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Journal of Communist
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Uruguayan communism:
The dilemmas of tactics and
strategy
a
Charlie Gillespie
a
Yale University
Published online: 12 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: Charlie Gillespie (1985) Uruguayan communism: The

dilemmas of tactics and strategy, Journal of Communist Studies, 1:3-4, 174-178,
DOI: 10.1080/13523278508414789

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 174 MILITARY MARXIST REGIMES IN AFRICA

revealed that the retiring general secretary could get no further than Khrushchev had
20 years earlier in coming to terms with Stalinism. Yet Gollan and the rest of the party
centre identified themselves with the 'Eurocommunism' of the BRS.
Nevertheless, the new draft of the party programme caused enough critical thinking
to bring about a split, when Sid French and Eric Trevett, leaders of the Surrey district,
took about 700 members out of the organization in 1977 to form the New Communist
Party (NCP). The subsequent demise of the NCP is one reason why the current
opposition will not try to defend 'Marxism-Leninism' by forming a new organization.
Of course, leading Eurocommunists, impatient with a leadership primarily composed
of 'machine-minders' whose first priority is to work with everybody, face no such
dilemma: in the past they have simply joined the Labour Party on an individual basis
(this was the direction taken by David Purdy and Mike Prior in the 1970s). But now
the shoe is on the other foot, and it is the fundamentalist opposition that must decide.
This is now organized around three factional journals in addition to The Morning
Star: The Straight Left, The Leninist, and Education Tomorrow. Of these, only the
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Morning Star leadership is foolish enough to formalize the split, while the others are
persuaded that they can take over the party machine by pursuing the faction war.
Although they have the usual shibbolethic differences, the opposition factions are united
in their perception of the leadership perspectives as tending to 'liquidationism'. For
there is an inherent problem in a tiny organization pursuing an Eurocommunist strategy,
namely that at best the party will become a think-tank for the left. This may have its
attractions for some of the party's intellectuals, but it is anathema to a growing
proportion of the membership and to most of the old leadership closely associated
with its industrial work: Ken Gill, Bert Ramelson, Derek Robinson, Kevin Halpin and
their like. All the evidence suggests that the oppositionist wing of the party will not
go away; either mass expulsions will occur or the faction fight will continue. Either
way, the further decline of the CPGB seems certain.
JOHN CALLAGHAN
Wolverhampton Polytechnic

Uruguayan Communism: The Dilemmas of Tactics and Strategy

One of the first acts of President Sanguinetti upon taking office on 1 March 1985 after
almost 12 years of military rule in Uruguay was to abrogate a number of the previous
regime's repressive decrees, thereby legalizing the Communist Party (PCU). Prior to
the military coup of 1973, with a membership of at least 20,000 (out of a population
of less than three million), the PCU had been one of the largest affiliates of the Third
International relative to population size in South America.1 Although it remained
seemingly 'stuck' at about six per cent of the votes in the 1971 election, it possessed
a number of strategic advantages. It was undisputably the largest left-wing party in
Uruguay, for the Socialist Party (PS) suffered from organizational weakness, faction-
alism and successive ideological lurches from Castroism to Maoism, and then to self-
proclaimed 'Marxism-Leninism' in 1972, at which time many leaders and militants
(especially of the youth wing) either were expelled or resigned to join the PCU.
Furthermore, the PCU was by far the dominant force in the country's sizeable trade-
union movement, 80 per cent of which was affiliated to the single union federation,
the CNT (National Workers' Convention). Although Uruguay's position in the world
economy and its small domestic market have not produced large-scale heavy industries,
it is nevertheless the most urbanized country in Latin America, with a very large public
sector, abundant service industries, and a strong middle class that has not necessarily
 PROFILE 175

proven inimical to socialist ideas. The PCU possessed union strongholds in the docks,
transport, construction and metallurgy, amongst municipal workers in the capital,
and in the major nationalized industries (electricity, telephones, water and railways).
It had a daily newspaper (ElPopular), a theoretical journal (Estudios), radio stations,
and a constellation of publishing houses, commercial interests, cultural associations,
and affiliated activities. The Union of Young Communists (UJC) with 5,000 or so
members was by far the largest youth organization in the country, particularly given
the historical weakness of the Church. Finally, the two so-called 'traditional parties'
(Colorado and Blanco) which had existed for a century and a half, and still won
80 per cent of the votes in the 1971 elections, were notoriously lacking in formal
organization, and reliant on notables, clientelism, and the established media for their
survival.
Against this apparently favourable situation, the PCU faced a number of serious
obstacles. In trade union politics it was caught between the increasing repressiveness
of the government after 1968 and the increasing militancy of the grassroots, where
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the influence of anarchists, ultra-left socialists, ex-Communists and independents was

growing rapidly. These groups formed an unofficial alliance called the 'Combative
Tendency', and pressed for immediate action, bitterly denouncing and undermining
the PCU's more cautious strategy of 'accumulation of forces' which, on occasion,
envisaged the possibility of 'social-contract'-type incomes policies to stabilize Uruguay's
rapidly disintegrating democracy. Amongst youth, it had lost its attractions to a
generation which was inspired by 'El Che' and theTupamaros, who defined themselves
as anti-imperialist revolutionaries, but who were more nationalist than Marxist, and
frankly hostile to the PCU. Although the General Secretary, Rodney Arismendi (con-
sidered by Moscow to be a world-class theoretician), responded by publicly dissociating
the party from the guerrilla strategy, the PCU was in practice the most pro-Cuban
party in the region, and belatedly adopted an 'insurance' policy of penetrating the
Tupamaro organization and creating its own secret military apparatus. Apart from
the constant danger of being outflanked on the left, the party continued to come
up against the prevalent anti-communism of much of Uruguayan political society: it
was common, for instance, even for those of the left, to refer to the Communists as
Los Bolches.
Nevertheless, over the past three decades as general secretary, Arismendi has argued
consistently for a 'popular front' strategy. The first phase was the creation of the 'Left
Liberation Front' (FIDEL) in 1962, which did far better than the rival 'Popular Union'
formed by the Socialists. In 1971 the strategy bore fruit with the formation of the Broad
Front, which included the Socialists, Christian Democrats and various ex-Colorados
and Blancos. Much to the party's chagrin, most of the increase in the total left-wing
vote benefited these latter groups rather than the PCU. For several years after the
election and well after the 1973 coup, the party more or less overtly tried to build an
alliance with progressive elements in the armed forces. It welcomed the military com-
muniques of February 1973 which called for profound reforms and served as a pretext
for their seizure of power. However, Peru and Portugal were very far away, and the
PCU was declared illegal at the end of the year. Two years later it was almost com-
pletely destroyed by a terrible wave of repression. Arismendi was allowed to travel
to the Soviet Union following an apparent deal, and from then on the decimated central
committee met in the exterior. The PCU became the worst victim of the dictatorship's
methods.
By 1980, when hope re-emerged that democracy might be restored, the PCU had
begun to co-operate with the exiled leader of the Blanco party, Wilson Ferreira,
and came to play a major role in the Convergencia Democrdtica which he set up.
 176 MILITARY MARXIST REGIMES IN AFRICA

This organization achieved no influence inside Uruguay; it was denounced by the

Colorados and resisted by many Socialists, Christian Democrats and ex-Tupamaros.
During March 1984, the former presidential candidate of the Broad Front, General
Liber Seregni, was released from gaol and began to rebuild a united left alliance.
It has been speculated that the PCU was not entirely happy at the abrupt change of
policy it was thus forced to implement. Whereas Ferreira and the Blancos remained
diehard opponents of the military regime, the Broad Front chose to win its own legal-
ization by entering into a pact with the Colorados and the commanders in chief of
the three services (who now wished to hand back power to civilians). The PCU was
not legalized, but it was allowed to run lists of candidates, under the banner Democracia
Avanzada, within the Broad Front. As had been the major intention of the Naval Club
Pact, the Colorados won the election and formed a centre-right government. To the
great disappointment of the left, which has never tasted power in Uruguay, the Broad
Front narrowly lost the contest for control of municipal government in Montevideo.
The resurrection of the PCU, a contradictory process of fomenting left unity while
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simultaneously attempting to rebuild the party's hegemonic position, has been fought
for in the Broad Front and the Union Federation (PIT-CNT), both of which are under-
going massive reorganization. These arenas, in turn, interact with the broader political
terrain of relations with the ruling Colorado government and Blanco opposition, and
the narrower internal struggle for reorganization of the party itself. It may be easiest
to examine these arenas as concentric circles, which is as they must appear to the leader-
ship of the party.
The recently-elected central committee of about 95 members includes no fewer than
40 new faces. Some 16 members of the pre-1973 central committee were murdered or
'disappeared': many more died of natural causes or have not returned from exile. One
or two have been ousted following accusations of having 'talked' while under inter-
rogation. Alongside Arismendi who remains General Secretary, the more popular union
leader and martyr Jaime Perez has been made his adjunct. The 17-member executive
closely resembles its predecessor, but the newly-devised secretariat (nine men; no
women) shows some notable omissions. Jose Luis Massera, a world-class mathematician
whose cruel imprisonment was the subject of an international campaign, had to make
do with the honour of delivering a speech commemorating Lenin's birth. Although
the fagade of unity remains unblemished, there can be little doubt that tensions exist
between those leaders who underwent the very different experience of exile (Arismendi,
Bruera, Rodriguez) and those who joined as many as 7,000 other comrades in gaol
and are probably more combative. The occasional independence of the 'Advanced
Democracy' senators is surely a less significant phenomenon, since they rely on the
now legal party's votes if they are to be re-elected.
The struggle over the reorganization of the Broad Front is a potentially explosive
matter, as the relationship of voting strength to organizational strength (numbers of
militants) among the different parties is often practically inverse. The ultra-left Inde-
pendent Democratic Left (IDI) is the sector that has the most to lose as the following
figures comparing voting strength and share in votes of the Broad Front executive show:

1971 Elections 1984 Elections Executive Votes

Advanced Democracy (PCU + allies) 33 28 32

99th List (Ex-Colorados) 10 39 16
Socialist Party 12 15 5
Christian Democrats 20 11 11 .
IDI and predecessors 23 7 26
 PROFILE 177

Already, the executive includes various independent members, and part of the solution
to the problem of block-voting is likely to be the introduction of direct representation
of grassroots committees (where sectarianism is normally weaker than amongst the
leadership). Nevertheless, the decline of the ultra-left is irreversible, and has led to
a certain rapprochement with the PCU in some sectors. Meanwhile, the Socialists are
divided over whether to unite with other moderate groups (as those leaders who spent
their exile in Spain learning from the PSOE would favour).
The degree of flux and uncertainty brought on by mass participation is higher still
in the reorganization of the PIT-CNT union federation, whose convention was post-
poned in 1984 due to failure to reach agreement on delegate selection. The non-
Communist left feel they are finally breaking the PCU's hegemony, having recently
captured control of the municipal workers', dockers' and refinery workers' unions.
They are mounting increased opposition to the existing leadership apparatus in textiles,
construction and health care, and their position will be strengthened by both the
incorporation of public sector unions, and the rejection of 'Unity Lists' in teachers'
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and students' unions. The situation remains highly complex, however, as greater union
democracy may not quell industrial militancy but rather the reverse. The country was
repeatedly paralysed by a wave of strikes until the President made a speech on 18 July
(Independence Day), demanding a social pact while threatening tough measures if
industrial peace was not achieved.
One great problem facing the PCU is that the objective of restoring its dominance
in the unions may conflict with the tactic of attempting to stabilize democracy by
'concertation'. The ultra-left is openly hostile to any social pact with the government
(let alone employers). Meanwhile, Advanced Democracy senators have spent their time
defending the left's pact with the military from the attacks of Blancos, and
simultaneously have been denouncing corruption in the navy and violations of human
rights by the previous regime. Although not as anti-Communist as many Colorados,
President Sanguinetti is anxious to promote 'pluralism' in the unions, if necessary
legally enforcing the practice of electing leaders by secret ballot (already widespread).
This is definitely a serious threat to the party, and is arguably counter-productive,
insofar as it may undermine the PCU's ability to pursue a moderate line and restrain
the pent-up demands of workers and employees whose real earnings have fallen to less
than half of their real value in 1968.
What are the prospects for the Communists after 12 years of bloody repression?
Although the Broad Front increased its share of the vote in 1984 compared to 1971,
the PCU failed to make progress and thus saw its relative share of the total left vote
decline.2 The extreme left and the Christian Democrats did badly, the Socialists and
moderate ex-Colorados (now the largest faction) performed well. Now the latter two
are discussing the possibility of uniting to form a moderate socialist party, although
the PS is still in theory 'Marxist-Leninist' and adamantly opposed to 'Social
Democracy'. Despite great efforts, the PCU may be losing control of the PIT-CNT.
Much of the debate on 'concertation' with the present Colorado government to
stabilize democracy has been stifled within the party. Still opposed to 'Eurocom-
munism', the PCU is faced in the long term with something of the dilemma that
faced the French Communist Party in 1977-78: left unity may one day break the
traditional parties' monopoly of government, but the new votes may not go to the
Communist Party but rather to its former (and surely future) centre-left rivals.
CHARLIE GILLESPIE
Yale University
 178 MILITARY MARXIST REGIMES IN AFRICA

NOTES

The author wishes to acknowledge dissertation research fellowships from the Inter-American
Foundation and the Social Science Research Council USA during 1984-85, for work on Uruguay's
return to democracy.
1. The party claimed membership to be 50,000 in 1973.
2. Although formally illegal, the PCU had no trouble organizing large political rallies for its
'Advanced Democracy' lists, including a huge welcome for Arismendi upon his return from
Moscow. It was the only left-wing party to control a daily newspaper, and had more militants,
posters and pamphlets on the streets than any other, constantly emphasizing the party's
martyrdom and intransigence under the regime. Although there were tensions over the unilateral
opening of Advanced Democracy committees in each neighbourhood, alongside those of the
Broad Front, and over the PCU's vetoing of a popular candidate for Mayor of Montevideo,
rival parties of the left avoided anti-Communist provocations. Seregni, for example, pro-
nounced Cuba a 'democracy' when pressed by the media on the subject. Whereas FIDEL
had 33 per cent of the Broad Front vote in 1971, Democracia Avanzada had merely 28 per cent
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in 1984. The stagnation of the Communists' national vote is shown below:

Year. 1938 1946 1954 1958 1962 1966 1971 1984

Percentage of vote: 1.5 4.9 2.2 2.6 3.5 5.7 6.0 5.9

Iraj Eskandari: The 'Red Prince' 1908-85

The history of the Iranian left presents problems for the historian, and tracing the life
of a communist, even in such a short space as here, involves uncertainties. The past
is never far away from the present; interested parties defend their honour by hiding
the evidence, whilst others are always prepared to fill the vacuum. At the same time
successive oppressive regimes in Iran have hardly encouraged scholarly work. In
addition, Iraj Eskandari was hardly ever a subject-matter independent of his party.
As he was establishing his place in the communist movement, the days of personal
influence and popular respect for individuals were fading. With the formation of the
Tudeh (the party of'the masses') the age of collective political struggle - at least for
the left - had begun.
Iraj Eskandari was born in 1908. His father, Yahya-Mirza Eskandari, a revolutionary
Social Democrat despite his princely title, and a pillar of the Iranian Constitutional
Revolution (1905-09), was assassinated soon after Iraj's birth. In his youth, Iraj left
Tehran to study in France and there made contact with Iranian Marxists who were
opposed to Reza Shah's oppressive rule. He also met Reza Radmanesh, who was to
remain his life-long comrade. At the same time, while he was a university student at
Grenoble, Eskandari joined the French Communist Party and it was his political
activities that cost him his government grant. Soon he was forced to abandon his
doctoral research and return to Tehran where he was employed by the Department
of Justice.
In the early 1930s, not long after his return, he joined Dr Arani, a prominent Iranian
Marxist, and together with him and Bozorg Alavi (now a leading writer) he took part
in the publication of Donya (The World) - a left-wing journal. Donya provided the
perfect camouflage for the activities of this three-man nucleus and for its efforts to
rally and organize prospective communists.
In 1935 Donya ceased publication for unknown reasons, but the political and
organizational work of Arani and his followers continued until 1937 when, betrayed