16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED xxxOnJanuary11,1977,appellantfiledapetitionwiththeCourtofFirstInstanceofRizalfor

theprobateoftheholographicwillofRicardoB.Bonillaandtheissuanceofletterstestamentaryin
Rodelas vs. Aranza
No.L58509.December7,1982. *
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B.
BONILLA, deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitionerappellant,vs.AMPARO
ARANZA,ET.AL.,oppositorsappellees,ATTY.LORENZOSUMULONG,intervenor.
Civil Law;Wills;Holographic Will;Admissibility of photos tatic or xerox copy of a lost or
destroyedwill.However,iftheholographicwillhasbeenlostordestroyedandnoothercopyis
available,thewillcannotbeprobatedbecausethebestandonlyevidenceisthehandwritingofthe
testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten
statementsofthetestatorandthehandwrittenwill.But,aphotostaticcopyorxeroxcopyofthe
holographicwillmaybeallowedbecausecomparisoncanbemadewiththestandardwritingsofthe
testator.InthecaseofGanvs.Yap,104Phil509,theCourtruledthattheexecutionandthe
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of
witnesseswhohaveseenand/orreadsuchwill.Thewillitselfmustbepresented;otherwise,it
shallproducenoeffect.Thelawregardsthedocumentitselfasmaterialproofofauthenticity.But,
in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or
photostaticcopy.Evenamimeographedorcarboncopy;orbyothersimilarmeans,ifany,whereby
theauthenticityofthehandwritingofthedeceasedmaybeexhibitedandtestedbeforetheprobate
court.Evidently,thephotostaticorxeroxcopyofthelostordestroyedholographicwillmaybe
admittedbecausethentheauthenticityofthehandwritingofthedeceasedcanbedeterminedby
theprobatecourt.
PETITIONtoreviewtheorderoftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
LucianoA.Josonforpetitionerappellant.
CesarC.Paralejoforoppositorappellee.
________________
*
FIRSTDIVISION.
17
VOL. 119, DECEMBER 7, 1982 17
Rodelas vs. Aranza
RELOVA,J.:
ThiscasewascertifiedtothisTribunalbytheCourtofAppealsforfinaldetermination
pursuanttoSection3,Rule50oftheRulesofCourt.
AsfoundbytheCourtofAppeals:
herfavor.Thepetition,docketedasSp.Proc.No.8432,wasopposedbytheappellees Amparo
Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes, Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the
followinggrounds:
1. (1)Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to
producethewillwithintwentydaysofthedeathofthetestatorasrequiredbyRule75,
section2oftheRulesofCourt;
2. (2)The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of
propertyafterdeathandwasnotintendedtotakeeffectafterdeath,andthereforeitwas
notawill;
3. (3)Theallegedholographicwillitself,andnotanallegedcopythereof,mustbeproduced,
otherwiseitwouldproducenoeffect,asheldinGanv.Yap,104Phil.509;and
4. (4)Thedeceaseddidnotleaveanywill,holographicorotherwise,executedandattestedas
requiredbylaw.
Theappelleeslikewisemovedfortheconsolidationofthecasewithanothercase(Sp.Proc.No.
8275).TheirmotionwasgrantedbythecourtinanorderdatedApril4,1977.
OnNovember13,1978,followingtheconsolidationofthecases,theappelleesmovedagainto
dismissthepetitionfortheprobateofthewill.Theyarguedthat:
1. (1)The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the
managementandimprovementoftheschoolsandcollegesfoundedbydecedentRicardo
B.Bonilla;and
2. (2)Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike
ordinarywills.
Uponoppositionoftheappellant,themotiontodismisswasdeniedbythecourtinitsorderof
February23,1979.
18
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rodelas vs. Aranza
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order was
contrary to law and settled pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme Court, to which the
appellantinturnfiledanopposition.OnJuly23,1979,thecourtsetasideitsorderofFebruary23,
1979anddismissedthepetitionfortheprobateofthewillofRicardoB.Bonilla.Thecourtsaid:
...Itisourconsideredopinionthatoncetheoriginalcopyoftheholographicwillislost,acopythereofcannot
standinlieuoftheoriginal.
 InthecaseofGanvs.Yap,104Phil.509,522,theSupremeCourtheldthatinthematterofholographic
willsthelaw,itisreasonabletosuppose,regardsthedocumentitselfasthematerialproofofauthenticityof
saidwills.
MOREOVER,thisCourtnotesthattheallegedholographicwillwasexecutedonJanuary25,1962while
RicardoB.BonilladiedonMay13,1976.Inviewofthelapseofmorethan14yearsfromthetimeofthe
executionofthewilltothedeathofthedecedent,thefactthattheoriginalofthewillcouldnotbelocatedshows
toourmindthatthedecedenthaddiscardedbeforehisdeathhisallegedlymissingHolographicWill.
Appellants motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the Court of
Appealsinwhichitiscontendedthatthedismissalofappellantspetitioniscontraryto
lawandwellsettledjurisprudence.
OnJuly7,1980,appelleesmovedtoforwardthecasetothisCourtonthegroundthat
theappealdoesnotinvolvequestionoffactandallegedthatthetrialcourtcommittedthe
followingassignederrors:
1. I.THELOWERCOURTERREDINHOLDINGTHATALOSTHOLOGRAPHIC
WILLMAYNOTBEPROVEDBYACOPYTHEREOF;
2. II.THELOWERCOURTERREDINHOLDINGTHATTHEDECEDENTHAS
DISCARDEDBEFOREHISDEATHTHEMISSINGHOLOGRAPHICWILL;
3. III.THELOWERCOURTERREDINDISMISSINGAPPELLANTSWILL.
Theonlyquestionhereiswhetheraholographicwillwhichwaslostorcannotbefound
canbeprovedbymeansofa
19
VOL. 119, DECEMBER 7, 1982 19
Rodelas vs. Aranza
photostaticcopy.PursuanttoArticle811oftheCivilCode,probateofholographicwillsis
the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The
probatemaybeuncontestedornot.Ifuncontested,atleastoneidentifyingwitnessis
requiredand,ifnowitnessisavailable,expertsmayberesortedto.Ifcontested,atleast
threeidentifyingwitnessesarerequired.However,iftheholographicwillhasbeenlostor
destroyedandnoothercopyisavailable,thewillcannotbeprobatedbecausethebest
andonlyevidenceisthehandwritingofthetestatorinsaidwill.Itisnecessarythat
therebeacomparisonbetweensamplehandwrittenstatementsofthetestatorandthe
handwrittenwill.But,aphotostaticcopyorxeroxcopyoftheholographicwillmaybe
allowedbecausecomparisoncanbemadewiththestandardwritingsofthetestator.In
the case of Gan vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, the Court ruled that the execution and the
contentsofalostordestroyedholographicwillmaynotbeprovedbythebaretestimony
of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will The will itself must be presented;
otherwise,itshallproducenoeffect.Thelawregardsthedocumentitselfasmaterial
proofofauthenticity.But,inFootnote8ofsaiddecision,itsaysthatPerhapsitmaybe
provedbyaphotographicorphotostaticcopy.Evenamimeographedorcarboncopy;orby
othersimilarmeans,ifany,wherebytheauthenticityofthehandwritingofthedeceased
maybeexhibitedandtestedbeforetheprobatecourt.Evidently,thephotostaticorxerox
copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticityofthehandwritingofthedeceasedcanbedeterminedbytheprobatecourt.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying
appellantsmotionforreconsiderationdatedAugust9,1979,oftheOrderdatedJuly23,
1979,dismissingherpetitiontoapprovethewillofthelateRicardoB.Bonilla,ishereby
SETASIDE.
SOORDERED.
Teehankee,Actg. C.J.,MelencioHerrera,Plana,VasquezandGutierrez, Jr.,
JJ.,concur.
20
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rodelas vs. Aranza
Ordersetaside.
Notes.Thefailuretoaffixa30centavodocumentarystamponawillisnotafatal
defectastheprobatecourtcanrequiretheproponenttoaffixtherequireddocumentary
stamptothenotarialacknowledgment.(Gabucanvs.Manta,95SCRA752.)
InasmuchasthewillwritteninEnglishsaysthatitwasinalanguageunderstood
and known to the testatrix, but also states that it was translated into the Filipino
language,theprobatejudgeshouldhavereadilyperceivedthatthetestatrixisilliterate
andthewillisvoid.(Surozavs.Honrado,110SCRA388.)
Apersonshowntohavesomeliabilitiestotheheirofanestateofthedeceasedandto
the estate as a whole cannot be appointed administrator, for such liabilities are not
compatible with the performance of the duties of an administrator. (Lim vs. Diaz
Millarez,18SCRA371.)
Itisnotpropertomakeafindinginanintestateproceedingthatadiscoveredwillhas
beenrevoked.Aseparatepetitionforprobateofthatallegedwillshouldbeorderedfiled
instead.(Malotovs.Maloto,79SCRA232.)
Theprobatecourtmayapproveaprojectofpartitionofaparceloflandbeingclaimed
byoneofthepartiesasexclusivelyhisandnotpartofthedecedentsestate.(Ermacvs.
Modelo,64SCRA358.)
o0o
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 237
Kalaw vs. Relova
No.L40207.September28,1984. *
ROSAK.KALAW,petitioner,vs.HON.JUDGEBENJAMINRELOVA,PresidingJudge
oftheCFIofBatangas,BranchVI,LipaCity,andGREGORIOK.KALAW,respondents.
Settlement of Estate;Ordinarily erasures or alterations in a holographic will does not
invalidatethewillitselfOrdinarily,whenanumberoferasures,corrections,andinterlineations
madebythetestatorinaholographicWillhavenotbeennotedunderhissignature,xxxtheWill
isnottherebyinvalidatedasawhole,butatmostonlyasrespectstheparticularwordserased,
correctedorinterlined.Manresagaveanidenticalcommentarywhenhesaidlaomisiondela
salvedadnoanulaeltestamento,segunlaregladejurisprudenciaestablecidaenlasentenciade4
deAbrilde1895.
Same;Where a holographic will has designate only one heir to the entire estate and the
designation was cancelled and another sole heir designated, without the cancellation being
authenticatedbyfullsignatureoftestator,entirewillisvoid.However,whenasinthiscase,the
holographicWillindisputehadonlyonesubstantialprovision,whichwasalteredbysubstituting
theoriginalheirwith
_______________
FIRSTDIVISION.
*
238
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Relova
another,butwhichalterationdidnotcarrytherequisiteoffullauthenticationbythefull
signatureofthetestator,theeffectmustbethattheentireWillisvoidedorrevokedforthesimple
reasonthatnothingremainsintheWillafterthatwhichcouldremainvalid.TostatethattheWill
asfirstwrittenshouldbegivenefficacyistodisregardtheseemingchangeofmindofthetestatrix.
Butthatchangeofmindcanneitherbegiveneffectbecauseshefailedtoauthenticateitinthe
mannerrequiredbylawbyaffixingherfullsignature.
Same;Same.The ruling inVelasco, supra,must be held confined to such insertions,
cancellations,erasuresoralterationsinaholographicWill,whichaffectonlytheefficacyofthe
altered words themselves butnottheessenceand validityoftheWillitself.Asitis,withthe
erasures,cancellationsandalterationsmadebythetestatrixherein,herrealintentioncannotbe
determinedwithcertitude.
TEEHANKEE,J.,concurring:
SettlementofEstate;Certiorari;PetitionerRosaisboundbythefactualfindingofthetrial
courtthattestatorherselfcrossedoutRosasnameassoleheir.Hence,thesubstitutionofGregorio
assoleheirevenifvoidfornotbeingauthenticatedasprescribedbylawwillnotresultinRosa
beingdeclaredheir.Iconcur.Rosa,havingappealedtothisCourtonasolequestionoflaw,is
bound by the trial courts factual finding that the peculiar alterations in the holographic will
crossingoutRosasnameandinsteadinsertingherbrotherGregoriosnameassoleheirandsole
executrixweremadebythetestatrixinherownhandwriting.(Ifinditpeculiarthatthetestatrix
whowasobviouslyaneducatedpersonwouldunthinkinglymakesuchcrudealterationsinsteadof
consultingherlawyerandwritinganentirelynewholographicwillinordertoavoidanydoubtsas
to her change of heir. It should be noted that the first alteration crossing out sister Rosa K.
KalawandinsertingbrotherGregorioKalawassoleheirisnoteveninitialedbythetestatrix.
OnlythesecondalterationcrossingoutsisterRosaK.KalawandinsertingbrotherGregorio
Kalawassoleexecutrixisinitialed.)ProbateoftheradicallyalteredwillreplacingGregoriofor
Rosa as sole heir is properly denied, since the same was not duly authenticated by the full
signatureoftheexecutrixasmandatorilyrequiredbyArticle814oftheCivilCode.Theoriginal
unalteredwillnamingRosaassoleheircannot,however,begiveneffectinviewofthetrialcourts
factual
239
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 239
Kalaw vs. Relova
findingthatthetestatrixhadbyherownhandwritingsubstitutedGregorioforRosa,sothat
thereisnolongeranywillnamingRosaassoleheir.Thenetresultisthatthetestatrixleftno
validwillandbothRosaandGregorioashernextofkinsucceedtoherintestateestate.
PETITIONforcertioraritoreviewthedecisionoftheCourtofFirstInstanceof
Batangas,Br.VI.Relova,J.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
LeandroH.Fernandezforpetitioner.
AntonioQuintosandJoseM.Yacatforrespondents.
MELENCIOHERRERA,J.:
OnSeptember1,1971,privaterespondentGREGORIOK.KALAW,claimingtobethe
soleheirofhisdeceasedsister,NatividadK.Kalaw,filedapetitionbeforetheCourtof
FirstInstanceofBatangas,BranchVI,LipaCity,fortheprobateofherholographicWill
executedonDecember24,1968.
TheholographicWillreadsinfullasfollows:
240
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Relova
TheholographicWill,asfirstwritten,namedROSAK.Kalaw,asisterofthetestatrix
as her sole heir. Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed
probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic Will contained alterations,
corrections,andinsertionswithouttheproperauthenticationbythefullsignatureofthe
testatrixasrequiredbyArticle814oftheCivilCodereading:
Art.814.Incaseofanyinsertion,cancellation,erasureoralterationinaholographicwill,the
testatormustauthenticatethesamebyhisfullsignature.
ROSAspositionwasthattheholographicWill,asfirstwritten,shouldbegiveneffect
andprobatedsothatshecouldbethesoleheirthereunder.
241
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 241
Kalaw vs. Relova
After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order, dated September 3, 1973,
readinginpart:
ThedocumentExhibitCwassubmittedtotheNationalBureauofInvestigationforexamination.
TheNBI reportedthatthehandwriting,thesignature,theinsertionsand/oradditionsandthe
initialweremadebyoneandthesameperson.Consequently,ExhibitCwasthehandwritingof
thedecedent,NatividadK.Kalaw.Theonlyquestioniswhetherthewill,ExhibitC,shouldbe
admittedtoprobatealthoughthealterationsand/orinsertionsoradditionsabovementionedwere
notauthenticatedbythefullsignatureofthetestatrixpursuanttoArt.814oftheCivilCode.The
petitioner contends thattheoppositors areestopped toasserttheprovisionofArt.814onthe
groundthattheythemselvesagreedthrutheircounseltosubmittheDocumenttotheNBIFOR
EXAMINATIONS.Thisisuntenable.Thepartiesdidnotagree,norwasitimpliedlyunderstood,
thattheoppositorswouldbeinestoppel.
TheCourtfinds,therefore,thattheprovisionofArticle814oftheCivilCodeisapplicableto
Exhibit C. Finding the insertions, alterations and/or additions in Exhibit C not to be
authenticatedbythefullsignatureofthetestatrixNatividadK.Kalaw,theCourtwilldenythe
admissiontoprobateofExhibitC.
WHEREFORE, the petition to probate Exhibit C as the holographic will of Natividad K.
Kalawisherebydenied.
SOORDERED.
From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration arguing that since the
alterationsand/orinsertions weremadebythetestatrix, thedenial to probateof her
holographic Will would be contrary to her right of testamentary disposition.
ReconsiderationwasdeniedinanOrder,datedNovember2,1973,onthegroundthat
Article 814 of the Civil Code being clear and explicit, (it) requires no necessity for
interpretation.
FromthatOrder,datedSeptember3,1973,denyingprobate,andtheOrderdated
November 2, 1973 denying reconsideration, ROSA filed this Petition for Review on
Certiorarionthesolelegalquestionofwhetherornottheoriginalunalteredtextafter
subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of
authenticationbythefullsignatureofthetestatrix,shouldbeprobatedornot,withher
assoleheir.
242
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Relova
Ordinarily, when anumberof erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the
testatorinaholographicWillhavenotbeennotedunderhissignature,xxxtheWillis
nottherebyinvalidatedasawhole,butatmostonlyasrespectstheparticularwords
erased,correctedorinterlined. Manresagaveanidenticalcommentarywhenhesaidla
1
omision de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia
establecidaenlasentenciade4deAbrilde1895. 2
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one
substantialprovision,whichwasalteredbysubstitutingtheoriginalheirwithanother,
but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full
signatureofthetestator,theeffectmustbethattheentireWillisvoidedorrevokedfor
thesimplereasonthatnothingremainsintheWillafterthatwhichcouldremainvalid.
TostatethattheWillasfirstwrittenshouldbegivenefficacyistodisregardtheseeming
changeof mindof thetestatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect
becauseshefailedtoauthenticateitinthemannerrequiredbylawbyaffixingherfull
signature.
TherulinginVelasco,supra,mustbeheldconfinedtosuchinsertions,cancellations,
erasuresoralterationsinaholographicWill,whichaffectonlytheefficacyofthealtered
wordsthemselvesbutnottheessenceandvalidityoftheWillitself.Asitis,withthe
erasures,cancellationsandalterationsmadebythetestatrixherein,herrealintention
cannot be determined with certitude. As Manresa had stated in his commentary on
Article 688 ofthe SpanishCivil Code,whenceArticle814ofthenew CivilCodewas
derived:
xxxNoinfringelodispuestoenestearticulodelCodigo(el688)lasentenciaquenodeclarala
nulidaddeuntestamentoolografoquecontengapalabrastachadas,enmendadasoentrerenglones,
nosalvadasporeltestadorbajosufirma,segunprevieneelparrafotercerodelmismo,porque,en
realidad,talomisionsolopuedeafectar
_______________
1
Velascovs.Lopez,1Phil.720,725(1903),citingaDecisionoftheSupremeCourtofSpainofApril4,1895.
ComentariosalCodigoCivilEspaol,Quintaedicion,Tomo5,Lib.IIITit.IIICap.IArt.688;pag.483.
2
243
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 243
Kalaw vs. Relova
alavalidezoeficaciadetalespalabras,ynuncaaltestamentomismo,yaporestaresadisposition
enparrafoapartedeaquelquedeterminalascondicionesnecesariasparalavalidezdeltestamento
olografo,yaporque,deadmitirlocontrario,sellegariaalabsurdodequepequeasenmiendasno
salvadas,queennadaafectasenalaparteesencialyrespectivadeltestamento,vinieranaanular
este,yyaporqueelpreceptocontenidoendichoparrafohadeentenderseenperfectaarmoniay
congruencia con el art. 26 de la ley del Notariado, que declara nulas las adiciones, apostillas,
entrerrenglonados,raspadurasytachadosenlasescriturasmatrices,siemprequenosesalvenen
la forma prevenida, pero no el documento que las contenga, y con mayor motivocuando las
palabras enmendadas, tachadas, o entrerrenglonadas no tengan importancia ni susciten duda
algunaacercadelpensamientodeltestador,oconstituyanmerosaccidentesdeortografiaodepurez
escrituraria,sintrascendenciaalguna(l).
 Masparaqueseaaplicableladoctrinadeexcepcioncontenidaenesteultimofallo,espreciso Notes.Thewillofthetestatorclearlyandexplicitlymustberespectedandcomplied
quelastachaduras,enmiendasoentrerrenglonadossinsalvar,seandepalabrasquenoafecten, with as an inviolable law among the parties in interest. (Rodriguez vs. Court of
alterennivariendemodosubstanciallaexpresavoluntaddeltestadormanifiestaeneldocumento . Appeals,27SCRA546.)
Asiloadviertelasentenciade29deNoviembrede1916,quedeclaranulountestamentoolografo Whereawillhasalreadybeenadmittedtoprobate,itsdueexecutionandauthenticity
por no estar salvada por el testador la enmienda del guarismo ultimo del ao en que fue
extendido (Italicsours).
3
are deemed established for purposes of settlement proceedings. (Santos vs.
WHEREFORE,thisPetitionisherebydismissedandtheDecisionofrespondentJudge, Buenaventura,18SCRA47.)
datedSeptember3,1973,isherebyaffirmedintoto.Nocosts.
SOORDERED. o0o
Plana,Gutierrez,Jr.andDelaFuente,JJ.,concur.
Teehankee,(Chairman),J.,concursinaseparateopinion.
Relova,J.,tooknopart.

TEEHANKEE,J.,concurring:

Iconcur.Rosa,havingappealedtothisCourtonasolequestionoflaw,isboundbythe
trialcourtsfactualfindingthatthepeculiaralterationsintheholographicwillcrossing
outRosasnameandinsteadinsertingherbrotherGregorios

_______________

Ibid.
3

244
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Relova
name as sole heir and sole executrix were made by the testatrix in her own
handwriting.(Ifinditpeculiarthatthetestatrixwhowasobviouslyaneducatedperson
wouldunthinkinglymakesuchcrudealterationsinsteadofconsultingherlawyerand
writinganentirelynewholographicwillin,ordertoavoidanydoubtsastoherchangeof
heir.ItshouldbenotedthatthefirstalterationcrossingoutsisterRosaK.Kalawand
insertingbrotherGregorioKalawassoleheirisnoteveninitialedbythetestatrix.Only
thesecondalterationcrossingoutsisterRosaK.KalawandinsertingbrotherGregorio
Kalawassoleexecutrixisinitialed.) Probateoftheradicallyalteredwillreplacing
Gregorio for Rosa as sole heir is properly denied, since the same was not duly
authenticatedbythefullsignatureoftheexecutrixasmandatorilyrequiredbyArticle
814 of the Civil Code. The original unaltered will naming Rosa as sole heir cannot,
however,begiveneffectinviewofthetrialcourtsfactualfindingthatthetestatrixhad
byherownhandwritingsubstitutedGregorioforRosa,sothatthereisnolongeranywill
namingRosaassoleheir.Thenetresultisthatthetestatrixleftnovalidwillandboth
RosaandGregorioashernextofkinsucceedtoherintestateestate.
Decisionaffirmed.
 Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
No.L37453.May25,1979. *

RIZALINAGABRIELGONZALES,petitioner,vs.HONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALS
andLUTGARDASANTIAGO,respondents.

CourtofAppeals;Evidence;FactualfindingsofCourtofAppealsnotgenerallyreviewable.It
will be noted from the above assignments of errors that the same are substantially factual in
characterandcontent.Hence,attheveryoutset,Wemustagainstatetheoftrepeatedandwell
established rule that in this jurisdiction, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not
reviewable,thesamebeingbindingandconclusiveonthisCourt.Thisrulehasbeenstatedand
reiteratedinalonglineofcases.
Same;Same;Same.Stated otherwise, findings of facts by the Court of Appeals, when
supportedbysubstantiveevidencearenotreviewableonappealbycertiorari.Saidfindingsofthe
appellatecourtarefinalandcannotbedisturbedbyUsparticularlybecauseitspremisesareborne
outbytherecordorbaseduponsubstantialevidenceandwhatismore,whensuchfindingsare
correct.Assignmentsoferrorsinvolvingfactualissuescannotbeventiliated
_______________

FIRSTDIVISION
*

184

184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
inareviewofthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsbecauseonlylegalquestionsmayberaised.
TheSupremeCourtisnotatlibertytoalterormodifythefactsassetforthinthedecisionofthe
CourtofAppealssoughttobereversed.WherethefindingsoftheCourtofAppealsarecontraryto
thoseofthetrialcourt,aminutescrutinybytheSupremeCourtisinorder,andresorttoduly
provenevidencebecomesnecessary.ThegeneralruleWehavethusstatedaboveisnotwithout
somerecognizedexceptions.
Will;Settlement of Estate;It is presumed that a witness to a will has the qualifications
prescribed by law, unless the contrary is established by the oppositor.We reject petitioners
contentionthatitmustfirstbeestablishedintherecordthegoodstandingofthewitnessinthe
community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness,
becausesuchattributesarepresumedofthewitnessunlessthecontraryisprovedotherwisebythe
opposingparty.
Same;Same;Evidence;NaturalizationLaw;Wordcrediblewithregardstowitnessestoa
willdoesnothavethemeaningoftermcrediblewitnessusedintheNaturalizationLaw.Wealso
rejectaswithoutmeritpetitionerscontentionthatthetermcredibleasusedintheCivilCode
should be given the same meaning it has under the Naturalization Law where the law is
mandatorythatthepetitionfornaturalizationmustbesupportedbytwocharacterwitnesseswho
mustprovetheirgoodstandinginthecommunity,reputationfortrustworthinessandreliableness,
theirhonestyanduprightness.
Same;Same;Same;Words competent witness and credible witness compared.In the
VOL. 90, MAY 25, 1979 183 strictsense,thecompetencyofapersontobeaninstrumentalwitnesstoawillisdeterminedby
the statute, that is Arts. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends on the
appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said
witness is telling the truth. Thus, in the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo
RosariodeMolo,No.L22005,May3,1968,theSupremeCourtheldandruledthat:Competency
asawitnessisonething,anditisanothertobeacrediblewitness,socrediblethattheCourtmust proved.
acceptwhathesays.Trialcourtsmayallowapersontotestifyasawitnessuponagivenmatter
because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his
testimony.
185
VOL. 90, MAY 25, 1979 185
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
Same;Same;Tobeconsideredacrediblewitnesstoawillitisnotmandatorythatwitness
goodcommunitystandingandprobitybefirstestablished.Infine,Westatetherulethatthe
instrumentalwitnessesinordertobecompetentmustbeshowntohavethequalificationsunder
Article820oftheCivilCodeandnoneofthedisqualifications underArticle821and fortheir
testimonytobecredible,thatisworthyofbeliefandentitledtocredence,itisnotmandatorythat
evidencebefirstestablishedonrecordthatthewitnesseshaveagoodstandinginthecommunity
orthattheyarehonestanduprightorreputedtobetrustworthyand reliable,forapersonis
presumedtobesuchunlessthecontraryisestablishedotherwise.Inotherwords,theinstrumental
witnessesmustbecompetentandtheirtestimoniesmustbecrediblebeforethecourtallowsthe
probateofthewilltheyhaveattested.
Same;Same;Same;Attorneys;Contracts;A will duly acknowledged before a notary public
hasinitsfavorthepresumptionofregularity,asforexample,regardingthedatewhenthenotary
wasfurnishedtheresidencecertificatesofthewitnesses.ButwhetherAtty.Paraisowaspreviously
furnishedwiththenamesandresidencecertificatesofthewitnessesonaprioroccasionoronthe
veryoccasionanddateinApril15,1961whenthewillwasexecuted,isofnomomentforsuchdata
appearinthenotarialacknowledgmentofNotaryPublicCiprianoParaiso,subscribedandswornto
bythewitnessesonApril15,1961followingtheattestationclausedulyexecutedandsignedonthe
sameoccasion,April15,1961.AndsinceExhibitFisanotarialwilldulyacknowledgedbythe
testatrixandthewitnessesbeforeanotarypublic,thesameisapublicdocumentexecutedand
attestedthroughtheinterventionofthenotarypublicandassuchpublicdocumentisevidenceof
thefactsinclear,unequivocalmannerthereinexpressed.Ithasinitsfavorthepresumptionof
regularity.Tocontradictallthese,theremustbeevidencethatisclear,convincingandmorethan
merelypreponderant.
Same;Same;Same;Findingsthattestatrixdictatedherwilltoherattorneywithoutanynote
isafindingoffact.ItisalsoafactualfindingsoftheCourtofAppealsinholdingthatitwas andcontradictions.Butinthecaseatbar,thethreeinstrumentalwitnesseswhoconstitutethe
crediblethatIsabelGabrielcouldhavedictatedthewill,ExhibitF,withoutanynoteordocument
toAtty.Paraisoasagainstthecontentionofpetitionerthatitwasincredible.
186
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
Same;Same;Same;Attestation clause best evidence of date the will was signed.The
attestation clause which Matilde Orobia signed is the best evidence as to the date of signing
becauseitpreservesinpermanentformarecitalofallthematerialfactsattendingtheexecutionof
the will. This is the very purpose of the attestation clause which is made for the purpose of
preservinginpermanentform,arecordofthefactsattendingtheexecutionofthewill,sothatin
caseoffailureinthememoryofthesubscribingwitnesses,orothercasualtytheymaystillbe
Same;Same;Same;Factthattherewasconflictoftestimonyastoidentityofphotographer
whotookaphotographofthesigningandattestationofthewill,notarequirementoflaw,isof
minor importance. What matters most is the photograph itself.The law does not require a
photographerfortheexecutionandattestationofthewill.ThefactthatMissOrobiamistakenly
identifiedthephotographerasCesarMendozascarcelydetractsfromhertestimonythatshewas
presentwhen thewill was signed becausewhat matters here is not thephotographerbut the
photographtakenwhichclearlyportraysMatildeOrobiaherself,hercowitnessesCelsoGimpaya
andMariaGimpaya,IsabelGabrielandAtty.Paraiso.
Same;Same;Itcannotbeexpectedthatthetestimonyofallthewitnesswillbeidenticalinall
theirminutestdetails.Theseareindeedunimportantdetailswhichcouldhavebeenaffectedby
thelapseoftimeandthetreacheryofhumanmemorysuchthatbythemselveswouldnotalterthe
probativevalueoftheirtestimoniesonthetrueexecutionofthewill,(Pascuavs.delaCruz,28
SCRA421,424)foritcannotbeexpectedthatthetestimonyofeverypersonwillbeidenticaland
coincidingwitheachotherwithregardtodetailsofanincidentandthatwitnessesarenotexpected
torememberalldetails.Humanexperienceteachusthatcontradictionsofwitnessesgenerally
occurinthedetailsofcertainincidents,afteralongseriesofquestionings,andfarfrombeingan
evidence.
Same;Same;Findingsoffactsoftrialcourtmaybereviewedandreversedwhereitoverlooked
andmisinterpretedthefactsonrecord.Findingsoffactsmadebytrialcourtsparticularlywhen
they are based on conflicting evidence whose evaluation hinges on questions of credibility of
contendingwitnessesliespeculiarlywithintheprovinceoftrialcourtsandgenerally,theappellate
courtshouldnotinterferewiththesame.Intheinstantcase,however,theCourt
187
VOL. 90, MAY 25, 1979 187
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
of Appeals found that the trial court had overlooked and misinterpreted the facts and
circumstancesestablishedintherecord.
Same;Same;Thethreeinstrumentalwitnessestothewillconstitutethebestevidencetothe
making of the will.Petitioners exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of the
testimoniesofthewitnessesfortheproponentofthewill,theirallegedevasions,inconsistencies
bestevidenceofthewillmakinghavetestifiedinfavoroftheprobateofthewill.Sohasthelawyer
whopreparedit,onelearnedinthelawandlonginthepracticethereof,whothereafternotarized
it.Allofthemaredisinterestedwitnesseswhostandtoreceivenobenefitfromthetestament.The
signaturesofthewitnessesandthetestatrixhavebeenidentifiedonthewillandthereisnoclaim
whatsoeverandbyanyone,muchlessthepetitioner,thattheywerenotgenuine.Inthelastand
finalanalysis,thehereinconflictisfactualandWegobacktotherulethattheSupremeCourt
cannotreviewandrevisethefindingsoffactoftherespondentCourtofAppeals.
PETITIONforreviewofthedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
FranciscoD.Rilloraza,Jr.forpetitioners.
AngelA.Sisonforprivaterespondent.
GUERRERO,J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, First
Division, promulgated on May 4, 1973 inCAG.R. No. 36523Rwhich reversed the
1
decisionoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofRizaldatedDecember15,1964andallowedthe
probateofthelastwillandtestamentofthedeceasedIsabelGabriel.
ItappearsthatonJune24,1961,hereinprivaterespondentLutgardaSantiagofileda
petitionwiththeCourtofFirstIn
_______________
Pennedbythen ActingPresiding JusticeJuan P.Enriquez,concurred inby AssociateJusticesMateo
1
CanonoyandRamonC.Fernandez.
JusticeRamonC.Fernandez,amemberoftheFirstDivision,tooknopart.
* Philamlife,forMissOrobia,and12DagalaSt.,Navotas,Rizal,forthetwoGimpayas.
188
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
stance of Rizal, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3617, for the probate of a will
allegedtohavebeenexecutedbythedeceasedIsabelGabrielanddesignatingtherein
petitionerastheprincipalbeneficiaryandexecutrix.
ThereisnodisputeintherecordsthatthelateIsabelAndresGabrieldiedasawidow
and without issue in the municipality of Navotas, province of Rizal, her place of
residence,onJune7,1961attheageofeightyfive(85),havingbeenbornin1876.Itis
likewise not controverted that herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago and
petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that private
respondent, with her husband and children, lived with the deceased at the latters
residenceprioranduptothetimeofherdeath.
The will submitted for probate, Exhibit F, which is typewritten and in Tagalog,
appearstohavebeenexecutedinManilaonthe15thdayofApril,1961,orbarelytwo(2)
monthspriortothedeathofIsabelGabriel.Itconsistsoffive(5)pages,includingthe
pageswhereontheattestationclauseandtheacknowledgmentofthenotarypublicwere
written.ThesignaturesofthedeceasedIsabelGabrielappearattheendofthewillon
pagefourandattheleftmarginofallthepages.Theattestationclause,whichisfound
onpagefour,readsasfollows:
PATUNAYNGMGASAKSI
Kamingmganakalagdangmgasaksiotestigonaangamingmgatinitirahanaynakasulatsa
gawingkananatkahilirangamingmgapangalansaibabanito,aypagpapatutuonaipinakilala,
ipinaalamatipinahayagsaaminniIsabelGabrielnaangkasulatangitonabinubuongLimang
Dahon (Five Pages) pati na ang dahong ito, na siya niyang TESTAMENTO AT HULING
HABILIN,ngayongika15ngAbril,1961,aynilagdaanngnasabingtestadoranasiIsabelGabriel
angnasabingtestamentosaibabaoilalimngkasulatannanasaikaapatnadahon(pagefour)at
nasaitaasngpatunaynamingito,atsakaliwangpanignglahatatbawatdahon(andontheleft
handmarginofeachandeverypage),saharapnglahatatbawatisasaamin,atkaminamang
mgasaksiaylumagdasaharapngnasabingtestadora,atsaharapnglahatatbawatisasa
189
VOL. 90, MAY 25, 1979 189
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
amin, sa ilalim ng patunay ng mga saksi at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon ng
testamentongito.
At the bottom thereof, under the heading Pangalan, are written the signatures of
MatildeD.Orobia,CelsoD.GimpayaandMariaR.Gimpaya,andoppositethesame,
undertheheadingTirahan,aretheirrespectiveplacesofresidence,961Highway54,
Theirsignaturesalsoappearontheleftmarginofalltheotherpages.Thewillispaged
by typewritten words as follows: Unang Dahon and underneath (Page One),
IkalawangDahonandunderneath(PageTwo),etc.,appearingatthetopofeachpage.
The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the Catholic
CemeteryofNavotas,RizalinaccordancewiththeritesoftheRomanCatholicChurch,
allexpensestobepaidfromherestate;thatallherobligations,ifany,bepaid;that
legaciesinspecifiedamountsbegiventohersister,PraxidesGabrielVda.deSantiago,
herbrotherSantiagoGabriel,andhernephewsandnieces,Benjamin,Salud,Rizalina
(herein petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres, all surnamed Gabriel, and Evangelina,
Rudyardo,Rosa,Andrea,Marcial,Numancia,Verena,allsurnamedSantiago.Toherein
privaterespondentLutgardaSantiago,whowasdescribedinthewillbythetestatrixas
aking mahal na pamangkin na aking pinalaki, inalagaan at minahal na katulad ng
isangtunaynaanakandnamedasuniversalheirandexecutor,werebequeathedall
properties and estate, real or personal, already acquired, or to be acquired, in her
(testatrixs)name,aftersatisfyingtheexpenses,debtsandlegaciesasaforementioned.
ThepetitionwasopposedbyRizalinaGabrielGonzales,hereinpetitioner,assailing
thedocumentpurportingtobethewillofthedeceasedonthefollowinggrounds:
1. 1.thatthesameisnotgenuine;andinthealternative
2. 2.thatthesamewasnotexecutedandattestedasrequiredbylaw;
190
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED witnesses,MatildeOrobia,CelsoGimpayaandMariaGimpaya,signingandwitnessing
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals thedocumentinthepresenceofthedeceasedandofeachotherasrequiredbylaw, hence 2

allowedprobate.
Oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid
1. 3.that,atthetimeoftheallegedexecutionofthepurportedwill,thedecedent
3

decision and such motion was opposed by petitionerappellant Lutgarda Santiago.

lackedtestamentarycapacityduetooldageandsickness;andinthesecond
4

Thereafter, parties submitted their respective Memoranda, and on August 28, 1973,
alternative
5

respondent Court, Former Special First Division, by Resolution denied the motion for
6

2. 4.thatthepurported will was procured through undueandimproperpressure
and influence on the part of the principal beneficiary, and/or of some other
personforherbenefit.
LutgardaSantiagofiledherAnswertotheOppositiononFebruary1,1962.Aftertrial,
thecourtaquorenderedjudgment,thesummaryanddispositiveportionsofwhichread:
Passinginsummaryuponthegroundsadvancedbytheoppositor,thisCourtfinds:
reconsiderationstatingthat:
Theoppositorappelleecontendsthatthepreponderanceofevidenceshowsthatthesupposedlast
willandtestamentofIsabelGabrielwashotexecutedinaccordancewithlawbecausethesame
wassignedonseveraloccasions,thatthetestatrixdidnotsignthewillinthepresenceofallthe
instrumentalwitnessesdidnotsignthewillinthepresenceofeachother.
The resolution of the factual issue raised in the motion for reconsideration hinges on the
appreciationoftheevidence.Wehavecarefullyreexaminedtheoralanddocumentaryevidenceof
record.ThereisnoreasontoalterthefindingsoffactinthedecisionofthisCourtsoughttobeset
aside. 7

1. 1.Thatthereisnoiotaofevidencetosupportthecontentionthatthepurportedwillofthe
deceasedwasprocuredthroughundueandimproperpressureandinfluenceonthepart
ofthepetitioner,orofsomeotherpersonforherbenefit;
2. 2.Thatthereis insufficientevidencetosustainthecontentionthatatthetimeofthe
allegedexecutionofthepurportedwill,thedeceasedlackedtestamentarycapacitydueto
oldageandsickness;
In her petition before this Court, oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales contends that
respondent Court abused its discretion and/or acted without or in excess of its
jurisdictioninreversingthefindingsoffactandconclusionsofthetrialcourt.TheCourt,
after deliberating on the petition but without giving due course resolved, in the
ResolutiondatedOct.11,1973to
______________
AnnexB,Petition;Rollo,Vol.I,pp.81101.
2

3. 3.That sufficient and abundant evidence warrants conclusively the fact that the AnnexesHandI,Petition;Rollo,Vol.I,pp.108,154.
3

purportedwillofthedeceasedwasnotexecutedandattestedasrequiredbylaw; AnnexK,Petition;Rollo,Vol.I,pp.167198.
4

AnnexesLandM,Petition;Rollo,Vol.I,pp.199248.
5

PennedbyAssociateJusticeRamonC.Fernandez,andconcurredinbyAssociateJusticesCeciliaMuoz
6

4. 4.That the evidence is likewise conclusive that the document presented for probate,
PalmaandMateoCanonoy.
ExhibitFisnotthepurportedwillallegedlydictatedbythedeceased,executedand AnnexN,Petition;Rollo,Vol.I,pp.250251.
7

signedbyher,andattestedbyherthreeattestingwitnessesonApril15,1961.
192
WHEREFORE,ExhibitF,thedocumentpresentedforprobateasthelastwillandtestament 192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
ofthedeceasedIsabelGabriel,isherebyDISALLOWED. Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
Fromthisjudgmentofdisallowance,LutgardaSantiagoappealedtorespondentCourt, requiretherespondentstocommentthereon,whichcommentwasfiledonNov.14,1973.
hence, theonlyissue decidedonappealwaswhetheror notthewillinquestionwas Uponconsiderationoftheallegations,theissuesraisedandtheargumentsadducedin
executedandattestedasrequiredbylaw.TheCourtofAppeals,uponconsiderationof the petition, as well as the Comment of private respondent thereon, We denied the
8

theevidenceadducedbybothparties,renderedthedecisionnowunderreview,holding petitionbyResolutiononNovember26,1973, thequestionraisedbeingfactualandfor

9

thatthewillinquestionwassignedandexecutedbythedeceasedIsabelGabrielonApril insufficientshowingthatthefindingsoffactbyrespondentCourtwereunsupportedby
15,1961inthepresenceofthethreeattesting substantialevidence.
191 Subsequently,oronDecember17,1973,petitionerRizalinaGabrielGonzalesfileda
VOL. 90, MAY 25, 1979 191 MotionforReconsideration whichprivaterespondentansweredbywayofherComment
10

Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals

or Opposition filed on January 15, 1974. A Reply and Rejoinder to Reply followed.
11
Finally,onMarch27,1974,Weresolvedtogiveduecoursetothepetition.
Thepetitionerinherbriefmakesthefollowingassignmentoferrors:
1. I.TherespondentCourtofAppealserredinholdingthatthedocument.Exhibit
Fwasexecutedandattestedasrequiredbylawwhentherewasabsolutelyno
proofthatthethreeinstrumentalwitnesseswerecrediblewitnesses.
2. II.TheCourtofAppealserredinreversingthefindingofthelowercourtthatthe
preparation and execution of the will Exhibit F, was unexpected and
coincidental.
3. III.TheCourtofAppealserredinfindingthatAtty.Paraisowasnotpreviously
furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to
enablehimtotypesuchdataintothedocumentExhibitF.
4. IV.TheCourtofAppealserredinholdingthatthefactthatthethreetypewritten
linesunderthetypewrittenwordsPangalanandTinitirahanwereleftblank Itwillbenotedfromtheaboveassignmentsoferrorsthatthesamearesubstantially
showsbeyondcavilthatthethreeattestingwitnesseswereallpresentinthe
sameoccasion.
5. V.TheCourtofAppealserredinreversingthetrialcourtsfindingthatitwas Court. This rule has been stated and reiterated in a long line of cases enumerated
incrediblethatIsabelGabrielcouldhave
______________
8
Rollo,Vol.II,pp.270312.
9
Rollo,Vol.II,p.317.
10
Rollo,Vol.II,pp.323354.
11
Rollo,Vol.II,pp.363385.
193
VOL. 90, MAY 25, 1979 193
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
1. dictatedthewill,ExhibitF,withoutanynoteordocument,toAtty.Paraiso. andinthemorerecentcasesofBaptistavs.CarilloandCA(L32192,July30,1976,72
2. VI.The Court of Appealserred in reversing the finding of the trial court that
Matilde Orubia was not physically present when the will, Exhibit F was
allegedlysignedonApril15,1961bythedeceasedIsabelGabrielandtheother
witnessesCelsoGimpayaandMariaGimpaya.
3. VII.The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court gave undue
importance to the picture takings as proof that the will was improperly
executed.
4. VIII.The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the grave contradictions,
evasions, and misrepresentations of witnesses (subscribing and notary)
presentedbythepetitionerhadbeenexplainedaway,andthatthetrialcourt
erredinrejectingsaidtestimonies.
5. IX.TheCourtofAppealsactedinexcessofitsappellatejurisdictionorhassofar
departedfromtheacceptedandusualcourseofjudicialproceedings,astocall
foranexerciseofthepowerofsupervision.
6. X.The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and
admitting to probate Exhibit F, the alleged last will and testament of the
deceasedIsabelGabriel.
factualincharacterandcontent.Hence,attheveryoutset,Wemustagainstatetheoft
repeatedandwellestablishedrulethatinthisjurisdiction,thefactualfindingsofthe
Court of Appeals are not reviewable, the same being binding and conclusive on this
inChanvs.CA(L27488,June30,1970,33SCRA737,743) andTapasvs.CA(L22202, 12
February27;1976,69SCRA393), 13
_______________
The citation of authorities which begins withMamuyac vs. Abena,67 Phil. 289(1939) lists some 35
12
leadingcasesuptoRamirezTel.Corp.vs.BankofAmerica,L22614,Aug.29,1969,29SCRA191.
DeGarciavs.CourtofAppeals,37SCRA129(1971);Bunyivs.Reyes,39SCRA504(1971);Napolisvs.
13
CourtofAppeals,43SCRA301(1972);Talosigvs.Vda.deNieba,43SCRA472(1972);EvangelistaandCo.vs.
AbadSantos,51SCRA416(1973);Tiongcovs.delaMerced,58SCRA89(1974).
194
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
SCRA214,217)andVda.deCatindigvs.HeirsofCatalinaRoque(L25777,November
26,1976,74SCRA83,88).InthecaseofChanvs.CA,thisCourtsaid:
xxxfromGuicov.Mayuga,a1936decision,theopinionbeingpennedbythethenJusticeRecto,
ithasbeenwellsettledthatthejurisdictionofthisCourtincasesbroughttousfromtheCourtof
Appealsislimitedtoreviewingandrevisingtheerrorsoflawimputedtoit,itsfindingsoffact
being conclusive. More specifically, in a decision exactly a month later, this Court, speaking
throughthethenJusticeLaurel,itwasheldthatthesameprincipleisapplicable,eveniftheCourt
of Appeals was in disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of the evidence with a 1. (1)AnypersonnotdomiciledinthePhilippines,
consequentreversalofitsfindingsoffact.xxx
2. (2)Thosewhohavebeenconvictedoffalsificationofadocument,perjuryorfalsetestimony.
Stated otherwise, findings of facts by the Court of Appeals, when supported by
substantive evidence are not reviewable on appeal by certiorari. Said findings of the
Underthelaw,thereisnomandatoryrequirementthatthewitnesstestifyinitiallyorat
appellatecourtarefinalandcannotbedisturbedbyUsparticularlybecauseitspremises
anytimeduringthetrialastohisgoodstandinginthecommunity,hisreputationfor
areborneoutbytherecordorbaseduponsubstantialevidenceandwhatismore,when
trustwor
such findings are correct. Assignments of errors involving factual issues cannot be
196
ventilatedinareviewofthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsbecauseonlylegalquestions
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
mayberaised.TheSupremeCourtisnotatlibertytoalterormodifythefactsasset
forthinthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealssoughttobereversed.Wherethefindingsof Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
theCourtofAppealsarecontrarytothoseofthetrialcourt,aminutescrutinybythe thinessandreliableness,hishonestyanduprightnessinorderthathistestimonymaybe
SupremeCourtisinorder,andresorttodulyprovenevidencebecomesnecessary.The believedandacceptedbythetrialcourt.Itisenoughthatthequalificationsenumerated
generalruleWehavethusstatedaboveisnotwithoutsomerecognizedexceptions. inArticle820oftheCivilCodearecompliedwith,suchthatthesoundnessofhismind
Havinglaid downthe abovelegal precepts asOur foundation,Wenow proceed to canbeshownbyordeducedfromhisanswerstothequestionspropoundedtohim,that
considerpetitionersassignmentsoferrors. his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony, or competently
Petitioner,inherfirstassignment,contendsthattherespondentCourtofAppeals provedotherwise,aswellasthefactthatheisnotblind,deafordumbandthatheisable
erredinholdingthatthedocument,ExhibitF,wasexecutedandattestedasrequired to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the
bylawwhentherewasabsolutelynoproofthatthethreeinstrumental disqualificationsunderArticle821oftheCivilCode.Werejectpetitionerscontention
195 thatitmustfirstbeestablishedintherecordthegoodstandingofthewitnessinthe
VOL. 90, MAY 25, 1979 195 community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and
uprightness,becausesuchattributesarepresumedofthewitnessunlessthecontraryis
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
provedotherwisebytheopposingparty.
witnesseswerecrediblewitnesses.ShearguesthattherequirementinArticle806,Civil
Wealsoreject aswithout meritpetitionerscontentionthat theterm credibleas
Code, thatthewitnessesmustbecredible is an absoluterequirementwhich mustbe
usedintheCivilCodeshouldbegiventhesamemeaningithasundertheNaturalization
compliedwithbeforeanallegedlastwillandtestamentmaybeadmittedtoprobateand
Lawwherethelawismandatorythatthepetitionfornaturalizationmustbesupported
thattobeacrediblewitness,theremustbeevidenceonrecordthatthewitnesshasa
by two character witnesses who must prove their good standing in the community,
good standing in his community, or that he is honest and upright, or reputed to be
reputationfortrustworthinessandreliableness,theirhonestyanduprightness.Thetwo
trustworthyandreliable.Accordingtopetitioner,unlessthequalificationsofthewitness
witnessesinapetitionfornaturalizationarecharacterwitnessesinthatbeingcitizensof
arefirstestablished,histestimonymaynotbefavorablyconsidered.Petitionercontends
thePhilippines,theypersonallyknowthepetitionertobearesidentofthePhilippines
that the term credible is not synonymous with competent for a witness may be
for the period of time required by the Act and a person of good repute and morally
competent under Article 820 and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be credible as
irreproachable and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications
requiredbyArticle805ofthesameCode.Itisfurtherurgedthatthetermcredibleas
necessarytobecomeacitizenofthePhilippinesandisnotinanywaydisqualifiedunder
usedintheCivilCodeshouldreceivethesamesettledandwellknownmeaningithas
the provisions of the Naturalization Law (Section 7, Commonwealth Act No. 473 as
undertheNaturalizationLaw,thelatterbeingakindredlegislationwiththeCivilCode
amended).
provisionsonwillswithrespecttothequalificationsofwitnesses.
Inprobateproceedings,theinstrumentalwitnessesarenotcharacterwitnessesfor
Wefindnomerittopetitionersfirstassignmentoferror.Article820oftheCivilCode
they merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities
providesthequalificationsofawitnesstotheexecutionofwillswhileArticle821sets
attendant tosaid execution. AndWe agree withthe respondent that the rulings laid
forththedisqualificationfrombeingawitnesstoawill.TheseArticlesstate:
Art.820.Anypersonofsoundmindandoftheageofeighteenyearsormore,andnotblind,deafor
downinthecasescitedbypetitionerconcerningcharacter
197
dumb,andabletoreadandwrite,maybeawitnesstotheexecutionofawillmentionedinarticle
805ofthisCode. VOL. 90, MAY 25, 1979 197
Art.21.Thefollowingaredisqualifiedfrombeingwitnessestoawill: Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
witnessesinnaturalizationproceedingsarenotapplicabletoinstrumentalwitnessesto
willsexecutedundertheCivilCodeofthePhilippines.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental
witnesses,namely,MatildeOrobia,CelsoGimpayaandMariaGimpaya,arecompetent
andcredibleissatisfactorilysupportedbytheevidenceasfoundbytherespondentCourt
of Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon.
Moreover,petitionerhasnotpointedtoanydisqualificationofanyofthesaidwitnesses,
muchlesshasitbeenshownthatanyoneofthemisbelow18yearsofage,ofunsound
mind,deafordumb,orcannotreadorwrite.
It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will, other than a
holographicwill,mustbesubscribedattheendthereofbythetestatorhimselforbythe
testators name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or morecrediblewitnesses in the
presenceofthetestatorandofoneanother.WhilethepetitionersubmitsthatArticle820
and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of thecompetency of a witnessdue to his
qualificationsunderthefirstArticleandnoneofthedisqualificationsunderthesecond
Article,whereasArticle805requirestheattestationofthreeormorecrediblewitnesses,
petitioner concludes that the termcrediblerequires something more than just
beingcompetentand,therefore,awitnessinadditiontobeingcompetentunderArticles
820and821mustalsobeacrediblewitnessunderArticle805.
PetitionercitesAmericanauthoritiesthatcompetencyandcredibilityofawitnessare
notsynonymoustermsandonemaybeacompetentwitnessandyetnotacredibleone.
She exacerbates that there is no evidence on record to show that the instrumental
witnesses are credible in themselves, that is, that they are of good standing in the
communitysinceonewasafamilydriverbyprofessionandthesecondthewifeofthe
driver,ahousekeeper.ItistruethatCelsoGimpayawasthedriverofthetestatrixand
hiswifeMariaGimpaya,merelyahousekeeper,andthatMatildeOrobiawasapiano
teachertoa
198
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
grandchild ofthe testatrix.But therelationofemployerand employeemuchless the
humblesocialorfinancialpositionofapersondonotdisqualifyhimtobeacompetent
testamentarywitness.(MoloPeksonandPerezNablevs.Tanchuco,etal.,100Phil344;
TestateEstateofRaymundo,Off.Gaz.,March18,1941,p.788).
Privaterespondentmaintainsthatthequalifications ofthe threeormore credible
witnessesmentionedinArticle805oftheCivilCodearethosementionedinArticle820
ofthesameCode,thisbeingobviousfromthatportionofArticle820whichsaysmaybe
awitnesstotheexecutionofawillmentionedinArticle805ofthisCode,andcites
authoritiesthatthewordcredibleinsofaraswitnessestoawillareconcernedsimply
meanscompetent.Thus,inthecaseofSuntayvs.Suntay,95Phil.500,theSupreme
CourtheldthatGrantingthatawillwasdulyexecutedandthatitwasinexistenceat
thetimeof,andnotrevokedbefore,thedeathofthetestator,stilltheprovisionsofthe
lost will must be clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible
witnesses,Credible witnesses mean competent witnesses and not those who testify to
factsfromoruponhearsay.(italicssupplied).
InMoloPekson and PerezNable vs. Tanchuco, et al.,100 Phil. 344, the Supreme
Court held that Section 620 of the same Code of Civil Procedure provides that any
personofsoundmind,andoftheageofeighteenyearsormore,andnotblind,deaf,or
dumbandabletoreadandwrite,maybeawitnesstotheexecutionofawill.Thissame
provisionisreproducedinourNewCivilCodeof1950,underArt.820.Therelationof
employer and employee, or being a relative to the beneficiary in a will, does not
disqualify one to be a witness to a will. The main qualification of a witness in the
attestationofwills,ifother qualificationsasto age,mentalcapacityand literacy are
present, is that said witness must be credible, that is to say, his testimony may be
entitledtocredence.Thereisalonglineofauthoritiesonthispoint,afewofwhichwe
maycite:
Acrediblewitnessisonewhoisnotdisqualifiedtotestifybymentalincapacity,crime,orother
cause.HistoricalSoc.ofDauphin
199
VOL. 90, MAY 25, 1979 199
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
(WordsandPhrases,Vol.10,p.340).
Asconstruedbythecommonlaw,acrediblewitnesstoawillmeansacompetentwitness.
AppealofClark,95A.517,114Me.105,Ann.Cas.1917A,837.(Ibid,p.341).
Expressioncrediblewitnessinrelationtoattestationofwillsmeanscompetentwitness;that
is,onecompetentunderthelawtotestifytofactofexecutionofwill.VernonsAnn.Civ.St.art.
8283.Moosvs.FirstStateBankofUvalde,Tex.Civ.App.60S.W.2nd888,889.(Ibid,p.342)
Thetermcredible,usedinthestatuteofwillsrequiringthatawillshallbeattestedbytwo
crediblewitnessesmeanscompetent;witnesseswho,atthetimeofattestingthewill,arelegally
competent to testify, in a court of justice, to the facts attested by subscribing the will, the
competencybeingdeterminedasofthedateoftheexecutionofthewillandnotofthetimeitis
offeredforprobate.Smithvs.Goodell,101N.E.255,256,258Ill.145.(Ibid.)
Crediblewitnesses,asusedinthestatuterelatingtowills,meanscompetentwitnessesthat
is,suchpersonsasarenotlegallydisqualifiedfromtestifyingincourtsofjustice,byreasonof
mental incapacity, interest, or the commission of crimes, or other cause excluding them from
testifyinggenerally,orrenderingthemincompetentinrespectoftheparticularsubjectmatterorin
theparticularsuitHillvs.ChicagoTitle&Trustco.,152N.E.545,546,322111.42.(Ibid.p.343)
Inthestrictsense,thecompetencyofapersontobeaninstrumentalwitnesstoawillis
determinedbythestatute,thatisArt.820and821,CivilCode,whereashiscredibility
dependsontheappreciationofhistestimonyandarisesfromthebeliefandconclusionof
theCourtthatsaidwitnessistellingthetruth.Thus,inthecaseofVda.deAroyov.El
BeateriodelSantissimoRosariodeMolo,No.L22005,May3,1968,theSupremeCourt
heldandruledthat:Competencyasawitnessisonething,anditisanothertobea
crediblewitness,socrediblethattheCourtmustacceptwhathesays.Trialcourtsmay
allowapersontotestifyasawitnessuponagivenmatterbecauseheiscompetent,but
maythereafterdecidewhethertobelieveornottobelievehistestimony.
Infine,Westatetherulethattheinstrumentalwitnessesinordertobecompetent
mustbeshowntohavethequalifica199
200
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
tionsunderArticle820oftheCivilCodeandnoneofthedisqualificationsunderArticle
821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to
credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on record that the
witnesseshaveagoodstandinginthecommunityorthattheyarehonestanduprightor
reputedtobetrustworthyandreliable,forapersonispresumedtobesuchunlessthe
contraryisestablishedotherwise.Inotherwords,theinstrumentalwitnessesmustbe
competentandtheirtestimoniesmustbecrediblebeforethecourtallowstheprobateof
thewilltheyhaveattested.We,therefore,rejectpetitionerspositionthatitwasfatalfor
respondent not to have introduced prior and independent proof of the fact that the
witnesses were credible witnesses, that is, that they have a good standing in the
communityandreputedtobetrustworthyandreliable.
Underthesecond,third,fourth,fifth,sixth,seventhandeighthassignmentsoferrors,
petitioner disputes the findings of fact of the respondent court in finding that the
preparationandexecutionofthewillwasexpectedandnotcoincidental,infindingthat
Atty.Paraisowasnotpreviouslyfurnishedwiththenamesandresidencecertificatesof
the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit F, in
holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words
pangalanandtinitirahanwereleftblankshowsbeyondcavilthatthethreeattesting
witnesseswereallpresentinthesameoccasion,inholdingcrediblethatIsabelGabriel
couldhavedictatedthewillwithoutnoteordocumenttoAtty.Paraiso,inholdingthat
MatildeOrobiawasphysicallypresentwhenthewillwassignedonApril15,1961bythe
deceasedIsabelGabrielandtheotherwitnessesCelsoGimpayaandMariaGimpaya,in
holdingthatthetrialcourtgaveundueimportancetothepicturetakingsasproofthat
thewillwasimproperlyexecuted,andinholdingthatthegravecontradictions,evasions
and misrepresentations of the witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented by the
petitionerhadbeenexplainedaway.
201
VOL. 90, MAY 25, 1979 201
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
Sincetheaboveerrorsarefactual,WemustrepeatwhatWehavepreviouslylaiddown
that thefindings offact of the appellate courtare binding and controlling which We
cannot review, subject to certain exceptions which We will consider and discuss
hereinafter.Weareconvincedthattheappellatecourtsfindingsaresufficientlyjustified
andsupportedbytheevidenceonrecord.Thus,theallegedunnaturalnesscharacterizing
the trip of the testatrix to the office of Atty. Paraiso and bringing all the witnesses
withoutpreviousappointmentforthepreparationandexecutionofthewillandthatit
wascoincidentalthatAtty.Paraisowasavailableatthemomentimpugnsthefindingof
theCourtofAppealsthatalthoughAtty.ParaisoadmittedthevisitofIsabelGabrieland
ofhercompanionstohisofficeonApril15,1961wasunexpectedastherewasnoprior
appointment with him, but he explained that he was available for any business
transactiononthatdayandthatIsabelGabrielhadearlierrequestedhimtohelpher
prepareherwill.Thefindingoftheappellatecourtisamplybasedonthetestimonyof
Celso Gimpaya that he was not only informed on the morning of the day that he
witnessedthewillbutthatitwasthethirdtimewhenIsabelGabrieltoldhimthathe
wasgoingtowitnessthemakingofherwill,aswellasthetestimonyofMariaGimpaya
thatshewascalledbyherhusbandCelsoGimpayatoproceedtoIsabelGabrielshouse
whichwasnearbyandfromsaidhouse,theyleftinacartothelawyersoffice,which
testimoniesarerecitedintherespondentCourtsdecision.
TherespondentCourtfurtherfoundthefollowingfacts:thatCelsoGimpayaandhis
wifeMariaGimpayaobtainedresidencecertificatesafewdaysbeforeExhibitFwas
executed.CelsoGimpayasresidencecertificateNo.A5114942wasissuedatNavotas,
RizalonApril13,1961whileMariaGimpayasresidencecertificateNo.A5114974was
issuedalsoatNavotas,RizalonApril14,1961.TherespondentCourtcorrectlyobserved
thattherewasnothingsurprisinginthesefactsandthatthesecuringoftheseresidence
certificatestwodaysandoneday,respectively,beforetheexecutionofthewillonApril
15,1961,farfromshowinganamazingcoincidence,
202
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
reveals that the spouses were earlier notified that they would be witnesses to the
executionofIsabelGabrielswill.
WealsoagreewiththerespondentCourtsconclusionthattheexcursiontotheoffice
ofAtty.Paraisowasplannedbythedeceased,whichconclusionwascorrectlydrawnfrom
thetestimonyoftheGimpayaspousesthattheystartedfromtheNavotasresidenceof
thedeceasedwithaphotographerandIsabelGabrielherself,thentheyproceededbycar
toMatildeOrobiashouseinPhilamlife,QuezonCitytofetchherandfromthere,allthe
three witnesses (the Gimpayas and Orobia) passed by a place where Isabel Gabriel
stayed for about ten to fifteen minutes at the clinic of Dr. Chikiamco before they
proceededtoAtty.CiprianoParaisosoffice.
 Itisalsoevidentfromtherecords,astestifiedtobyAtty.Paraiso,thatprevioustothe
daythat,thewillwasexecutedonApril15,1961,IsabelGabrielhadrequestedhimto
helpherintheexecutionofherwillandthathetoldherthatifshereallywantedto
executeherwill,sheshouldbringwithheratleasttheMayorofNavotas,Rizalanda
Councilortobeherwitnessesandthathe(Atty.Paraiso)wantedamedicalcertificate
from a physician notwithstanding the fact that he believed her to be of sound and
dispositionmind.Fromthisevidence,theappellatecourtrightlyconcluded,thus:Itis,
therefore,clearthatthepresenceofIsabelGabrielandherwitnessesMatildeOrobia,
CelsoGimpayaandMariaGimpayaincludingthephotographerinthelawofficeofAtty.
Paraiso was not coincidental as their gathering was prearranged by Isabel Gabriel
herself.
AstotheappellatecourtsfindingthatAtty.Paraisowasnotpreviouslyfurnished
withthenamesandresidencecertificatesofthewitnessesastoenablehimtotypesuch
dataintothedocumentExhibitT,whichthepetitionerassailsascontradictoryand
irreconcilable with the statement of the Court that Atty. Paraiso was handed a list
(containing the names of the witnesses and their respective residence certificates)
immediately upon their arrival in the law office by Isabel Gabriel and this was
corroboratedbyAtty.Paraisohimselfwhotestifiedthatitwasonlyonsaidoccasionthat
he
203
VOL. 90, MAY 25, 1979 203
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
receivedsuchlistfromIsabelGabriel,Wecannotagreewithpetitionerscontention.We
find no contradiction for the respondent Court held that on the occasion of the will
makingonApril15,1961,thelistwasgivenimmediatelytoAtty.Paraisoandthatno
suchlistwasgiventhelawyerinanypreviousoccasionordatepriortoApril15,1961.
ButwhetherAtty.Paraisowaspreviouslyfurnishedwiththenamesandresidence
certificatesofthewitnessesonaprioroccasionorontheveryoccasionanddateinApril
15, 1961 when the will was executed, is of no moment for such data appear in the
notarialacknowledgmentofNotaryPublicCiprianoParaiso,subscribedandsworntoby
thewitnessesonApril15,1961followingtheattestationclausedulyexecutedandsigned
on the same occasion, April 15, 1961. And since Exhibit F is a notarial will duly
acknowledgedbythetestatrixandthewitnessesbeforeanotarypublic,thesameisa
publicdocumentexecutedandattestedthroughtheinterventionofthenotarypublicand
assuchpublicdocumentisevidenceofthefactsinclear,unequivocalmannertherein
expressed.Ithasinitsfavorthepresumptionofregularity.Tocontradictallthese,there
mustbeevidencethatisclear,convincingandmorethanmerelypreponderant.(Yturalde
vs.Azurin,28SCRA407).Wefindnosuchevidencepointedbypetitionerinthecaseat
bar.
Likewise, theconclusionoftheCourt of Appealsinholding thatthe fact thatthe
threetypewrittenlinesunderthetypewrittenwordspangalarandtinitirahanwere
leftblankshowsbeyondcavilthatthethreeattestingwitnesseswereallpresentinthe
sameoccasionmeritsOurapprovalbecausethisconclusionissupportedandborneoutby
theevidencefoundbytheappellatecourt,thus:Onpage5ofExhibitF,beneaththe
typewrittenwordsnames,Res.TaxCert.,dateissuedandplaceissuedtheonly
nameofIsabelGabrielwithResidenceTaxCertificateNo.A5113274issuedonFebruary
24,1961atNavotas,Rizalappearstobeintypewrittenformwhilethenames,residence
taxcertificatenumbers,datesandplacesofissuanceofsaidcertificatespertainingtothe
three(3)witnesseswerepersonallyhandwrittenbyAtty.Paraiso.Again,thiscoincides
withAtty.Paraisos
204
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
eventhesaiemustbemadetocloserelatives;andtheseventhwastheappointmentof
theappellantSantiagoasexecutrixofthewillwithoutbond.Thetechnicaldescriptionof
the properties in paragraph 5 of Exhibit F was not given and the numbers of the
certificatesoftitlewereonlysuppliedbyAtty.Paraiso.
Itistruethatinonedisposition,thenumbersoftheTorrenstitlesoftheproperties
disposedandthedocketnumberofaspecialproceedingareindicatedwhichAtty.Paraiso
candidly admitted were supplied by him, whereupon petitioner contends that it was
incrediblethatIsabelGabrielcouldhavedictatedthewillExhibitFwithoutanynote
or document to Atty. Paraiso, considering that Isabel Gabriel was an old and sickly
woman more than eightyone years old and had been suffering from a brain injury
causedbytwosevereblowsatherheadanddiedofterminalcancerafewweeksafterthe
executionofExhibitFWhilewecanrulethatthisisafindingoffactwhichiswithin
the competency of the respondent appellate court in determining the testamentary
capacityofthetestatrixandis,therefore,beyondOurpowertoreviseandreview,We
neverthelessholdthattheconclusionreachedbytheCourtofAppealsthatthetestatrix
dictatedherwillwithoutanynoteormemorandumappearstobefullysupportedbythe
followingfactsorevidenceappearingonrecord.Thus,IsabelGabriel,despiteherage,
wasparticularlyactiveinherbusinessaffairsassheactivelymanagedtheaffairsofthe
moviebusinessIsabelitaTheater,payingtheaparatistasherselfuntilJune4,1961,3
daysbeforeherdeath.ShewasthewidowofthelateEligioNaval,formerGovernorof
RizalProvinceandactedascoadministratrixintheIntestateEstateofherdeceased
husband Eligio Naval. The text of the will was in Tagalog, a dialect known and
understood by her and in the light of all the circumstances, We agree with the
respondentCourtthatthetestatrixdictatedherwillwithoutanynoteormemorandum,
afactunanimouslytestifiedtobythethreeattestingwitnessesandthenotarypublic
himself.
Petitioners sixth assignment of error is also bereft of merit. The evidence, both
testimonialanddocumentaryis,according
205
 VOL. 90, MAY 25, 1979 205
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
totherespondentcourt,overwhelmingthatMatildeOrobiawasphysicallypresentwhen
thewillwassignedonApril15,1961bythetestatrixandtheothertwowitnesses,Celso
GimpayaandMariaGimpaya.Suchfactualfindingoftheappellatecourtisveryclear,
thus: On the contrary, the record is replete with proof that Matilde Orobia was
physicallypresentwhenthewillwassignedbyIsabelGabrielonApril15,1961along
withhercowitnessesCelsoGimpayaandMariaGimpaya.Thetrialcourtsconclusion
that Orobias admission that she gave piano lessons to the child of the appellant on
WednesdaysandSaturdaysandthatApril15,1961happenedtobeaSaturdayforwhich
reasonOrobiacouldnothavebeenpresenttowitnessthewillonthatdayispurely
conjectural.WitnessOrobiadidnotadmithavinggivenpianolessonstotheappellants
childeveryWednesdayandSaturdaywithoutfail.ItishighlyprobablethatevenifApril
15,1961wereaSaturday,shegavenopianolessonsonthatdayforwhichreasonshe
could have witnessed the execution of the will. Orobia spoke of occasions when she
missedgivingpianolessonsandhadtomakeupforthesame.Anyway,herpresenceat
the law office of Atty. Paraiso was in the morning of April 15, 1961 and there was
nothingtoprecludeherfromgivingpianolessonsontheafternoonofthesamedayin
Navotas,Rizal.
InadditiontothetestimonyofMatildeOrobia,CelsoGimpayaandMariaGimpaya
thatMatildewaspresentonApril15,1961andthatshesignedtheattestationclauseto
thewillandonthelefthandmarginofeachofthepagesofthewill,thedocumentary
evidencewhichisthewillitself,theattestationclauseandthenotarialacknowledgment
overwhelminglyandconvincinglyprovesuchfactthatMatildeOrobiawaspresenton
thatdayofApril15,1961andthatshewitnessedthewillbysigninghernamethereon
and acknowledged the same before the notary public, Atty. Cipriano P. Paraiso. The
attestationclause whichMatilde Orobia signedisthe best evidenceasto thedateof
signing because it preserves in permanent form a recital of all the material facts
attendingtheexecutionofthewill.Thisistheverypurposeoftheattestationclause
whichismadeforthepurposeofpreservinginpermanentform,a
206
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
recordofthefactsattendingtheexecutionofthewill,sothatincaseoffailureinthe
memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty they may still be proved.
(ThompsononWills,2nded.,Sec.132;Leynezvs.Leynez,68Phil.745).
AstotheseventherrorassignedbypetitionerfaultingtheCourtofAppealsinholding
thatthetrialcourtgaveundueimportancetothepicturetakingsasproofthatthewill
was improperly executed, We agree with the reasoning of the respondent court that:
Matilde Orobias identification of the photographer as Cesar Mendoza, contrary to
whattheothertwowitnesses(CelsoandMariaGimpaya)andAtty.Paraisosaidthatthe
photographerwasBenjaminCifra,Jr.,isatworstaminormistakeattributabletolapse
oftime.Thelawdoesnotrequireaphotographerfortheexecutionandattestationofthe
will.ThefactthatMissOrobiamistakenlyidentifiedthephotographerasCesarMendoza
scarcely detracts from her testimony that she was present when the will was signed
because what matters here is not the photographer but the photograph taken which
clearlyportraysMatildeOrobiaherself,hercowitnessesCelsoGimpaya.Further,the
respondentCourtcorrectlyheld:Thetrialcourtgaveundueimportancetothepicture
takings,jumpingtherefromtotheconclusionthatthewillwasimproperlyexecuted.The
evidencehowever,heavilypointstoonlyoneoccasionoftheexecutionofthewillonApril
15,1961whichwaswitnessedbyMatildeOrobia,CelsoGimpayaandMariaGimpaya.
These witnesses were quite emphatic and positive when they spoke of this occasion.
Hence,theiridentificationofsomephotographswhereintheyallappearedalongwith
IsabelGabrielandAtty.Paraisowassuperfluous.
Continuing,therespondentCourtdeclared:Itistruethatthesecondpicturetaking
wasdisclosedatthecrossexaminationofCelsoGimpaya.ButthiswasexplainedbyAtty.
ParaisoasareenactmentofthefirstincidentupontheinsistenceofIsabelGabriel.Such
reenactment where Matilde Orobia was admittedly no longer present was wholly
unnecessaryifnotpointless.Whatwasimportantwasthatthewillwasdulyexecuted
andwitnessedonthefirstoccasionon
207
VOL. 90, MAY 25, 1979 207
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
April15,1961,andWeagreewiththeCourtsrationalizationinconformitywithlogic,
lawandjurisprudencewhichdonotrequirepicturetakingasoneofthelegalrequisites
fortheexecutionorprobateofawill.
Petitionerpointstoallegedgravecontradictions,evasionsandmisrepresentationsof
witnessesintheirrespectivetestimoniesbeforethetrialcourt.Ontheotherhand,the
respondent Court of Appeals held that said contradictions, evasions and
misrepresentationshadbeenexplainedaway.Suchdiscrepanciesasinthedescriptionof
thetypewriterusedbyAtty.Paraisowhichhedescribedaselitewhichtohimmeant
big letters which are of the type in which the will was typewritten but which was
identifiedbywitnessJollyBugarinoftheN.B.I,aspica,themistakeinmentioningthe
nameofthephotographerbyMatildeOrobiatobeCesarMendozawhenactuallyitwas
Benjamin Cifra, Jr.these are indeed unimportant details which could have been
affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory such that by
themselveswouldnotaltertheprobativevalueoftheirtestimoniesonthetrueexecution
ofthewill,(Pascualvs.delaCruz,28SCRA421,424)foritcannotbeexpectedthatthe
testimonyofeverypersonwillbeidenticalandcoincidingwitheachotherwithregardto
details of an incident and that witnesses are not expected to remember all details.
Human experience teach us that contradictions of witnesses generally occur in the
detailsofcertainincidents,afteralongseriesofquestionings,andfarfrombeingan
evidenceoffalsehoodconstituteademonstrationofgoodfaith.Inasmuchasnotallthose
whowitnessanincidentareimpressedinlikemanner,itisbutnaturalthatinrelating
theirimpressions,theyshouldnotagreeintheminordetails;hencethecontradictionsin
theirtestimony.(Lopezvs.Liboro,81Phil.429).
ItisurgedofUsbythepetitionerthatthefindingsofthetrialcourtshouldnothave
beendisturbedbytherespondentappellatecourtbecausethetrialcourtwasinabetter
positiontoweighandevaluatetheevidencepresentedinthecourseofthetrialAsa
general rule, petitioner is correct but itis subject to wellestablished exceptions. The
rightoftheCourtofAp
208
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
peals to review, alter and reverse the findings of the trial court where the appellate
court,inreviewingtheevidencehasfoundthatfactsandcircumstancesofweightand
influence have been ignored and overlooked and the significance of which have been
misinterpretedbythetrial court, cannotbedisputed.Findings offactsmade bytrial
courtsparticularlywhentheyarebasedonconflictingevidencewhoseevaluationhinges
onquestionsofcredibilityofcontendingwitnessesliespeculiarlywithintheprovinceof
trialcourtsandgenerally,theappellatecourtshouldnotinterferewiththesame.Inthe
instantcase,however,theCourtofAppealsfoundthatthetrialcourthadoverlookedand
misinterpreted the facts and circumstances established in the record. Whereas the
appellatecourtsaidthatNothingintherecordsupportsthetrialcourtsunbeliefthat
IsabelGabrieldictatedherwillwithoutanynoteordocumenttoAtty.Paraiso;thatthe
trialcourtsconclusionthatMatildeOrobiacouldnothavewitnessedanybodysigning
theallegedwillorthatshecouldnothavewitnessedCelsoGimpayaandMariaGimpaya
signthesameorthatshewitnessedonlythedeceasedsigningit,isaconclusionbased
notonfactsbutoninferences;thatthetrialcourtgaveundueimportancetothepicture
takings,jumpingtherefromtotheconclusionthatthewillwasimproperlyexecutedand
thatthereisnothingintheentirerecordtosupporttheconclusionofthecourtaquothat
the willsigning occasion was a mere coincidence and that Isabel Gabriel made an
appointmentonlywithMatildeOrobiatowitnessthesigningofherwill,thenitbecomes
thedutyoftheappellatecourttoreversefindingsoffactofthetrialcourtintheexercise
ofitsappellatejurisdictionoverthelowercourts.
Stillthepetitionerinsiststhatthecaseatbarisanexceptiontotherulethatthe
judgmentoftheCourtofAppealsisconclusiveastothefactsandcannotbereviewedby
theSupremeCourt.AgainWeagreewiththepetitionerthatamongtheexceptionsare:
(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
whenthereisagraveabuseofdiscretion;(4)whenthe
209
VOL. 90, MAY 25, 1979 209
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
presenceofeachotherasrequiredbylaw.Specifically,WeaffirmthatonApril15,1961
thetestatrixIsabelGabriel,togetherwithMatildeOrobia,CelsoGimpayaandhiswife
MariaGimpaya,andaphotographerproceededinacartotheofficeofAtty.Cipriano
ParaisoattheBankofP.I.Building,Manilainthemorningofthatday;thatontheway,
IsabelGabrielobtainedamedicalcertificatefromoneDr.Chikiamkowhichshegaveto
Atty.Paraisouponarrivingatthelattersofficeandtoldthelawyerthatshewantedher
willtobemade;thatAtty.ParaisoaskedIsabelGabrieltodictatewhatshewantedtobe
written in the will and the attorney wrote down the dictation of Isabel Gabriel in
Tagalog,alanguageknowntoandspokenbyher;thatAtty.Paraisoreadbacktoher
whathewroteasdictatedandsheaffirmedtheircorrectness;thelawyerthentypedthe
willandafterfinishingthedocument,hereadittoherandshetoldhimthatitwas
alright; thatthereafter, Isabel Gabriel signedhername atthe endofthewillin the
presenceofthethreewitnessesMatildeOrobia,CelsoGimpayaandMariaGimpayaand
alsoatthelefthandmarginofeachandeverypageofthedocumentinthepresencealso
ofthesaidthreewitnesses;thatthereafterMatildeOrobiaattestedthewillbysigning
hernameattheendoftheattestationclauseandatthelefthandmarginofpages1,2,3
and5ofthedocumentinthepresenceofIsabelGabrielandtheothertwowitnesses,
Celso GimpayaandMaria Gimpaya;then, CelsoGimpaya signedalsothewillat the
bottomoftheattestationclauseandatthelefthandmarginoftheotherpagesofthe
documentinthepresenceofIsabelGabriel,MatildeOrobiaandMariaGimpaya;that
MariaGimpayafollowedsuit,signinghernameatthefootoftheattestationclauseand
atthelefthandmarginofeverypageinthepresenceofIsabelGabriel,MatildeOrobia
andCelsoGimpaya; that thereafter, Atty. Paraisonotarizedthe will as PageNo. 94,
BookNo.IV,Seriesof1961,inhisNotarialRegister.Ontheoccasionoftheexecution
and attestation of the will, a photographer took pictures, one Exhibit G, depicting
MatildeOrobia,thetestatrixIsabelGabriel,CelsoGimpaya,MariaGimpayaandAtty.
Paraiso, taken on said occasion of the signing of the will, and another, Exhibit H,
showingMatildeOrobiasigning
210
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
testimonythathehadearlieradvisedIsabelGabrieltobringwithheratleasttheMayor
andaCouncilorofNavotas,Rizaltobeherwitnessesforhedidnotknowbeforehandthe
identitiesofthethreeattestingwitnessesuntilthelattershowedupathislawoffice
withIsabelGabrielonApril15,1961.Atty.Paraisosclaimwhichwasnotcontroverted
that he wrote down in his own hand the date appearing on page 5 of Exhibit F
dissipates any lingering doubt that he prepared and ratified the will on the date in
question.
ItisalsoafactualfindingoftheCourtofAppealsinholdingthatitwascrediblethat
IsabelGabrielcouldhavedictatedthewill,ExhibitF,withoutanynoteordocumentto
Atty.Paraisoasagainstthecontentionofpetitionerthatitwasincredible.Thisrulingof
therespondentcourtisfullysupportedbytheevidenceonrecordasstatedinthedecision
underreview,thus:NothingintherecordsupportsthetrialcourtsunbeliefthatIsabel
GabrieldictatedherwillwithoutanynoteordocumenttoAtty.Paraiso.Onthecontrary,
allthethreeattestingwitnessesuniformlytestifiedthatIsabelGabrieldictatedherwill
toAtty.Paraisoandthatotherthanthepieceofpaperthatshehandedtosaidlawyer
shehadnonoteordocument.Thisfactjibeswiththeevidencewhichthetrialcourt
itselfbelievedwasunshakenthatIsabelGabrielwasofsounddisposingmemorywhen
sheexecutedherwill.
ExhibitFrevealsonlyseven(7)dispositionswhicharenotcomplicatedbutquite
simple.ThefirstwasIsabelGabrielswishtobeinterredaccordingtoCatholicrites;the
secondwasageneraldirectivetopayherdebtsifany;thethirdprovidedforP1,000.00
forhersisterPraxidesGabrielVda.deSantiagoandP2,000.00forherbrotherSantiago
Gabriel; the fourth was a listing of her 13 nephews and nieces including oppositor
appelleeRizalinaGabrielandtheamountforeachlegatee;thefifthwastheinstitutionof
thepetitionerappellant,LutgardaSantiagoastheprincipalheirmentioningingeneral
termsseven(7)typesofproperties;thesixthdisposedoftheremainderofherestate
whichshewilledinfavorofappellantLutgardaSantiagobutprohibitingthesaleofsuch
propertiestoanyoneexceptinextremesituationsinwhich
211
VOL. 90, MAY 25, 1979 211
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting;(6)whentheCourtofAppeals,inmakingitsfindings,wentbeyondtheissues
ofthecaseandthesameiscontrarytotheadmissionsofbothappellantandappellee.
(Roquevs.Buan,etal.,G.R.No.L22459,Oct.31,1967;Ramosvs.PepsiColaBottling
Co.,G.R.No.L22533,Feb.9,1967;Hilario,Jr.vs.CityofManila,G.R.No.L19570;
Sept.14,1967).
Petitionersinsistenceiswithoutmerit.Weholdthatthecaseatbardoesnotfall
withinanyoftheexceptionsenumeratedabove.Welikewiseholdthatthefindingsoffact
of the respondent appellate court are fully supported by the evidence on record. The
conclusionsarefullysustainedbysubstantialevidence.Wefindnoabuseofdiscretion
andWediscernnomisapprehensionoffacts.TherespondentCourtsfindingsoffactare
notconflicting.Hence,thewellestablishedrulethatthedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals
anditsfindingsoffactarebindingandconclusiveandshouldnotbedisturbedbythis
Tribunalanditmustbeappliedinthecaseatbarinitsfullforceandeffect,without
qualification or reservation. The above holding simply synthesizes the resolutions we
have heretofore made in respect to petitioners previous assignments of error and to
whichWehavedisagreedand,therefore,rejected.
ThelastassignmentsoferrorofpetitionermustnecessarilyberejectedbyUsasWe
findtherespondentCourtactedproperlyandcorrectlyandhasnotdepartedfromthe
acceptedandusualcourseofjudicialproceedingsastocallfortheexerciseofthepowerof
supervisionbytheSupremeCourt,andasWefindthattheCourtofAppealsdidnoterr
inreversingthedecisionofthetrialcourtandadmittingtoprobateExhibitF,thelast
willandtestamentofthedeceasedIsabelGabriel.
We rule that the respondent Courts factual findings upon its summation and
evaluationoftheevidenceonrecordisunassailablethat:Fromthewelterofevidence
presented,weareconvincedthatthewillinquestionwasexecutedonApril15,1961in
the presence of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya signing and
witnessingthesameinthe
212
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
the will on a table with Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sitting
around the table. Atty. Paraiso, after finishing the notarial act, then delivered the
originaltoIsabelGabrielandretainedtheothercopiesforhisfileandnotarialregister.
Afewdaysfollowingthesigningofthewill,IsabelGabriel,CelsoGimpayaandanother
photographerarrivedattheofficeofAtty.Paraisoandtoldthelawyerthatshewanted
anotherpicturetakenbecausethefirstpicturedidnotturnoutgood.Thelawyertoldher
thatthiscannotbedonebecausethewillwasalreadysignedbutIsabelGabrielinsisted
thatapicturebetaken,soasimulatedsigningwasperformedduringwhichincident
MatildeOrobiawasnotpresent.
Petitionersexacerbationcentersonthesupposedincredibilityofthetestimoniesof
thewitnessesfortheproponentofthewill,theirallegedevasions,inconsistenciesand
contradictions.Butinthecaseatbar,thethreeinstrumentalwitnesseswhoconstitute
thebestevidenceofthewillmakinghavetestifiedinfavoroftheprobateofthewill.So
hasthelawyerwhopreparedit,onelearnedinthelawandlonginthepracticethereof,
whothereafternotarizedit.Allofthemaredisinterestedwitnesseswhostandtoreceive
nobenefitfromthetestament.Thesignaturesofthewitnessesandthetestatrixhave
beenidentifiedonthewillandthereisnoclaimwhatsoeverandbyanyone,muchless
the petitioner, that they were not genuine. In the last and final analysis, the herein
conflictisfactualandwegobacktotherulethattheSupremeCourtcannotreviewand
revisethefindingsoffactsoftherespondentCourtofAppeals.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is
herebyAFFIRMED,withcostsagainstthepetitioner.
SOORDERED.
Teehankee,Makasiar,DeCastroandHerrera,JJ.,concur.
Judgmentaffirmed.
Notes.Thecumulativeeffectofcircumstancesmayleadtotheconclusionthatthe
testatorwasindeedmentallyin
213
 VOL. 90, MAY 25, 1979
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
capacitated to make a will, that is, to know the nature of his estate which is to be
disposedoftheproperobjectsofhisbounty,andthecharacterofthetestamentaryact.
(Ramirezvs.Ramirez,39SCRA147.)
Anacknowledgingnotarycannotserveasawitnesstoawillatthesametime.(Cruz
vs.Villasor,54SCRA31.)
Evenifitsallowanceisnotopposed,thecourtmustbeconvincedoftheauthenticity
and due execution of the will which requires that in such a situation at least one
attestingwitnessmusttestify.(Vda.dePrecillavs.Narciso,46SCRA538.)
Nothinglessthanthebestevidenceshouldberequiredtobepresentedtothecourt
before a document purporting to be a will is to be admitted to probate or be denied
probate.(Vda.dePrecillavs.Narciso,46SCRA538.)
Thejurisdictionofaprobatecourtbecomesvesteduponthedeliverytheretoofthe
willevenifnopetitionforitsallowancewasfileduntillater,because,uponthewillbeing
deposited,thecourtcould,motupropriohavetakenstepstofixthetimeandplacefor
provingthewillandissuedthecorrespondingnoticesconformablytowhatisprescribed
bySection3,Rule76,oftheRevisedRulesofCourt(Section3,Rule77,oftheOldRules
ofCourt.)(Rodriguezvs.Borja,17SCRA418.)
Where intestate proceedings before a court of first instance had already been
commenced,theprobateofthewillshouldbefiledinthesamecourt,eitherinaseparate
specialproceedingorinanappropriatemotionforsaidpurposefiledisalreadypending
intestateproceeding.(Uriartevs.CourtofFirstInstanceofNegrosOccidental,33SCRA
252.)
Awillmaybeallowedevenifsomewitnessesdonotrememberhavingattestedtoit,if
otherevidencesatisfactorilyshowdueexecution,andthatfailureofwitnesstoidentify
hissignaturedoesnotprovate.(Maravillavs.Maravilla,37SCRA672.)
o0o
213
VOL. 158, FEBRUARY 29, 1988 451
Testate Estate of Adriana Maloto vs. Court of Appeals
No.L76464.February29,1988. *
TESTATEESTATEOFTHELATEADRIANAMALOTO,ALDINAMALOTOCASIANO,
CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC
CHURCH OF MOLO, AND ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
PANFILOMALOTOANDFELINOMALOTO,respondents.
CivilLaw;Wills;RevocationofWill;Toconstituteaneffectiverevocation,thephysicalactof
destructionofawillmustbecoupledwithanimusrevocandionthepartofthetestator. Itisclear
thatthephysicalactofdestructionofawill,likeburninginthiscase,doesnotperseconstitutean
effectiverevocation,unlessthedestructioniscoupledwithanimusrevocandionthepartofthe
testator.Itisnotimperativethatthephysicaldestructionbedonebythetestatorhimself.Itmay
beperformedbyanotherpersonbutundertheexpressdirectionandinthepresenceofthetestator.
Ofcourse,itgoeswithoutsayingthatthedocumentdestroyedmustbethewillitself.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Intentiontorevokemustbeaccompaniedbyovertphysicalactof
burning, tearing, obliterating or cancelling the will by the testator or by another person in his
presenceandunderhisexpressdirection.Inthiscase,whileanimusrevocandi,ortheintentionto
revoke,maybeconceded,forthatisastateofmind,yetthatrequisitealonewouldnotsuffice.
Animusrevocandiisonlyoneofthenecessaryelementsfortheeffectiverevocationofalastwill
andtestament.Theintentiontorevokemustbeaccompaniedbytheovertphysicalactofburning,
tearing,obliterating,orcancellingthewillcarriedoutbythetestatororbyanotherpersoninhis
presenceandunderhisexpressdirection.Thereispaucityofevidencetoshowcompliancewith
theserequirements.Forone,thedocumentorpapersburnedbyAdriana'smaid,Guadalupe,was
notsatisfactorilyestablishedtobeawillatall,muchlessthewillofAdrianaMaloto.Foranother,
theburningwasnotproventohavebeendoneundertheexpressdirectionofAdriana.Andthen,
theburningwasnotinherpresence.Bothwitnesses,GuadalupeandEladio,wereoneinstating
thattheyweretheonlyonespresentattheplacewherethestove(presumablyinthekitchen)was
locatedinwhichthepapersproferredasawillwereburned.
____________
 *
SECONDDIVISION.
452
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Testate Estate of Adriana Maloto vs. Court of Appeals
CivilProcedure;ResAdjudicata;Doctrineofresadjudicatafindsnoapplicationinthecaseat
bar; Requisites of res adjudicata.The doctrine of res adjudicata finds no application in the
presentcontroversy.Forajudgmenttobeabartoasubsequentcase,thefollowingrequisitesmust
concur:(1)thepresenceofafinalformerjudgment;(2)theformerjudgmentwasrenderedbya
courthavingjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterandtheparties;(3)theformerjudgmentisa
judgment on the merits; and (4) there is, between the first and the second action, identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action. We do not find here the presence of all the
enumeratedrequisites.
Same;Same;Same;Strictlyspeaking,nofinaljudgmentrenderedinsofarastheprobateof
AdrianaMaloto'swillisconcerned.Forone,thereisyet,strictlyspeaking,nofinaljudgment
renderedinsofarastheprobateofAdrianaMaloto'swillisconcerned.Thedecisionofthetrialcourt
inSpecialProceedingNo.1736,althoughfinal,involvedonlytheintestateSettlementoftheestate
ofAdriaiana.Assuch,thatjudgmentcouldnotinanymannerbeconstruedtobefinalwith
respecttotheprobateofthesubsequentlydiscoveredwillofthedecedent.Neitherisitajudgment
onthemeritsoftheactionforprobate.Thisisunderstandablysobecausethetrialcourt,inthe
intestateproceeding,waswithoutjurisdictiontoruleontheprobateofthecontestedwill.Afterall,
anactionforprobate,asitimplies,isfoundedonthepresenceofawillandwiththeobjectiveof
provingitsdueexecutionandvalidity,somethingwhichcannotbeproperlydoneinanintestate
settlementofestateproceedingwhichispredicatedontheassumptionthatthedecedentleftno
will.Thus,thereislikewisenoidentitybetweenthecauseofactioninintestateproceedingand
thatinanactionforprobate,Bethatasitmay,itwouldberememberedthatitwasprecisely
becauseofourrulinginG.R.No.L30479thatthepetitionersinstitutedthisseparateactionforthe
probateofthelateAdrianaMaloto'swill.Hence,onthesegroundsalone,thepositionoftheprivate
respondentsonthisscorecannotbesustained.
PETITIONforcertioraritoreviewthedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
SARMIENTO,J.:
Thisisnotthefirsttimethatthepartiestothiscasecometous.Infact,twoothercases
directlyrelatedtothepresentoneand
453
VOL. 158, FEBRUARY 29, 1988 453
Testate Estate of Adriana Maloto us. Court of Appeals
involvingthesamepartieshadalreadybeendecidedbyusinthepast.InG.R.No.L
30479, whichwasapetitionforcertiorariandmandamusinstitutedbythepetitioners
1
herein, we dismissed the petition ruling that the more appropriate remedy of the
petitionersisaseparateproceedingfortheprobateofthewillinquestion.Pursuantto
thesaidruling,thepetitionerscommencedinthethenCourtofFirstInstanceofIloilo,
SpecialProceedingNo.2176,fortheprobateofthedisputedwill,whichwasopposedby
theprivaterespondentspresently,PanfiloandFelino,bothsurnamedMaloto.Thetrial
courtdismissedthepetitiononApril30,1970.Complainingagainstthedismissal,again,
thepetitionerscametothisCourtonapetitionforreviewbycertiorari. Actingonthe 2
saidpetition,wesetasidethetrialcourt'sorderanddirectedittoproceedtohearthe
caseonthemerits.Thetrialcourt,afterhearing,foundthewilltohavealreadybeen
revokedbythetestatrix.AdrianaMaloto,andthus,deniedthepetition.Thepetitioners
appealedthetrialcourt'sdecisiontotheIntermediateAppellateCourtwhich,onJune7,
1985, affirmed the order. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the adverse
decisionprovedtobeofnoavail,hence,thispetition.
Forabetterunderstandingofthecontroversy,afactualaccountwouldbeagreat
help.
OnOctober20,1963,AdrianaMalotodiedleavingasheirshernieceandnephews,
the petitioners Aldina MalotoCasiano and Constancio Maloto, and the private
respondentsPanfiloMalotoandFelinoMaloto.Believingthatthedeceaseddidnotleave
behindalastwillandtestament,thesefourheirscommencedonNovember4,1963an
intestateproceedingforthesettlementoftheiraunt'sestate.Thecasewasinstitutedin
thethenCourtofFirstInstanceofIloiloandwasdocketedasSpecialProceedingNo.
1736.However,whilethecasewasstillinprogress,ortobeexactonFebruary1,1964,
the partiesAldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felinoexecuted an agreement of
extrajudicialsettlementofAdriana'sestate.Theagreementprovidedforthedivisionof
theestateintofourequalpartsamongtheparties.The
____________
1
ConstancioMaloto,etal.vs.Hon.EmigdioV.Nietes,etc.,etal.,May14,1969.
2
G.R.No.L32328.
454
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Testate Estate of Adriana Maloto vs. Court of Appeals
Malotos then presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for
approvalwhichthecourtdidonMarch21,1964.Thatshouldhavesignalledtheendof
thecontroversy,but,unfortunately,ithadnot.
Three years later, or sometime in March 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former
associate of Adriana's counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a document
entitled"KATAPUSANNGAPAGBULUTAN(Testamento),"datedJanuary3,1940,and
purportingtobethelastwillandtestamentofAdriana.Atty.Palmaclaimedtohave
foundthetestament,theoriginalcopy,whilehewasgoingthroughsomematerialsinside
thecabinetdrawerformerlyusedbyAtty.Hervas.Thedocumentwassubmittedtothe
officeoftheclerkoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofIloiloonApril1,1967.Incidentally,
whilePanfiloandFelinoarestillnamedasheirsinthesaidwill,AldinaandConstancio
are bequeathedmuchbiggerand morevaluablesharesintheestate ofAdrianathan
what they received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had
earliersigned.Thewilllikewisegivesdevisesandlegaciestootherparties,amongthem
beingthepetitionersAsilodeMolo,theRomanCatholicChurchofMolo,andPurificacion
Miraflor.
Thus, on May 24, 1967, Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and
legatees named in the will, filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a motion for
reconsiderationandannulmentoftheproceedingsthereinandfortheallowanceofthe
will.Whenthetrialcourtdeniedtheirmotion,thepetitionercametousbywayofa
petitionforcertiorariandmandamusassailingtheordersofthetrialcourt. Aswestated 3
earlier,wedismissedthatpetitionandadvisedthataseparateproceedingfortheprobate
oftheallegedwillwouldbetheappropriatevehicletothreshoutthemattersraisedby
thepetitioners.
Significantly,theappellatecourtwhilefindingasinconclusivethematteronwhether
ornotthedocumentorpapersallegedlyburnedbythehousehelpofAdriana,Guadalupe
Maloto Vda, de Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will,
contradicteditselfandfoundthatthewillhadbeenrevoked.Therespondentcourtstated
thatthepresenceofanimusrevocandiinthedestructionofthewillhad,nevertheless,
beensufficiently
____________
G.R.No.L30479,supra.
3
455
VOL. 158. FEBRUARY 29, 1988 455
Testate Estate of Adriana Maloto vs. Court of Appeals
proven.Theappellatecourtbaseditsfindingonthefactsthatthedocumentwasnotin
the two safes in Adriana's residence, by the testatrix going to the residence of Atty.
Hervastoretrieveacopyofthewillleftinthelatter'spossession,and,herseekingthe
servicesofAtty.Palmainordertohaveanewwilldrawnup.Forreasonsshortlytobe
explained,wedonotviewsuchfacts,evenconsideredcollectively,assufficientbasesfor
theconclusionthatAdrianaMaloto'swillhadbeeneffectivelyrevoked.
There is no doubt as to the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and the due
executionofthewill.Theheartofthecaseliesontheissueastowhetherornotthewill
wasrevokedbyAdriana.
TheprovisionsofthenewCivilCodepertinenttotheissuecanbefoundinArticle
830.
Art.830.Nowillshallberevokedexceptinthefollowingcases:
1. (1)Byimplicationoflaw;or
2. (2)Bysomewill,codicil,orotherwritingexecutedasprovidedincaseofwills;or
3. (3)Byburning,tearing,cancelling,orobliteratingthewillwiththeintentionofrevokingit,
by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the
express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the estate
distributedinaccordancetherewith,ifitscontents,anddueexecution,andthefactofits
unauthorizeddestruction,cancellation,orobliterationareestablishedaccordingtothe
RulesofCourt.(ItalicsSupplied.)
Itisclearthatthephysicalactofdestructionofawill,likeburninginthiscase,doesnot
perseconstituteaneffectiverevocation,unlessthedestructioniscoupledwithanimus
revocandionthepartofthetestator.Itisnotimperativethatthephysicaldestructionbe
done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under
theexpressdirectionandinthepresenceofthetestator.Ofcourse,itgoeswithoutsaying
thatthedocumentdestroyedmustbethewillitself.
Inthiscase,whileanimusrevocandi,ortheintentiontorevoke,maybeconceded,for
thatisastateofmind,yetthatrequisitealonewouldnotsuffice,"Animusrevocandiis
onlyoneofthenecessaryelementsfortheeffectiverevocationofalastwill
456
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Testate Estate of Adriana Maloto vs. Court of Appeals
andtestament.Theintentiontorevokemustbeaccompaniedbytheovertphysicalactof
burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by
another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of
evidencetoshowcompliancewiththeserequirements.Forone,thedocumentorpapers
burnedbyAdriana'smaid,Guadalupe,wasnotsatisfactorilyestablishedtobeawillat
all,muchlessthewillofAdrianaMaloto.Foranother,theburningwasnotprovento
havebeendoneundertheexpressdirectionofAdriana.Andthen,theburningwasnotin
herpresence.Bothwitnesses,GuadalupeandEladio,wereoneinstatingthattheywere
the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was
locatedinwhichthepapersprofferedasawillwereburned.
Therespondentappellatecourtinassessingtheevidencepresentedbytheprivate
respondents as oppositors in the trial court, concluded that the testimony of the two
witnesseswhotestifiedinfavorofthewill'srevocationappear"inconclusive."Weshare
thesameview.Nowhereintherecordsbeforeusdoesitappearthatthetwowitnesses,
Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably
positive that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think,
believed that the papers she destroyed was the will only because, according to her,
Adrianatoldherso.Eladio,ontheotherhand,obtainedhisinformationthattheburned
documentwasthewillbecauseGuadalupetoldhimso,thus,histestimonyonthispoint
isdoublehearsay.
Atthisjuncture,wereiteratethat"(it)isanimportantmatterofpublicinterestthata
purported will is not denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very
institutionoftestamentarysuccessionwillbeshakentoitsveryfoundationsxxx."
Theprivaterespondentsintheirbidforthedismissalofthepresentactionforprobate
instituted by the petitioners argue that the same is already barred byres
adjudicata.They claim that this bar was brought about by the petitioners' failure to
appealtimelyfromtheorderdatedNovember16,1968ofthe
____________
4
Vda,dePrecillavs.Narciso,No.L27200,August18,1972,46SCRA538,565566,quotedin:Maninang
vs.CourtofAppeals,No.L57848,June19,1982,114SCRA78.
457
VOL. 158, FEBRUARY 29, 1988 457
Testate Estate of Adriana Maloto vs. Court of Appeals
trial court in the intestate proceeding (Special Proceeding No. 1736) denying their
(petitioners') motion to reopen the case, and their prayer to annul the previous
proceedingsthereinandtoallowthelastwillandtestamentofthelateAdrianaMaloto.
Thisisuntenable.
Thedoctrineofresadjudicatafindsnoapplicationinthepresentcontroversy.Fora
judgmenttobeabartoasubsequentcase,thefollowingrequisitesmustconcur:(1)the
presenceofafinalformerjudgment;(2)theformerjudgmentwasrenderedbyacourt
havingjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterandtheparties;(3)theformerjudgmentisa
judgmentonthemerits;and(4)thereis,betweenthefirstandthesecondaction,identity
ofparties,ofsubjectmatter,andofcauseofaction. Wedonotfindherethepresenceof
5
alltheenumeratedrequisites.
For one, there is yet, strictly speaking, no final judgmentrendered insofar asthe
probateofAdrianaMaloto'swillisconcerned.ThedecisionofthetrialcourtinSpecial
ProceedingNo.1736,althoughfinal,involvedonlytheintestatesettlementoftheestate
ofAdriana.Assuch,thatjudgmentcouldnotinanymannerbeconstruedtobefinalwith
respecttotheprobateofthesubsequentlydiscoveredwillofthedecedent.Neitherisita
judgmentonthemeritsoftheactionforprobate.Thisisunderstandablysobecausethe
trialcourt,intheintestateproceeding,waswithoutjurisdictiontoruleontheprobateof
the contested will. After all, an action for probate, as it implies, is founded on the
6
presence of a will and with the objective of proving its due execution and validity,
somethingwhichcannotbeproperlydoneinanintestatesettlementofestateproceeding
which is predicated on the assumption that the decedent left no will. Thus, there is
likewisenoidentitybetweenthecauseofactioninintestateproceedingandthatinan
action for probate. Be that as it may, it would be remembered that it was precisely
becauseofourrulinginG.R.No.L30479thatthepetitionersinstitutedthisseparate
actionfortheprobateofthelateAdrianaMaloto'swill.
_____________
HeirsofMatildeCenizalArguzonvs.Miclat,No.L61049,April15,1985,135SCRA678;Martinezvs.
5
CourtofAppeals,No.L41425,November11,1985,139SCRA558.
6
SeeCircaNilaDevelopmentCorporation,et.al.vs.Hon.SalvadorJ.Baylen,etc.,etal.,G.R.Nos.69757
58,January29,1988.
458
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Testate Estate of Adriana Maloto us. Court of Appeals
Hence,onthesegroundsalone,thepositionoftheprivaterespondentsonthisscorecan
notbesustained.
Onelastnote.Theprivaterespondentspointoutthatrevocationcouldbeinferred
fromthefactthat"(a)majorandsubstantialbulkofthepropertiesmentionedinthewill
hadbeendisposedof:whileaninsignificantportionofthepropertiesremainedatthe
timeofdeath(ofthetestatrix);and,furthermore,morevaluablepropertieshavebeen
acquiredaftertheexecutionofthewillonJanuary3,1940."7Sufficeittostateherethat
as these additional matters raised by the private respondents are extraneous to this
specialproceeding,theycouldonlybeappropriatelytakenupafterthewillhasbeenduly
probatedandacertificateofitsallowanceissued.
WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrenderedREVERSINGandSETTINGASIDEthe
Decision dated June 7, 1985 and the Resolution dated October 22, 1986, of the
respondentCourtofAppeals,andanewoneENTEREDfortheallowanceofAdriana
Maloto'slastwillandtestament.Costsagainsttheprivaterespondents.
ThisDecisionisIMMEDIATELYEXECUTORY,
SOORDERED.
Yap(Chairman),MelencioHerrera,andParasJJ.,concur.
Padilla,J.,nopartinthedeliberation.
Judgmentreversedandsetaside.
Notes.Under Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899 which governs this case a
personduringhislifetimemaypartitionhispropertyamonghisheirstakeeffectafter
hisdeathandthisdeedisneitherawilloradonation.(Mangoyvs.CourtofAppeals,144
SCRA33.)
RightstoinheritanceofapersonwhodiedaftertheNewCivilCodetookeffectshall
begovernedbysaidCode.(Yapvs.CourtofAppeals,145SCRA229.)
o0o

[No.26317.January29,1927]
Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased. FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner and
appellant,vs.CORNELIOMAMUYAC,AMBROSIOLARIOSA,FELICIANABAUZON,
andCATALINAMAMUYAC,opponentsandappellees.
WILLS,CANCELLATIONOF;PRESUMPTION.Thelawdoesnotrequireanyevidence
oftherevocationorcancellationofthewilltobepreserved.Itthereforebecomesdifficultat
times to prove the cancellation or revocation of wills. The fact that such cancellation or
revocationhastakenplacemusteitherremainunprovedorbeinferredfromevidenceshowing
thatafterduesearchtheoriginalwillcannotbefound.Whereawillwhichcannotbefoundis
showntohavebeeninthepossessionofthetestator,whenlastseen,thepresumptionis,inthe
absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same
presumptionarises whereitisshownthatthetestatorhadreadyaccesstothewillandit
cannotbefoundafterhisdeath.Itwillnotbepresumedthatsuchwillhasbeendestroyedby
anyotherpersonwithouttheknowledgeorauthorityofthetestator.
APPEALfromajudgmentoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofLaUnion.Teodoro,J.
Thefactsarestatedintheopinionofthecourt.
NicanorTavoraforappellant.
JoseRiveraforappellees.
JOHNSON,J.:
Thepurposeofthisactionwastoobtaintheprobationofalastwillandtestamentof
MiguelMamuyac,whodiedonthe2ddayofJanuary,1922,inthemunicipalityofAgoo
oftheProvinceofLaUnion.Itappearsfromtherecordthatonoraboutthe27thdayof
July,1918,thesaidMiguelMamuyacexecutedalastwillandtestament(ExhibitA).In
themonthofJanuary,1922,thesaidFranciscoGagopresentedapetitionintheCourtof
FirstInstanceoftheProvinceofLaUnionfortheprobationofthatwill.Theprobationof
thesamewasopposedbyCornelioMamuyac,AmbrosioLariosa,FelicianaBauzon,and
Catalina
903
VOL. 49, JANUARY 29, 1927
Gago vs. Mamuyac
Mamuyac(civilcauseNo.1144,ProvinceofLaUnion),Afterhearingallofthepartiesthe
petitionfortheprobationofsaidwillwasdeniedbytheHonorableC.M.Villarealonthe
2ddayofNovember,1923,uponthegroundthatthedeceasedhadonthe16thdayof
April,1919,executedanewwillandtestament.
Onthe21stdayofFebruary,1925,thepresentactionwascommenced.Itspurpose
wastosecuretheprobationofthesaidwillofthe16thdayofApril,1919(Exhibit1).To
said petition Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina
Mamuyac presented their oppositions, alleging (a) that the said will is a copy of the
secondwillandtestamentexecutedbythesaidMiguelMamuyac;(b)that.thesamehad
beencancelledandrevokedduringthelifetimeofMiguelMamuyacand(c)thatthesaid
willwasnotthelastwillandtestamentofthedeceasedMiguelMamuyac.
Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable Anastasio R. Teodoro, judge, after
hearingtherespectiveparties,deniedtheprobationofsaidwillofApril16,1919,upon
the ground that the same had been cancelled and revoked in the year 1920. Judge
Teodoro,afterexaminingtheevidenceadduced,foundthatthefollowingfactshadbeen
satisfactorilyproved:
"ThatExhibitAisamerecarboncopyofitsoriginalwhichremainedinthepossession
of the deceased testator Miguel Mamuyac, who revoked it before his death as per
testimonyofwitnessesJoseFenoy,whotypedthewillofthetestatoronApril16,1919,
andCarlosBejar,whosawonDecember30,1920,theoriginalofExhibitA(willof1919)
actually cancelled by the testator Miguel Mamuyac, who assured Carlos Bejar that
inasmuchashehadsoldhimahouseandthelandwherethehousewasbuilt,hehadto
cancelit(thewillof1919),executingtherebyanewtestament.NarcisaGagoinaway
corroborates the testimony of Jose Fenoy, admitting that the will executed by the
deceased(MiguelMamuyac)in1919wasfound
904
904 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gago vs. Mamuyac
in the possession of father Miguel Mamuyac. The opponents have successfully
establishedthefactthatfatherMiguelMamuyachadexecutedin1920anotherwill.The
sameNarcisaGago,thesisterofthedeceased,whowaslivinginthehousewithhim,
whencrossexaminedbyattorneyfortheopponents,testifiedthattheoriginalofExhibit
Acouldnotbefound.Fortheforegoingconsiderationandforthereasonthattheoriginal
of Exhibit A has been cancelled by the deceased father Miguel Mamuyac, the court
disallows the probate of Exhibit A for the applicant." From that order the petitioner
appealed.
Theappellantcontendsthatthelowercourtcommittedanerrorinnotfindingfrom
theevidencethatthewillinquestionhadbeenexecutedwithalltheformalitiesrequired
bythelaw;thatthesamehadbeenrevokedandcancelledin1920beforehisdeath;that
thesaidwillwasamerecarboncopyandthattheoppositorswerenotestoppedfrom
903
allegingthatfact.
Withreferencetothesaidcancellation,itmaybestatedthatthereispositiveproof,
notdenied,whichwasacceptedbythelowercourt,thatthewillinquestionhadbeen
cancelledin1920.Thelawdoesnotrequireanyevidenceoftherevocationorcancellation
ofawillto.bepreserved.Itthereforebecomesdifficultattimestoprovetherevocationor
cancellationofwills.Thefactthat.suchcancellationorrevocationhastakenplacemust
eitherremainunprovedorbeinferredfromevidenceshowingthatafterduesearchthe
originalwillcannotbefound.Whereawillwhichcannotbefoundisshowntohavebeen
inthepossessionofthetestator,whenlastseen,thepresumptionis,intheabsenceof
other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same
presumptionariseswhereitisshownthatthetestatorhadreadyaccesstothewillandit
cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been
destroyedbyanyotherpersonwithouttheknowledgeorauthorityofthetestator.The
905
VOL. 49, JANUARY 29, 1927 905
Gago vs. Mamuyac
force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying
greatly,beingweakorstrongaccordingtothecircumstances,isneverconclusive,but
maybeovercomebyproofthatthewillwasnotdestroyedbythetestatorwithintentto
revokeit.
Inviewofthefactthattheoriginalwillof1919couldnotbefoundafterthedeathof
thetestatorMiguelMamuyacandinviewofthepositiveproofthatthesamehadbeen
cancelled,weareforcedtotheconclusionthattheconclusionsofthelowercourtarein
accordancewiththeweightoftheevidence.Inaproceedingtoprobateawilltheburden
ofproofisupontheproponentclearlytoestablishnotonlyitsexecutionbutitsexistence.
Havingproveditsexecutionbytheproponents,theburdenisonthecontestanttoshow
thatithasbeenrevoked.Inagreatmajorityofinstancesinwhichwillsaredestroyedfor
thepurposeofrevokingthemthereisnowitnesstotheactofcancellationordestruction
andallevidenceofitscancellationperisheswiththetestator.Copiesofwillsshouldbe
admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper
testimonythatawillwasexecutedinduplicateandeachcopywasexecutedwithallthe
formalitiesandrequirementsofthelaw,thentheduplicatemaybeadmittedinevidence
when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled or
destroyedbythetestator.(Borromeovs.Casquijo,G.R.No.26063.) 1

Afteracarefulexaminationoftheentirerecord,wearefullypersuadedthatthewill
presentedforprobatehadbeencancelledbythetestatorin1920.Thereforethejudgment
appealedfromisherebyaffirmed.Andwithoutanyfindingastocosts,itissoordered.
Street,Malcolm,Villamor,Ostrand,Romualdez,andVillaReal,JJ.,concur.
Judgmentaffirmed.

[No.L2538.September21,1951]
TestateEstateoftheDeceasedMARIANOMOLOYLEGASPI.JUANAJUANVDA.DE
MOLO,petitionerandappellee,vs.Luz,GLICERIAandCORNELIOMOLO,oppositors
andappellants.
1. 1.WILLS;REVOCATIONBYSUBSEQUENTWILL;EFFECTOFVOIDREVOCATORY
CLAUSE.Asubsequentwillcontainingaclauserevokingapreviouswill,havingbeen
disallowedforthereasonthatitwasnotexecutedinconformitywiththeprovisionsof
section618oftheCodeofCivilProcedureastothemakingofwills,cannotproducethe
effect of annuling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void
(Samsonvs.Naval,41Phil.,838).
1. 2.ID.;PROBATE;DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION.Even in the supposition
that the destruction of the original will by the testator could be presumed from the
failureofthepetitioner
38
38 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Molo vs. Molo
1. toproduceitincourt,suchdestructioncannothavetheeffectofdefeatingthepriorwill
whereitisfoundedonthemistakenbeliefthatthelaterwillhasbeenvalidlyexecuted
andwouldbegivendueeffect.Theearlierwillcanstillbeadmittedtoprobateunderthe
principle of "dependent relative revocation". The theory on which this principle is
predicatedisthatthetestatordidnotintendtodieintestate.Andthisintentionisclearly
manifestwhereheexecutedtwowillsontwodifferentoccasionsandinstitutedhiswife
ashisuniversalheir.
APPEALfromanorderoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofRizal.Tan,J.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
ClaroM.RectoandSerafinC.Dizonforappellants.
Delgado&Floresforappellee.
BAUTISTAANGELO,J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal admitting to
probatethelastwillandtestamentofthedeceasedMarianoMoloyLegaspiexecutedon
August17,1918.TheoppositorsappellantsbroughtthecaseonappealtothisCourtfor
thereasonthatthevalueofthepropertiesinvolvedexceedsP50,000.
Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay,
provinceofRizal,withoutleavinganyforcedheireitherinthedescendingorascending
line.Hewassurvived,however,byhiswife,thehereinpetitionerJuanaJuanVda.de
Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositorsappellants, Luz, Gliceria and
Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of Candido Molo y
Legaspi, deceasedbrotherof thetestator. Mariano Moloy Legaspi lefttwowills, one
executed on August 17, 1918, (Exhibit A) and another executed on June 20, 1939,
(ExhibitI).Thelatterwillcontainsaclausewhichexpresslyrevokesthewillexecutedin
1918.
OnFebruary7,1941,JuanaJuanVda.deMolofiledintheCourtofFirstInstanceof
Rizalapetition,whichwasdocketedasspecialproceedingNo.8022,seekingtheprobate
ofthewillexecutedbythedeceasedonJune20,1939.
39
VOL. 90, SEPTEMBER 21, 1951 39
Molo vs. Molo
Therebeingnoopposition,thewillwasprobated.However,uponpetitionfiledbythe
hereinoppositors,theorderofthecourtadmittingthewilltoprobatewassetasideand
thecasewasreopened.Afterhearing,atwhichbothpartiespresentedtheirevidence,the
courtrendereddecisiondenyingtheprobateofsaidwillonthegroundthatthepetitioner
failedtoprovethatthesamewasexecutedinaccordancewithlaw.
In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow on
February24,1944,filedanotherpetitionf orthe probateof thewill executed bythe
deceasedonAugust17,1918,whichwasdocketedasspecialproceedingNo.56,inthe
samecourt.Again,thesameoppositorsfiledanoppositiontothepetitionbasedonthree
grounds:(1)thatpetitionerisnowestoppedfromseekingtheprobateofthewillof1918;
(2)thatsaidwillhasnotbeenexecutedinthemannerrequiredbylawand(3)thatthe
willhasbeensubsequentlyrevoked.Butbeforethesecondpetitioncouldbeheard,the
battleforliberationcameandtherecordsofthecaseweredestroyed.Consequently,a
petitionforreconstitutionwasfiled,butthesamewasfoundtobeimpossiblebecause
neitherpetitionernoroppositorscouldproducethecopiesrequiredforitsreconstitution.
Asaresult,petitionerfiledanewpetitiononSeptember14,1946,similartotheone
destroyed,towhichtheoppositorsfiledanoppositionbasedonthesamegroundsasthose
containedintheirformeropposition.Then,thecasewassetfortrial,andonMay28,
1948,thecourtissuedanorderadmittingthewilltoprobateasalreadystatedinthe
earlypartofthisdecision.Fromthisordertheoppositorsappealedassigningsixerrors,
towit:
1. "I.Theprobatecourterredinnotholdingthatthepresentpetitionervoluntarily
and deliberately frustrated the probate of the will dated June 20, 1939, in
special proceeding No, 8022, in order to enable her to obtain the probate of
anotherallegedwillofMolodated1918.
2. "II.Thecourtaquoerredinnotholdingthatthepetitionerisnowestoppedfrom
seekingtheprobateofMolo'sallegedwillof1918.
40
40 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Molo vs. Molo
1. "III.Thelowercourterredinnotholdingthatpetitionerhereinhascometocourt
with'uncleanhands'andassuchisnotentitledtorelief.
2. "IV.TheprobatecourterredinnotholdingthatMolo'sallegedwillofAugust17,
1918wasnotexecutedinthemannerrequiredbylaw.
3. "V.The probate court erred in not holding that the alleged will of 1918 was
deliberatelyrevokedbyMolohimself.
4. "VI.The lower court erred in not holding that Molo's will of 1918 was
subsequentlyrevokedbythedecedent'swillof1939."
Intheirfirstassignmentoferror,counselforoppositorscontendthattheprobatecourt
erred in not holding that the petitioner voluntarily and deliberately frustrated the
probateofthewilldatedJune20,1939,inordertoenablehertoobtaintheprobateofthe
will executed by the deceased on August 17, 1918, pointing out certain facts and
circumstances which in their opinion indicate that petitioner connived with witness
CanutoPerezinanefforttodefeatandfrustratetheprobateofthe1939willbecauseof
her knowledge that said will was intrinsically defective in that "the one and only
testamentarydispositionthereofwasa'disposicincaptatoria'".Thesecircumstances,
counsel for the appellants contend, constitute a series of steps deliberately taken by
petitionerwithaviewtoinsuringtherealizationofherplanofsecuringtheprobateof
the1918willwhichshebelievedwouldbettersafeguardherrighttoinheritfromthe
deceased.
These imputations of fraud and bad faith allegedly committed in connection with
specialproceedingsNo.8022,nowclosedandterminated,arevigorouslymetbycounsel
forpetitionerwhocontendsthattoraisethemintheseproceedingswhichareentirely
newanddistinctandcompletelyindependentfromtheotherisimproperandunfairas
theyfindnosupportwhatsoeverinanyevidencesubmittedbythepartiesinthiscase.
Theyaremerelybasedonpresumptionsandconjecturesnotsupportedbyanyproof.For
thisreason,counselcontends,thelowercourtwasjustifiedindisregardingthemandin
passingthemsubsilentioinitsdecision.
41
VOL. 90, SEPTEMBER 21, 1951 41
Molo vs. Molo
A careful examination of the evidence available in this case seems to justify this
contention.Thereisindeednoevidencewhichmayjustifytheinsinuationthatpetitioner
haddeliberatelyintendedtofrustratetheprobateofthe1939willofthedeceasedto
enablehertoseektheprobateofanotherwillotherthanamereconjecturedrawnfrom
theapparentlyunexpectedtestimonyofCanutoPerezthathewentoutoftheroomto
answeranurgentcallofnaturewhenArtemioReyeswassigningthewillandthefailure
ofpetitionerlatertoimpeachthecharacterofsaidwitnessinspiteoftheopportunity
given her by the court to do so. Apart from this insufficiency of evidence, the record
disclosesthatthisfailurehasbeenexplainedbypetitionerwhensheinformedthecourt
thatshewasunabletoimpeachthecharacterofherwitnessCanutoPerezbecauseofher
inability to find witnesses who may impeach him, and this explanation stands
uncontradicted.Whetherthisexplanationissatisfactoryornot,itisnotnowforusto
determine.Itisanincidentthatcomeswithintheprovinceoftheformercase.Thefailure
ofpetitionertopresentthetestimonyofArtemioReyesattherehearinghasalsobeen
explained,anditappearsthatpetitionerhasfailedbecausehiswhereaboutscouldnotbe
found.WhetherthisistrueornotisnotalsoforthisCourttodetermine.Itislikewise
withintheprovinceandfunctionofthecourtintheformercase.Andtheunfairnessof
thisimputationbecomesmoreglaringwhenwetakestockofthedevelopmentsthathad
takenplaceintheseproceedingswhichshowinboldreliefthetruenatureoftheconduct,
behaviorandcharacterofthepetitionersobitterlyassailedandheldindisreputebythe
oppositors.
Itshouldberecalledthatthefirstpetitionfortheprobateofthewillexecutedon
June 20, 1939, was filed on February 7, 1941, by the petitioner. There being no
opposition,thewillwasprobated.Subsequently,however,uponpetitionoftheherein
oppositors,theorderofthecourtadmittingsaidwilltoprobatewassetaside,overthe
vigorousoppo
42
42 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Molo vs. Molo
sitionofthehereinpetitioner,andthecasewasreopened.Thereopeningwasordered
becauseofthestrongoppositionoftheoppositorswhocontendedthatthewillhadnot
beenexecutedasrequiredbylaw.Aftertheevidenceofbothpartieshadbeenpresented,
theoppositorsfiledanextensivememorandumwhereintheyreiteratedtheirviewthat
the will should be denied probate. And on the strength of this opposition, the court
disallowedthewill.
Ifpetitionerthenknewthatthe1939willwasinherentlydefectiveandwouldmake
the testamentary disposition in her favor invalid and ineffective, because it is a
"disposicincaptatoria",whichknowledgeshemayeasilyacquirethroughconsultation
withalawyer,therewasnoneedforhertogothroughtheordealoffilingthepetitionfor
theprobateofthewill.Shecouldaccomplishherdesirebymerelysuppressingthewillor
tearingordestroyingit,andthentakestepsleadingtotheprobateofthewillexecutedin
1918.Butherconsciencewasclearandbadehertotaketheonlypropersteppossible
underthecircumstances,whichistoinstitutethenecessaryproceedingsfortheprobate
of the 1939 will. This she did and the will was admitted to probate. But then the
unexpectedhappened.Overhervigorousopposition,thehereinappellantsfiledapetition
forreopening,andoverhervigorousobjection,thesamewasgrantedandthecasewas
reopened.Hermotionforreconsiderationwasdenied.Isitherfaultthatthecasewas
reopened?Isitherfaultthattheorderadmittingthewilltoprobatewassetaside?That
was a contingency which petitioner never expected. Had appellants not filed their
oppositiontotheprobateofthewillandhadtheylimitedtheirobjectiontotheintrinsic
validityofsaidwill,theirplantodefeatthewillandsecuretheintestacyofthedeceased
wouldhaveperhapsbeenaccomplished.Buttheyfailedintheirstrategy.Ifsaidwillwas
denied probate it is due to their own effort. It is now unfair to impute bad faith to
petitionersimplybecausesheexertedeveryefforttoprotectherown
43
VOL. 90, SEPTEMBER 21, 1951 43
Molo vs. Molo
interestandpreventtheintestacyofthedeceasedtohappen.
Havingreachedtheforegoingconclusions,itisobviousthatthecourtdidnotcommit
thesecondandthirderrorsimputedtoitbythecounselforappellants.Indeed,petitioner
cannot be considered guilty of estoppel which would prevent her from seeking the
probateofthe1918willsimplybecauseherefforttoobtaintheallowanceofthe1939will
hasfailedconsideringthatinboththe1918and1939willsshewasinstitutedbyher
husbandashisuniversalheir.Norcanshebechargedwithbadfaithfarhavingdoneso
becauseofherdesiretopreventtheintestacyofherhusband.Shecannotbeblamedfor
beingzealousinprotectingherinterest.
Thenextcontention ofappellants refers to therevocatory clause containedinthe
1939willofthedeceasedwhichwasdeniedprobate.Theycontendthat,notwithstanding
thedisallowanceofsaidwill,therevocatoryclauseisvalidandstillhastheeffectof
nullifyingthepriorwillof1918.Counselforpetitionermeetsthisargumentbyinvoking
thedoctrinelaiddowninthecaseofSamsonvs.Naval,(41Phil.,838).Hecontendsthat
thefactsinvolvedinthatcaseareonallfourswiththefactsofthiscase.Hence,the
doctrineinthatcaseisherecontrolling.
Thereismeritinthiscontention.Wehavecarefullyreadthefactsinvolvedinthe
Samsoncaseandweareindeedimpressedbytheirstrikingsimilaritywiththefactsof
thiscase.Wedonotneedtoreciteherewhatthosefactsare;itisenoughtopointout
thattheycontainmanypointsandcircumstancesincommon.Noreason,therefore,is
seenwhythedoctrinelaiddowninthatcase(whichwequotehereunder)shouldnot
applyandcontrolthepresentcase.
"Asubsequentwill,containingaclauserevokingapreviouswill,havingbeendisallowed,forthe
reasonthatitwasnotexecutedinconformitywiththeprovisionsofsection618oftheCodeofCivil
Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will,
inasmuchassaidrevocatoryclauseisvoid."(41Phil.,838.)
44
44 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Molo vs. Molo
Aproposofthisquestion,counselforoppositorsmaketheremarkthat,whiletheydonot
disagreewiththesoundnessoftherulinglaiddownintheSamsoncase,thereisreason
to abandon said ruling because it is archaic or antiquated and runs counter to the
moderntrendprevailinginAmericanjurisprudence.Theymaintainthatsaidrulingisno
longercontrollingbutmerelyrepresentsthepointofviewoftheminorityandshould,
therefore,beabandoned,moresoifweconsiderthefactthatsection623ofourCodeof
CivilProcedure,whichgovernstherevocationofwills,isofAmericanoriginandassuch
shouldfollowtheprevailingtrendofthemajorityviewintheUnitedStates.Alongline
ofauthoritiesiscitedinsupportofthiscontention.Andtheseauthoritiesholdtheview,
that"anexpressrevocationisimmediatelyeffectiveupontheexecutionofthesubsequent
will,anddoesnotrequirethatitfirstundergotheformalityofaprobateproceeding".(p.
63,appellants'brief).
While there are many cases which uphold the view entertained by counsel for
oppositors,andthatviewappearstobecontrollinginthestateswherethedecisionshad
beenpromulgated,however,wearereluctanttofallinlinewiththeassertionthatthatis
nowtheprevailingviewintheUnitedStates.InthesearchwehavemadeofAmerican
authoritiesonthesubject,wefoundourselvesinapoolofconflictingopinionsperhaps
becauseofthepeculiarprovisionscontainedinthestatutesadoptedbyeachStateonthe
subjectofrevocationofwills.Buttheimpressionwegatheredfromareviewandstudyof
thepertinentauthoritiesisthatthedoctrinelaiddownintheSamsoncaseisstillagood
law.Onpage328oftheAmericanJurisprudence,Vol.57,whichisarevisionpublished
in1948,wefoundthefollowingpassageswhichinouropiniontrulyreflectthepresent
trendofAmericanjurisprudenceonthismatteraffectingtherevocationofpriorwills:
"SEC. 471.Observance of Formalities in Execution of Instrument.Ordinarily, statutes which
permittherevocationofawillbyan
45
VOL. 90, SEPTEMBER 21, 1951 45
Molo vs. Molo
otherwritingprovidethattobeeffectiveasarevocation,thewritingmustbeexecutedwiththe
sameformalitieswhicharerequiredtobeobservedintheexecutionofawill.Accordingly,where,
under the statutes, attestation is necessary to the making of a valid will, an unattested
nontestamentarywritingisnoteffectivetorevokeapriorwill.Ithasbeenheldthatawritingfails
asarevokinginstrumentwhereitisnotexecutedwiththeformalitiesrequisitefortheexecutionof
a will, even though it is inscribed on the will itself, although it may effect a revocation by
cancellationorobliterationofthewordsofthewill.Atestatorcannotreservetohimselfthepower
tomodifyawillbyawritteninstrumentsubsequentlypreparedbutnotexecutedinthemanner
requiredforawill.
"SEC. 472.Subsequent Unexecuted, Invalid, or Ineffective Will or Codicil.A will which is
invalidbecauseoftheincapacityofthetestatororofundueinfluencecanhavenoeffectwhatever
asarevokingwill.Moreover,awillisnotrevokedbytheunexecuteddraftofalaterone.Norisa
will revoked bya defectively executed will or codicil, even though thelatter contains aclause
expresslyrevokingtheformerwill,inajurisdictionwhereitisprovidedbyacontrollingstatute
thatnowritingotherthanatestamentaryinstrumentissufficienttorevokeawill,forthesimple
reasonthatthereisnorevokingwill.Similarlywherethestatuteprovidesthatawillmaybe
revokedbyasubsequentwillorotherwritingexecutedwiththesameformalitiesasarerequiredin
theexecutionofwills,adefectivelyexecutedwilldoesnotrevokeapriorwill,sinceitcannotbe
saidthatthereisawritingwhichcomplieswiththestatute.Moreover,awillorcodicilwhich,on
accountofthemannerinwhichitisexecuted,issufficienttopassonlypersonallydoesnotaffect
dispositionsofrealestatemadebyaformerwill,eventhoughitmayexpresslypurporttodoso.
Theintentofthetestatortorevokeisimmaterial,ifhehasnotcompliedwiththestatute."(57Am.
Jur.,328,329.)
WefindthesameopinionintheAmericanLawReports,Annotated,editedin1939.On
page1400,Volume123,thereappearmanyauthoritiesonthe"applicationofruleswhere
secondwillisinvalid",amongwhichatypicaloneisthefollowing:
"Itisuniversallyagreedthatwherethesecondwillisinvalidonaccountofnotbeingexecutedin
accordance with the provisions of the statute, or where the testator has not sufficient mental
capacitytomakeawillorthewillisprocuredthroughundueinfluence,
46
46 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Molo vs. Molo
orthesuch,inotherwords,wherethesecondwillisreallynowill,itdoesnotrevokethefirstwill
oraffectitinanymanner."Mortvs.BakerUniversity(1935)229Mo.App.,632,78S.W.(2d),498."
Thesetreaties cannot bemistaken. They upholdthe view on whichtheruling in the
Samsoncaseispredicated.Theyreflecttheopinionthatthisrulingissoundandgood
andforthisreasonweseenojustificationforabandoningitasnowsuggestedbycounsel
fortheoppositors.
Itistruethatourlawonthematter(sec.623,CodeofCivilProcedure)providesthat
awillmayberevoked"bysomewill,codicil,orotherwritingexecutedasprovidedincase
ofwills";butitcannotbesaidthatthe1939willshouldberegarded,notasawillwithin
themeaningofsaidword,butas"otherwritingexecutedasprovidedinthecaseofwills",
simply because it was denied probate. And even if it be regarded as anyother
writingwithinthemeaningofsaidclause,thereisauthorityforholdingthatunlesssaid
writingisadmittedtoprobate,itcannothavetheeffectofrevocation.(See57Am.Jur.
pp.329330).
Butcounselforoppositorscontendthat,regardlessofsaidrevocatoryclause,saidwill
of1918cannotstillbegiveneffectbecauseofthepresumptionthatitwasdeliberately
revokedbythetestatorhimself.Theoppositorscontendthatthetestator,afterexecuting
the1939will,andwithfullknowledgeoftherevocatoryclausecontainedinsaidwill,
himselfdeliberatelydestroyedtheoriginalofthe1918will,andthatforthisreasonthe
willsubmittedbypetitionerforprobateintheseproceedingsisonlyaduplicateofsaid
original.
There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator deliberately
destroyedtheoriginalofthe1918willbecauseofhisknowledgeoftherevocatoryclause
containedinthewillheexecutedin1939.Theonlyevidencewehaveisthatwhenthe
firstwillwasexecutedin1918,JuanSalcedo,whopreparedit,gavetheoriginaland
copiestothetestatorhimselfandapparentlytheyremainedin
47
VOL. 90, SEPTEMBER 21, 1951 47
Molo vs. Molo
hispossessionuntilheexecutedhissecondwillin1939.Andwhenthe1939willwas
deniedprobateonNovember29,1943,andpetitionerwasaskedbyherattorneytolook
foranotherwill,shefoundtheduplicatecopy(ExhibitA)amongthepapersorfilesofthe
testator.Shedidnotfindtheoriginal.
Ifitcanbeinferredthatthetestatordeliberatelydestroyedthe1918willbecauseof
hisknowledgeoftherevocatoryclauseofthe1939will,anditistruethathegavea
duplicatecopy thereofto hiswife, the hereinpetitioner, the most logical stepfor the
testatortotakeistorecallsaidduplicatecopyinorderthatitmaylikewisebedestroyed.
Butthiswasnotdoneasshownbythefactthatsaidduplicatecopyremainedinthe
possessionofpetitioner.Itispossiblethatbecauseofthelonglapseoftwentyone(21)
yearssincethefirstwillwasexecuted,theoriginalofthewillhadbeenmisplacedorlost,
andforgettingthattherewasacopy,thetestatordeemeditwisetoexecuteanotherwill
containingexactlythesametestamentarydispositions.Whatevermaybetheconclusion
wemaydrawfromthischainofcircumstances,thestubbornfactisthatthereisnodirect
evidence of voluntary or deliberate destruction of the first will by the testator. This
mattercannotbelefttomereinferenceorconjecture.
 Grantingforthesakeofargumentthattheearlierwillwasvoluntarilydestroyedby Montilla and Tobia vs. Hilario and Crisologo
thetestatoraftertheexecutionofthesecondwill,whichrevokedthefirst,couldtherebe The will in question was attested, as required by law, by three witnesses, Lorenzo
anydoubt,underthistheory,thatsaidearlierwillwasdestroyedbythetestatorinthe Morales,RufinoEnriquez,andAngelCuenca.Thefirsttwowitnessesdiedbeforethe
honestbeliefthatitwasnolongernecessarybecausehehadexpresslyrevokeditinhis commencementofthepresentproceedings.Sotheonlyinstrumentalwitnessavailable
willof1939?Inotherwords,canwenotsaythatthedestructionoftheearlierwillwas wasAngelCuencaandunderourlawandprecedents,histestimonyissufficienttoprove
but the necessary consequence of the testator's belief that the revocatory clause thedueexecutionofthewill.However,petitionerpresentednotonlythetestimonyof
containedinthesubsequentwillwasvalidandthelatterwouldbegiveneffect?Ifsuchis CuencabutplacedonthewitnessstandJuanSalcedo,thenotarypublicwhoprepared
thecase,thenitisouropinionthattheearlierwillcanstillbeadmittedtoprobateunder and notarized the will upon the express desire and instruction of the testator. The
theprincipleof"dependentrelativerevocation". testimony of these witnesses shows that the will had been executed in the manner
48
requiredbylaw.Wehavereadtheirtestimonyandwewereimpressedbytheirreadiness
48 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED andsincerity.Weareconvincedthattheytoldthetruth.
Molo vs. Molo Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
"Thisdoctrineisknownasthatofdependentrelativerevocation,andisusuallyappliedwherethe appellants.
testatorcancels ordestroys awillorexecutes aninstrumentintended torevoke awill witha
Pars,C.J.,Feria,Pablo,Bengzon,Tuason,andJugo,JJ.,concur.
presentintentiontomakeanewtestamentarydispositionasasubstitutefortheold,andthenew
dispositionisnotmadeor,ifmade,failsofeffectforsomereason.Thedoctrineisnotlimitedtothe Reyes,J.,concursintheresult.
existenceofsomeotherdocument,however,andhasbeenappliedwhereawillwasdestroyedasa
consequenceofamistakeoflaw***."(68C.J.p.799). Orderaffirmed.
"Therule is established thatwheretheactofdestructionis connected withthemaking of
anotherwillsoasfairlytoraisetheinferencethatthetestatormeanttherevocationoftheoldto
dependupontheefficacyofthenewdispositionintendedtobesubstituted,therevocationwillbe
conditionalanddependentupontheefficacyofthenewdisposition;andif,foranyreason,thenew
willintendedtobemadeasasubstituteisinoperative,therevocationfailsandtheoriginalwill
remainsinfullforce."(Gardner,pp.232,233.)
"This isthedoctrineofdependentrelativerevocation.Thefailureofthenewtestamentary
disposition,uponwhosevaliditytherevocationdepends,isequivalenttothenonfulfillmentofa
suspensivecondition,andhencepreventstherevocationoftheoriginalwill.Butamereintentto
makeatsometimeawillinplaceofthatdestroyedwillnotrenderthedestructionconditional.It
mustappearthattherevocationisdependentuponthevalidexecutionofanewwill."(1Alexander,
p.751;Gardner,p.233.)

Wehold,therefore,thateveninthesuppositionthatthedestructionoftheoriginalwill
bythetestatorcouldbepresumedfromthefailureofthepetitionertoproduceitincourt,
suchdestructioncannothavetheeffectofdefeatingthepriorwillof1918becauseofthe
fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly
executedandwouldbegivendueeffect.Thetheoryonwhichthisprincipleispredicated
isthatthetestatordidnotintendtodieintestate.Andthisintentionisclearlymanifest
when heexecutedtwowillson.twodifferent occasions andinstitutedhiswifeas his
universalheir.Therecanthereforebenomistakeastohisintentionofdyingtestate.
Theremainingquestiontobedeterminedreferstothesufficiencyoftheevidenceto
provethedueexecutionofthewill.
49
VOL. 90, SEPTEMBER 24, 1951 49
 [No.17714.May31,1922]
In the matter of the estate of Jesus de Leon. IGNACIA DIAZ, petitioner and
appellant,vs.ANADELEON,opponentandappellee.
WILLS;REVOCATION;"ANIMO REVOCANDI."According to the statute governing
thesubjectinthisjurisdictionthedestructionanimorevocandiofawillconstitutes,initself,a
sufficientrevocation.(Sec.623,CodeofCivilProcedure.)Theoriginalwillhereinpresentedfor
probatehavingbeendestroyedanimorevocandi,cannotbedeclaredthewillandlasttestament
ofthetestator.
APPEALfromajudgmentoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofIloilo.Camus,J.
Thefactsarestatedintheopinionofthecourt.
Montinola,Montinola&HontiverosandJoseLopezVitoforappellant.
FranciscoA.Delgado,Powell&HillandPadilla&Trenasforappellee.

ROMUALDEZ,J.:

TheonlyquestionraisedinthiscaseiswhetherornotthewillexecutedbyJesusde
Leon,nowdeceased,wasrevokedbyhim.
The petitioner denies such revocation, while the contestant affirms the same by
allegingthatthetestatorrevokedhiswillbydestroyingit,andbyexecutinganotherwill
expresslyrevokingtheformer.
WefindthatthesecondwillExhibit1executedbythedeceasedisnotclothedwithall
thenecessaryrSquisitestoconstituteasufficientrevocation.
Butaccordingtothestatutegoverningthesubjectinthisjurisdiction,thedestruction
of a will withanimo revocandiconstitutes, initself, a sufficientrevocation. (Sec. 623,
CodeofCivilProcedure.)
Fromtheevidencesubmittedinthiscase,itappearsthatthetestator,shortlyafter
theexecutioncutionofthefirstwill
414
414 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Berbari vs. General Oil Co.
inquestion,askedthatthesamebereturnedtohim.Theinstrumentwasreturnedtothe
testatorwhoorderedhisservanttotearthedocument.Thiswasdoneinhispresenceand
beforeanursewhotestifiedtothiseffect.Aftersometime,thetestator,beingaskedby
Dr.CornelioMapaaboutthewill,saidthatithadbeendestroyed.
 The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that the
testatorwasanxioustowithdraworchangetheprovisionsheh&dmadeinhisfirstwill.
Thisfactisdisclosedbythetestator'sownstatementstothewitnessesCantoandthe
MotherSuperioroftheHospitalwherehewasconfined.
The original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed withanimo
revocandi,cannot now be probated as the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon.
Judgmentisaffirmedwithcostsagainstthepetitioner.Soordered.
Araullo,C.J.,Malcolm,Avancea,Ostrand,andJohns,JJ.,concur.
Villamor,J.,didnottakepart.
Judgmentaffirmed.

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