CIVIL LAW

TORTS
I. Preliminary Considerations
A. DEFINITION OF TORT
A.1. ACCORDING TO MANNER OF
COMMISSION
(1) Negligent Tort consists in the failure to
act according to the standard of diligence
required under the attendant circumstances.
It is a voluntary act or omission which results
in injury to others, without intending to cause
the same.
Note: While the term tort has been used
interchangeably with the term quasi-delict,
the latter merely represents an area of tort
law concerned with damage resulting from
fault (by doing a positive act constituting
negligence) or negligence (by omitting to do
an act due to negligence) of the defendant.
(2) Intentional Tort perpetrated by one who
intends to do that which the law has
declared to be wrong. It is conduct where
the actor desires to cause the
consequences of the act, or that he believes
that the consequences are substantially
certain to result therefrom.
(3) Strict Liability one is liable independent
of fault or negligence. It only requires proof
of a certain set of facts. Liability here is
based on the breach of an absolute duty to
make something safe. It most often applies
to ultra-hazardous activities or in product
liability cases. It is also known as absolute
liability or liability without fault.
Strict liability is imposed by articles 1314,
1711, 1712, 1723, 2183, 2184, 2187, 2189,
2190, 2191, 2192, 2193.
A.2. ACCORDING TO SCOPE
(1) General Tort liability is based on any of
the three categories: intentional, negligent,
strict liability
(2) Specific Includes trespass, assault,
battery, negligence, products liability, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress
B. DEFINITION OF QUASI-DELICT
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as
culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts
is an Anglo-American or common law concept.
Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana
because it includes not only negligennce, but
intentional criminal acts such as assualt and
battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the
general scheme of the Philippine legal system
envisioned by the Commission responsible for
drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and
malicious acts with certain exceptopms, are to
be governed by the Revised Penal Code while
negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these
opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in
the absence of Article 21, would have been
beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that
vacuum [Baksh v. CA, G.R. No. 97336 (1993)].
The concept of quasi-delict does not cover
intentional acts. The liability arising from from
extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a
voluntary act or omission, which, without willful
intent, but by mere negligence or inattention,
has caused damage to another [Cango v Manila
Railroad, G.R. No. 12191 (1918)]
The concept of quasi-delict is so broad that it
includes not only injuries to persons but also
damage to property [Cinco v Canonoy, G.R. No.
L-33171 (1979)]
C. CULPA AQUILIANA DISTINGUISHED FROM
CRIME
A quasi-delict is a separate source of obligation
under Article 1157.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or
negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant.
RPC, Art. 100. Every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable.
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate
legal institution under the Civil Code, with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime. However, the same negligent act causing
damage may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, or create an action for quasi-delict
[Barredo v Garcia, G.R. No. 48006 (1942)]
An act or omission causing damage to another
may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on
the part of the offenderfor civil liability ex
delicto, and independent civil liabilities. The
choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his
cause of action in his initiatory pleading or
complaint [LG Foods v Philadelfa, G.R. No.
158995 (2006)]
D. CULPA AQUILIANA DISTINGUISHED FROM
CULPA CONTRACTUAL; PRESENCE OF
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
D.1. AS TO SOURCE
In culpa aquiliana or non-contractual obligation,
it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission
itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas
in contractual relations, the vinculum exists
independently of the breach of voluntary duty
assumed by the parties when entering into the
contractual relation [Cangco v. Manila Railroad,
supra].
D.2. AS TO BURDEN OF PROOF
When the source of the obligation upon which
the plaintiffs cause of action depends is a
negligent act or omission, the burden of proof
rests upon the plaintiff to prove the negligence
if he does not his action fails. But when the facts
averred show a contractual undertaking by
defendant for the benefit of the plaintiff, and it is
alleged that the plaintiff has failed or refused to
perform the contract, it is not necessary for the
plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the
breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to
negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his
servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of
its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to
warrant a recovery. [Cangco v. Manila Railroad,
supra]
D.3. AS TO APPLICABILITY OF THE
DOCTRINE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
The doctrine of proximate cause [to establish the
fault or negligence of the defendant] is
applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in
actions involving breach of contract [Calalas v.
CA, G.R. No. 122039 (2000)].
D.4. AS TO THE DEFENSE OF AN EMPLOYER
FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF AN EMPLOYEE
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action
for breach of contract to show that the breach
was due to the negligent conduct of the
defendant or his servants, proof on the part of
the defendant that the negligence or omission of
his servants or agents caused the breach of
contract would not constitute a defense to the
action [Cangco v. Manila Railroad, supra].
Presence of Contactual Relations
The Supreme Court held there may instances
where there can be a quasi-delict even when
there is a contract between the parties. The test
(whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to
underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated
thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract
between two parties, an act or omission can
nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by
itself, the fact that the parties are contractually
bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict
provisions to the case [Far East v. CA, G.R. No.
108164 (1995)].
II. QUASI-DELICT
Elements: [PNR v. Brunty, G.R. No. 169891
(2006)]
(a) Damage to the plaintiff
(b) Negligence by act/omission of the defendant
(c) Connection of the cause and effect between
the fault/negligence of the defendant and the
damage incurred by the plaintiff.
A. NEGLIGENCE
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the
obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of
the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and
of the place. When negligence shows bad
faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the
diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required.
Negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing
of something which a prudent and reasonable
man would not do [Layugan v. IAC, G.R. No.
73998 (1988)].
The diligence with which the law requires the
individual to at all times govern his conduct
varies with the nature of the situation in which he
is placed and the importance of the act which he
is to perform [Jorge v Sicam, G.R. No. 159617
(2007)].
To determine whether there has been
negligence by the defendant, this 2-step
analysis may be used: 1) determine the
diligence required of the actor under the
circumstances, and 2) determine whether the
actor has performed the diligence required.
Failing the second step would lead to the
conclusion that the defendant has been
negligent.
By jumping into the sea, the employee failed to
exercise even slight care and diligence and
displayed a reckless disregard of the safety of
his person. His death was caused by his
notorious negligence. Notorious negligence has
been held to be tantamount to gross negligence
which is want of even slight care and diligence
[Ameda v Rio, G.R. No. L-6870 (1954)].
A.1. DEFAULT STANDARD OF CARE: GOOD
FATHER OF A FAMILY
Test: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent man would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he
is negligent. Negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him,
but is determined in the light of human
experience and the facts involved in the
particular case. Conduct is said to be negligent
when a prudent man in the position of the
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to
warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding
against its consequences [Picart v Smith, G.R.
No. L-12219 (1918)].
A.2. STANDARD OF CARE NEEDED IN
SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES
(1) Operators of Motor Vehicles
Because of inherent differences between
motorists and cyclists, the former being
capable of greater speed and destruction,
operators of motor vehicles have a higher
standard in his duty of care [Anonuevo v CA,
G.R. No. 130003 (2004)].
(2) Banks
The law imposes on banks high standards in
view of the fiduciary nature of banking.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8791 (RA
8791), which took effect on 13 June 2000,
declares that the State recognizes the
fiduciary nature of banking that requires
high standards of integrity and performance.
This fiduciary relationship means that the
banks obligation to observe high standards
of integrity and performance is deemed
written into every deposit agreement
between a bank and its depositor. The
fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to
assume a degree of diligence higher than
 that of a good father of a family
[Consolidated Bank v CA, G.R. No. 138569
(2003)].
(3) Experts (In General)
Those who undertake any work calling for
special skills are required not only to
exercise reasonable care in what they do
but also possess a standard minimum of
special knowledge and ability. In all
employments where peculiar skill is
requisite, one who offers his services is
understood as holding himself out to the
public as possessing the degree of skill
commonly possessed by others in the same
employment [Far Eastern Shipping, G.R.
No. 130068 (1998)].
When a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring
professional skill, he will be held liable for
negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and
skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular
work which he attempts to do [Culion v
Philippine Motors, G.R. No 32611 (1930)].
(4) Doctors
Whether or not a physician has committed
an inexcusable lack of precaution in the
treatment of his patient is to be determined
according to the standard of care observed
by other members of the profession in good
standing under similar circumstances
bearing in mind the advanced state of the
profession at the time of treatment of
present state of medical science. It is in this
aspect of medical malpractice that expert
testimony is essential to establish not only
the standard of care of the profession but
also that the physicians conduct in the
treatment and care falls below such
standard [Cruz v CA, GR. No. 122445
(1997)]
(5) Pharmacists
The profession of pharmacy, it has been
said again and again, is one demanding
care and skill. Even under the first
conservative expression, "ordinary care"
with reference to the business of a
druggistmust be held to signify "the
highest practicable degree of prudence,
thoughtfulness, and vigilance, and most
exact and reliable safeguards consistent
with the reasonable conduct of the business
in order that human life may not constantly
be exposed to the danger flowing from the
substitution of deadly poisons for harmless
medicine. [US v Pineda, G.R. No. L-12858
(1918)]
Mistake is negligence and care is no
defense [Mercury Drug v De Leon, G.R. No.
165622 (2008)].
(6) Possessor of Extremely Dangerous
Instrumentalities
[A] higher degree of care is required of
someone who has in his possession or
under his control an instrumentality
extremely dangerous in character, such as
dangerous weapons or substances. Such
person in possession or control of
dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to
take exceptional precautions to prevent any
injury being done thereby. Unlike the
ordinary affairs of life or business which
involve little or no risk, a business dealing
with dangerous weapons requires the
exercise of a higher degree of care [Pacis v
Morales, G.R. No. 169467 (2010)].
(7) Children
The conduct of an infant of tender years is
not to be judged by the same rule, which
governs that of an adult. The care and
caution required of a child is according to his
maturity and capacity only, and this is to be
determined in each case by the
circumstances of the case [Taylor v Manila
Railroad, G.R. No. 4977 (1910)].
No contributory negligence can be imputed
to children below 9 years old [Jarco
Marketing v CA, G.R. No. 129792 (1999)].
The degree of care required to be exercised
must vary with the capacity of the person
 endangered to care for himself. The
standard of conduct to which a child must
conform for his own protection is that degree
of care ordinarily exercised by children of
the same age, capacity, discretion,
knowledge and experience under the same
or similar circumstances [Ylarde v Aquino,
G.R. No. L-33722 (1988)].
A.3. PRESUMPTIONS OF NEGLIGENCE
i. IN MOTOR VEHICLE MISHAPS
(1) Liability of the owner
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the
owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the
former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by
the use of the due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. xxx
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the
provisions of article 2180 are applicable.
Art. 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall
file with the proper government office a bond
executed by a government-controlled
corporation or office, to answer for damages to
third persons. The amount of the bond and
other terms shall be fixed by the competent
public official.
Owner shall mean the actual legal owner of
the motor vehicle, in whose name such vehicle
is duly registered with the LTO. Registration of
motor vehicles is required not because it is the
operative act which transfers ownership in
vehicles, but because it is the means by which
the owner can be identified so that if any
accident occurs, or damage or injury is caused
in the operation of the vehicle, responsibility can
be fixed.
The owner is solidarily liable with the driver for
motor vehicle mishaps when:
(a) The owner was IN the vehicle at the
time, AND
(b) The owner could have, by the use of
due diligence, prevented the misfortune.
Note: If the owner was NOT inside the vehicle,
Art. 2180 applies.
The presumption is against the owner of the
motor vehicle. He has the burden of proving due
diligence. Thus, once a driver is proven
negligent in causing damage, the law presumes
the vehicle owner equally negligent and imposes
upon the latter the burden of proving proper
selection and supervision of employee as a
defense.
As held in Vargas v. Langcay [G.R. No. 17459
(1962)], the registered owner/operator of a
passenger vehicle is jointly and severally liable
with the driver for damages incurred by
passengers or third persons as a consequence
of injuries or death sustained in the operation of
said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual
owner of a vehicle is, the operator of record
continues to be the operator of the vehicle as
regards the public and third persons and as
such is directly and primarily responsible for the
consequences incident to its operation, so that
in contemplation of law, such owner/operator of
record is the employer of the driver, the actual
operator and employer being considered merely
as his agent.
The registered owner of a motor vehicle is
primarily liable for the damage or injury caused
to another, but he has a right to be indemnified
by the real owner of the amount he was required
to pay. This rule applies both to private and to
common carriers with respect to their
passengers [Tamayo v Aquino, G.R. No. L-
12634 (1959)].
The law does not require that a person must
possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency
either in the mechanics of driving or in the
observance of traffic rules before he may own a
motor vehicle. The test of his negligence, within
the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to
do that which the evidence of his own senses
tells him he should do in order to avoid the
accident. And as far as perception is concerned,
absent a minimum level imposed by law, a
maneuver that appears to be fraught with
danger to one passenger may appear to be
entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were
the law to require a uniform standard of
perceptiveness, employment of professional
drivers by car owners who, by their very
inadequacies, have real need of drivers'
services, would be effectively proscribed [Caedo
v Yu Khe Tai, G.R. No. L-20392 (1968)].
The owner of the motor vehicle is not liable for
the misfortune unless the negligent acts of the
driver are continued for such a length of time as
to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to
observe them and to direct his driver to desist
therefrom. The act complained of must be
continued in the presence of the owner for such
a length of time that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his drivers act his own
[Chapman v Underwood, G.R. No. L-9010
(1914)].
(2) Liability of the driver
Art. 2184. xxx It is disputably presumed that a
driver was negligent, if he had been found
guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next
preceding two months.
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary,
it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Article 2184 establishes a presumption of
negligence on the part of the driver based on
previous violations of traffic regulations. Article
2185 establishes a presumption of negligence
on the basis of simultaneous violations.
Despite the presumption of negligence arising
from the traffic regulation violation, the claimant
must still prove that such negligence was the
proximate cause in order to successfully claim
for damages [Sanitary Steam v CA, G.R. No.
119092 (1998)].
Article 2185 was not formulated to compel or
ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and
regulations. It does not apply to non-motorized
vehicles, in recognition of the unequal footing of
standards applicable to motor vehicles as
opposed to other types of vehicles [Aonuevo v.
CA, supra].
ii. POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS WEAPONS
OR SUBSTANCES
Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of
negligence if the death or injury results from
his possession of dangerous weapons or
substances, such as firearms and poison,
except when the use or possession thereof is
indispensable in his occupation or business.
iii. COMMON CARRIERS
Art. 1735. In all cases other than those
mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the
preceding article (calamity, act of public
enemy in war, act of owner of the goods,
character of the goods, order of competent
public authority), if the goods are lost
destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as required
under Art. 1733.
Art. 1752. Even when there is an agreement
limiting the liability of the common carrier in
the vigilance over the goods, the common
carrier is disputably presumed to have been
negligent in case of their loss, destruction or
deterioration.
iv. RES IPSA LOQUITUR
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or
the transaction speaks for itself) is a rule of
evidence (not of substantive law) peculiar to the
law of negligence. The doctrine treats the injury
itself as proof of negligence.
Elements: [Ramos v. CA, G.R. No. 124354
(1999)]
(a) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of someones
negligence;
(b) It is caused by an instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and
(c) The possibility of contributing conduct, which
would make the plaintiff responsible, is
eliminated.
Basis
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part
upon the theory that the defendant in charge of
the instrumentality which causes the injury either
knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff
has no such knowledge, and therefore is
compelled to allege negligence in general terms
and to rely upon the proof of the happening of
the accident in order to establish negligence
[DM Consunji v. CA, G.R. No. 137873 (2001)].
Effect
The fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken
with the surrounding circumstances, raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a
plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an
explanation [Ramos v CA, supra].
In medical malpractice cases, when the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the
need for expert medical testimony is dispensed
with because the injury itself provides the proof
of negligence. The reason is that the general
rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies
only to such matters clearly within the domain of
medical science, and not to matters that are
within the common knowledge of mankind which
may be testified to by anyone familiar with the
facts.
Note: For the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply,
it must appear that the injured party had no
knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or
that the party to be charged with negligence has
superior knowledge or opportunity for
explanation of the accident.
A.4. PERSONS LIABLE
(1) The direct tortfeasor
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. xxx
The tortfeasor may be a natural or juridical
person. For natural persons, apply requisites of
Art. 2176 and for juridical persons, apply
vicarious liability provisions.
(2) Persons vicariously liable
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for ones own
acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage.
Also referred to as the doctrine of imputed
negligence. The rationale is to extend liability by
legal fiction to those in a position to exercise
absolute or limited control over the direct
tortfeasor. The doctrine does not apply where
moral culpability can be imputed directly, as
when there is actual intent to cause harm to
others.
The liability of the vicarious obligor is primary
and direct (solidarily liable with the tortfesor),
not subsidiary. His responsibility is not
conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior
recourse against the negligent tortfeasor.
Under Article 2180
Persons Actor
Vicariously Liable
Father and, in Minor children who live in
case of his death their company
or incapacity, the
mother
Guardians Minors or incapacitated
persons who are under
their authority and live in
their company
Owners and Employees in the service of
managers of an the branches in which the
establishment or latter are employed or on
enterprise the occasion of their
functions
Employers Employees and household
helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in
any business or industry
State Special agent
Teachers or heads Pupils and students or
of establishments apprentices, so long as
of arts and trades they remain in their custody
(a) Persons exercising parental authority
Art. 2180 (2). The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
FC, Art. 221. Parents and other persons
exercising parental authority shall be civilly
liable for the injuries and damages caused by
the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate
defenses provided by law.
FC, Art. 216. In default of parents or a
judicially appointed guardian, the following
person shall exercise substitute parental
authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in
Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-
one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-
one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial
guardian over the property of the child
becomes necessary, the same order of
preference shall be observed.
FC, Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned
neglected or abused children and other
children similarly situated, parental authority
shall be entrusted in summary judicial
proceedings to heads of children's homes,
orphanages and similar institutions duly
accredited by the proper government agency.
Art 2180, par 2 of the Civil Code which holds the
father liable for damages has been modified by
the Family Code and PD 603. Art. 211 of the FC
declares joint parental authority of the mother
and father over common children. The parent(s)
exercising parental authority are liable for the
torts of their children.
Who are liable for minors?
(1) Parents/Adoptive parents
(2) Court-appointed guardians
(3) Substitute Parental Authorities
(a) Grandparents
(b) Oldest qualified sibling over 21 years old
(c) Childs actual custodian, provided he is
qualified and over 21 years old.
(4) Special Parental Authorities
(a) School
(b) Administrators
(c) Teachers
(d) Individual, entity, or institution engaged
in child care
Illegitimate children
Responsibility is with the mother whom the law
vests with parental authority.
Basis of liability of parents and adopters
Parental liability is anchored upon parental
authority coupled with presumed parental
dereliction in the discharge of the duties
accompanying such authority. The parental
dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the
presumption can be overturned under Article
2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents
had exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent the damage [Tamargo v.
CA, G.R. No. 85044 (1992)].
Meaning of Minority
Par. 2 and 3 of Art. 2180 speak of minors.
Minors here refer to those who are below 21
years of age, not below 18 years. The law
reducing the majority age from 21 to 18 years
old did not amend these paragraphs. Basis is
FC, Art. 236 (3), as amended by RA 6809,
provides, Nothing in this Code shall be
construed to derogate from the duty or
responsibility of parents and guardians for
children and wards below 21 years of age
mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of
2180 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2180 (3). Guardians are liable for
damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live in their company.
The liability of guardians with respect to their
wards is governed by the same rule as in the
liability of parents with respect to their children
below 21 years and who live with them
Incompetent includes (Rule 92, ROC):
(1) Those suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction,
(2) Prodigals,
(3) Deaf and dumb who are unable to read and
write
(4) Unsound mind, even though they have lucid
intervals
(5) Being of sound mind, but by reason of age,
disease, weak mind, and other similar
causes, cannot take care of themselves or
manage their property
Liability of minor or insane tortfeasor without
a parent or guardian
He shall be answerable with his own property in
an action against him where a guardian ad litem
shall be appointed. [Art. 2182]
(b) Teachers and schools
Art. 2180 (7). Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
FC, Art. 218. The school, its administrators
and teachers, or the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child are shall have
special parental authority and responsibility
over the minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all
authorized activities whether inside or outside
the premises of the school, entity or institution.
FC, Art. 219. Those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article shall
be principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial
guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be
subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in
the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is
proved that they exercised the proper
diligence required under the particular
circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the
preceding articles shall be governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
Under Article 2180, the teacher is liable for the
acts or omissions of the pupils and students,
and so is the head of establishment of arts and
trades for the apprentices, so long as they
remain in custody, regardless of age. Under the
Family Code, liability attaches to the school, its
administrators and teachers, or the individual or
entity engaged in child care, so long as the child
is under their supervision, instruction, or custody,
and the child is below 18 years old.
Basis of liability of teachers and heads of
establishments of arts and trades
They stand, to a certain extent, in loco parentis
and are called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the child.
Custody means the protective and supervisory
custody that the school, its head and teachers
exercise over the pupils, for as long as they are
in attendance in school, which includes recess
time [Palisoc v. Brillantes, G.R. No. L-29025
(1971)].
As long as it is shown that the student is in the
school premises pursuant to a legitimate student
objective, in the exercise of a legitimate right, or
the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege,
the responsibility of the school authorities over
the student continues [Amadora v CA, G.R. No.
L-47745 (1988)].
(c) Owners/managers of
establishments/employers
Art. 2180 (4). The owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Art. 2180 (5). Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former
are not engaged in any business or industry.
Owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise does not include a manager of a
corporation. (Spanish term directores connotes
employer. But manager of a corporation is not
an employer, but rather merely an employee of
the owner.) [Philippine Rabbit v. Philam
Forwarders, G.R. No. L-25142 (1975)].
The liability imposed upon employers with
respect to damages occasioned by the
negligence of their employees to whom they are
not bound by contract is based on the
employers own negligence, such as when he
places a powerful automobile in the hands of a
servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the
method of managing such vehicle [Cangco v.
Manila Railroad, supra].
This Court still employs the "control test" to
determine the existence of an employer-
employee relationship between hospital and
doctor. Under the "control test", an employment
relationship exists between a physician and a
hospital if the hospital controls both the means
and the details of the process by which the
physician is to accomplish his task. The Court
earlier ruled that there was employer-employee
relationship between the doctor and employee
but reversed itself upon motion for
reconsideration. They still held the hospital liable
on the basis of agency and corporate
responsibility [Professional Services v. CA and
Agana, G.R. No. 126297 (2010)].
Within the scope of their assigned task in Art.
2180 includes any act done by an employee in
furtherance of the interests, or for the account of
the employer at the time of the infliction of the
injury or damage [Filamer v CA, G.R. No. 75112
(1990)].
Basis of liability
Employers negligence in
(1) The selection of their employees (culpa in
eligiendo)
(2) The supervision over their employees (culpa
in vigilando)
Presumption of Negligence
The presentation of proof of the negligence of its
employee gives rise to the presumption that the
defendant employer did not exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees
[Lampesa v. De Vera, G.R. No. 155111 (2008)].
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE 4TH AND 5TH
PARAGRAPHS OF ART. 2180
A distinction must be made between the two
provisions to determine what is applicable. Both
provisions apply to employers: the fourth
paragraph, to owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise; and the fifth
paragraph, to employers in general, whether or
not engaged in any business or industry. The
fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of
employees committed either in the service of the
branches or on the occasion of their functions,
while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent
acts of employees acting within the scope of
their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of
the former in both employer coverage and acts
included. Negligent acts of employees, whether
or not the employer is engaged in a business or
industry, are covered so long as they were
acting within the scope of their assigned task,
even though committed neither in the service of
the branches nor on the occasion of their
functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes
wear different hats. They perform functions
which are beyond their office, title or designation
but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of
duty [Castilex Industrial Corp. v. Vasquez, G.R.
No. (1999)].
DEFENSE OF DILIGENCE IN SELECTION AND
SUPERVISION
Due diligence in the supervision of employees
includes the formulation of suitable rules and
regulations for the guidance of employees and
the issuance of proper instructions intended for
the protection of the public and persons with
whom the employer has relations through his or
her employees and the imposition of necessary
disciplinary measures upon employees in case
of breach or as may be warranted to ensure
performance of acts as indispensable to the
business of and beneficial to their employee
[Metro Manila Transit v. CA, G.R. No. 104408
(1993)].
Due diligence in the selection of employees
require that the employer carefully examined the
applicant for employment as to his qualifications,
his experience and record of service.
Criminal Negligence
The vicarious liability of the employer for criminal
negligence of his employee is governed by RPC
103. Conviction of the employee conclusively
binds the employer. Defense of due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee is
not available. The employer cannot appeal the
conviction [Fernando v. Franco (1971)].
Note: The liability of the employer under Art. 103
RPC is subsidiary.
Registered Owner Rule
The registered owner of the vehicle is primarily
responsible to the public for whatever damage
or injury the vehicle may have caused, even if
he had already sold the same to someone else.
The policy is the easy identification of the owner
who can be held responsible so as not to
inconvenience or prejudice the third party injured
[Cadiente v. Macas (2008)]. The registered
owner, however, has the right to be indemnified
by the real or actual owner of the amount that he
may be required to pay as damages for the
injury caused to the plaintiff [Orix Metro Leasing
v. Mangalinan (2012)]. This rule applies even if
the vehicle is leased to third persons. The
liability of the registered owner is subject to his
right of recourse against the transferee or buyer.
(d) The State
1987 Constitution, Art. XVI, Sec. 3. The State
may not be sued without its consent.
Art. 2180 (3). The State is responsible in like
manner when it acts through a special agent;
but not when the damage has been caused by
the official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in
Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Instances where the State gives its consent
to be sued
(1) Art. 2180 (6) is an example of an express
legislative consent. Here, the State assumes
a limited liability for the acts of its special
agents.
(2) Art. 2189 provides for state liability for
damages caused by defective condition of
public works.
(3) Local Government Code provides for the
liability of local government units for
wrongful exercise of its proprietary (as
opposed to its governmental) functions. The
latter is the same as that of a private
corporation or individual. [Mendoza v. De
Leon (1916)]
A special agent is one who receives a definite
and fixed order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official. This concept does not apply to
any executive agent who is an employee of the
active administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which are
inherent in and naturally pertain to his office
[Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands,
G.R. No. 11154 (1960)].
A corporate body performing non-governmental
functions becomes liable for the damage caused
by the accident resulting from the tortious act of
its driver-employee. Such corporate body
assumes the responsibility of an ordinary
employer and as such, becomes answerable for
damages [Fontanilla v. Maliaman, G.R. No.
55963 (1991)].
(3) Joint tortfeasors
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for quasi-delict is
solidary.
Definition of Joint Tortfeasors
They are all persons who command, instigate,
promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet in the commission of a
tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done
for their benefit [Filipinas Broadcasting Network
v. AMEC-BCCM, G.R. No. 141994 (2005)].
Applicability of the provision
The provision applies when there are 2 or more
persons who have participated in the
commission of a single quasi-delict. The injury
must be indivisible.
B. CAUSE
Concept of Proximate Cause
In order that civil liability for negligence may
arise, there must be a direct causal connection
between the damage suffered by the plaintiff and
the act or omission of the defendant.
Where the particular harm sustained was
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the
defendants misconduct, his act or omission is
the legal cause thereof. Foreseeability is the
fundamental basis of the law of negligence. To
be negligent, the defendant must have acted or
failed to act in such a way that an ordinary
reasonable man would have realized that certain
interests of certain persons were reasonably
subjected to a general but definite class of risks.
[JARENCIO]
Two definitions of proximate cause:
(1) Proximate cause immediately resulting in
injury: defined as that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred [Bataclan v. Medina,
G.R. No. 10126 (1957)].
(2) Proximate cause not immediately
resulting in injury but sets in motion a
chain of events, also known as
Proximate Legal Cause: that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment
of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom
[Bataclan v. Medina, supra].
Differentiated from:
(1) Concurrent Cause Several causes
producing the injury, and each is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not
have happened. The injury is attributed to
any or all the causes, and recovery may be
had against any or all of those responsible.
As a general rule, that negligence in order to
render a person liable need not be the sole
cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his
negligence, concurring with one or more
efficient causes other than the plaintiffs, is
the proximate cause of the injury. Where the
concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omissions of two or more persons, although
acting independently, are in combination the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury
to a third person, it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury. Where their
 concurring negligence resulted in injury or
damage to a third party, they become joint
tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the
resulting damage [Far Eastern Shipping v.
CA, G.R. No. 130068 (1998)].
(2) Remote Cause a cause which would have
been a proximate cause, had there been no
efficient intervening cause after it and prior
to the injury.
A prior and remote cause cannot be made
the basis of an action if such remote cause
did nothing more than furnish the condition
or give rise to the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the
injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though
such injury would not have happened but for
such condition or occasion [Manila Electric
v. Remonquillo, G.R. No. L-8328 (1956)].
(3) Intervening Cause
The test of determining whether or not the
intervening cause is sufficient to absolve a
prior cause of the injury is as follows:
whether the intervention of a later cause is a
significant part of the risk involved in the
defendants conduct, or is so reasonable
connected with it that the responsibility
should not be terminated. In the affirmative,
such foreseeable intervening forces are
within the scope of the original risk, and
hence of the defendants negligence. In the
negative, there exists an efficient intervening
cause that relieves the defendant of liability.
If the intervening cause is one which in
ordinary human experience is reasonably to
be anticipated, or one which the defendant
has reason to anticipate under the particular
circumstances, the defendant may be
negligent, among other reasons, because of
failure to guard against it. There is an
intervening cause combining with the
defendants conduct to produce the result,
and the defendants negligence consists in
failure to protect the plaintiff against that
very risk [Phoenix Construction v. IAC, G.R.
No. L-65295 (1987)].
Tests to Determine Proximate Cause
(1) But for / Sine qua non rule
Whether such negligent conduct is a cause
without which the injury would not have
occurred or is the efficient cause which set
in motion the chain of circumstances leading
to the injury. [Bataclan v. Medina, supra]
(2) Sufficient link
The Supreme Court has adopted a
relaxation of the but for test in Dy Teban v.
Jose Ching [G.R. No. 161803 (2008)].
Plaintiff, however, must establish a sufficient
link between the act or omission and the
damage or injury. That link must not be
remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability
will attach. The damage or injury must be a
natural and probable result of the act or
omission.
(3) Substantial factor
If the actors conduct is a substantial factor
in bringing about harm to another, the fact
that the actor neither foresees nor should
have foreseen the harm or the manner in
which it occurred, does not prevent him from
being liable. [Philippine Rabbit v. IAC, G.R.
No. L-66102-04 (1990)]
(4) Mixed considerations
There is no exact formula to determine
probable cause. It is based upon mixed
considerations of logic, common sense,
policy and precedent [Dy Teban v. Jose
Ching, supra].
(5) Cause v. condition
The distinction between cause and condition
has already been almost entirely discredited.
So far as it has any validity at all, it must
refer to the type of case where the forces set
in operation by the defendant have come to
rest in a position of apparent safety, and
some new force intervense. But even in
such cases, it is not the distinction between
cause and condition which is important,
but the nature of the risk and the character
of the intervening cause [Phoenix
Construction v. IAC, supra].
(6) Last clear chance
 The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
Also known as: "doctrine of discovered peril
or doctrine of supervening negligence or
humanitarian doctrine.
The antecedent negligence of the plaintiff
does not preclude him from recovering
damages caused by the supervening
negligence of the defendant, who had the
last fair chance to prevent the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence [PNR
v. Brunty, supra].
If both parties are found to be negligent; but,
their negligence are not contemporaneous,
the person who has the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and fails to do so
is chargeable with the consequences,
without reference to the prior negligence of
the other party [Picart v Smith, supra].
Simply stated, it covers successive acts of
negligence:
Primary negligence of the
defendant
Contributory negligence of the
plaintiff
Subsequent negligence of the
defendant in failing to avoid the
injury to the plaintiff
Note:
If plaintiff is the proximate cause: no recovery
can be made.
If plaintiff is not the proximate cause:
Recovery can be made but such will be
mitigated.
If negligence of parties is equal in degree,
then each bears his own loss.
The doctrine of last clear chance finds no
application in a case where the proximate cause
of the injury has been established [PNR v
Brunty, supra].
The doctrine is not applicable in the
following cases:
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply
in a case of culpa contractual, where neither the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his
last clear chance to avoid the loss, would
exonerate the defendant from liability. Such
contributory negligence or last clear chance by
the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery
of damages by the plaintiff but does not
exculpate the defendant from his breach of
contract [Consolidated Bank v. CA, G.R. No.
138569 (2003)].
Last clear chance applies only if the person who
allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the
accident was aware of the existence of peril or
should, with exercise of due care, have been
aware of it. The doctrine can never apply where
the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by application of all means at hand after
the peril is or should have been discovered
[Pantranco v. Baesa, G.R. No. 79051-51(1989)].
The doctrine of last clear chance applies in a
suit between the owners and drivers of colliding
vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger
demands responsibility from the carrier to
enforce its contractual obligations. It will be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the
jeepney and its owners on the ground that the
other driver was likewise guilty of negligence
[Bustamante v. CA, G.R. No. 89880 (1991)].
C. DEFENSES
C.1. DUE DILIGENCE TO PREVENT THE
DAMAGE UNDER ARTICLE 2180
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for ones own
acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
(8) The responsibility treated of in this article
shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
The presumption of negligence on the part of the
master or employer, either in the selection of
servant/employee or in the supervision, when an
injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant/employee may be rebutted if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court
that in the selection and supervision, he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family [Ramos v. PEPSI, G.R. No. L-
22533 (1967)].
C.2. ACTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
When what is involved is a duty owing to the
public in general, an individual cannot have a
cause of action the public officer although he
may have been injured by the action or inaction
of the officer, except when the individual suffers
a particular or special injury [Vinzons-Chato v
Fortun, G.R. No. 141309 (2008)].
C.3. AUTHORITY OF LAW
Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of
mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
except when the law itself authorizes their
validity.
RPC, Art. 11. The following do not incur any
criminal liability:
(5) Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office
(8) Any person who acts in obedience to an
order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose
C.4. DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA
There can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty.
Right to recover damages does not arise from
the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses. To
warrant the recovery of damages, there must be
both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted
by the defendant, and damage resulting to the
plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or
damage without wrong, does not constitute a
cause of action, since damages are merely part
of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a
breach or wrong [Custodio v. CA, G.R. No.
116100 (1996)].
Damage
Injury Damages
Illegal invasion Loss, hurt, Recompense
of a legal right harm resulting or
from the injury compensation
awarded
One who made use of his own legal right does
no injury, thus, whatever damages are caused to
another should be borne solely by him under the
principle of damnum absque injuria. This
principle, however, does not apply when there is
an abuse in the exercise of a persons right
[Amonoy v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 140420 (2001)]
C.5. PLAINTIFFS NEGLIGENCE IS THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence
was the proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. xxx
This defense of plaintiffs negligence as
proximate cause is absolute, for it bars recovery
on the part of the plaintiff. In Manila Electric v.
Remoquillo, supra, the Court did not allow
recovery by Magno, ruling that his death was
primarily caused by his own negligence and in
some measure by the too close proximity of the
media agua to the electric wire.
If the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own
carelessness contributed to the principal
occurrence, that is, to the accident, as one of the
determining causes thereof, he cannot recover
[Bernardo v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 9308 (1914)].
C.6. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE
PLAINTIFF
Art. 2179. xxx But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant's lack
of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
Art. 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the
damages that he may recover.
Contributory negligence is defined as conduct
on the part of the injured party, which contributed
as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection
[Valenzuela v. CA, GR. No. 115024 (1996)].
Contributory negligence does not defeat an
action if it can be shown that the defendant
might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of
the injured party's negligence. Where the plaintiff
contributes to the principal occurrence as one of
its determining factors, he cannot recover.
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributes only to his own injury, he may
recover the amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should pay for such
injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent
for his own imprudence [MH Rakes v. Atlantic,
G.R. No. L-1719 (1907)].
The defense of contributory negligence does not
apply in criminal cases committed through
reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege
the negligence of another to evade the effects of
his own negligence [Genobiagon v. CA, G.R. No.
40452 (1989)].
C.7. FORTUITOUS EVENT
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified
by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person
shall be responsible for those events which,
could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, were inevitable.
Elements of caso fortuito [Juntilla v. Fontanar,
G.R. No. L-45637 (1985)]:
(a) The cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of
the debtor to comply with his obligation,
must be independent of the human will;
(b) It must be impossible to foresee the event or
if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to
avoid;
(c) The occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and
(d) The obligor must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor.
C.8. PLAINTIFFS ASSUMPTION OF RISK /
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (that to
which a person assents is not presumed in law
as injury) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the
consent to injury which precludes the recovery
of damages by one who has knowingly and
voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he
is not negligent in doing so. This is so because,
in theory, the plaintiffs acceptance of the risk
has wiped out the defendants duty, and as to
the plaintiff the defendants negligence is not a
legal wrong.
Requisites:
(a) That the plaintiff had actual knowledge of
the danger;
(b) That he understood and appreciated the risk
from the danger; and
(c) That he voluntarily exposed himself to such
risk
The defense is not applicable in the following
cases:
A person is excused from the force of the rule
(volenti non fit injuria), that when he voluntarily
assents to a known danger he must abide by the
consequences, if an emergency is found to exist
or if the life or property of another is in peril or
when he seeks to rescue his endangered
property [Ilocos Norte v. CA, G.R. No. 53401
(1989)].
The doctrine does not find application to the
case because even if respondent Reyes
assumed the risk of being asked to leave the
pary, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code, were still under the obligation to treat
him fairly in order not to expose him to
unnecessary ridicule and shame [Nikko Hotel v.
Roberto Reyes, G.R. No. 154259 (2005)].
C.9. PRESCRIPTION
Art. 1146. The following actions must be
instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict;
However, when the action arises from or out of
any act, activity, or conduct of any public
officer involving the exercise of powers or
authority arising from Martial Law including the
arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the
same must be brought within one (1) year.
Art. 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds
of actions, when there is no special provision
which ordains otherwise, shall be counted
from the day they may be brought.
Prescription periods:
4 years for quasi-delict
1 year for defamation
It is clear that the prescriptive period must be
counted when the last element occurs or takes
place, the time of the commission of an act or
omission violative of the right of the plaintiff,
which is the time when the cause of action
arises. Thus, the prescription period begins from
the day the quasi-delict is committed [Kramer v.
CA, G.R. No. 83524 (1989)].
C.10. WAIVER
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial
to a third person with a right recognized by
law.
Art. 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is
demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of
an action for future fraud is void.
C.11. EMERGENCY RULE OR SUDDEN PERIL
DOCTRINE
An individual, who suddenly finds himself in a
situation of danger and is required to act without
much time to consider the best means that may
be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is
not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake
what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to be a better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his own negligence
[Valenzuela v. CA, supra].
III. INTENTIONAL TORTS
Liability for personal acts or omission is founded
on that indisputable principle of justice
recognized by all legislators that when a person
by his act or omission causes damage or
prejudice to another, a juridical relation is
created by virtue of which the injured person
acquires a right to be indemnified and the
person causing the damage is charged with the
corresponding duty of repairing the damage. The
reason for this is found in the obvious truth that
man should subordinate his acts to the precepts
of prudence and if he fails to observe them and
cause damage to another, he must repair the
damage [MANRESA].
A. HUMAN RELATIONS TORTS
A.1. ABUSE OF RIGHT
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Generally, the exercise of any right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was
established. It must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to injure
another.
There is abuse of right when:
(1) The right is exercised for the only purpose of
prejudicing or injuring another
(2) The objective of the act is illegitimate
(3) There is an absence of good faith
Elements [Albenson v. CA, G.R. No. 88694
(1993)]:
(a) There is a legal right or duty;
(b) Which is exercised in bad faith;
(c) For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.
Case Legal Right and Injury Doctrine
Velayo v. Shell Right to transfer credit. The standards in NCC 19 are
(1959) The transfer of credit from Shell Philippines implemented by NCC 21.
to Shell USA was deemed a violation of
NCC 21 as it allowed Shell to attach
properties of their creditor CALI to the
prejudice of its other creditors.
Globe v. CA (1989) Right to dismiss an employee. When a right is exercised in a
The dismissal itself was not illegal but it manner which does not conform with
was the manner of dismissal which was the norms in NCC 19, and results in
deemed in violation of Article 19, as such damage to another, a legal wrong is
was based on unfounded accusations of thereby committed. The law,
dishonesty. therefore, recognizes a primordial
limitation on all rights.
University of the Academic freedom. The conscious indifference of a
East v. Jader (2000) The conscious indifference of the school in person to the rights or welfare of the
not informing its student that he could not others who may be affected by his
graduate formed the basis for the award of act or omission can support a claim
damages. for damages.
Amonoy v. Gutierrez Right to demolish anothers house on his The principle of damnum absque
(2001) own property. injuria does not apply when the
Amonoy obtained a judgment in his favor exercise of the legal right is
for Gutierrez to vacate. A demolition order suspended or extinguished pursuant
was issued but the court suspended it with to a court order. The exercise of a
a TRO. Amonoy proceeded with the right ends when the right disappears,
demolition. In a complaint for damages, he and it disappears when it is abused,
claims the principle of damnum absque especially to the prejudice of others.
injuria.
Nikko Hotel Manila Right to forbid uninvited guests from Article 19, known to contain what is
Garden v. Reyes entering the party. commonly referred to as the principle
(2005) Ruby Lims throwing out of complainant of abuse of rights, is not a panacea
Reyes, as a gatecrasher in a private party, for all human hurts and social
was merely in exercise of her duties as grievances. The object of this article
Executive Secretary of the hotel where the is to set certain standards which
party was held, and did not constitute a must be observed not only in the
violation of Article 19. exercise of ones rights but also in
the performance of ones duties.

A.2. ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
The provision is intended to provide a remedy in
cases where the law declares an act illegal but
fails to provide for a relief to the party injured.
[JARENCIO]
NCC 20 does not distinguish, and the act may
be done willfully or negligently.
Requisites
(a) The act must be willful or negligent;
(b) It must be contrary to law; and
(c) Damages must be suffered by the injured
party.
Salvador was misdiagnosed with Hepatitis, as a
result of which she lost her job. During trial, it
was proven that the clinic was operating under
substandard conditions, in violation of the
Clinical Laboratory Law, DOH Administrative
Order No. 49-B, and the Philippine Medical
Technology Act of 1969. The Court held that
violation of a statutory duty is negligence, and
that Article 20 provides the legal basis for award
of damages to a party who suffers damage
whenever one commits an act in violation of
some legal provision [Garcia v. Salvador, G.R.
No. 168512 (2007)].
A.3. ACTS CONTRARY TO MORALS
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
This article is designed to expand the concept
of torts and quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in statute books. [Baksh v. CA, supra].
Elements: [Albenson v. CA, supra].
(a) There is an act which is legal;
(b) But which is contrary to morals, good
customs, and public policy; and
(c) It is done with intent to injure.
Examples of acts contrary to morals:
(1) Breach of Promise to Marry and Moral
Seduction
Mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-
described preparation and publicity, only to
walk out of it when the matrimony is about to
be solemnized, is quite different. This is
palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
customs xxx [Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-
20089 (1964)].
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact
the proximate cause of the acceptance of
his love by a woman and his representation
to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto
him in a sexual congress, proof that he had,
in reality, no intention of marrying her and
that the promise was only a subtle scheme
or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her
to accept him and to obtain her consent to
the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because
of such promise to marry but because of the
fraud and deceit behind it and the willful
injury to her honor and reputation. It is
essential, however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy
[Baksh v. CA, supra].
However, when for one whole year, the
plaintiff, a woman of legal age, maintained
sexual relations with the defendant, with
repeated acts of intercourse, there is here
voluntariness. No case under Article 21 is
made [Tanjanco v. CA, G.R. No. L-18630
(1966)].
(2) Malicious Prosecution
Malicious prosecution is the institution of any
action or proceeding, either civil or criminal,
maliciously and without probable cause.
Elements: [Magbanua v. Junsay, G.R.
No.132659 (2007)]
 (a) The fact of the prosecution or that the
prosecution did occur and that the
defendant was himself the prosecutor or
that he instigated its commencement;
(b) That the action finally terminated with an
acquittal;
(c) That in bringing the action, the
prosecutor acted without probable
cause
(d) That the prosecutor was actuated or
impelled by legal malice, that is, by
improper or sinister motive.
The mere dismissal of the criminal complaint
by the fiscals office did not create a cause
of action for malicious prosecution, because
the proceedings therein did not involve an
exhaustive examination of the elements of
malicious prosecution. To constitute such,
there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and
humiliate a person and that it was initiated
deliberately by the defendant knowing that
his charges were false and groundless [Que
v. IAC, G.R. No. 66865 (1989)].
Malicious prosecution involves not only
criminal but civil and administrative suits as
well [Magbanua v. Junsay, supra].
(3) Public Humiliation
Lolitas family filed a case against Alfonse
Pe, a married man, for allegedly seducing
Lolita and causing great damage to the
name of her parents, brothers, and sisters.
The Court sustained the claim, finding an
injury to Lolitas family in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs and public policy
as contemplated in Article 21 of the new
Civil Code [Pe v. Pe, G.R. No. L-17396
(1962)].
It is against morals, good customs and
public policy to humiliate, embarrass and
degrade the dignity of a person. Everyone
must respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons (Article 26, Civil Code) [Grand
Union v. Espino, G.R. No. L-48250 (1979)].
(4) Oppressive Dismissal
The right of an employer to dismiss an
employee is not to be confused with the
manner in which this right is to be exercised
and the effects flowing therefrom. If the
dismissal was done antisocially or
oppressively, then there is a violation of
Article 1701, which prohibits acts of
oppression by either capital or labor against
the other, and Article 21, which makes a
person liable for damages if he willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs, or
public policy. When the manner in which the
company exercised its right to dismiss was
abusive, oppressive and malicious, it is
liable for damages [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines,
G.R. No. L-38000 (1974)].
A.4. UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without
just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.
Art. 23. Even when an act or event causing
damage to anothers property was not due to
the fault or negligence of the defendant, the
latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the
act or event he was benefited.
Art. 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and
unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation
of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall
be unjustly enriched or benefited at the
expense of another.
Art. 2143. The provisions for quasi contracts in
this Chapter do not exclude other quasi-
contracts which may come within the purview
of the preceding article.
One person should not be permitted to unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another, but
should be required to make restitution of, or for
property or benefits received, retained, or
appropriated where it is just and equitable that
such restitution be made, and where such action
involves no violation or frustration of law or
opposition to public policy, either directly or
indirectly.
Enrichment at the expense of another is not per
se forbidden. It is such enrichment without just
or legal cause that is contemplated here. Just
and legal cause is always presumed, and the
plaintiff has the burden of proving its absence.
The restitution must cover the loss suffered by
the plaintiff but it can never exceed the amount
of unjust enrichment of the defendant if it is less
than the loss of the plaintiff.
Requisites:
(a) That the defendant has been enriched;
(b) That the plaintiff has suffered a loss;
(c) That the enrichment of the defendant is
without just or legal ground; and
(d) That the plaintiff has no other action based
on contract, crime or quasi-delict.
A.5. VIOLATION OF HUMAN DIGNITY
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following
and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers
residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life
or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated
from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account
of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life,
place of birth, physical defect, or other
personal condition.
Article 26 specifically applies to intentional acts
which fall short of being criminal offenses. It
itself expressly refers to tortious conduct which
"may not constitute criminal offenses." The
purpose is precisely to fill a gap or lacuna in the
law where a person who suffers injury because
of a wrongful act not constituting a crime is left
without any redress. Under Article 26, the
person responsible for such act becomes liable
for "damages, prevention and other relief." In
short, to preserve peace and harmony in the
family and in the community, Article 26 seeks to
eliminate cases of damnum absque injuria in
human relations [MVRS Publications v. Islamic
Da'wah Council, G.R. No. 135306 (2003)].
The principal rights protected under this
provision are the following:
(1) The right to personal dignity
(2) The right to personal security
(3) The right to family relations
(4) The right to social intercourse
(5) The right to privacy
(6) The right to peace of mind
Note: Coverage of Art. 26 is not limited to those
enumerated therein, the enumeration being
merely examples of acts violative of a persons
rights to dignity, personality, privacy and peace
of mind. Other similar acts are also covered
within the scope of the article.
VIOLATION OF PERSONAL DIGNITY
In order to be actionable it is not necessary that
the act constitutes a criminal offense. The
remedy afforded by the law is not only the
recovery of damages. Prevention and other
relief is also available. In other words, injunction
and other appropriate reliefs may also be
obtained by the aggrieved party.
VIOLATION OF PRIVACY
Privacy is the right to be let alone, or to be free
from unwarranted publicity, or to live without
unwarranted interference by the public in
matters in which the public is not necessarily
concerned. This right is purely personal in
nature, such that it can be invoked only by the
person actually injured, it is subject to a proper
waiver, and it ceases upon death. However, the
privilege may be given to heirs of a deceased to
protect his memory, to protect the feelings of the
living heirs.
Reasonableness of Expectation of Privacy
Test: [Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685 (1998)]
(1) Whether by ones conduct, the individual
has exhibited an expectation of privacy
(2) Whether this expectation is one that society
recognizes and accepts as reasonable
The general rule is that the right to privacy may
only be invoked by natural persons. Juridical
persons cannot invoke this because the basis to
this right is an injury to the feelings and
sensibilities of the injured party, and a
corporation has none of those. The exception is
where the right to privacy is invoked along with
the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. An individuals right to privacy under
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may
extend to places where he has the right to
exclude the public or deny them access [Sps.
Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736 (2013)].
Types of invasion of privacy
(1) Publication of embarrassing private facts
The interest here is the right to be free from
unwarranted publicity, wrongful publicizing of
private affairs and activities, as these are
outside the ambit of legitimate public
concern.
Public figures enjoy a limited right to privacy
as compared to ordinary individuals [Ayer v.
Capulong, G.R. No. 82380 (1988)].
(2) Intrusion upon plaintiffs private affairs
This is not limited to situations where the
wrongdoer physically trespasses into
ones property.
Generally, there is no invasion of privacy
when journalists report something that
occurs in the public realm, except when
the acts of the journalist are to an extent
that it constitutes harassment.
RA 4200: It is illegal for any person not
authorized by both parties to any private
communication to secretly record such
communication.
(3) Publicity which puts one in a false light in the
public eye The interest here is in not being
made or forced to appear before the public
in an objectionable false light or position.
Tort of putting in false
Defamation
light
The embarrassment of Concerns the
a person being reputational harm to a
portrayed as person
something he is not
Statement should be Publication is satisfied
actually made in public even if communicated
to only one specific
third person
(4) Commercial appropriation of likeness of
image It consists of appropriation, for the
defendants benefit or advantage (ex. used
in defendants advertisement), of the
plaintiffs name or likeness (picture or
portrait).
DISTURBANCE OF PEACE OF MIND
The disturbance of the mental and emotional
tranquility of the plaintiff by the defendant is a
legal injury in itself and, therefore, a sufficient
cause of action for damages, injunction, and
other relief. A person, however, cannot be held
liable for damages for the mental or emotional
disturbance of the plaintiff which was due to the
latters susceptibility to such disturbance, where
the defendant had no knowledge of such
peculiar susceptibility. The tendency of the law is
to secure an interest in mental comfort only to
the extent of the ordinary sensibilities of men.
Interference with Relations
An interference with the continuance of
unimpaired interests founded upon the relation
in which the plaintiff stands toward one or more
third persons [Prosser and Keeton].
KINDS:
(1) Family relations
(2) Social relations
(3) Economic relations
(4) Political relations
Family Relations
ALIENATION OF AFFECTION
This is a cause of action in favor of a
husband against one who wrongfully
alienates the affection of his wife, depriving
 him of his conjugal rights to her consortium,
that is, her society, affection, and assistance.
Elements:
(a) Wrongful conduct of the defendant:
intentional and malicious enticing of a
spouse away from the other spouse
(b) Loss of affection or consortium
Note: Complete absence of affection
between the spouses is not a defense.
(c) Causal connection between such
conduct and loss
There is no evidence that the parents of
Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and
abetted her original suit for annulment, or
her subsequent divorce; she appears to
have acted independently, and being of age,
she was entitled to judge what was best for
her and ask that her decisions be respected.
Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be
charged with alienation of affections in the
absence of malice or unworthy motives,
which have not been shown, good faith
being always presumed until the contrary is
proved [Tenchavez v. Escao, G.R. No. L-
19671 (1965)].
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
The plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius also seeks to
recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of
what is called Anglo-Saxon common law
"consortium" of his wife, that is, "her
services, society and conjugal
companionship", as a result of personal
injuries which she had received from the
accident now under consideration. Inasmuch
as a wife's domestic assistance and
conjugal companionship are purely personal
and voluntary acts which neither of the
spouses may be compelled to render, it is
necessary for the party claiming indemnity
for the loss of such services to prove that
the person obliged to render them had done
so before he was injured and that he would
be willing to continue rendering them had he
not been prevented from so doing [Lilius v.
Manila Railroad Company, G.R. No. L-
39587 (1934)].
CRIMINAL CONVERSATION (ADULTERY)
Interference with the marital relations by
committing adultery with one of the spouses.
This is obvious enough in the case of rape
but also applies where the adulterous
spouse consented to or initiated the
intercourse. [PROSSER AND KEETON, p.
917]
Social Relations
(1) Meddling with or disturbing family
relations
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following
and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief;
xxx
2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or
family relations of another;
Developed as an offshoot of the action for
enticing away a servant and depriving the
master of the proprietary interest in [the
servants] services until there has been a
gradual shift of emphasis away from
services and toward a recognition of more
intangible elements in the domestic
relations, such as companionship and
affection. [PROSSER AND KEETON, p. 916]
INTRIGUING TO CAUSE ANOTHER TO BE ALIENATED
FROM HIS FRIENDS
A person who committed affirmative acts
intended to alienate the existing friendship of
one with his friends is liable for damages. A
man is a social being and for being so, he
needs friends to socialize with and to
depend upon in case of need. To alienate
him wrongfully or with malice from his
friends is to cause him suffering for which he
is entitled to damages.
Economic Relations
Art. 1314. Any person who induces another to
violate his contract with another person shall
be liable for damages to the other contracting
party.
Tort liability may be imposed upon a defendant
who intentionally and improperly interferes with
the plaintiffs rights under a contract with another
person if the interference causes the plaintiff to
lose a right under the contract or makes the
contract rights more costly or less valuable. This
law of interference of contract is part of a larger
body of tort law aimed at protection of
relationships [PROSSER AND KEETON].
Elements of tort interference: [So Ping Bun v.
CA, G.R. No. 120554 (1999)]
(a) Existence of a valid contract
(b) Knowledge on the part of the third person of
the existence of contract; and
(c) Interference of the third person is without
legal justification or excuse.
Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and
advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill
and credit. He has no right to be protected
against competition; but he has a right to be free
from malicious and wanton interference,
disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or loss
comes as a result of competition, or the exercise
of like rights by others, it is damnum absque
injuria, unless some superior right by contract or
otherwise is interfered with. Thus, a plaintiff
loses his cause of action if the defendant
provides a sufficient justification for such
interference, which must be an equal or superior
right in themselves. The defendant may not
legally excuse himself on the ground that he
acted on a wrong understanding of his own
rights, or without malice, or bona fide, or in the
best interests of himself [Gilchrist v. Cuddy, G.R.
No. 9356 (1915)].
Bad faith/Malice is required to make the
defendant liable for damages in cases of
tortuous interference [So Ping Bun v. CA, supra].
A.6 DERELICTION OF DUTY
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral
loss because a public servant or employee
refuses or neglects, without just cause, to
perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against the latter,
without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.
This applies only to acts of nonfeasance or the
nonperformance of some acts which a person is
obliged or has responsibility to perform. The duty
of the public servant must be ministerial in
character. If the duty is discretionary, he is not
liable unless he acted in a notoriously arbitrary
manner.
The defense of good faith is not available
because an officer is under constant obligation
to discharge the duties of his office, and it is not
necessary to show that his failure to act was due
to malice or willfulness.
Requisites: [Amaro v. Sumanguit, G.R. No. L-
14986 (1962)]
(a) Defendant is a public officer charged with a
performance of a duty in favor of the plaintiff;
(b) He refused or neglected without just cause
to perform the duty;
(c) Plaintiff sustained material or moral loss as
a consequence of such non-performance;
(d) The amount of such damages, if material.
A.7. UNFAIR COMPETITION
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural,
commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor
through the use of force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or
highhanded method shall give rise to a right of
action by the person who thereby suffers
damage.
B. INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS
Rule 111, Sec. 3, ROC. In the cases provided
for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the independent civil
action may be brought by the offended party. It
shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.
B.1. VIOLATION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable
to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion
(2) Freedom of speech
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to
maintain a periodical publication
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention
(5) Freedom of suffrage
(6) The right against deprivation of property
without due process of law
(7) The right to just compensation when
property is taken for public use
(8) The right to equal protection of the laws
(9) The right to be secure in ones person,
house, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures
(10)The liberty of abode and of changing the
same
(11)The right to privacy of communication and
correspondence
(12)The right to become a member of
associations and societies for purposes
not contrary to law
(13)The right to take part in a peaceable
assembly and petition the government for
redress of grievances
(14)The right to be free from involuntary
servitude in any form
(15)The right of the accused against excessive
bail
(16)The right of the accused to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and the cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, to
have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses on is behalf;
(17)Freedom from being compelled to be a
witness against ones self, or from being
forced to confess his guilt, or from being
induced by a promise of immunity or
reward to make such confession, except
when the person confessing becomes a
State witness.
(18)Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel
and unusual punishment, unless the same
is imposed or inflicted in accordance with
a statute which has not been judicially
declared unconstitutional;
(19)Freedom of access to the courts
In any of the cases referred to in this article,
whether or not the defendants act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved
party has a right to commence an entirely
separate and distinct civil action for damages,
and for other relief. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted) and may
be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages.
Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not
demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal
code or any other penal statute.
Article 32 speaks of a particular specie of an
act that may give rise to an action for damages
against a public officer, and that is, a tort for
impairment of rights and liberties. [Vinzons-
Chato v. Fortune, supra]
Article 32 is clear that not only public officers but
also private individuals can incur civil liability for
violation of rights enumerated therein. Because
the provision speaks of an officer, employee or
person directly or indirectly responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rights and liberties
of another, it is not the actor alone who must
answer for damages under Article 32. It is not
even necessary that the defendant should have
acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it
would defeat its main purpose, which is the
effective protection of individual rights. [Silahis v.
Soluta, G.R. No. 163087 (2006)]
B.2. DEFAMATION, FRAUD, PHYSICAL
INJURIES
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
The civil action for damages that Article 33
allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is
manifest from the provision which uses the
expressions criminal action and criminal
prosecution. Quoting Tolentino, the Court ruled
that this provision is an exception to the general
rule that the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
Where the offense is defamation, fraud, or
physical injuries, a civil action may be filed
independently of the criminal action, even
though no reservation is made [Madeja v. Caro,
G.R. No. 51183 (1983)].
(1) Defamation the offense of injuring a
persons character, fame or reputation
through false or malicious statements.
Defamation is an invasion of a relational
interest since it involves the opinion which
others in the community may have, or tend
to have, of the plaintiff.
Elements of libel pursuant to RPC, Art.
353:
(a) An allegation or imputation of a
discreditable act or condition concerning
another
(b) Publication of the imputation
(c) Identity of the person defamed
(d) Existence of malice
Where the defamation is alleged to have
been directed at a group or class, it is
essential that the statement must be so
sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to
every individual in that group or class, or
sufficiently specific so that each individual in
the class or group can prove that the
defamatory statement was specifically
pointed to him [MVRS Publications, Inc. v.
Islamic, supra].
In determining whether certain utterances
are defamatory, the words used are to be
construed in their entirety and taken in their
plain, natural and ordinary meaning, as they
would naturally be understood by persons
hearing or reading them, unless it appears
that they were used and understood in
another sense. When malice in fact is
proven, assertions and proofs that the
libelous articles are qualifiedly privileged
communications are futile, since being
qualifiedly privileged communications merely
prevents the presumption of malice from
attaching in a defamatory imputation
[Yuchengco v. Manila Chronicle, G.R. No.
184315 (2009)].
(2) Fraud Estafa under RPC, 315; Article 33
does not cover violations of B.P. 22.
(3) Physical Injuries (Assault and Battery)
Battery
Battery is the actual infliction of any unlawful
or unauthorized violence on the person of
another, irrespective of its degree. The law
protects the interest of the individual in
freedom from bodily harm or any impairment
of the physical integrity of the body.
Assault
Assault is an intentional, unlawful offer of
physical injury to another by force unlawfully
directed toward the person of another, under
such circumstances as to create a well-
founded fear of imminent peril, coupled with
the apparent present ability to effectuate the
attempt if not prevented. The law seeks to
protect the interest of the individual in
freedom from offensive bodily touching
although no actual harm is done.
Defamation and fraud (in Art. 33) are used in
their ordinary sense because there are no
specific provisions in the Revised Penal
Code using these terms as names of
offenses defined therein, so that these two
terms defamation and fraud must have been
used not to impart to them any technical
 meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in
their generic sense. With these apparent
circumstances in mind, it is evident that the
term physical injuries could not have been
used in its specific sense as a crime defined
in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult
to believe that the Code Commission would
have used terms in same articlesome in
this general and others in its technical
sense. In other words, the term physical
injuries should be understood to mean
bodily injury, not the crime of physical
injuries, because the terms used with the
latter are general terms [Carandang v.
Santiago and Valenton, G.R. No. L-8238
(1955)].
Paje was acquitted of the charge of
homicide and double serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence on the
ground that the collision was a pure accident
and the negligence charged against him did
not exist. In a separate civil action to enforce
civil liability filed by the heirs of the
deceased, the Court ruled that criminal
negligence is not one of the three crimes
mentioned in Article 33, which authorizes the
institution of an independent civil action.
Although in the case of Dyogi v. Yatco, the
Court held that the term physical injuries
includes homicide, it is borne in mind that
the charge against Paje was for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, and the
law penalizes the negligent or careless act,
not the result thereof [Corpus v. Paje, G.R.
No. L-26737 (1969)].
B.3. NEGLECT OF DUTY
Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal
police force refuses or fails to render aid or
protection to any person in case of danger to
life or property, such peace officer shall be
primarily liable for damages, and the city or
municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible
therefor. The civil action herein recognized
shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of
evidence shall suffice to support such action.
Art. 34 covers a situation where:
(1) There is danger to the life or property of a
person;
(2) A member of a city or municipal police force
who is present in the scene refused or failed
to render aid or protection to the person; and
(3) Damages are caused whether to the person
and/or property of the victim.
Nature of liability
(1) Of the police officer Primary
(2) City or municipality Subsidiary
The defense of having observed the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent the damage
is not available to the city/municipality.
B.4. CATCH-ALL INDEPENDENT CIVIL
ACTION
Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured
by a criminal offense, charges another with the
same, for which no independent civil action is
granted in this Code or any special law, but the
justice of the peace finds no reasonable
grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses
or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the
complaint may bring a civil action for damages
against the alleged offender. Such civil action
may be supported by a preponderance of
evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to
indemnify the defendant in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an
information should be presented by the
prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be
suspended until the termination of the criminal
proceedings.
IV. LIABILITY ATTACHED TO SPECIFIC
PERSONS
A. STRICT LIABILITY
A.1. POSSESSOR OR USER OF ANIMALS
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or
whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may
cause, although it may escape or be lost. This
responsibility shall cease only in case the
damage should come from force majeure or
from the fault of the person who has suffered
damage.
Since the law makes no distinction, this is
applicable to both wild (in case the wild animal is
kept) and domestic animals. It is enough that
defendant is the possessor, owner, or user of the
animal at the time it caused the damage
complained of, to hold him liable therefor.
Possession of the animal, not ownership, is
determinative of liability under Art. 2183. The
obligation imposed by said article is not based
on the negligence or on the presumed lack of
vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal
causing damage. It is based on natural equity
and on the principle of social interest that he
who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure,
or service, must answer for any damage which
such animal may cause. The contention that the
defendant could not be expected to exercise
remote control of the animal is not acceptable. In
fact, Art. 2183 holds the possessor liable even if
the animal should escape or be lost and so be
removed from his control. It is likewise
immaterial that the animal was tame and was
merely provoked by the victim. The law does not
speak only of vicious animals but covers even
tame ones as long as they cause injury [Vestil v.
IAC, G.R. No. 74431 (1989)].
Possible defenses against this liability
(1) Force Majeure
(2) Fault of person suffering damage
(3) Act of third persons
A.2. PROVINCES, CITIES, AND
MUNICIPALITIES
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities
shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of
the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision.
It is not even necessary that the defective roads
or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality for liability to attach. The article only
requires that either control or supervision be
exercised over said street or road [Guilatco v.
Dagupan, G.R. No. 61516 (1989)].
A.3. PROPRIETOR OF BUILDING OR
STRUCTURE
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or
structure is responsible for the damages
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it
should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible
for damages caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has
not been taken care of with due diligence,
and the inflammation of explosive
substances which have not been kept in a
safe and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be
harmful to persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near
highways or lanes, if not caused by force
majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers
or deposits of infectious matter,
constructed without precautions suitable to
the place.
Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two
preceding articles should be the result of any
defect in the construction mentioned in article
1723, the third person suffering damages may
proceed only against the engineer or architect
or contractor in accordance with said article,
within the period therein fixed.
Ownership of a building imposes on the
proprietor thereof the duty to maintain it in good
condition at all times to the end that it may not
collapse either totally or partially as to cause
damage or injury to anothers person or
property. This duty obtains whether the building
is leased or held in usufruct. Considering,
however, that the lessee or usufructuary has
direct and immediate control of the building, the
law imposes on him the duty to notify the
proprietor of such urgent or extraordinary
repairs. And where the proprietors failure to
make the necessary repairs was due to the
failure of the lessee or usufructuary to notify him,
the proprietor is entitled to indemnification for
damages he may have been required to pay to
the parties.
Liability does not attach to the proprietor if the
damage was caused by any defect in the
construction mentioned in Article 1723, in which
case the action should be against the engineer
or architect.
Under Article 2190, the plaintiff is required to
prove:
(a) The total or partial collapse of a building or
structure
(b) That the defendant is the proprietor
(c) That the collapse was due to the lack of
necessary repairs
Note: There is no requirement to prove
negligence.
Under Article 2191, with the exception of No. 1,
negligence is also not an issue.
The owner or proprietor of a place of public
amusement impliedly warrants that the
premises, appliances and amusement devices
are safe for the purpose for which they are
designed, the doctrine being subject to no other
exception or qualification than that he does not
contract against unknown defects not
discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means
[Gotesco Investment Corp. v. Chatto, G.R. No.
87584 (1992)].
A.4. ENGINEER OR ARCHITECT OF
COLLAPSED BUILDING
Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew
up the plans and specifications for a building is
liable for damages if within fifteen years from
the completion of the structure, the same
should collapse by reason of a defect in those
plans and specifications, or due to the defects
in the ground. The contractor is likewise
responsible for the damages if the edifice falls,
within the same period, on account of defects
in the construction or the use of materials of
inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any
violation of the terms of the contract. If the
engineer or architect supervises the
construction, he shall be solidarily liable with
the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion,
does not imply waiver of any of the cause of
action by reason of any defect mentioned in
the preceding paragraph.
The action must be brought within ten years
following the collapse of the building.
Engineer or architect who drew up the plans and
specifications is liable if the building collapses
within 15 years due to:
(1) A defect in those plans and specifications; or
(2) Due to the defects in the ground.
Contractor is liable if the edifice falls within 15
years due to:
(1) Defects in the construction;
(2) The use of materials of inferior quality
furnished by the contractor; or
(3) Due to any violation of the terms of the
contract.
Here, the plaintiff need only prove that such
conditions (defects) exist, and need not prove
that negligence of the defendant be the cause of
the conditions.
A.5. OWNERS OF ENTERPRISES OR OTHER
EMPLOYERS
Art. 1711. Owners of enterprises and other
employers are obliged to pay compensation
for the death of or injuries to their laborers,
workmen, mechanics or other employees,
even though the event may have been purely
accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause,
if the death or personal injury arose out of and
in the course of the employment. The
employer is also liable for compensation if the
employee contracts any illness or disease
caused by such employment or as the result of
the nature of the employment. If the mishap
was due to the employee's own notorious
negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness,
the employer shall not be liable for
compensation. When the employee's lack of
due care contributed to his death or injury, the
compensation shall be equitably reduced.
Art. 1712. If the death or injury is due to the
negligence of a fellow worker, the latter and
the employer shall be solidarily liable for
compensation. If a fellow worker's intentional
malicious act is the only cause of the death or
injury, the employer shall not be answerable,
unless it should be shown that the latter did
not exercise due diligence in the selection or
supervision of the plaintiff's fellow worker.
Alarcon, a teacher, hired Urzino and Azaa to
dig a well on his land; in the course of which
Urzino died of asphyxia. The Court found that
under the principle of ejusdem generis, said
other employers mentioned in Article 1711
must be construed to refer to persons who
belong to a class analogous to owners of
enterprises, such as those operating a business
or engaged in a particular industry or trade,
requiring its managers to contract the services of
laborers, workers and/or employees. Alarcon,
not owning any enterprise, did not fall under the
category of other employers [Alarcon v.
Alarcon, G.R. No. L-15692 (1961)].
Situations covered:
(1) Death or injury arising out of or
in the course of employment here, the
employer is liable even if the event which
caused the death or injury was purely
accidental or due to a fortuitous event
(2) Illness or disease caused by
their employment or as the result of the
nature of the employment
Defenses available to the employer:
(1) When death or injury is not
caused by a fellow worker
The mishap due to the employees own
notorious negligence or voluntary act, or
drunkenness
(2) When death or injury is
caused by a fellow worker
General rule: The employer is solidarily
liable with the fellow worker causing the
death or injury
Exception: If the only cause of the death
or injury was the fellow workers
intentional or malicious act
Exception to the exception: If it is shown
that the employer did not exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision
of the fellow worker causing the death or
injury
A.6. HEAD OF A FAMILY FOR THINGS
THROWN OR FALLING
Art 2193. The head of a family that lives in a
building or a part thereof, is responsible for
damages caused by things thrown or falling
from the same.
The purpose of the law is to relieve the injured
party of the difficulty of determining and proving
who threw the thing or what caused it to fall, or
that either was due to the fault or negligence of
any particular individual.
Lessee is considered as the head of the family. It
is enough that he lives in and has control over it
[Dingcong v. Kanaan, G.R. No. L-47033 (1941)].
A.7. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
i. MANUFACTURERS / PROCESSORS OF
FOODSTUFFS
Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of
foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar
goods shall be liable for death or injuries
caused by any noxious or harmful substances
used, although no contractual relation exists
between them and the consumers.
Under the foregoing provision, liability is not
made to depend upon fault or negligence of the
manufacturer or processor. The provision
likewise dispensed with any contractual relation
between the manufacturer and the consumer,
thereby clearly implying that liability is imposed
by law as a matter of public policy.
Proof of negligence under this provision is not
necessary; as such, traditional contract and
warranty defenses as (1) lack of privity; (2) lack
of reliance on a warranty; (3) lack of notice to
the defendant of the breach of warranty; and (4)
disclaimer of implied warranties are inapplicable.
Requisites of liability
(a) Defendant is a manufacturer or possessor of
foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles and similar
goods;
(b) He used noxious or harmful substances in
the manufacture or processing of the
foodstuff, drinks or toilet articles consumed
or used by the plaintiff;
(c) Plaintiffs death or injury was caused by the
product so consumed or used; and
(d) The damages sustained and claimed by the
plaintiff and the amount thereof.
Burden of proof
The burden of proof that the product was in a
defective condition at the time it left the hands of
the manufacturer and particular seller is upon
the injured plaintiff.
Who may recover
Although the article used the term consumer,
such term includes a user and purchaser of products, as well as for the insufficient or
the injuriously defective food product or toilet
article. The person who may recover need not
be the purchaser of the foodstuff or toilet article.
ii. CONSUMER ACT RA 7394, SECS. 92-107
(CH. 1)
Consumer Act Provisions
Article 4. Definition of Terms.
(n) "Consumer" means a natural person who is
a purchaser, lessee, recipient or prospective
purchaser, lessor or recipient of consumer
products, services or credit.
(as) "Manufacturer" means any person who
manufactures, assembles or processes
consumer products, except that if the goods
are manufactured, assembled or processed for
another person who attaches his own brand
name to the consumer products, the latter
shall be deemed the manufacturer. In case of
imported products, the manufacturer's
representatives or, in his absence, the
importer, shall be deemed the manufacturer.
Article 92. Exemptions. If the concerned
department finds that for good or sufficient
reasons, full compliance with the labeling
requirements otherwise applicable under this
Act is impracticable or is not necessary for the
adequate protection of public health and
safety, it shall promulgate regulations
exempting such substances from these
requirements to the extent it deems consistent
with the objective of adequately safeguarding
public health and safety, and any hazardous
substance which does not bear a label in
accordance with such regulations shall be
deemed mislabeled hazardous substance.
Article 97. Liability for the Defective Products.
Any Filipino or foreign manufacturer,
producer, and any importer, shall be liable for
redress, independently of fault, for damages
caused to consumers by defects resulting from
design, manufacture, construction, assembly
and erection, formulas and handling and
making up, presentation or packing of their
inadequate information on the use and
hazards thereof.
A product is defective when it does not offer
the safety rightfully expected of it, taking
relevant circumstances into consideration,
including but not limited to:
(a) presentation of product
(b) use and hazards reasonably expected of
it;
(c) the time it was put into circulation.
A product is not considered defective because
another better quality product has been placed
in the market. The manufacturer, builder,
producer or importer shall not be held liable
when it evidences:
(a) that it did not place the product on the
 market;
(b) that although it did place the product on
the market such product has no defect;
(c) that the consumer or a third party is solely
at fault.
Article 98. Liability of Tradesman or Seller.
The tradesman/seller is likewise liable,
pursuant to the preceding article when:
(a) it is not possible to identify the
manufacturer, builder, producer or
importer;
(b) the product is supplied, without clear
identification of the manufacturer,
producer, builder or importer;
(c) he does not adequately preserve
perishable goods. The party making
payment to the damaged party may
exercise the right to recover a part of the
whole of the payment made against the
other responsible parties, in accordance
with their part or responsibility in the
cause of the damage effected.
Article 99. Liability for Defective Services.
The service supplier is liable for redress,
independently of fault, for damages caused to
consumers by defects relating to the rendering
of the services, as well as for insufficient or
inadequate information on the fruition and
hazards thereof.
The service is defective when it does not
provide the safety the consumer may rightfully
expect of it, taking the relevant circumstances
into consideration, including but not limited to:
(a) the manner in which it is provided;
(b) the result of hazards which may
reasonably be expected of it;
(c) the time when it was provided.
A service is not considered defective because
of the use or introduction of new techniques.
The supplier of the services shall not be held
liable when it is proven:
(a) that there is no defect in the service
rendered;
(b) that the consumer or third party is solely at
fault.
Article 100. Liability for Product and Service
Imperfection. The suppliers of durable or
nondurable consumer products are jointly
liable for imperfections in quality that render
the products unfit or inadequate for
consumption for which they are designed or
decrease their value, and for those resulting
from inconsistency with the information
provided on the container, packaging, labels or
publicity messages/advertisement, with due
regard to the variations resulting from their
nature, the consumer being able to demand
replacement to the imperfect parts.
If the imperfection is not corrected within thirty
(30) days, the consumer may alternatively
demand at his option:
(a) the replacement of the product by another
of the same kind, in a perfect state of use;
(b) the immediate reimbursement of the
amount paid, with monetary updating,
without prejudice to any losses and
damages;
(c) a proportionate price reduction.
The parties may agree to reduce or increase
the term specified in the immediately
preceding paragraph; but such shall not be
less than seven (7) nor more than one
hundred and eighty (180) days.
The consumer may make immediate use of
the alternatives under the second paragraph of
this Article when by virtue of the extent of the
imperfection, the replacement of the imperfect
parts may jeopardize the product quality or
characteristics, thus decreasing its value.
If the consumer opts for the alternative under
sub-paragraph (a) of the second paragraph of
this Article, and replacement of the product is
not possible, it may be replaced by another of
a different kind, mark or model: Provided, That
any difference in price may result thereof shall
be supplemented or reimbursed by the party
which caused the damage, without prejudice
to the provisions of the second, third and
fourth paragraphs of this Article.
Article 101. Liability for Product Quantity
Imperfection. Suppliers are jointly liable for
imperfections in the quantity of the product
when, in due regard for variations inherent
thereto, their net content is less than that
indicated on the container, packaging, labeling
or advertisement, the consumer having
powers to demand, alternatively, at his own
option:
(a) the proportionate price
(b) the supplementing of weight or measure
differential;
(c) the replacement of the product by another
of the same kind, mark or model, without
said imperfections;
(d) the immediate reimbursement of the
amount paid, with monetary updating
without prejudice to losses and damages if
any.
The provisions of the fifth paragraph of Article
99 shall apply to this Article.
The immediate supplier shall be liable if the
instrument used for weighing or measuring is
not gauged in accordance with official
standards.
Article 102. Liability for Service Quality
Imperfection. The service supplier is liable
for any quality imperfections that render the
services improper for consumption or
decrease their value, and for those resulting
from inconsistency with the information
contained in the offer or advertisement, the
consumer being entitled to demand
alternatively at his option:
(a) the performance of the services, without
any additional cost and when applicable;
(b) the immediate reimbursement of the
amount paid, with monetary updating
without prejudice to losses and damages,
if any;
(c) a proportionate price reduction.
Reperformance of services may be entrusted
to duly qualified third parties, at the supplier's
risk and cost.
Improper services are those which prove to be
inadequate for purposes reasonably expected
of them and those that fail to meet the
provisions of this Act regulating service
rendering.
Article 103. Repair Service Obligation. When
services are provided for the repair of any
product, the supplier shall be considered
implicitly bound to use adequate, new, original
replacement parts, or those that maintain the
manufacturer's technical specifications unless,
otherwise authorized, as regards to the latter
by the consumer.
Article 104. Ignorance of Quality Imperfection.
The supplier's ignorance of the quality
imperfections due to inadequacy of the
products and services does not exempt him
from any liability.
Article 105. Legal Guarantee of Adequacy.
The legal guarantee of product or service
adequacy does not require an express
instrument or contractual exoneration of the
supplier being forbidden.
Article 106. Prohibition in Contractual
Stipulation. The stipulation in a contract of a
clause preventing, exonerating or reducing the
obligation to indemnify for damages effected,
as provided for in this and in the preceding
Articles, is hereby prohibited, if there is more
than one person responsible for the cause of
the damage, they shall be jointly liable for the
redress established in the pertinent provisions
of this Act. However, if the damage is caused
by a component or part incorporated in the
product or service, its manufacturer, builder or
importer and the person who incorporated the
component or part are jointly liable.
A.8. NUISANCE
Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property,
or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety
 of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free
passage of any public highway or street,
or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
Art. 696. Every successive owner or
possessor of property who fails or refuses to
abate a nuisance in that property started by a
former owner or possessor is liable therefor in
the same manner as the one who created it.
Art. 697. The abatement of a nuisance does
not preclude the right of any person injured to
recover damages for its past existence.
Art. 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize any
nuisance, whether public or private.
Nuisance is a condition and not an act or failure
to act, so that if a wrongful condition exists, the
person responsible for its existence is
responsible for the resulting damages to others.
Sangco: A person who creates or maintains a
nuisance is liable for the resulting injury to
others regardless of the degree of care or skill
exercised to avoid the injury. The creation or
maintenance of a nuisance is a violation of an
absolute duty.
Liability for Negligence v. Liability for
Nuisance
Negligence Nuisance
Basis Liability is Liability attaches
based on lack regardless of the
of proper care skill exercised to
and diligence avoid the injury
Condition Act complained There is continuing
of the act of is already harm being
done which suffered by the
caused injury to aggrieved party
the plaintiff because of the
maintenance of the
act or thing which
constitutes the
nuisance
Remedy Action for Abatement
damages
Easement against Nuisance
Art. 682. Every building or piece of land is
subject to the easement which prohibits the
proprietor or possessor from committing
nuisance through noise, jarring, offensive odor,
smoke, heat, dust, water, glare and other
causes.
Art. 683. Subject to zoning, health, police and
other laws and regulations, factories and
shops may be maintained provided the least
possible annoyance is caused to the
neighborhood.
The provisions impose a prohibition upon
owners of buildings of land from committing
therein a nuisance or using such buildings or
lands in a manner as will constitute a nuisance.
It is based on the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas (so use your own as not to injure
anothers property).
The general rule is that everyone is bound to
bear the habitual or customary inconveniences
that result from the proximity of others, and so
long as this level is not surpassed, he may not
complain against them. But if the prejudice
exceeds the inconveniences that such proximity
habitually brings, the neighbor who causes such
disturbances is held responsible for the resulting
damage, being guilty of causing nuisance. There
can be no doubt that commercial and industrial
activities which are lawful in themselves may
become nuisances if they are so offensive to the
senses that they render the enjoyment of life
and property uncomfortable. It is no defense that
skill and care have been exercised and the most
improved methods and appliances employed to
prevent such result. In this case, the Court ruled
that causing or maintaining disturbing noises or
sounds may constitute an actionable nuisance
[Velasco v. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. 18390
(1971)].
Types of Nuisance:
(1) Nuisance per se
It is recognized as a nuisance under any
and all circumstances because it constitutes
a direct menace to public health and safety
and, for that reason, may be abated
summarily under the undefined law of
necessity.
To become a nuisance per se, the thing
must, of itself, because of its inherent
qualities, without complement, be productive
of injury, or, by reason of the matter of its
use or exposure, threaten or be dangerous
to life or property.
(2) Nuisance per accidens
It becomes a nuisance depending upon
certain conditions and circumstances, and
its existence being a question of fact, it
cannot be abated without due hearing
thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide
whether such a thing does in law constitute
a nuisance.
A nuisance is, according to Blackstone, "Any
thing that works3 hurt, inconvenience, or
damages." They arise from pursuing
particular trades or industries in populous
neighborhoods; from acts of public
indecency, keeping disorderly houses, and
houses of ill fame, gambling houses, etc.
Nuisances have been divided into two
classes: Nuisances per se, and nuisances
per accidens. To the first belong those which
are unquestionably and under all
circumstances nuisances, such as gambling
houses, houses of ill fame, etc. The number
of such nuisances is necessarily limited, and
by far the greater number of nuisances are
such because of particular facts and
circumstances surrounding the otherwise
harmless cause of the nuisance. For this
reason, it will readily be seen that whether a
particular thing is a nuisance is generally a
question of fact, to be determined in the first
instance before the term nuisance can be
applied to it [Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Co.
v. Municipal Council, G.R. No. L-7012
(1913)].
(3) Public nuisance
Art. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A
public nuisance affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon
individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance
is one that is not included in the foregoing
definition.
A public nuisance is the doing of or the failure to
do something that injuriously affects safety,
health, or morals of the public, or works some
substantial annoyance, inconvenience or injury
to the public. It causes hurt, inconvenience, or
damage to the public generally, or such part of
the public as necessarily comes in contact with it
in the exercise of a public or common right.
Art. 699. The remedies against a public
nuisance are:
(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or
any local ordinance: or
(2) A civil action; or
(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
Art. 700. The district health officer shall take
care that one or all of the remedies against a
public nuisance are availed of.
Art. 701. If a civil action is brought by reason
of the maintenance of a public nuisance, such
action shall be commenced by the city or
municipal mayor.
Art. 702. The district health officer shall
determine whether or not abatement, without
judicial proceedings, is the best remedy
against a public nuisance.
Art. 703. A private person may file an action on
account of a public nuisance, if it is specially
injurious to himself.
Art. 704. Any private person may abate a
public nuisance which is specially injurious to
him by removing, or if necessary, by
destroying the thing which constitutes the
same, without committing a breach of the
peace, or doing unnecessary injury. But it is
necessary:
(1) That demand be first made upon the
owner or possessor of the property to
abate the nuisance;
(2) That such demand has been rejected;
(3) That the abatement be approved by the
district health officer and executed with the
assistance of the local police; and
(4) That the value of the destruction does not
exceed three thousand pesos.
(4) Private nuisance
It is one which violates only private rights
and produces damage to but one or a few
persons, and cannot be said to be public.
Art. 705. The remedies against a private
nuisance are:
(1) A civil action; or
(2) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
Art. 706. Any person injured by a private
nuisance may abate it by removing, or if
necessary, by destroying the thing which
constitutes the nuisance, without committing a
breach of the peace or doing unnecessary
injury. However, it is indispensable that the
procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a
public nuisance by a private person be
followed.
Art. 707. A private person or a public official
extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be
liable for damages:
Summary of Strict Liability
Person Strictly Liable For What
(1) If he causes unnecessary injury; or
(2) If an alleged nuisance is later declared by
the courts to be not a real nuisance.
(5) Attractive Nuisance
General Rule: When people come to the
lands or premises of others for their own
purposes, without right or invitation, they
must take the lands as they see them.
Exception: Attractive Nuisance doctrine.
One who maintains on his premises
dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of
a character likely to attract children at play,
and who fails to exercise ordinary care to
prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender
years who is injured thereby, even if the
child is technically a trespasser in the
premises. The principle reason for the
doctrine is that the condition or appliance in
question although its danger is apparent to
those of age, is so enticing or alluring to
children of tender years as to induce them to
approach, get on or use it, and this
attractiveness is an implied invitation to such
children [Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan,
G.R. No. L-3422 (1952)].
When Applicable/Not Applicable: [De Leon on
Torts and Damages]
The danger to the child must be caused by the
attraction itself, or by something with which the
attraction brings the child in contact.
Protects a meddling child, but not a danger
which was created by the child himself.
Limited to latent dangers, and is no basis for
recovery where peril is obvious or patent.
Does not apply to natural dangers.
The age and maturity of the injured child and
the reason for the childs presence are
important considerations in the application of
the doctrine.
Defenses or Exceptions
Possessor of an animal or For the damage the animal may cause Force majeure
whoever makes use of them Fault of the person who
even if the animal is lost or suffered damage
escaped
Owner of Motor Vehicle Motor vehicle mishaps Solidary liability only if the
owner was in the vehicle and if
he could have prevented it thru
due diligence
If not in vehicle, apply Art. 2180
for his liability as employer
Manufacturers and Death and injuries caused by any Absence of contractual relation
processors of foodstuffs, noxious or harmful substances used not a defense
drinks, toilet articles and
similar goods
Defendant in possession of Death or injury results from such Possession or use thereof is
dangerous weapons/ possession indispensable in his occupation or
substances such as firearms business
and poison
Provinces, Cities and The death or injuries suffered by any The defective public work is not
Municipalities person by reason of the defective under the LGUs control or
condition of roads, streets, bridges, supervision
public buildings, and other public works
Proprietor of building/ (a) Total or partial collapse of building Responsibility for collapse should
structure or structure if due to lack of be due to the lack of necessary
necessary repairs repairs
(b) Explosion of machinery which has
not been taken cared of with due
diligence, and the inflammation of
explosive substances which have
not been kept in a safe and
adequate place
(c) By excessive smoke, which may
be harmful to persons or property
(d) By falling of trees situated at or
near highways or lanes, if not
caused by force majeure
(e) By emanations from tubes, canals,
sewers or deposits of infectious
matter, constructed without
precautions suitable to the place
Engineer or Architect If within 15 years from completion of Action not brought within 10 years
the structure, the same should collapse from collapse
by reason of:
(a) Defects in the plans or
specifications; or
(b) Defects in the ground.

If within the same period, the edifice

 falls on account of:
(a) Defects in the construction;
(b) Used of materials of inferior quality
furnished by him; or
(c) Violation of the terms of the
contract and he supervised the
construction.
Contractor If within 15 years from the completion Action not brought within 10 years
of the structure, the edifice falls on from collapse
account of:
(a) Defects in the construction;
(b) Used of materials of inferior quality
furnished by him; or
(c) Violation of the terms of the
contract
Head of the Family that lives Liable for damages caused by things
in a building or any part thrown or falling from the same
thereof
CIVIL LAW
DAMAGES
I. DAMAGES
A. DEFINITION
Damages may be defined as the pecuniary
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for
an injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed,
the pecuniary consequences, which the law
imposes for the breach of some duty or the
violation of some right [People v. Ballesteros,
G.R. No. 120921].
The recompense or compensation awarded for
the damage suffered [Custodio v CA, G.R. No.
116100].
B. WHEN ALLOWED
The obligation to repair the damages exists
whether done intentionally or negligently and
whether or not punishable by law [Occena v
Icamina, G.R. No. 82146 (1990)]
The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses
does not give rise to a right to recover
damages. To warrant the recovery of damages,
there must be both a right of action for a legal
wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage
resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong
without damage, or damage without wrong, does
not constitute a cause of action, since damages
are merely part of the remedy allowed for the
injury caused by a breach or wrong [Custodio v
CA, G.R. No. 116100].
INJURY VS. DAMAGE VS. DAMAGES
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right.
Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm, which results
from the injury. Damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered
[Custodio v CA, supra].
ELEMENTS FOR RECOVERY OF DAMAGES
(1) Right of action
(2) For a wrong inflicted by the defendant
(3) Damage resulting to the plaintiff
C. TYPES OF DAMAGES
Art. 2197. Damages may be:
(1) Actual or compensatory;
(2) Moral;
(3) Nominal;
(4) Temperate or moderate;
(5) Liquidated; or
(6) Exemplary or corrective.
ACCORDING TO PURPOSE
(1) For adequate reparation of the injury
a) Compensatory damages
(reparation of pecuniary losses)
b) Moral (reparation for non-pecuniary
losses: injury to feelings; physical
suffering, etc.)
(2) For vindication of the right violated:
a) Nominal damages
(3) For less than adequate reparation:
a) Moderate
(4) For deterring future violations:
a) Exemplary or corrective
II. Actual & Compensatory Damages
Compensatory damages are damages in
satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or
injury sustained. The phrase actual damages is
sometimes used as synonymous with
compensatory damages.
REQUISITES
To seek recovery of actual damages, it is
necessary to prove the actual amount of loss
with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised
upon competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable [Asilo, Jr. v. People and Sps.
Bombasi, G.R. No. 159017-18 (2011)].
WHEN IS A PERSON ENTITLED?
(1) When there is a pecuniary loss suffered by
him;
(2) When he has alleged and prayed for such
relief [Manchester Devt Corp v. CA, G.R.
No. L-75919 (1987)];
(3) When he has duly proved it;
(4) When provided by law or by stipulation.
No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary for:
moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or
exemplary damages. The assessment of such
damages is discretionary upon the court, except
liquidated ones. (Art. 2216)
ALLEGED AND PROVED WITH CERTAINTY
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by
stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.
The damages must be proven by competent
evidence (admissible or probative)
There must be pleading and proof of actual
damages suffered for the same to be
recovered. In addition to the fact that the
amount of loss must be capable of proof, it must
also be actually proven with a reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon competent
proof or the best evidence obtainable. The
burden of proof of the damage suffered is,
consequently, imposed on the party claiming the
same, who should adduce the best evidence
available in support thereof In the absence
of corroborative evidence, it has been held that
self-serving statements of account are not
sufficient basis for an award of actual damages
[Oceaneering Contractors v Baretto, G.R. No.
184215 (2011)].
Actual or compensatory damages cannot be
presumed, but must be proven with a
reasonable degree of certainty [MCC Industrial
Sales Corp. v Ssangyong Corp., G.R. No.
170633 (2007)].
Damages must be proved with reasonable
accuracy, even when not denied [Valencia vs.
Tantoco, G.R. No. L-7267 (1956)].
DEGREE OF CERTAINTY REQUIRED AS TO:
FACT, CAUSE AND AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
Damages are not rendered uncertain just
because they cannot be calculated with absolute
exactness or because the consequences of the
wrong are not precisely definite in pecuniary
amount.
The principle, which will disallow recovery of
damages when their existence rests solely on
speculation, applies both to the fact and cause
of damages.
(1) The requirement of certainty does not
prevent the drawing of reasonable
inferences from the fact and circumstance in
evidence.
(2) Events which occur after the wrong
complained of may serve to render the
damage sufficiently certain.
(3) The damages must be susceptible of
ascertainment in some manner other than
by mere speculation, conjecture or surmise
and by reference to some fairly definite
standard, such as market value, established
experience or direct inference from known
circumstances.
Where, however, it is reasonably certain that
injury consisting of failure to realize otherwise
reasonably expected profits had been incurred,
uncertainty as to the precise amount of such
unrealized profits will not prevent recovery or the
award of damages [Talisay-Silay v. Associacion,
G.R. No. 91852 (1995)].
COMPONENTS
Actual damage covers the following:
(1) Value of loss; unrealized profit
(2) Attorneys fees and expenses of litigation
(3) Interest
LOSS COVERED:
In General
Art. 2200. Indemnification for damages shall
comprehend not only the value of the loss
suffered, but also that of the profits which the
obligee failed to obtain.
In other words, indemnification for damages is
not limited to damnum emergens (actual loss)
but extends to lucrum cessans (a cession of gain
or amount of profit lost).
The award of damages for loss of earning
capacity is concerned with the determination of
losses or damages sustained by the [plaintiffs],
as dependents and intestate heirs of the
deceased, and that said damages consist, not of
the full amount of his earnings, but of the
support they received or would have received
from him had he not died in consequence of
negligence of [defendants] agent Only net
earnings, and not gross earnings are to be
considered. That is, the total of the earnings less
expenses necessary in the creation of such
earnings or income and less living and other
incidental expenses [Candano Shipping Lines,
Inc. v Sugata-on, G.R. No. 163212 (2007)].
EXTENT OR SCOPE OF ACTUAL DAMAGES
Source Extent of Liability
-If the obligor acted in
GOOD FAITH, he shall be
liable for natural and
probable consequences of
the breach, which the
parties have foreseen or
could have reasonably
Contracts foreseen at the time the
Art.
and obligation was constituted.
220
Quasi-
1
contracts -If the obligor acted with
FRAUD, BAD FAITH,
MALICE or WANTON
ATTITUDE, he shall be
responsible for all
damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the
breach.
Liability extends to all
damages which are the
natural and probable
consequence of the act or
Crimes
Art. omission complained of
and
220
Quasi-
2 WON the damage was
delicts
foreseen or could have
been reasonably foreseen
by the defendant is
irrelevant
IN CONTRACTS AND QUASI-CONTRACTS
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the
damages for which the obligor who acted in
good faith is liable shall be those that are the
natural and probable consequences of the
breach of the obligation, and which the parties
have foreseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton
attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed
to the non-performance of the obligation.
Art. 2214. In quasi delicts, the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the
damages that he may recover.
Art. 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and
quasi-delicts, the court may equitably mitigate
the damages under circumstances other than
the case referred to in the preceding article, as
in the following instances:
(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened
the terms of the contract;
(2) That the plaintiff has derived some
benefit as a result of the contract;
(3) In cases where exemplary damages are
to be awarded, that the defendant acted
upon the advice of counsel;
(4) That the loss would have resulted in any
event;
(5) That since the filing of the action, the
defendant has done his best to lessen
the plaintiff's loss or injury.
The damages recoverable upon breach of
contract are, primarily, the ordinary, natural and
in a sense the necessary damages resulting
from the breach. Other damages, known as
special damages, are recoverable where it
appears that the particular conditions which
made such damages a probable consequence of
the breach were known to the delinquent party at
the time the contract was made [Daywalt vs.
Recoletos et al., G.R. No. L-13505 (1919)].
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment
or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
wrong; it partakes of the nature of fraudBPI-
FB acted out of the impetus of self-protection
and not out of malevolence or ill will. BPI-FB was
not in the corrupt state of mind contemplated in
Article 2201 and should not be held liable for all
damages now being imputed to it for its breach
of obligation [BPI Family Bank v. Franco, G.R.
No. 123498 (2007)].
That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of
respondent airline when it did not allow
petitioners to board their flight in spite of
confirmed tickets cannot be disputed.
Overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the
passengers concerned to an award of moral
damages [Spouses Zalamea v. CA, G.R. No.
104235 (1993)].
IN CRIMES AND QUASI-DELICTS
Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi delicts, the
defendant shall be liable for all damages which
are the natural and probable consequences of
the act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have been
foreseen or could have reasonably been
foreseen by the defendant.
In case of crimes, damages are to be increased
or decreased according to aggravating or
mitigating circumstances present.
Interest, as part of damages, may be
adjudicated in a proper case, in the Courts
discretion.
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff, in case of
quasi-delicts, shall reduce the damages to which
he may be entitled. However, in case of crimes,
there is no mitigation for contributory negligence
of the plaintiff.
The indemnity authorized by our criminal law as
civil liability ex delicto for the offended party, in
the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial
policy and aside from other proven actual
damages, is itself equivalent to actual or
compensatory damages in civil law. The
principal consideration for the award of damages
is the penalty provided by law or imposable for
the offense because of its heinousness, not the
public penalty actually imposed on the
offender Hence, notwithstanding the fact that
the imposable public penalty against the
offender should be lowered due to his minority,
there is no justifiable ground to depart from the
jurisprudential trend in the award of damages in
the case of qualified rape, considering the
compensatory nature of the award of civil
indemnity and moral damages [People v Sarcia,
G.R. No. 169641 (2009)].
EARNING CAPACITY, BUSINESS STANDING
Art. 2205. Damages may be recovered:
(1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity
in cases of temporary or permanent
personal injury;
(2) For injury to the plaintiff's business standing
or commercial credit.
LOSS OR IMPAIRMENT OF EARNING
CAPACITY
The Court did not award actual damages
because it was found that plaintiffs employment
was lost even before the injury upon which she
was suing. The Court equated loss of
employment with loss of earning capacity
[Gatchalian v. Delim, G.R. No. 56487 (1991)].
The plaintiff need not be actually engaged in
gainful employment to recover damages due to
loss or impairment of earning capacity. In
determining the amount of damages to be
awarded, the Supreme Court considered the
plaintiffs age, probable life expectancy, the state
of his health, and his mental and physical
condition before the accident Taking into
account [the plaintiffs] outstanding abilities, he
would have enjoyed a successful professional
career in banking [Mercury Drug v Huang, G.R.
No. 172122 (2007)].
INJURY TO BUSINESS STANDING OR
COMMERCIAL CREDIT
Loss of goodwill should be proven with the same
standard of proof as other compensatory
damages [Tanay Recreation Center v. Fausto,
G.R. No. 140182 (2005)].

FORMULA FOR THE NET EARNING
CAPACITY
Net earning capacity = Life expectancy * (Gross
annual income Reasonable living expenses)
[People vs. Aringue, G.R. No. 116487 (1997)].
Where:
Life expectancy = 2/3 * (80 age of victim at the
time of death)
As a rule, documentary evidence should be
presented to substantiate the claim for loss of
earning capacity [Tan, et al. vs. OMC Carriers,
Inc., G.R. No. 190521 (2011)].
By way of exception, damages for loss of
earning capacity may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the
deceased is self-employed and earning less
than the minimum wage under current labor
laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken
of the fact that in the deceased's line of work, no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) the
deceased is employed as a daily wage worker
earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.
DEATH BY CRIME OR QUASI-DELICT
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death
caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there
may have been mitigating circumstances.
In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss
of the earning capacity of the deceased,
and the indemnity shall be paid to the
heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in
every case be assessed and awarded by
the court, unless the deceased on account
of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning
capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give
support according to the provisions of
article 291, the recipient who is not an heir
called to the decedent's inheritance by the
law of testate or intestate succession, may
demand support from the person causing
the death, for a period not exceeding five
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the
court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages
for mental anguish by reason of the death
of the deceased.
CIVIL / DEATH INDEMNITY
Mere commission of the crime shall entitle the
heirs of the deceased to such damages.
AS TO THE LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY
General Rule:
Shall be awarded in every case, and that
claimant shall present documentary evidence to
substantiate claim for damages.
Exceptions:
(1) If the deceased was self-employed and
earning less than the minimum wage; or
(2) The deceased was a daily wage worker
earning less than the minimum wage.
Additional Exception:
Testimonial evidence suffices to establish a
basis for which the court can make a fair and
reasonable estimate of the loss of earning
capacity [Pleyto v. Lomboy, G.R. No. 148737
(2004)]
Note: Such an exception to documentary proof
requirement only exists as to the loss of earning
capacity.
IN RAPE CASES
No statutory basis but in several cases the court
awards compensatory damages to victims of
rape.
Civil indemnity, in the nature of actual and
compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the
finding of the fact of rape. [People v. Astrologo,
G.R. No. 169873 (2007)].
The SC held that it could not be proven that the
age of the victim was such that it would support
a penalty of death. Thus, it imposed reclusion
perpetua instead. But SC said that this should
not affect the civil liability to be imposed, and
maintained the same at Php. 75,000 [People v.
Bartolini, G.R. No. 179498 (2010)].
ATTORNEYS FEES AND EXPENSES OF
LITIGATION
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation,
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation,
other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered,
except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution
against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action
or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and
evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff's plainly valid, just and
demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of
household helpers, laborers and skilled
workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's
compensation and employer's liability
laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil
liability arising from a crime;
(10)When at least double judicial costs are
awarded;
(11)In any other case where the court deems it
just and equitable that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be
recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation must be reasonable.
General Rule
Attorneys fees and costs of litigation are
recoverable IF stipulated.
Exceptions
If there is no stipulation, they are recoverable
only in the following cases:
(1) By reason of malice or bad faith
(a) When exemplary damages are awarded
(b) In case of a clearly unfounded civil
action
(c) Where defendant acted in gross and
evident bad faith
(d) When at least double judicial costs are
awarded
(1) By reason of plaintiffs indigence in
(a) Actions for legal support
(b) Actions for recovery of wages of
laborers, etc.
(c) Actions for workmens compensation
(1) By reason of crimes in
(a) Criminal cases of malicious
prosecution
(b) Separate actions to recover civil
liability arising from crime
(2) By reason of equity
(a) Where the defendants act compelled
plaintiff to litigate with third persons
(b) Where the Court deems it just and
equitable
Note: In all cases, attorneys fees and costs of
litigation must be reasonable.
Even if expressly stipulated, attorneys fees
are subject to control by the Courts.
Attorneys fees in CC 2208 is an award made in
favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the
litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor
who may enforce the judgment for attorney's
fees by execution [Quirante v. IAC, G.R. No.
73886 (1989)].
Attorney's fees cannot be recovered except in
cases provided for in CC 2208 [MERALCO v.
Ramoy, G.R. No. 158911 (2008)].
Attorneys fees and expenses of litigation are
recoverable only in the concept of actual
damages, not as moral damages nor judicial
costs. Hence, such must be specifically prayed
forand may not be deemed incorporated within
a general prayer for "such other relief and
remedy as this court may deem just and
equitable [Briones v Macabagdal, G.R. No. No interest may be recovered on unliquidated
150666 (2010)]." (not fixed in amount) claims or damages, except
when the demand can be established with
For CC 2208 (2), an adverse decision does reasonable certainty at the Courts discretion.
not ipso facto justify an award of attorneys fees
to the winning party. Even when a claimant is Compounding of interest
compelled to litigate with third persons or to Interest due shall earn legal interest from the
incur expenses to protect his rights, still time it is judicially demanded, although the
attorneys fees may not be awarded where no obligation may be silent on the point.
sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected Note that interest due can earn only at 6%,
in a partys persistence in a case other than an whether the rate of interest of the principal is
erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his greater than 6%.
cause [Bank of America v. Philippine Racing
Club, G.R. No. 150228 (2009)]. Determination of legal interest
(1) When an obligation, regardless of its source
INTEREST (i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts
Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the or quasi-delicts) is breached, the
payment of a sum of money, and the debtor contravenor can be held liable for damages.
incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, (2) With regard particularly to an AWARD OF
there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall INTEREST in the concept of actual and
be the payment of the interest agreed upon, compensatory damages, the RATE of
and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, as well as the ACCRUAL thereof, is
interest, which is six per cent per annum. imposed, as follows [Eastern Shipping
Lines v. CA, (1994) as modified by Nakar v.
Art. 2210. Interest may, in the discretion of the Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871 (2013)]:
court, be allowed upon damages awarded for
breach of contract. BASE RATE ACCRUAL
(a) When the (a)That To be
Art. 2211. In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest obligation is which computed from
as a part of the damages may, in a proper breached, and it may default, i.e.,
case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the consists in the have from JUDICIAL
court. PAYMENT OF A been or
SUM OF MONEY, stipulate EXTRAJUDICI
Art. 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest i.e., a loan or d in AL demand
from the time it is judicially demanded, forbearance of writing. under and
although the obligation may be silent upon this money, the (b) In the subject to the
point. interest due absence provisions of
should be- of Article 1169 of
Art. 2213. Interest cannot be recovered upon stipulatio the Civil Code.
unliquidated claims or damages, except when n, the
the demand can be established with rate of
reasonable certainty. interest
shall be
Interest accrues when: 6% per
(1) The obligation consists in the payment of a annum
sum of money (legal
(2) Debtor incurs in delay interest)
(3) There being no stipulation to the contrary (b) Furthermo Legal From the time
re, the INTEREST interest it is
BASE RATE ACCRUAL BASE RATE ACCRUAL
DUE shall itself JUDICIALLY case consists in forbearance of
earn demanded. the payment of a credit.
(c) When an 6% per If claim or sum of money
obligation, NOT annum. damages are
constituting a loan LIQUIDATED, Note:
or forbearance of from default, The new rate of legal interest (6%) in Nacar
money, is i.e., from does not apply to judgments that have become
breached, an judicial or final and executory prior to July 1, 2013.
interest on the extrajudicial
AMOUNT OF demand. (Art. Start of Delay
DAMAGES 1169, Civil (1) Extrajudicial: Demand letter
awarded may be Code) (2) Judicial: Filing of complaint
imposed at the (3) Award
discretion of the If
court. UNLIQUIDATE Duty to Minimize
D, from the Art. 2203. The party suffering loss or injury
The actual base time the must exercise the diligence of a good father of
for the demand can a family to minimize the damages resulting
computation of be established from the act or omission in question.
legal interest shall with
be on the amount reasonable Article 2203 of the Civil Code exhorts parties
finally adjudged. certainty. suffering from loss or injury to exercise the
Hence, the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize
interest shall the damages resulting from the act or omission
begin to run in question. One who is injured then by the
only FROM wrongful or negligent act of another should
THE DATE exercise reasonable care and diligence to
THE minimize the resulting damage. Anyway, he can
JUDGMENT recover from the wrongdoer money lost in
OF THE reasonable efforts to preserve the property
COURT IS injured and for injuries incurred in attempting to
MADE (at prevent damage to it [Lim and Gunnaban vs.
which time the CA, G.R. No. 125817 (2002)].
quantification
of damages Burden of Proof
may be The DEFENDANT has the burden of proof to
deemed to establish that the victim, by the exercise of the
have been diligence of a good father of a family, could have
reasonably mitigated the damages. In the absence of such
ascertained). proof, the amount of damages cannot be
(d) When the 6% per From reduced.
JUDGMENT of annum FINALITY
the court UNTIL ITS Note:
awarding a sum SATISFACTIO The victim is required only to take such steps as
of money N, this period an ordinary prudent man would reasonably
becomes final being deemed adopt for his own interest.
and executory, to be an
whether or not the equivalent to a
III. Moral Damages
Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of
the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
Art. 2218. In the adjudication of moral
damages, the sentimental value of property,
real or personal, may be considered.
Moral damages are emphatically not intended to
enrich a complainant at the expense of the
defendant. Its award is aimed at the restoration,
within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual
status quo ante, and it must be proportional to
the suffering inflicted [Visayan Sawmill v. CA,
G.R. No. 83851 (1993)].
Mental suffering means distress or serious pain
as distinguished from annoyance, regret or
vexation [Bagumbayan Corp. v. IAC, G.R. No. L-
66274 (1984)].
Mental anguish is intense mental suffering.
Generally, damages for mental anguish are
limited to cases in which there has been a
personal physical injury or where the defendant
willfully, wantonly, recklessly, or intentionally
caused the mental anguish.
WHEN AWARDED
Awarded when injury consists of:
(1) Physical suffering
(2) Besmirched reputation
(3) Mental anguish
(4) Fright
(5) Moral shock
(6) Wounded feelings
(7) Social humiliation
(8) Serious anxiety
(9) Similar injury
Though incapable of pecuniary computation
If such is the proximate result of defendants act
or omission.
REQUISITES FOR AWARDING MORAL
DAMAGES
The conditions for awarding moral damages are
[Sulpicio Lines v. Curso, G.R. No. 157009
(2010)]:
(a) There must be an injury, whether physical,
mental, or psychological, clearly
substantiated by the claimant;
(b) There must be a culpable act or omission
factually established;
(c) The wrongful act or omission of the
defendant must be the proximate cause of
the injury sustained by the claimant; and
(d) The award of damages is predicated on any
of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF RECOVERY:
(1) Moral damages must somehow be
proportional to the suffering inflicted.
(2) In culpa contractual or breach of contract,
moral damages may be recovered when the
defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of
gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or
in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligation and, exceptionally, when the act
of breach of contract itself is constitutive of
tort resulting in physical injuries.
(3) By special rule in Article 1764, in relation to
Article 2206, moral damages may also be
awarded in case the death of a passenger
results from a breach of carriage.
(4) In culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict,
(a) when an act or omission causes
physical injuries, or
(b) where the defendant is guilty of
intentional tort, moral damages may
aptly be recovered. This rule also
applies to contracts when breached by
tort.
(5) In culpa criminal, moral damages could be
lawfully due when the accused is found
guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts,
adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary
detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or
defamation.
(6) Malicious prosecution can also give rise to a
claim for moral damages. The term
 "analogous cases," referred to in Article
2219, following the ejusdem generis rule,
must be held similar to those expressly
enumerated by the law.
(7) Although the institution of a clearly
unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal
justification for an award of attorney's fees,
such filing, however, has almost invariably
been held not to be a ground for an award
of moral damages. [Expertravel & Tours vs.
CA., G.R. No. 130030 (1999)].
(8) The burden rests on the person claiming
moral damages to show convincing
evidence for good faith is presumed. In a
case involving simple negligence, moral
damages cannot be recovered. [Villanueva
v. Salvador (2006)].
(9) Failure to use the precise legal terms or
"sacramental phrases" of "mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings or
moral shock" does not justify the denial of
the claim for damages. It is sufficient that
these exact terms have been pleaded in the
complaint and evidence has been adduced
[Miranda-Ribaya v. Bautista (1980)].
(10) Even if the allegations regarding the amount
of damages in the complaint are not
specifically denied in the answer, such
damages are not deemed admitted.
[Raagas, et al. v. Traya et al (1968)].
(11) An appeal in a criminal case opens the
whole case for review and this 'includes the
review of the penalty, indemnity and
damages. Even if the offended party had
not appealed from said award, and the only
party who sought a review of the decision of
said court was the accused, the court can
increase damages awarded. [Sumalpong v.
CA (1997)].
(12) It can only be awarded to natural persons.
The award of moral damages cannot be granted
in favor of a corporation because, being an
artificial person and having existence only in
legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no
emotions, no senses, It cannot, therefore,
experience physical suffering and mental
anguish, which can be experienced only by one
having a nervous system. The statement in
People vs. Manero and Mambulao Lumber Co.
vs. PNB that a corporation may recover moral
damages if it "has a good reputation that is
debased, resulting in social humiliation" is obiter
dictum [ABS-CBN v. CA, G.R. No. 128690
(1999)].
While it is true that besmirched reputation is
included in moral damages, it cannot cause
mental anguish to a corporation, unlike in the
case of a natural person, for a corporation has
no reputation in the sense that an individual has,
and besides, it is inherently impossible for a
corporation to suffer mental anguish
[NAPOCOR v. Philipp Brothers (2001)].
WHEN RECOVERABLE
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered
in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other
lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of
defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted,
raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this
article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and
brothers and sisters may bring the action
mentioned in No. 9 of t his article, in the order
named.
IN CRIMINAL OFFENSE RESULTING IN
PHYSICAL INJURIES
Under paragraph (1), Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, moral damages may be recovered in a
criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. In
its generic sense, "physical injuries" includes
death [People v. Villaver (2001)].

In a case where the father of a family was
stabbed to death, the SC said that a violent
death invariably and necessarily brings about
emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victims family For this reason, moral damages
must be awarded even in the absence of any
allegation and proof of the heirs emotional
suffering [Arcona v CA, G.R. No. 134784
(2002)].
IN QUASI-DELICTS CAUSING PHYSICAL
INJURIES
In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, moral
damages may be recovered (a) when an act or
omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where
the defendant is guilty of intentional tort. The SC
held that an employer that is vicariously liable
with its employee-driver may also be held liable
for moral damages to the injured plaintiff [B.F.
Metal v. Lomotan, G.R. No. 170813 (2008)].
IN SEDUCTION, ABDUCTION, RAPE AND
OTHER LASCIVIOUS ACTS
Anent the award of damages, civil indemnity ex
delicto is mandatory upon finding of the fact of
rape while moral damages is awarded upon
such finding without need of further proof
because it is assumed that a rape victim has
actually suffered moral injuries entitling the
victim to such award. If without factual and legal
bases, no award of exemplary damages should
be allowed [People v. Calongui (2006)].
In a case where the offender-father was
convicted of simple rape instead of qualified
rape due to the prosecutions failure to
specifically allege the age and minority of the
victim-daughter, but such was nonetheless
established during the trial, the award of civil
indemnity and moral damages in a conviction for
simple rape should equal the award of civil
indemnity and moral damages in convictions for
qualified rape. Truly, [the victims] moral suffering
is just as great as when her father who raped
her is convicted for qualified rape as when he is
convicted only for simple rape due to a
technicality [People v. Bartolini, supra].
Where there are multiple counts of rape and
other lascivious acts, the SC awarded moral
damages for each count of lascivious acts and
each count of rape [People v. Abadies (2002)].
Note: Recovery may be had by the offended
party and also by her parents.
IN ILLEGAL OR ARBITRARY DETENTION OR
ARREST
Since the crime committed in this case is
kidnapping and failure to return a minor under
Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code, the same
is clearly analogous to illegal and arbitrary
detention or arrest, thereby justifying the award
of moral damages [People v. Bernardo (2002)].
IN CASE OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
As a rule, no moral damages is imposed for
litigation, because the law could not have meant
to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. A
person's right to litigate, as a rule, should not be
penalized. This right, however, must be
exercised in good faith. Absence of good faith in
the present case is shown by the fact that
petitioner clearly has no cause of action against
respondents but it recklessly filed suit anyway
and wantonly pursued pointless appeals,
thereby causing the latter to spend valuable
time, money and effort in unnecessarily
defending themselves, incurring damages in the
process [Industrial Insurance v. Bondad, G.R.
No. 136722 (2000)].
Moral damages cannot be recovered from a
person who has filed a complaint against
another in good faith, or without malice or bad
faith. If damage results from the filing of the
complaint, it is damnum absque injuria [Mijares
v. CA (1997)].
The adverse result of an action does not per se
make the act wrongful and subject the actor to
the payment of moral damages. The law could
not have meant to impose a penalty on the right
to litigate; such right is so precious that moral
damages may not be charged on those who may
exercise it erroneously [Barreto vs. Arevalo
(1956)].

IN ACTS REFERRED TO IN ARTS. 21, 26, 27,
28, 29, 32, 34 &35, NCC
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following
and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's
residence:
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life
or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be
alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account
of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life,
place of birth, physical defect, or other
personal condition.
VIOLATION OF HUMAN DIGNITY
The law seeks to protect a person from being
unjustly humiliated. Using this provision, the SC
awarded moral damages to the plaintiff, a
married man, against the defendant, who
confronted the plaintiff face-to-face, invading the
latters privacy, to hurl defamatory words at him
in the presence of his wife and children,
neighbors and friends, accusing him of having
an adulterous relationship with another woman
[Concepcion v. CA (1998)].
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral
loss because a public servant or employee
refuses or neglects, without just cause, to
perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against the latter,
without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.
REFUSAL OR NEGLECT OF DUTY
Under CC 27, in relation to CC 2219 and 2217, a
public officer may be liable for moral damages
for as long as the moral damages suffered by
[the plaintiff] were the proximate result of
[defendants] refusal to perform an official duty
or neglect in the performance thereof. In fact,
under Articles 19 and 27 of the Civil Code, a
public official may be made to pay damages for
performing a perfectly legal act, albeit with bad
faith or in violation of the "abuse of right"
doctrine [Concepcion v. CA, supra].
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural,
commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor
through the use of force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or
highhanded method shall give rise to a right of
action by the person who thereby suffers
damage.
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same
act or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence.
Upon motion of the defendant, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is
based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall
so declare. In the absence of any declaration
to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due
to that ground.
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable
to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to
maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal
detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property
 without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when
private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the
laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person,
house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
(2) The liberty of abode and of changing the
same;
(3) The privacy of communication and
correspondence;
(4) The right to become a member of
associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law;
(5) The right to take part in a peaceable
assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances;
(6) The right to be free from involuntary
servitude in any form;
(7) The right of the accused against
excessive bail;
(8) The right of the accused to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witness in his
behalf;
(9) Freedom from being compelled to be a
witness against one's self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being
induced by a promise of immunity or
reward to make such confession, except
when the person confessing becomes a
State witness;
(10) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel
and unusual punishment, unless the
same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not
been judicially declared unconstitutional;
and
(11) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article,
whether or not the defendant's act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved
party has a right to commence an entirely
separate and distinct civil action for damages,
and for other relief. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and mat
be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages.
Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not
demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal
Code or other penal statute.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
The purpose of [CC 32] is to provide a sanction
to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms
enshrined in the Constitution. Under [CC 32], it
is not necessary that the public officer acted with
malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that
there was a violation of the constitutional rights
of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable
motives or good faith in the performance of
one's duties [Cojuangco v. CA, (1999)].
Article 32 of the Civil Code provides that moral
damages are proper when the rights of
individuals, including the right against
deprivation of property without due process of
law, are violated [Meralco v Spouses Chua
(2010)].
Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal
police force refuses or fails to render aid or
protection to any person in case of danger to
life or property, such peace officer shall be
primarily liable for damages, and the city or
municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible
therefor. The civil action herein recognized
shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of
evidence shall suffice to support such action.
Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured
by a criminal offense, charges another with the
same, for which no independent civil action is
granted in this Code or any special law, but the
justice of the peace finds no reasonable
grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses
or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the
complaint may bring a civil action for damages
against the alleged offender. Such civil action
may be supported by a preponderance of
evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to
indemnify the defendant in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an
information should be presented by the
prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be
suspended until the termination of the criminal
proceedings.
Please refer to previous discussions on the
provisions.
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a
legal ground for awarding moral damages if
the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due.
The same rule applies to breaches of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith.
IN WILLFUL INJURY TO PROPERTY
To sustain an award of damages, the damage
inflicted upon [plaintiffs] property must be
malicious or willful, an element crucial to merit
an award of moral damages under Article 2220
of the Civil Code [Regala v. Carin, G.R. No.
188715 (2011)].
IN BREACH OF CONTRACT IN BAD FAITH
Moral damages may be recovered in culpa
contractual where the defendant acted in bad
faith or with malice in the breach of the contract.
However, a conscious or intentional design need
not always be present since negligence may
occasionally be so gross as to amount to malice
or bad faith. Bad faith, in the context of Art. 2220
of the Civil Code,
includes gross negligence. Thus, we have held
in a number of cases that moral damages may
be awarded in culpa contractual or breach of
contract when the defendant acted fraudulently
or in bad faith, or is guilty of gross negligence
amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of
his contractual obligations [Bankard, Inc. v.
Feliciano, G.R. No 141761 (2006)].
As an exception [to the requirement of bad faith],
moral damages may be awarded in case of
breach of contract of carriage that results in the
death of a passenger [Sulpicio Lines v. Curso,
supra].
WHO MAY RECOVER MORAL DAMAGES
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered
in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other
lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of
defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted,
raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this
article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and
brothers and sisters may bring the action
mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order
named.
RELATIVES OF INJURED PERSONS
Article 2219 circumscribes the instances in
which moral damages may be awarded. The
provision does not include succession in the
collateral line as a source of the right to recover
moral damages. The usage of the phrase
analogous cases in the provision means simply
that the situation must be held similar to those
expressly enumerated in the law in question
[Sulpicio Lines v Curso, supra].
JURIDICAL PERSONS
The award of moral damages cannot be granted
in favor of a corporation because, being an
artificial person and having existence only in
legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no
emotions, no senses, It cannot, therefore,
experience physical suffering and mental
anguish, which can be experienced only by one
having a nervous system. [ABS-CBN v. CA,
supra].
FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING
AMOUNT
The amount of damages awarded in this appeal
has been determined by adequately considering
the official, political, social, and financial
standing of the offended parties on one hand,
and the business and financial position of the
offender on the other. The SC further considered
the present rate of exchange and the terms at
which the amount of damages awarded would
approximately be in U.S. dollars, the defendant
being an international airline. Senate President
Lopez, for his social standing and prestige,
received P100,000; his wife Maria Lopez
received P50,000 for her discomfort, and the fact
that she was already sick and suffering a flu
when she left the Philippines via defendants
plane; and the Montelibanos received P25,000
each, for being immediate family members of
Senator Lopez, and as such they likewise
shared his prestige and humiliation [Lopez v.
Pan American, G.R. No. L-22415 (1966)].
IV. Nominal Damages
Nominal damages consist in damages awarded,
not for purposes of indemnifying the plaintiff for
any loss suffered, but for the vindication or
recognition of a right violated by the defendant.
REQUISITES AND CHARACTERISTICS
(1) Invasion or violation of any legal or property
right.
(2) No proof of loss is required.
(3) The award is to vindicate the right violated.
WHEN AWARDED
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated
in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for
the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any
loss suffered by him.
Art. 2222. The court may award nominal
damages in every obligation arising from any
source enumerated in article 1157, or in every
case where any property right has been
invaded.
Art. 2223. The adjudication of nominal
damages shall preclude further contest upon
the right involved and all accessory questions,
as between the parties to the suit, or their
respective heirs and assigns.
One does not ask for nominal damages, and it is
in lieu of the actual, moral, temperate, or
liquidated damages.
Nominal damages are incompatible with actual,
temperate and exemplary damages.
Nominal damages cannot co-exist with actual or
compensatory damages [Armovit v. CA (1990)].
Nominal damages "are recoverable where a
legal right is technically violated and must be
vindicated against an invasion that has produced
no actual present loss of any kind. Its award is
thus not for the purpose of indemnification for a
loss but for the recognition and vindication of a
right. When granted by the courts, they are not
treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but
simply a recognition of the existence of a
technical injury. A violation of the plaintiffs right,
even if only technical, is sufficient to support an
award of nominal damages. Conversely, so long
as there is a showing of a violation of the right of
the plaintiff, an award of nominal damages is
proper [Gonzales v. PCIB, G.R. No. 180257
(2011)].
NATURE AND DETERMINATION OF AMOUNT
The assessment of nominal damages is left to
the discretion of the trial court according to the
circumstances of the case. Generally, nominal
damages by their nature are small sums fixed by
the court without regard to the extent of the harm
done to the injured party. However, it is generally
held that a nominal damage is a substantial
claim, if based upon the violation of a legal right;
in such a case, the law presumes damage
although actual or compensatory damages are
not proven [Gonzales v. People, G.R. No.
159950 (2007)].
V. Temperate Damages
Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages,
which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss
has been suffered but its amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be provided with
certainty.
Art. 2225. Temperate damages must be
reasonable under the circumstances.
These damages are awarded for pecuniary loss,
in an amount that, from the nature of the case,
cannot be proved with certainty.
REQUISITES
(1) Actual existence of pecuniary loss
(2) The nature and circumstances of the loss
prevents proof of the exact amount
(3) They are more than nominal and less than
compensatory.
(4) Causal connection between the loss and the
defendants act or omission.
(5) Amount must be reasonable.
In cases where the resulting injury might be
continuing and possible future complications
directly arising from the injury, while certain to
occur are difficult to predict, temperate damages
can and should be awarded on top of actual or
compensatory damages; in such cases there is
no incompatibility between actual and temperate
damages as they cover two distinct phases
[Ramos v. CA, supra].
Temperate damages are incompatible with
nominal damages hence, cannot be granted
concurrently [Citytrust Bank v. IAC (1994)].
Temperate damages are included within the
context of compensatory damages. [Tan v. OMC
Carriers, supra].
The SC awarded temperate damages in lieu of
actual damages for loss of earning capacity
where earning capacity is plainly established but
no evidence was presented to support the
allegation of the injured partys actual income
[Pleno v. CA, G.R. No. 56505 (1988)].
Courts are authorized to award temperate
damages even in cases where the amount of
pecuniary loss could have been proven with
certainty, if no such adequate proof was
presented. The allowance of temperate
damages when actual damages were not
adequately proven is ultimately a rule drawn
from equity, the principle affording relief to those
definitely injured who are unable to prove how
definite the injury [Republic v. Tuvera, G.R. No.
148246 (2007)].
FACTORS IN DETERMINING AMOUNT
The SC awarded temperate damages where
from the nature of the case, definite proof of
pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the
court is convinced that the plaintiff suffered
some pecuniary loss. [De Guzman v. Tumolva,
G.R. No. 188072 (2011)].
WHERE NO RECEIPTS WERE PROVIDED
Where the amount of actual damages cannot be
determined because no receipts were presented
to prove the same but it is shown that the heirs
are entitled thereto, temperate damages may be
awarded, fixed atP25,000.00. Considering that
funeral expenses were obviously incurred by the
victims heirs, an award ofP25,000.00 as
temperate damages is proper [People v.
Surongon (2007)].
VI.Liquidated Damages
Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those
agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be
paid in case of breach thereof.
Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether
intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be
equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable.
Liquidated damages are those damages agreed
upon by the parties to a contract to be paid in
case of breach thereof.
It differs from a penal clause in that in the latter
case the amount agreed to be paid may bear no
relation to the probable damages resulting from
the breach. Basically, a penalty is ad terrorem,
while liquidated damages are ad reparationem.
REQUISITES AND CHARACTERISTICS
(1) Liquidated damages must be validly
stipulated.
(2) There is no need to prove the amount of
actual damages.
(3) Breach of the principal contract must be
proved.
RULES GOVERNING BREACH OF
CONTRACT
Art. 2228. When the breach of the contract
committed by the defendant is not the one
contemplated by the parties in agreeing upon
the liquidated damages, the law shall
determine the measure of damages, and not
the stipulation.
Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by
the parties to a contract to be paid in case of
breach thereof. The stipulation on attorneys
fees contained in the said Promissory Note
constitutes what is known as a penal clause. A
penalty clause, expressly recognized by law, is
an accessory undertaking to assume greater
liability on the part of the obligor in case of
breach of an obligation. It functions to strengthen
the coercive force of obligation and to provide, in
effect, for what could be the liquidated damages
resulting from such a breach. The obligor would
then be bound to pay the stipulated indemnity
without the necessity of proof on the existence
and on the measure of damages caused by the
breach [Suatengco v. Reyes (2008)].
General Rule: The penalty shall substitute the
indemnity for damages and the payment of the
interests in case of breach.
Exceptions
(1) When there is a stipulation to the contrary.
(2) When the obligor is sued for refusal to pay
the agreed penalty.
(3) When the obligor is guilty of fraud.
The amount can be reduced if:
(1) it is unconscionable as determined by the
court
(2) there is partial or irregular performance.
VII. Exemplary or Corrective Damages
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages
are imposed, by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.
In common law, these damages were termed
punitive.
The grant of temperate damages paves the way
for the award of exemplary damages. Under
Article 2234 of the Civil Code, a showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to temperate damages allows
the award of exemplary damages [Canada v All
Commodities Marketing (2008)].
Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich
one party or impoverish another but to serve as
a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to
curb socially deleterious actions [PNB v. CA
(1996)].
WHEN RECOVERABLE
IN CRIMINAL OFFENSES; NCC ART. 2230
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary
damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines
and shall be paid to the offended party.
Award of exemplary damages is part of the civil
liability, not of the penalty.
Damages are paid to the offended party
separately from the fines.
Although an aggravating circumstance not
specifically alleged in the information, albeit
established at trial, cannot be appreciated to
increase the criminal liability of the accused, the
established presence of one or two aggravating
circumstances of any kind or nature entitles the
offended party to exemplary damages under
Article 2230 of the Civil Code because the
requirement of specificity in the information
affected only the criminal liability of the accused,
not his civil liability [People v. Dadulla (2011)].
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages,
therefore, can be awarded, not only in the
presence of an aggravating circumstance, but
also where the circumstances of the case show
the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct
of the offender. As in this case, where the
offender sexually assaulted a pregnant married
woman, the offender has shown moral
corruption, perversity, and wickedness. He has
grievously wronged the institution of marriage.
The imposition then of exemplary damages by
way of example to deter others from committing
similar acts or for correction for the public good
is warranted in quasi-delicts [People v. Alfredo
(2010)].
IN QUASI-DELICTS; NCC ART. 2231
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary
damages may be granted if the defendant
acted with gross negligence.
While CC 2231 provides that for quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence, with
more reason is its imposition justified when the
act performed is deliberate, malicious and
tainted with bad faith [Globe Mackay v. CA
(1989)].
IN CONTRACTS AND QUASI-CONTRACTS;
NCC ART. 2232
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the
court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
REQUISITES
Art. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be
recovered as a matter of right; the court will
decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated.
Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary
damages need not be proved, the plaintiff
must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages before
the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be
awarded. In case liquidated damages have
been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is
necessary in order that such liquidated
damages may be recovered, nevertheless,
before the court may consider the question of
granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated
damages, the plaintiff must show that he
would be entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages were it not for the
stipulation for liquidated damages.
Art. 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary
damages are renounced in advance shall be
null and void.
REQUISITES TO RECOVER EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
AGREED UPON
The plaintiff must show that he/she is entitled to
moral, temperate or compensatory damages:
If arising When exemplary
from damages are granted
The crime was
Art. committed with an
Crimes
2230 aggravating
circumstance/s
Art. Quasi- Defendant acted with
2231 delicts gross negligence
 Defendant acted in a
Contracts
Art. wanton, fraudulent,
and Quasi-
2232 reckless, oppressive, or
contracts
malevolent manner
General Principles
(1) Exemplary damages cannot be awarded
alone: they must be awarded IN ADDITION
to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
(2) The purpose of the award is to deter the
defendant (and others in a similar condition)
from a repetition of the acts for which
exemplary damages were awarded; hence,
they are not recoverable as a matter of
right.
(3) The defendant must be guilty of other
malice or else negligence above the
ordinary.
(4) Plaintiff is not required to prove the amount
of exemplary damages.
(a) But plaintiff must show that he is
entitled to moral, temperate, or
compensatory damage; that is,
substantial damages, not purely
nominal ones. This requirement
applies even if the contract stipulates
liquidated damages.
(b) The amount of exemplary damage
need not be pleaded in the complaint
because the same cannot be proved.
It is merely incidental or dependent
upon what the court may award as
compensatory damages.
DAMAGES IN CASE OF DEATH
RE. CRIMES AND QUASI-DELICTS
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death
caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there
may have been mitigating circumstances. In
addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss
of the earning capacity of the deceased,
and the indemnity shall be paid to the
heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in
every case be assessed and awarded by
the court, unless the deceased on
account of permanent physical disability
not caused by the defendant, had no
earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give
support according to the provisions of
Article 291, the recipient who is not an
heir called to the decedent's inheritance
by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from
the person causing the death, for a period
not exceeding five years, the exact
duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages
for mental anguish by reason of the death
of the deceased.
IN DEATH CAUSED BY BREACH OF
CONDUCT BY A COMMON CRIME
When death occurs as a result of a crime, the
heirs of the deceased are entitled to the
following items of damages:
(1) As indemnity for the death of the victim of
the offense P12,000.00, without the need
of any evidence or proof of damages, and
even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances attending the
commission of the offense.
(2) As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of
the deceased an amount to be fixed by
the Court according to the circumstances of
the deceased related to his actual income at
the time of death and his probable life
expectancy, the said indemnity to be
assessed and awarded by the court as a
matter of duty, unless the deceased had no
earning capacity at said time on account of
permanent disability not caused by the
accused. If the deceased was obliged to
give support, under Art. 291, Civil Code, the
recipient who is not an heir, may demand
support from the accused for not more than
five years, the exact duration to be fixed by
the court.
(3) As moral damages for mental anguish,
an amount to be fixed by the court. This
may be recovered even by the illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the
deceased.
(4) As exemplary damages, when the crime is
attended by one or more aggravating
circumstances, an amount to be fixed in
the discretion of the court, the same to be
considered separate from fines.
(5) As attorney's fees and expresses of
litigation, the actual amount thereof, (but
only when a separate civil action to recover
civil liability has been filed or when
exemplary damages are awarded).
(6) Interests in the proper cases.
(7) It must be emphasized that the indemnities
for loss of earning capacity of the deceased
and for moral damages are recoverable
separately from and in addition to the fixed
sum of P12,000.00 corresponding to the
indemnity for the sole fact of death, and that
these damages may, however, be
respectively increased or lessened
according to the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, except items 1 and 4 above,
for obvious reasons [Heirs of Raymundo
Castro v. Bustos (1969)].
At present, the SC allows civil indemnity of Php.
50,000 in cases of homicide [De Villa v. People
(2012)] and Php. 75,000 in cases of murder
[People v. Camat (2012)].
The omission from Article 2206 (3) of the
brothers and sisters of the deceased passenger
reveals the legislative intent to exclude them
from the recovery of moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius
[Sulpicio Lines v. Curso, supra].
VIII. Graduation of Damages
RULES
IN CRIMES
Art. 2204. In crimes, the damages to be
adjudicated may be respectively increased or
lessened according to the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances.
IN QUASI-DELICTS
Art. 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the
damages that he may recover.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
The alleged contributory negligence of the
victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused in
criminal cases committed through reckless
imprudence, since one cannot allege the
negligence of another to evade the effects of his
own negligence [Genobiagon v. CA, supra].
If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing
himself in danger contributed in some degree to
the injury as a proximate, although not as its
primary cause [Rakes v. Atlantic, G.R. No. L-
1719 (1907)].
PLAINTIFFS NEGLIGENCE
Even if Manila Electric is negligent, in order that
it may be held liable, its negligence must be the
proximate and direct cause of the accident
[Manila Electric v. Remonquillo, supra].
Both of the parties contributed to the proximate
cause; hence, they cannot recover from one
another [Bernardo v. Legaspi, supra].
IN CONTRACTS, QUASI-CONTRACTS AND
QUASI-DELICTS
Art. 2215 In contracts, quasi-contracts, and
quasi-delicts, the court may equitably mitigate
the damages under circumstances other than
the case referred to in the preceding article, as
in the following instances:
(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened
the terms of the contract;
(2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit
as a result of the contract;
(3) In cases where exemplary damages are
to be awarded, that the defendant acted
upon the advice of counsel;
(4) That the loss would have resulted in any
event;
(5) That since the filing of the action, the
defendant has done his best to lessen the
plaintiff's loss or injury.
GROUNDS FOR MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
FOR CONTRACTS:
(1) Violation of terms of the contract by the
plaintiff himself;
(2) Obtention or enjoyment of benefit under the
contract by the plaintiff himself;
(3) Defendant acted upon advice of counsel in
cases where exemplary damages are to be
 awarded such as under Articles 2230, 2231,
and 2232;
(4) Defendant has done his best to lessen the
plaintiffs injury or loss.
FOR QUASI-CONTRACTS:
(1) In cases where exemplary damages are to
be awarded such as in Art. 2232;
(2) Defendant has done his best to lessen the
plaintiffs injury or loss.
FOR QUASI-DELICTS:
(1) That the loss would have resulted in any
event because of the negligence or
omission of another, and where such
negligence or omission is the immediate
and proximate cause of the damage or
injury;
(2) Defendant has done his best to lessen the
plaintiffs injury or loss.
The SC deemed CC 2215(2) inapplicable where
the harm done to private respondents outweighs
any benefits the plaintiffs may have derived from
being transported to Tacloban instead of being
taken to Catbalogan, their destination and the
vessel's first port of call, pursuant to its normal
schedule [Sweet Lines v. CA (1983)].
RULE WHEN CONTRACTING PARTIES ARE IN
PARI DELICTO
Generally, parties to a void agreement cannot
expect the aid of the law; the courts leave them
as they are, because they are deemed in pari
delicto or "in equal fault." In pari delicto is "a
universal doctrine which holds that no action
arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal
contract; no suit can be maintained for its
specific performance, or to recover the property
agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money
agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation;
and where the parties are in pari delicto, no
affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one
against the other."
This rule, however, is subject to exceptions that
permit the return of that which may have been
given under a void contract to:
(a) the innocent party (Arts. 1411-1412, Civil
Code);
(b) the debtor who pays usurious interest (Art.
1413, Civil Code);
(c) the party repudiating the void contract
before the illegal purpose is accomplished
or before damage is caused to a third
person and if public interest is subserved by
allowing recovery (Art. 1414, Civil Code);
(d) the incapacitated party if the interest of
justice so demands (Art. 1415, Civil Code);
(e) the party for whose protection the
prohibition by law is intended if the
agreement is not illegal per se but merely
prohibited and if public policy would be
enhanced by permitting recovery (Art. 1416,
Civil Code); and
(f) the party for whose benefit the law has
been intended such as in price ceiling laws
(Art. 1417, Civil Code) and labor laws (Arts.
1418-1419, Civil Code).
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether
intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be
equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable.
COMPROMISE
Art. 2031. The courts may mitigate the
damages to be paid by the losing party who
has shown a sincere desire for a compromise.
IX. Miscellaneous Rules
DAMAGES THAT CANNOT CO-EXIST
NOMINAL WITH OTHER DAMAGES
Art. 2223. The adjudication of nominal
damages shall preclude further contest upon
the right involved and all accessory questions,
as between the parties to the suit, or their
respective heirs and assigns.
The propriety of the damages awarded has not
been questioned, Nevertheless, it is patent upon
the record that the award of P10,000 by way of
nominal damages is untenable as a matter of
law, since nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages [Vda. De Medina v.
Cresencia (1956)].
Since the court below has already awarded
compensatory and exemplary damages that are
in themselves a judicial recognition that
Plaintiffs right was violated, the award of
nominal damages is unnecessary and improper.
Anyway, ten thousand pesos cannot, in common
sense, be deemed nominal.
ACTUAL AND LIQUIDATED
Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those
agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be
paid in case of breach thereof.

DAMAGES THAT MUST CO-EXIST

EXEMPLARY WITH MORAL, TEMPERATE,

LIQUIDATED OR COMPENSATORY

There is no basis for awarding exemplary

damages either, because this species of
damages is only allowed in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated, or compensatory
damages, none of which have been allowed in
this case, for reasons herein before discussed
[Francisco v. GSIS (1963)].

There was, therefore, no legal basis for the

award of exemplary damages since the private
respondent was not entitled to moral, temperate,
or compensatory damages and there was no
agreement on stipulated damages [Scott
Consultants & Resource Development Corp. v.
CA (1995)].

DAMAGES THAT MUST STAND ALONE

NOMINAL DAMAGES
Art. 2223. The adjudication of nominal
damages shall preclude further contest upon
the right involved and all accessory questions,
as between the parties to the suit, or their
respective heirs and assigns.