EDWIN A. ACEBEDO v. EDDIE P.

ARQUERO Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position
exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an
399 SCRA 10 (2003) individual than in the judiciary. That is why the Court has firmly laid down
exacting standards of morality and decency expected of those in the service of
Position in the judiciary requires greater moral righteousness and uprightness. the judiciary.

Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Brookes Point, Palawan for immorality, alleging that his
wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the MTC Brookes Point,
and Arquero unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife.
Arquero claimed that Acebedo himself had been cohabitating with another
woman. Based on Arqueros testimony, he justified his having a relationship
with Irader solely on the written document purportedly a Kasunduan or
agreement entered into by Acebedo and Irader, consenting to and giving
freedom to either of them to seek any partner and to live with him or her.
ISSUE:
Their conduct, not to mention behavior, is circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility, characterized by, among other things, propriety and
decorum so as to earn and keep the publics respect and confidence in the
judicial service. It must be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with
respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also to their behavior outside
the court as private individuals
Arqueros act of having illicit relations with Irader is, within the purview of
Section 46 (5) of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, a disgraceful and
immoral conduct.

Whether or not Arquero should be held guilty of immorality

HELD:

Arqueros justification fails. Being an employee of the judiciary, Arquero ought

to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the
validity of the marriage between Acebedo and Irader. Article 1 of the Family
Code provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation. It is an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules
established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the
parties.
Unethical notarization of unlawful marital separation agreement - A.C. No.
9081
A.C. No. 9081
"x x x.
he sole issue in this case is whether Omaa violated the Canon of Professional
Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and Espinosas Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay.
he Ruling of this Court
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of
the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.2 The Court has also
ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage
and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and
extrajudiciallydissolving the conjugal partnership,3 which is exactly what
Omaa did in this case.
In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where the
lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in this
case, such as: notarizing a document between the spouses which permitted
the husband to take a concubine and allowed the wife to live with another
man, without opposition from each other;5 ratifying a document entitled
Legal Separation where the couple agreed to be separated from each other
mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizing
each other to remarry, and renouncing any action that they might have against
each other;6 preparing a document authorizing a married couple who had
been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing the right of action
which each may have against the other;7 and preparing a document declaring
the conjugal partnership dissolved.8
We cannot accept Omaas allegation that it was her part-time office staff
whonotarized the contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaa herself
notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff
whonotarized the contract, it only showed Omaas negligence in doing
hernotarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible
for the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this
responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries9 or any member of his
staff.
We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void
document, Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Omaa knew fully well that the
Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay has no legal effect and is against public policy.
Therefore, Omaa may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach of
the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.10
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaa from the practice of law for
ONE YEAR. We REVOKE Atty. Omaas notarial commission, if still existing, and
SUSPEND her as a notary public for TWO YEARS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaas personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all
chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED."
Republic v. Cantor
G.R. No. 184621; December 10, 2013
FACTS:
Sometime in January 1998, Jerry F. Cantor left his wife Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor after a
violent quarrel. After more than four years of not seeing or hearing from Jerry, Maria Fe
filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband. She alleged
that she conducted a diligent search for her husband and exerted earnest efforts to
find him. The RTC granted her petition. Dissatisfied with the ruling, the OSG filed the
present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Did Maria Fe have a well-founded belief that Jerry was dead in pursuant with Article 41
of the Family Code?
HELD:
Whether or not one has a well-founded belief that his or her spouse is dead depends
on the unique circumstance of each case and that there is no set standard or procedure
in determining the same. Maria Fes alleged well-founded belief arose when: 1) Jerrys
relatives and friends could not give her any information on his whereabouts; and 2) she
did not find Jerrys name in the patients directory whenever she went to a hospital. It
appears that Maria Fe did not actively look for her husband in hospitals and it may be
sensed that her search was not intentional or planned. Her search for Jerry was far from
diligent. Were it not for the finality of the RTC ruling, the declaration of presumptive
death should have been recalled and set aside for utter lack of factual basis.
ALMELOR
Article 45
Manuel married Leonida in 1989. They are both medical practitioners. They begot 3
children. 11 years later, Leonida sought to annul her marriage with Manuel claiming
that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations. Leonida testified that Manuel is a harsh disciplinarian and that his policy
towards their children are often unconventional and was the cause of their frequent
fight. Manuel has an unreasonable way of imposing discipline towards their children
but is remarkably so gentle towards his mom. He is more affectionate towards his mom
and this is a factor which is unreasonable for Leonida. Further, Leonida also testified
that Manuel is a homosexual as evidenced by his unusual closeness to his male
companions and that he concealed his homosexuality from Leonida prior to their
marriage. She once caught Manuel talking to a man affectionately over the phone and
she confirmed all her fear when she saw Manuel kiss a man. The RTC ruled that their
marriage is null and void not because of PI but rather due to fraud by reason of
Manuels concealment of his homosexuality (Art 45 of the FC). The CA affirmed the
RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void
due to fraud by reason of Manuels concealment of his homosexuality.
HELD: The SC emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a
marriage. It is the concealment of homosexuality that would. In the case at bar
however, it is not proven that Manuel is a homosexual. The lower court should not have
taken the publics perception against Manuels sexuality. His peculiarities must not be
ruled by the lower court as an indication of his homosexuality for those are not
conclusive and are not sufficient enough to prove so. Even granting that Manuel is
indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was
it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that Leonidas
consent had been vitiated by such.
Bugayong vs. Ginez
GR No. 10033, December 28, 1956 Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be claimed
only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to
FACTS:
the adultery or concubinage.
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on
August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after the marriage,
they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before he went back to
duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez would stay with his sisters who
later moved in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law
and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to Pangasinan to reside with her
mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a local college.

Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiffs sister-in-
law) and some from anonymous writers, which were not produced at the hearing,
informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. He admitted that his wife
informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. All these communications,
prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked him
to consult with the navy legal department.

In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the
house of the defendants godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of
the plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next
day, they slept together in their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on
the information he received but instead of answering, she merely packed up and left
which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for
legal separation.

ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as
a ground for dismissal of the action.

HELD:

Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal

separation. A single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily
is sufficient to constitute condonation and where the parties live in the same house, it is
presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
43 SCRA 177
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there
FACTS:
could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a
August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and
nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the
children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during appellant.
their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese
woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of
legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should
be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on
the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the
parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be
completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner
died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her
death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the
grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article
102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal
separation. Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her
father, Macario Lapuz.

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal
separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD:

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property
rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source
being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so
that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If
death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming,
Ilusorio vs. Bildner
GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000
FACTS:
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued
at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of
Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30
years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant),
Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972.
Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse,
Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner
lived in Antipolo City.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
Potencianos liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was
86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental
capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights
against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right
of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the
exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any
other process.

In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months
in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother
overdose Potenciano which caused the latters health to deteriorate. In February 1998,
Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired
judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did
not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March
1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his
husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her
husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

HELD:

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by

which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To
justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
effective not merely nominal or moral.
VALINO vs ADRIANO et al.
G.R. No. 182894; April 22, 2014; Mendoza, En Banc
DOCTRINE:
The law confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of
the family to the exclusion of ones common law partner.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and
wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common
law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of
man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse
exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third
persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of
the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take
possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting
place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may
receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that
persons having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.
FACTS:
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano) married respondent Rosario Adriano in 1955. The
couple had 5 children and 1 adopted child, also impleaded herein as respondents. The
marriage did turn sour and the couple separated in fact, though Adriano continued to
support his wife and children.
Atty. Adriano then started living with Valino, whom he courted. Atty. Adriano died and
since his immediate family, including respondent were in the United States, Valino took
it upon herself to bury Atty. Adriano at her family's mausoleum. In the meantime,
Respondents heard about the death and requested Valino to delay the burial so they
can pay their final respects, but Valino still buried the body.
Respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for
actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees and that the remains of Atty.
Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot.
Valino claimed that it was Atty. Adriano's last wish to be buried at Valino's family's
mausoleum and that the respondent's knew that Atty. Adriano was already in a coma
yet they still proceeded to the US on vacation. And that as far as the public was
concerned, Valino had been introducing her as his wife for the past 20 years.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the
counterclaim of Valino after it found them to have not been sufficiently proven.
CA reversed [explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to the custody of
the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in
relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate
court that the law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to
make arrangements for the funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled
to such right on the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of
the latters death, notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact.]
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents (wife and children of deceased Atty. Adriano) are
entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
HELD:
YES. The weight of legal provisions puts the responsibility of the burial with the
respondents, to wit:
The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in
accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of
descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be
preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right. (New Civil Code
Art. 305)
Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve
upon the following persons in the order herein provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;

(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and

(4) The brothers and sisters. (Family Code, Art. 199)

No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the

consent of the persons mentioned in Articles [199 of the Family Code] and 305. (New
Civil Code, Art. 308)

As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact
that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he
died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or
renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the
funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.

It is also recognized that a corpse is outside the commerce of man. However, the law
recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a
decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no
legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those
obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take possession of the
dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even
transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may receive the respect of
the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons having this right
may recover the corpse from third persons.
Republic vs. Dayot relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified
their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a
GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008
mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to
FACTS: be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas
marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised
any time.
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In
lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together
for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina
Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.
Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a
complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where
he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured
through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they
executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

HELD:

CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at
the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa
started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration
of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
binding in the Supreme Court.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit