Choice of Law

Gray v. Gray (1934)

Facts:
Gray filed an action in New Hampshire
o Action is for damages arising out of personal injuries
o Alleged to have been caused by her husband while driving from their
home in New Hampshire to Maine where the accident happened.
In Maine: spouses are barred from maintaining an action against each other.
o No such prohibition exists in New Hampshire.
Issue/s:
WON Mrs. Gray can sue Mr. Gray NO
Held:
Rule: conflict between the lex loci and the lex fori lex loci governs, as regards
the legal effect and the incident of acts
o Therefore: whatever would be a defense to this action if it had been
brought in Maine is a defense here (New Hampshire), EXCEPT IF: the
cause of action had arisen in this (New Hampshire) state.
Mrs. Grays argument:
o only reason a recovery could not be had in Maine is the spousal relation
between her and Mr. Gray
o Since they are residents of New Hampshire, where no such prohibition
exists, she could sue in New Hampshire.
Is Mrs. Grays argument correct? NO
o Her argument fails to distinguish between status and the incidents
which local law attaches to the status.
Status of parties: husband and wife, which they brought into
Maine.
Incidents of the status: those prescribed by law of the place
where transactions take place (e.g. applied in torts)
o It should be observed that much of the plaintiffs argument is based upon
the assertion that inability to recover in Maine is merely because suits
 between husband and wife are forbidden (hence the resort to a
jurisdiction where such suits are allowed)
BUT: examination of Maine law shows that there is not only a
prohibition of suit, but that acts complained of do not give rise
to any cause of action.
Rules and conduct have no force to regulate acts done outside the jurisdiction
which made the rules, save as their operation is enforced by control over parties
found within the jurisdiction.
o In the great majority of cases, complaints of conduct are adjusted in the
jurisdiction where the conduct took place. It is desirable that the remedy
be the same, wherever the action is brought.
Alabama Great Southern RR. Co v Carroll (Year)
Facts:
Carroll, resident of Alabama, brakeman employed by defendants, an Alabama
corporation. This corporation. Defendant operated a railroad from Tennesee.
Through Alabama to Mississippi. The contract of employment was entered into in
Alabama.
Carroll, injured in Mississipi because of his negligent act to spot a defective link
between two freight cars, which defendants employees were duty bound to inspect.
Under Mississippi Carroll cant recover against his employer because the
negligence was caused by the act of a fellow servant.
Under Alabama law: absolute liability was imposed on the company for the injuries
suffered by employees in the course of their employment.
Carroll brought suit in Alabama.
Issue:
WON Carroll can claim liabilities under the Alabama law?
Held:
Plaintiff has shown no cause of action under common law (in Alabama and
Mississippi)
 o Cause of action is determined by the law of the state in such time and place
where the facts existed. In this case, Mississipi laws give no recovery to
negligence of a co-worker.
Subject to some jurisdictions actions to the qualification that the infliction of the
injuries would also support an action in the state (where the action is brought) had
they been received within the state.
No authority supports the proposition that casualty that transpired in Alabama, and
even if consequence transpired and manifested somewhere else, recovery can be
had in Alabama.
o When the facts are in Alabama and liability is fixed in Alabama, such can
be enforced in another state if its enactments or policies are not opposed
to such but this is not the case here.
It is admitted that no injury was sustained as the train passed Alabama.
The fact which created the right to sue, the injury without action happened in
Mississippi.
Section 2590 (the law that would subject the defendant to pay damages and which
plaintiff relies on) had no efficacy beyond the lines of Alabama. It cannot be
enforced if the facts and liability occur in another state. It states: When a personal
injury is received in Alabama by a servant & employee..
Argument: the fact that the plaintiff sustained the injuries, he was in discharge of
duties and his contract was entered into In Alabama(An Alabama contract), also
he was a citizen of Alabama and defendant Alabama corporation (but this is of NO
importance).
o No bearing on the primary question of existence of cause of action. No
need to determine plaintiffs citizen or domicile
Duties and liabilities of the parties do not spring from the contract.
Sec 2590 is not about contractual relations but of employee-employer relationship.
Case remanded for refusing to instruct the jury to find for the defendant.

AUTEN v. AUTEN (1954)

Facts:
 The Autens were married in England in 1917 and lived there until 1931. Mr. Auten
deserted his wife and children and moved to New York.
Mrs. Auten went to New York where a separation agreement was executed. Under
the Agreement, Mr. Auten had to pay 50pounds a month through a New York
trustees for Mrs. Auten and his children support, with a condition that Mrs. Auten
shall not bring any action relating to their Separation.
Mr. Auten failed to pay, hence Mrs. Auten filed a case in England, but it never
went to trial. Hence, the case was brought to New York.
Mr. Auten argued that because of wifes institution of action, she violated the
contract. Hence, his obligation was extinguished.
Lower Court, applying New York law, found for Mr. Auten.
Issue/s: WON the New York or English law will apply in this case?
Held:
No, the English law must be applied in this case.
The place where the agreement was made and where the trustee, to whom the
moneys were in the first instance to be paid, had his office in England.
It compels the conclusion that it is the English Law which must be applied to
determine the impact and effect to be given the wifes institution of the separation
suit.
Under the center of gravity or the grouping of contacts theory of the COL, the
courts, instead of regarding the conclusive the parties intention or the place of
making or the performance, lay emphasis rather upon the law of the place which
has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute.
Since the law of England must be applied, and since at the very least, an issue exists
as the WON the courts of that country treat the commencement of a separation
action as a repudiation of an earlier-made separation agreement, summary
judgment should not have been granted. JUDGMENT REVERSED.
Haag v. Barnes (1961)
Facts:
An illegitimate child was born to Norman Barnes, an Illinois lawyer, and Dorothy
Haag, then a New York legal secretary.
 Before giving birth, she moved to California to live with her sister.
Haag traveled to Chicago prior to her childs birth, where Barnes promised to
shoulder the hospital expenses.
They entered into a support agreement in Chicago providing that Barnes
would pay $275/mo until the child is 16 years old in exchange for release
from any other obligation.
o The agreement contained a choice-of-law clause in favor of Illinois,
which upheld such agreements if the sum was at least $800.
New York law does not give any binding effect to any agreements made by
parents of an illegitimate child, unless the same is judicially approved.
Haag and the child went to New York and filed the support action. Barnes
invokes the choice-of-law agreement to bar the proceeding.

Issue/s: WON Illinois as the choice-of-law should have jurisdiction over the case.
Held: YES.
The agreement states that it shall in all respects be interpreted, construed and
governed by the laws of the State of Illinois, and it was also drawn and signed
by the complainant in Illinois.
The traditional conflicts rule would, without doubt, treat these factors as
conclusive and result in applying Illinois law.
The parties intention and place of making of the contract are to be given heavy
weigh in determining which jurisdiction has the most significant contacts with
the matter in dispute.
o When these important factors are taken together with others of the
significant contacts in the case, they likewise point to Illinois law.
Among these other Illinois contacts are the following:
o Both parties are designated in the agreement as being of Chicago,
Illinois, and the defendants place of business is and always has been
in Illinois;
o The child was born in Illinois;
 o The persons designated to act as agents for the principals (except for a
third alternate) are Illinois residents, also the attorneys of both parties
who drew the agreement; and
o All contributions for support have been, and still are made from
Chicago.
Babcock v. Jackson (1963)
Facts:
Georgia Babock and her friends, Mr and Mrs Jackson are all residents of NY who
left for a weekend trip to Canada
Mr. Jackson lost control of the car and Babock was badly injured so she filed a
case against him in NY after
NY doesnt have a guest statute but Ontario Canada has a statute rendering the
driver/vehicle owner NOT liable for injuries unless it operated in the business of
carrying passengers for compensation
Jackson moved to dismiss since the law that governs the place of accident
governs
Issue/s:
Shall the law of the place of the tort invariably govern the availability of relief or
shall the applicable choice of law rule be considered?
Held:
NY has greater and more direct concern, Ontario has minimal interest
Injuries sustained by NY guest as a result of negligence of NY host in vehicle
licensed in NY
NY has a policy of requiring tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries
NY is where the parties resided, where their guest-host relationship arose and
where the trip began and was to end
Although the rightness/wrongness of defendants conduct depends upon the place
where it happened, the rights and liabilities of the parties stem from their guest-
host relationship
Where the issue involves standards of conduct, law of the place of the tort
governs but the dispositions of other issues (in this case, being able to claim
 relief) must turn to the jurisdiction which has greatest interest w/c is NY in this
case
Application of NY law advanced the policy reflected in that law, while failure to
apply Ontario law did not impair the policy behind that law (which was to
prevent fraudulent assertion of claims against insurance companies)
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van Voorhis
There is no overriding public policy which justifies the change in the established
rule
This case makes substantial changes in the law of torts

Problem of Characterization
Gibbs v. Gov't of Pi (1933)
Facts:
Allison Gibbs is the husband of Eva Johnson Gibbs .
o They are both citizen and are domiciled in California
During their marriage, they acquired three parcels of land in Manila, which
formed part of their conjugal partnership.
Eva died and Allison was named as administrator. Allison then filed an ex parte
petition. Allison claims that under the law of California the community property
of spouses, who are citizens of California, upon death of the wife previous o the
husband, belongs absolutely to the husband without administration.
o The court issued a decree proclaiming Allison as the absolute owner of
the lands in accordance with Art. 1401 of California Civil Code.
Allison presented the said decree to the Register of Deeds (RoD) of Manila
demanding that a TCT be issued to him.
o RoD declined since the inheritance tax was not yet paid
Allison filed with CFI of Manila requiring RoD to issue the titles to him without
paying the inheritance tax.
After the CFI affirmed the denial of RoD, the case went to the SC which
remanded it to the CFI for the presentation of the pertinent law of California in
force at the time of death of Eva.
Issue/s:
WON the California Civil Code or the Philippine Admin Code (basis for
rejection of RoD) should apply Philippine law
Held:
Article 10 Civil Code of Phil (?) applies only when the deceased was vested with
a descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippines.
In Clarke v. Clarke, it was held that it is a principle firmly established that to the
law of the state in which the land is situated we must look for the rules which
govern its descent, alienation, and transfer.
Such principle is stated in Art. 10 of our Civil Code: real property to the laws
of the country which it is situated.
Under 5 Cal. Jur., 478: In accord with the rule that real property is subject to
the lex rei sitae, the respective rights of husband and wife in such property, in the
absence of an antenuptial contract, are determined by the law of the place where
the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties.
o Mrs. Gibbs property must be determined by lex rei sitae
Under Philippine law Art. 1407 of the Civil Code it provides:
o All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in
the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
Art. 1426 states:
o Upon dissolution of the conjugal partnership and after inventory and
liquidation, the net remainder of the partnership property shall be
divided share and share alike between husband and wife, or their
respective heirs.
Therefore, under Philippine law, the wife is vested with a descendible interest.
That interest was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance. The case then
falls within the transfers requiring the payment of inheritance tax.
Grant v. McAuliffe (1953)
Facts:
Plaintiffs are all residents of California
 They were injured after their car collided with another car which was driven by
Pullen (also Californian)
Pullen died
This happened in Arizona
Plaintiffs brought a suit against Pullens estate with McAuliffe as administrator
Trial court granted the defendants motion to dismiss based on Arizona law
where a tort action, which has not been commenced before the death of the
tortfeasor, must be abated
Meantime, in Cali law such actions/suits survive the death of the tortfeasor and
can be maintained against the administrator
Issue/s:
WON the law of the forum applies in this case Yaze
Held:
We have concluded that survival of causes of action should be governed by the
law of the forum
Survival is not an essential part of the cause of action itself but relates to the
procedures available for the enforcement of the legal claim of damages.
As this is a settlement of an estate, this is a purely local proceeding.
All of the parties are residents of this state, and the estate is found in this state so
it is just right that the matter be governed by the laws of this state and kebs to
Arizona law
The order granting defendants motion to abate is reversed
Cadalin v. POEA Administrator (1994)
Facts:
In 1984, Bienvenido Cadalin, et. al., instituted a class suit with the POEA for
money claims arising from their recruitment by Asia International Builders
Corporation (AIBC), a domestic corporation, and employment by Brown and
Root International Inc. (BRII), a foreign coporation based in Texas.
The petitioners sought the payment for the unexpired portion of their
employment contracts, as well as unpaid benefits. They also sought for the
 suspension of license of AIBC and BRII, and the imposition of penalties due to
prohibited practices.
In the state of Bahrain where some of the complainants were deployed, Amiri
Decree No. 23 was issued which provides the terms and conditions of
employment of workers. Such Decree gives 1 year as prescription to institute
claims arising from. their employment.
Issue/s:
WON the 1 yr prescriptive period in the Amiri Decree applies No
Held:
There was dispute as to which prescriptive period will apply: (1) 10 years as
provided by the Civil Code, (2) 3 years as provided by the Labor Code and (3) 1
year as provided by the Amiri Decree.
As a general rule, foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.
Procedural matters such as service of process, joinder and appeal are governed by
the laws of the forum even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of laws for it may be
viewed as either procedural or substantive depending on the characterization
given.
The characterization becomes irrelevant however if the country of the forum has
a borrowing statute which directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign state
of limitations to pending claims based on foreign law.
In the Philippines, Sec. 48 of the Code of CivPro is treated as a borrowing statute.
However, this cannot be enforced as this would contravene the public policy on
protection to labor, based on our Constitution.

Haumschild v. Continental Casualty (1959)

Facts:
11/17/56: Haumschild and Gleason were married in Lincoln county, Wisconsin
(their domicile)
12/19/56: Haumschild was injured while riding in a motor truck driven by
Gleason in California due to her husbands negligence.
 Haumschild filed an action (in Wisconsin) against Gleason and Continental
Casualty Insurance Company to recover damages.
3/10/58: marriage was annulled
Gleason moved to dismiss case on the ground that under California law, spouses
are immune from suit.
Issue/s:
WON California law should apply in this case?
Held:
The law of the place of the wrong will govern as to substantive tort law, but the
law of the domicile will govern as to capacity to sue. (California law governs the
accident, but Wisconsin law governs the spouses incapacity to sue one another)
The law of the domicile is the one that ought to be applied in determining any
issue of incapacity to sue based upon family relationship.
o This ruling overturned six prior cases
o Chose this ruling based on public policy, acknowledging the trend away
from the rule of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws.

The Problem of Renvoi

AZNAR v. GARCIA (1963)
Facts:
Edward Christensen was a California national who, at the time of his death, was
domiciled in the PH.
Executor of Christensens estate, in the final account and project of partition,
ratified the payment of P3,600 to oppositor-appellant Maria Helen Christensen
married to Eduardo Garcia. This was done in accordance with the will of
Christensen
Executor also proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to the
decedents daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen, married to Bernard Daney. This
was also in accordance with Christensens will.
Helen filed an opposition to the project of partition alleging that it deprived her of
her legitime as acknowledged natural child of the decedent.
 Legal ground of her opposition: distribution should be governed by PH laws
Issue/s:
(1) Which law should apply in this case? Law of California
(2) What is the law in California regarding the disposition of personal property?
PH Law
Held:
(1) Art. 16 of the Civil code governs the validity of the testamentary dispositions.
But to apply Art. 16, there is need to determine the meaning of the term national
law as used therein.
In this case, there is no American law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the US as each state has its own private law that is enforceable
within the state. So national law in this case means the private law of the state
of California
(2) On this point, Executor raises the doctrine of Estate of McDaniel and In re
Kaufman that says that a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form
and manner that he desires. On the other hand, oppositor cites Art. 946 of the
Civil Code of California that states that If there is no law to the contrary, in the
place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its
owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile (basically, according to
California Law, PH law should apply)
SC stated that the Kaufman doctrine is internal law of California (making it
applicable to citizens within Californias jurisdiction) and Art. 946 is its conflicts
of law provision (applicable to Californians living in other jurisdictions).
SC ruled that Art. 946 should apply because that is the Californian law applicable
to this case.
The court of domicile cannot and should not refer the case back to the California,
as such action would leave the issue incapable of determination, because the case
would then be tossed back and forth between the states
Annesley Davidson v. Annesley (1926)
Facts:
 Testatrix is a British subject who died in France (1924) domiciled according to
English law but NOT according to French Law, since she never complied with
Art. 13 of French Civil Codewhich are steps to be taken for the acquisition of
French domicile.
In 1919, she made in France a will in English Form. The will gives the estate to
her daughter, Ms. Annesley, included as well are the statements that she had no
intention to abandon her domicile of origin, England.
1921, testator made a codicil in France in English Form as well.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the domicile of the testatrix at the time of her death was French or
English(a) for purposes of English Law (b) For purposes of French law. If it
were governed by French law, the testator can only dispose of 1/3 of her personal
property, however, she disposed all of her personal propertyl in the will.
Held:
The question of the testators domicile is answered by ascertaining whether she
abandoned her English domicile and had acquired of French domicile of choice
in accordance with requirements of English law-factum of residence + animus
manendi.
Considering the test, the testatrix domicile at the time of her death is
FRENCH. However, what French law does govern?
According to French municipal law, the law applicable in the case of a
foreigner NOT legally domiciled in France is the LAW OF THE PERSONS
NATIONALITYIN THIS CASE BRITISH.
BUT, the law of that nationality, British, refers back to French law (confusing? I
know!) law of the docimile.
QUESTION: Will French law accept the reference back, or renvoi, and apply the
municipal law? There are 2 views--distribute movables in English municipal law
or accept and distribute pursuant to French lawFRENCH LAW!
According to French law, the courts, administering the movable property of a
deceased foreigner who, according to the law of his country is domiciled in
France, and whose property must, according to law, be applied with the law of
 the country of his domicile which is French municipal laweven though
deceased has not complied with Art. 13 (prescribes steps in acquiring French
domicile)
Pursuant to French law, only 1/3 of testatrix personal property maybe disposed.

NOTES: This is a case of DOUBLE RENVOI, if single revoi then English law will
apply, but since its cooler and more inception-like double, so French law (parle a ma
main! merde! salope! bite!)
University of Chicago v. Dater (1936)
Facts:
Spouses George and Nellie Dater and Spouses John and Clara Price, residents of
Benton Harbor, Michigan, obtained a loan from the University of Chicago for
$75,000, which was secured by George and Johns property in Chicago.
In Chicago, the plaintiff prepared the trust deed and promissory notes, which
were drawn up between the Daters and the Prices, as first parties, and the
Chicago Title & Trust Company, as trustee. These notes were payable in Chicago
and at such place and time as the legal holder might appoint.
The trust mortgage and notes were sent by mail to the Benton Harbor State Bank
for the signature of the parties. The parties signed the papers in Benton Harbor,
Michigan and mailed them back to the plaintiffs agent in Chicago, where the
trust deed was recorded. Consequently, the loan was made and a check was
issued payable to the Daters and the Prices and cashed in Chicago.
John Price died, consequently, Clara became the actual and recorded owner of at
least of the property.
Foreclosure proceedings were instituted on the property and its subsequent
chancery sale, in Chicago. However, a collection suit was filed in Michigan
before the foreclosure suit was completed in Chicago.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the University of Chicago against George
Dater. However, plaintiff has no cause of action against Clara Price, because she
has no capacity to enter into an obligation in Michigan; hence, this appeal.
Issue:
 WON Clara Price has capacity to enter into an obligation in Michigan, and thus
liable to pay the plaintiff?
Held:
Clara Price has no capacity to enter into an obligation in Michigan and thus she
in not liable to pay the plaintiff.
The law of Chicago, Illinois applies because the plaintiff signed the notes and
completed the same in the said State. The notes were only sent to Michigan for
the signature of the defendant and her co-executors. After signing the notes, the
same were returned to Chicago. Manual delivery was completed in Chicago.
There was no agreement that the mortgagee (Univ. of Chicago) will make the
loan prior to delivery.
In Burr v. Beckler, the wife, a resident of Illinois but was temporarily in Florida,
executed a note and trust deed in Florida and mailed them to her husband in
Chicago. The court held that the delivery of the note and trust deed by the wife
was completed in Florida, hence, the law of that state governed her capacity to
contract. She was not competent to enter into a contract under Florida law, hence,
her note and trust deed were void. This case applies squarely in the case at bar.
Since the law of Chicago, Illinois applies, under which the capacity of Clara
Price is governed by the law of Michigan. Under the law of Michigan, a married
woman cannot bind her separate estate through personal engagement for the
benefit of others.
Notes:
By accepting renvoi, Michigan protected the interest of a Michigan wife, especially since
Illinois disclaimed any desire in applying its law. It promoted uniformity of results.
PFAU v. Trent Aluminum co. (1970)
Facts:
Plaintiff, Steven Pfau, a domiciliary of Connecticut, was a student at Parsons
College in Iowa, and the defendant, Bruce Trent, a domiciliary of New Jersey, was
a student at the same college.
After Easter vacation, Trent agreed to drive the plaintiff to Columbia, Missouri, in
the automobile registered in New Jersey in the name of the Trent Aluminum
 Company, a New Jersey corporation owned by Bruce's father. Bruce was using the
car with the owner-corporation's consent. The vehicle was insured in New Jersey
by a New Jersey carrier.
Shortly after leaving Parsons on April 22, 1966, and while still in Iowa, Bruce
failed to negotiate a curve and the car he was operating collided with an oncoming
vehicle driven by Joseph Davis. Mr. Davis and his wife and child, who were Iowa
domiciliaries, causing injuries to Pfau.
Iowa has a guest statute which provides that a host-driver is not liable to his
passenger-guest for ordinary negligence
Issue:
Whether the Iowa guest statute is applicable to this action?
Held:
this case, however, we are faced with a more complex situation since plaintiff is a
domiciliary of Connecticut. Thus, we must consider the law of both New Jersey
and Connecticut.
Connecticut long ago repealed its guest statute and now permits guest-passengers
to recover from their host-drivers for ordinary negligence. There is no doubt that
if this plaintiff-guest had been injured in a Connecticut accident by a Connecticut
host-driver, there would be no bar to recover for ordinary negligence if suit were
brought in that state.
It would appear that Connecticut's substantive law allowing a guest to recover for
his host's ordinary negligence would give it a significant interest in having that law
applied to this case.
Defendants contend that plaintiff should not be allowed to recover when he could
not do so in either Iowa where the accident occurred or in Connecticut where he is
domiciled. We cannot agree for two reasons. First, it is not definite that plaintiff
would be unable to recover in either of those states. More importantly, however,
we see no reason for applying Connecticut's choice-of-law rule. To do so would
frustrate the very goals of governmental-interest analysis. Connecticut's choice-of-
law rule does not identify that state's interest in the matter. Lex loci delicti was
 born in an effort to achieve simplicity and uniformity, and does not relate to a
state's interest in having its law applied to given issues in a tort case.
To conclude, since Iowa has no interest in this litigation, and since the substantive
laws of Connecticut and New Jersey are the same, this case presents a false conflict
and the Connecticut plaintiff should have the right to maintain an action for
ordinary negligence in our courts (New Jersey). In this situation principles of
comity, and perhaps the equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses of
the Constitution, dictate that we should afford the Connecticut plaintiff the same
protection a New Jersey plaintiff would be given.

Bellis v. Bellis (1968)

Facts:
Amos Bellis is a citizen and resident of Texas.
With his first wife (Mary Mallen), he had five legitimate children (but one died,
so four surviving legitimate children).
With his second wife (Violet Kennedy), he had three legitimate children.
Additionally, he had three illegitimate children.
Bellis made a will in the Philippines, stating that his estate should be distributed
as follows:
o $40K to his first wife
o $40K each to his illegitimate children
o The remainder will go to his 7 legitimate children
Bellis died in Texas, and his will was probated in the CFI of Manila. The
executor (Peoples Bank and Trust Co.) divided the estate in accordance with the
will.
The illegitimate children opposed the partition saying that they were deprived of
their legitimes as compulsory heirs; but the CFI, relying on Art. 16 of the Civil
Code, followed the national law of the decedent (Texas law) which did not
provide for legitimes.
Issue:
What law should apply? (Philippine law or Texas law?) Texas law
Held:
 The doctrine of renvoi does not apply in this case. The doctrine usually applies
when the decedent is a national of one country and domiciled in another. But in
this case, the decedent is a national and is also domiciled in Texas.
In this case, the illegitimate children contend that the decedent had two wills (one
in Texas, and one in the Philippines). They maintain that it was the intention of
the decedent that the Philippine will be governed by Philippine laws, and the
Texas will be governed by Texas laws. This argument must fail. It has been held
that a provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties be distributed
in accordance with Philippine laws and not his national law, is illegal and void
(Miciano v. Brimo).
The Civil Code provides that capacity to succeed, the order of succession, and the
amount of successional rights are to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.
Since it is admitted that Amos Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas, Texas
laws should govern. Under Texas laws, there are no forced heirs or legitimes,
thus, the Philippine laws on legitimes cannot be applied.

Notice and Proof of Foreign Law

Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Escolin (1974)
Facts:
The Hodges (Charles Hodges and Linnie Jane) lived in the Philippines for almost
half a century and died leaving substantial properties in Iloilo and in the US. The
wife died 5 years before the husband (1957), providing in her will that while her
estate would go to him, upon his death, the remainder should pass to her siblings.
They were childless.
Charles was appointed as the executor of the will but no liquidation occurred. It
was alleged that Charles made statements and manifestations to the US
inheritance tax authorities that he had renounced his inheritance in favor of his
wifes other heirs. He was supposed to ratify this in the Philippines
Husband died (1962). Magno was appointed as administratrix of testate estate of
Mrs. Hodges. PCIB became the special administratrix of Mr. Hodges.
 In the probate proceeding, Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted
Charles to turn over the property to Linnies brother and sister and since that is
her will, the same must be respected. Magno also contended that Linnie was a
Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator); that under Article 16 of the
Civil Code, successional rights are governed by Linnies national law; that under
Texas law, Linnies will shall be respected regardless of the presence of legitimes
(Charles share in the estate).
PCIB argues that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws
because Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death (applying
the renvoi doctrine).
Issue/s:
WON Texas Law on succession should apply No, it wasnt proven.
Held:
The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties
failed to adduce proof as to the law of Texas. The Supreme Court held that for
what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the
evidence that would be presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court
however emphasized that Texas law at the time of Linnies death is the law
applicable and not said law at any other time.
The question of what are the laws of Texas governing the matters here in issue is,
in the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign
laws may not be taken judicial notice of an have to be proven like any other fact
in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare exception in
instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of the
court, such as when they are well and generally known or they have been actually
ruled upon in other cases before it and non of the parties concerned claim
otherwise.
In Re Estate of Johnson (1918)
Facts:
Emil Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized US citizen, died in Manila,
leaving a holographic will. It was signed by 2 witnesses only instead of 3
 witnesses as required by Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, it
could not be proved under said Section 618.
A petition was filed for the probate of said will, on the ground that Johnson was
at the time of his death, a citizen of the State of Illinois, and that the will was
executed in accordance with the laws of Illinois. As such, the will can be properly
probated in the Philippines pursuant to Section 636 of the Code.
The document was declared legal and admitted to probate.
However, after the will had been probated, an alleged daughter of Johnson, Ebba
Ingeborg, through her counsel, moved for the annulment of probate on the ground
that the deceased testator was not a resident of Illinois and the probated will was
not in accordance with the laws of the that state.
Issue/s:
WON the trial court erred in admitting the will to probate Yes
WON the laws of Illinois apply- Yes
Held:
The SC ruled that the trial court erred in admitting the will to probate because the
trial judge merely relied on a reading of Section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of
Illinois, and he may have assumed that he could take judicial notice of the laws of
Illinois under Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
o The trial court did not examine any witness with reference to the laws of
Illinois on the subject of the execution of the will.
On the second issue, the SC ruled that even if the trial court erred in taking
judicial notice of the law of Illinois, its judgment could not be set aside because
of the following:
o The petition for annulment of probate dos not state any fact from which it
could appear that the Illinois law is different from what the trial court
found, and
o Because the assignment of error raises no question as to the trial courts
supposed error of taking judicial notice.
 The affidavits by which the petition is accompanied contain no reference to the
subject, and the petitioner did not cite any authority (jurisprudence) which might
tend to raise a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of the trial court.
WALTON v. ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL CO. (1956)
Facts:
Plaintiff, citizen and resident of Arkansas but temporarily in Saudi. While driving
his vehicle, a truck driven by employee of defendant hit the formers vehicle
thereby injuring him. Defendant is incorporated in Delaware, licensed to do
business in New York, and engaged in extensive business in Saudi.
Both plaintiff and defendant, in their complaint and answer respectively, did not
prove or offer to prove Saudi Arabian laws. The court did not take judicial notice
of it.
Under the well-established New York decisions, defendant was negligent and
therefore liable to plaintiff. The trial judge saying he would not take judicial
notice of Saudi Arabian law directed a verdict in favor of the defendant and gave
judgment against plaintiff.
Issue/s:
WON judge should take judicial notice of Saudi Arabian Law? No
Who has the burden of proving the foreign law? Plaintiff
Held:
It is well settled by the New York decisions that the substantive law applicable to
an alleged tort is the law of the place where the alleged tort occurred (in this case
Saudi). At the same time, the general federal rule is that the law of the foreign
country is a fact that must be proved. Plaintiff has the burden of proving that, but
he was not able to plead and prove it.
A judge may be said to be abusing its discretion if he takes judicial notice of
foreign law not pleaded.

Leary v. Gledhill (1951)

Facts:
 Thomas Leary, plaintiff, and William Gledhill, the defendant, became acquainted
in the military service.
Leary purchased $1,000 worth of stocks from Gledhill.
Leary, upon Gledhills invitation, visited him in France. At a conversation in a
hotel in Paris, Gledhill told Leary that he needed about $4,000 and that he could
raise about $2,000 by asking his wife to sell the automobile in the U.S.
Gledhill asked Leary to help him, but did not mention anything about selling any
shares of stocks.
Upon Learys return to Germany, he mailed Gledhill a check payable to order for
$1,500, without indicating in the check or in the accompanying letter what the
money was for.
They did not see or hear from each other again until the trial.
Leary then instituted a suit against Gledhill to recover the alleged loan, testifying
that the check for $1,500 was a personal loan to Gledhill.
Gledhill denied saying that he never borrowed money from Leary.
Gledhill moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that Learys proofs
were insufficient:
o There being no promise to pay,
o No demand for repayment, and
o No pleading or proof of the law of France where the transaction
occurredwherein the rules of law for a foreign country must be pleaded
and proved as facts along with other elements of a cause of action to
enable plaintiff to recover against defendant.
Issue/s:
WON the plaintiff must fail in his cause of action because of the failure to
produce the applicable law of France No
Held:
The transaction occurred in France; the Court may take judicial knowledge that
France is not a common law, but rather a civil jurisdiction.
o It would therefore be inappropriate and contrary to elementary
knowledge to presume that the principles of common law prevail there.
 This does not mean, however, that the plaintiff must fail in his cause of action
because of the absence of any proof at trial of the applicable law in France.
o In these circumstances, any one of the three other presumptions may be
indulged:
That the law of France is the same as the law of the forum
That the law of France, like all civilized countries, recognizes
certain fundamental principles (eg: taking of a loan creates an
obligation upon the borrower to make repayment)
That the parties, by failing to prove the law of France, have
acquiesced in having their dispute determined by the law of the
forum.
The Court based its decision upon the presumption that the law of France, in
common with that of other civilized countries, recognizes a liability to make
repayment under the facts presented.
This presumption has limitations, however, for in many cases, it would be
difficult to determine whether or not the question presented was of such
fundamental nature as reasonably o warrant the assumption that it would be
similarly treated by the laws of all civilized countires.
The presumption that in the absence of proof the parties acquiesce in the
application of the law of the forum, be in statutory law or common law, does not
present any such difficulties for it may be universally applied, regardless of the
nature of the controversy.
o Authorities seem to favor this.
Thus, the rights of the parties are to be determined by the law of New Jersey
which unquestionably permits recovery on the facts proven.

Zalamea v. CA (1993)
Facts:
Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea and their daughter purchased 3 airline tickets
from the Manila agent of Trans-World Airlines, Inc. The tickets of the spouses
 were purchased at a 75% discount while their daughter paid full fare. All tickets
were confirmed in Manila and were re-confirmed in New York.
On the date of the flight, they were wait-listed because all seats were taken.
Eventually, Mr. Zalamea, holding his daughters ticket was allowed to board
while the other 2 were constrained to purchase tickets from another airline.
They filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of carriage before
RTC Makati.
RTC- ruled in their favor Granted them refund, moral damages, attys fees.
CA affirmed but no moral damages since overbooking is an accepted practice
of US airlines. So, no fraud.
Issue/s:
WON the law of the forum applies in this case Yes
WON lex loci celebrationis No
Held:
The US law allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proven.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its
customer service agents that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil
Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from that, no official publication
of the Code was presented.
Even if the claimed Code does exist, it is not applicable to the case at bar
according to lex loci contractus. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the
Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Phil. law.
Jurisprudence states that overbooking amounts to bad faith entitling passengers to
moral damages. TWA is guilty of bad faith for not informing its passengers
beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if the tickets are
already confirmed.
TWA is also liable for exemplary damages.

Miciano v. Brimo (1924)

Facts:
The case concerns the partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph Brimo.
 The judicial administrator of the estate, Juan Miciano, filed a scheme of partition
which was opposed by one of the brothers of the deceased, Andre Brimo.
The opposition was based on the ground that the partition in question puts into
effect the provisions of the deceaseds will which are not in accordance with the
laws of his Turkish nationality and hence, void for violating the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
o Article 16, par. 2: However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless
of the country wherein said property may be found.
However, the oppositor failed to prove that the said testamentary dispositions are
not in accordance with the Turkish laws, and failed to present any evidence
showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter.
Issue/s:
WON the Turkish laws on testamentary dispositions will apply No
Held:
In the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those
of the Philippines.
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are.
o Oppositor himself acknowledges the need to present the laws when he
desired to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point, so
much so that he assigns an error on the court in not having deferred the
approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony
requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not
constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court considering he was granted
ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence.
There is no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular.
 Therefore, there is no evidence in record that the national law of the testator Joseph
Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being
contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed.
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

NOTES from book on the case:

- As a result of failure oppositor to prove Turkish law, the court used the
presumption that Turkish law was the same as Philippine law. (processual
presumption)
- The Court ordered the distribution of the estate in accord with Philippine law, but
in the same breath held tat the testators express wish that Philippine law be applied
was void for being contrary to law.
- The use of the most significant relationship theory or disingenuous characterization
would have led the court to arrive at the same conclusion without flouting the
testators intentions.
Suntay v. Suntay (1952)
Facts:
In the year 1934, Jose Suntaya resident, Filipino citizendied in Amoy, China.
o He left behind real and personal properties in the Philippines as well a
house in Amoy.
o He was survived by children from a first marriage as well as the wife and
children from his second marriage.
Intestate proceedings were commenced in Bulacan.
On the other hand, Suntays widow from his second marriage filed a petition in the
same court for the probate of a will allegedly executed in 1929.
o The petition was denied, however, as the will was lost before the hearing.
The Pacific War broke out and after liberation, Silvino Suntayone of the children
from the second marriageclaimed that he had found a will, written in Chinese
characters, that had been executed, filed, recorded, and probated by his father in
China in the year 1931.
 Silvino then filed a petition for the probate of the will executed in China in 1931
or of the will executed in the Philippines in 1929.
Issue/s:
WON Silvino was able to prove that the will was probated in China?NO
Held:
The following must be proved:
o The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court;
o The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills;
o The legal requirements for the execution of valid wills in China in 1931.
There was no proof on these points.
If anything, all the proceedings that had taken place in the municipal district court
of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses
to the will and not necessarily for probate.
In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court
and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that
the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts
are the same as those provided for in our laws on the subject.
As a proceeding in rem, notice either by personal service or through publication to
all interested parties must have been made.
o In this case, the evidence shows that no such notice was received by the
interested parties residing in the Philippines.
Thus, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district
court of China cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the
probate or allowance of a will.

Note:
The attempt to probate the will executed in the Philippines in 1929 was also denied
for failure to prove the provisions of a lost will by testimony of at least 2 credible
witnesses.
 In attempting to prove Chinese laws, unverified answers to questions propounded
by counsel to the Consul General of China on the matter of probate were submitted
but were deemed inadmissible by the Court.
o Court held that the Consul General does not qualify as an expert on the
Chinese law on procedure in probate matters and;
o Admitting the unverified answers into evidence would deprive the adverse
party of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness as consuls are
appointed to attend to trade matters.
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher (1961)
Facts:
Walter G. Stevenson, born in the Philippines of British parents, married another
British subject, Beatrice, in Manila. He died in 1951 in California where he and
his wife moved to.
In his will, he instituted Beatrice as his sole heiress to certain real and personal
properties, among which are 210,000 shares of stocks in Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines (Mines).
Ian Murray Statt (Statt), the appointed ancillary administrator of his estate filed
an estate and inheritance tax return. He made a preliminary return to secure the
waiver of the CIR on the inheritance of the Mines shares of stock.
In 1952, Beatrice assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses
Fisher.
Statt filed an amended estate and inheritance tax return claiming ADDITIONAL
EXEMPTIONS, one of which is the estate and inheritance tax on the Mines
shares of stock pursuant to a reciprocity proviso in the NIRC, hence, warranting a
refund from what he initially paid. The collector denied the claim. He then filed
in the CFI of Manila for the said amount.
CFI ruled that (a) the share of Beatrice should be deducted from the net estate
of Walter, (b) the intangible personal property belonging to the estate of Walter is
exempt from inheritance tax pursuant to the reciprocity proviso in NIRC.
Issue/s:
 WON the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso in the NIRC granting
exemption from the payment of taxes for the Mines shares of stock. NO
Held:
Reciprocity must be total. If any of the two states collects or imposes or does not
exempt any transfer, death, legacy or succession tax of any character, the
reciprocity does not work.
In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non-resident with
properties, there are imposed upon his estate, both an estate and an inheritance
tax.
But, under the laws of California, only inheritance tax is imposed. Also, although
the Federal Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate tax, it does not grant
exemption on the basis of reciprocity. Thus, a Filipino citizen shall always be at a
disadvantage. This is not what the legislators intended.

Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa (1991)

Facts:
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) commenced deportation
proceedings against William Gatchalian, an alleged Chinese citizen, for violating
the Immigration Act.
CID pointed out that the marriages of Williams grandfather, Santiago, (to Chu
Gim Tee) and father, Francisco, (to Ong Chiu Kiok) in China were not supported
by any evidence other than their self-serving testimony now was there any
showing what the laws of China were.
CID claims that for the said marriages to be valid in this country, it should have
been shown that they were valid by the laws of China. There being no showing of
the laws, they concluded that the marriages cannot be considered valid.
Hence, Santiagos children followed the citizenship of their mother, having been
born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of Franciscos marriage
not having been demonstrated, William followed the citizenship of his mother.
Issue/s:
 WON the marriage of Gatchalian in China is valid in accordance with Philippine
law YES
Held:
In absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. This is known as Processual
Presumption.
In this case, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises
a presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law.
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that
marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere.
Having declared the assailed marriage is valid, William Gatchalian follows the
citizenship of his father, a Filipino citizen.

Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Ople (1990)

Facts:
Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) is a foreign corporation licensed to do
business in the Philippines executed in Manila (2) separate contracts of
employment, one with private respondent Farrales and the other with private
respondent Mamasig which states:
o 5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by
the mutual consent of the parties.
o 6. TERMINATION
Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA
reserves the right to terminate this agreement at any time by
giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month
before the intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the
EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one months salary.
o 10. APPLICABLE LAW:
This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by
the laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan
 shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or
under this agreement.
Roughly 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts of
employment, PIA sent separate letters informing Farrales and Mamasig that they
will be terminated effective September 1, 1980.
Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal dismissal and
non-payment of company benefits and bonuses, against PIA at Ministry of Labor
and Employment
PIA claims that their relationship is governed by the law of contracts under the
aforementioned paragraphs and not Labor Law
Issue/s:
Which law should govern over the case? Which court has jurisdiction?
Philippine law and jurisdiction
Held:
PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which
specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and,
secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in
connection with the agreement only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan.
We have already pointed out that the employee and employer relationship is
much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine
laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon
some other law to govern their relationship.
Neither may petitioner invoke par. 10 specifying Karachi courts as the sole venue
for the settlement of disputes.
o A cursory reading of the case shows that multiple and substantive
contacts between Philippine law and Philippine courts are present.
o The contract was executed in the Philippines
o Contract was partially performed in Phil.
o Private respondents are Phil citizens and residents
o Petitioner is a foreign corporation doing business in the Phil
 o Respondents are based in Phil in between their assigned flights to Middle
East and Europe
Petitioner did not plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law it must be
presumed then that it is the same in Philippines.