided share to a stranger. Hence, there was nothing to redeem and no right of
redemption; and if the late Ramirez had no such right at his death, he could not transmit it to his own
heirs. Much less could Ramirez acquire such right of redemption eight years after his death, when
the sale to Uy & Sons, Inc. was made; because death extinguishes civil personality, and, therefore,
all further juridical capacity to acquire or transmit rights and obligations of any kind (Civil Code of the
Phil., Art. 42).
It is argued that the actual share of appellant Mrs. Butte in the estate of Jose V. Ramirez has not
been specifically determined as yet, that it is still contingent; and that the liquidation of estate of Jose
V. Ramirez may require the alienation of the decedent's undivided portion in the Sta. Cruz property,
in which event Mrs. Butte would have no interest in said undivided portion. Even if it were true, the
fact would remain that so long as that undivided share remains in the estate, the heirs of Jose V.
Ramirez own it, as the deceased did own it before his demise, so that his heirs are now as much co-
owners of the Sta. Cruz property as Jose V. Ramirez was himself a co-owner thereof during his
lifetime. As co-owners of the property, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez, or any one of them, became
personally vested with right of legal redemption as soon as Mrs. Garnier sold her own pro-indiviso
interest to Uy & Sons. Even if subsequently, the undivided share of Ramirez (and of his heirs) should
eventually be sold to satisfy the creditors of the estate, it would not destroy their ownership of it
before the sale, but would only convey or transfer it as in turn sold (of it actually is sold) to pay his
creditors. Hence, the right of any of the Ramirez heirs to redeem the Garnier share will not be
retroactively affected. All that the law requires is that the legal redemptioner should be a co-owner at
the time the undivided share of another co-owner is sold to a stranger. Whether or not the
redemptioner will continue being a co-owner after exercising the legal redemptioner is irrelevant for
the purposes of law.
Nor it can be argued that if the original share of Ramirez is sold by the administrator, his heirs would
stand in law as never having acquired that share. This would only be true if the inheritance is
repudiated or the heir's quality as such is voided. But where the heirship is undisputed, the
purchaser of hereditary property is not deemed to have acquired the title directly from the deceased
Ramirez, because a dead man can not convey title, nor from the administrator who owns no part of
the estate; the purchaser can only derive his title from the Ramirez heirs, represented by the
administrator, as their trustee or legal representative.
The right of appellant Angela M. Butte to make the redemption being established, the next point of
inquiry is whether she had made or tendered the redemption price within the 30 days from notices as
prescribed by law. This period, be it noted, is peremptory, because the policy of the law is not to
leave the purchaser's title in uncertainty beyond the established 30-day period. In considering
whether or not the offer to redeem was timely, we think that the notice given by the vendee (buyer)
should not be taken into account. The text of Article 1623 clearly and expressly prescribes that the
thirty days for making the redemption are to be counted from notice in writing by the vendor. Under
the old law (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1524), it was immaterial who gave the notice; so long as the
redeeming co-owner learned of the alienation in favor of the stranger, the redemption period began
to run. It is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a
particular method of giving notice, and that method must be deemed exclusive (39 Am. Jur., 237;
Payne vs. State, 12 S.W. [2d] 528). As ruled in Wampler vs. Lecompte, 150 Atl. 458 (affd. in 75 Law
Ed. [U.S.] 275)
Why these provisions were inserted in the statute we are not informed, but we may assume
until the contrary is shown, that a state of facts in respect thereto existed, which warranted
the legislature in so legislating.
The reasons for requiring that the notice should be given by the seller, and not by the buyer, are
easily divined. The seller of an undivided interest is in the best position to know who are his co-
owners that under the law must be notified of the sale. Also, the notice by the seller removes all
doubts as to the fact of the sale, its perfection; and its validity, the notice being a reaffirmation
thereof, so that the party need not entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the alienation. This
assurance would not exist if the notice should be given by the buyer.
The notice which became operative is that given by Mrs. Chambers, in her capacity as attorney-in-
fact of the vendor Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. Under date of December 11, 1958, she wrote the
Administrator Bank of the Philippine Islands that her principal's one-sixth (1/6) share in the Sta. Cruz
property had been sold to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. for P500,000.00. The Bank received this notice on
December 15, 1958, and on the same day endorsed it to Mrs. Butte, care of Delgado, Flores and
Macapagal (her attorneys), who received the same on December 16, 1958. Mrs. Butte tendered
redemption and upon the vendee's refusal, judicially consigned the price of P500,000.00 on January
15, 1959. The latter date was the last one of the thirty days allowed by the Code for the redemption,
counted by excluding December 16, 1958 and including January 15, 1959, pursuant to Article 13 of
the Civil Code. Therefore, the redemption was made in due time.
The date of receipt of the vendor's notice by the Administrator Bank (December 15) can not be
counted as determining the start of thirty days; for the Administrator of the estate was not a proper
redemptioner, since, as previously shown, the right to redeem the share of Marie Garnier did not
form part of the estate of Jose V. Ramirez.
We find no jurisdiction for appellant's claim that the P500,000,00. paid by Uy & Sons, Inc. for the
Garnier share is grossly excessive. Gross excess cannot be predicated on mere individual estimates
of market price by a single realtor.
The redemption and consignation having been properly made, the Uy counterclaim for damages and
attorney's fees predicated on the assumption that plaintiff's action was clearly unfounded, becomes
untenable.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside, and
another one entered:
(a) Declaring the consignation of P500,000,00 made by appellant Angela M. Butte duly and
properly made;
(b) Declaring that said appellant properly exercised in due time the legal redemption of the
one-sixth (1/6) undivided portion of the land covered by Certificate of Title No. 59363 of the
Office of the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila, sold on December 9, 1958 by Marie
Garnier Vda. de Ramirez to appellant Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.
(c) Ordering appellant Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. to accept the consigned price and to convey
to Angela M. Butte the undivided portion above referred to, within 30 days from the time our
decision becomes final, and subsequently to account for the rentals and fruits of the
redeemed share from and after January 15, 1958, until its conveyance; and.
(d) Ordering the return of the records to the court of origin for further proceedings
conformable to this opinion.
Without finding as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Paredes and De Leon, JJ., took no part.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25952 June 30, 1967
MARGARITA SALVADOR, in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-fact of CANDIDA SALVADOR,

ET AL.,petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ANDRES STA. MARIA, DOMINADOR CARDENAS, REMEDIOS CABRERA,
ALBERTO M. K. JAMIR and SIMEON ENRIQUEZ, respondents.
Arturo Joaquin for petitioners.

Pelaez, Jalandoni and Jamir and S. V. Enriquez, for respondent Simeon Enriquez.
C. E. Medina and J. M. Locsin for respondent Philippine National Bank.
Bala and Enriquez for the other respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Seven parcels of titled land and two parcels of untitled land, situated in Bigaa, Bulacan, were owned
by Celestino Salvador. In 1941, he executed a deed of sale over them in favor of the spouses
Alfonso Salvador and Anatolia Halili. Alleging that the sale was void for lack of consideration, he filed
on May 12,1955, against said vendees, a suit for reconveyance of said parcels of land (CFI of
Bulacan, Br. I, Civil Case No. 1082).
On April 27, 1956, Celestino Salvador died, testate. As his alleged heirs, twenty-one persons1 were
on May 18, 1956 substituted as plaintiffs in the action for reconveyance. And meanwhile, special
proceedings for the probate of his will and for letters testamentary was instituted (CFI of Bulacan, Br.
II, Sp. Proceedings No. 940). In said proceedings, Dominador Cardenas was appointed on June 11,
1956 special administrator of Celestino Salvador's testate estate. 1w ph1.t
On September 4, 1956 the administrator filed in Sp. Proceedings No. 940 an inventory of properties
of the estate, covering the same parcels of land subject matter of the reconveyance action. On
September 7, 1956, Celestino Salvador's will was admitted to probate and Dominador Cardenas was
appointed executor of said will. Actual issuance of letters testamentary to him was made on October
27, 1956.
Twenty-three (23) persons were instituted heirs in the will. Of these, nine (9) were not among the
twenty-one (21) alleged relatives substituted in the reconveyance case; and of the twenty-one (21)
substituted alleged heirs seven (7) were not instituted in the will. 2
In the suit for reconveyance, on November 26, 1956, the Court (CFI of Bulacan, Br. I) rendered
judgment, ordering the defendants therein (the spouses Alfonso and Anatolia), to reconvey the
parcels of land to the estate of Celestino Salvador. Appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals was
interposed by said defendants. 1w ph1.t
On August 12, 1961, the Court of Appeals affirmed the reconveyance judgment, with the correction
that reconveyance be in favor of the twenty-one (21) heirs substituted as plaintiffs therein.
About three years later, pursuant to an order of the CFI of Bulacan, Br. II, in the testacy proceedings,
dated April 21, 1964, one of the parcels of land involved, Lot 6, was sold so that with its proceeds
debtors who filed claims may be paid. The Philippine National Bank bought it at P41,184.00. Said
amount was then deposited in the same bank by the administrator, subject to Court order.
On December 18, 1964, defendants in the suit for reconveyance executed a deed of reconveyance
over the subject parcels of land, in favor of Celestino Salvador's estate. Revoking the same as lot in
accordance with the final judgment therein, the CFI of Bulacan, Br. I, on September 24, 1965,
ordered a new deed of reconveyance to be executed, in favor of the twenty-one persons substituted
as plaintiffs in that action. Accordingly, on September 30, 1965, a new deed of reconveyance was
made, in favor of said twenty-one (21) persons as heirs of Celestino.
Following this, on November 22, 1965, said Br. I, ordered the corresponding title certificate (TCT No.
54639) in the administrator's name, cancelled; new title certificate to be issued in the names of the
same twenty-one (21) persons. Said order was carried out, and TCT No. 63734 was issued in the
names of the twenty-one persons. 3
On December 7, 1965, Br. I (reconveyance court) ordered the Philippine National Bank to release
the P41,184.00 proceeds of the sale of Lot 6, to the twenty-one (21) plaintiffs in the reconveyance
case. Apparently, although the passbook was given by the administrator to said twenty-one persons,
no release was made, as the Philippine National Bank awaited Br. II's order.
Br. II, on March 1, 1966, approved the following claims against the estate:
Taxes Nat'l. gov't P5,328.23

Atty's fees Atty. Enriquez 8,000.00
Atty's fees Atty. Jamir 12,000.00
Loan R. Cabrera 13,544.35
TOTAL........ 38,872.58
=========
On March 30, 1966, said Br. II (probate court), ordered return of the passbook to the administrator;
and release to the administrator by the PNB of the P41,184.00, or so much thereof is needed to pay
the afore-stated debts of the estate.
After failing to get reconsideration of said order, the twenty-one (21) substituted heirs, on April 25,
1966, filed with Us the present special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction to assail
the order to pay the debts of the estate with the P41,184.00 proceeds of the sale of Lot 6; and to
question Br. II's (probate court) power to dispose of the parcels of land involved in the reconveyance
suit in Br. I.
Raised are these issues: (1) Are the parcels of land and the proceeds of the sale of one of them,
properties of the estate or not? (2) Does final judgment in the reconveyance suit in favor of the
twenty-one so-called heirs who substituted Celestino Salvador, bar the disposition of the reconveyed
properties by the settlement court?
It is a settled point of law that the right of heirs to specific, distributive shares of inheritance does not
become finally determinable until all the debts of the estate are paid. Until then, in the face of said
claims, their rights cannot be enforced, are inchoate, and subject to the existence of a residue after
payment of the debts (Castellvi de Raquiza v. Castellvi, L-17630, October 31, 1963; Jimoga-on v.
Belmonte, 84 Phil. 545; Sec. 1, Rule 90, Rules of Court).
Petitioners do not question the existence of the debts abovementioned. They only contend that the
properties involved having been ordered by final judgment reconveyed to them, not to the estate the
same are not properties of the estate but their own, and thus, not liable for debts of the estate.
Said contention is self-refuting. Petitioners rely for their rights on their alleged character as heirs of
Celestino; as such, they were substituted in the reconveyance case; the reconveyance to them was
reconveyance to them as heirs of Celestino Salvador. It follows that the properties they claim are,
even by their own reasoning, part of Celestino's estate. The right thereto as allegedly his heirs would
arise only if said parcels of land are part of the estate of Celestino, not otherwise. Their having
received the same, therefore, in the reconveyance action, was perforce in trust for the estate,
subject to its obligations. They cannot distribute said properties among themselves as substituted
heirs without the debts of the estate being first satisfied.
At any rate, the proceeds of Lot 6 alone (P41,184.00) appears more than sufficient to pay the debt
(P38,872.58); and there will remain the other parcels of land not sold. As to the question of who will
receive how much as heirs, the same is properly determinable by the settlement court, after payment
of the debts (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436; Maningat v. Castillo, 75 Phil. 532; Jimoga-on v.
Belmonte, supra).
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is denied, without costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar Sanchez and Castro JJ., concur.
Footnotes
Surnamed Salvador: Francisco; Juana; Francisco; Marcelo; Luis, Donata; Candida; Pangne;
1
Eusebio; Manala; Perpetua; Margarita; Patricia; Eduviges; Dionisio; Leona; Nicolasa.

Surnamed Hernandez: Obinal; Salvador; Maximo; and Felicidad.
Parties in reconveyance not named in will: Pangne; Manala; Nicolas; Leona; Eduviges;
2
Dionisio; all surnamed Salvador; and Salvador Hernandez.
Named in will not substituted in reconveyance: Virginia; Severina; Victorians;

Milagros; Nicanor; Catalino; all surnamed Salvador; Dionisio Ramos; Dominador
Cardenas; and Feliciano Hernandez.
3 They received said new certificate on Dec. 9, 1965.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25049 August 30, 1968
FILEMON RAMIREZ, MONICA RAMIREZ, and JOSE EGUARAS, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ARTEMIO BALTAZAR, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Eduardo M. Peralta for plaintiffs-appellants.

Tomas P. Anonuevo for defendants-appellees Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores.
Tirso Caballero for defendant-appellee Artemio Diawan.
ANGELES, J.:
On appeal from an order dismissing the complaint, on motion to dismiss, in Civil Case No. SC-319 of
the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
It appears that on 6 January 1959, Victoriana Eguaras single, made and executed a real estate
mortgage over a parcel of land, owned by her in fee simple, as security for a loan of P2,170.00 in
favor of the spouses Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores.
Upon the demise of the mortgagor, the mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, on 16 September
1960 filed a petition for the intestate proceedings of her estate, in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. SC-99 wherein said mortgages, as petitioners, alleged that
Filemon Ramirez and Monica Ramirez are the heirs of the deceased. Filemon Ramirez was
appointed administrator of the estate; however, having failed to qualify, on 16 January 1961, the
court appointed Artemio Diawan, then a deputy clerk of court, administrator of the estate who, in due
time, qualified for the office.
On 19 April 1961, the mortgagees, Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores, filed a complaint for
foreclosure of the aforesaid mortgage, against Artemio Diawan, in his capacity as administrator of
the estate, docketed as Civil Case No. SC-292 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. The
defendant-administrator was duly served with summons but he failed to answer, whereupon, on
petition of the plaintiffs said defendant was declared in default. The case was referred to a
commissioner to receive the evidence for the plaintiffs, and defendant-administrator, as deputy clerk
of court, acted as such hearing commissioner. 1wph1.t
On 16 August 1961, decision was rendered decreeing the foreclosure of the mortgaged property and
the sale thereof, if, within ninety days from finality of the decision, the obligation was not fully paid.
The judgment not having been satisfied, a writ of execution was issued for the sale of the mortgaged
property, and after compliance with the requirements of the law regarding the sending, posting and
publication of the notice of sale, the Sheriff sold the property at public auction to the highest bidder,
who happened to be the plaintiffs themselves, for the sum of P2,888.50 covering the amount of the
judgment, plus the expenses of the sale and the Sheriff's fees. On petition of the plaintiffs, the sale
was confirmed by the court on 26 January 1962.
On 6 February 1962, Filemon Ramirez, Monica Ramirez and Jose Eguaras, the first two being the
heirs named in the petition for intestate proceedings, filed a complaint designated "For the
Annulment of all Proceedings in said Civil Case No. SC-292 for the Foreclosure of the Mortgage",
against the spouses Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores, and Artemio Diawan, in his capacity as
administrator of the estate of Victoriana Eguaras, deceased, and Silverio Talabis, in his capacity as
deputy provincial sheriff of Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. SC-319 of the Court of First Instance
of Laguna.
The facts hereinabove narrated are, succinctly, contained in the complaint in said Civil Case No. SC-
319, with the additional averments that the defendant Diawan, the deputy clerk of court appointed as
administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased, acted in collusion with the other defendants
Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores, deliberately and in fraud of the plaintiffs: (a) in allowing the
reglementary period within which to file an answer to lapse without notifying and/or informing the
said plaintiffs of the complaint for foreclosure, as a result of which he was declared in default to the
prejudice of the estate which he represents; (b) that had the plaintiffs (Monica and Filemon) been
notified of the pendency of the case, the defendant administrator could have interposed a
counterclaim because payment in the sum of P1,548.52 had been made and received by the
mortgagees on account of the debt; (c) in presiding as hearing officer in the ex parte hearing in Civil
Case No. 292, to receive evidence for plaintiffs therein, notwithstanding the fact that there was
another deputy clerk of court available who could have acted in his stead, as a result of which an
anomalous situation was created whereby he was a defendant and at the same time a commissioner
receiving evidence against himself as administrator; (d) in allowing judgment to become final without
notifying the plaintiffs; (e) in deliberately, allowing the 90-day period within which to make payment to
expire without notifying the heirs, as a result of which the said heirs were not afforded an opportunity
to make payments ordered by the Court in its decision; and (f) in refusing to help the heirs seek
postponement of the auction sale. It is also alleged that it was only when the property foreclosed
was published for sale at public auction that the heirs came to know about the foreclosure
proceedings.
The defendants spouses, Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores, filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue; defendant Diawan likewise
moved to dismiss on two grounds: that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and that the complaint
states no cause of action. 1wph1.t
Despite vigorous opposition interposed by the plaintiffs against the aforesaid motions to dismiss, the
court, on 13 March 1962, dismissed the complaint with costs against the plaintiffs, reasoning thus:
that "upon consideration of the evidence, said defendant could not have offered any evidence to
avoid the foreclosure of the mortgage which the Court found to be in order. Under the circumstances
and with the apparent disinterestedness of Filemon and Rolando to qualify as administrator when
appointed, there could not have been any connivance and/or collusion between plaintiffs in this case
and Artemio Diawan as administrator"; and that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue since their
status as legal heirs of the deceased has yet to be determined precisely in Special Proceeding No.
SC-99, and until such status is so fixed by the Court, they have no cause of action against
defendants.
In that order of 13 March 1962, the court also denied plaintiffs' petition for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants from entering and taking physical possession of the land
in question on the ground "that possession thereof was effected and delivered by the Provincial
Sheriff to Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores on February, 1962."
Reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, the plaintiffs took the present appeal
where they assigned the following errors: (1) in holding that plaintiffs-appellants have no legal
capacity to sue until their status as legal heirs of the deceased is determined in Special Proceeding
No. SC-99; (2) in ruling that there was no collusion or connivance among the defendants-appellees,
despite the fact that the issue in the motion to dismiss is purely legal, not factual; and (3) in denying
the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction.
At the outset, let it be remembered that the defendants-appellees, in availing themselves of the
defense that the plaintiffs-appellants had not been declared to be the heirs of the deceased
Victoriana Eguaras, have overlooked the fact that the (defendants-appellees) themselves in their
petition for intestate proceedings (Case SC-99) have alleged that Filemon Ramirez and Monica
Ramirez, two of herein plaintiffs-appellants, are the heirs of the deceased. Insofar as defendants-
appellees are concerned, it is our opinion that they are estopped from questioning the heirship of
these two named persons to the estate of the deceased.
There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically transmitted to the heirs from the
moment of the death of the decedent.1 While, as a rule, the formal declaration or recognition to such
successional rights needs judicial confirmation, this Court has, under special circumstances,
protected these rights from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial
declaration.2 In Pascual vs. Pascual,3 it was ruled that although heirs have no legal standing in court
upon the commencement of testate or intestate proceedings, this rule admits of an exception as
"when the administrator fails or refuses to act in which event the heirs may act in his place."
A similar situation obtains in the case at bar. The administrator is being charged to have been in
collusion and connivance with the mortgagees of a property of the deceased, allowing its foreclosure
without notifying the heirs, to the prejudice of the latter. Since the ground for the present action to
annul the aforesaid foreclosure proceedings is the fraud resulting from such insidious machinations
and collusion in which the administrator has allegedly participated, it would be farfetched to expect
the said administrator himself to file the action in behalf of the estate. And who else but the heirs,
who have an interest to assert and to protect, would bring the action? Inevitably, this case should fall
under the exception, rather than the general rule that pending proceedings for the settlement of the
estate, the heirs have no right to commence an action arising out of the rights belonging to the
deceased.
On the second point raised, We fully agree with the plaintiffs-appellants that the lower court had
gone too far in practically adjudicating the case on the merits when it made the observation that
"there could not have been any connivance and/or collusion between plaintiffs in this case and
Artemio Diawan as administrator." A thorough scrutiny of the allegations in the motions to dismiss
filed by defendants-appellees does not indicate that that question was ever put at issue therein. On
the other hand, the controversy on the existence or inexistence of collusion between the parties
as a result of which judgment was rendered against the estate is the very core of the complaint
that was dismissed. Undoubtedly, the cause of action is based on Section 30, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court.
We are not, however, in accord with the third assigned error the denial of the motion for the
issuance of preliminary injunction for it puts at issue the factual finding made by the lower court
that the defendants had already been placed in possession of the property. At this stage of the
proceeding, and considering the nature of the case before Us, such a question is, at this time,
beyond the competence of the Court.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order appealed from is hereby set aside insofar as it dismissed the
complaint in Civil Case No. SC-319, and the records be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. Costs against defendants-appellees. The Clerk of Court is directed to furnish a copy of
this decision to the Department of Justice for its information.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1 Art. 777, New Civil Code.
Morales, et al. vs. Yanes 98 Phil. 677, citing Coroner vs. Ona, 33 Phil. 456; Nable Jose vs.
2
Nable Jose, 41 Phil. 713; Velasco vs. Vizmanos, 45 Phil. 675. See also Cabuyao vs.
Caagbay, et al., 95 Phil. 614.
3 73 Phil. 561.

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-15088 January 31, 1961

TORIBIA FONTANILLA PACIO, SANTIAGO PACIO, ESPERANZA PACIO, and ROSARIO

Alfredo F. Tadiar for plaintiffs-appellants.

According to the stipulation of facts:

5. That Flaviano Pacio died on November 2, 1951;

xxx xxx xxx

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953

MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,

Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976

Federico Paredes for petitioners.

Demetrio V. Pre for private respondents.

Hence, this petition for review.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE

G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA,

G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972

Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for administrator-appellee.

Quiogue & Quiogue for appellee Matilde de Borja.

Andres Matias for appellee Cayetano de Borja.

Sevilla & Aquino for appellant.

Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-appellee.

Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for oppositor-appellant.

Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee.

Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David Gueverra for defendant-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:p

THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between

Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del

3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that

4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly to

5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose

shall be considered as full complete payment settlement of her hereditary

It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no

The lot allotted to Francisco was described as

Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena

On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of

He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte,

The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:

xxx xxx xxx

Fernando, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-24434 January 17, 1968

HEIRS OF PEDRO REGANON, JOVENCIA REGANON, MENCIA REGANON, JOSEFA

Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellees.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The facts of the case are admitted by both parties.

Defendant-appellant argues that the property of an incompetent under guardianship is in custodia

Republic of the Philippines

JULITA GO ONG, FOR HERSELF AND AS JUDICIAL GUARDIAN OF STEVEN GO

Concluding, the trial court ruled:

After the dissolution of the marriage with the death of plaintiff's

WHEREFORE, with the modification that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings

The sole issue in this case is

The instant petition is devoid of merit.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.