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G.R. No.

178411 June 23, 2010 property since they have not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for sales
patent has not yet been granted. Additionally, they failed to implead the Republic of the Philippines, which
Office of the City Mayor vs. Ebio is an indispensable party.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. 21
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. On January 31, 2007, the Court of
amended, assailing the January 31, 2007 Decision1 and June 8, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals Appeals issued its Decision in favor of the respondents. According to the Court of Appeals--
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 allegedly for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The CA had
reversed the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 196, issued on April 29, The issue ultimately boils down to the question of ownership of the lands adjoining Cutcut Creek
2005 in Civil Case No. 05-0155. particularly Road Lot No. 8 (hereinafter RL 8) and the accreted portion beside RL 8.
Below are the facts. The evidentiary records of the instant case, shows that RL 8 containing an area of 291 square meters is
owned by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. covered by TCT No. S-62176. The same RL 8 appears to have been
Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land consisting of 406 square meters, donated by the Guaranteed Homes to the City Government of Paraaque on 22 March 1966 and which
more or less, located at 9781 Vitalez Compound in Barangay Vitalez, Paraaque City and covered by was accepted by the then Mayor FLORENCIO BERNABE on 5 April 1966. There is no evidence however,
Tax Declaration Nos. 01027 and 01472 in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an when RL 8 has been intended as a road lot.
accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor of the said
parcel of land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his son, On the other hand, the evidentiary records reveal that PEDRO VITALEZ possessed the accreted property
Pedro Vitalez. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. since 1930 per his Affidavit dated 21 March 1966 for the purpose of declaring the said property for taxation
In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy, 4 Pedro was able to obtain a purposes. The property then became the subject of Tax Declaration No. 20134 beginning the year 1967
tax declaration over the said property in his name.5 Since then, respondents have been religiously paying and the real property taxes therefor had been paid for the years 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1972,
real property taxes for the said property.6 1973, 1974, 1978, 1980, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Sometime
in 1964 and 1971, construction permits were issued in favor of Appellant MARIO EBIO for the subject
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedros daughter, Zenaida. Upon Pedros advice, property. On 21 April 1987, PEDRO VITALEZ transferred his rights in the accreted property to MARIO
the couple established their home on the said lot. In April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio secured EBIO and his successors-in-interest.
building permits from the Paraaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the said
compound.7 On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights8 ceding his claim over the Applying [Article 457 of the Civil Code considering] the foregoing documentary evidence, it could be
entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax declarations under Pedros name were concluded that Guaranteed Homes is the owner of the accreted property considering its ownership of the
cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario Ebios name.9 adjoining RL 8 to which the accretion attached. However, this is without the application of the provisions
of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription which is likewise applicable in the instant case.
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series
of 199910seeking assistance from the City Government of Paraaque for the construction of an access The subject of acquisitive prescription in the instant case is the accreted portion which [was] duly proven
road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed road, projected to be eight (8) by the Appellants. It is clear that since 1930, Appellants together with their predecessor-in-interest,
meters wide and sixty (60) meters long, will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez PEDRO VITALEZ[,] have been in exclusive possession of the subject property and starting 1964 had
Compound11 traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. When the city government advised all the introduced improvements thereon as evidenced by their construction permits. Thus, even by
affected residents to vacate the said area, respondents immediately registered their opposition thereto. extraordinary acquisitive prescription[,] Appellants have acquired ownership of the property in question
As a result, the road project was temporarily suspended.12 since 1930 even if the adjoining RL 8 was subsequently registered in the name of Guaranteed Homes. x
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from the barangay and the Further, it was only in 1978 that Guaranteed Homes was able to have RL 8 registered in its name, which
city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot. Respondents filed is almost fifty years from the time PEDRO VITALEZ occupied the adjoining accreted property in 1930. x
letter-complaints before the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, the Department of Interior and
Local Government and the Office of the Vice Mayor.13 On June 29, 2003, the Sangguniang Barangay of We likewise note the continuous payment of real property taxes of Appellants which bolster their right
Vitalez held a meeting to discuss the construction of the proposed road. In the said meeting, respondents over the subject property.
asserted their opposition to the proposed project and their claim of ownership over the affected In sum, We are fully convinced and so hold that the Appellants [have] amply proven their right over the
property.14 On November 14, 2003, respondents attended another meeting with officials from the city property in question.
government, but no definite agreement was reached by and among the parties. 15
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Order of
On March 28, 2005, City Administrator Noli Aldip sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property.16 Respondents
sent a letter to the Office of the City Administrator asserting, in sum, their claim over the subject property SO ORDERED.22
and expressing intent for a further dialogue.17 The request remained unheeded.1avvphi1
On June 8, 2007, the appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Paraaque City on April 21, 2005 and raising the following assignment of errors:
applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners. 18 In the course of the proceedings,
respondents admitted before the trial court that they have a pending application for the issuance of a I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
sales patent before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 19 APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A RIGHT IN ESSE IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;]
On April 29, 2005, the RTC issued an Order20 denying the petition for lack of merit. The trial court
reasoned that respondents were not able to prove successfully that they have an established right to the
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF contrast, a necessary party is one whose presence in the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the
APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT LOT IS AVAILABLE FOR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION IS IN whole controversy but whose interest is separable such that a final decree can be made in their absence
ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;] AND without affecting them.33
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE COMPLAINT FILED In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city government of Paraaque from
BY RESPONDENTS IN THE LOWER COURT.23 proceeding with its implementation of the road construction project. The State is neither a necessary nor
an indispensable party to an action where no positive act shall be required from it or where no obligation
The issues may be narrowed down into two (2): procedurally, whether the State is an indispensable party shall be imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar. Neither would it be an indispensable party if none of
to respondents action for prohibitory injunction; and substantively, whether the character of respondents its properties shall be divested nor any of its rights infringed.
possession and occupation of the subject property entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory
injunction. We also find that the character of possession and ownership by the respondents over the contested land
entitles them to the avails of the action.
The petition is without merit.
A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right.34 A party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must
An action for injunction is brought specifically to restrain or command the performance of an act. 24 It is prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or existing. 35 It should not be
distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction, which cannot exist except only as part or as contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may never arise. 36
an incident to an independent action or proceeding. Moreover, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary
remedy of a preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction may issue.25 In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and
possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit from the
In the case at bar, respondents filed an action for injunction to prevent the local government of Paraaque local government of Paraaque for the construction of their family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro
City from proceeding with the construction of an access road that will traverse through a parcel of land executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare the property in his name for
which they claim is owned by them by virtue of acquisitive prescription. taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of
Petitioners, however, argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is classified as part of the Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8 to the local
public domain, any land that may have formed along its banks through time should also be considered government of Paraaque.
as part of the public domain. And respondents should have included the State as it is an indispensable From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one conclusion can be
party to the action. made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of
We do not agree. Paraaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly,
respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription.
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said
settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only
accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect,26 in relation the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never
to Article 457 of the Civil Code. intended as a means of acquiring ownership.37 A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not
confer, ownership.38
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over alluvial deposits along
the banks of a creek. It reads: Did the filing of a sales patent application by the respondents, which remains pending before the DENR,
estop them from filing an injunction suit?
ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by
accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.27 We answer in the negative.
Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states: Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either through judicial proceedings
or through administrative process. In the instant case, respondents admitted that they opted to confirm
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually their title over the property administratively by filing an application for sales patent.
receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
Respondents application for sales patent, however, should not be used to prejudice or derogate what
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do may be deemed as their vested right over the subject property. The sales patent application should
not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate instead be considered as a mere superfluity particularly since ownership over the land, which they seek
to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining to buy from the State, is already vested upon them by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the
property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject State does not have any authority to convey a property through the issuance of a grant or a patent if the
to acquisition through prescription by third persons.28 land is no longer a public land.39
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give what he does not have. Such principle is equally
possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property applicable even against a sovereign entity that is the State.
of public domain.29 Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State.30
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 31, 2007 Decision, as well as the
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, 31 the land which is formed by the July 8, 2007 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 are hereby AFFIRMED.
gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public
domain by clear provision of law. With costs against petitioners.
Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is such that a final decree SO ORDERED.
would necessarily affect his/her right, so that the court cannot proceed without their presence. 32 In
G.R. No. L-39248 May 7, 1976 10. That the excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a result of the
approval of the subdivision survey (LRC) Psd-69322 was formerly a portion of the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, plaintiff-appellee, Davao River which dried up by reason of the change of course of the said Davao
vs. River; hence a land belonging to the public domain; and
HEIRS OF LUISA VILLA ABRILLE, defendant-appellant, LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSIONER
and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY, defendants. 11. That as a consequence thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18887 which
covers Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 of Subdivision Survey (LRC) Psd-69322, wherein the
ESGUERRA, J.: excess area of land belong to the public domain (not private land) is null and void ab
This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 47438- initio.
R. The Court of Appeals certified it to this Court for final consideration and resolution of the pure question On June 10, 1969, defendant Register of Deeds of Davao- City filed her answer averring that she, "in the
of law involved. performance of her ministerial duty, honestly and in good faith effected the registration of Subdivision Lot
The factual background of the case is as follows: No. 379-B-2-B-1 and Lot No. 379B-2-B-2 and the issuance of corresponding TCT No. 18886 and TCT
No. 18887 therefor, respectively, in view of the approval of the Land Registration Commissioner of
On May 9, 1969, a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title was filed by the Republic of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, and in view of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Davao to
Philippines (represented by the Director of Lands), with the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch 1, correct the area in Certificate of Title No. T-1439, to cancel the same and to issue in lieu thereof TCT
alleging, among others, the following: Nos. T-18886 and T-18887".
3. That defendant Commissioner of Land Registration and defendant Register of On July 2, 1969, herein defendant-appellants filed their answer admitting the allegations contained in
Deeds of Davao City whose Offices are at Espaa Extension, Quezon City and paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the complaint; that they admit the increase in area of the land of their
Davao City, respectively. "(are included in this complaint, the first being the public predecessor but that the increase in area of the land was acceded to and concurred in by the defendant,
Official charged under the law with the approval )." subdivision surveys of private Land Registration Commissioner, and the same was duly noted and approved by the Court of First
lands while the second is the Official vested with the authority to issue certificates of Instance of Davao; that they admit the issuance of TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887 out of Certificate of
titles, pursuant to the provisions of Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Title No. T- 1439 in the name of their predecessor-in-interest Luisa Villa Abrille but that TCT No. T-18886
Land Registration Law; had been cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-19077 was issued in favor of Gaudencio Consunji,
and, TCT No. T-18887 had likewise been cancelled and several Transfer Certificates of Title were issued
4. That defendant Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille) is the thereunder; that the subject increase of area was made in accordance with law and existing
owner of a parcel of land in the City of Davao containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED jurisprudence; and that Luisa Villa Abrille, predecessor-in-interest of herein defendant-appellant, as
TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY TWO SQUARE METERS riparian owner was entitled under the law to claim, as she did, the increase or excess in area of her
(525.652), more or less, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 of the Registry original land as her own.
of Deeds of Davao City, issued in her name;
On August 12, 1969, defendant Commissioner of Land Registration prays for a judgment on the pleadings
5. That deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the subdivision of the and avers in his answer that he has no knowledge of the subject matter of the complaint since the
aforesaid parcel of land into two lots designated as Lots Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and 379- subdivision plan involved therein was approved by the then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio
B-2-B-2 under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-69322 which was approved by the Land Noblejas; and that on February 19, 1968, the then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas,
Registration Commissioner on March 17,1967; issued LRC Circular No. 167 directing the Register of Deeds throughout the Philippines to, among others,
6. That under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, Lot No. 379- B-2-B-1 contains an deny the registration of subdivision plans with increased or expanded areas and to withhold the issuance
area of 30,100 Square Meters while Lot No. 379-B-2B-2 contains an area of 577,679 of the corresponding titles, or if the plans have already been registered and the titles issued, to recall the
Square Meters or a total area of 607,779 Square Meters, which is 82,127 Square titles and to take appropriate steps for their cancellation.
Meters more than the original area covered in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 Some private persons, as actual possessors and occupants, tried to intervene in the case as movant-
in the name of said defendant Luisa Villa Abrille; intervenors but they were denied standing in court by the trial court in its order of August 16,1969.
7. That on March 27, 1967 or ten days after the approval by the Land Registration On January 6, 1970, the parties litigants submitted in court their "Agreed Stipulation of Facts" and pray
Commissioner, said Luisa Villa Abrille was able to secure an order from the Court of that judgment be rendered by the trial court on their case based on their stipulation of facts. The "Agreed
First Instance of Davao in LRC (GLRO) Doc. No. 9969, directing the Register of Stipulation of Facts" of the parties reads as follows:
Deeds for the City of Davao and Province of Davao, to correct the area of Certificate
of Title No. T-1439 and thereafter to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof TCT COME NOW the parties assisted by their respective attorneys, and unto the
Nos. T-18886 and T-18887; Honorable Court, most respectfully submit the following stipulation of facts and
allege:
8. That on March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned registered Lot 379-B-
2-B-1 and issued TCT No. 18886 therefor, in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille and on 1. That Lot 379-B-2-B was originally registered on June 28, 1916 in the Registry
the same date registered Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 and issued TCT No. 18887 in the Book of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga as Vol. A27, Page 40 under Original
name of Luisa Villa Abrille; Certificate of Title No. 5609, Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 317, in the name of
Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna, father of Luisa Villa Abrille;
9. That the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2, which includes the aforementioned
excess area of 82,127 Square Meters, was not in accordance with law for lack of the 2. That upon the death of the original owner, the said property was inherited by Luisa
required notice and publication as prescribed in Act 496, as amended, otherwise Villa Abrille and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 was issued in the name of
known as the Land Registration Law; said Luisa Villa Abrille;
3. That subsequently, by virtue of an approved subdivision plan Psd-69322 by the 11. That the parcel of land subject of the increase is fully planted with coconuts,
defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T- bananas and other seasonal crops by the defendants, through their predecessor-in-
18886 and 18887 were issued by the defendant, Register of Deeds of Davao, copy interest;
of which subdivision plan is hereto attached as Annex "A", and made integral part
hereof; 12. That the increase in area could have taken place very long time ago as the
coconuts planted thereon had long been fruit bearing;
4. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18886 was subsequently cancelled by
virtue of deed of sale, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19077 was issued in the 13. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18886 does not contain any portion of the
name of Gaudencio Consunji a purchaser in good faith and for value; increase in area;

5. That the said subdivision plan Annex "A" was also approved by the Court of First 14. That of the certificates of title issued based under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
Instance of Davao, Branch IV, through an Order dated March 27, 1967, copy of which 71236, only Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T- 20725; T-20701; T-20713; and T-
order is hereto attached as Annex "B" and made part hereof; 20690 contain the increase in area; while all the other certificates of title issued under
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 do not contain any increase in area;
6. That the said Order Annex "B" was issued by the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch IV, on the strength of the Report of the defendant, Land Registration 15. That the parties agree that the issuance of the Order Annex "B" was without
Commissioner, copy of which report is hereto attached as Annex "C" and made notice to the Director of Lands.
integral part hereof; The trial court thereafter rendered its decision dated January 27, 1970, which reads
7. That much later on, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18887 was by virtue of an as follows:
Order of the Court of First Instance, Branch 1, in Special Proceedings No. 1357, This is an ordinary civil action for annulment of certificate of title instituted by the
entitled: In the Matter of the Testate Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille, approving a project Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, against the Estate
of partition cancelled, and in lieu thereof, the following Transfer Certificates of Title of Luisa Abrille, represented by Huang Siu Sin, Administrator, the Land Registration
were issued to the following named persons, to wit: Commissioner and the Register of Deeds of the City of Davao. Because the residue
(a) T-20690 - Huang Siu Sin; of the intestate estate of Luisa Villa Abrille had been divided among Huang Siu Sin,
Josefino Huang, Milagros Huang, Miguel Huang and lap Tong Ha, heirs, they were
(b) T-20692 - Huang Siu Sin; directed to appear and to substitute for the intestate estate and they did.
(c) T-20701 - Josefino Huang; The parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
(d) T-20702 - Josefino Huang; xxx xxx xxx
(e) T-20703 - Josefino Huang; The increase in area of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 5609 of
the Register of Deeds of Davao in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna and
(f) T-20732 Huang Siu Sin, et al.; subsequently by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T. 1439 in the name of Luisa Villa
(g) T-20733 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.; Abrille and finally, based on subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236, by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725 in the name of Milagros Huang, T20701 in the
(h) T-20713 - Miguel Huang; name of Josefino Huang, T-20713 in the name of Miguel Huang and T-20690 in the
name of Huang Siu Sin, is from 525,652 square meters to 607,779 square meters,
(i) T-23015 - Miguel Huang; or 82,127 square meters.
(j) T-20725 - Milagros Huang; The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille in order to include the
(k) T-20726 - Milagros Huang; increase in area was a petition for approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-79322
recommended by the Commissioner of Land Registration in his Report, and for
which certificates of title were issued on the basis of a subdivision plan LRC Psd- issuance of new title under Section 44, Act 496, as amended, filed with this court,
71236 duly approved by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, copy of which was assigned to Branch IV.
which subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made
integral part hereof; Even pursuant to Section 44 of Act 496 under which the aforesaid remedy was
sought, notice before the hearing is required. The parties admit that there was no
8. That the parties admit that there was an increase in the area of Lot 379-B-2-B, but notice to the persons interested, including the Director of Lands, before the petition
the same was with the knowledge of the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner was heard.
and the court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV;
Worse, the increase in area could not have been included in Transfer Certificates of
9. That the parties admit that no registered owner has been affected or prejudiced in Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 even assuming arguendo that
the increase in area as only Luisa Villa Abrille as the registered owner holds property the same belonged to the owner of the land to which it is adjacent by the simple
adjacent to the parcel of land in question; expediency of a petition for approval of subdivision plan and issuance of new titles,
because a subdivision of a registered land under Section 44 of Act 496 does not
10. That the portion of land subject of the increase adjoins Lot 379-B-2-B and abuts authorize the inclusion of land or area not embraced in the titled or in excess of what
the Davao River; is stated in the title. And the approval by the Court of such subdivision plan does not
lend validity to it. The subdivision must be limited to the area stated in the title.
Neither amendment of the title under Section 112 of Act 496 would be a valid remedy Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the approval of their
1. Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 and then Psd-71236 to include the questioned increased area of
82,127 square meters is, to say the least, unwarranted and irregular. This is so, for the increased area in
The heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille.. owners of the adjacent estate, might have acquired question, which is not a registered land but formerly a river bed, is so big as to give allowance for a mere
a registrable title to the land in question but to bring it under the operation of the Land mistake in area of the original registration of the tracts of land of the defendant-appellant formerly
Registration Act, a petition for registration under Act 496 should have been filed. belonging to and registered in the name of their grandfather, Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna. In order to
More so when the title acquired is by continuous possession for at least 30 years bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have been a former river bed of the Davao River,
under a claim of ownership And even assuming that the land is an accretion, the fact under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act 496, proceedings in registrations of
that the riparian estate is registered does not bring ipso facto effect its accretion land title should have been filed Instead of an ordinary approval of subdivision plan.
thereto under the operation of the Land Registration Act. No decree of registration
of the land based upon final judgment promulgated by a court of competent It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496, which the predecessor-in-interest
jurisdiction after due publication, notice and hearing, has been issued by the (Luisa Villa Abrille) of the herein defendant-appellant took, is good only insofar as it covers previously
Commissioner of Land Registration and transcribed by the Register of Deeds of registered lands. In the instant case, part of the tracts of land, particularly the area of 82,127 square
Davao in the registry, for the reason that no initial or original registration proceedings meters, has not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse still, the approval of
have been instituted by the owner. And the only way by which a title to the land in Subdivision Plans (LRC) Psd-69322 and Psd-71236 was without notice to all parties in interest, more
question can be issued for the first time is for the Land Registration Commissioner particularly the Director of Lands. For an applicant to have his imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a
to issue a decree of registration based upon final judgment rendered by a court of land to be originally registered under Act 496, the following requisites should all be satisfied:
competent jurisdiction after trial.
1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor;
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered cancelling Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 and directing the Register of Deeds 2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;
of Davao to issue new certificates of title in lieu thereof after the portions consisting 3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court;
of 82,127 square meters, the land involved, shall have been segregated therefrom
in accordance with law. 4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together with all the
documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land
Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, defendant Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille brought the case Registration Commission;
on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, in its Resolution dated July 22, 1974,
certified the case (CA-G.R. No. 47438-R) to this Court for consideration and final disposition. 5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place of the
hearing in the Official Gazette;
Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in holding the approval of Subdivision Plan
(LRC) Psd-69322 of no legal effect merely on ground of lack of notice to interested persons, and in 6. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known to have
ordering the cancellation of Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690. It is the interests in the property by the sheriff;
contention of the defendant-appellant that since the government agencies having to do with lands know
all the time the increase in area in subdivision plan Psd-69322, and the government agencies concerned 7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the notice or
tolerated if not abetted the ultimate inclusion of the involved increase in area, defendant-appellant should not;
not be made to suffer the effect of the allegedly wrong procedure or step taken in the approval of the 8. Hearing of the case by the Court;
aforementioned subdivision plan. Besides, defendant-appellant claims that it is their honest belief that the
legal remedy taken by them in seeking the approval of their subdivision plan concerned was well within 9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;
the law, particularly the provision of Section 44 of Act 496, as amended.
10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and instructing
Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, maintains that the approval of the subdivision plan, with the increase the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of confirmation and registration;
in area, by the defendant-appellant Land Registration Commission does not lend validity to the said
subdivision plan; and that the issuance of the four transfer certificates of title (Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T- 11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration Commission;
20713 and T-20690) over the increased area in question is improper and invalid notwithstanding the 12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register of
conformity of the Land Registration Commissioner and the subsequent order of the Court of First Instance Deeds, and
of Davao, Branch IV, approving the subdivision plan concerned, as the required giving of notice to all
parties interested in defendant-appellant's petition for approval of subdivision plan was not at all followed, 13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and the
issuance of the owner's duplicate original certificate of title to the applicant by the
Before Us, therefore, for consideration and final resolution, in order to arrive at a judicious disposition of Register of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.
the case at bar, is whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which cover the increased area in question totalling Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been complied with, the lower court committed no error
82,127 square meters. in its appealed decision dated January 27, 1970.

After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in controversy, We are of the opinion and so hold WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.
that the lower court acted correctly in ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-
No special pronouncement as to costs.
20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which admittedly covered the increased area of 82,127 square
meters under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-71236 (and formerly under Psd-69322) for the City of Davao. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962 of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art.
714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an accretion to the mother or registered land
IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners, of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old
vs. Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the accretion has been occupied by the defendants since
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents. 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does not require any act of possession on
BARRERA, J.: the part of the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest
(Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the appropriation on the part of the reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of the alluvial formation, as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and
Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have
latter without petitioners' consent. been in possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by
prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, the action was commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the land
with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts.
province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the
parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown by Original registered property, the same may be considered as registered property, within the meaning
Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU- of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription or adverse
83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary possession by another person.
was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter,
a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the
so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:
site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which
the registered area (Exh. C-1). started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties.
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela By law, therefore, unless some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the
against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of
their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the
formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
entered upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that they have acquired ownership
the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this case. The Court a quo, has
1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in
and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present. question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is
registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496,
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the which states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall
ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and be acquired by prescription or adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of
deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said the defendant began only in the month of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period
decision, in part, reads: required for prescription before the present action was instituted.
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An
deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We accretion to registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to
are inclined to believe that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931, protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such
because the surveyors found out that the northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them protection does not extend beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To hold
was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact that the otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the technical
accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendant description of the land given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and
witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the plaintiffs, the area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has
accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the erosion of the area of
Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate
Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since 1933 do not only Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to all the rights
contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is concerned.
incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on
reason for which, it was only declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants accession: and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition area by another
under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered upon the land. We could not give person through prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v.
credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.
28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this declaration begins with the year
1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the
not mean that they become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision length of time that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that
he occupied the land in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact remain, however,
plaintiffs. The area under occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after
declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was superseded in petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up
1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality wherein it is located was to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The
changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the
both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal president protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it
of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on the south, and was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the
defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This is
defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was then a question which requires determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such
less than one hectare. possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were
in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by
that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to
that the defendants occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's them and can not be reviewed by us.
attention to the fact that the land was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were
the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an action until 1958, because it was only then that they The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the
were able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code
never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the
Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in
tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but accordance with law.
because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.
conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part thus So ordered.
included, containing an area of some 458 square meters.1wph1.t
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession from 1933
to 1958 is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is
they and not the plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional
circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were deprived thereof
in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps to recover the same. The excuse they gave
for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their
property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too
flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of the surveyor's fees had nothing to
do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to
have it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs by
accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the defendants. We
are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really in possession
since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to
their rights only when they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription
had already supervened in favor of the defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in
question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old,
petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land
which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just
because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land
purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso
facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system
of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law.
Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but
merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible
by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation
G.R. No. 68166 February 12, 1997 Pascual's application for the same reason as that advanced by the Director of Lands. Later on, however,
the Director of Lands withdrew his opposition. The Director of Forestry become the sole oppositor.
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs. On June 2, 1960, the court a quo issued an order of general default excepting the Director of Lands and
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents. the Director of Forestry.
Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of general default was lifted and, on February 13,
1961, Navarro thereupon filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro claimed that the land
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: sought to be registered has always been part of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of
Unique is the legal question visited upon the claim of an applicant in a Land Registration case by Manila Bay; that he was a lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond
oppositors thereto, the Government and a Government lessee, involving as it does ownership of land permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by the Office of the President; and that be bad
formed by alluvium. already converted the area covered by the lease into a fishpond.

The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. His registered During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on November 6, 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed
property is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north a complaint for ejectment against Emiliano Navarro, one Marcelo Lopez and their privies, alleged by
by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River and the Bulacan River flow down towards the Manila Bay and act Pascual to have unlawfully claimed and possessed, through stealth, force and strategy, a portion of the
as boundaries of the applicant's registered land on the east and on the west. subject property covered by Plan Psu-175181. The defendants in the case were alleged to have built a
provisional dike thereon: thus they have thereby deprived Pascual of the premises sought to be
The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the applicant's land. Applicant's registered. This, notwithstanding repeated demands for defendants to vacate the property.
registered property is bounded on the north by the Manila Bay.
The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to the Court of First Instance
The issue: May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense that it naturally (now Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan, the appeal having been docketed as Civil Case No. 2873.
accrues in favor of the riparian owner or should the land be considered as foreshore land? Because of the similarity of the parties and the subject matter, the appealed case for ejectment was
consolidated with the land registration case and was jointly tried by the court a quo.
Before us is a petition for review of: (1) the decision 1 and (2) two subsequent resolutions 2 of the
Intermediate Appellate Court 3 (now the Court of Appeals) in Land Registration Case No. N-84, 4 the During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases, Emiliano Navarro died on November 1, 1961
application over which was filed by private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Sinforoso Pascual, now and was substituted by his heirs, the herein petitioners.
deceased, before the Court of First Instance 5 (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
Subsequently, on August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was substituted by his heirs, the herein private
There is no dispute as to the following facts: respondents.
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application for foreshore lease covering On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the subject property to be foreshore
a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17) land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration proceedings.
hectares. This application was denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion for reconsideration.
The decision's dispositive portion reads:
Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond
application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially, such application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground (1) Dismissing plaintiff [private respondent] Sinforoso Pascual's complaint for
that the property formed part of the public domain. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Director of ejectment in Civil Case No. 2873;
Fisheries, on May 27, 1958, gave due course to his application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares
of the property as may be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes. (2) Denying the application of Sinforoso Pascual for land registration over the land
in question; and
The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Emiliano Navarro's application. Aggrieved by
the decision of the Director of Fisheries, it appealed to the Secretary of Natural Resources who, however, (3) Directing said Sinforoso Pascual, through his heirs, as plaintiff in Civil Case No.
affirmed the grant. The then Executive Secretary, acting in behalf of the President of the Philippines, 2873 and as applicant in Land Registration Case No. N-84 to pay costs in both
similarly affirmed the grant. instances." 6
On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual flied an application to register The heirs of Pascual appealed and, before the respondent appellate court, assisted the following errors:
and confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, described in Plan Psu-
175181 and said to have an area of 146,611 square meters. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion 1. The lower court erred in not finding the land in question as an accretion by the
to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers to the land admittedly owned by applicants-
Title No. 6830. It is bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan appellants [private respondents].
River, and on the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow 2. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question is foreshore land.
downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting
in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner. 3. The lower court erred in not ordering the registration of the land in controversy in
favor of applicants-appellants [private respondents].
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an
opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title 4. The lower court erred in not finding that the applicants-appellants [private
to the subject property, the same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the respondents] are entitled to eject the oppositor-appellee [petitioners]. 7
Republic of the Philippines. The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal, similarly opposed
On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the court a quo and granted the petition for the said trees were planted. But this is not so because the land mass went far beyond
registration of the subject property but excluding therefrom fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards corner the boundary, or where the trees were planted.
1; and fifty meters (50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of the Psu-175181.
On the other hand, the picture-exhibits of appellants [private respondents] clearly
The respondent appellate court explained the reversal in this wise: show that the land that accumulated beyond the so- called boundary, as well as the
entire area being applied for is dry land, above sea level, and bearing innumerable
The paramount issue to be resolved in this appeal as set forth by the parties in their trees . . . The existence of vegetation on the land could only confirm that the soil
respective briefs is whether or not the land sought to be registered is accretion or thereat came from inland rather than from the sea, for what could the sea bring to
foreshore land, or, whether or not said land was formed by the action of the two rivers the shore but sand, pebbles, stones, rocks and corrals? On the other hand, the two
of Talisay and Bulacan or by the action of the Manila Bay. If formed by the action of rivers would be bringing soil on their downward flow which they brought along from
the Talisay and Bulacan rivers, the subject land is accretion but if formed by the the eroded mountains, the lands along their path, and dumped them all on the
action of the Manila Bay then it is foreshore land. northern portion of appellants' [private respondents'] land.
xxx xxx xxx In view of the foregoing, we have to deviate from the lower court's finding. While it is
It is undisputed that applicants-appellants [private respondents] owned the land true that the subject land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay fronting appellants'
immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. Their property which is [private respondents'] land, said land is not foreshore but an accretion from the action
covered by OCT No. 6830 is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers. In fact, this is exactly what the Bureau of Lands
by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay and Bulacan found out, as shown in the following report of the Acting Provincial Officer, Jesus M.
rivers come from inland flowing downstream towards the Manila Bay. In other words, Orozco, to wit:
between the Talisay River and the Bulacan River is the property of applicants with "Upon ocular inspection of the land subject of this registration
both rivers acting as the boundary to said land and the flow of both rivers meeting made on June 11, 1960, it was found out that the said land is . .
and emptying into the Manila Bay. The subject land was formed at the tip or apex of . . sandwitched [sic] by two big rivers . . . . These two rivers bring
appellants' [private respondents'] land adding thereto the land now sought to be down considerable amount of soil and sediments during floods
registered. every year thus raising the soil of the land adjoining the private
This makes this case quite unique because while it is undisputed that the subject property of the applicant [private respondents]. About four-fifth
land is immediately attached to appellants' [private respondents'] land and forms the [sic] of the area applied for is now dry land whereon are planted
tip thereof, at the same time, said land immediately faces the Manila Bay which is palapat trees thickly growing thereon. It is the natural action of
part of the sea. We can understand therefore the confusion this case might have these two rivers that has caused the formation of said land . . . .
caused the lower court, faced as it was with the uneasy problem of deciding whether subject of this registration case. It has been formed, therefore,
or not the subject land was formed by the action of the two rivers or by the action of by accretion. And having been formed by accretion, the said
the sea. Since the subject land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay facing land may be considered the private property of the riparian
appellants' [private respondents'] land, it would be quite easy to conclude that it is owner who is the applicant herein [private respondents] . . . .
foreshore and therefore part of the patrimonial property of the State as the lower In view of the above, the opposition hereto filed by the
court did in fact rule . . . . government should be withdrawn, except for the portion
xxx xxx xxx recommended by the land investigator in his report dated May
2, 1960, to be excluded and considered foreshore. . . ."
It is however undisputed that appellants' [private respondents'] land lies between
these two rivers and it is precisely appellants' [private respondents'] land which acts Because of this report, no less than the Solicitor General representing the Bureau of
as a barricade preventing these two rivers to meet. Thus, since the flow of the two Lands withdrew his opposition dated March 25, 1960, and limited "the same to the
rivers is downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are deposited northern portion of the land applied for, compromising a strip 50 meters wide along
at their mouths. the Manila Bay, which should be declared public land as part of the foreshore" . . .
.8
It is, therefore, difficult to see how the Manila Bay could have been the cause of the
deposit thereat for in the natural course of things, the waves of the sea eat the land Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the respondent appellate court ordered the issuance of the
on the shore, as they suge [sic] inland. It would not therefore add anything to the corresponding decree of registration in the name of private respondents and the reversion to
land but instead subtract from it due to the action of the waves and the wind. It is private respondents of the possession of the portion of the subject property included in
then more logical to believe that the two rivers flowing towards the bay emptied their Navarro's fishpond permit.
cargo of sand, silt and clay at their mouths, thus causing appellants' [private On December 20, 1978, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforecited decision. The
respondents'] land to accumulate therein. Director of Forestry also moved for the reconsideration of the same decision. Both motions were opposed
However, our distinguished colleage [sic], Mr. Justice Serrano, do [sic] not seem to by private respondents on January 27, 1979.
accept this theory and stated that the subject land arose only when . . . . Pascual On November 21, 1980, respondent appellate court promulgated a resolution denying the motion for
planted "palapat" and "bakawan" trees thereat to serve as a boundary or strainer. reconsideration filed by the Director of Forestry. It, however, modified its decision, to read, viz:
But we do not see how this act of planting trees by Pascual would explain how the
land mass came into being. Much less will it prove that the same came from the sea. (3). Ordering private oppositors Heirs of Emiliano Navarro to vacate that portion
Following Mr. Justice Serrano's argument that it were the few trees that acted as included in their fishpond permit covered by Plan Psu-175181 and hand over
strainers or blocks, then the land that grew would have stopped at the place where possession of said portion to applicants-appellants, if the said portion is not within
the strip of land fifty (50) meters wide along Manila Bay on the northern portion of Petitioners' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of accretion, is misplaced.
the land subject of the registration proceedings and which area is more particularly
referred to as fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards corner 1; and fifty (50) meters First, the title of petitioners' own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary to be Manila Bay.
from corner 5 towards corner 6 of Plan Psu-175181. . . . 9 Petitioners' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of the two rivers
whose torrential action, petitioners insist, is to account for the accretion on their land. In fact, one of the
On December 15, 1980, we granted the Solicitor General, acting as counsel for the Director of Forestry, petitioners, Sulpicio Pascual, testified in open court that the waves of Manila Bay used to hit the disputed
an extension of time within which to file in this court, a petition for review of the decision dated November land being part of the bay's foreshore but, after he had planted palapat and bakawan trees thereon in
29, 1978 of the respondent appellate court and of the aforecited resolution dated November 21, 1980. 1948, the land began to
rise. 16
Thereafter, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Forestry, filed a petition for review entitled,
"The Director of Forestry vs. the Court of Appeals." 10 We, however, denied the same in a minute Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land; (b) petitioners' own tract of land;
resolution dated July 20, 1981, such petition having been prematurely filed at a time when the Court of (c) the Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers. Petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay
Appeals was yet to resolve petitioners' pending motion to set aside the resolution dated November 21, and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side lies now the disputed land where before
1980. 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the
Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern
On October 9, 1981, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the and western boundaries of petitioners' own tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is
decision dated November 29, 1978. adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that the
On October 17, 1981, respondent appellate court made an entry of judgment stating that the decision alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.
dated November 29, 1978 had become final and executory as against herein petitioners as oppositors in Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that petitioners' own tract of land adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila
L.R.C. Case No. N-84 and Civil Case No. 2873 of the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind of body of water the
Court) of Balanga, Bataan. Manila Bay is. It is to be remembered that we held that:
On October 26, 1981, a second motion for reconsideration of the decision dated November 29, 1978 was Appellant next contends that . . . . Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We
filed by petitioners' new counsel. find said contention untenable. A bay is part of the sea, being a mere indentatiom of
On March 26, 1982, respondent appellate court issued a resolution granting petitioners' request for leave the same:
to file a second motion for reconsideration. "Bay. An opening into the land where the water is shut in on
On July 13, 1984, after hearing, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' second motion for all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of
reconsideration on the ground that the same was filed out of time, citing Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore
of Court which provides that a motion for reconsideration shall be made ex-parte and filed within fifteen of the sea or of a lake. " 7 C.J. 1013-1014." 17
(15) days from the notice of the final order or judgment. The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the
Hence this petition where the respondent appellate court is imputed to have palpably erred in appreciating foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the
the fact of the case and to have gravely misapplied statutory and case law relating to accretion, applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
specifically, Article 457 of the Civil Code. The process by which the disputed land was formed, is not difficult to discern from the facts of the case.
We find no merit in the petition. As the trial court correctly observed:

The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay A perusal of the survey plan . . . . of the land subject matter of these cases shows
and the accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by the action of the sea which brought that on the eastern side, the property is bounded by Talisay River, on the western
soil and sand sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and bakawan trees planted thereon by side by Bulacan River, on the southern side by Lot 1436 and on the northern side by
petitioner Sulpicio Pascual in 1948 Manila Bay. It is not correct to state that the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers meet a
certain portion because the two rivers both flow towards Manila Bay. The Talisay
Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously argue that the River is straight while the Bulacan River is a little bit meandering and there is no
disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers portion where the two rivers meet before they end up at Manila Bay. The land which
which run their course on the eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own tract of is adjacent to the property belonging to Pascual cannot be considered an accretion
land. [caused by the action of the two rivers].
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of the Applicant Pascual . . . . has not presented proofs to convince the Court that the land
following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it he has applied for registration is the result of the settling down on his registered land
be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place of soil, earth or other deposits so as to be rightfully be considered as an accretion
is adjacent to the bank of the river. 11 Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium [caused by the action of the two rivers]. Said Art. 457 finds no applicability where the
is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank 12; the owner of such estate is called the riparian accretion must have been caused by action of the bay. 18
owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands
bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. 13 The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the aforegoing observation is that the disputed
the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be land is part of the foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore, part of the public domain. The respondent
seen 14 but is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by appellate court, however, perceived the fact that petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and
third persons 15. Bulacan Rivers, to be basis to conclude that the disputed land must be an accretion formed by the action
of the two rivers because petitioners' own land acted as a barricade preventing the two rivers to meet and
that the current of the two rivers carried sediments of sand and silt downwards to the Manila Bay which be applied in multifarious situations, we have ruled differently insofar as accretions on lands adjoining the
accumulated somehow to a 14-hectare land. These conclusions, however, are fatally incongruous in the Laguna de Bay are concerned.
light of the one undisputed critical fact: the accretion was deposited, not on either the eastern or western
portion of petitioners' land where a river each runs, but on the northern portion of petitioners' land which In the cases of Government of the P.I v. Colegio de San Jose 21, Republic v. Court of Appeals 22, Republic
adjoins the Manila Bay. Worse, such conclusions are further eroded of their practical logic and v. Alagad 23, and Meneses v. Court of
consonance with natural experience in the light of Sulpicio Pascual's admission as to having planted Appeals 24, we categorically ruled that Laguna de Bay is a lake the accretion on which, by the mandate
palapat and bakawan trees on the northern boundary of their own land. In amplification of this, plainly of Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to the owner of the land contiguous thereto.
more reasonable and valid are Justice Mariano Serrano's observations in his dissenting opinion when he The instant controversy, however, brings a situation calling for the application of Article 4 of the Spanish
stated that: Law of Waters of 1866, the disputed land being an accretion on the foreshore of Manila Bay which is, for
As appellants' (titled) land . . . . acts as a barricade that prevents the two rivers to all legal purposes, considered a sea.
meet, and considering the wide expanse of the boundary between said land and the Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:
Manila Bay, measuring some 593.00 meters . . . . it is believed rather farfetched for
the land in question to have been formed through "sediments of sand and salt [sic] . Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action
. . . deposited at their [rivers'] mouths." Moreover, if "since the flow of the two rivers of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the
is downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are deposited at their waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
mouths," why then would the alleged cargo of sand, silt and clay accumulate at the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government
northern portion of appellants' titled land facing Manila Bay instead of merely at the shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto
mouths and banks of these two rivers? That being the case, the accretion formed at and as increment thereof.
said portion of appellants' titled [land] was not caused by the current of the two rivers
but by the action of the sea (Manila Bay) into which the rivers empty. In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed land
in this controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore
The conclusion . . . . is not supported by any reference to the evidence which, on the of Manila Bay is. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and
contrary, shows that the disputed land was formed by the action of the sea. Thus, no "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not
less than Sulpicio Pascual, one of the heirs of the original applicant, testified on capable of being appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization granted in
cross-examination that the land in dispute was part of the shore and it was only in due form by a competent authority." 25 Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have
1948 that he noticed that the land was beginning to get higher after he had planted the right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer
trees thereon in necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast
1948. . . . . guard services. 26 Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or legislative department has
already declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to
. . . . it is established that before 1948 sea water from the Manila Bay at high tide be the property of petitioners as owners of the estates adjacent thereto.
could reach as far as the dike of appellants' fishpond within their titled property, which
dike now separates this titled property from the land in question. Even in 1948 when WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED and DISMISSED.
appellants had already planted palapat and bakawan trees in the land involved,
inasmuch as these trees were yet small, the waves of the sea could still reach the Costs against petitioners.
dike. This must be so because in . . . . the survey plan of the titled property approved SO ORDERED.
in 1918, said titled land was bounded on the north by Manila Bay. So Manila Bay
was adjacent to it on the north. It was only after the planting of the aforesaid trees in
1948 that the land in question began to rise or to get higher in elevation.
The trees planted by appellants in 1948 became a sort of strainer of the sea water
and at the same time a kind of block to the strained sediments from being carried
back to the sea by the very waves that brought them to the former shore at the end
of the dike, which must have caused the shoreline to recede and dry up eventually
raising the former shore leading to the formation of the land in question." 19
In other words, the combined and interactive effect of the planting of palapat and bakawan
trees, the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay eventually resulting in the drying up of its
former foreshore, and the regular torrential action of the waters of Manila Bay, is the formation
of the disputed land on the northern boundary of petitioners' own tract of land.
The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of
the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, part of the public domain
At the outset, there is a need to distinguish between Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay.
While we held in the case of Ignacio v. Director of Lands and
Valeriano 20 that Manila Bay is considered a sea for purposes of determining which law on accretion is to

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