American Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies (ASECS)

Swift's Tale: On Satire, Negation, and the Uses of Irony

Author(s): W. B. Carnochan
Source: Eighteenth-Century Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn, 1971), pp. 122-144
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press . Sponsor: American Society for
Eighteenth-Century Studies (ASECS) .
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 Tale
Swift's
On Satire,Negation,
and theUses of Irony
W. B. CARNOCHAN

His satires,
SWIFT TEASES US intothought. self-referential
as they
are,turnthemindinward and,also,totheinnerlifeofsatire.
onitself
Gulliver,theModestProposal,theTale, all are deep allegoricalver-
sionsoftheirownsurface structures.It is theTale thatI am going
to talkabouthere-and aboutsomeofitssatiriceffects thatseem
to meexemplary ofthesatiriccase.
Everyoneagreesthatsatireresistsdefinition, and thereasonis
usuallysupposedtobe becausefamily resemblances (afterWittgen-
steinwe needn'tinsiston more)arefiendishly to establish.
difficult
Thoughthereareby-blows in thebestoffamilies, thelinealmarkis
likelytobe strong. Notso,wethink, withsatire.Evenifwe arewell
disposedto genreas a working concept, stillso muchis happening
in "satire"--thatis,in all thedifferent things towhichthelabelgets
we
attached-that protect ourselveswith those reassuring quotation
marks.Butare therenotsomeotherreasonsbesidestheinductive
onesforourperplexity? If not,we arewrongto makesucha fuss.
The grasslooksgreener everywhere else.Whyarewe notso lucky,
we think, as to be feeding in therich,well-fenced pasturesof(say)
tragedy andcomedy? Or, as is reallythemotivebehindmostsuch
pseudoenvious glances,whydoesanybody botherwithtragedy and
comedy when,as matters fordefinition, are
they suchsybaritic fare?
Allthisis theusualself-aggrandisement andconsolation ofthemind.
Butinrational moments weknowthatothers arefeeling equallyput
uponbycircumstance. Is theinsistence onthedifferent-ness ofsatire
justanother case,then,of criticalself-applause? Or is therereally
something toit?
Introductions getwritten afterthefact.It wouldnotbe wrongto
callwhatfollows an attempt find
to outifcritics ofsatirearesuffering
from massdelusion, butthedescription implies theoutcome. I think
122

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 SWIFT'S TALE 123

theyare not,eveniftheyhave sometimesmisunderstood thesource

I thinkthereare good reasons,beyondthe elusive
of the difficulty.
formalproperties of satire,whyit seemsa specialcase. It mayhelp
to specifyin themostconventionalway whereI thinkthedifficulty
lies: namely,at thepointofintersection betweensatire'scriticaland
aestheticcontent. To specify it thatway,thoughlackingin nuance,
getstheissuesquarelyintosight.It is like skywriting, mile-high let-
terssoon alteredby windsof qualificationand change.We should
look at it a moment,though,beforethelettersfade.
We take it forgranted,as an originalconditionof satire,thatit
has a criticalpurpose,althoughby now satireis probablythe only
artisticformaboutwhichwe wouldmakethatsortof assumptionso
readily:theonlyone,notevenexceptingcomedy,in whichwe think
of moralcriticism as its raisond'etre.That is an oddityat thestart.
But,itgoeswithoutsaying,satireisn'tidenticalwithridicule,attack,
adversemoraljudgment.Even whenwe add a phraseof qualifica-
tion-"by indirection," for example-we stillhaven'tdone much
about satireas art.But in whatsense,conversely, is satireintended
as art?We can say,it doesn'tmatterabout intentionand it doesn't
reallymatterhow we definean aestheticobject,butthatonlypoints
up theproblem.Commonsensestillhas to be dealtwith:thethings
we call satiresby and large fall into the class of thingswe call
aestheticobjects.So the nextquestionis, how and how well does
moralantagonismcoexistwithan aestheticpurpose?-whichis the
oldestquestionof all, thoughwithspecial application.It does not
seem enoughto say thatsatiricart instructsand pleases or thatit
instructs by pleasing.Satireis not supposedto please in the same
way as otherforms.Whatit amountsto,stillin big letters, is this:in
satirethe issue of art and moralityis more acute than usual. The
subjectsof satireare vice and folly.How shouldtheybe renderedso
thatwe will know themforwhat theyare? Some people say the
satiristlikesplayingin thedungoftheAugeanstablesand onlypre-
tendsto be cleaningtheplace up. Othersdenyit. But how,in fact,
to tell?While we are waitingon specifics,thereis an answerthat
soundsand in a way is axiomatic:by lookingat thethingcreated.
That is unsatisfying,butithas a point:I am interested in determina-
tionsoftheform,notin whatthesatirist"likes"or doesn't.
One morequestion,thoughitsrelevancewon'tbe clearyet:what
is thelinkbetweensatireand irony?We have troubledisentangling
the idea of satirefromthe ironicproceduresof the satirists:satire

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124 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES

and irony(we think)justgo together. Ironyis theindirectionthat

converts tosatire.
criticism Butis there any reason
behind what looks
likea dependency Thereis a historical
relationship? reasoninAugus-
tanpractice, whichestablished theallianceon a basisfirmerthanit
hadbeenbefore. Stillweneedsomething morethanthat.Unlesswe
havemore,theconnection between satireandironyseemsto be in
thenatureofan accident. I thinkwefeelitis notan accident. These
prelimmary questions andtheevidence to comearein thelongrun
directedto thisconclusion:thatirony,Swift'sespecially, is the
rhetorical
satirist's victoryin thepresence ofself-defeat.
"Notions"of great"Heightand Latitude"theseare,notto be
brought withinso smalla "Compassofa Pen"(189) 1 as thisessay
is. Of coursethereis no moreusefulwordthan"essay."A "trying
out,"itmakesitsownapology.2

WhytheTale as a testcase?The answerwillhavetowaitmostly

on theevidence, butI supposeeveryone feelstheTale is somehow
specialandspecially Theflowering
intriguing. ofyouthful brilliance
andexuberance-"`'Good God! whata geniusI had whenI wrote
thatbook'" 3--it luresandpuzzlesus bya kaleidoscopic shiftingof
surfaces.The "Digression on Madness"is theclosestthingin it to
whatis calleda crux,butithasneverdominated talkabouttheTale
as BookIV has dominated talkabout theTravels. Notonlydo the
surfacesshiftrapidlybuttherearedensesubstrata beneaththem.In
thedigressions and prefatorymatter (I am goingto beg
especially
thequestion ofThomasSwift's partinthereligiousallegory)4 words

carrya fullweight ThegeniusoftheTaleeverywhere

ofassociations.
demands thatwelookclose-yetalwaysseemsbeyondus as thesur-

1 Parenthetic page referencesto the Tale are fromA Tale of a Tub to whichis
added The Battleof the Booksand the MechanicalOperationof the Spirit,ed. A.
C. Guthkelchand D. NicholSmith,2nd ed. (Oxford,1958).
2 An apology,albeit,thatwas unconvincing to Samuel Johnson:"he . . . who
wantsskillto forma plan, or diligenceto pursueit, needs onlyentitlehis per-
formancean essay,to acquirethe rightof heapingtogetherthe collectionsof half
his life,withoutorder,coherence,or propriety" (Rambler158).
3 A Tale of a Tub, p. xix and n. 2. Supposedlya remarkoverheardin Swift's
old age, it is fromScottby way of TheophilusSwift.
4 The reopeningof ThomasSwift'sclaimwill probablyproduceextendedschol-
arlylitigation.See RobertMartinAdams,"JonathanSwift,ThomasSwift,and the
Authorship of A Tale of a Tub," MP, 64 (February1967), 198-232.

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 SWIFT'S TALE 125

facesflash past.To arrestthemovement, ifonlyfora moment, would

be togetneartheheartofsatiricthings. Atleastthatis whatcritical
optimism hopesfor.
The Tale'sdensity ofstyleanditsrapidmovement area measure
ofwhatcouldbe calledmetaphysical habitsofmind,unhampered by
theformal requirements of analysis.Like manyofus, Swiftwas a
metaphysician whocouldn't do metaphysics andtherefore didn'tlike
thesubject,one whocouldnotcurethediseaseexceptby diver-
sionary measures. In hiscasewe valuethediversionary measures as
muchas a directcure.Andin theTale he engagesa themethathas
allmanner ofreverberations whenwestart thinkingaboutsatire.The
themeis thatof"nothing," thevoid,and is announced at thevery
end:"I amnowtrying an Experiment veryfrequent amongModem
Authors; whichis,towriteuponNothing" (208). Butsurely notjust
"now,"at theend."Now"is retroactive, and theTale is itselfthe
experiment. Can itbe thenthattheheartofsatiricthings willturn
outtobe nowhere; nothing at all?
I willbe suspected offaddism:oftransforming Pope andPagan,
PeterandJack(nota pagan,butSwift concededonlya littlediffer-
ence) to GiantExistentialist-as, in Hawthorne's "CelestialRail-
road," Bunyan's Pope and Pagan are turned into Giant
Transcendentalist. "Nothing"is in voguethesedays,and Giant
is domesticated.
Existentialist Norman0. Brown's Love'sBodyends
witha chapter called"Nothing." 5 R. D. Laing'sThePolitics ofEx-
perience has a recurrent theme:"'There'snothing to be afraidof.'
Theultimate reassurance, andtheultimate terror."6 "Nothing," says
RobertMartinAdamsas he beginsexploring thevoid,"is closerto
thesupreme commonplace ofourcommonplace age thanitspreoc-
cupationwithNothing." 7But whatmakesnothing evenmoreofa
commonplace is itslonghistory, another ofthefootnotes thatWest-
em philosophy has written to Plato.8Norman0. Brownis in the
tradition ofpseudo-Dionysius, whoseMystical Theology comesto a
closewitha rendering ofall thethings thatdivinity is not.9The via
5 (New York,1966),pp. 256-66.
6 (New York,1968),p. 38.
7 Nil: Episodes in theLiterary Conquestof Void duringtheNineteenth Century
(New York,1966),p. 3.
8 In particular,to Plato's disputewithParmenidesand the sophists;see below,
pp. 136, 137,n. 29.
9"It is notknowledgeor truth;noris It kingshipor wisdom;nor is It one, nor
is It unity,noris It Godheador Goodness;noris It a Spirit,as we understand the
term,since It is not Sonshipor Fatherhood;noris It any otherthingsuch as we

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126 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES

negativa,granted,is "notpurelynegative";10butthatis trueofnoth-

ing,too. In thehighRenaissancetheparadoxicalnatureof nothing
was mostalluring:theage'sobsessionwiththethemeand theliterary
consequencesofthatobsessionhavebeenlovinglyand richlycharted
by Rosalie L. Colie."1In the seventeenth century,thoughparadox
was everpresent,nothingtook on a new realityas (supposedly)a
confirmed scientificfact.12In the eighteenth centuryit mostlywent
underan alias-the experienceofnothingwas theexperienceofthe
"sublime"-but in thenineteenth centurygraduallygotback itsown
name,whichitkeeps,by and large,evennow.In one wayor another
it is alwayswithus.'3 And perhapsit is to thepointthatBrownand
Laing and Adams and Colie have all in separatewayslearnedfrom
Swift.14Perhapstheyhave sensedin him a kindredinterestin the
void.
To be sure,thereare otherwaysof talkingabout the Tale. The
combatbetweenancientsand modems,thegnosticheresies,Angli-
can rationalism,all these thingsare part of what went into the
book.'5Stillit has thatinsistentstrangeness aboutit whichleavesus
wide-eyed and dubious of what we've seen. I am concernedwiththe
strangeness, not withhistoricalprecedentsand problems-except
insofaras nothingis itselfa historicalprecedentand problem.Even
thentherewillnotbe anymoretracingof thethemethanhas been
lightlydone already.To describethe Tale as an "essayon nothing"
or any otherbeing can have knowledgeof; nor does It belongto the categoryof
non-existence or to thatof existence;nor do existentbeingsknowIt as it actually
is, nor does It knowthemas theyactuallyare; nor can the reasonattainto It to
name It or to knowIt; noris It darkness, noris It light,or error,or truth;norcan
any affirmation or negationapplyto It" (Dionysiusthe Areopagite,On the Divine
Names and the MysticalTheology,trans.C. E. Rolt,ed. W. J. Sparrow-Simpson
[London,1920],pp. 200-1).
10 Ibid., p. 199n.
11ParadoxiaEpidemica:The RenaissanceTraditionofParadox(Princeton, 1966),
esp. pp. 219-51.
12 Ibid.,pp. 252-72.
13 By any othername,though,nothingbecomesmoreobviouslyand less para-
doxicallysomething.The "sublime,"the "infinite," and othervariationson the
theme bring on similarbut less acute head-spinningeffectsthan their great
original.
14 Anytottingup of Swift's"influence"would be pedantic.But Adams'diversely
impressivescholarshipis symptomatic. It moves betweenthe poles of "Jonathan
Swift,ThomasSwift,and the Authorship of A Tale of a Tub" and Nil. I thinkof
his essayon the Tale as an effort(because two authorsare betterforthe purpose
thanone) to give substanceto void.
15 See MiriamKosh Starkman, Swift'sSatireon Learningin A Tale of a Tub
(Princeton,1950); Ronald Paulson,Themeand Structure in Swift'sTale of a Tub
(New Haven, 1960); and PhillipHarth,Swiftand AnglicanRationalism:The Re-
ligiousBackgroundofA Tale ofa Tub (Chicago,1961).

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 SWIFT'S TALE 127

willleave a greatdeal out: hic multadesiderantur. But withluck it

willputsomeofwhathas beenmissingin. I shallbeginbylookingat
a verysmallpartof theTale, afterthatturningto an impression of
thewholeand thento theimplications, especiallygenericones,of a
satiricessayon nothing.It willbe as well,however,to takeone more
precautionand hanga mottoon thedoorbeforegoingin:
GreatNegative,how vainlywould the wise
Inquire,define,distinguish,
teach,devise,
Didst thounot standto pointtheirblindphilosophies!16

The place to beginis at thebeginning, althoughthattakessome

lookingfor.By skippingover the "Apology"of 1710 and the ma-
terialattributed to thebookseller,we arriveat the "EpistleDedica-
tory,to His RoyalHighnessPrincePosterity"-wheretheunsuspect-
ingreader,pickingup thebook in March 1704, wouldhave thought
thattheTale of a Tub was at last underway.The authorspeaksfor
thefirsttimein his own voice, and a curiousvoice it is. For surely
something is troublesome aboutaddressingPrincePosterity. At least
it becomestroublesome whenwe distinguish betweenthe readerin
1704 and ourselves."Posterity" meanssomething differentnow; and
thenagain,it doesn't.We are put offbalance as soon as we think
aboutwhatis goingon.
On the one hand,PrincePosterity has a fixedallegoricalbeing,
and we thinkwe understandallegory:a one to one relationship, it
is said. On theotherhand,PrincePosterity is onlya pointreceding
on thehorizon.The allegoryrealizesitselfin us: we are PrincePos-
terity,and thatis a cleverpiece of flattery.
Yet how can we believe
it? The Prince'sreign,we know,is somewherefarther on-and the
farther on thebetter,because posterity (comingafterwards) comes
onlywhenwe are dead. The Prince'sreignhas alwayscome already
and is alwaysstillto come. No wonderthenthathis "Governour"
is time.Somethingis missingand as usual it turnsout to be the
present.Everything is either"after"or "before."We enterintothe
contractbetweenauthorand reader,thinking itfinal,onlyto findout
thatits validitystillhas to be referredto Prince Posterity, whose
judgmentsare alwayswaitingto be handeddown.We are on treach-
erous ground.
16"Upon Nothing,"The CompletePoems of JohnWilmot,Earl of Rochester,
ed. David M. Vieth(New Haven,1968),p. 119.

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128 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES

Justhowtreacherous is clear,soon enough,fromthefatethatbe-

falls the "Productions"(32) of modernwit, which the authorso
muchwantsto save fromoblivion.As evidenceto showPrincePos-
terity,he has prepared"a copious List of Titles." But the "Origi-
nals"-title pages posted as advertisements in the streets-have
vanishedand eventhecopiouslistseemsneverto have been. What-
ever therewas, it is irrevocably past:
The Originals
werepostedfresh uponall GatesandCorners but
ofStreets;
ina veryfewHourstotakea Review,
returning theywerealltorndown,and
onesintheir
fresh Places:I enquired
afterthemamongReadersandBook-
sellers,butI enquiredin vain,theMemorialof themwas lostamongMen,
theirPlace was no moreto be found:andI was laughedto scorn,fora Clown
anda Pedant, allTasteandRefinement,
without little intheCourseof
versed
present andthatknewnothing
Affairs, ofwhathadpass'din thebestCom-
paniesofCourtandTown.(34-35)
Butifthetitlesand eventhelist,whicharein a queerwaythe"spirit"
ofthebooks,arelost,surelythebodymustremain.Can nothinghave
been made out of something?

BUT YourGovernour, perhaps,maystillinsist,

andputtheQuestion:What
is thenbecomeofthoseimmense BalesofPaper,whichmustneedshavebeen
employ'd in suchNumbers ofBooks?Can thesealsobe wholly annihilate,
andso ofa suddenas I pretend?WhatshallI sayinreturnofso invidious
an
Objection?It illbefits
theDistancebetween YourHighnessandMe, tosend
You forocularConviction to a Jakes,or an Oven;to theWindows of a
Bawdy-house, ortoa sordidLanthorn.Books,likeMentheirAuthors, have
no morethanoneWayofcoming intotheWorld, butthere
aretenThousand
togooutofit,andreturn nomore.(35-36)
The interplaybetweenmatterand spiritis splendidlymuddledby
now-but nothingis at all uncertainabout thatlast somberchord:
thereare tenthousandwaysforbooks and authorsto go out of the
worldand returnno more.
I thinkI am notjustinventinga responseto fita hypothesis
when
of
I say thatI get fromthe image Prince Posterityand fromthe
mysterious fateof theproductionsof modernwita feelinglike ver-
tigo,as iftherewereonlythethinnest supportbeneathone'sfeetand
below that,nothing;ratherlike walkingaround the dome of St.
Paul's, knowingthatonlyemptyspace is beneath;or likethesensa-
tionsone used to have in childhoodwhentrying to thinkaboutthe
universeand how theremustbe (but couldn'tbe) nothingbeyond.
To describethisopeningoftheTale as an existential with
encounter

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 SWIFT'S TALE 129

nothingness is not merelyjoking: "Vertigois anguishto the extent

thatI am afraidnot of fallingover the precipice,but of throwing
myselfover,"and anguish"is preciselymy consciousnessof being
my own future,in the mode of not-being"(Sartre).17The tub is
thrownoverboardto divertLeviathan;but if Leviathantakes the
bait,it's goodbye,tub. In the addressto PrincePosterity, isn'tthe
authorthrowinghimself-as in a way any writermust-over the
edge? The Tale is a productionof modernwit.Its authoris every-
whereconsciousof beinghis own future,in themode of not-being.
If we look again at whathappensto theproductionsof modernwit,
itwillbe witha bettersenseofwhatis at stake.
"The Memorialof themwas lostamongMen, theirPlace was no
moreto be found."It is theghostliness of an ordinaryfact,reported
withBiblicalsonority, thatis frightening.The title-pagesare posted
and takendown,thatis all,buttheyhave vanishedtotally.Whenthe
authorgoes lookingforthem,he is laughedto scorn.It is thedream
fantasyin whichfamiliarobjectsor even places are missingwhen
one comes back to findthem.Not just, theyare gone, but "their
Place was no moreto be found."Everything is gone,eventhemem-
oryof it. Perhapsthe people who remembered are gone, too. The
passiveverbseffacewhatever itis thatwas once (thoughttobe) there.
And theauthoris laughedat-it is thefantasyin which"everyoneis
laughingat me"-not justbecausehe doesn'tknowwhereeverything
has gone but because he is littleversedin "presentAffairs"(where
and whenis the"present"?)and because he knowsnothing,without
like Socratesknowingthatthatis all he knows: "I was laughedto
scorn,fora Clown and a Pedant,withoutall Taste and Refinement,
littleversedin theCourseofpresentAffairs, and thatknewnothing
of what had pass'd in the best Companiesof Court and Town."
Presentaffairsare what has "pass'd." As for "nothing,"it seems
innocentenoughbut is neverreallyinnocent.We can put a period
afterit-in a sensecan'thelpdoingso, because thatis thenatureof
thingssyntactically-andget the harmless"not anything"or the
real thing,whateverit is thatis called "nothing."It is alwayslike
thatwith"nothing:""thereis nothingherein thisWill,totidemver-
bis, making mention of Shoulder-knots . . ." (83). And most em-
phaticallywhenthereis nothingafter"nothing:""1 am now trying
an ExperimentveryfrequentamongModernAuthors;whichis, to
trans.Hazel E.
17 Beingand Nothingness, Barnes(New York,1968),pp. 65, 68.

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 130 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES

writeupon Nothing."The Tale is about the nothingbeneathour

feet,abouta past and a futurewhenwe werenot and willnotbe.
Whois theauthoroftheTale? The wholepointis thathe has many
names-Swift,thehack,Bentley,a madman,and so on-while he is
also noteverto be named,unnameable.Like theauthoroftheAnat-
omyofMelancholy,perhapshe is Democritus,Jr.,perhapstheman
in themoon,perhapsno one. To call him"Swift"or (ifyou wanta
persona)the"hackwriter"is probablyno worsethancallinghim,in
a desperateeffort the"author."All are approximations:
at neutrality,
Swift'sanonymity it is also a metaphor
is notjusta practicalmatter,
of concealmentand endowshim withthe terrorsof the absolute.
Here is pseudo-Dionysiuson the divinenames: "Now is not the
secretName preciselythatwhichis above all namesand nameless,
and is fixedbeyondeverynamethatis named,notonlyin thisworld
butalso in thatwhichis to come." 18Whatcontainseveryname and
is no namemayas wellbe no thingas everything.So maybenobody
is the authorof thistale, whichtherefore signifies nothing.Trying
to name theunnameableis like tryingto fixa shape on theclouds
on a windyday.We maywantto agree,lackinganyknowledgemore
precise,that"Clouds therewere"(35). But even that,it maybe, is
too much.The clouds,like theproductionsof modemwit,will re-
turnno more.
Wheredoes the Tale take place? In the same regionsof the air
whereBurtonhad disportedhimself notmanyyearsearlier:
As a long-winged Hawk,whenhe is firstwhistled
offthefist, mounts aloft,
andforhispleasure manya circuit
fetcheth intheAir,stillsoaring
higherand
higher,tillhe be cometo hisfullpitch,andin theend,whenthegameis
sprung,comesdownamain,andstoopsupona sudden:so willI, having now
comeat lastintotheseamplefieldsofAir,wherein I mayfreely expatiate
andexercise myself a whilerove,wander
formyrecreation, roundaboutthe
world,mountaloftto thoseethereal orbsandcelestialspheres, andso de-
scendtomyformer elementsagain.19
Whatwas in Burtonthe exhilarationof a safe thoughparadoxical
adventureand of a safereturn("and so descendto myformerele-
mentsagain") is in theTale thesenseof a stillmoreperilousvoyage

18On the Divine Names and the MysticalTheology,p. 61.

19 The Anatomy ofMelancholy, ed. FloydDell and Paul Jordan-Smith
(New York,
1948),p. 407. I wasn'tconsciousof it when I wrotethisessay,but KathleenWil-
liamsand RosalieColie citethispassage,and probablyI remembered Burton'slong-
wingedhawkfromone or bothof them.See JonathanSwiftand the Age of Com-
promise(Lawrence,1958),pp. 15-16; and ParadoxiaEpidemica,p. 452.

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 SWIFT'S TALE 131

intoemptyspace. The rhythms oftheTale are thoseofriseand fall:

"To get quit of Number"it is "thePhilosopher'sWay in all Ages"
to erect"certainEdificesin theAir." 20 (55, 56) It isn'tjust getting
quitofpersonsand crowds:21 personsand crowdshave been trans-
formedintoabstractquantity.It's gettingquit of number,too. We
are searchingafterzero in the ample fieldsof air. And even if,be-
cause of "Inclemenciesof Air, especiallyin theseNorth-West Re-
gions"(56), we have to have some artificial supports-ladder,pul-
pit, and stage-itinerant--onceagain we seem to be on a precari-
ous platform,suspendedoverspace. Accordingto theAeolists,wind
is the principle "fromwhich . . . this whole Universe was at first
produced,andintowhichitmustat lastbe resolved"(1 50).22 Ladder,
pulpit,and stage-itinerant
are explorations
intotheoriginof things.
Air and windare something, but verymuchlike nothing,too. And
are thereany rungson thebottomof the ladder?
Sometimeswe experiencea kindof Miltonicfall,as in thegreat
passage aboutthemind'sempyreanhabitof makinggods and devils
("AND, whereasthe mind of Man, when he gives the Spur and
Bridleto hisThoughts,dothneverstop,butnaturallysalliesoutinto
both extreamsof High and Low, of Good and Evil . . ." [157f.]);
or a ridelike Phaeton's;or a falllike Icarus' ("Or, whetherFancy,
flyingup to the imaginationof whatis Highestand Best,becomes
over-shot,and spent,and weary,and suddenlyfallslikea dead Bird
of Paradise, to the Ground . . ." [158]). There are great heights
everywhere andgreatdepths,and theyarethesame.The productions
of modernwitare "sunkin theAbyssof Things"(32). The tailor's
hell is a "horridGulph,"swallowingits spoils,"terribleto behold"
(76). CurtiusandEmpedocles,heroandmadman,leap intothecrater
of Etna. There are emptyheads and emptytubs and emptyvaults,
mists,vapours,clouds, exhalations,smoke.And the author'spen,
by hisallegorizingofHerodotus,is just a featherin theair (149).
Whatis theshape of theTale, comingas it does to nothingin the
20 On images of rise and fall in Swift'ssatiregenerally,see JohnM. Bullitt,
Jonathan Swiftand theAnatomyof Satire(Cambridge,Mass., 1953),pp. 181-92.
21 Amongthe meaningsof "number"that denote accumulationor quantityis
thisone: "Those forming a specifiedclass; also, the multitude,
the commonherd.
Obs. rare"(NED, II.7.e).
22 Perhapsit is incidental,but the dogmaof theAeolistswould have recalledto
the Tale's firstreadersthe greatstormof 26-27 November1703, whichconvinced
manythattheend of theworldwas at hand,caused enormousdamage,occasioned
a fastday in January1703/4,and was commemorated by Defoe, by otherpam-
phleteers, and by a hostof publishedsermons.The catalogueof booksforEaster
term,1704, includesnot onlythe Tale but severalof the sermonson the storm.

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132 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES

end? Whatis thecompassof a pen,in theoryifneverin fact,but a

circlewithoutlimits?The symbolsforinfinity crowdin, as manyas
ingenuityaffords.But it does not mattermuch how we designate
whatcan hardlybe designated, how we imaginewhatcan hardlybe
imagined.The Tale, forall we know,is shapedlikea tub.It matters
more to see how the satireis alwayscancellingitselfout, turning
aroundand back on itself,leavingus wherewe began.The "Digres-
sion on Madness,"old criticalchestnutthatit is, is toughto crack
becausewhenwe are done we findout thatjustwhenwe thoughtwe
were about to tastesuccesswe were as far away as ever fromthe
center."Those Entertainments and Pleasureswe mostvalue in Life,
are such as Dupe and play the Wag withthe Senses" (171). Very
well,happinessconsistsin thesensesbeingwell-deceived. But then:
"He thatcan withEpicuruscontenthis Ideas withthe Films and
Images thatflyoffupon his Sensesfromthe Superficies of Things"
(174)-his is thatserene,peacefulstatewhichwe remember. Happi-
nessconsistsalwaysin beingwell-deceived,but beingwell-deceived
consistsin-what? The sensesare trickedand we are happy,or the
sensesare nottrickedand we are happy.True,we are notjustwhere
we began. The "Senses"are notwhattheywere.But thatis all part
of thegame. The "straitLine" has been "drawnby its own Length
into a Circle" (158). We were as faraway alwaysfromthe center
withouteverreallyknowingtherewas a center.Not untilitwas over
and we weren'tthere.But anyway,maybewe didn'twantto be. If
it was a nut to crack, maybe cracking it would have "cost . . . a
Tooth"and yieldednothing-"nothing," thatis, "buta Worm"(66).
Afterall,thewomanwas verymuchtheworseforbeingflayed.
So, once again,whatis theTale about?It is a fantasiaon a theme.
It is about words,the materialsof whichit is made. Words,the
Aeolistssay, are onlywind.So the Tale is verymuchlike nothing
and returns to nothingliketheotherproductions of modernwit.Its
subjectis its own procreationin the garretof the hack writer,its
death,and eventhefewreflextwitchesafterlifeis gone: "Whenthe
Subject is utterlyexhausted"-when the air has been altogether
breathedout-"the Pen stillmove[s] on" (208). It is aboutthepast
and thefuture, whicherasethepresent,eventhoughtheauthortries
to snatcha presentas besthe can: "I professto Your Highness,in
theIntegrity ofmyHeart,thatwhatI am goingto sayis literally true
thisMinuteI am writing"(36). WhatI am goingto say is literally
(whythat"literally"?)truenow. It is dizzying.

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 SWIFT'S TALE 133

Affirmations about futureevents,I've learned,are an old, sore

spot forlogicians.It seemsto have been Aristotlewho startedit all
witha conundrum in chapternineofDe Interpretatione: Whatis the
statusof an affirmation like "therewill be a sea-battletomorrow"?
True or false?He decidesit is neither.Navies of philosophers have
sailedin afterAristotle,and thenavigating had betterbe leftto them.
But "whatI am goingto say is true"seemseven moreof a puzzle
thanAristotle's sea-battle.Not onlyis it an affirmation aboutfuture
events,it is a mockingproblemof reference. What does "whatI am
goingto say"referto? The possibilities are limitedonlybymortality.
And "whatI am goingto say,"in thecase in point,is all thatfollows
of the Tale of a Tub, includingthe predicateof the sentence:"is
literallytruethisMinuteI am writing."We are sweptaway in the
vortexof self-reference. "Is literallytruethisMinuteI am writing"
truethisminuteI am writing.
is literally And so on. It is notso bad
a case as if thewriterhad predicatedthe falsenessof whathe was
goingto say,but we will getto thatsortof thinglateron. For the
momentthisis bad enough.
Verylittleis clear,unlessitis this:theevanescenceof"thisMinute
I am writing," the elusive"now." The "popularTriptych"of past,
present,and future-populareven thoughit has a blank center
panel and thoughwe doubtthe authenticity of thewings-is not a
veryphilosophicalpictureoftime,butitis a psychological common-
place.23The Tale is about nothing,being about the trans-ience of
things.24

23 "Popular triptych" is Nabokov'sphrase: "Time is anythingbut the popular

triptych:a no-longerexistingPast, the durationless point of the Present,and a
'not-yet'that may nevercome. No. There are only two panels. The Past (ever-
existingin my mind) and the Present(to which my mind gives durationand,
therefore,reality).If we make a thirdcompartment the
of fulfilledexpectation,
foreseen,the foreordained, the facultyof prevision,perfectforecast,we are still
applyingour mindto thePresent."Ada or Ardor:A FamilyChronicle(New York,
1969), pp. 559-60. It is notthatNabokovis "right"-hisdenialofspace-time willnot
deterthe physicists-but thathe is wittyand comforting whenit comesto the un-
comfortable businessof time.Tryingto get timeintomentalfocus"is likerummag-
ing withone hand in the glove compartment forthe road map-fishing out Monte-
negro,the Dolomites,paper money,a telegram-everything exceptthe stretchof
chaotic countrybetweenArdez and Somethingsoprano, in the dark,in the rain,
whiletrying to takeadvantageofa redlightin the coal black,withthewipersfunc-
tioningmetronomically, chronometrically:the blind fingerof space pokingand
tearingthetextureof time"(p. 537).
24 JohnR. Clark'sFormand Frenzyin Swift'sTale of a Tub (Ithaca, 1970) was
publishedafterI wrotethisessay.We touchon a numberofthesamethemes,espe-
ciallythisone of the Tale's temporalconcerns.See pp. 117-41.

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134 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES

So farI have aimedat an impression, a recreationof vertiginous

effects,and have triedto let thewordsof the Tale do muchof the
work.But evenif theimpression is accurateso faras it goes,it has
to be qualified;as, I daresay,readerswill have long been readyto
protest.
It has to be qualifiedbecause theemptyspaces in the Tale are in
factfullof things-thingsthatI have ignoredso farbut thatwe are
all the timebumpinginto. At least Jack has the relativegrace to
admitit whenhe bouncesintoa post or fallsin a gutter,if onlyto
ascribehismishapsthento theunfathomable determinations ofGod.
I have been conjuringposts and guttersinto an imaginarynon-
existence.It is timeto give themtheirdue.
Open the Tale almostat randomand you will find-what will
you not find?--dogs,rats,cheese, dung, firecrackers, keys,beef,
partridge,quail, venison,pheasant,plum-pudding, custard,eyes,
fingers,teeth,noses,ears,cows,bulls,notto mentioncoats,ribbons,
lace, tassels,pickles,woodcocks,worms:in truthit is "a verycom-
pleat Anatomy"(123). All thesethings,despitethe cabbalisticef-
fortseverywhere to spiritualizethem,are just what theyare, the
ordinarybaggage of ordinarylife. They are as importantas, and
complementary to,theeffects of void. They are like Sartre's"alarm
clocks,signboards, taxforms, policemen,so manyguardrailsagainst
anguish."But therethesimilarity stops.Sartredecidesit is he who
givesmeaningto the alarmclock,he "who by a signboardforbids
himselfto walk on a flowerbed," and withthat"all thebarriers,all
theguardrailscollapse,nihilatedby the consciousnessof myfree-
dom." 25 Swiftwould not have been surprised,onlyamused,to see
Calvinistdeterminism and existentialfreedomlookingantithetically
alike.For SwiftthepostthatJackbumpsintois merelythere,neither
a partof God's greatconspiracynorsomething to be annihilated by
the act of mind.The postis thereand is reassuring.It existsin the
present:collidingwithitis likehavingtimestop,justlongenough.
Posts,likedogsand cheeseand alarmclocks,are morallyneutral.
That is, theyaren'teasily adaptable to the exemplarymethodsof
moraldiscourse.Whenthethingorthingsin questionaremoreeasily
associatedwithvalue judgments, otherconsequencesfollow."It ill

25 Beingand Nothingness,
p. 77.

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 SWIFT'S TALE 135

befitstheDistancebetweenYour Highnessand Me," saystheauthor

to PrincePosterity, "to send You forocularConvictionto a Jakes,
or an Oven; to theWindowsof a Bawdy-house,or to a sordidLan-
thorn."Ocularconvictionofwhat?Supposedly,ofthe"annihilation"
of theproductionsof modem wit. But is it reallythatat all? The
booksvanishin thejakes orwherever else and are at leastfiguratively
annihilated.But whilethebookshave gone,thejakes is stillwithus.
As so oftenin Swift,abstractlanguage("ocular Conviction")and
periodic suspensionof meaningcome up against-finally-hard
facts.In thiscase affirmation is at a distance,voyeuristic. But jakes
and ovenand bawdy-house and lanternare thesignsofhumanfacts,
thecommondenominators of our physicalnature-excreting,forni-
cating,eating,stayingwarm,findingone's way. If our physicalna-
tureis our "lower"nature,there'sno helpingthat.Afterthenight-
mare in whicheverything has seemedto be annihilated,afterbeing
laughedto scornforsupposingthatanything is or was, aftertrying
to fixa shapeon thecloudsor a name on theauthorof theTale, we
wake up and realizeitwas a dreamand are a bodyagain.It does not
matterthatthe books are gone. I eat and fornicateand excrete,
therefore I am. Or because it is (as withDescartes)a processbeing
renderedand containedby the presenttense: eating,fornicating,
excreting, thereforeI am.
Far frommerelyhatingthesehumanfunctions, Swiftnotonlyde-
pendedon themlike anyof us (or at leasthe dependedon some of
them; I want to leave alone the never-to-be-solved question of
his sexuallife)but also I thinkthatin an obscureway he accepted
thatdependence.We can see thatbetternow thanwe used to. The
moral of "Cassinus and Peter"is beyonddispute,and Norman0.
Brown'sreadingof Swifton sublimation,26 thoughprobablynotbe-
yonddispute,has strengthened theclaimthatitwasn'tour animality
but ourpretending to be beyondanimality thatoffended Swiftmost.
If thereseemsto be a contradiction betweenwhatI've said hereand
whatI've said elsewhereaboutHouyhnhnms and Yahoos,27I think
it willbe clear in thesequel. Stillit is a strangepass we have come
to whenthe jakes and the bawdy-houseofferSwiftand ourselves,
his readers,a kindof reassurance.

26 Life AgainstDeath: The Psychoanalytic

Meaningof History(New York,n.d.)
pp. 179-201.
27 Lemuel Gulliver'sMirrorfor Man (Berkeley,1968).

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136 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES

We are gettingcloserto thepoint:thevocationofthesatirist. Odd

as it seemswhen the jakes and bawdy-houseare in Swift'ssatire
guardrailsagainstanguish,it is just theway thingsare in thepsy-
chologyof everyday.So is satireall a sham?Is thesatiristdabbling
in thefilthof thestablesbecause he needsto and likesit and,worse
yet,needsto exhibithimselfdoingit? Thereis moreto it thanthat.
One of the thingssatiretypicallytriesto do is to obliterateits
subjects.It pressestowardsextinction.It takes the productionsof
modernwit and forcesthemover the precipiceinto the abyss of
things.The Aeolistsare so much wind. Partridge,poor fellow,is
quite dead whenSwiftis done withhim. Satiretriesveryoftento
make nothingout of something.But can you reallydo that?Can
Partridge,anymorethantheproductionsof modemwit,be wholly
annihilate?Isn'the morenearlyalive thanever?It is the common-
place about satire endowingits subjectswith immortality. That
smacksofparadox,butitdoes notgo so deep as anotherpuzzlethat
is dangerously close by and thatwe need to look at: thevenerable
puzzle of non-existence.
Everyoneknowsthepuzzle as it wereintuitively. It is a nagging
conditionof life,even if it is at the frontof onlythe philosophical
consciousness:

Stranger:Make a nobleeffort,as becomesyouth,andendeavour

withall
yourmight tospeakofnot-being ina right without
manner, introducing
into
iteither
existence
orunity orplurality.
Theaetetus:It wouldbe a strange
boldnessinmewhichwouldattemptthe
taskwhenI seeyouthusdiscomfited.28

How is itpossibleto supposethenothingness of nothing, to attribute

nothingto nothingness? Thereis no rightmanner,so thepuzzlegoes,
of speakingof non-being.Talk of non-beingdefeatsitself:not only
(perhaps)was I ignoringthingsin the Tale thatdo existbut also
the existenceof thingsthatdo not. "It would be a strangebold-
ness in me whichwould attemptthe task whenI see you thusdis-
comfited."It is the boldness,then,of the satiristto attemptwhat
seemsimpossible:to incorporatein his satirethefactof non-being.

28 Sophist,The DialoguesofPlato,ed. B. Jowett,

3rded. (London,1892),IV, 367.

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 SWIFT'S TALE 137

See how body (to "incorporate")and therefore being are always

getting back in.
Confronted withthebeing of non-being,philosophershave said
it is nottechnicallya paradoxat all, thewholethingis "a superficial
verbalpuzzle";29 and then,likeFreudin hisdifferent way,theyhave
deniedtheexistenceof negativefacts,thatotherpuzzle withwhich
thebeingof non-beingis deeplyinvolved.30 Whetheror not Freud
and the philosophersare right-we shall get to one philosopher's
counterargument beforebeing done-their temptations have been
verygreat.And iftheyare right,ifthesatirist'swillto annihilateis a
metaphysical perversity-evenassuminghe were God and not just
a makerof metaphors, thenreallywe don'tneed thejakes and the
bawdy-houseto bringus to our senses.On thisview thejakes and
thebawdy-houseare themselves metaphorsforwhathas been hap-
forcewhoever
peningall the timedespitethe satirist'sbest efforts:
or whateverit is overthecliffand back it comes,at least as real as
ever,drivenby thegales of paradox.If non-existence is imaginary,
consistingof difference, or opposition,or anythingbut non-being,
thensatirein one ofitsmodesis in thebalance.
But thereis moreto come,and whentraditional theoriesofevil-
cumbersomeconstructions as usuallytheyare-are also put in the
scales,thebalance tips(as it mayseem)decisively.Theyhave to be
putin thescalesbecause whateveris, is right;whateveris not,isn't.
An essayon nothingis an essayon thenatureand originofevil:

. . . whatever
arisesfromNothing is necessarily
imperfect; andthelessitis
removed fromnothing . . . themoreimperfect it is. Thereis no occasion
thereforeforanEvilPrinciple tointroducetheEvilofDefect, oran Inequal-
intheWorksofGod:fortheverynature
ityofPerfections ofcreatedBeings
necessarily
requiresit,andwemayconceive theplaceofthisMalicious Prin-
cipleto be abundantly supplied fromhence,thattheyderivetheirOriginal
from Nothing.3Y

29 Eric Toms,Negationand Logic (Oxford,1962), p. 95. Cf. the wordsof the

stranger,Sophist,IV, 394: "Andhe who is scepticalofthiscontradiction, mustthink
how he can findsomething betterto say; or if he sees a puzzle, and his pleasureis
to drag wordsthisway and that,the argumentwill proveto him,thathe is not
makinga worthyuse of his faculties;forthereis no charmin such puzzles,and
in detectingthem. ." But Toms does not thinkthe puzzle is
thereis no difficulty
see below,pp. 141-44.
onlysuperficial;
SOFor a shortrollcall of somephilosophers and theirviews,see JackKaminsky,
Languageand Ontology(Carbondale,Ill., 1969),pp. 8-12.
31 An Essay on the Originof Evil (London,1731), p. 89. On King's theodicy,
eighteenth-century optimism, and theirplace in the historyof Christianthought

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138 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES

This Augustan,and Augustinian, gestureat averting Manichaeanism

is fromthe Englishtranslationof King's De OrigineMali (1702).
And the difference betweenSwiftand the man who was laterhis
archbishop,like the difference also betweenSwiftand Pope, lies in
Swift'sgreaterunderstanding ofhowdifficult it all is. Supposethata
satiristaims at rendering evil,whichtakesits originex nihilo.How
can he do it?Thereis a way,in theory,to avoid unacceptabledam-
age, thatis, to show evil not as aspiringto absolutenon-beingbut
insteadas privatioboni,whichimpliesthefirmpresenceofthegood,
or at leastthebetter,in thelack ofwhichevilconsists.If on theother
hand he triesto chase evilto itspointof origin,he associateshimself
withall theimpossibilities ofthatimpossibletask.If evilin an abso-
lutesenseis whatis not,and good whatis, yetifwhatis not-by the
(false) paradox of negation-in factis, thenthe satiristwho aims
figuratively hissubjectsrunstwomorethanfigurative
at annihilating
risks:eitherevil turnsout to be good, or else it turnsout to be an
independent "principle"and Manichaeandualismcomesback in.
Both alternatives look dangerous,but thesecondperhapsless so.
SomewouldsaythatManichaeanismis whatsatireis all about.Even
don'twantto be dualists,theargument
if satirists wouldgo, theyare
psychologically bound to it. Who needs semanticparadoxeswhen
all thesenseofsatirepointsto a mortalstruggle goingon betweena
good and evilprinciple?I wouldsay,notonlydoes thesatirist usually
notwantto,butusuallyhe doesn'tconcedeevilthatmuchdignity-
not evenwhenhe confersthehonorof attempted annihilation, and
that,forthe moment,is the case beingconsidered.Partridgeis no
angelofdarkness.But afterScylla,Charybdiswaits:Isn'tthesatirist
thenan exponentof Satan's heresy,"Evil, be thoumygood"? We
are back to the jakes, the bawdy-house,and the Augean stables.
Homelyimages,all ofthem,Manichaeanonlyin theharmlesssense
thatthe kingdomof darknesswas thebody,and fartoo homelyto
represent an evil"principle,"independent and powerful. But arethey
not,in theirway,good?
The answerwillbe, perhaps:no, satireshowsus how to measure
theirvalue; thesatirist'stheoreticalsolutionis his everyday practice.
Evil as privatioboniconsistsin difference or opposition-in thisjust
like non-existence-and satire reveals moral relationships.The

see (in additionto Lovejoy'sGreatChain of Being) JohnHick, Evil and the God
of Love (London,1966), especiallypp. 151-74.

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 SWIFT'S TALE 139

Lilliputiansare very,verysmall,but Swiftisn'ttryingto obliterate

them,he is onlysettingthemagainstGulliverand thebig Brobding-
nagians,who furnish a relativestandardofvalue. I am notsurethat
thisis so axiomatically trueof Gulliveras no doubtit seems.32If it
is true,however,theTale and theTravelsdiffer preciselyin thecon-
structiontheyputupontheidea ofevil,and perhapsin GulliverSwift
has givenover(uncharacteristically) someold,impossibleaspirations.
Yet even whensatiredemonstrates relationship,stillit neverquite
escapes thedemonof the absolute.The Lilliputians aren'tgoingto
becomeBrobdingnagians, and satirehas verylittleto say aboutthe
processesoflife:satiriccharacters (itis thecommonplaceabouthow
satirediffersfromthenovel)have nowhereto go butwheretheyare
and seemby thesame tokenneverto have been anywhere else. And
if people are onlywhereand whattheyare, withnevera hope of
beingelsewhereor otherwise, we haveedgedcloserto evilas absolute
or,as a result,evil as good. Unalterablerelationship, on inspection,
looks like no relationship at all.
We are also told,as a ruleof satiricprocedure,afterPartA, Part
B; aftertheonslaught, thentherecommendation to virtue;afterthe
firstthreeBooks of the Travels,Book IV and theHouyhnhnms; or
if you read it thisway, afterthe Houyhnhnms, the Portuguesesea
captainand Gulliver'sfamily.38 True enough,again, but the argu-
mentputsa lot of pressureon somefrailreeds.I thinktheHouyhn-
hnms can withstandit, but othersdo not thinkso. And how
important, really,is the Portuguesesea captain?The Tale is more
typicalanyway:thereis no last exhortation to thevirtuouslife,and
as represented by Martin,the virtuouslifeis all partof a tale of a
tub.(Wottonwas quiterightaboutthat.)34 Stillvirtuewillout.There
are the jakes, the bawdy-house,the stables,or whateverelse the
scene affords.
Somemoredistinctions willillustratewhatis not,fromthepointof
view I have takenhere,the usual satiriccase. Thus: It is hard to

32 Because it is possiblethatrelativestandards of value are in factan objectof

Swift'ssatire.
33 Cf. MaryClaire Randolph,"The Structural Design of the FormalVerse Sa-
tire,"PQ, 21 (1942), 368-84.
34 "So thatlet Peterbe mad one way,and Jackanother, and let Martinbe sober,
and spendhis Time withPatienceand Phlegmin pickingthe Embroidery offhis
Coat neverso carefully, 'firmlyresolvingto alterwhateverwas alreadyamiss,and
reduce all theirfutureMeasures to the strictestObedience prescribedtherein';
Yet stillthisis all partof a Tale of a Tub" (Wotton's"Observations," A Tale of a
Tub, p. 322).

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140 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES

thinkof "The Vanityof Human Wishes"as satire;it is too deeply

concernedwithprocessand withthemind'sopportunity of making
the happinessit does not find.It is hard to thinkof Rabelais as a
forhe invertstheusual standardsof value in a comicritual
satirist,
of celebration:jakes and bawdy-house,and not in spite of them-
selves,are heraldicemblemsofthewinningside. It is evenharderto
thinkofSade as a satirist:whenwhatever is,is natural,and whatever
is naturalis quiteall right,whenthetorturer is exemplary and tradi-
tionalvirtueis rewardedwithan errantthunderbolt, itis a comedyof
theperverse.And as we movestillfarther awayfromcommonusage,
denyingwhatfewwouldeverseriouslyaffirm, it is almostimpossible
to thinkof Paradise Lost as satire.God wins and Satan has a very
long fall.Even ifBlake's paradoxweregranted,thecase wouldnot
be quitethesame as thesatirist's.The satiristis of thedevil'sparty
not because thedevilis a hero-more obviouslythaneverin Para-
dise Lost, he is still an ass-but because what is created,being
created,acquiresvaluein beingwhatitis.
As I have perhapsmythically and no doubtselectively described
him,thesatiristhas onlytwochoices: to stopbeinga satirist, which
is probablyto stopbeinghimself;or to makethebestof it,knowing
thatthebestof it is goingto be thebestof a bad (good) thing.The
satiristwho takeshis reassuranceparadoxically,not joyfully,from
the jakes and bawdy-housewill like Swiftsurelyfeel revulsionat
beingdependent,hate beingwhathe is.

To summarizewherewe havebeen.The thesiswas, first:nothing.

Then,theantithesis:something. And a kindofsynthesis: nothingas
something. Butin thelargerrhythm ofit: Thesis,nothing.Antithesis,
something (includingnothing).Synthesis,whichis stillto come,both
nothingand something. "Both/and,"however,is a giveaway:not a
synthesisreally,notHegelianbecoming,butbothnothingand some-
thing,thoughsimultaneously, yet separately,a bindingtogether.
Whatwe come to finallyis irony,in whichthelaw of contradiction
is suspended.
The voidcannotbe made to go away.We knowitis there.When,
in the Tale, we come back to findthetitlesthatwerepostedin the
streetsand discovertheydo not exist,we know thatindeedthey
don't existand neverdid: a fiction,thatis all. Impeccablylogical
thoughit maybe to do awaywithnon-existence and negativefacts,

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 SWIFT'S TALE 141

stillthesenseof the abyss,in thepit of the stomach,resistsall the

dramamineof thelogicians.Whatis more,maybeit is notimpecca-
ble logicto reducenon-existence to existence,maybethereis a real
paradox and not just a superficialverbal puzzle, maybenegative
facts(evenforthelogician)can'tbe disposedofat all. Shouldthatbe
the case, the ironisthas always known somethingthat the phil-
osopherhas not.
The subject of negation,philosophicallyconsidered,is a very
roughthicketof argument fortheamateur.I have exploredonlythe
edgesof it,forfearof gettingbadlyscratched;yettruth,it maybe,
lies at the center.Wisdomis a fox,a sackposset,a nut,etc. StillI
have foundsomehelp,evenfortheamateur,in a book calledBeing,
Negationand Logic, by Eric Toms.35It is a book of challengesand
I suspectwouldbe unacceptableto mostlogicianssinceit calls into
doubtthepremiseson whichorthodoxlogic is based.36But thatis
whatgivesit interest hereand partof whatmakesit alluringto the
amateur.I wantto sketchitsconclusions,howeverbriefly, and indi-
cate as bestI can someoftheinferences thatTomsmakesfromthem.
Whetherhe is rightorwrong,I don'tknow.Stillhis argument should
make anyironistmorehopeful.
First of all, then,Toms claims that accountsof non-existence
"possessone important featurein common,viz. theyall explainnon-
existencein termsofnegation."All wouldbe well,of course,"ifne-
gation in turnwere explicable in purelyaffirmative terms"-all
wouldbe well,thatis, forthelogiciantrying to dissolvea paradox.
But,as Tomsbelieves:negationis notexplicablein affirmative terms,
whileat thesame time"everynegativepropositionand everynega-
tivefactis self-contradictory,"
and thereis no way aroundthepara-
dox of negation(pp. 80, 96). Thereforethereis no way to solvethe
puzzle of non-being,and that,if true,shakesthe foundationsof a
logicthatis based on thelaw ofcontradiction. What,then,is left?
"An altogetherdifferent approachis called for,"says Toms, "if
enquiryis to proceedbeyondthispoint."This altogetherdifferent
approachwould concernitselfwithwhat he calls "over-necessita-
tion."He has in mindthequestion,whethernecessarytruthsare true

35 See n. 29. Subsequentpage references to Toms's book will be givenin the

text.
36 The logicianG. B. Keene reviewedit in termsof bemusedregret:"It . . .
seemsquestionablewhat thereis leftforMr. Toms,who afterall is down on the
title-pageas 'lecturer
in logic,'and othersin his position,to lecturein" (Philosophi-
cal Quarterly 13 [19631,277).

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142 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES

byconvention,
but"over-necessitation"
so faras I can tellis a termof
his ownmaking.37He explainswhathe meansbyit in thisway:

Theproblem ofover-necessitation
is a moregeneralonethanthatofPN [the
paradoxofnegation]. PN can be statedin theform:Whatever is negated
therebyis. Henceforanyp, not-pimplies not-
p, andin so faras p implies
not-p(byNC [thelawofnon-contradiction]) andnot(not-p)implies not-p
(byPN), wehavetheconverse too,viz.p impliesnot-p.... Whenever we
havethismutualimplication ofoppositesitfollowsthatbotharetrue.This
remainsso,evenifwebeginbychoosing thesolution thatbotharefalse,for
falsehood is effectively onlyin termsofthenegative
definable factmaking
thecontradictory ofthefalseproposition consists
true.Over-necessitation in
theadmission ofthetruthofbothopposites(p. 122).

An immediateroughtranslation will get us back moresquarelyon

our own ground.Satirethataims metaphorically at annihilatingits
subjects(and that,we haveseen,maybe moregenerally thecase than
we had dared think)aims at whatis impossible;but conversely, it
aimsat whatis possible,thoughself-contradictory, too. Satirereturns
afteralmostvanishingbut it returns, as Swiftbestknew,in theem-
brace of irony. "Over-necessitation," the mutual implicationof
oppositesand theconsequencethatbothare true,is theironist'slife-
blood.
Of coursenegationis not quite everything: "themutualimplica-
tionofoppositescan be broughtaboutby othermeansthanPN, e.g.,
by the argumentsof a reflexive paradox" (p. 122). And although,
as Toms says,theparadoxofnegationprobably"concernsa levelof
thought"thatis "morebasic" (p. 122n), we can use one of the re-
flexiveparadoxes-the mostfamousof all-to characterize theiron-
ist: theironistis forevertheliar who sayshe lies and therefore tells
bothfalseand true.38 Gulliversayshe tellsthetruth,and thatis not
too harda case to deal with;itis theironistbehindhimwhogivesthe

37 This is how he arrivesat the term:"If, to the objectivenecessityof NC [the

law of noncontradiction], we add the proved objectivenecessityof PN [the
paradoxof negation],this stillbringsus no nearerto conventionalism. Owing to
the resultingconflict languagecould perhapsbe used
of necessitiesconventionalist
to describethe way thingsappear,but it could not be a description of the way
thingsare. What we have in fact is over-necessitation, not under-necessitation"
(Being,Negationand Logic, pp. 120-1).
38 For thepersonlikemyself whowantsto understand thereflexiveparadoxesbet-
terbut is not well versedin symboliclogic,W. V. Quine'stitleessayin The Ways
of Paradoxand OtherEssays (New York,1966) is especiallyvaluable;it is "semi-
popular"and proceeds,as Quine happilyputsit,in "unbroken English"(p. vii).

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 SWIFT'S TALE 143

most trouble. And the truthhe tells is that "not-p implies p . . . p

impliesnot-p."
I have describedironyelsewhereas assertingand denyingtheex-
istenceof opposites.39 I stillthinkthedescription is serviceable,but
itneedsone wordmore:I shouldhave said,ironyis thesimultaneous
assertionand denial of theexistenceof opposites.Successionis not
enough,simultaneity is of theessence.Ironyfuseswhatwe can only
say consecutively: "not-pimpliesp ... p impliesnot-p."And ifthat
is so, we can inferanotherdeeplyfoundedreasonfortheprevalence
ofAugustanirony.Was itnotan answerto theGalileanand Newton-
ian worldofflux,theworldthathad substituted becomingforbeing
and was no longer"a realmofsubstancesin qualitativeand teleolog-
ical relations"but "a realmofbodies movingmechanically in space
and time?"40If ironydeniesprocess,it is a creatingof the timeless
world,a sortofparadise,thoughof coursethemockeryofparadise,
too.
Yet was itnecessary?May we not,instead,getto thecelestialcity
by dialecticaladvances:"It mightbe thoughtthatdialecticalphilos-
ophydeals adequatelywiththe problemof over-necessitation" (p.
122). It is one of theissuesofHegel scholarshipwhetherdialecticis
or is not a temporalprocess;and, therefore, whetherit doesn'tor
whether itdoes suspendthelaw ofcontradiction.41But suppose,with
Toms,thatit is a temporalprocess.In thatcase, thoughit "certainly
admitstheexistenceof over-necessitation . .. thisis notthesame as
sayingit adequatelyexpressesover-necessitation" (p. 122). "It is
clear," says Toms, "thatwhat over-necessitation consistsin is the
conjunctionof opposites,theirco-existencein time,and that the
successionofoppositesin timeis therefore something notspecifically
demandedbytheover-necessitation itself.The conclusionis thatthe
idea of a dialecticalmovementexpressesnot the natureof over-
necessitation itself,butthefactthata selfstandingoutsidetheover-

39 Lemuel Gulliver'sMirrorforMan, p. 78.

Foundationsof ModernScience(GardenCity,
40 E. A. Burtt,The Metaphysical
N.Y.: n.d.),p. 161.
41 Cf. G. R. G. Mure,An Introduction to Hegel (Oxford,1940), p. 139: "It has
been objectedto Hegel's Logic thathe bases it on a flatdenialof thelaw of contra-
diction."Mureanswersthatthesisand antithesis "are not,in fact,competing forthe
same [predicative]position;forthesubjectwhichtheycharacterize developsin the
transitionfromthesisto antithesis.
DespiteHegel'soccasionally misleadinglanguage,
the antithesisis not just the negationof the thesis:it is the negatedthesis"(pp.
140-41).

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144 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES

necessitation needs to rationaliseit" (p. 123). That is, we look for

comfort in themovement ofhistory, usingtemporalfactsas an image
fora stateofthingsthatexistsoutsideoftime.Dialecticalphilosophy
rationalizes whatis philosophically unacceptable.Ironyacceptswhat
is both unacceptableand true. That is how Swiftovercomesthe
philosophers and, also, howhe overcamehimself.Swiftwas an iron-
ist because he knewhow deep the problemlay. He resembledan-
otherironistin theknowledgethat"to be or notto be" was notjust
a matterof mortality.
On any single-minded view,ironyis indefensible. It is a thiefin
thenight,to frighten thecustodiansofabsolutespirit:"The ironical,
as 'genial' individuality, consistsin the self-annihilation of whatis
noble,great,and excellent."42 It is an instanceofbad faith:"In irony
a man annihilateswhathe positswithinone and the same act; he
leads us to believein ordernotto be believed;he affirms to denyand
deniesto affirm, he createsa positiveobjectbutit has no beingother
thanitsnothingness."43 But perhaps,afterall, it is an ambidextrous
universewe live in, withantigalaxieselsewhere?Ironistswould an-
swerHegel or Sartre,as theywould answerotherless sophisticated
arguments thatironyis an artfortheelite: onlyhalftrue.If thepar-
adox ofnegationcan'tbe solved,thenironyis latentin thenatureof
at leastverbalthings.These are Toms'slastwords:"The problemof
over-necessitation is immense,unsolvedand almostuntouched.Let
one-oneunderestimate it" (p. 124). Ironistshaven'tsolvedit-that
has been far fromtheirintention-buttheyhave neverunderesti-
matedit.
The taleis of a tub,and we are in it. The wayoutis to act and be
silent.
Yet in factthe Tale does not come to nothingin the end. In the
silentwombare futurechancesoflifeand sound: "I shallherepause
awhile,tillI find,by feelingtheWorld'sPulse, and myown,thatit
willbe of absoluteNecessityforus both,to resumemyPen" (210).
Beingbornis a historicalnecessity.The artistis theworld'smidwife
and hisown.We are back in therealmofprocessand oftime.
StanfordUniversity

42 Hegel, On Art,Religion,Philosophy:IntroductoryLecturesto the Realm of

AbsoluteSpirit,ed. J.GlennGray(New York,1970),p. 100.
43 Beingand Nothingness, p. 87.

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