G.R. No.

181613 November 25, 2009

ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
We grant Rosalinda A. Peneras (Penera) motion for reconsideration of this Courts Decision of 11 September 2009 (Decision).
The assailed Decision dismissed Peneras petition and affirmed the Resolution dated 30 July 2008 of the COMELEC En Banc as well as
the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. The Decision disqualified Penera from running for the office of
Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera.
In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera submits the following arguments:
1. Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of RA 8436 as amended by Section 13 of RA
9369.
2. The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and substantial evidence against Penera for violation of
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
3. Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for disqualification and has consistently disputed the charge of
premature campaigning.
4. The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is not the same as admitting she engaged in premature election
campaigning.
Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a "candidate" as "any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office,
who has filed a certificate of candidacy x x x." The second sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by Section
13 of RA 9369, provides that "[a]ny person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing] shall only be considered
as a candidate at the start of the campaign periodfor which he filed his certificate of candidacy." The immediately succeeding
proviso in the same third paragraph states that "unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the
start of the aforesaid campaign period." These two provisions determine the resolution of this case.
The Decision states that "[w]hen the campaign period starts and [the person who filed his certificate of candidacy] proceeds with
his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior
to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which
he/she may be disqualified."1
Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but
even before the start of the campaign period. From the filing of the certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of the
campaign period, the Decision considers the partisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy "as the promotion
of his/her election as a candidate." Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start
of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a "candidate" even
before the start of the campaign period. lawphil
The assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law.
The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC,2 which held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the
start of the campaign period. In Lanot, this Court explained:
Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an election
campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.
The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who "has filed a certificate of
candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate." The third element
requires that the campaign period has not started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed.
Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, which under Section 75 of the
Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the campaign period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80
for acts done prior to such last day. Before such last day, there is no "particular candidate or candidates" to campaign for or against.
On the day immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80 covers
only acts done "outside" the campaign period.
Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may only apply to acts done on such last day,
which is before the start of the campaign period and after at least one candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps
the reason why those running for elective public office usually file their certificates of candidacy on the last day or close to the last
day.
There is no dispute that Eusebios acts of election campaigning or partisan political activities were committed outside of the
campaign period. The only question is whether Eusebio, who filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003, was a
"candidate" when he committed those acts before the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004.
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 ("RA 8436") moved the deadline for the filing of certificates of candidacy to 120 days before
election day. Thus, the original deadline was moved from 23 March 2004 to 2 January 2004, or 81 days earlier. The crucial question
is: did this change in the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy make one who filed his certificate of candidacy before 2
January 2004 immediately liable for violation of Section 80 if he engaged in election campaign or partisan political activities prior to
the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004?
Section 11 of RA 8436 provides:
SECTION 11. Official Ballot. The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot which shall contain the titles of
the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position,
the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space
where the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be
provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/ manifestation to participate in the
election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official, whether
national or local, running for any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and
vice-president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the position for which he/she
is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the
certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice-President, Senators and candidates under the party-list system as well as
petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate in the party-list system shall be on February 9, 1998 while the deadline
for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable
with that of private printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the
services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the
printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens arms of the Commission may assign watchers in the
printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the serial number on the ballot stub
shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a
photocopying machine, and that identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, are
provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot for every registered voter
with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.
Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of candidacy is to give ample time for the printing of
official ballots. This is clear from the following deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee:
SENATOR GONZALES. Okay. Then, how about the campaign period, would it be the same[,] uniform for local and national officials?
THE CHAIRMAN Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
Congress has laid down the law a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court
has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the
filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy."
Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period."
The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not this Court but the Legislature. This Court
has no recourse but to apply a law that is as clear, concise and express as the second sentence, and its immediately succeeding
proviso, as written in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Peneras Motion for Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the Decision of this Court in
G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the
COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor
of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY
POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS
FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a precious
heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,[1]that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those
who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound importance to the nation. The
issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our
people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of
the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich
heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than
distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino
(KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his
place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on
Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition
docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an
American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother.Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first,
Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such
prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented
several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish
by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F.
Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified
photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and
Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or
entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F.
Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a
certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe
and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643,
No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported
marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed
during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier
filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004,
petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of
preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.
Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino
X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,a.k.a. Fernando
Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of
candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner
Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code -
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct
of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to
deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64[2] in an action
for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law which power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance
of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a
proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in
urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any
tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs.
Roxas,[4] as not (being) justiciable controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act
Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-
Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same."Republic Act 1793
designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the
subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic
Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an
election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the
winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -
Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the
President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not
include an election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the
second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing
a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo
warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office.[5] In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This
rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution,
would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No.
161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poea.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the
"citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office. [6] Aristotle saw its significance
if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate
in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence.[7] The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for
which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and
entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other.[8] In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life
and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and
large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty
and justice.[9] Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to
participate in the exercise of political power.[10] The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which
laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained expression
in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the
rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship.[12]
The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."[13] In
church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on
citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive
law.Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly
extended by Royal Decrees.[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to
whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts; [15] however, three
royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August
1841,[16]the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands, [17] and
finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree
of 13 July 1870.[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89,
according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by special laws.[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with the first
categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.[20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced
to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law
dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil
laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United States. [21] Under Article IX of the
treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined
by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including
the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry,
commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the
territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of
the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration
they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined
by the Congress."[22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of
the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be
"aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the
protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to
as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April,
1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight." [23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the
11th day of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of
Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.[24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period
no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that
the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and
England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period. [25] More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein."[26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word
"Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his
slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens
of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States
under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April
1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen
of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935
Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship
as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at the time, which provided
that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory
situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and
required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to
correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the
1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -
Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is
deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed
to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionableproviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write,
at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding
such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."[27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through
its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization,jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only
two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs.
Collector of Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was
his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou
had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos,
Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe,
showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced
by petitioner was an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July
1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In
the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be
twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August
1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and
married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent
and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the
documents would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of
public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during
the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of
Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by
respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof,
particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of
Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos,
Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were
certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth
certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facieevidence of the facts therein stated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of
official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine
and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such
errors as might have occurred.[31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos,
Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony
of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902
considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however,
likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of
Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to
conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before
death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of all
residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or
paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son
according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August
1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or
paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only
if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document.[32] Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the
mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father
who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate
was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an
authoritative document of recognition.[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,[34] the Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is whether or not his birth certificate
(Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been
voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there
is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might
have happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that
in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be
made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the
parent recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F.
Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only
other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what
could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private individuals which must be
authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out
in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or
compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child
who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the
child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the
child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought
during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for
purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public
instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to
be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs
should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to
institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
x x x x x x x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate
children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this
Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be
given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an
attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family
in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal
affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect
his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil
Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has
thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience
among members of a family, and those which exist among members of a society for the protection of private interests."[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a
civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their
support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal
property, the classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in
general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed
exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is
significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code, [39] such as on successional rights and family relations.[40] In
adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their
legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law [41] and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish
family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions
in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles
and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was
paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination
survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and
should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from
and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation
or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules
on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being
applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of
the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of
a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be
made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in
question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before
the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living
together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in
accordance with law do hereby declare that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the Philippines as
`Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at the University of the
Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
 8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself
lived together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the
liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
xxxxxxxxx
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and
that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately,
we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the
mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish
parentage.Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should
apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to
respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on
July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and
respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez
could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth
certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father
and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would
make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie
Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de
Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus
sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if
the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did
not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson
who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the
stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a
father who had become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the
1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be
naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of
Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no
valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If
Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a
Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio,
Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate.This statement about Quintin, based
on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply
repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
xxxxxxxxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate
child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father
and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs. Cayat. [47] I would grant that the
distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not
justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state interest can there be for
disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit
liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding
an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if
there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be
reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean
Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter
dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the
child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother
had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to
prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing
on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed
under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC
for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the
disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of President in the 10 th May 2004 national elections on the
contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both
having been directly elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential
election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not
before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary
to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the
father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have
been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death,
such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino
citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made
a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to
the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which,
as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections,
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in
dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 211789-90 March 17, 2015

DR. REY B. AQUINO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 the challenge to the October 19, 20122 and February 18, 20143 resolutions
of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) sitting En Banc, in E.O. Case No. 10-003 and E.O. Case No. 10-008.
The October 19, 2012 resolution, among others, directed the COMELECs Law Department to file the appropriate information
against petitioner Dr. Rey B. Aquinofor violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 87374 in relation to Section 261(h) of the Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881) (the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines).The February 18, 2014 resolution, in turn, affirmed in
toto the October 19, 2012 resolution.
The Factual Antecedents
On January 8, 2010, Aquino, as President and Chief Executive Officer of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC),issued
PhilHealth Special Order No. 16, Series of 2010 (reassignment order)5 directing the reassignment of several PHIC officers and
employees.
The pertinent portion of PhilHealth SO No. 16-20106 reads:
08 January 2010
SPECIAL ORDER
No. 16, s. 2010
Subject: Re-Assignment of PhilHealth Officials
In the interest of the service and further enhance organizational efficiency and synergy, the following PhilHealth officials and
personnel are hereby re-assigned to the offices opposite their names. This is also being made to strengthen PhilHealths
organizational capability by providing opportunities to its key personnel for professional growth and development in strategic
management, which is imperative in view of the impending vacancies in crucial 3rd level positions.
xxxx
By virtue of this Order, the above named officers are bound to perform all the duties and functions required in their respective
assignments and shall receive the corresponding allowances.
This Order shall take effect immediately.
DR. REY B. AQUINO
President and CEO
On the same date, Aquino released the reassignment order, via the PHICs intranet service, to all PHIC officers and employees,
including the following: (1) Dennis Adre, PHIC Regional Vice-President (VP); (2) Masiding Alonto,PHIC Regional VP; and (3)
Khaliquzzaman M. Macabato, PHIC Assistant Regional VP.
On January 11, 2010, Aquino issued an Advisory implementing the reassignment order. The Advisory directed these officers to,
among others, "report to their new regional assignments; or to the central office; or to other areas, as the case may be, not later
than five (5) working days from the date of issuance of the reassignment order or January 15, 2010 for officers transferred,
reassigned or designated to various posts located in the central office; and/or ten (10) working days from the ADVISORY or January
22, 2010, in the case of those reassigned or transferred from a regional office to another or from the central office to a regional office
and vice versa."7 In view of the reassignment order and its directive, Dean Rudyard A. Avila III, consultant to the Chairman of the
Board of PHIC and former Secretary of the PHIC Board of Directors, filed before the COMELEC on January 18, 2010, a complaint
against Aquino and Melinda C. Mercado, PHIC Officer-in-Charge, Executive VPand Chief Operating Officer, for violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8737in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881. The case was docketed as E.O. Case No. 10-003.
On February 1, 2010, Adre, Alonto and Macabato, along with Romeo D. Albertoand Johnny Y. Sychua (PHIC Regional VPs) likewise
filed before the COMELEC a similar complaint for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881 against Tito
M. Mendiola, PHIC Senior VP for Operations Sector, and Ruben John A. Basa, PHIC Group VP for Corporate Affairs. The case was
docketed as E.O. Case No. 10-008.
E.O. Case No. 10-003 and E.O. Case No. 10-008 were subsequently consolidated (consolidated COMELEC complaints).
Meanwhile, Aquino wrote the COMELEC a letter dated January 11, 2010,8 asking for a "categorical declaration that the issuance of
and transition to the respective office designations of concerned officers x x x is beyond the purview of COMELEC Resolution No.
8737 x x x." He posited that the reassignment order is beyond the coverage of this COMELEC resolution as he issued it on January
8,2010, or prior to the start of the election period that began on January 11, 2010. Aquino reiterated this request in his letter dated
February 26, 2010.9
On March 29, 2010, Aquino filed a petition10 before the COMELEC reiterating his request and maintaining that PhilHealth SO No. 16-
2010 is beyond the coverage of Resolution No. 8737. This case was docketed as E.M. Case No. 10-018.
The assailed COMELEC resolutions
1. The October 19, 2012 resolution11
The COMELEC directed its Law Department to file the appropriate information against Aquino for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in
relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881; it dismissed, for lack of merit, the complaint against Mercado, Mendiola, and Basa.
The COMELEC declared that Aquino violated Section 261(h) of BP 881 when he directed the transfer/reassignment of the PHIC
officers and employees within the declared election period without its prior approval. It pointed out that Section 261(h) considers an
election offense for "any public official who makes or causes the transfer or detail whatever of any public officer or employee in the
civil service x x x within the election period except upon prior approval of the Commission."
Citing Regalado, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,12 the COMELEC explained in this regard that "the words transfer and detail [in Section
261(h) of BP 881] are modified by the word whatever x x x [such that] any movement of personnel from one station to another
during the election, whether or not in the same office or agency, is covered by the prohibition." 13
The COMELEC pointed out, too, that in promulgating Resolution No. 8737, it merely laid down the guidelines relative to the transfer,
detail or reassignment of officers and employees of the civil service for the January 10, 2010 to June 9, 2010 election period set for
the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections (May 10, 2010 elections) which guidelines still fall well within the provisions of Section
261(h) of BP 881. It emphasized that Resolution No. 8737 merely reiterated Section 261(h)s prohibition and the requirement of
prior COMELEC approval in any case of personnel transfers or details; and provided penalties in case of violation of the prohibition.
In this case, the COMELEC noted that while the facts at first glance would support Aquinos contention that the reassignment order
is beyond the coverage of the election transfer ban as Aquino issued it on January 8, 2010, its implementation was carried out after
the transfer ban had already set in. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding its issuance supports the conclusion that Aquino
violated the transfer ban, i.e., Aquino issued the reassignment order late in the afternoon of January 8, 2010, which was a Friday; he
issued the guidelines implementing the transfer/reassignment order only on January 11, 2010, after the transfer ban had taken
effect; and, even after the election period had already started, he still issued several transfer/reassignment orders from January 21
to February 15, 2010,14 absent the required prior COMELEC approval.
In short, the COMELEC found a prima facie case against Aquino for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of
BP 881 because while the reassignment order was issued on January 8, 2010, or prior to the start of the transfer ban, its
implementation took effect after the transfer ban had already set in. To the COMELEC, a transfer/reassignment order must be issued
and implemented prior to the start of the election period to be excluded from the coverage of the transfer ban. Any personnel
action issued and/or implemented during the election period must have prior COMELEC approval to be valid; otherwise, such
personnel action is illegal and renders liable the person who made or caused the movement.
The COMELEC dismissed the complaint against the other respondents because: (1) the documents on record bear only Aquinos
signature; and (2) conspiracy among them was not alleged nor proved.
On December 7, 2012, Aquino sought reconsideration15 of the COMELECs October 19, 2012 resolution. He argued that what he
directed when he issued the order was only a reassignment, not a transfer, which is not covered by the transfer ban. In this regard,
he pointed to Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 2,series of 2005, and the Courts ruling in Tapispisan v. Court of
Appeals16 to support his position.
He argued, too, that he issued the directive outside of or before the start of the election period, i.e., on January 8, 2010.
Lastly, he pointed out that he thrice sought from the COMELEC the required approvals as early as January 11, 2010; as of the date of
the filing of this motion, the COMELEC has yet to act on his letter-requests.
2. The February 18, 2014 resolution17
The COMELEC affirmed in toto the October 19, 2012 resolution.
The COMELEC agreed with the complainants position and ruled that the word "whatever" in Section 261(h) of BP 881 expanded the
coverage of the prohibition so as to include any movement of personnel, including reassignment, among others. In fact, to dispel any
ambiguity as regards Section 261(h)s prohibition, Resolution No. 8737 defined the word "transfer" as including any personnel
action.
Accordingly, the COMELEC held that insofar as the prohibition provision (under Section 261[h] of BP881) is concerned, the terms
"transfer" and "reassignment" have similar legal consequences. Lastly, the COMELEC emphasized that only a prima facie finding of
violation or probable cause is required for purposes of filing an Information for an election offense. In Aquinos case, the facts show
such prima facie case against him for violation of Section 261(h) of BP 881. COMELEC resolution on Aquinos petition (E.M. Case No.
10-018)
In a resolution dated August 20, 2010,18 the COMELEC First Division denied Aquinos petition (for declaration of the non-coverage of
the reassignment order under the transfer ban) and directed the COMELECs Law department to conduct preliminary investigation
to determine whether Aquino committed an election offense for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP
881.
The First Division agreed that Section 261(h) of BP 881 and Resolution No. 8737 do not render illegal per se the transfer of a
government officer or employee during election period and that the law, in fact, recognizes the inherent prerogative of the
appointing authority to effect such transfers or details whenever necessary to meet the exigencies of the public service.
It nevertheless pointed out that the transfers or details in this case were effected without the required prior COMELEC approval
which sufficiently renders Aquino liable for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation with Section 261(h).
The Petition
Aquino essentially argues that, first, the COMELEC exceeded its authority to implement the election laws when, in interpreting
Section 261(h) of BP 881, it added reassignments as a covered offense when the prohibitions speaks only of transfer and detail. To
him, the COMELEC could not legally and validly add a third mode of personnel action and hold him accountable for its violation,
when the legislative intent clearly and specifically prohibited only transfer and detail from among the several modes of personnel
action enumerated under the various laws governing the civil service, i.e., Presidential Decree (PD) No. 807 and Executive Order (EO)
No. 292.
He argues that while the COMELEC indeed has the exclusive authority to implement the election laws, and with it the authority to
issue rules and regulations to supply details or clarify gaps in the law, it cannot validly extend what these laws provide without
running afoul of the basic precept that the power to make laws is exclusively lodged in the legislature.
Thus, Aquino takes exception to the COMELECs reliance in Regalado19 arguing that the term "whatever" was added simply to modify
the term "detail" (which it immediately follows) or both the terms "detail and/or transfer;" the addition of the term "whatever" was
never meant to include within the coverage of the prohibition any mode of personnel action other than transfer and detail.
Then too, he points out that the Court, in Regalado, declared the transfer as falling within the prohibitions coverage because
although made in the exigencies of public service, it was, in fact, used for electioneering purposes or to harass subordinates of
different political persuasion.
In this case, he argues that none of the complaining PHIC officer/personnel even alleged a situation similar to those in Regalado.
Hence, the COMELEC cannot hold him criminally liable for an act that the law does not prohibit under the maxim nullum crimen sine
lege.
Second, the reassignment order did not violate Section 261(h) of BP 881 because he issued it on January 8,2010, or before the start
of the election period on January 10, 2010. Hepoints out that by its terms, the "reassignments" were immediately executory; it was
also released and disseminated via the PHICs intranet service and facsimiles, to all concerned officers and employees on the same
date of issue.
Further, he argues that Section 3 of BP 881 fixes the start of the election period at ninety (90) days before the day of the election,
not one hundred and twenty (120) days before, which the COMELEC set in Resolution No. 8737. Hence, the election period for the
May 10, 2010 elections should have commenced on February 9, 2010, not January 10, 2010.
At any rate, Aquino argues that the COMELECs resolutions and directive to file criminal action against him were premature and
without legal basis. He points out that, if only to comply with the legal requirement of prior COMELEC approval, he had thrice
requested20 the COMELEC for exemption from Resolution No. 8737. To this date and despite the issuance of the October 19, 2012
and February18, 2014 resolutions, his request remains pending before the COMELEC En Banc.21 He insists that the resolution of his
request/petition for exemption is necessary as the issues raised therein were prejudicial questions to the issues in the consolidated
COMELEC complaints.
The Case for the COMELEC
The COMELEC, through the Solicitor General, argues 22 that it has the power to prosecute any reassignment of officers and
employees in the civil service made during the election period. In this regard, it points out that the words "transfer" and "detail" are
precisely modified by the word "whatever" such that any movement of personnel from one station to another, whether or not in the
same office or agency, is covered by the prohibition under Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881. Such
personnel action necessarily includes "reassignment." In addition, the COMELEC defends that it did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when it directed its law department to file the appropriate information against Aquino for violation of Resolution No.
8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881. It points out that: (1) Aquino issued the reassignment order during the election period,
absent its prior approval; and (2) it did not err in fixing the election period for the May 10, 2010 elections and in implementing
Resolution No. 8737.
Relying on Regalado, the COMELEC reasons that for an act to fall under Section 261(h) of BP 881, two elements must concur: (1) a
public officer or employee is transferred or detailed within the election period as fixed by it; and (2) the transfer or detail was
effected without its prior approval pursuant to its implementing rules and regulations.
In this case, it argues that both elements were present. First, while the reassignment order was issued on January 8, 2010, it actually
became effective only on January 11, 2010, well within the election period. To this end, it points out that: (1) the Order was issued at
about four-thirty in the afternoon (4:30 pm) when it was already too late to be implemented; (2) the complainants in the
consolidated complaints received a copy of the Order only on January 11, 2010; (3) Aquino issued the Advisory likewise only on
January 11, 2010; and (4) Aquino issued other reassignment orders between January 21 and February 15, 2010. 23
In other words, the COMELEC submits that if a reassignment order was implemented during the election period, even if issued prior
thereto as in this case, it is still covered by the election ban on personnel transfer.
Second, Aquino issued the reassignment order without its prior approval. To the COMELEC, Aquinos January 11, 2010 and February
26, 2010 letters, as well as his March 18,2010 petition (for exemption from the election transfer ban) could not have rectified the
deficiency because the letter-requests were submitted and filed long after the election ban had already taken effect; and the
petition for exemption was filed long after the complaints were filed against him.
Lastly, the COMELEC argues that the election period which it fixed for the May 10, 2010 election is valid and legal pursuant to its
authority under Section 3 of BP 881. The period fixed is likewise valid, 24 pursuant to Section 12 of Resolution No. 873725 in relation to
Section 52(m) of BP 88126 and Section 30 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6646.27
The Issues
The basic issues before us are whether: the COMELEC validly issued Resolution No. 8737 that defined transfer, as contemplated
under Section 261(h) of BP 881, to include all personnel action including reassignments; and if so, whether the COMELEC validly
found prima facie case against Aquino for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h).
The Court's Ruling
Preliminary Considerations
In assailing the COMELECs October 19, 2012 and February 18, 2014 resolutions, Aquino comes to this Court via Rule 64 in relation to
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As a Rule 64 petition (viewed from a Rule 65 approach), the Courts standard of review is "grave abuse of discretion" or such
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; the
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility."28 A lower court or tribunals violation of the Constitution, law or existing jurisprudence 29 or their use
of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint their action with grave abuse of discretion.30
In this petition, Aquino ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC as it found prima facie case to indict him for
violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881. He presents the following main arguments:
1. The COMELEC exceeded its rule-making authority when it issued Resolution No. 8737 that expanded the coverage of
Section 261(h) of BP 881;
2. The reassignment order is beyond the coverage of Section 261(h) of BP 881 because he issued it before the start of the
election period; and
3. The COMELEC prematurely issued its resolutions (finding prima facie case against him) as the COMELEC had, then, yet to
resolve his request for exemption from the coverage of Resolution No. 8737.
We approach these arguments with the consideration of the distinct role that the COMELEC plays in our government structure. We
consider as well the considerable latitude which the Constitution and the laws grant it as it ensures the accomplishment of the great
objective for which it was created free, orderly and honest elections. 31 We recognize this legal reality and concede that we have no
general powers of supervision over the COMELEC except those which the Constitution specifically grants to us, i.e., to review its
decisions, orders, and rulings within the limited terms of a petition for certiorari. 32
Thus, in this Rule 64 petition, the scope of our review is limited to the question: whether the COMELECs exercise of its powers as it
issued the prima-facie-case-finding resolution and Resolution No. 8737 was without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Aquinos petition must prosper if the COMELEC, in appreciating and calibrating the evidence as it arrived at the assailed resolutions,
exceeded its authority or exercised its discretion in an excessive, arbitrary, and gravely abusive manner. The grant of the petition
based on these asserted violations in effect recognizes that, in acting as it did, the COMELEC committed errors of the level that
effectively affected its jurisdiction.
Aquinos petition must fail, however, if the COMELECs acts, even though viewed erroneous under the terms of the asserted
violations, were still well within the limits of its powers under the Constitution and relevant statutes. The Court must, in such case,
recognize the COMELECs exercise of its discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions to be proper and well within its jurisdiction.
Viewed in this light, we GRANT the petition; we find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in the manner that it
found prima facie case against Aquino for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881.
A. COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 is valid
1. The COMELECs enforcement and
administration power and rule-making power
To determine the validity of Resolution No. 8737, we first discuss some of the basic precepts touching on the powers granted to the
COMELEC as it fulfills its mandate under the Constitution and statutes.
We begin with the Constitution the fundamental law to which all laws must conform. The pertinent provisions read:
ARTICLE IX
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
A. COMMON PROVISIONS
xxxx
Section 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its
offices. Such rules however shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
xxxx
C. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Section 2.The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall.
[emphases and underscoring supplied]
By statute, BP 881 provides:
Article VII
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct
of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall:
xxxx
(c) Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to
enforce and administer x x x x.
[emphases supplied]
A common and clear conclusion that we can gather from these provisions is the obvious and unequivocal intent of the framers of the
Constitution and of the law to grant the COMELEC with powers, necessary and incidental to achieve the objective of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
Thus, expressly, the Constitution and the laws grant the COMELEC with the power, first and foremost, to "[e]nforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election," and second, to "promulgate rules and regulations." Together, these
powers ensure that the COMELEC is well armed to properly enforce and implement the election laws and enable it to fill in the
situational gaps which the law does not provide for or which the legislature had not foreseen.
In exercising these powers and fulfilling its mandate, the COMELEC, in addition, must necessarily interpret the provisions of the law
that they are to enforce and for which they will craft the guidelines. Thus, to this extent and in this sense, the COMELEC likewise
exercises the power of legal interpretation pursuant to the legal principle that the grant of a power includes all the powers necessary
for the exercise of the power expressly given.
Like all grant of powers, however, the grant to the COMELEC of its express enforcement and administration, and rule-making and
implied interpretative powers are not without limitations. The exercise of these powers should always be read in conjunction
with, not in isolation from, the Constitution and the laws from where it draws the power.
2. The COMELEC did not exceed the
exercise of its rule-making power;
reassignment is included in the
prohibition pursuant to the phrase
"transfer or detail whatever"
In Resolution No. 8737, the COMELEC defined the phrase "transfer or detail whatever" found in Section 261(h) of BP 881 as including
any personnel action, i.e., "reassignment." Aquino questions this COMELEC interpretation as an unwarranted expansion of the legal
prohibition which he argues renders the COMELEC liable for grave abuse of discretion.
We agree with the questioned COMELEC interpretation of the phrase "transfer or detail whatever."
a. The COMELECs interpretation,
pursuant to our Regalado ruling,
is consistent with the constitutional
and legislative intent
A necessary starting point in considering how we are to interpret the phrase "transfer or detail whatever" is the legal provisions
involved BP 881 and the various laws governing the civil service.
On the one hand, Aquino argues that the laws on the civil service should govern in the interpretation of the phrase. Under this
approach, the term "whatever" is viewed as modifying only either the term "detail" (which it immediately follows) or both the terms
"detail and/or transfer." In such case, "reassignments," which is a distinct mode of personnel action under the civil service laws, are
automatically excluded.
On the other hand, the COMELEC holds the position that the phrase "transfer or detail whatever" should be interpreted in the light
of the general objectives of our election laws. Under this approach, the terms transfer and detail, as modified by the term whatever,
are to be understood in their general sense such that any movement of personnel from one station to another, including
"reassignments," is covered by the prohibition.
In Regalado, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court already clarified the interpretation of the term whatever as used in Section 261(h) of
BP 881 in relation to the terms transfer and detail. In agreeing with the Solicitor Generals position, this Court declared that the
terms transfer and detail are modified by the term whatever such that "any movement of personnel from one station to another,
whether or not in the same office or agency, during the election period is covered by the prohibition." 34
Read in the light of this ruling, we affirm the COMELECs interpretation of the phrase "transfer or detail whatever" as we find the
Regalado interpretation consistent with the legislative intent. Indeed, as used in Section 261(h) of BP 881, the term whatever should
be not be read strictly in conjunction with only either the term transfer or the term detail; nor should the phrase transfer or detail
whatever be read in isolation from the purpose of the legal prohibition. Rather, consistent with our rules in reading provisions of
law, the term whatever as well as the phrase transfer or detail whatever should be understood within the broader context of
the purpose of BP881. They should likewise be understood within the context of all other laws that the COMELEC is required to
administer and enforce. This is the proper approach that anyone, including this Court, should take when reading Section 261(h), as
well as all other provisions of BP 881 and other election laws.
From this perspective, we reiterate our observation in Regalado that any personnel action, when caused or made during the election
period, can be used for electioneering or to harass subordinates with different political persuasions. This possibility of being used
for electioneering purposes or to harass subordinates created by any movement of personnel during the election period is
precisely what the transfer ban seeks to prevent.
Thus, it is immaterial whether or not the personnel action has in fact been actually used for electioneering purposes or whether
there has been any allegation in the complaint to this effect. The mere existence of such plausibility for electioneering is the reason
that animated the legal prohibition against any personnel action, including transfers and reassignments, during the election period.
To our mind, the interpretation that includes any form of personnel action, such as reassignment, within the coverage of the phrase
precisely guards against any such electioneering and political harassment situations. This interpretation also more vigorously
enforces the aim not only of BP 881, but more importantly of the Constitution to secure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
Thus, to reiterate and emphasize the election laws prohibition on transfer or detail covers any movement of personnel from one
station to another, whether or not in the same office or agency when made or caused during the election period.
b. Its interpretation is also
consistent with basic statutory
construction rules
In addition to what has been discussed, we affirm the COMELECs interpretation as it is more in keeping with the following basic
statutory construction rules:
First, that a word, phrase or provision in a statute should be construed not in isolation with but in relation to the whole law. The
clauses and phrases of a statute must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions; but the whole and every part of it must be
construed in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. 35 In short, all the words of a statute must
be taken into consideration in order to ascertain and to animate the intention of the law making bodies. Ut magis valeat quam
pereat.
In this light, Aquinos interpretation that the term whatever and the transfer ban itself refers to either only the term transfer or
the term detail, or only to both these terms would obviously violate this well-known canon as it essentially views the phrase
transfer or detail whatever in isolation from the entire statute.
Second, that the words of a statute are to be understood in their natural, plain, and ordinary acceptation and the signification that
they have in common use, and are to be given their ordinary meaning, unless otherwise specifically provided.36
When, as in this case, the specific provision in which it was used or the various provisions of the statute when read as a whole do not
betray a legislative intent to give the term a different sense or a technical meaning, the term whatever as used under Section 261(h)
should, therefore, be understood in its ordinary or common sense.
As commonly understood, the term whatever means "anything at all: any of various other things that might also be mentioned;" or
"something similar but hard to identify with certainty."37 Based on this definition, whatever would have served no purpose were we
to accept Aquinos constrained interpretation. This is because any of the various other forms of personnel action, under the laws
governing the civil service that would have been covered by the prohibition (with its use of the term whatever), will automatically be
excluded by Section 261(h)s use of the terms transfer and detail.
In fact, if we were to follow the logic of Aquinos argument, the only form of personnel action that Section 261(h) would prohibit are
transfer and detail; any other form of personnel action are and will simply be allowed. This strict interpretation is clearly and
undoubtedly wrong for as we pointed out above, the interpretation that includes any form of personnel action under the phrase not
only guards against any electioneering and political harassment situations that the prohibition seeks to avoid. It enforces more
vigorously the aim of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections to effectuate and safeguard the will of the
electorate in choosing their representatives.
In short, Aquinos interpretation will only render the term whatever a mere surplusage if the legislature intended to limit the
prohibition to transfer or detail only as defined by the laws governing the civil service.
Third, that special legal provisions prevail over general ones.38 Our civil service system is currently governed by PD 807,39 otherwise
known as the Civil Service Decree, and EO 29240 or the Administrative Code of 1987.
PD 807 provides for the organization of the Civil Service Commission, its powers and functions, and all other matters related to the
civil service and the Commission. Its primary intent and purpose is to establish a career service which ensures that appointment in
the civil service is made only according to merit and fitness, and to establish a progressive system of personnel administration as
well as measures that promote morale and the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, and professionalism in
the Civil Service.41
EO 292, on the other hand, was enacted to incorporate in a unified document the major structural, functional, and procedural
principles and rules of governance.42 Essentially, EO 292 provides the basic rules that will generally govern the organization and
operation of the government.
Together, these laws operate to ensure the efficient and organized operation and administration of the government and of its
various departments and offices, particularly of the executive branch. As a necessary tool to the governments efficient operation,
these laws also ensure that only the fit, in terms of their satisfaction of the formal and informal qualifications, occupy positions in
the government and discharge public duties.
When what is involved, however, is the exercise of the right to vote and be voted for a particular right guaranteed to all citizens of
the Philippines the laws governing the administration of the government and of the civil service play only a minor, and perhaps,
insignificant role. With regard to this particular and peculiar right and the entire system by which this right is exercised and
protected, what governs are our various election laws, foremost of which is BP 881.
Thus, in reading and interpreting the provisions governing election offenses, we should consider the terms of the election laws
themselves and how they operate as a whole. As a necessary and indispensable tool in this interpretation process, we must likewise
consider these provisions in the light of the constitutional and legislative goal of attaining free, honest, and peaceful elections. It is
only through these considerations that the right to vote and to be voted for is positively guaranteed.
Under these considerations and with particular regard to election offenses, BP 881 serves as a special law that is consistent with our
basic statutory construction rules and prevails over the more general laws governing the civil service. In other words, the treatment
by the laws governing the civil service of the terms "transfer, detail and reassignment" as distinct modes of personnel action does
not and cannot control the interpretation of laws dealing with election and election offenses, including the interpretation of Section
261(h) ofBP 881, unless otherwise specifically provided.
In sum, we find the COMELECs exercise of its discretion in ruling that reassignments fall within the coverage of the prohibited
transfers or details to be well within its jurisdiction.
To reiterate in clear terms, the prohibition on transfer or detail whatever during the election period under Section 261(h) of BP 881
covers any personnel action including reassignments.
3. The "120-day before and 30-day
after" election period was validly
fixed by the COMELEC pursuant to
its rule-making power
As a general rule, the period of election starts at ninety (90) days before and ends thirty (30) days after the election date pursuant to
Section 9, Article IX-C of the Constitution and Section 3 of BP 881. This rule, however, is not without exception. Under these same
provisions, the COMELEC is not precluded from setting a period different from that provided thereunder.
In this case, the COMELEC fixed the election period for the May 10, 2010 Elections at 120 days before and 30 days after the day of
the election. We find this period proper as we find no arbitrariness in the COMELECs act of fixing an election period longer than the
period fixed in the Constitution and BP 881. For one, the COMELEC fixed the longer period of 120-days-before-and-30-days-
afterpursuant to Section 9, Article IX-C of the Constitution and Section 3 of BP 881. Also, Resolution No. 8737, through which the
COMELEC fixed this alternate period of election, is valid as it was issued pursuant to the COMELECs valid exercise of its rule-making
power (under Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution and Section 52[c] of BP 881). Too, Resolution No. 8737 is valid as it complied
with the publication requirement. Note that per the record, Resolution No. 8737 was published twice on December 31, 2009 in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and on January 4, 2010 in the Daily Tribune.43
B. The facts and the clear terms of the law
does not support the COMELECs
prima facie finding of violation of
Resolution No. 8737 in relation to
Section 261(h) of BP 881
Under Section 261(h) of BP 881,a person commits the election offense of violation of the election transfer ban when he makes or
causes the transfer or detail whatever of any official or employee of the government during the election period absent prior
approval of the COMELEC.
By its terms, Section 261(h) provides at once the elements of the offense and its exceptions. The elements are: (1) the making or
causing of a government official or employees transfer or detail whatever; (2) the making or causing of the transfer or detail
whatever was made during the election period; and (3) these acts were made without the required prior COMELEC approval. As this
provision operates, the making or causing of the movement of personnel during the election period but without the required
COMELEC approval is covered by the prohibition and renders the responsible person liable for the offense. Conversely, the making
or causing (of the movement of personnel) before or after the election period even without the required COMELEC approval, or
during the election period but with the required COMELEC approval are not covered by the prohibition and do not render the
responsible person liable for this election offense.
A critical point to consider in determining whether or not Aquino may be held liable under this provision is the interpretation of the
phrase made or caused and the extent to which the prohibition (on transfer or detail whatever) applies to his case. Factually, it is
likewise imperative to consider the date when Aquino made or caused the reassignment of the affected PHIC officers and
employees.
Make is defined as "to cause to exist. To do, perform, or execute; as to make an issue, to make oath, to make a presentment. To do
in form of law; to perform with due formalities; to execute in legal form; as to make answer, to make a return or report. To execute
as ones act or obligation; to prepare and sign; to issue; to sign, execute, and deliver." 44
Cause, on the other hand, is defined as "each separate antecedent of an event. Something that precedes and brings about an effect
or result. A reason for an action or condition x x x x an agent that brings about something. That which in some manner is
accountable for condition that brings about an effect or that produces a cause for the resultant action or state." 45
Significantly, the terms make and cause indicate one and the same thing the beginning, the start of something, a precursor; it
pertains to an act that brings about a desired result. If we read these definitions within the context of Section 261(h) of BP 881, the
legal prohibition on transfer or detail undoubtedly affects only those acts that go into the making or causing or to the antecedent
acts. Any act that occurs or is performed after the antecedent act of making or causing or those acts performed to carry out an event
or result desired by the antecedent acts, such as the actual or physical act of transferring, are no longer the concern of the legal
prohibition.
When viewed in terms of how transfer or reassignments of government officers and employees are usually carried into place, this
act of making or causing often consists in the act of issuing the transfer or reassignment order. To issue something means "to
discharge, produce, send out, publish, put into circulation, come out," 46 "to send forth; to emit; to promulgate; as an officer issues
orders, process issues from a court."47 In this sense, the act of issuing entails the mechanical act of drafting or writing the order, by
the issuing official himself or through a subordinate; the signing of the order; and completed with its release as addressed to the
concerned officer or employee.
During this phase of the entire transfer or reassignment process, the official responsible for issuing the order plays an active role at
its center. The issuing of the order are his very acts. Thus, if the orders are issued prior to the start of the election period, they are
automatically rendered beyond the coverage of the prohibition and the issuing official cannot be held liable for violation of Section
261(h) of BP 881. Conversely, if the orders are issued during the election period and without COMELEC approval, these are covered
by the prohibition and renders the issuing official liable for violation of Section 261(h).
Once the transfer or reassignment order is issued, the making or causing as the defining act that determines whether a government
official may be held liable under Section 261(h) is deemed completed. The completion of this phase likewise ends the active role the
issuing official plays. Thus, the transfer or reassignment process moves to the next phase the implementation of the order. By
definition, implement refers to "the act of fulfilling or performing." 48
At the implementation phase of the transfer or reassignment process, the issuing official shifts to passive participation. The
government officer or employee to whom the order is addressed takes on the active role in performing the duties needed to
implement the order.
During the implementation phase, the addressee may immediately comply with the order assume the post and discharge its
duties or may delay compliance; or choose not to comply at all. In these situations, the issuing official has no immediate and
actual control of the addressees action.
While the issuing official holds disciplinary power over the addressee in case of delay or non-compliance, the exercise of his
disciplining authority over the erring employee would come after the fact delay or non-compliance.
In short, during the making or causing phase of the entire transfer or reassignment process from drafting the order, to its signing,
up to its release the issuing official plays a very real and active role. Once the transfer or reassignment order is issued, the active
role is shifted to the addressee of the order who should now carry out the purpose of the order. At this level the implementation
phase the issuing officials only role is to see to it that the concerned officer or employee complies with the order. The issuing
official may only exert discipline upon the addressee who refuses to comply with the order.
Following these considerations, we find that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in this case based on the following facts:
First, Aquino made or caused the reassignment of the concerned PHIC officers and employees before the election period.
Second, Aquino sent out, via the PHICs intranet service, the reassignment order to all affected PHIC officers and employees before
the election period.
Third, the reassignment order was complete in its terms, as it enumerated clearly the affected PHIC officers and employees as well
as their respective places of reassignments, and was made effective immediately or on the day of its issue, which was likewise
before the election period. Fourth, the subsequent orders that Aquino issued were not reassignment orders per se contrary to the
COMELECs assessment. Rather, they were, in fact, simply either orders of retention, i.e., orders addressed to the incumbent officer-
occupant of the affected position to effectively maintain the status quo and continue performing the duties of the position while the
reassigned officer or employee had not yet assumed or had been refusing to assume the position and its duties; or orders of
temporary discharge of additional duties, i.e., orders addressed to the officer occupying the position next in rank to discharge the
duties of the affected position while the reassigned officer or employee had not yet assumed or had been refusing to assume the
position and its duties.
Retention of duties and temporary discharge of additional duties do not contemplate or involve any movement of personnel,
whether under any of the various forms of personnel action enumerated under the laws governing the civil service or otherwise.
Hence, these subsequent orders could not be covered by the legal prohibition on transfers or detail.
Based on these clear facts, Aquino completed the act of making or causing the reassignment of the affected PHIC officers and
employees before the start of the election period. In this sense, the evils sought to be addressed by Section 261 (h) of BP 881 is kept
intact by the timely exercise of his management prerogative in rearranging or reassigning PHIC personnel within its various offices
necessary for the PHIC's efficient and smooth operation. As Aquino's acts of issuing the order fell outside the coverage of the
transfer prohibition, he cannot be held liable for violation of Section 261(h).
In sum, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when, firstly, it used wrong or irrelevant considerations when it sought to hold
Aquino liable for violation of Section 261 (h) for issuing orders that were clearly not for reassignment, but which were simply orders
for retention of position or orders for temporary discharge of additional duties.
Secondly, the COMELEC also went beyond the clear contemplation and intention of the law and of existing jurisprudence when it
included within the prohibition's coverage the implementation aspect of the reassignment process - acts that were obviously no
longer within his active and immediate control and beyond the ambit of making or causing to which the prohibition applies.
In view of this conclusion, we no longer find it necessary to discuss the other issues or matters raised in this petition.
WHEREFORE, in the light of these considerations, we hereby GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the resolutions dated
October 19, 2012, and February 18, 2014, of the Commission on Elections in E.O. Case No. 10-003 and E.O. Case No. 10-008. The
complaints against petitioner Dr. Rey B. Aquino for violation of RA 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881 are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY G.R. No. 190582

represented herein by its Chair,
DANTON REMOTO, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:
Respondent. April 8, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of
its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.

Justice Robert A. Jackson

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette[1]

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make different choices choices we would not make
for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited
merely because they are different, and the right to disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a core value protected by our
Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and demands of morality. In many cases, where
moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox philosophical
justifications about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that
practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This
will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.

Factual Background

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed
by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009[2] (the First
Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009[3] (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The
case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as
the Party-List System Act.[4]

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was
denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. OnAugust 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition[5] for
registration with the COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that
because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and thatAng Ladlad complied with the 8-point
guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.[6] Ang Ladlad laid out its national
membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.[7]

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral
grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:

x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate
and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender.

This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. In
Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:

For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural use into
that which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in
their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves
that recompense of their error which was meet.

In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:

For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women ye are indeed a people transgressing beyond
bounds. (7.81) And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those
who indulged in sin and crime! (7:84) He said: O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief
(29:30).

As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petitions par. 6F: Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is further indicated in par. 24 of
the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in
the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).

Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence,
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to
be complied with for accreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as Any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or
disregards decency or morality x x x

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,morals,
good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts whose cause,
object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are inexistent and
void from the beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines,
obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of
prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment
and fine, shall be imposed upon:

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;
 2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing
such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes,
acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1)
glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or
pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5)
are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and
edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are
offensive to morals.

Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful
when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or
regulations relating to the elections.

Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the
teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that older practicing
homosexuals are a threat to the youth. As an agency of the government, ours too is the States avowed duty under Section 13,
Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.[8]

When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,[9] three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners
Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for
Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and
speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:

I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its
under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual orientationsper se would benefit the
nation as a whole.

Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional
representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its constituencies, then all
representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers
of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of
persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests
are also the nations only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation because of their under
representation. Until the time comes whenLadlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender
identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.

II. No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians,
gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a special class of individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also been held that
homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a
comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations, as in the case of race or religion
or belief.

xxxx

Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is elevated, there can be no denying
that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the same Bill
of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.

xxxx

IV. Public Morals

x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to
any particular religious groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are
generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more
 than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped
[sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.

V. Legal Provisions

But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code
imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public
morals. It penalizes immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows. Ang Ladlad apparently falls
under these legal provisions. This is clear from its Petitions paragraph 6F:Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and
lesbians who are already of age It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having
Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippineswere estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance
as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x x. These are all
unlawful.[10]

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to
grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation.Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the
COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later
than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.[11] Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given
until January 16, 2010 to Comment.[12] Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioners application.[13] Thus, in order
to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own comment.[14] The COMELEC, through its Law
Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.[15]

In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately
and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.[16]

Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching
thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.[17] The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the standards and
principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene.

On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene[18] which motion was granted on February 2, 2010.[19]

The Parties Arguments

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional
rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioners application for registration since there
was no basis for COMELECs allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should have
been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioners freedom of speech,
expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the
nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence
contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the
Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically
enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,[20] the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.
 Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had nationwide existence
through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that save for a few
isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country.[21]
This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence is a new one; previously,
the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated
or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections. Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners accreditation
mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioners alleged non-
existence were already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst,
a belated afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and a serious violation of petitioners right to procedural due process.

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never
claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to
constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion
group.[22] Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the
following LGBT networks:

Abra Gay Association

Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City
Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) Metro Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila
Naga City Gay Association Naga City
ONE BACARDI
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) Metro Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City[23]

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had
no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is
registered as Ang Ladlads principal place of business.

Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the
respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or
the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious
matters.[24] Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.[25] We thus find that it was grave
violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
 Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is
able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular
purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:[26]

x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds.
"Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be
resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating
public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious
programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a
religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon
religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-
religious views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its
citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must
have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the
beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence
on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law.
After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling
influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform
manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its
deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion
clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the
Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that
government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest
extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.[27]

Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration

Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has
long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:

Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses
to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is nothing
wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals
we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence.[28]

We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt
of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage,
family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that
the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these generally accepted public morals have not been
convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.[29]

The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that there should have
been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups members have committed or are committing immoral acts.[30] The OSG argues:

x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or more than one gender, but
mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action.Reduction ad
absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both
the straights and the gays. Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.[31]

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither
has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably
damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning
morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered
detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one
end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is
robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.

We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article
694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or
disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings.[32] A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a
mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the
inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is
this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.

Equal Protection

Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the
laws, courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. Equality, said Aristotle, consists in the same
treatment of similar persons.[33] The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection
of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.[34]

Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as
long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.[35] In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng
Pilipinas,[36] we declared that [i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the rational basis test,
coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution.[37]

The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this
constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such
belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume
that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a
legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its
unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate
state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the
party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is
concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would
similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause.[38] We
are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient
evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under
the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by
the circumstances of the case.

Freedom of Expression and Association

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position
through normal democratic means.[39] It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and
deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:[40]

In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free,
every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public square where people
deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing
religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is
prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a
constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic
governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the
beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and
accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however
small not only for a majority, however large but for each of us" the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It
promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those
that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace.
Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions
concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
 Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception that homosexual conduct violates
public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.[41] European and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights
claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts.[42] To the
extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts
analysis.

In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and
lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their
actions were caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint.[43]

With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional
structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has
emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper
opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities
or the majority of the population.[44]A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues
in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.[45] Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are
incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.[46]

We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are
entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships
between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that
view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to
exclude from consideration the values of other members of the community.

Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to
highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not
suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor
expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.

The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not
been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG
argues that:

There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority
to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful
exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.

xxxx

A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of
elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right
which cannot be limited.

As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition has the
clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally participate in
public life through engagement in the party list elections.

This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by
[47]
law. x x x
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and as advanced by
the OSG itself the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has
been precluded, because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the
political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners fundamental
rights.

Non-Discrimination and International Law

In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human rights law, in particular, has
grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate
structural and governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic
legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.

Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly
recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:

 Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this
respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be applied equally to all
persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article
26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to include sexual
orientation.[48] Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited
under various international agreements.[49]

The UDHR provides:

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and
without unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee
in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public
affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or
government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to
ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic
government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.

xxxx

15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons
entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must
be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be
excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political
affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States
parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from elective
office.[50]

We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines international
law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioners invocation of
the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),[51] which
petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There
are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in
any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.[52] Petitioner has not
undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of society wants or demands is automatically a human
right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for
human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law
obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if wants are couched
in rights language, then they are no longer controversial.
 Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law
professors, are at best de lege ferenda and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international
law is characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and
respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio
juris.[53]

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in
flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior.
Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our
democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16,
2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are herebySET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list
accreditation.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review the Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is
being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2
February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a
Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the
United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before
the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. 6
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the
United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 7
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among
others, the following statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will
obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and
national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching
thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-
American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnados US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated
travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and
again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name "Arnado,
Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the
following pertinent travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his answer and
memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes
and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following documents as evidence: 14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all
neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and
continuously residing in his familys ancestral house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that
Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to
the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr.
Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15
April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a registered voter of
Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on misrepresentation, 15 the
COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Baluas contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States
was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence to support his contention," 16 whereas the First Division
still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local Government Code." 17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnados claim that he is a Filipino citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnados act of
consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnados continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and
that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring
inconsistency between Arnados unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official
document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly
divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals. 19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Rommel C.
Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnados proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect. 20
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the evidence is insufficient to
justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law." 21 He raised the following contentions:22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the
Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation
of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine passport, and that he used his
Philippine passport after he obtained it;
4. Baluas petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the First Divisions treatment of
the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23
5. He is undoubtedly the peoples choice as indicated by his winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which should have been filed within
ten days from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest
number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration
together with an Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division
correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case.
Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the
legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado
opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that
as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final
adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission
"shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose
qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquilings intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in proceedings
for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the
second placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the
First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and ruled that the
petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010,
the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnados Motion for
Reconsideration, on the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he
never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen
again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law
saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The
First Divisions reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The
petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by
choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be
its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by
working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport
after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.
xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he applied for a Philippine passport, the
passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was
actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent
already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the respondents submission of a certified true copy
of his passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010,
January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge,
his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used
whatever is within his control during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not one of the
grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this case. Under said principle,
once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this
assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring
his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the absence of
clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of
citizenship."26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United States. The latters
continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-
mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondents
submission with the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for running for the
mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during his incumbency,
title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after
his election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the
mayoralty post cure the latters failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the highest number of votes does not
validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was
adversely resolved against him after election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His
ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the application of the constitutional and
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people
who expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the law. 27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino
citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado
is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Divisions disqualification of Arnado,
Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC
committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge
on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a
renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
affects ones qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First
Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling
contends that he has an interest in the disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is
disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the winner in the
elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and
/ or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear
from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in
proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered. 29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling
has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and
therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before
this Court.
Arnados claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents therein have not appealed the
decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining
finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed
by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to ones
nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation
required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his
foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225
or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for repatriation
before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution
of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the
time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation,
thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation
under the laws of the foreign country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship,
the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship. 33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his
US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question
to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby
rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his
US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign
passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of
both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next
day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights
granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there
are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v.
Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad
that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces
his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation
and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former
Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he recanted
his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship,
which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively
reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented
himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively
imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for
naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of
renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign
citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of
Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009,
on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election
or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged. x x x.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue
to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnados act of consistently using his US passport effectively
negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No.
9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him from running for an
elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office would be
thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as
a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine
passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later. 43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen
and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does
not make his use of a US passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of
representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent
already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is
September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US
passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnados subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign citizenship
and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not
undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by
the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to ones flag and country. While those who
acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are
required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided
allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of
Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding
the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes 45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-
placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again
put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as
the winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal president. The
petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes,
and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second
time to the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-election absent the
four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to
any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots." 47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a decision that a
candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person
ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite
different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an
examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of
canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus to the board of canvassers to
correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or
illegality that it cannot be determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the
correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only
result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing
parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a
plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the
other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to
any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one case
the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal
character and circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in contrast
to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are
striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a
disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction
being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared
that no one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4 June 1912"
where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal
president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The Court
therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in
those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said
order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on
respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and additional issues, let judgment be
entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere
pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement,
it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots and
ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who received the next highest
number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even
have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his
ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself
out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his
ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily
affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the
substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When
the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve
as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not
qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very
law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of
the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC 50 when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public
office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in
this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If
a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing
all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC 52 where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-
ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements."53
We have ruled in the past that a candidates victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the
candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidates certificate of candidacy. We said that while
provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election
laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give
effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with the realization
that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law
and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively
negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an informed choice about a
candidates eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic
qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out
what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or
deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious,
candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may
have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification, and employing
every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the
election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule
of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only
the electorates voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral
anarchy to set in.1wphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from
among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC 54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any legal
effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The
votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in
favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to
participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to
the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as
candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a
candidates disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher
number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified
candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorates awareness of the candidates disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate.
The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidates
disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the
winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC
but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
There was no chance for Arnados proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to the
petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already
proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnados candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of
election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify
the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American
citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position." The
prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the
election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It
could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the
elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the
winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado possessed even
prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections,
reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not
apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective
position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May
2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

RESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

[P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005]
RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., protestant, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, protestee.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The moving finger writes, says Omar Khayyam in the Rubayyat, and having writ, moves on. Nor all your piety nor wit, adds the
poet, could lure it back to cancel half a line; nor all your tears wash out a word of it.
Such is my view on the providential case for our consideration.
Before this Electoral Tribunal, composed pursuant to the Constitution, by all the fifteen members of the Supreme Court, is a
matter of first impression. We are tasked not only to determine, as originally prayed for, who between the Protestant and the
Protestee was the true winner in the May 10, 2004 Presidential Elections, but also to decide now whether the Protestants widow
(Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe, popularly known as the cinema star Susan Roces) could intervene and/or substitute for the deceased party,
assuming arguendo that the protest could survive his death.
If one were guided by folk wisdom expressed in the adage that in a democracy, the voice of the people is the voice of God, then
it would appear our task had been made easy by fateful events. Past midnight, in the early hours of June 24, 2004, the Congress as
the representatives of the sovereign people and acting as the National Board of Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call vote,
proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) the duly elected President of the Philippines. She obtained 12,905,808 votes, as
against 11,782,232 votes for the second-placer, the movie actor Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ).[1] She took her Oath of Office before the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on June 30, 2004.
Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, Mr. FPJ, filed seasonably an election protest before this
Electoral Tribunal on July 23, 2004. Mrs. GMA, through counsel, filed her Answer with Counter Protest on August 5, 2004. As
counsels for the parties exchanged lively motions to rush the presentation of their respective positions on the controversy, an act of
God intervened. On December 14, 2004, the Protestant died in the course of his medical treatment at St. Lukes Hospital. The
medical certificate, filed by counsel as part of the Notice of Death of the Protestant, showed that he died of cardio-pulmonary arrest,
secondary to cerebral infarction.
However, neither the Protestees proclamation by Congress nor the death of her main rival as a fortuitous intervening event,
appears to abate the present controversy in the public arena. Instead, notice may be taken of periodic mass actions,
demonstrations, and rallies raising an outcry for this Tribunal to decide the electoral protest of Mr. FPJ against Mrs. GMA once and
for all. The oracular function of this Tribunal, it would appear, needs to be fully exercised to make manifest here and abroad who is
the duly elected leader of the Filipino nation. All these, despite the fact that the submissions by the parties on their respective sides
in the protest and the counter-protest are thus far, far from completed.
Needless to stress, this Tribunal cannot shirk its constitutional duty. Yet, neither could it go beyond its mandate under the
Constitution and the law. Further, this Tribunal is guided by its Rules, as well as the Rules of Court in a suppletory manner.
Considering the transcendental importance of the electoral contest involving the Presidency, a rush to judgment is simply out of the
question. Yet decide the matter we must, without further delay, to prevent popular unrest and avoid further destabilization of
government at the highest level.
Together with the formal Notice of the Death of Protestant, his counsel has submitted to the Tribunal, dated January 10, 2005,
a MANIFESTATION with URGENT PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR DECEASED PROTESTANT FPJ, by the
widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe, who signed the verification and certification therein.
As movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ claims that because of the untimely demise of her husband and in representation not only of
her deceased husband but more so because of the paramount interest of the Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to
continue and substitute for her late husband in the election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the
electorate in the 2004 elections. In support of her assertion, she cites De Castro v. Commission on Elections,[2] and Lomugdang v.
Javier,[3] to the effect that the death of the protestant does not constitute a ground for the dismissal of the contest nor oust the trial
court of the jurisdiction to decide the election contest. She stresses nevertheless that even if the instant protest case succeeds, she
is cognizant that as a mere substitute she cannot succeed, assume or be entitled to said elective office, and her utmost concern is
not personal but one that involves the publics interest. She prays, however, that if subsequently determined that the protestee
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo did not get the highest number of votes for president, for protestee to be disallowed from remaining in
office, and thus prevented from exercising the powers, duties, responsibilities and prerogatives reserved only to the duly-elected
president or her legitimate successor.
In her Comment, the Protestee, Mrs. GMA, relying on Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias[4] and subsequent cases including analogous
cases decided by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the
proper party to replace the deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a property that passes on to the heirs. She
points out that the widow has no legal right to substitute for her husband in an election protest, since no such right survives the
husband, considering that the right to file an election protest is personal and non-transmissible.
Protestee also contends Mrs. FPJ cannot substitute for her deceased husband because under the Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, only the registered candidates who obtained the 2 nd and 3rd highest votes for the presidency may contest the
election of the president and patently, Mrs. FPJ did not receive the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for she was not even a candidate for the
presidency in the election that is being contested.
Citing pertinent PET Rules, protestee also stresses that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction over actions of surviving spouses to
ascertain the vote of the electorate as the Tribunal has jurisdiction only over election protests and quo warranto cases.
According to protestee, movant/intervenor Mrs. FPJ cannot use the public interest to justify her request to be substituted for
her husband. Public interest, i.e. the need to dispel uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate, is applicable only in election
contests, not in an action to merely ascertain the true and genuine will of the people. She asserts that the only case herein
cognizable by this Tribunal is an election protest involving a protestant and a protestee, not between the electorate and the
protestee. Citing analogous HRET cases, protestee avers that in a case where the protestant, the primary adversary in an election
protest case dies, the public interest in said protest dies with him.
Protestee also contends that in the adversarial nature of a protest case where one of the parties dies, a correct ruling cannot
be had because the dead protestant could no longer refute his adversarys allegations because death has rendered him hors de
combat.
Further citing Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos,[5] protestee points out that this Tribunal, nonetheless, confirmed its power to
dismiss an electoral case on technical grounds. She adds that if the Tribunal can do so on a technicality, all the more it could for a
stronger reason, that of protestants death.
In her Reply, movant/intervenor argues that reference of protestee to the HRET case of Abadilla v. Ablan,[6] was erroneous
inasmuch as said case was a congressional protest and the controlling case is De Castro. She likewise contends that protestant failed
to distinguish between a right to an office which protestant concedes is personal and non-transmissible vis--vis the right to pursue
the process which is not personal but imbued with public interest. She likewise stresses that the death of the protestant abolished
the personal/private character of the protest, as protestants right to assume if he prevails, necessarily disappears, and the same
cannot be transferred to anyone else, protestants widow included. She insists, however, that the public interest remains. Further,
movant/intervenor posits that the protest having been commenced cannot be abated by the death of the protestant and the only
real issue is the determination of the proper substitute. She avers that the Tribunals rule is clear on who can commence and initiate
a protest compared to the persons who can initiate a quo warranto. She admits that in the former, only the second and third placers
in the presidential election are authorized to commence the contest, while in the latter, any voter may initiate the petition. She
contends that with no personal interest involved, any registered voter can continue the duly-commenced protest as the real-party-
in-interest which is analogous to a quo warranto. She contradicts protestee and insists that allowing any voter to substitute just like
in a quo warranto will not open the floodgate to whimsical protests, and the imagined political instability feared by protestee will
even more be pronounced if the protest is dismissed. Movant/intervenor reiterates that the issue at hand involves just the
continuation of proceedings by allowing substitution and the taking over by the substitute of the prosecution of the protest already
duly commenced.
Plainly, the issue here is: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latters
protest case?
The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET Rules. It provides,
Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second
or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a
verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this express enumeration, the rule
makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario
where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2 nd or the 3rdhighest
number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.
 This Tribunal, however, does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention but it does allow for the analogous and
suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decisions of the electoral tribunals. [7]
Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. [8] This rule allows substitution by a legal representative. It
can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal
representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said Section 16. However, in our application of this rule to an election
contest, we have every time ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs
upon death.[9] Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies
during the pendency of the protest. In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias,[10] we recognized substitution upon the death of the protestee
but denied substitution by the widow or heirs since they are not the real parties in interest. Similarly, in the later case of De la
Victoria v. Commission on Elections,[11] we struck down the claim of the surviving spouse and children of the protestee to the
contested office for the same reason. Even in analogous cases before other electoral tribunals, [12] involving substitution by the
widow of a deceased protestant, in cases where the widow is not a real party in interest, we denied substitution by the wife or heirs.
This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily abates the pending action. We have held as early as Vda. de De Mesa
(1966) that while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal
and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the
protest proceedings.[13] Hence, we have allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party in
interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the
suit.[14] In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias[15] and Lomugdang v. Javier,[16] we permitted substitution by the vice-mayor since the vice-
mayor is a real party in interest considering that if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor succeeds to
the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot assume office. In contrast, herein movant/intervenor,
Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that
protestants widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest.
We are not unaware that a contest before election tribunals has two aspects. First, it is in pursuit of ones right to a public
office, and second, it is imbued with public interest.
Indeed the personal aspect of the case is inextricably linked with the public interest. For an election protest involves not merely
conflicting private aspirations but is imbued with public interest which raises it into a plane over and above ordinary civil
actions.[17] But herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, has overly stressed that it is with the paramount public interest in mind that she
desires to pursue the process commenced by her late husband. She avers that she is pursuing the process to determine who truly
won the election, as a service to the Filipino people. We laud her noble intention and her interest to find out the true will of the
electorate. However, nobility of intention is not the point of reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an election
protest. Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court [18] is the applicable rule on intervention in the absence of such a rule in the PET
Rules. In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigation and of such
direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will
not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome should it be determined that the declared president did not truly get the
highest number of votes. We fully appreciate counsels manifestation that movant/intervenor herself claims she has no interest in
assuming the position as she is aware that she cannot succeed to the presidency, having no legal right to it. Yet thus far, in this case,
no real parties such as the vice-presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections, have come forward to intervene, or to be substituted for
the deceased protestant. In our view, if persons not real parties in the action could be allowed to intervene, proceedings will be
unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable and this is not the policy of the law. [19] It is far more prudent to abide by the
existing strict limitations on intervention and substitution under the law and the rules.
Conformably then with the law, the rules and prevailing jurisprudence, this Tribunal finds no justifiable reason to grant the
petition/motion for intervention and substitution.
WHEREFORE, the motion of movant/intervenor JESUSA SONORA POE a.k.a. SUSAN ROCES to intervene and substitute for the
deceased protestant is DENIED for lack of merit.
Acting on the protest and considering the Notice of the Death, submitted by counsel of protestant RONALD ALLAN POE, a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR., we also resolve that Presidential Electoral Tribunal Case No. 002, entitled Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe,
Jr. v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, should be as it is hereby DISMISSED on the ground that no real party in interest has come forward
within the period allowed by law, to intervene in this case or be substituted for the deceased protestant.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

P.E.T. Case No. 001 February 13, 1996

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, protestant,
vs.
FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS, protestee.
RESOLUTION
In her motion of 16 August 1995, reiterated in her Comment of 29 August 1995, Protestant Miriam Defensor-Santiago prayed that
the revision of ballots in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be
deemed completed.
We deferred action on that motion and required the Protestant and the Protestee to submit their respective memoranda on the
issue of whether this case had been rendered moot by the election of the Protestant as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her
assumption of office as such on 30 June 1995.
The Protestant answers this issue in the negative. Relying on Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias,1 Lomugdang vs. Javier,2 and De
Castro vs. Ginete,3 she asserts that an election contest involves not only an adjudication and settlement of the private interests of
the rival candidates, but more importantly, the paramount need to dispel, once and for all, the uncertainty that beclouds the true
choice of the electorate. Hence, it is imbued with public interest and should be pursued to its final conclusion to determine the bona
fide winner. She further asserts that an election case may be rendered moot only if the term of the contested office has
expired,4 thus her election as Senator and assumption of office as such cannot, under the rule laid down in Moraleja vs. Relova,5 be
construed as an abandonment of the instant protest. Finally, she alleges that this Court has departed from the orthodox view that a
case should be dismissed if it has been mooted. 6
For his part, the Protestee submits that there is strong legal basis for this Tribunal to rule that the Protestant is deemed to have
abandoned the instant protest, in light of the ruling in Dimaporo vs. Mitra7 which construed Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881
(Omnibus Election Code).8 He submits, however, that public interest requires that this protest be resolved on the merits considering
that: (a) it involves a matter of paramount and grave public interest; and (b) it was filed merely to keep Protestant Santiago in the
limelight in preparation for her Senatorial campaign. He likewise claims that a resolution on the merits would confirm his victory in
the 11 May 1992 presidential election and prove that the instant protest is unfounded. Further more, it would establish guiding and
controlling principles or doctrines with respect to presidential election protest cases, thereby educating the bench and the bar and
preventing the indiscriminate filing of baseless protest cases.
We cannot subscribe to the view of the Protestee that by filing her certificate of candidacy for Senator Protestant Santiago ipso
facto forfeited her claim to the office of President pursuant to Section 67 of B.P. Blg. 881. Plainly, the said section applies exclusively
to an incumbent elective official who files a certificate of candidacy for any office "other than the one he is holding in a permanent
capacity." Even more plain is that the Protestant was not the incumbent President at the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
for Senator nor at any time before that. Thus, the holding in Dimaporo does not apply to the Protestant.
Neither do we find any convincing logic to the Protestee's proposition that this case should nevertheless be resolved on the merits
because its filing was done in bad faith, i.e., merely to keep the Protestant in the limelight in preparation for her Senatorial
campaign. If that were so, then public interest would be served if this case were put to an abrupt end after the Protestant won a
seat in the Senate. Finally, neither do we find any cogent nor compelling reason to proceed with this case, in the event that we find
it to be moot, simply to establish guiding and controlling principles or doctrines with respect to election protests involving the office
of the President or the Vice-President.
I.
The key then to the resolution of the aforestated issue is the consideration of public interest and public policy and their
encompassing effects on election cases which have been unequivocally expressed in the cases cited by the Protestant.
In Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias,9 this Court stated:
It is axiomatic that an election contest, involving as it does not only the adjudication and settlement of the private interests
of the rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling once and for all the uncertainty that beclouds the real
choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the offices within their gift, is a proceeding
imbued with public interest which raises it onto a plane over and above ordinary civil actions. For this reason, broad
perspectives of public policy impose upon courts the imperative duty to ascertain by all means within their command who
is the real candidate elected in as expeditious a manner as possible, without being fettered by technicalities and procedural
barriers to the end that the will of the people may not be frustrated (Ibasco vs. Ilao, et al., G.R. L-17512, December 29,
1960; Reforma vs. De Luna, G.R. L-13242, July 31, 1958). So inextricably intertwined are the interests of the contestants and
those of the public that there can be no gainsaying the logic of the proposition that even the voluntary cessation in office of
the protestee not only does not ipso facto divest him or the character of an adversary in the contest inasmuch as he retains
a party interest to keep his political opponent out of the office and maintain therein his successor, but also does not in any
manner impair or detract from the jurisdiction of the court to pursue the proceeding to its final conclusion (De Los Angeles
vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595, 597; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584, 587; Galves vs. Maramba, G.R. L-13206).
Upon the same principle, the death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the proceedings in the election protest filed
against him, and it may be stated as a rule that an election contest survives and must be prosecuted to final judgment
despite the death of the protestee. (In Silverio vs. Castro, 19 SCRA 520 [1967], where the trial court proceeded with the trial
of an election protest and decided it even if the protestee had already died and his Vice-Mayor had assumed office by
succession, this Court, instead of dismissing the appeal brought on behalf of the deceased protestee, required the Vice-
Mayor to intervene on the side of the appellant)
In Lomugdang vs. Javier,10 this Court declared:
Determination of what candidate has been in fact elected is a matter clothed with public interest, wherefore, public policy
demands that an election contest, duly commenced, be not abated by the death of the contestant. We have squarely so
ruled in Sibulo vda. de Mesa vs. Judge Mencias, G.R. No. L-24583, October 26, 1966, in the same spirit that led this Court to
hold that the ineligibility of the protestant is not a defense (Caesar vs. Garrido, 53 Phil. 57), and that the protestee's
cessation in office is not a ground for the dismissal of the contest nor detract the Court's jurisdiction to decide the case
(Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584).
In the same Sibulo case, already cited, this Court likewise ruled that by virtue of Section 7, Republic Act 2264, the vice-
mayor elect has the status of a real party in interest in the continuation of the proceedings and is entitled to intervene
therein. For if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice mayor succeeds to the office of mayor that
becomes vacant if the duly elected cannot assume the post.
In Moraleja vs. Relova,11 this Court ruled:
As to the contention that by accepting such appointment as Technical Assistant, protestant has abandoned his protest, all
that need be said is that once the court has acquired jurisdiction over an election contest, the public interest involved
demands that the true winner be known without regard to the wishes or acts of the parties, so much so that there can be
no default, compromise nor stipulation of facts in this kind of cases. (Francisco, How To Try Election Cases, p.
163, citing Civilio v. Tomacruz, 62 Phil. 689). In the same manner that the acceptance by the protestee of an appointment to
another position is not a ground for dismissal of the protest (Philippine Law on Elections by Martin, 1970 ed., pp. 258-
259, citing Calvo v. Maramba, G.R. No. L-13206, January 7, 1918) like the resignation of the protestee from the contested
office (Angeles v. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595), simply because it is of public interest that the real winner be known, neither can
the acceptance of a more or less temporary employment, such as that of a technical assistant of the Vice-Governor, which
is a primarily confidential position, be considered as inconsistent with protestant's determination to protect and pursue the
public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. In such instances, the plight of protestant
may be viewed in the same light as that of an employee who has been illegally dismissed and who, to find means to support
himself and family while he prosecutes his case for reinstatement, accepts a temporary employment elsewhere. Such
employee is not deemed to have abandoned the position he seeks to recover. (Tan v. Gimenez, et al. G.R. No. L-12525,
 February 19, 1960, 107 Phil. 17; Potot v. Bagano, G.R. No. L-2456, January 25, 1949, 82 Phil. 679). Of course, the case of
protestant who accepts a permanent appointment to a regular office could be different, but We are not ruling on it here.
In De Castro vs. Ginete,12 this Court stated:
The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is
really the lawful choice of the electorate. What is sought in an election protest is the correction of the canvass of the votes,
which is the basis of the proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest involves a public office in which the
public has an interest. Certainly, the act of a losing candidate of recognizing the one who is proclaimed the winner should
not bar the losing candidate from questioning the validity of the election of the winner in the manner provided by law.
The factual milieu in these cases is not on all fours with the instant protest.
In Sibulo vda. de De Mesa, as in the later case of Silverio vs. Castro,13 the protestee had been proclaimed the winning mayoralty
candidate and had assumed office, and then died during the pendency of the election protest. While in Lomugdang, it was the
protestant who died during the pendency of the protest.
In Moraleja, the election protest survived the protestant's acceptance of temporary employment during the pendency of his election
protest. Likewise, in De los Angeles vs. Rodriguez,14 cited in Sibulo vda. de De Mesa, an election protest was continued despite the
resignation from office of the protestee.
Finally, in De Castro, the only issue presented was whether the protest should be dismissed on the ground ofestoppel. In this
proceeding, the protestant congratulated the protestee after the latter was proclaimed the winner by the board of canvassers and
even exhorted those present during the inauguration and installation into office of the protestee to support the latter's
administration.
May the above dicta apply to the case of Protestant Santiago who assumed the office of Senator after her election as such in the 8
May 1995 election? This question was impliedly raised but not resolved in Moraleja. For after holding that the acceptance by the
protestant therein of a temporary appointment during the pendency of his protest did not amount to an abandonment thereof, nor
could it be considered inconsistent with his determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the election protest,
this Court noted: "Of course, the case of a protestant who accepts a permanent appointment to a regular office could be different,
but We are not ruling on it here."15
Indeed, it would be entirely different where the protestant pursued the new position through a popular election, as in the case of
Protestant Santiago who filed a certificate of candidacy for Senator in the 8 May 1995 election, campaigned for such office, and
submitted herself to be voted upon. She knew that the term of office of the Senators who would then be elected would be six years,
to commence at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election16 and to end at noon of 30 June 2001. Knowing her
high sense of integrity and candor, it is most unlikely that during her campaign, she promised to serve the electorate as Senator,
subject to the outcome of this protest. In short, she filed her certificate of candidacy for the Senate without any qualification,
condition, or reservation.
In so doing, she entered into a political contract with the electorate that if elected, she would assume the office of Senator,
discharge its functions and serve her constituency as such for the term for which she was elected. These are givens which are in full
accord with the principle enshrined in the Constitution that, public office is a public trust, and public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people and serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. 17
Indeed, it has been aptly said:
It is impossible that government shall be carried on, and the functions of civil society exercised, without the aid and
intervention of public servants or officers, and every person, therefore, who enters into civil society and avails himself of
the benefits and protection of the government, must owe to this society, or, in other words, to the public, at least a social
duty to bear his share of the public burdens, by accepting and performing, under reasonable circumstances, the duties of
those public offices to which he may be lawfully chosen.18
In this jurisdiction, an elected public official may even be held criminally liable should he refuse to discharge an elective office. 19
The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of which coincides with the last
three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant
Santiago's term if she would succeed in proving in the instant protest. that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In
assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, in the
language of Moraleja, abandoned her "determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the
real choice of the electorate." Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest. Moreover, the
dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992
presidential election, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.
It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may be summarily dismissed,
regardless of the public policy and public interest implications thereof, on the following grounds:
(1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance;
(2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof;
(3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules;
(4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing of the protest; and
(5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not clearly legible. 20
Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules of Court which apply in a suppletory character, 21 may
likewise be pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer. After which, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing
on such grounds.22 In sum, if an election protest may be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger
reason, if it has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant.
II.
There is yet another reason why this case should now be dismissed.
This Tribunal cannot close its eyes to the fact that the Protestant has decided to waive the revision of the remaining unrevised
ballots from 4,017 precincts out of the 17,527 precincts of the designated three pilot areas. This is an unabashed reversal from her
original stand in her Motion and Manifestation dated 18 October 1993. Taking this into account, this Tribunal declared in its
resolution of 21 October 1993:
 After deliberating on the foregoing pleadings and the arguments of the parties, the Tribunal rules for the Protestant insofar
as the revision of the remaining ballot boxes from her pilot areas are concerned, and against the immediate application of
Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal to the Protestee in respect of the Counter-Protest.
At this stage of the proceedings in this case it cannot be reasonably determined whether the revised ballots are
"considerable" enough to establish a trend either in favor of or against the Protestant as would justify an appropriate action
contemplated in Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal, or whether the unrevised ballots from said areas would not, in the
language of the Protestant, "materially affect the result of the representative sample of the ballot boxes so far revised." As
to the 1,300 ballot boxes from Makati, the proper time to raise the objections to the ballot boxes and its contents would be
during the revision stage.
Consequently, we resolved therein to:
A. ORDER the revision of the remaining unrevised ballot boxes enumerated in the aforequoted paragraph A of the 5
October 1993 Resolution and for that purpose to DIRECT the Acting Clerk of Court of the Tribunal to collect said ballot
boxes and other election documents and paraphernalia from their respective custodians in the event that their revisions in
connection with other election protests in which they are involved have been terminated, and if such revisions are not yet
completed, to coordinate with the appropriate tribunal or court in which such other election protests are pending and
which have already obtained custody of the ballot boxes and started revision with the end in view of either seeking
expeditious revisions in such other election protests or obtaining the custody of the ballot boxes and related election
documents and paraphernalia for their immediate delivery to the Tribunal; and
B. REQUIRE the Protestant to inform the Tribunal, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, if after the completion of the
revision of the ballots from her pilot areas she would present evidence in connection therewith.
Until the present, however, the Protestant has not informed the Tribunal whether after the completion of the revision of the ballots
from her pilot areas, she still intends to present evidence in connection therewith. This failure then, is nothing short of a manifest
indication that she no longer intends to do so.
It is entirely irrelevant at this stage of the proceedings that the Protestant's revisors discovered in the course of the revisions alleged
irregularities in 13,510 out of the 17,525 contested precincts in the pilot areas and have objected to thousands of ballots cast in
favor of the Protestee. Revision is merely the first stage, and not the alpha and omega, of an election contest. In no uncertain terms
then, this Tribunal declared in its resolution of 18 March 1993 that:
Protestant knows only too well, being a lawyer and a former judge herself, that the revision phase of her protest is but the
first stage in the resolution of her electoral protest and that the function of the revisors is very limited. In her 12 February
1993 Comment on Protestee's 5 February 1993 Urgent Motion for the issuance of a resolution which, inter alia, would
clarify that revisors may observe the objections and/or claims made by the revisors of the other party as well as the ballots
subject thereof, and record such observations in a form to be provided for that purpose, Protestant unequivocally stated:
8. Further, the principle and plan of the RPET [Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal] is to subdivide the entire
election contest into various stages. Thus, the first stage is the Revision Proper. Second is the technical
examination if so desired by either party. Third is the reception of evidence. And Fourth, is the filing of parties'
memoranda.
and described the function of the revisors as "solely to examine and segregate the ballots according to which ballots they
would like to contest or object (contested ballots) and those which they admit or have no objections (uncontested ballots)."
Indeed, revisors do not have any judicial discretion; their duties are merely clerical in nature (Hontiveros vs. Altavas, 24 Phil.
632 [1913]). In fact, their opinion or decision on the more crucial or critical matter of what ballots are to be contested or
not does not even bind the Tribunal (Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil. 781 [1929]; Olano vs. Tibayan, 53 Phil. 168 [1929]). Thus,
no undue importance may be given to the revision phase of an election contest. It can never serve as a logical or an
acceptable basis for the conclusion that massive fraud or irregularities were committed during an election or that a
Protestant had won in said election. If that were so, a Protestant may contest all ballot boxes and, in the course of the
revision thereof, object for any imagined ground whatsoever, even if the same be totally unfounded and ridiculous to all
ballots credited to the Protestee; and then, at the end of the day, said Protestant may even announce to the whole world
that contrary to what is reflected in the election returns, Protestee had actually lost the elections.
All told, a dismissal of this election protest is inevitable.
III.
However, three Members of the Tribunal outrightly disagree with the foregoing disquisitions. Hence, a reply to the important points
they raise is in order.
Mr. Justice Puno's perception that the majority would dismiss this "election protest as moot and academic on two (2) grounds: first,
that the findings of irregularities made by the revisors of the protestant in the course of the revision of ballots in 13,510 contested
precincts are entirely irrelevant; and second, she abandoned her protest when she filed her certificate of candidacy in the 8 May
1995 senatorial elections," is inaccurate. The dispositive portion of this resolution leaves no room for any doubt or
miscomprehension that the dismissal is based on the ground that the protest "has been rendered moot and academic by its
abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her
discharge of the duties and functions thereof." There is, therefore, ONLY ONE reason or ground why the protest has been rendered
moot and academic, i.e., it has been abandoned or withdrawn. This was the very issue upon which the parties were required, in the
resolution of 26 September 1995, to submit their respective memoranda.
The majority neither conveyed, asserted nor even suggested, as Mr. Justice Puno has apparently understood, that this protest has
become moot and academic because the finding of irregularities by the Protestant's revisors in the course of the revision of the
ballots in 13,510 contested precincts in the pilot areas are "entirely irrelevant," and that the Protestant has abandoned this protest
by filing a certificate of candidacy for the office of Senator in the 8 May 1995 elections. The majority's views on "irrelevancy" and "on
the filing of the certificate of candidacy" are not the grounds themselves, but parts only of the arguments to strengthen the
conclusion reached, i.e.,abandonment. Otherwise stated, in order to make the point crystal clear, the majority never held that the
irrelevancy of the finding of irregularities is a ground why this protest has become moot and academic. It only declared that the
Protestant's: (a) waiver of revision of the unrevised ballots from the remaining 4,017 contested precincts in the pilot areas; and (b)
failure to comply with the resolution of 21 October 1995 requiring her to inform the Tribunal within ten days from notice if she
would still present evidence after completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas rendered such "findings" of
irregularities entirely irrelevant considering the Tribunal's disquisitions on what revision is in its 18 March 1993 resolution.
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Puno lifted the words "entirely irrelevant"; from the fourth paragraph under the heading "II" of this
Resolution. It must, however, be stressed that the said paragraph is inexorably linked to the preceding two paragraphs relating to
the above-mentioned waiver and non-compliance, which provide the major premises for the fourth paragraph; more concretely, the
latter is nothing more than the logical conclusion which the major premises support.
The reasons adduced by Mr. Justice Puno for the Protestant's turn-around are mere speculations. In any event, the protestant's
possible "belief . . . that the contested ballots in 13,500 precincts when properly appreciated will sufficiently establish her electoral
victory," cannot stand against her previous insistence to proceed with the revision of the remaining unrevised ballots and the
aforementioned finding of the Tribunal in its resolution of 21 October 1993. The Tribunal is not to blame for "the slow pace of the
protest," if at all she so believes in such a state of things. Neither can the thought of cutting costs be a valid reason. The Protestant
knew from the outset that the revision of the ballots in the pilot areas was a crucial phase of this protest because, under Rule 61 of
the Rules of the Tribunal, the protest could forthwith be dismissed if the Tribunal were convinced that she would probably fail to
make out a case but only after examination of the ballots from the pilot areas and the evaluation of the evidence offered in
connection therewith. It goes without saying that every ballot then in the pilot areas counts.
Then too, it was never the view of the majority that the Protestant's filing of the certificate of candidacy for a seat in the Senate in
the 8 May 1995 election was the sole and exclusive operative act for what Mr. Justice Puno perceives to be the majority's second
ground why this protest has become moot and academic. To the majority, such filing was only the initial step in a series of acts
performed by the Protestant to convincingly evince her abandonment of this protest, viz., campaigning for the office of Senator,
assumption of such office after her election and her discharge of the duties and functions of the said office. Precisely, in the
resolution of 26 September 1995, this Court directed the Protestant and the Protestee to submit their respective memoranda on the
issue
[o]f whether or not the protest has not been rendered moot and academic by the election of the Protestant as Senator and
her subsequent assumption of office as such on 30 June 1995. (emphasis supplied)
As to the concept of abandonment, Mr. Justice Puno and Mr. Justice Kapunan cite Black's Law Dictionary and the cases of Roebuck
vs. Mecosta Country Road Commission,23 Dober vs. Ukase Inv. Co., 24 and McCall vs. Cull,25cited therein. We have turned to the
primary sources of these cases, meticulously perused them, and found none materially significant to this protest.
The first two cases above refer to abandonment of property. Roebuck involved the issue of whether a roadway had been abandoned
by the Mecosta Road Commission. The Court therein held that in order for there to be an abandonment of land dedicated to public
use, two elements must concur, viz., (a) intention to relinquish the right or property, but without intending to transfer title to any
particular person; and (b) the external act which such intention is carried into effect. While Dober, on the issue of whether the
plaintiff therein abandoned a certain property, quoted Corpus Juris that the intention to abandon must be determined from the
facts and circumstances of the case. There must be a clear, unequivocal and decisive act of the party to constitute abandonment in
respect of a right secured an act done which shows a determination in the individual not to have a benefit which is designed for him.
It is, of course, settled that a public office is not deemed property. 26
Only McCall involved the issue of abandonment of office. It is stated therein as follows:
Abandonment is a matter of intention and, when thought of in connection with an office, implies that the occupant has quit
the office and ceased to perform its duties. As long as he continues to discharge the duties of the office, even though his
source of title is two appointments, one valid and the other invalid, it cannot be said he has abandoned it. It was said in
Steingruber v. City of San Antonio, Tex. Com. App., 220 S.W. 77, 78: "A public office may be abandoned. Abandonment is a
species of resignation. Resignation and abandonment are voluntary acts. The former is a formal relinquishment; the latter a
relinquishment through non-user. Abandonment implies non-user, but non-user does not, of itself, constitute
abandonment. The failure to perform the duties pertaining to the office must be with actual or imputed intention on the
part of the officer to abandon and relinquish the office. The intention may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the
party, and is a question of fact. Abandonment may result from an acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful removal or
discharge, but, as in other cases of abandonment, the question of intention is involved.
Strictly speaking, McCall is inapplicable to this protest for, as correctly stated in the dissent of Mr. Justice Kapunan, the Protestant
could not abandon the office of President which she was not holding at the time she filed the certificate of candidacy for Senator.
But the majority of the Tribunal never declared, nor even implied, that she abandoned the office of President because it knew that
she had yet nothing to abandon. Precisely, she filed this protest to be declared the winner for that office, to thereafter assume and
perform the duties thereof, and exercise the powers appertaining thereto. What the Tribunal explicitly states is that the
Protestant abandoned this Protest, thereby rendering this protest moot.
Mr. Justice Puno also insists that abandonment raises a question of fact and that the Tribunal cannot resolve it "for lack of
competent evidence"; moreover, he notes that the Protestee "has not adduced evidence which can be the basis for a finding that
she intentionally abandoned her protest; on the contrary, the Protestee does not want the protest to be dismissed on a technicality
but prays that it be decided on the merits." Suffice it to say that the Protestant herself has not denied nor questioned the following
facts, which by themselves, constitute overwhelming proof of the intention to abandon the protest:
(a) Filing of a certificate of candidacy for Senator for the 8 May 1995 elections;
(b) Campaigning for the office of Senator in such election;
(c) Taking her oath of office as Senator upon the commencement of the term therefor;
(d) Assumption of office as Senator; and
(e) Discharge and performance of the duties appertaining to the office of Senator.
These acts speak for themselves res ipsa loquitur to negate any proposition that the Protestant has not abandoned this protest.
Thus, what initially appears to be the correct view in the dissent is, in the final analysis, misplaced. This must also be the verdict
upon the following pronouncements of Mr. Justice Puno:
A more fundamental reason prevents me from joining the majority. With due respect, I submit that the majority ruling on
abandonment is inconsistent with the doctrine that an election contest is concerned less with the private interest of the
candidates but more with public interest. Under a republican regime of government, the overarching object of an election
contest is to seek and enforce the judgment of the people on who should govern them. It is not a happenstance that the
first declaration of policy of our Constitution underlines in bright that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government
 authority emanates from them." The first duty of a citizen as a particle of sovereignty in a democracy is to exercise his
sovereignty just as the first duty of any reigning government is to uphold the sovereignty of the people at all cost. Thus,
in Moraleja vs. Relova, we emphatically held that ". . . once the court has acquired jurisdiction over an election contest, the
public interest involved demands that the true winner be known without regard to the wishes or acts of the parties so
much so that there can be no default, compromise nor stipulation of facts in this kind of cases." Wisely, this Tribunal has
consistently demurred from dismissing election contests even on the ground of death of the protestee or the protestant.
The majority appears to stray away from this lodestar of our Constitution. It will dismiss the case at bar even while the
protestee and the protestant are yet alive, even while the term of the 1992 president-elect has yet to expire, and even
while the protestee and the protestant together plead, that the Tribunal should determine the true will of the people by
deciding their dispute on the merit[s] and not on technicalities that trifle with the truth. I submit that it is the better stance
for the Tribunal to decide this election contest on the merit[s] and vindicate the political judgment of the people which far
surpasses in significance all other considerations. Our duty to tell the people who have the right to govern them cannot
depend on the uncertain oscillations of politics of the litigants as often times they are directed by the wind of convenience,
and not by the weal of the public.
For one, the majority has, in no uncertain terms, demonstrated the dissimilarities in the factual settings of the instant protest vis-a-
vis the earlier cases that enunciated the doctrine relied on by Mr. Justice Puno. Then, too, it must be reiterated, to avoid further
miscomprehension, that the Moraleja ruling even conceded that the matter of abandonment "could be different" if the petitioner
therein had accepted "a permanent appointment to a regular office" during the pendency of his protest. In short, Moraleja in fact
intimates abandonment of an election protest if, in the meantime, the Protestant accepts a permanent appointment to a regular
office. If that be so, then would it be, and for weightier reasons, against a protestant who voluntarily sought election to an office
whose term would extend beyond the expiry date of the term of the contested office, and after winning the said election, took her
oath and assumed office and thereafter continuously serves it.
In Moraleja, the Supreme Court was meticulous in excluding abandonment from the enumeration of specific "acts or wishes" of the
parties which must be disregarded because of the public interest component of an election protest. As reflected in the above
quotation from Mr. Justice Puno's dissent, only default, compromise, orstipulation of facts are included.
Finally, with all due respect, the above pronouncement of Mr. Justice Puno forgets that, as distinctly pointed out in the early part of
this Resolution, the Rules of the Tribunal allow summary dismissal of election protests even for less important grounds, to repeat,
such as the petition filed with the Tribunal or the annexes attached thereto are not clearly legible, or the filing fees and cash
deposits were not filed within the periods fixed in the Rules, 27 and the additional provision for dismissal under Rule 61. All these
provisions of the Rules would then be put to naught or, at the very least, modified or amended in a way not authorized by the Rules,
if the theory of Mr. Justice Puno be accepted. Such theory would unreasonably bind the Tribunal to the technical minutiae of trial on
the merits to bring to their ultimate end all protests or contests filed before it including those filed by candidates who even forgot to
vote for themselves and obtained no votes in the final count, but, unable to accept defeat, filed a protest claiming massive fraud and
irregularities, vote-buying, and terrorism. Consequently, all the time and energy of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be spent
appreciating millions of revised ballots to the prejudice of their regular judicial functions in the Court, as the electoral protest of
every Juan, Pedro, and Jose who lost in the presidential elections would have to be heard on the merits. Public policy abhors such a
scenario and no public good stands to be thereby served.
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal hereby resolved to
(1) GRANT the Protestant's Motion of 16 August 1995 to dispense with the revision of ballots and other election documents
in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas;
(2) DISMISS the instant election protest, since it has been rendered moot and academic by its abandonment or withdrawal
by the Protestant as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and
functions thereof; and
(3) DISMISS, as a consequence, the Protestee's Counter-Protest.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.