Lim vs Felix

G.R. Nos. 94054-57, February 19, 1991

Facts: At the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of
Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely
Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone
assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination
plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. For the crime of multiple murder and frustrated
murder, the accused were Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94054-
57), Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor
Antonio Kho (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69.) The RTC of Masbate concluded that a probable cause has
been established for the issuance of warrants of arrest. In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest
of the petitioners plus bail for provisional liberty.
The entire records of the case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent
Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case. A petition to transfer the venue of the
Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of Makati was filed by petitioners and granted
by the SC.

On July 5, 1990, the respondent court (RTC Makati) issued warrants of arrest against the accused including
the petitioners herein. The respondent Judge said:

In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate,
Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was committed
and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial
Prosecutor who properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four separate informations for
murder. Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have
declared the existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and there
is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutors certification
in each information xxx

Issue: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the
prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists
Held: No.
The Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires x x x probable cause to
be personally determined by the Judge x x x, not by any other officer or person.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the
investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination
is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge
commits a grave abuse of discretion.

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed
by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal
determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as
mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had
nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners motion for the
transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the
respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.

Manalili vs CA

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of CAs decision in affirming TCs decision on
convicting Manalili of

Illegal possession of prohibited drug violating RA 6425.Police operatives Espiritu, Lumabas and driver
Enriquez conducted surveillance along the front of Kalookan Cemetery basedon the information that
drug addicts were roaming around in the area, saw a man who appeared to be high on drugs and
introduced themselves as policemen. Said man avoided them and tried to resist, when they asked what
the man washolding in his hand, the man held out his wallet and allowed Espiritu to examine it, who
found what he suspected to be crushed mj leaves. The man was brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit and
turned out to be Manalili. The substance found on

Manalilis wallet was sent to NBI Forensic Chemistry Section and was confirmed as mj. Manalilis version
of the story was that early afternoon he was riding in a tricycle when 3 policemen stopped the tricycle

and informed them of the suspected possession of mj, the policemen bodily searched both Manalili and
the driver and upon finding nothing illegal on their persons, let the driver go but brought Manalili along
to the police station. Manaliliwhile on the way to the station saw a neighbor whom he signaled to follow
them and when he was again searched in the station, he was asked to strip his pants where they found
nothing illegal. Said neighbor then asked the policemen to let Manalili go seeing as they had not found
anything illegal but Manalili was put on a cell who was brought to a fiscal later that day and was told not
to say anything despite his saying that the policemen had not found mj on his person. Said tricycle driver
and neighbor testified on court as to

how the 2 searches yielded nothing illegal on Manalilis person.

Issues:

1.W/N evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk is admissible.

2.W/N Manalilis actions constituted a waiver of his rights.

3.W/N the evidence is sufficient to prove Manalilis guilt.

Ruling:

I. In Terry vs Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police
officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat him for weapons: W)here a police officer
observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidence
against the person from whom they were taken. It did not, however abandon the rule that the police
must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the
warrant procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances. As People vs Lacerna enumerated 5
recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches and seizures: 1) search incidental to
lawful arrest; 2) search of moving vehicles; 3) seizure in plain view; 4) customs search; 5) waiver of the
accused of his rights against

unreasonable searches and seizures. From Espiritus experience as a member of the Anti

-Narcotics Unit of Caloocan City

Police, Manalilis suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were high.

II.SGs contention that Manalili effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally obtained
when he failed to raise this issue or object during trial. A valid waiver of right against unreasonable
searches and seizures require the concurrence of these requisites: 1) the right to be waived existed; 2)
the person waiving it had knowledge; and 3) he/she had actual intention to relinquish the right. In this
case however, it is deemed that Manalili has waived such right for failure to raise its violation before the
trial court, at the earliest opportunity possible. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first
time on appeal.

III. Manalilis contention that the charge was trumped up to extort money and testimonies of the
arresting officers were inconsistent, it held that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses particularly when affirmed by CA is

accorded great weight and respect as it had opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as
they testified before it. The elements of illegal possession of mj are: a) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; b) such possession is not authorized by law;
and c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. The substance found on Manalilis
wallet was identified as mj which was prohibited and knowingly without authority. Considering that he
was high and tried to avoid and resist, such behavior clearly shows that he knew he was holding mj and
it was prohibited by law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDISON SUCRO

G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991

Facts:

Pat. Roy fulgencio, a member of the INP Kalibo, Aklan was instructed by P/Lt Vicente Seraspi Jr.,
Station commander, to monitor the activities of appellant. Fulgencio positioned himself to a house,
adjacent of which i a chapel. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel taking something which turn out
later to be marijuana from a compartment of a cart found inside the chapel and return to the street
where he handed the same to a buyer.

Fulgencio radioed Seraspi and reported the activity, Seraspi instructed Fulgencio to continue
monitoring.

At about 6:30 PM Fulgencio again called up Sraspi to report the third buyer later identified as
Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant.

At that point, the team seraspi proceeded to the area and fulgencio told seraspi to intercept
Macabante and Appellant. Team Seraspi caught up with macabante at a crossing. Upon seeing the police
Macabante throw something at the ground which turned to a tea bag of marijuana. Macabante
admitted that he brought the same from appellant. The police team was able to overtake and arrest
appellant.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful

2. Whether or not the evidence resulting from arrest is admissible

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure for the
instance that arrest without warrant is considered lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer when the officer sees the
offense, although at the distance, or hears the disturbance created thereby and proceed at once at the
scene the act of surveillance

Second requirement: the act of macabante, throwing of the marijuana and the admission, constitute
that he just committed an illegal act which the police officer had personal knowledge, being members of
the team which monitors Sucros nefarious activity

People vs bati police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it
had earlier conducted surveillance activities.

Evidence - admissible because the arrest is valid

People vs Valdez
G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000
EN BANC
I.Facts
a.) SP03 Marcelo Tipay received a tip from an unnamed informer about a marijuana plantation
b.)With the help of the informant, the authorities searched for the area of the marijuana plantation.
c.) The authorities found 7 five-foot high cannabis plants and took picture of the accused with the plants
and seized the marijuana as evidence
d.)Authorities took pictures of accused with the cannabis plants
e.)Authorities, as testified by the accused, coerced the accused for a confession
g.) The Trial Court finds Abe Valdez guilty and sentenced to death
II. Issues on appeal
1.) Trial court erred in admitting the 7 marijuana plants as evidence despite its inadmissibility because of
illegal search
2.) Where the seized cannabis plants admissible as evidence
3.) Was the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
III. SC decisions
1.)There was an informer so there was ample time for a search warrant to be signed; Furthermore
informant showed/described where the cannabis plants were. Therefore, doctrine of plain view cannot
be implied because the authorities were searching for the plants not stumbled upon inadvertently.
2.) As the cannabis plants fall under Fruits of the Poisonous tree doctrine it is inadmissible in evidence
because the seizure was invalid.
3.) The confession given by the accused-appellant was without the help of a counsel and therefore
deemed as hearsay
IV. Final Judgment.
In line of the above mentioned the SC reverses the decision and hereby acquits Abe Valdez on the
grounds of reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Chief of Police Jim
Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, LaUnion began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his
officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call at around
12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting for police
assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. According to Almoite, the vessel
looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisher folk of the area and was poised to dock at
Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to
Tammocalao beach and there conferred with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a
lone male passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San. When the speedboat landed, the male
passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored straw bag, and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the
police officers, the man changed direction. Badua held Chuas right arm to prevent him from fleeing.
They then introduced themselves as police officers; however, Chua did not understand what theyre
saying. And by resorting of sign language, Cid motioned with his hands for the man to open his bag.
The man acceded to the request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent plastics
containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was later identified to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with
an interpreter to inform him of his constitutional rights.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted by the Police Officers constitute a
valid exemption from the warrant requirement.

RULING:

The Court held in the negative. The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a
person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid of a valid search
warrant issued in accordance with the Rules. However, warrantless searches may be permitted in the
following cases, to wit:

(1)search of moving vehicles,

(2)seizure in plain view,

(3)customs searches,

(4)waiver or consent searches,

(5)stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and(6)search incidental to a lawful arrest. It is required in
cases of in flagrante delicto that the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of such facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. Probable cause means a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant
a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the
case at bar, there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's participation
in on going criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive
search. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel
that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically
mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. With these, the Court held that there was no
probable cause to justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The Court likewise did not appreciate the
contention of the Prosecution that there was a waiver or consented search. If CHUA could not
understand what was orally articulated to him, how could he understand the police's "sign language?"
More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign language" that
he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search. Finally,
being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was held to be inadmissible in evidence. Hence,
the accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

People vs. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220,

(Constitutional Law Warrantless Arrest, Inflagrante Delicto)

Facts: Accused-appellant, convicted of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 assailed the validity
of a warrantless arrest by a police officer, after marijuana leaves were found on the formers bag when
it was inspected. Accused-appellant contends that the arrest is unconstitutional due to lack of warrant.

Issue: Whether or not there was valid arrest without warrant.

Held: Yes. A police officer or a private person may without a warrant arrest a person in flagrante delicto.

Police Officers X and Y together with a Barangay Police( in our place we call it Barangay Tanod) were
conducting surveillance operations in a bus station allegedly to check on persons who may be engaging
in the traffic of dangerous drugs based from the information supplied by the informers.

There was a person(M) carrying a red bag who was acting suspiciously. The officers noticed
him,approached him and identified themselves, asked him to open the bag,when opened,there were
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic. M was arrested by the officers.

Issue : Was there a valid arrest??

Ruling :

Yes. The court ruled that there was a valid warrant less arrest and a valid warrant less search. The court
made distinction from the case of Tangliben and Amminudin. In the latter, the urgency presented by
Tangliben were not present. In the former, the court found that the officers were faced by an on the
spot information which required them to act swiftly.

(UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner
Vs.
LEILA REYES JOHNSON, respondent
[GR 138881, 18 December 2000]
FACTS:

Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a resident of
Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American on 16
June 1968 and had since been working as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those
with Alzheimer's disease, in convalescent homes in the United States. On 16 June 1998, she arrived in
the Philippines to visit her son's family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United States
on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, 26 June 1998.
At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA
departure area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for
weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives. When she frisked Johnson, a
departing passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something
hard on the latter's abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two
panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied
with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir,
hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon." She was directed to take Johnson to the nearest
women's room for inspection. Ramirez took Johnson to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina
Bernal. Embile stayed outside. Inside the women's room, Johnson was asked again by Ramirez what the
hard object on her stomach was and Johnson gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez
then asked her "to bring out the thing under her girdle." Johnson brought out three plastic packs, which
Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the women's room. The confiscated packs contained a total
of 580.2 grams of a substance which was fount by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu." Embile took Johnson and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and
Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where Johnson's passport and ticket were
taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal belongings were itemized. Johnson
was charged for the possession of 3 plastic bages of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug,
weighing a total of 580.2 grams; a violation of 16 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by RA
7659. On 14 May 1999, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, found Johnson guilty and
sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs
of the suit. Johnson appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her right against unreasonable
search and seizure.

RULING:

The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial
investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113
of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that "A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been
committed and person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx." The circumstances surrounding the
arrest of the accused falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that
she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being accurate. The methamphetamine
hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant
to airport security procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an
aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are
routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects,
physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such
searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved,
and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to
search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine
hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in
evidence against Johnson. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was
justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante
delicto.

PEOPLE V MALMSTEDT

198 SCRA 401

F: Accused is a Swedish national arrested for carrying Hashish, a form of marijuana during a NARCOM
inspection. He was tried and found guilty in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. He contends that the
arrest was illegal without the search warrant.

I: WON the arrest made was illegal in the absence of a search warrant.

R: NARCOM operation was conducted with a probable cause for a warrantless search upon information
that prohibited drugs are in the possession of the accused and he failed to immediately present his
passport.
A warrantless arrest may be lawfully made:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

I. THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to
Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing
an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to
the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of
Lawyers and Advocates For Peoples Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents
Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate
guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people. Petitioners contended
that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.

II. THE ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and
seizures?

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable search
and seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on
the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also
be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security.
In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of
the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military
men by NPA sparrow units, not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming
rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely
brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what one can rightly
consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its
existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the
same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a
peaceful community.

People vs. de Gracia [GR 102009-10, 6 July 1994] Second Division, Regalado (J): 5 concur

Facts: The incidents took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in December, 1989 by ultra-
rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People
(RAM-SFP) against the Government. At that time, various government establishments and military
camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with their "tora-tora" planes. At
around midnight of 30 November 1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied
Villamor Air Base, while the Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army
Operations Center, and Channel 4, the government television station. Also, some elements of the
Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan,
Metro Manila. On 1 December 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital
Region Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar
Sales Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Quezon City, together with his team
composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a
Sgt. Ramos. The surveillance, which actually started on the night of 30 November 1989 at around 10:00
p.m., was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that said establishment
was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post. Sgt. Crispin
Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around 10 to 15 meters away from the Eurocar building
near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance
on foot. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment near
Camp Aguinaldo. After a while a group of 5 men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked
towards the car of the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front, saw
the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area. As they
passed by the group, then only 6 meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at
the team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the
surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and they were afraid
that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire. As a consequence, at around 6:30 a.m. of 5
December 1989, searching them composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt.
Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos
Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate 6 cartons of M-16
ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside
one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right portion of the
building. St. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw Rolando De Gracia inside the
office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only
person then present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As a
result of the raid, the team arrested de Gracia, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were
janitors at the Eurocar building. They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the
explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the
raiding team because, according to them, at that time there was so much disorder considering that the
nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing
within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed.
The group was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that
de Gracia is supposedly a "boy" therein. de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal
possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide
(Criminal Cases Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively), which were tried jointly by the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 103. During the arraignment, de Gracia pleaded not guilty to both charges.
However, he admitted that he is not authorized to posses any firearms, ammunition and/or explosive.
The parties likewise stipulated that there was a rebellion during the period from November 30 up to 9
December 1989. On 22 February 1991, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting de Gracia of
attempted homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession
of firearms in furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. De
Gracia appealed.

Issue: Whether the military operatives made a valid search and seizure during the height of the
December 1989 coup detat.

Held: It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed
with a search warrant at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said
office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted
on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar
building. When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door
despite the requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. The
Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are
the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of
automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be
justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time
because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp
Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously
closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted. Under the foregoing
circumstances, the case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless
search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than
sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the
raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial
judge himself manifested that on 5 December 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed.
Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870 (and other consolidated petitions),
November 3, 2008

DECISION
(En Banc)

VELASCO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

These consolidated petitions challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165, the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of (1) candidates for public
office; (2) students of secondary and tertiary schools; (3) officers and employees of public and private
offices; and (4) persons charged before the prosecutors office of a crime with an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.

The challenged section reads:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to
safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2)
testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug
used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be
subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant
to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to
the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and employees of public and private
offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in
the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any
officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which
shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor
Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxx xxx xxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug
test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6486.

II. THE ISSUES

1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?

2. Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declared Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It alsoPARTIALLY GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos.
157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec.
36(f)UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court thus permanently enjoined all the concerned agencies from
implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.]

1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator; NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally
impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the
provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid
down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4)
age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not
possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the
Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it
cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the
Constitution.

Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby
declared as, unconstitutional.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As
couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean,
obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its
proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another
qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the
Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before
or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume
office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.

2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs (f)
thereof is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary and tertiary schools

Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of Independent
School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and applied the
following principles: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody
and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty
to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as may
reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on
applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of Education, supra, the Court is of the view and so holds that the
provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition
for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the
right to enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.

As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees of public and private offices

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been
held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. And
whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the
government-mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some
compelling state interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to
be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employeesand students
for that matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to
in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause standard is not required
or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged
administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon
which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the
privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work
policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining
unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their
privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement
upon such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law.
Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated
in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation
that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every
officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she
may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The
goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as
may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by
providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to random drug test as contained in the
companys work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as
much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies
that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test,
doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important
consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-
controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results
tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides
that access to the drug results shall be on the need to know basis; that the drug test result and the
records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality
of the test results. Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the
prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All
told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper
safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set
forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public
officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the
norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil
servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and
to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.

As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged before the prosecutors office with a crime with an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional
viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from
the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their
voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private
and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's
office with criminal offenses punishable with 6 years and 1 day imprisonment. The operative concepts
in the mandatory drug testing are randomness and suspicionless. In the case of persons charged
with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are
impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the
prosecutors office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

POLLO VS DAVID

Pollo vs David
G. R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011

Facts: Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also
the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the Mamamayan Muna
Hindi Mamaya Na program of the CSC.

On January 3. 2007, CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David received an unsigned complaint letter
which was marked Confidential and was sent through a courier service (LBC) from certain Allan San
Pascual of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. The letter contain allegations that the petitioner have been
helping many who have pending cases in the CSC and the letter sender pleas that the CSC should
investigate this anomaly to maintain the clean and good behaviour of their office.

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information
technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically to back
up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.

After some briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City.
The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD)
was witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored
said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text messages to petitioner and the head of LSD,
who were both out of the office at the time, informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in
their divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair.

Issue: Legality of the search conducted in the petitioners office computer and the copying of his
personal files without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a transgression of his constitutional right to
privacy.

Ruling: Yes.

In sum, we conclude that the special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make
theprobable-cause requirement impracticable, x x x for legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory
intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will
neither unduly burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the efficient and proper
operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of public employees. We
hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of
government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of
work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion
must be reasonable:

Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider
whether theaction was justified at its inception, x x x ; second, one must determine whether the
search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place, x x x

Ordinarily, a search of an employees office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty
of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose
such as to retrieve a needed file. x x x The search will be permissible in its scope when the measures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of
the nature of the [misconduct]. x x x39 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioners computer was justified at its inception
and scope. We quote with approval the CSCs discussion on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent
as it were with the guidelines established by OConnor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind
of the Commission that the search of Pollos computer has successfully passed the test of
reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed
American authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a
government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a work-
related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the inception
of the search, a complaint was received recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was
lawyering for parties having pending cases with the said regional office or in the Commission. The
nature of the imputation was serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was
found to be furtively engaged in the practice of lawyering for parties with pending cases before the
Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have shattering
repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the
Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate
as an impartial and objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is settled that a court or an
administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the
general public would not have any trust and confidence in it.

Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or
limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was
received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional
office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was justified since these furnished
the easiest means for an employee to encode and store documents. Indeed, the computers would be a
likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of
computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and
immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would
invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation.

Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the warrantless search in an open and
transparent manner. Officials and some employees of the regional office, who happened to be in the
vicinity, were on hand to observe the process until its completion. In addition, the respondent himself
was duly notified, through text messaging, of the search and the concomitant retrieval of files from his
computer.

All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on computer assigned to Pollo
was not, in any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of the managerial
prerogative of the Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and
efficiency by going after the work-related misfeasance of its employees. Consequently, the evidence
derived from the questioned search are deemed admissible.

Petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other
argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate
intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the afore cited authorities.