Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317) Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the
Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Article IX (B), Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)
FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet members,
undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive department to hold 2 positions in
the government and government corporations and to receive additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional
against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their
deputies to hold any other office or employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that Unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the
said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated unless otherwise allowed by law
which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such as in the case of the Vice
President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, section 13 of the constitution.
RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to
prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self enrichment which a betrayal
of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution in Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a broad exception from
Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the legislative intent of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only
limited to and strictly applies only to particular instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the
Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null
and void.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus,
it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished
by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the
light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The
object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and
the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to
that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. 11
Francisco vs. House of Representatives (GR 160261, 10 November 2003)
Francisco vs. House of Representatives(GR 160261, 10 November 2003)En Banc, Carpio Morales (J): 1 concurs, 3
wrote separate concurring opinions to which 4 concur, 2 wrote concurringand dissenting separate opinions to which
2 concur.
Procedure in Impeachment Porceedings, superceding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the
11thCongress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee
onJustice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by
theChief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President
Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario
G.Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred
tothe House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution.The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient inform," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four
months and threeweeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House by HouseRepresentatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House
of Representatives.Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court
against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint isunconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution
that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year."
Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.
Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article
VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the
different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent
in all courtsas a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual
controversiesinvolving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which,
together with thecorollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of
government and insures that itsvast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The
separation of powers is afundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division inour Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and issupreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the
three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained
and independent of each other. TheConstitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of thevarious departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter,effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine
the law, and hence to declareexecutive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.The major difference
between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court isthat while the
power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature,that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a
power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the
U.S.
Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive
power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied
inSection 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to
impeach and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will
when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not
intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-
defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion,
through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of
judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to beinterpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are
integral components of thecalibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Francisco vs. House of Representatives G.R. No. 160261
FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court, Chief Justice Hilario
Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second
complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with
the House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question h; as
resulted in a political crisis.
HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by
the House of Representatives are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
REASONING: In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is evermindful of the
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among thelegislative, executive or judicial
branches of government by no means prescribes for absoluteautonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by thesovereign people.At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and
balances which has been carefullycalibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three
branches mustbe given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutionalbasis
for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedingswould upset the system of
checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as awhole and "one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that
insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. The framers of the
Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when aproposal reached the floor proposing
that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of theHouse shall be necessary to initiate impeachment
proceedings," this was met by a proposal todelete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate
impeachmentproceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.Having concluded that the initiation takes place by
the act of filing and referral or endorsementof the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by
the filing by at leastone-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of
theHouse, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachmentcomplaint has been
initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against thesame official within a one year period.The
Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits onlythe main issue of whether
the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justicetransgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year
time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not goabout assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn
justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert
judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.
LAMBINO, ET AL. VS. COMELEC (G.R. NO. 174153, 25 OCTOBER 2006) DIGEST
On 15 February 2006, the group of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado (Lambino Group) commenced gathering
signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a
petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition
under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The proposed
changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government.
The Lambino Group claims that: (a) their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least 12%
of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters; and (b)
COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The COMELEC, however, denied due course to the petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to
amend the Constitution, pursuant to the Supreme Courts ruling in Santiago vs. Commission on Elections. The
Lambino Group elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, which also threw out the petition.
1. The initiative petition does not comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on direct proposal by the
people
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing provision that allows a peoples initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full
text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the
framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on peoples initiative; and (b) in particular, the people
must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition
containing such full text.
The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire
proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people
who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments
may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of
such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen
the full text of the proposed amendments before not after signing.
Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is
proposed and failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.
In the case of the Lambino Groups petition, theres not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the proposed
changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is
attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-
Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the
people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed
amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. Thats why the
Constitution requires that an initiative must be directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition meaning that
the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as
amending the nations fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from
the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
2. The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through
Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The
third mode is through a peoples initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to amendments to this
Constitution. This distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A
peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its
revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the
Constitution.
Does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? Yes. By any legal test
and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the
abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not
a mere amendment.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. Revision
broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of
powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of
the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand,
amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved.
Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other
section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change
reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing
Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a change
requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a
revision.
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than
the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of
checks-and-balances among or within the three branches.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of
one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the
word republican with monarchic or theocratic in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the
entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change
will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the
structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of
the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body
with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several
provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other
hand, constitutions allow peoples initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or
recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our
Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative
test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety
of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The court examines only the
number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry
is whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as
to amount to a revision. Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of
inquiry. Thus, a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes change in its fundamental
framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also
includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances.
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group proposed changes overhaul two articles Article VI on the
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches
of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a
revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation
of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of
Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and revision is only one of
procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes
to the Constitution, substantive changes are called revisions because members of the deliberative body work
full-time on the changes. The same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called
amendments because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an occupation,
profession, or vocation out of such endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that the express intent of the framers and
the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Groups theory. Where the intent of the framers and
the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and
language.
3. A revisit of Santiago vs. COMELEC is not necessary
The petition failed to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct
and scope of a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. There is, therefore, no need to revisit this Courts ruling
in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to cover the
system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of
the present petition. It settled that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be
resolved on some other grounds.
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, this will not change the result here because the present petition violates Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution, which provision must first be complied with even before complying with RA 6735.
Worse, the petition violates the following provisions of RA 6735:
a. Section 5(b), requiring that the people must sign the petition as signatories. The 6.3 million signatories did not sign
the petition or the amended petition filed with the COMELEC. Only Attys. Lambino, Donato and Agra signed the
petition and amended petition.
b. Section 10(a), providing that no petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate.
The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of
government.
Occena vs. Comelec G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
Facts:
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions
proposing constitutional amendments goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. The
rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law.
The three Resolutions were: 1) Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes 2) Resolution No. 2
dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly; and 3) Resolution No. 3
on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections. The three resolutions were approved by the
Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981 which the date of plebiscite
has been set on April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is a fundamental law. (2) Whether or not the Interim Batasang Pambansa
has the power to propose amendments. (3) Whether or not the three-fourth votes is necessary to propose
amendments as well as the standard for proper submission. (4) Whether or not the three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments are valid.
Held:
Yes, the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power and privilege to propose amendments. On January 17, 1973, the
present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the
recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also
be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973
Constitution is the fundamental law. The existence of this power is indubitable as the applicable provision in the 1976
Amendments is quite explicit. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose
amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that
the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the
agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional
convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa
exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential
purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and
the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the
amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. The three
resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and
27, 1981, thus making them valid.
Imbong v Comelec September 11, 1970
RA 6132: delegates in Constitutional Convention
Petitioner: Imbong
Respondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec Members)
Petitioner: Gonzales
Respondent: Comelec
Ponente: Makasiar
RELATED LAWS:
Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 delegates from each representative
district who shall be elected in November, 1970.
RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2
Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2: Constitutional Convention shall be composed of 320delegates a
proportioned among existing representative districts according to the population. Provided that each district shall be
entitled to 2 delegates.
RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4.
Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their candidacy
Sec 2: apportionment of delegates
Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the election or from assuming any
appointive office/position until the final adournment of the ConCon.
Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving support/representing a delegate to the
convention.
FACTS:
This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running candidates for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and
validity of entire law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8
ISSUE:
Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the parameters set by such a call
is constitutional.
HOLDING:
The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore,
specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.
RATIO:
- Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution
-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:
Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for the
purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4
- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for such
apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted more
representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of
delegates I other provinces with more population.
- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this
disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections
and to allow them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention.
- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity since
candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does
not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.
Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997)
FACTS:
Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the
necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers
of general and local circulation; and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to
assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the
purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed
to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendment to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .
HELD:
NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply means that the main thrust of
the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative or amendments to the Constitution are declared void.
RATIO:
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II
and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution
was left to some future law.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue
through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each
legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to
verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and
voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it
cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that
the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under
Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was
merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which
should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order
directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
PUNO, concurring and dissenting
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders the COMELEC
to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot implement the peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise
submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. (MELO and
MENDOZA concur)
VITUG, concurring and dissenting
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the Court did
not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for constitutional amendments.
[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent under the ponencia should be held
to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as having intended or contemplated to embrace the
signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people
initiative.
FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly and well-written
ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)
PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the initiatory Delfin
Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to be directly proposed by the people through initiative, there is no
implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void.
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number of signatures
in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district no
public funds may be spent and no government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution.
Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully
from the majoritys two other rulings.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)
Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms,Modernization and Action (PIRMA),
filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to liftthe term limits of elective officials, through Peoples
Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the
people to exercise the power todirectly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued
an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing.
At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the
Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizableby the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago,
Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against
COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision
on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed byCongress. No such
law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.
Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it isoutside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme
Court granted the Motions for Intervention.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.(2) Whether or not
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative onamendments to the Constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific provisions onthe conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether the lifting of
term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or anamendment of the Constitution.
Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementinglegislation the same cannot
operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right,the people cannot exercise it if Congress does
not provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and
regulations on theconduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule
thatwhat has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). Thedelegation of the
power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rulesand regulations to implement the
exercise of the right to peoples initiative.The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would
affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guaranteeof
equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revisioncannot be done by
initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issueof whether or not the petition is a
revision or amendment has become academic.
GONZALES VS. COMELEC [21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967]
Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the
following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120,
as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as
nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least,
one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed
of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on
the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize
Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional
convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act
No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and
3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
Issue: Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the Constitution.

Held: Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3
unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs
therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be contested except
directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is
merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office;
and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is
concerned.

"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof."

Article XV of the Constitution provides:

. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for
that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes
cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.

From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that
R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the
functions of delegates to the Convention.