PROPERTY

IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

SORIANO VS SPOUSES GALIT, GR 156295, September 23, 2003

Facts: Ricardo Galit contracted a loan from Marcelo Soriano, in the total sum of P480,000.00,
evidenced by four promissory notes. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over a
parcel of land. After he failed to pay his obligation, Soriano filed a complaint for sum of money
against him with the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City. Respondents, the Spouses Ricardo and
Rosalina Galit, failed to file their answer. Hence, upon motion of Marcelo Soriano, the trial court
declared the spouses in default and proceeded to receive evidence for petitioner Soriano ex parte.
The RTC Balanga rendered judgment in favor of petitioner Soriano. The judgment became final
and executory. Accordingly, the trial court issued a writ of execution in due course, by virtue of
which, Deputy Sheriff Renato E. Robles levied on the following real properties of the Galit
spouses:

1. A parcel of land containing an area of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY
NINE (35,759) SQUARE METERS, more or less x x x;

2. STORE/HOUSE CONSTRUCTED on Lot No. 1103 made of strong materials G.I. roofing
containing an area of 30 sq. meters, more or less x x x;

3. BODEGA constructed on Lot 1103, made of strong materials, G.I. roofing, with a floor area of
42.75 sq. m. more or less x x x.

At the sale of the above-enumerated properties at public auction held on December 23, 1998,
petitioner was the highest and only bidder with a bid price of P483,000.00. Accordingly, on
February 4, 1999, Deputy Sheriff Robles issued a Certificate of Sale of Execution of Real
Property. On February 23, 2001, ten months from the time the Certificate of Sale on Execution
was registered with the Registry of Deeds, petitioner moved for the issuance of a writ of
possession. He averred that the one-year period of redemption had elapsed without the
respondents having redeemed the properties sold at public auction; thus, the sale of said
properties had already become final. He also argued that after the lapse of the redemption period,
the titles to the properties should be considered, for all legal intents and purposes, in his name and
favor. The RTC granted the motion for issuance of writ of possession for the following properties:

1. STORE HOUSE constructed on Lot No. 1103 situated at Centro 1, Orani, Bataan covered by
TCT No. 40785;

2. BODEGA constructed on Lot No. 1103 with an area of 42.75 square meters under Tax
Declaration No. 86 situated at Centro 1, Orani, Bataan;

3. Original Certificate of Title No. 40785 with an area of 134 square meters known as Lot No. 1103
of the Cadastral Survey of Orani.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the inclusion of the
parcel of land among the list of real properties in the writ of possession. Respondents argued that
said property was not among those sold on execution by Deputy Sheriff Renato E. Robles as
reflected in the Certificate of Sale on Execution of Real Property. The petition was granted.

Issue: Whether or not the land on which the buildings levied upon in execution is necessarily
included.

Ruling: ART. 415. The following are immovable property:

(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil.

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(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking them material or deterioration of the object;

(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or ornamentation, placed in buildings or on
lands by the owner of the immovable in such a manner that it reveals the intention to attach them
permanently to the tenements;

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for
an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;

(6) Animal houses, pigeon houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding places of similar nature, in
case their owner has placed them or preserves them with the intention to have them permanently
attached to the land, and forming a permanent part of it; the animals in these places are also
included;

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(9) Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain
at a fixed place on a river, lake or coast;

x x x x x x x x x.

The foregoing provision of the Civil Code enumerates land and buildings separately. This can only
mean that a building is, by itself, considered immovable. Thus, it has been held that . . . while it is
true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation of the
improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on
which it has been built. Such mortgage would be still a real estate mortgage for the building would
still be considered immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land.
(emphasis and italics supplied)

In this case, considering that what was sold by virtue of the writ of execution issued by the trial
court was merely the storehouse and bodega constructed on the parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-40785, which by themselves are real properties of respondents
spouses, the same should be regarded as separate and distinct from the conveyance of the lot on
which they stand.

PROPERTY IN RELATION TO THE PERSON TO WHOM IT BELONGS

DACANAY VS ASISTIO, JR, 208 SCRA 404, May 6, 1992.

Facts: This is a petition for mandamus to the non-action of the city government of Caloocan in
accordance with the decision of the RTC to evict the occupants of a flea market located in the
streets of Caloocan. On January 5, 1979, the Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted an
ordinance allowing the use of streets for the purpose of flea markets subject to several conditions.
In 1987, Mayor Martinez caused the demolition of the flea markets and the stallowners filed a case
against such action. The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the streets in questions
(Heros del '96, Gozon and Gonzales) are of public dominion, hence outside the commerce of man.
After the decision came out, there was a change in the city administration and current mayor
(Asistio) did not pursue the action of the previous mayor and left the flea markets in the streets as
is. Dacanay, being a resident of Heroes del '96 filed a petition for mandamus to remove the stalls
in their street.
Issue: Whether or not public streets be leased or licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a city
ordinance or resolution of Metropolitan Manila Commission.

Ruling: NO

1. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside the
commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract. (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code)

2. The vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve
such as for traveling. As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy
portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the
streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the
public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of a few
should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health, peace,
safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to
protect.

3. Any executive order or city resolution cannot change the nature of the public street because it is
going to be contrary to the general law. The Executive Order issued by Acting Mayor Robles
authorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted
licenses by the city government contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and roads
for public use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public
to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for
vehicles and pedestrians. As early as 1989, the public respondents bad started to look for feasible
alternative sites for flea markets. They have had more than ample time to relocate the street
vendors.

FRISCO F. DOMALSIN vs SPOUSES JUANITO VALENCIANO and AMALIA VALENCIANO,

G.R. No. 158687, January 25, 2006

Facts: Frisco Domalsin filed an action for forcible entry against the Spouses Valenciano. Domalsin
had allegedly been in continuous, adverse possession of a parcel of land in Baguio for 19 years
prior to the institution of the action, had introduced various improvements on the lot, and had been
consistently declaring it in his name for tax purposes. The Valencianos allegedly entered the
premises and tried to construct a building, by force and strategy, without the authority and consent
of Domalsin. 2 witnesses were presented by Domalsin, who testified that the latter had caused the
construction of 2 houses and a private road. Domalsin testified that he was passing Kennon Road
when he discovered that a portion of the Bued River could be a potential source of supplies for his
trucking business. He allegedly had an agreement with the previous occupant of the site, as
executed in a Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim, turning over the land in exchange for consideration.
DPWH and the Bureau of Mines then issued permits in favor of Domalsin to extract construction
materials in the said land. William Banuca was accepted by Domalsin as foreman and lived in one
of the houses in the property. Domalsin then claimed to have given the house which William
occupied to his laborers. The Valencianos claim that it was their cousin, Gloria Banuca (William's
wife), was the one who invited Domalsin to come and reside in the area. Domalsin allegedly
hauled sand and gravel from 1981 from 1985 but later stopped never and never returned. Gloria
claimed to have introduced the improvements on said property. The Valencianos averred that they
paid the Banucas for leveling the hill on which they constructed their house. MCTC found that the
subject of the controversy is possession of a road-right-of-way along Kennon Road and ruled in
favor of Domalsin. Domalsin had prior material possession over the land and that the destruction
of the house he built thereon due to an earthquake was not tantamount to abandonment. RTC
affirmed MCTC's decision, stating that the Banucas never laid claim over the property taking into
consideration that they were already residents of the place, such that they are deemed to have
acknowledged and respected Domalsin's prior possession. However, CA reversed and held that
the lower court erred in implying that Domalsin's right to possess the subject property stemmed
from his acquisition of the one-hectare property below the road-right-of-way. Subject of the
quitclaim and waiver was not the road-right-of-way but the sloping terrain below it. That was the
property acquired by Domalsin to have access to sand and gravel on the river and did not include
the road-right-of-way. As to Gloria's claim: Since subject property is a road-right-of-way, it forms
part of the public dominion and thus not susceptible to private acquisition or ownership.
Improvements made on the land or payment of realty taxes will never ripen into ownership.

Issue: Who among Domalsin and the Valencianos had a better right to possession of the disputed
road-right-of-way? - Neither of the two of them since public dominion.

Ruling: As the land in question is a portion of Kennon Road which is for the use of the people, it is
part of the public dominion. Hence, the parties cannot appropriate the land for themselves and
cannot claim any right of possession over it.

In light of this exposition, it is clear that neither the petitioner nor the respondents can own nor
possess the subject property the same being part of the public dominion. Property of public
dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as follows:

ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and other of similar character.
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.

Properties of public dominion are owned by the general public. Public use is use that is not
confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public. As the land in controversy is
a portion of Kennon Road which is for the use of the people, there can be no dispute that same is
part of public dominion. This being the case, the parties cannot appropriate the land for
themselves. Thus, they cannot claim any right of possession over it. This is clear from Article 530
of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated
may be the object of possession.

OWNERSHIP
Rights of a Person as a Consequence of Ownership

Dept. of Education vs Tuliao, GR 205644, June 9, 2014

Facts: On October 8, 2002, Mariano Tuliao (Tuliao) filed an action for recovery of possession and
removal of structure with damages against the Department of Education (DepEd) with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Tuguegarao City (MTCC). He alleged that he was the registered
owner of the subject parcel of land and that a portion of the said property was allowed by his
predecessors-in-interest to be used by the Atulayan Elementary School (AES) as an access road
for the schoolchildren in going to and from the school. In March 2000, upon discovering that a
structure was being constructed on the land, he demanded that the DepED cease and desist and
vacate the property. The respondent, however, refused. Tuliao likewise demanded payment for
reasonable rent, but his demand was also ignored. In its defense, the DepEd denied the material
allegations of the complaint and averred that it did not state a cause of action. Even if there was,
the same was already barred by prescription and/or laches. Its occupation of the subject land was
adverse, peaceful, continuous, and in the concept of an owner for more than fifty (50) years. It also
alleged that it did not receive a notice to cease and desist or notice to vacate. As owner of the
school site, it could not be compelled to pay rent or its reasonable value.

Issue: What the option of the owner?

Ruling: Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of
the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay
the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees.
In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate
the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease
and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

Tuliao was the registered owner of the subject property and, thus, had a right of action against the
holder and possessor of the said property. Further, respondent's possession of the subject
property was merely tolerated by Tuliao. For said reason, his right to recover it was never barred
by laches. As to the structures, the court ruled that it could not allow the immediate removal
thereof in view of the provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil Code and directed Tuliao to
exercise his options under said article. Whether to appropriate the structures built on the lot in suit
as his own by paying to the defendant the amount of the expenses spent for the structures or to
oblige the defendant to pay the price of the land, and said option must be exercised and relayed to
the court formally within 30 days from receipt of the decision and a copy of such notice must be
furnished to the defendant. If in case the plaintiff exercises the option to appropriate the structures
built on the lot in suit, the defendant is hereby directed to submit to the court the amount of the
expenses spent for the structures within 15 days from receipt of the notice of the plaintiff of his
desired option. If the plaintiff decides to oblige the defendant to pay the price of the land, the
current market value of the land including its improvements as determined by the City Assessor's
Office shall be the basis for the price thereof. In case the plaintiff exercises the option to oblige the
defendant to pay the price of the land but the latter rejects such purchase because the value of the
land is considerably more than that of the structures, the parties shall agree upon the terms of a
forced lease, and give the court a formal written notice of such agreement and its provisos. If no
formal agreement shall be entered into within a reasonable period, the court shall fix the terms of
the forced lease. If that would not be feasible or practical for DepEd, its remedy is to file an action
for expropriation.

RIGHT OF ACCESSION
Land owner in GF, Builder in Bad Faith

Sps. Nuguid vs CA, GR 151815, February 23, 2006

Facts: Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot on which he built a four-door two-storey
apartment building. For failure to pay realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction by the City
Treasurer to Mamerto Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it for P103,000 to the spouses Juan and
Erlinda Nuguid. Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale before the RTC of Quezon City,
the RTC upheld the spouses title but declared that the four-door two-storey apartment building
was not included in the auction sale. This was affirmed by the CA and by the SC.The Nuguids
became the uncontested owners of commercial lot. The Nuguid spouses moved for delivery of
possession of the lot and the apartment building.

Issue: WON the Nuguids should reimburse Pecson for thebenefits derived from the apartment
building.
Ruling: YES. Since petitioners opted to appropriate the improvement for themselves as early as
June 1993, when they applied for a writ of execution despite knowledge that the auction sale did
not include the apartment building, they could not benefit from the lots improvement, until they
reimbursed the lots improvement in full, based on the current market value of the property. Under
Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to appropriate the improvement as his own
upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the possessor in good faith.
Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all
the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of retention until full
reimbursement is made. The right of retention is considered as one of the measures devised by
the law for the protection of builders in good faith. Its object is to guarantee full and prompt
reimbursement as it permits the actual possessor to remain in possession while he has not been
reimbursed (by the person who defeated him in the case for possession of the property) for those
necessary expenses and useful improvements made by him on the thing possessed. Given the
circumstances of the instant case where the builder in good faith has been clearly denied his right
of retention for almost half a decade, we find that the increased award of rentals by the RTC was
reasonable and equitable. The petitioners had reaped all the benefits from the improvement
introduced by the respondent during said period, without paying any amount to the latter as
reimbursement for his construction costs and expenses. They should account and pay for such
benefits.

ROSALES VS. CASTELLFORT, G.R. NO.157044. OCTOBER 5, 2005

Facts: Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily Rosqueta-Rosales (petitioners) are the
registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of approximately 315 square meters, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 36856 and designated as Lot 17, Block 1 of Subdivision
Plan LRCPsd-55244 situated in Los Baos, Laguna. On August 16, 1995, petitioners discovered
that a house was being constructed on their lot, without their knowledge and consent, by
respondent Miguel Castelltort (Castelltort).It turned out that respondents Castelltort and his wife
Judith had purchased a lot, Lot 16 of the same Subdivision Plan, from respondent Lina Lopez-
Villegas (Lina) through her son-attorney-in-fact Rene Villegas (Villegas) but that after a survey
thereof by geodetic engineer Augusto Rivera, he pointed to Lot 17 as the Lot 16 the Castelltorts
purchased. Negotiations for the settlement of the case thus began, with Villegas offering a larger
lot near petitioners lot in the same subdivision as a replacement thereof. In the alternative,
Villegas proposed to pay the purchase price of petitioners lot with legal interest. Both proposals
were, however, rejected by petitioners whose counsel, by letter of August 24, 1995, directed
Castelltort to stop the construction of and demolish his house and any other structure he may have
built thereon, and desist from entering the lot. Petitioners subsequently filed on September 1, 1995
a complaint for recovery of possession and damages with prayer for the issuance of a restraining
order and preliminary injunction against spouses-respondents Miguel and Judith Castelltort before
the RTC of Calamba, Laguna.

ISSUE: Under Art 448, who has the right of option?

RULING: Under the foregoing provision (Art 448), the landowner can choose between
appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of
the land, unless its value is considerably more than that of the structures, in which case the builder
in good faith shall pay reasonable rent. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of
the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule
that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not
the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless,
is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner
of the building to remove it from the land. The raison d etre for this provision has been enunciated
thus: Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises
between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without
causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of
forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the
option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder
or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either
option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is
older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory
thing.

JOSEFA VS SAN BUENAVENTURA, GR 157044, October 5, 2005

Facts: San Buenventura is the owner of a piece of land. She entered into a contract of lease of
Josefa stipulating thereon that the lease will be for five years and is renewable upon the consent
of the parties. Josefa introduced improvements on the property his occupation of the same. After
five years, however, San Buenaventura demanded that Josefa vacate the premises or otherwise
pay a monthly rental of P30,000.00. Josefa, however, continued to stay and paid only P15,000.00
which was received by San Buenventura.

Issue: Whether petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for his improvement on the leased
premises.

Ruling: In this case, there is no question that petitioner was initially a lawful possessor because
his entry into the property is by virtue of a lease contract with respondent. However as a mere
lessee whose possession after the expiration is at the sufferance of the owner of the property
cannot claim to be a builder in good faith. Under Art.1678 of the New Civil Code (NCC) petitioner
is entitled to one half of the value of the improvement only if respondent, as the owner, decides to
appropriate the improvement. Since respondent refused to appropriate the improvements
petitioner cannot compel her to reimburse to him one-half of the value. The Sole right of the
petitioner under Art. 1678 is to remove the improvement without causing anymore damage upon
the property leased than is necessary.

FLORENTINO VS SUPER VALUE, INC., GR 172374, September 12, 2007

Facts: "Empanada Royale," and respondent executed three Contracts of Lease containing similar
terms and conditions over the cart-type stalls at SM North Edsa and SM Southmall and a store
space at SM Megamall. The term of each contract is for a period of four months and may be
renewed upon agreement of the parties. Petitioner introduce improvements upon the store space
at SM Megamall. Upon the expiration of the original Contracts of Lease, the parties agreed to
renew the same by extending their terms. Before the expiration of said Contracts of Lease,
petitioner received two letters from the respondent. In the first letter, petitioner was charged with
violating Section 8 of the Contracts of Lease In the second letter, respondent informed the
petitioner that it will no longer renew the Contracts of Lease for the three outlets, upon their
expiration on 31 March 2000. In a letter-reply dated 11 February 2000, petitioner explained. Such
explanation notwithstanding, respondent still refused to renew its Contracts of Lease with the
petitioner. To the contrary, respondent took possession of the store space in SM Megamall and
confiscated the equipment and personal belongings of the petitioner found therein after the
expiration of the lease contract. Petitioner demanded that the respondent release the equipment
and personal belongings it seized from the SM Megamall store space and return the security
deposits, in the sum of 192,000.00, turned over by the petitioner upon signing of the Contracts of
Lease. On 15 June 2000, petitioner sent respondent another letter reiterating her previous
demands, but the latter failed or refused to comply therewith. On 17 August 2000, an action for
Specific Performance, Sum of Money and Damages was filed by the petitioner against the
respondent before the RTC of Makati.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is liable to reimburse the petitioner for the sum of the
improvements she introduced in the leased premises.

Ruling: In ruling that the respondent is liable to reimburse petitioner one half of the amount of
improvements made on the leased store space should it choose to appropriate the same, the RTC
relied on the provision of Article 1678 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for
which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the
lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the
improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may
remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall
not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.

While it is true that under the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code, the lessor is under the
obligation to pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements made should the lessor
choose to appropriate the improvements, Article 1678 however should be read together with
Article 448 and Article 546 of the same statute, which provide:

Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot
be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In
such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate
the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease
and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only possessor in good
faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of
retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the
amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by
reason thereof.

Thus, to be entitled to reimbursement for improvements introduced on the property, the petitioner
must be considered a builder in good faith. Further, Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, which
allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with
the belief that he is the owner thereof. A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in
his title to the land at the time he builds on it. In this case, the petitioner cannot claim that she was
not aware of any flaw in her title or was under the belief that she is the owner of the subject
premises for it is a settled fact that she is merely a lessee thereof.

HEIRS OF SARILI VS. LAGROSA, GR 193517, January 15, 2004

Facts: Respondent is the owner of a certain parcel of land which he has been religiously paying
the real estate taxes for since its acquisition. Respondent is a resident of California, USA, and
during his vacation in the Philippines, he discovered that a new certificate of title to the subject
property was issued by the RD in the name of Victorino married to Isabel Amparo by virtue of a
falsified Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 16, 1978 (February 16, 1978 deed of sale)
purportedly executed by him and his wife, Amelia U. Lagrosa.
Spouses Sarili built a house on the subject lot.

Issue: Whether or not the Spouses should be refunded on the house they built on the
subject lot.

Ruling: To determine the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the house Sps. Sarili
built on the subject property in bad faith in accordance with Article 449 in relation to Articles 450,
451, 452, and the first paragraph of Article 546 of the Civil Code which respectively read as
follows:
ART. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built,
planted or sown without right to indemnity.

ART. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith
may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to
replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed;
or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.

ART. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from
the builder, planter or sower.

ART. 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary
expenses of preservation of the land.

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ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in
good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

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To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on which
he builds, i.e. , that he be a possessor in concept of owner, and that he be unaware that there
exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. Good faith is an intangible
and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among
other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to
seek an unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge
of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. As for Sps. Sarili, they knew or at
the very least, should have known from the very beginning that they were dealing with a person
who possibly had no authority to sell the subject property considering the palpable irregularity in
the subject SPAs acknowledgment. Yet, relying solely on said document and without any further
investigation on Ramoss capacity to sell Sps. Sarili still chose to proceed with its purchase and
even built a house thereon. Based on the foregoing it cannot be seriously doubted that Sps. Sarili
were actually aware of a flaw or defect in their title or mode of acquisition and have consequently
built the house on the subject property in bad faith under legal contemplation. The case is
therefore remanded to the court a quo for the proper application of the above-cited Civil Code
provisions.

ACCESSION NATURAL
ALLUVIUM

BAGAIPO VS CA, GR 116290, December 8, 2000

Facts: Leonor Lozano is the owner of a registered parcel of land located across and opposite the
southeast portion of petitioners lot facing the Davao River. Lozano acquired and occupied her
property in 1962 when his wife inherited the land from her father who died that year.

On May 26, 1989, Bagaipo filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Mandatory Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Damages against Lozano for: (1) the surrender of possession by
Lozano of a certain portion of land measuring 29,162 square meters which is supposedly included
in the area belonging to Bagaipo under TCT No. T-15757; and (2) the recovery of a land area
measuring 37,901 square meters which Bagaipo allegedly lost when the Davao River traversed
her property. Bagaipo contended that as a result of a change in course of the said river, her
property became divided into three lots, namely: Lots 415-A, 415-B and 415-C.
In January 1988, Bagaipo commissioned a resurvey of Lot 415 and presented before the trial court
a survey plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Gersacio A. Magno. The survey plan allegedly
showed that: a) the area presently occupied by Bagaipo, identified as Lot 415-A, now had an area
of only 79,843 square meters; b) Lot 415-B, with an area measuring 37,901 square meters, which
cut across Bagaipos land was taken up by the new course of the Davao River; and c) an area of
29,162 square meters designated as Lot 415-C was illegally occupied by respondent Lozano. The
combined area of the lots described by Engineer Magno in the survey plan tallied with the
technical description of Bagaipos land under TCT No. T-15757. Magno concluded that the land
presently located across the river and parallel to Bagaipos property still belonged to the latter and
not to Lozano, who planted some 350 fruit-bearing trees on Lot 415-C and the old abandoned river
bed.

Bagaipo also presented Godofredo Corias, a former barangay captain and long-time resident of
Ma-a to prove her claim that the Davao River had indeed changed its course. Corias testified that
the occurrence was caused by a big flood in 1968 and a bamboo grove which used to indicate the
position of the river was washed away. The river which flowed previously in front of a chapel
located 15 meters away from the riverbank within Bagaipos property now flowed behind it. Corias
was also present when Magno conducted the relocation survey in 1988.

For his part, Lozano insisted that the land claimed by Bagaipo is actually an accretion to their titled
property. He asserted that the Davao River did not change its course and that the reduction in
Bagaipos domain was caused by gradual erosion due to the current of the Davao River. Lozano
added that it is also because of the rivers natural action that silt slowly deposited and added to his
land over a long period of time. He further averred that this accretion continues up to the present
and that registration proceedings instituted by him over the alluvial formation could not be
concluded precisely because it continued to increase in size.

Lozano presented three witnesses: Atty. Pedro Castillo, his brother-in-law; Cabitunga Pasanday, a
tenant of Atty. Castillo; and Alamin Catucag, a tenant of the Lozanos.

Atty. Castillo testified that the land occupied by the Lozanos was transferred to his sister, Ramona
when they extra-judicially partitioned their parents property upon his fathers death. On September
9, 1973, Atty. Castillo filed a land registration case involving the accretion which formed on the
property and submitted for this purpose, a survey plan approved by the Bureau of Lands as well
as tax declarations covering the said accretion. An Order of General Default was already issued in
the land registration case on November 5, 1975, but the case itself remained pending since the
petition had to be amended to include the continuing addition to the land area.

Mr. Cabitunga Pasanday testified that he has continuously worked on the land as tenant of the
Castillos since 1925, tilling an area of about 3 hectares. However, the land he tilled located
opposite the land of the Lozanos and adjacent to the Davao River has decreased over the years to
its present size of about 1 hectare. He said the soil on the bank of the river, as well as coconut
trees he planted would be carried away each time there was a flood. This similar erosion occurs
on the properties of Bagaipo and a certain Dr. Rodriguez, since the elevation of the riverbank on
their properties is higher than the elevation on Lozanos side.

Alamin Catucag testified that he has been a tenant of the Castillos since 1939 and that the portion
he occupies was given to Ramona, Lozanos wife. It was only 1 hectare in 1939 but has increased
to 3 hectares due to soil deposits from the mountains and river. Catucag said that Bagaipos
property was reduced to half since it is in the curve of the river and its soil erodes and gets carried
away by river water.

On April 5, 1991, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection. It concluded that the applicable
law is Article 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. of the New Civil Code and not
Art. 461. The reduction in the land area of plaintiff was caused by erosion and not by a change in
course of the Davao River. Conformably then, the trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: WON there was a change in the rivers course which resulted to avulsion?

Ruling: NO.The trial court and the appellate court both found that the decrease in land area was
brought about by erosion and not a change in the rivers course. This conclusion was reached
after the trial judge observed during ocular inspection that the banks located on petitioners land
are sharp, craggy and very much higher than the land on the other side of the river. Additionally,
the riverbank on respondents side is lower and gently sloping. The lower land therefore naturally
received the alluvial soil carried by the river current. The decrease in petitioners land area and the
corresponding expansion of respondents property were the combined effect of erosion and
accretion respectively. Art. 461 of the Civil Code is inapplicable. Petitioner cannot claim ownership
over the old abandoned riverbed because the same is inexistent. The riverbeds former location
cannot even be pinpointed with particularity since the movement of the Davao River took place
gradually over an unspecified period of time, up to the present. The rule is well-settled that
accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: 1) That the deposit
be gradual and imperceptible; 2) That it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and
3)That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. These requisites
were sufficiently proven in favor of respondents. In the absence of evidence that the change in the
course of the river was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion, the presumption is that the
change was gradual and was caused by alluvium and erosion.

REYNANTE VS CA, GR 95905, April 8, 1992

Facts: More than 50 years ago, Reynante was taken as tenant by the late Don Cosme Carlos
over a fishpond in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Reynante subsequently built a nipa hut where he and
his family lived and took care of the nipa palms which they planted on lots 1 and 2, which was
located between the fishpond and Liputan River. Reynantes family sold the nipa palms, and
appropriated the fruits as his own, without interference or complaint from Don Carlos. Upon Don
Carlos death, his heirs convinced Reynante to sign an affidavit, relinquishing his rights as a
caretaker of the fishpond. Reynante, however, continued to live in the nipa hut he had built, and he
still took care of the nipa palms, which he continued to sell. This lead the heirs to file a complaint
for forcible entry with preliminary injunction against Reynante in the MTC. The MTC found for
Reynante, but the heirs appealed to the RTC, where the decision was reversed. The CA merely
affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not accretion automatically becomes registered land just because the
adjoining lot is registered in the Torrens System?

HELD: While it is true that alluvial deposits shall belong to the owner of the lot adjoining such
accretion, it does not automatically bestow an imprescriptibility. If the owners of said land have not
registered this with the proper entity, said land will be subject to acquisition by prescription, which
was what occurred in this case. Since the affidavits prove that Reynante has been in possession
of these lands for more than 50 years, the SC rightly held that the land belongs to him.

VDA DE NAZARENO VS CA, GR 98045, June 26, 1996

Facts: The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan
de Oro City. Said land was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas
Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river. The subject land was the direct result of the
dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations. Jose
Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio
Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In the latter part of 1982, private respondents
allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for
ejectment. A decision was rendered against private respondents, which decision was affirmed by
the Regional Trial Court. The decision of the lower court was finally enforced with the private
respondents being ejected from portions of the subject lots they occupied.

Issue: Whether or not the subject land can be claimed by the riparian owner.

Ruling: Applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which provides:

"To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters."

In the case of Meneses v. CA, this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property
under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the
deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of
the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks or rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case,
give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually
received from the effects of the current of waters.

For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the above-
mentioned requisites must be present. However, they admit that the accretion was formed by the
dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the
Cagayan River bounding their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such
boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of
the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of
Manila, this Court held that the word "current" indicates the participation of the body of water in the
ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners' submission not having met the first
and second requirements of the rules on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.

REPUBLIC VS SANTOS, GR 160453, November 12, 2012

Facts: Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio
Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the
property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Paranaque City. The property, which had an area of
1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paranaque City, and
was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr.
(Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paranaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road,
and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan. On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan
amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of
the latters co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed through
accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession
for more than 30 years.

Issue: Whether or not the subject parcel land maybe acquired through the process of accretion.

Held: No. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The
deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made
through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks
of rivers.

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became
respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an
accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water
level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the
gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In
accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as
the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear
and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to
accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to. The
State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502
of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the
State. It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as
its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river
beds should belong to some other person.

The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not
need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that
instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner
from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest has no
applicability herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence,
the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by respondents predecessor-in-interest did not
translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot
4998-B.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more
than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by
prescription or by other means without any competent proof that the land was already declared as
alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the
State as part of its public dominion.

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that
there is a showing of a title from the State. Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no
matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that
are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to
the owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining
lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of
the land affected by the natural change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all
river beds remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription
unless previously declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that
Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents
could not be deemed to have acquired the property through prescription.

AVULSION
Formation of Islands

JAGUALING VS CA, GR 94283, March 4, 1991

Facts: Eduave claims that she inherited a parcel of land from her parents, which later increased in
size due to erosion caused by typhoon Ineng. In 1973 Jagualing asked her permission to plant
corn and bananas provided that they prevent squatters to come to the area.

The land was the subject of a reconveyance case between Janita Eduave vs. Heirs of Antonio
Factura which was the subject of judgment by compromise in view of the amicable settlement of
the parties. In the amicable settlement the heirs of Antonio Factura (Jagualing), ceded a portion of
the land with an area of 1,289 square meters more or less to Eduave.

Later, Jagualing denied the claim of ownership of Eduave, and asserted that they are the real
owners of the land in litigation containing an area of 18,000 square meters more or less. According
to them, they acquired the land by acquisitive prescription since they have occupied the land since
1969. They presented tax declarations and photos of actual occupation to prove claim of
prescription.

Eduave filed an action to quiet title and/or remove a cloud over the property in question against
Jagualing. RTC dismissed the complaint for failure of Eduave to establish by preponderance of
evidence their claim of ownership over the land in litigation and that the land is a delta thus is part
of public domain not susceptible of appropriation.

The CA found that the island was formed by the branching off of the river and subsequent thereto
the accumulation of alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of the Civil Code
the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, declared private respondents as the
lawful and true owners of the land subject of this case and ordered petitioners to vacate the
premises and deliver possession of the land to private respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jagualing acquired the island thru prescription?

HELD: No. From the evidence thus submitted, CA had sufficient basis for the finding that the
property of Eduave actually existed and was identified prior to the branching off or division of the
river. The CA, therefore, properly applied Article 463 of the Civil Code which allows the ownership
over a portion of land separated or isolated by river movement to be retained by the owner thereof
prior to such separation or isolation. The parcel of land in question is part of an island that formed
in a non-navigable and non-flotable river; from a small mass of eroded or segregated outcrop of
land, it increased to its present size due to the gradual and successive accumulation of alluvial
deposits. In this regard the CA also did not err in applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. Under this
provision, the island belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner
thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer than the property of private respondents,
they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion which corresponds to the length of their
property along the margin of the river.

It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. This preferential right
is, under Article 465, also granted the owners of the land located in the margin nearest the formed
island for the reason that they are in the best position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of
the same. In fact, no specific act of possession over the accretion is required. If, however, the
riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse possession of
third parties, as indeed even accretion to land titled under the torrens system must itself still be
registered.

However, Jagualing failed to prove adverse possession of the land for the required period and
their possession cannot be considered in good faith since by their admission they have recognized
Eduaves ownership over the land. Thus the land still belongs to Eduave.

Islands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner nearest to its margin. However such
accretion may be lost to third parties thru prescription.

QUIETING OF TITLE

MANAQUIL ET. AL., VS MOICO, GR 180076, November 20, 2012

Facts: Lots 18 and 19 in Dagat-Dagatan, Navotas form part of the land previously expropriated by
the National Housing Authority (NHA). Lots 18 and 19 were awarded to spouses Iluminardo and
Prescilla Mananquil under a Conditional Contract to Sell. After the death of the spouses in 1991, it
turned out that Prescilla had a child by a previous marriage namely Eulogio Francisco Maypa
(Eulogio). Iluminardos supposed heirs (Mananquil heirs) his brothers and sisters and herein
petitioners Dionisio and Estanislao Mananquil (Estanislao), Laudencia Mananquil-Villamor
(Laudencia), and Dianita Mananquil-Rabino (Dianita) executed an Extrajudicial Settlement Among
Heirs and adjudicated ownership over Lots 18 and 19 in favor of Dianita. They took possession of
Lots 18 and 19 and leased them out to third parties. Sometime later, the Mananquil heirs
discovered that in 1997, Eulogio and two others, on the claim that they are surviving heirs of
Iluminardo and Prescilla, had executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights
and Sale, and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Roberto Moico (Moico). Moico began evicting
the Mananquils tenants. Thus, the Mananquils filed a case for quieting of title. The RTC ruled in
favor of the Mananquils. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC. The Mananquils argue that since
they are the legal heirs of Iluminardo Mananquil, then they possess the requisite legal or equitable
title or interest in Lots 18 and 19, which thus permits them to file an action to quiet title; and
whatever rights Iluminardo had over the lots were transmitted to them from the moment of his
death, per Article 777 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action to quiet title should prosper?

HELD: The petition lacks merit. An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy
grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the
complainant and other claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one
who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of
both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated,
and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even
to abuse the property as he deems best. But for an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

From the evidence adduced below, it appears that the petitioners have failed to show their
qualifications or right to succeed Iluminardo in his rights under the NHA program/project. They
failed to present any title, award, grant, document or certification from the NHA or proper
government agency which would show that Iluminardo and Prescilla have become the registered
owners/beneficiaries/ awardees of Lots 18 and 19, or that petitioners are qualified successors or
beneficiaries under the Dagat-Dagatan program/project, taking over Iluminardos rights after his
death.

Petitioners should have shown, to the satisfaction of the courts that under the NHA program
project governing the grant of Lots 18 and 19, they are entitled and qualified to succeed or
substitute for Iluminardo in his rights upon his death. DENIED.

RESIDENTS OF LOWER ATAB &TEACHERS VILLAGES, ET. AL VS STA MONICA

INDUSTRIAL & DEV. CORP., GR 198878, October 15, 2014
Facts: In May 2001, petitioners residents of Lower Atab & Teachers Village, Sto. Tomas Proper
Barangay, Baguio City filed a civil case for quieting of title with damages against respondent Sta.
Monica Industrial and Development Corporation. The Complaint in said case essentially alleged
that petitioners are successors and transferees-in-interest of Torres, the supposed owner of an
unregistered parcel of land in Baguio City which Torres possessed and declared for tax purposes
in 1918; that they are in possession of the subject property in the concept of owner, declared their
respective lots and homes for tax purposes, and paid the real estate taxes thereon; that in May
2000, respondent began to erect a fence on the subject property, claiming that it is the owner of a
large portion thereof by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-631849 (TCT No. T-63184); that
said TCT No. T-63184 is null and void, as it was derived from Original Certificate of Title No. O-
281 (OCT No. O-281), which was declared void pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 127110 (PD
1271) and in the decided case of Republic v. Marcos; and that TCT No. T-63184 is a cloud upon
their title and interests and should therefore be cancelled. Petitioners thus prayed that
respondents TCT No. T-63184 be surrendered and cancelled; that actual, moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees, legal expenses, and costs be awarded in their favor; and finally, that
injunctive relief be issued against respondent to prevent it from selling the subject property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action to quiet title should prosper?

RULING: The Court denies the Petition. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable
requisites must be present, namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title
to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy."

"Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership."

Beneficial ownership has been defined as ownership recognized by law and capable of being
enforced in the courts at the suit of the beneficial owner. Blacks Law Dictionary indicates that the
term is used in two senses: first, to indicate the interest of a beneficiary in trust property (also
called "equitable ownership"); and second, to refer to the power of a corporate shareholder to buy
or sell the shares, though the shareholder is not registered in the corporations books as the
owner. Usually, beneficial ownership is distinguished from naked ownership, which is the
enjoyment of all the benefits and privileges of ownership, as against possession of the bare title to
property.

Petitioners do not have legal or equitable title to the subject property. Evidently, there are no
certificates of title in their respective names. And by their own admission in their pleadings,
specifically in their pre-trial brief and memorandum before the trial court, they acknowledged that
they applied for the purchase of the property from the government, through town site sales
applications coursed through the DENR. In their Petition before this Court, they particularly prayed
that TCT No. T-63184 be nullified in order that the said title would not hinder the approval of their
town site sales applications pending with the DENR. Thus, petitioners admitted that they are not
the owners of the subject property; the same constitutes state or government land which they
would like to acquire by purchase. It would have been different if they were directly claiming the
property as their own as a result of acquisitive prescription, which would then give them the
requisite equitable title. By stating that they were in the process of applying to purchase the
subject property from the government, they admitted that they had no such equitable title, at the
very least, which should allow them to prosecute a case for quieting of title.

In short, petitioners recognize that legal and equitable title to the subject property lies in the
State.1wphi1 Thus, as to them, quieting of title is not an available remedy.