Certiorari Impeachment PDF

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
Manila
REP. CLAVEL A. MARTINEZ

(4th Dist., Cebu),
HERMINIO HARRY L.
ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ
BUTUYAN, ROGER R.
RAYEL, ALFREDO LIGON III,
GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL
REGALADO BAGARES, and
CHRISTOPHER F.C.
BOLASTIG,
Petitioners,
X__________________________X
-versus-
Case No. ______________
Certiorari and Madamus
under RULE 65
THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES of the
13th CONGRESS, represented by
REP. JOSE DE VENECIA, Speaker
of the House of Representatives
and the COMMITTEE ON
JUSTICE, represented by REP.
SIMEON DATUMANONG,
Committee Chairperson,
Respondents.
X__________________________X
1
P E T I T I O N FOR CERTIORARI
A. PREFATORY STATEMENT
1. Ours is a Constitution tempered by the fires of its time. Borne out of a long
struggle for freedom from Martial Law, it has given us a Supreme Court of
innovation,1 one that, in fact, is endowed with expansive powers of, and
yes, duty to, review cases and controversies.
2. Indeed, it is a Constitution that has entrusted upon our High Court the
dutyto settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.2
3. What we then have is a system of judicial review that, as the Supreme Court
has noted in one landmark ruling not too long ago, broadens the scope of
judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions,
would have normally left to the political departments to decide.3
1See Taada v. Angara,G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997.
2 CONST., art. VIII, 1.
3 Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 881211, September 15, 1989; 177 SCRA 695 (1989).
2
4. Under this system, as Justice Roberto Concepcion, the principal proponent of
this innovation, would put it,
The judicial power is meant to be a check against all powers

of government without exception, except that judicial power
must be exercised within the limits confined thereto. A
matter of national defense, national interest, national
welfare is not necessarily beyond the jurisdiction of judicial
power.4
5. The doctrinal reaffirmation of this bedrock principle of a constitutionally
canalized duty of judicial review finds a relevant restatement in a recent
landmark ruling that casts a long shadow over this instant Petitions path:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict,

no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it
may appear to be, over the determination of the nature,
scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers
where the Constitution itself provides for the means and
bases of its resolution...5
6. Today, the duty of the Court to check the abusive acts of another branch of
government in this case, the legislature, in what, in other jurisdictions,
would constitute a political question immune to judicial intervention is
once again being invoked.
7. In this instance, the Petitioners argue that an impeachment proceeding
against the Chief Executive, though described by the same Constitution as
primarily an act of Congress, is not without well-defined constitutional
4 III RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 645-646 (1986).
5 Francisco, et al., v. House of Representatives, et al., G.R. No. 160206, November 10,
2003.[Hereinafter, Francisco case].
3
parameters; where those charged by the Constitution with the sole power to
prosecute an impeachable public officerin this case, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, President of the Philippines transgressed the bounds set by the
same Constitution for the exercise of such power, it would be a clear
stultification of its constitutional responsibility, to borrow from the
language of Justice Cardozo,6 if the Supreme Court refuses to lift a finger to
resolve a constitutional controversy of supreme transcendental and national
importance. 7
6 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 92 (1921).
7 The point can well be seen in the following excerpts from a debate in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission deliberations :
MR. TREAS. Madam President, may I just ask a few questions of the
Committee for clarification.
According to Section 3, subparagraph 2, after a complaint for

impeachment is filed, it is referred to the proper committee of the House
for investigation and report. My question now is: If after the investigation
and report, notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence in support of the
complaint for impeachment and taking into account political
considerations, especially if it is an impeachment against the president
and the House is controlled by his party, and necessarily the committee
also, it is dismissed, the complaint is already denied, am I right?
MR. ROMULO. Yes, that is right.
MR. TREAS. Will the person who filed the impeachment have any
remedy in view of the overwhelming evidence and the fact that the
committee acted in a capricious and whimsical manner?
MR. ROMULO. Under this proposal, the answer must be no that is why
I think Commissioner Davide has some amendments in mind to cure
these gaps in the procedure.
MR. TREAS. May it not be subject of a judicial review?
MR. ROMULO. As the Commissioner knows, in the definition of judicial

power, one might be able to secure a review by certiorari, but that is not
an expeditious remedy. So, we are open to suggestions. II RECORDS
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 287 (1986). [underlining
supplied].
4
8. Once again, the Supreme Court is cast into the eye of a storm, as
constitutional decision-making involves policy-making and, in that sense,
politics8
9. But as it fulfilled its constitutionally-mandated duty in the Francisco case,9
when the High Tribunal struck the impeachment proceedings against its very
Chief Justice, Hilario Davide Jr., as unconstitutional, so should it now
squarely confront this constitutional issue of transcendental ramifications on
our national life, and slay the hydra.
B. PARTIES
10. The Petitioner, Clavel A. Martinez (4th Dist. Cebu), is one of the members of
the House of Representatives of the 13th Congress who had sought to impeach
the President of the Philippines. She is an endorser of one of the
impeachment complaints the amended one in question in this instant case
and is filing this Petition on the legal doctrine that legislators have standing to
maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers, and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office,10 and are allowed to sue to question the validity of
any official action which infringes their prerogatives as legislators.11
8Vicente
V. Mendoza, The Protection of Liberties and Citizens Rights: The Role of the Philippine
Supreme Court, 21 HUMAN RIGHTS L. J. 129 (1999); also excerpted in VICENTE V.V.
MENDOZA, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 296 (2004).
9G.R. No. 160206, November 10, 2003.
10 Del Mar v. PAGCOR, G.R. No.138298, November 29, 2000.
11Kilosbayan v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, November 16, 1995. See also Philippine International
Air Terminals Co., G.R. No.155001, May 5, 2003.
5
11. The Petitioners below, filing the instant Petition in propria personae, are
members of the Roque and Butuyan Law Offices. They are members in good
standing of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, who, as officers of the court,
and as taxpayers and citizens, have a direct interest in the faithful adherence
to constitutional processes of their elected representatives in Congress12:
11.1. Herminio Harry L. Roque Jr.;
11.2. Joel Ruiz Butuyan;
11.3. Roger R. Rayel;
11.4. Alfredo Ligon III;
11.5. Gary S. Mallari;
11.6. Romel Regalado Bagares; and
11.7. Christopher F.C. Bolastig.
12. Respondent, the House of Representatives of the 13th Congress, is represented
by Rep. Jose De Venecia, the incumbent House Speaker.
12 For one, their oath as lawyers obligates them to support the Constitution. Also, as held in the
Francisco case:
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the

constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be
able to show, not only that the law or government act is invalid, but also
that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person
complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statue or act complained of. In
fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest. GR. No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003.
[emphasis supplied].
6
13. Respondent, The Committee on Justice, is represented by Rep. Simeon
Datumanong, the incumbent Committee chairperson.
14. The Respondents may be served with court processes at the House of
Representatives, Batasan Complex, National Government Center, Quezon
City.
C. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
15. On June 27, 2005, lawyer Oliver Lozano filed an unverified complaint for
impeachment against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines
with the House of Representatives of the 13th Congress. hereinafter
ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT].13 It was endorsed by Rep. Rodante
Marcoleta of the Alagad party-list TWO DAYS LATER, on July 29, 2005t.14
16. On June 28, 2005 Lozano filed a supplemental complaint of the same date.15
17. On June 29, 2005, Lozano submitted to the House of Representatives a
second supplemental complaint of the same date.16
13 A copy of the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT is attached as ANNEX A.
14 A copy of the Marcoleta Resolution of Endorsement is attached as ANNEX B.
15 A copy of the [first] supplemental complaint is attached as ANNEX A-1.
16 A copy of second supplemental complaint is attached as ANNEX A-2.
7
18. On June 30, 2005, he filed a third supplemental complaint of the same date.17
19. On the same day, lawyer Joselito Rizaldo Lopez filed a Motion and
Manifestation for Leave to be allowed to be a Co-complainant of Atty. Oliver
Lozano Relative to his Complaint for Impeachment of the same date.18
20. On July 4, 2005, Lozano filed a fourth supplemental complaint dated July 1,
200519, and a fifth supplemental complaint20 dated July 4, 2005.
21. On the same day, Lopez filed his own impeachment complaint, also
unverified, charging Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines,
with betrayal of public trust.21 [hereinafter, LOPEZ COMPLAINT]. The
complaint, curiously similar in language and substance to the ORIGINAL
LOZANO COMPLAINT, was endorsed by Rep. Antonio Alvarez (1st Dist.
Palawan).22
22. On July 5, 2005, Lozano submitted to the House of Representatives a sixth
supplemental complaint of the same date.23
17 A copy of the third supplemental complaint is attached as ANNEX A-3.
18 A copy of the Lopez Motion and Manifestation is attached as ANNEX C.
19 A copy of the fourth supplemental complaint is attached as ANNEX A-4.
20 A copy of the fifth supplemental complaint is attached as ANNEX A-5.
21 A copy of the LOPEZ COMPLAINT is attached as ANNEX D.
22 A copy of the Alvarez Resolution of Endorsement is attached as ANNEX D-1.
23 A copy of the sixth supplemental complaint is attached as ANNEX A-6.
8
23. On July 18, 2005, Rep. Rolex Suplico endorsed the ORIGINAL LOZANO
COMPLAINT.24
24. On July 19, 2005, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines filed
through lawyer Pedro M. Ferrer an Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam
dated July 18, 2005[hereinafter, ANSWER].25
25. On July 21, 2005, Lozano filed a seventh supplemental complaint of the same
date.26 It should be stressed that none of the seven supplemental complaints
was endorsed.
26. On July 25, 2005, at 8:01 a.m., House Speaker De Venecia referred to the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives the ORIGINAL LOZANO
COMPLAINT, the resolutions for endorsement filed by Rep. Marcoleta and
Rex Suplico, along with other documents:27
27. That same day, at around 9:30 a.m. members of the Minority bloc in the
House of Representatives, party-list representatives, and joined by concerned
private citizens filed an AMENDED COMPLAINT before the Office of the
24A copy of the Suplico Resolution of Endorsement is attached as ANNEX B-1. The Committee on
Justice puts it at July 14, 2005. See infra note 36, COMMITTEE REPORT 1012 at 2.
25 A copy of the ANSWER is attached as ANNEX E.
26 A copy of the seventh supplemental complaint is attached as ANNEX A-7.
27A copy of the Speakers Memorandum to the Secretary General dated July 25, 2005 is attached
as ANNEX F.
9
Secretary General of the House of Representatives.28 Lozano himself joined as
a complainant in the AMENDED COMPLAINT, with a signed verification.
28. The same day, in a meeting of the House of Representatives in plenary the
Secretary General, upon direction of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives read on First Reading the three complaints,29 simultaneously
referring all three complaints to the Committee on Justice.
29. On July 26, 2005, the Deputy Secretary General of the House of
Representatives subsequently transmitted all three complaints the
ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT, the AMENDED COMPLAINT, and the
LOPEZ COMPLAINT in one bundle of papers to the Committee on Justice,
which simultaneously received them at 4:20 p.m. of the same day.
30. On the same day, July 26, 2005, Lopez filed a Motion and Affidavit of
Withdrawal/Desistance.30
28A copy of the AMENDED COMPLAINT is attached as ANNEX G. The complaint carried the
heading thus: In Re Impeachment of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President, Republic of the
Philippines.
29A copy of the Journal records containing the pertinent information is attached as ANNEX G-1
[H.R. JOURNAL, 13th CONG. 2d Sess. 17-18 (July 25, 2005)]. See also ANNEX G-2, a copy of the
Order of Business of the House of Representatives in plenary, for July 25, 2005, under the section
Reference of Business, through which the three complaints were simultaneously referred to the
Committee on Justice.
30 A copy of the Motion and Affidavit of Withdrawal is attached as ANNEX H-4
10
31. On August 1, 2005, the House of Representative sitting in plenary adopted a
new set of Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings [hereinafter,
RULES OF PROCEDURE].31
32. On August 3, 2005, Lopez filed a Rescission of Withdrawal.32
33. On August 10, 2005, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines,
filed through her lawyer a Motion to Strike of the same date.33
34. It was also the same day the Committee opened its first hearing of the
impeachment proceeding against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Philippines.
35. Instead of immediately determining the sufficiency of form and substance of
the three complaints, the Committee chairperson, Rep. Simeon Datumanong,
(2nd Dist. Maguindanao), allowed Rep. Edcel C. Lagman (1st Dist. Albay) to
present a list of seven prejudicial questions, 34 to wit:
31 A copy of the RULES OF PROCEDURE is attached as ANNEX F-1.
32A copy of the Rescission of Withdrawal is attached as ANNEX H-5.
33 A copy of the Motion to Strike is attached as ANNEX I.
34 A copy of the Lagman list of prejudicial questions is attached as ANNEX J.
11
35.1. Was the amended complaint which was filed on 25 July 2005
properly or seasonably interposed or is it a prohibited pleading under
Article XI of the Constitution and the pertinent Rules on Impeachment of
the House of Representatives?
35.2. Considering that the amended complaint was file don 25 July 2005
when the House had not yet adopted the Rules of Procedure on
Impeachment in the 13th Congress, under what standard or rule should
the filing of the amended complaint be assessed?
35.3. Since the amended complaint radically and substantially
supplanted the original Lozano complaint, should it be considered as a
separate, independent and new complaint?
35.4. If it is considered a separate or new complaint, is it barred by the
one-year rule which provides that no impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.35
35.5. How will the amended complaint be assessed under the standard or
definition of initiating impeachment proceedings in the case of Ernesto B.
Francisco Jr., et al. v. House of Representatives, et al.,36?
35Rep. Lagman referred to CONST. Art. XI, 3(5) here.
36G.R. No. 160206, November 10, 2003.
12
35.6. Did the amended complaint supersede the original Lozano
complaint so much so that the Lozano complaint will be subsumed under
the amended complaint and considering further that Atty. Oliver Lozano
signed the verification attached to the amended complaint thereby giving
his conformity to the amended complaint?
35.7. What is the import and effect of respondents filing of an early
answer on the amended complaint?
36. In that same hearing, Rep. Datumanong also raised the following issues:
36.1. Whether or not to consider the impeachment complaints one by
one as referred by the House;
36.2. Whether or not to consolidate the complaints like bills of the same
subject matter pending before a Committee of the House;
36.3. What is the effect of the Amended Complaint, which was the third
to be referred by the House to the Committee, on the first complaint of
Atty. Lozano?37
These issues were reflected in the Agenda sent out by the Committee the next day, along with a
37
Notice of Meeting, see infra note 38.
13
37. However, before the Committee on Justice could discuss the prejudicial
questions and Rep. Datumanongs above-quoted issues, the hearing was
suspended after members of the Minority bloc in the Committee, led by Rep.
Suplico, questioned the chairs ruling that that only regular and ex officio
members of the committee will be allowed to participate in the debates.
Thereafter, the chair moved for an executive session to resolve the
controversy.
38. On August 11, 2005 the Committee on Justice sent out notices to its members
regarding two hearings set for August 16-17, 2005, along with the Agenda for
the hearings.38 Without the prior approval of the members of the Committee
on Justice, Rep. Datumanong included in the Agenda, the above-quoted
issues and Rep. Lagmans prejudicial questions.
39. On August 16, 2005, despite the objections raised by many members of the
pro-impeachment bloc, the chairperson, Rep. Datumanong proceeded with
deliberations on the prejudicial questions.
40. The next several hearings of the Committee on Justice was marked by
protracted debates on the propriety of deliberating over the prejudicial
questions, with the majority, by sheer force of number, prevailing over the
minority when it came to a vote, 54-24, on August 23, 2005.
38A copy of the Notice of Meeting is attached as ANNEX K ; a certified true copy of the Agenda is
attached as ANNEX K-1
14
41. In the end, the Committee on Justice whittled the prejudicial questions
down to two questions that would prove prejudicial to the AMENDED
COMPLAINT: (a) Is the AMENDED COMPLAINT filed on 25 July 2005 a
separate and new complaint instead of amendatory to the Lozano complaint
filed on 25 July 2005 a separate and new complaint instead of amendatory to
the Lozano complaint filed on 27 June 2005? (b) Did the Lozano complaint
bar the Lopez complaint and the AMENDED COMPLAINT pursuant to Art.
XII 3(5) of the 1987 Constitution?39
42. On August 30, 2005, members of the minority walked out of the hearing of
the Committee on Justice, denouncing it as a sham proceeding and
declaring that they will no longer participate in the deliberations.
43. This came after Rep. Datumanong moved to finally put to a vote the first
prejudicial question on whether the amended impeachment complaint is
separate and distinct from the one originally filed by Lozano against Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines, over objections raised by
members of the minority that the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT was a
sham complaint.
44. Rep. Datumanong also denied an appeal made by Rep. Robert Ace Barbers
(2nd Dist. Surigao Del Norte) to defer the voting and allow him to speak on a
revelation made by former Social Welfare Secretary Dinky Soliman at a press
conference in Makati City that morning that the ORIGINAL LOZANO
39 See ANNEX L, infra, at 13.
15
COMPLAINT was part of a plot by Malacaang to preempt a genuine
impeachment proceeding against the President.40
45. The walkout did not deter the majority in the Committee on Justice from
continuing with the proceedings and voting on the two prejudicial questions.
46. Despite the absence of member of the minority in the proceedings, the
Committee on Justice (a) voted 46-0, with one abstention, to declare the
ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT as being sufficient in form; and (b) voted
49-1, with two abstentions, to declare the same complaint insufficient in
substance.
47. By the first vote, the Committee on Justice held the AMENDED
IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT and the LOPEZ COMPLAINT as separate and
distinct from the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT, and deemed these two
other complaints as barred by the ruling of the Supreme Court in the
Francisco case. By the second vote, the Committee on Justice effectively shut
down the impeachment proceeding against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Philippines.
40For an account of the walkout and the subsequent events involving the Committee on Justice,
see Alecks Pabico,Lutong Makaw Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), August
30, 2005, available at http://www.pcij.org/blog/?p=343 <last visited September 20, 2005>; and
Alecks Pabico, Lozano Complaint Sufficient in Form, Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism (PCIJ), August 31, 2005, available at http://www.pcij.org/blog/?p=349 <last visited
September 20, 2005>.
16
48. The decision by vote of the majority of the Committee on Justice (a) to
treat the AMENDED COMPLAINT and the ORIGINAL LOZANO
COMPLAINT as separate and distinct from each another; (b) to dismiss the
AMENDED COMPLAINT and the LOPEZ COMPLAINT for supposedly being
barred by the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT, and eventually, (c) to
dismiss the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT for being insufficient in
substance despite being sufficient in form was carried, among other matters,
in a Committee Report subsequently transmitted to the House of
Representatives sitting in plenary.41
49. The dispositive portion of COMMITTEE REPORT 1012 reads thus:
ACCORDINGLY, the Committee on Justice finds, resolves

and concludes that:
1. The Amended Complaint which was filed on 25 July

2006 is a new and separate complaint which is not
merely amendatory to the Lozano Complaint which was
filed on 27 June 2005;
2. The Lozano Complaint, having been filed and referred

to the Committee on Justice or initiated before the
Lopez Complaint, which was filed on 04 July 2005, and
the Amended Complaint, which was filed on 25 July
2005, barred the two subsequent complaints pursuant to
the one-year bar rule provided for in Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution;
3. The Lozano Complaint, while sufficient in form, is

deficient in substance; and
4. The Amended Complaint and the Lopez Complaint

are dismissed for being prohibited complaints and the
Lozano Complaint is dismissed for not being sufficient
in substance.
These dispositions confirm the Committee Report approved

in principle by the requisite majority on 31 August 2005.
41A certified true copy of the H.R. REP. No. 1012 (Sept. 5, 2005) is attached as ANNEX
L.[Hereinafter, COMMITTEE REPORT 1012).
17
It is further recommended that this Committee Report and
its accompanying Resolution be approved in a Plenary Roll
call vote pursuant to Section 3(3) of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution.42
50. On September 6, 2005, the House of Representatives by a vote of more than
two-thirds of all its Members, decided to affirm the action and report of the
Committee on Justice. The House of Representatives voted 158-51, with six
abstentions, to approve COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, dismissing all three
impeachment complaints filed before the chamber.43
51. Under the Rules adopted on October 27, 2004 by the House of
Representatives [hereinafter, HOUSE RULES] to govern its proceedings,
when a measure is adopted or lost, a member of the committee who voted
with the majority, may move for its reconsideration on the same or succeeding
day. The HOUSE RULES only allows one (1) motion for reconsideration.44
52. The opportunity to revive the impeachment proceeding against Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines, came on September 19, 2005,
when the House of Representatives of the 13th Congress resumed session.
42 COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, at 33-34.
43 A certified true copy of the record of proceedings of the House of Representatives voting in
plenary to ratify and accept COMMITTEE REPORT 1012 is attached as ANNEX M. In any case,
this matter can well be considered as one of public record, and of judicial notice. See also the
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) blog entry, by Alecks Pabico, A Death
Foretold, for a news report of the results of the vote, available at
http://www.pcij.org/blog/?p=367 <last visited September 5, 2005>. It must also be said that
members of the pro-impeachment bloc had vigorously objected to what they said was the
questionable manner in which it was drafted.
44HOUSE RULES, Chap. IX, 39.
18
53. However, a lack of quorum barred the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration
as so described in the HOUSE RULES.45 It in effect made such filing moot
and academic.
45This is now a matter of judicial notice. For an account of what transpired at the House of
Representatives on that day, the Petitioners reproduce here in full the following newspaper
article regarding the matter:
Lack of House quorum foils effort to revive impeachment
Lack of quorum in the House of Representatives during yesterdays

resumption of sessions effectively barred pro-impeachment lawmakers
from reviving their junked complaint against President Arroyo,
effectively burying the issue six feet under.
Only 104 of the 236 members of the chamber showed up yesterday,

which forced Congress to adjourn the session shortly before 5 p.m. Some
50 House members are still out of the country, mostly in New York where
they attended the United Nations summit.
The absence of deliberations in the House plenary prevented a member

of the majority, whom members of the minority were banking on, to raise
a motion for reconsideration on the Sept. 6 historic ruling that voted 158-
51 to junk the complaints.
Under the rules, any congressman who voted in the majority (neither of
the opposition nor one of six lawmakers who abstained) can raise the
appeal on the next session day immediately after voting was completed,
or yesterday.
"Procedurally, the impeachment is dead. And Congress can do nothing

about it," House Minority Leader Francis Escudero acknowledged to
reporters, at the same time warning Mrs. Arroyo that the issue will
continue to "haunt and hound" her wherever she goes.
His colleague, Cibac party-list Rep. Joel Villanueva, son of evangelist Bro.
Eddie Villanueva who also joined calls for Mrs. Arroyos ouster, said this
has always been the majoritys tack, to win on technicalities. "Its always
been a technical knockout."
Pro-impeachment Rep. Rolex Suplico of Iloilo City questioned the way in

which Congress computed the quorum, saying the 50 lawmakers abroad
should be excluded from the computation because they cannot be
compelled to attend sessions.
"The computation should be 236 minus 50, which equals 186, divided by
two, then 93 comes up, then you add one. Thats 94," he stressed, citing a
precedent in jurisprudence, Avelino vs Cuenco.
Chances of bringing the case to the Supreme Court, according to San

Juan Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, head of the impeachment legal team, are
also nil, following the dismissal of two separate petitions filed by lawyers
Oliver Lozano and Ernesto Francisco Jr.
"Were looking at a peoples tribunal or peoples court. Of course, we also

dont want to have a kangaroo court. Thats what we are discussing right
now. Its not extra-constitutional but I dont think theres something
illegal about it," he said.
Sorsogon City Rep. Escudero said the challenge now is for Mrs. Arroyo to
19
D. NATURE OF THE CASE
54. This is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the RULES
OF COURT.
55. This Petition asks of this Honorable Court to nullify the constitutionally
contemptible acts of the Committee on Justice as embodied in COMMITTEE
REPORT 1012, and their affirmation by the House of Representatives of the
13th Congress, voting in plenary, and to direct the House of Representatives to
designate her legal team to defend her on charges that she cheated her
way to victory in the May 2004 polls.
The opposition may only file another impeachment petition a year from
now.
Wishful thinking
Administration lawmakers, meantime, described as "wishful thinking"

attempts by their opponents to revive the impeachment complaint, as the
158 congressmen who voted to dismiss the complaint remain "solid."
"No amount of propaganda or bluffing can persuade anyone from the

majority to support the complainants bid to reverse the House decision,"
Eastern Samar Rep. Marcelino Libanan said.
"There is no chance the pro-impeachment group can convince anyone

from the anti-impeachment congressmen to move for reconsideration.
The 158 votes are still solid," he added.
Davao del Sur Rep. Douglas Cagas urged their colleagues instead to focus
on their legislative priorities. "The pro-impeachment group should stop
living in the past and thinking of what-might-have-beens."
"The nation needs to focus on urgent problems and concerns. Surely the
pro-impeachment solons did not run for office just to oust the President.
They should not be too obsessed with this undertaking," he said.
As this developed, the fate of Ilocos Norte Rep. Imee Marcos and her
status in the House minority bloc is still undecided as Escudero said their
reorganization depends on the "movements" of those in the majority,
who may also purge their ranks.
The daughter of the late strongman is in danger of losing her

membership on the powerful Commission on Appointments, the lone slot
provided to the minority bloc, following her mysterious absence during
the historic House plenary voting junking the impeachment complaint.
See Delon Porcalla, Lack of Quorom Foils Effort to Revive

Impeachment, The Philippine Star, September 20, 2005, available at
http://philstar.com/philstar/News200509200403.htm <last visited
September 20, 2005>.
20
remand the AMENDED COMPLAINT to the Committee on Justice for a
constitutional determination of its sufficiency of form and substance.
56. The Petitioners, on account of the instant suits urgent, novel and
transcendental nature, assert that there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
E. TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION
57. On September 7, 2005, the Petitioners received a certified true copy of
COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, of the Committee on Justice dated September 5,
2005. Subsequently, on September 8, 2005, the Petitioners received a
certified true copy of record of the questioned plenary vote.
58. Under Rule 65, 4 of the RULES OF COURT, the Petitioners have sixty (60)
days from the date of the questioned acts or the date of receipt of the
questioned documents within which to file this Petition to question
COMMITTEE REPORT 1012 and the plenary vote made to affirm and accept
its findings and conclusions.
59. This Petition is therefore, filed on time. The corresponding docket and other
lawful fees and deposit for costs are paid simultaneously with the filing of this
Petition.
21
F. SUBMISSIONS
I.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN PLENARY COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RATIFIED BY VOTE OF 158-51, THE
DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE BY MAJORITY VOTE,
AND AS EMBODIED IN COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, TO DISCUSS
PREJUDICIAL AND THRESHOLD QUESTIONS AHEAD OF A
DETERMINATION OF THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF THE THREE
IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINTS, IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND ITS OWN RULES OF PROCEDURE.
II.

OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RATIFIED BY A VOTE OF 158-51, THE
AND AS EMBODIED IN COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, TO TREAT THE
AMENDED COMPLAINT AS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE
ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT, CONSIDERING THAT THE
DEFECTIVE ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT HAS ALREADY BEEN
SUPERSEDED BY THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WHILE THE LOPEZ
COMPLAINT, IT BEING FRAUGHT WITH PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE INFIRMITIES, IS OF NO LEGAL EFFECT.
III.

AND AS EMBODIED IN COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, TO DISMISS
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AS A PROHIBITED PLEADING UNDER
THE RULING IN THE FRANCISCO CASE WHEN IT IS CLEAR THAT
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE VARIOUS APPLICABLE
RULES OF PROCEDURE, THE ONE-YEAR CONSTITUTIONAL BAR
DOES NOT APPLY.
IV.
PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF

MANDAMUS, CONSIDERING THAT BOTH THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES IN PLENARY AND THE COMMITTEE ON
JUSTICE REFUSED TO PERFORM A POSITIVE DUTY THE
CONSTITUTION DEMANDS OF THEM IN THE CONDUCT OF AN
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDING.
22
F. DISCUSSION
I. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN PLENARY COMMITTED

AND AS EMBODIED IN COMMITTEE REPORT 1012,46 TO DISCUSS
PREJUDICIAL AND THRESHOLD QUESTIONS AHEAD OF A
DETERMINATION OF THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF THE THREE
IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINTS, IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND ITS OWN RULES OF PROCEDURE.
60. It should be stressed that neither the Constitution nor the RULES OF
PROCEDURE allows deliberations on prejudicial questions in an
impeachment proceeding. In fact, the rules only provide a two-stage process
of deliberation on the sufficiency of any impeachment complaint: the first
being sufficiency as to form, and the second being sufficiency as to substance.
These are the only threshold matters to be deliberated upon by the Committee
on Justice on the sufficiency of an impeachment complaint, nothing more,
nothing less.47
61. By interjecting deliberations on prejudicial questions prior to a
determination of form and substance, the majority in the Committee on
Justice amended the RULES OF PROCEDURE. The RULES OF PROCEDURE
was approved by the plenary; these rules cannot be amended by the sheer
action of the majority in the Committee on Justice. Consequently, the
Committee on Justice exceeded its authority and violated the Constitution, for
more than amending the RULES OF PROCEDURE, by majority vote, the
Committee on Justice amended the Constitution itself when it provided for a
46 COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, at 13-22.
47See RULES OF PROCEDURE, RULE III 4.
23
deliberation on prejudicial questions ahead of a determination of form and
substance of the complaints.48
62. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, so said a path-breaking ruling
that established the historic basis of the power of judicial review, that the
constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or that the legislature
may alter the constitution by an ordinary act49
63. It went on thus:
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The

constitution is either a superior paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with
ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable
when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative

act contrary to the constitution is not law; if the latter part be
true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the
48 Under the HOUSE RULES,
Standing and special committees may adopt their own rules by a majority
vote of all their members, Provided, That these are consistent with these
rules and will not expand or in any way alter their jurisdictions as
provided herein. See HOUSE RULES, Chap. IX, 34.
The HOUSE RULES moreover provides that,
Any provision of these Rules, except those that are also embodied in the
Constitution, may be amended by a majority vote of all the Members of
the House. See HOUSE RULES, Chap. XXV, 150.
It is clear that granting that the Committee on Justice may amend the RULES OF PROCEDURE,
it may not amend such rules where to do so would go against the provisions of the Constitution
setting the parameters within which it may deliberate in the case of a pending impeachment
proceeding.
49Marbury v. Madison 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1903), as excerpted in MENDOZA,
supra note 8, at 11.
24
part of the people, to limit a power in its nature
illimitable50
64. Moreover, prejudicial questions are plainly improper in impeachment
proceedings before the Committee on Justice that, under the RULES OF
PROCEDURE, only have jurisdiction, at that juncture, to tackle questions of
form and substance.
65. Allowing the discussion of prejudicial questions is a legal anomaly and can
only stem from a gross misunderstanding of criminal procedure as applied in
an impeachment proceeding.
66. In fact, any sophomore law student worth her salt knows what a prejudicial
question is all about. An eminent scholar of legal procedure, Prof. Antonio
Bautista, correctly describes the existence of prejudicial question as a
situation when,
The same or similar issue, factual, or legal or mixed, may be

raised in a pending civil litigation and in a pending criminal
prosecution. Each court which has jurisdiction over the civil
case and/or the criminal action is competent to adjudicate
this issue.51
67. The REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [hereinafter, RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] have outlined the elements of this doctrine of
prejudicial question in this wise:
50Marbury v. Madison 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1903), as excerpted in MENDOZA,

supra note 8, at 11.
51AntonioR. Bautista, Precedence and Pre-Emption in Adjudication: The Doctrine of Prejudicial

Question, 78 PHIL.L. J. 1 (2003).
25
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A
petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be
filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting
the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has
been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be
filed in the same criminal action any time before the
prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a

prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed..52
68. The most cursory reading of these sections of the RULES OF COURT will
show that no such prejudicial question exists in the impeachment
proceeding against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines.
69. The majority in the Committee on Justice has conveniently forgotten that this
is an impeachment proceeding. As such, it is sui generis. 53
70. It must be said that suspiciously, the prejudicial questions raised by Rep.
Lagman, along with the other arguments raised in COMMITTEE REPORT
1012 against the AMENDED COMPLAINT, all sound strikingly similar to
52RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 111, 6 and 7.
53Seethe concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Reynato Puno in the Francisco case, where
he says:
I therefore respectfully submit that there is now a commixture of

political and judicial components in our reengineered concept of
impeachment. It is for this reason and more that impeachment
proceedings are classified as sui generis. To be sure, our impeachment
proceedings are indigenous, a kind of its own. They have been shaped by
our distinct political experience especially in the last fifty years See G.R.
No. 160206, November 10, 2003.
26
those found in the ANSWER and the MOTION TO STRIKE filed by the
Presidents lawyer, Pedro M. Ferrer. In the first place, as raised in the
deliberations of the Committee on Justice by many of the endorsers and/or
complainants, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has no legal standing yet to appear
before the Committee on Justice. The pertinent provision of the RULES OF
PROCEDURE adopted by the House of Representatives of the 13th Congress
provides thus:
Section 5. Notice to Respondent and Time to Plead.

If the committee finds the complaint sufficient in form and
substance, it shall immediately furnish the respondent with
a copy of the resolution and/or verified complaint, as the
case may be, with written notice that he shall answer the
complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice thereof
and serve a copy of the answer to the complainant or
complainants. No motion to dismiss shall be allowed within
the period to answer the complaint.54
71. Indeed, both the Constitution and the RULES OF PROCEDURE prohibit the
filing of any pleading by the Respondent until after the Committee on Justice
has made a determination on the sufficiency of any impeachment complaint
with respect to form and substance.55 At this point in the impeachment
process, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has no personality to appear by counsel.
She as yet has no locus standi. Both the Answer and the Motion to Strike are
functus oficio, mere scraps of paper.
72. At any rate, a prejudicial question goes into the heart of substance. Under the
54 RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule III 5.[italics supplied] Just like the procedure in preliminary
investigation in ordinary criminal cases, the Committee on Justice, which acts as the investigating
prosecutor, shall determine on its own whether the complaint is sufficient in form and substance.
If it is determined to be sufficient, then the respondent must file his answer, not a motion to
dismiss.
55 See RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule III 4 and 5.
27
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE and jurisprudence, a prejudicial
question is no mere procedural matter but deals with a substantive issue
determinative of the guilt of an accused in a criminal proceeding.56 In fact, it
can well be said that a prejudicial question deals with the issue of jurisdiction,
one that, under the RULES OF PROCEDURE, is clearly a matter of substance.
As the pertinent provision of the RULES OF PROCEDURE puts it:
Should the committee find the complaint sufficient in form,

it shall then determine if the complaint is sufficient in
substance. The requirement of substance is met if there is a
recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee. If the
committee finds that the complaint is not sufficient in
substance, it shall dismiss the complaint and shall submit its
report as provided hereunder.57
73. Therefore, the House of Representatives in plenary committed a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ratified by a
vote of 158-51 the decision of the Committee on Justice, as recorded in
COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, to discuss prejudicial and threshold questions
56Asthe existence of a civil case is often held as a defense in a criminal proceeding involving the
same issue, or at the very least, as something determinative of whether or not the criminal action
may proceed. See the discussion in Bautista, supra note 51, at 10.
The scholar of procedural law himself proposes to do away with the doctrine altogether. In his
study of the doctrine, he made the following conclusion:
The doctrine of prejudicial question serves no useful purpose. The

specter of confusing rulings on the same issues is just that a
specter[T]he doctrine has conduced to much harm and unnecessary
litigation over elusive and conceptually befuddling issues of sameness,
determinativeness and precedenceIt would be best to do away
altogether with the doctrine of prejudicial question. Let the criminal
court decide the issue regardless of whether the same or similar result is
contemporaneously litigated in a civil action. There is no good reason for
the criminal court, which may even be the same court, to defer to the civil
court. Bautista, supra note 51, at 24-25.
If that is so, this Honorable Committee will have done well to simply disregard these supposed
prejudicial and threshold issues raised by the Respondent, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and get on
with its duty to determine the sufficiency of form and substance of the three complaints now
before it.
57RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule III 4(b).
28
ahead of a determination of the form and substance of the three impeachment
complaints, in violation of the Constitution and the RULES OF PROCEDURE.
II. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN PLENARY COMMITTED

AND AS EMBODIED IN COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, TO TREAT THE
AMENDED COMPLAINT AS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE
ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT, CONSIDERING THAT THE
DEFECTIVE ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT HAS ALREADY BEEN
SUPERSEDED BY THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WHILE THE LOPEZ
COMPLAINT, IT BEING FRAUGHT WITH PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE INFIRMITIES, IS OF NO LEGAL EFFECT.
The ORIGINAL LOZANO

COMPLAINT is stricken with a
basic jurisdictional defect it was
not endorsed by a member of the
House of Representatives of the
13th Congress at the time it was
filed.
74. A most basic consideration must not be glossed over: at the time the
ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT was filed, it did not have the endorsement
of a member of the present House of Representatives.
75. This is a jurisdictional defect that effectively deprives the House of
Representatives of any jurisdiction over the ORIGINAL LOZANO
COMPLAINT.
76. Art. XI 3(2) of the Constitution provides that:
29
A verified complaint may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from
such referral. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof. [emphasis supplied].
77. In the case of the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT, the endorsement
by Rep. Marcoleta only came into the scene TWO DAYS LATER. This is
a fatal law that effectively deprives the ORIGINAL LOZANO
COMPLAINT of any legal personality and effect.
78. The Constitution provides that the impeachment complaint may be
filed by a citizen upon a resolution of endorsement58 by any member
of the House of Representatives. The endorsement must come with the
filing of the complaint, otherwise the complaint becomes stricken with
a fatal jurisdictional defect. A reasonable construction of this
constitutional requirement cannot agree with a situation where the
endorsement came after the filing of the complaint. This is a provision
evidently placed there by the framers of the Constitution as yet another
check against frivolous impeachment complaints.
58 CONST. Art. XI 3(2).
30
In sheer bad faith, the Committee
on Justice, by a majority vote,
insisted on the ORIGINAL
LOZANO COMPLAINT when its
members knew the complaint was
stricken with yet another
jurisdictional defect: it was not
properly verified.
79. The Constitution, which has established the parameters for the conduct of
impeachment proceedings, requires a verification for any impeachment
complaint to be valid, as can be seen in the following pertinent provisions of
the Charter:
A verified complaint may be filed by any Member of the

House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution
of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days,
and referred to the proper Committee within three session
days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to
the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution
shall be calendared for consideration by the House within
ten session days from receipt thereof59
In case the verified complaint or resolution of

impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members
of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed60
80.The RULES OF PROCEDURE adopted by the House of Representatives of the
13th Congress unequivocally requires that an impeachment complaint be
verified:
59 CONST. art. XI, 3 (2) [emphasis supplied].
60 CONST. art. XI, 3(4) [emphasis supplied].
31
Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. -
Impeachment shall be initiated by the filing and subsequent
referral to the Committee on Justice of:
(a) a verified complaint for impeachment filed by any

Member of the House of Representatives or;
(b) a verified complaint filed by any citizen upon a

resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof; or
(c) a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment

filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the
House.61
81. Moreover, the RULES OF PROCEDURE specifically outlined the form of the
verification in this wise:
The contents of the verification shall be as follows:
We, after being sworn in accordance with law, depose and

state. That we are the complainants in the above-entitled
complaint/resolution of impeachment; that we have caused
the said complaint/resolution to be prepared and have read
the contents thereof; and that the allegations therein are true
of our own knowledge and belief on the basis of our reading
and appreciation of documents and other records pertinent
thereto62
82. In the case of the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT and its supplements,
none of them has been properly verified at all.
61RULES OF PROCEDURE, RULE II, 2. [emphasis supplied]. A verification, according to case

law, is intended to assure that the allegations in the pleading have been prepared in good faith or
are true and correct, not mere speculations See Robern Dev't. Corp. v. Quitain, 315 SCRA 150,
159 (1999).
62 RULES OF PROCEDURE, RULE IV, 13.
32
83. Instead, each of these pleadings only carried what amounts to a JURAT
usually found at the end of an affidavit, which is subscribed and sworn to
before a Notary Public.63
84. To illustrate, the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT only bears the following
statement at the end of the document:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27th day of

June 2005, in Quezon City. I certify that I personally
examined the affiant who understood and voluntarily
executed his affidavit64
85. Hence, it strains the credulity of ordinary citizens that despite this fatal
infirmity found in the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT and its
supplements, the Committee on Justice, through a majority vote, insisted that
the complaint is sufficient in form.
63In contrast to the verification, a jurat "is that part of an affidavit in which the officer certifies
that the instrument was sworn to before him It is not a part of a pleading but merely evidences
the fact that the affidavit was properly madeBuenaventura v. NBP Officials, G.R. No. 114829
March 1, 1995, citing Theobald v. Chicago Ry. Co., 75 Ill. App. 208; Young v. Wooden, 265 SW 24,
204 Ky. 694; and LORENZO M. TAADA & FRANCISCO A. RODRIGO, MODERN LEGAL
FORMS, VOL. I, 31 (6th ed., 1985). The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice defines the jurat in this
wise: It is an act in which an individual on a single occasion,
appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or

document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such
instrument or document.
64ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT, at 5. All the supplemental complaints Lozano filed also
carried the jurat, and not a verification. The records of the Committee on Justice will readily bear
out this fact.
33
86. Yet it is not surprising that the Majority in the Committee on Justice
preferred the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT its defects and infirmities
are an assurance that the President will not be impeached and convicted. It is
crystal clear that it cannot even pass the test of form, precisely because it has
not been properly verified.
87. Hence, COMMITTEE REPORT 1012 could say with some air of nonchalance
and without any legal basis at all, that since Lozano is a member of the
Philippine Bar, his signature as a lawyer suffices [sic] a verification because
he was the one who prepared the complaint in his own behalf, not for his
client65 Certainly, a JURAT could not be considered substantial compliance
to the requirement that the complaint be verified.
88. Accordingly, it was in sheer bad faith that the Committee on Justice insisted
that it first tackle legally and constitutionally impermissible prejudicial
questions in order to dismiss the AMENDED COMPLAINT.
89. This strategy concocted by the tyranny of numbers in the Committee on
Justice for the eventual rejection of the AMENDED COMPLAINT is clearly
seen in its decision to first consider purportedly prejudicial questions ahead
of a constitutional determination of the form and substance of the complaints.
65COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, at 23.
34
90. Consequently, with the AMENDED COMPLAINT later dismissed, along with
the LOPEZ COMPLAINT, as a prohibited pleading, the Committee on Justice
then supposedly reviewed the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT and its
supplements, for a determination of substance, and thereafter dismissed it as
well.
91. Whether as a result of harried oversight or out of a desire to project some
measure of deliberative due process to the public, the Committee on Justice
actually passed upon matters of substance found in the AMENDED
COMPLAINT, and this, in the absence of any hearing at all where the
complainants were allowed to present evidence on these matters. 66
The LOPEZ COMPLAINT is

fraught with even graver
infirmities flaws that render it,
like the ORIGINAL LOZANO
COMPLAINT and its supplements,
constitutionally and procedurally
infirm.
92. The LOPEZ COMPLAINT fares worse than the ORIGINAL LOZANO
COMPLAINT. Lopez labeled his complaint a verified one, which is farthest
from the truth, as the records of the House of Representatives, and its
Committee on Justice, will bear out. Like the ORIGINAL LOZANO
66See COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, at 29-30.
35
COMPLAINT and its supplements, the LOPEZ COMPLAINT only carried a
JURAT. 67
93. In fact, the LOPEZ COMPLAINT is stricken with other formal and
substantive defects. For one, some three weeks after it was filed, or on July
26, 2005, the complainant withdrew the LOPEZ COMPLAINT, citing poor
health as a reason.
94. Then, on August 3, 2005, the complainant filed a pleading of the same date
styled as a Rescission of Withdrawal with the House of Representatives,
saying that [a]fter due consideration, and after having been advised by well
meaning friends that my participation in the proceedings is an imperative
duty as a law-abiding citizen, I have decided to rescind my withdrawal.
95. Hence, we have a LOPEZ COMPLAINT riddled with the following infirmities
(a) the complainant did not properly verify it; (b) he subsequently withdrew it
on July 26, 2005, or a day after it was referred along with the two other
complaints to the Committee on Justice; (c) he changed his mind and on
August 3, 2005, he filed with the Committee on Justice a Rescission of
Withdrawal.
67 The jurat in the LOPEZ COMPLAINT states thus: SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me
this 4 July 2005 in Quezon City. I hereby certify that I have personally examined the
Complainant/Affiant who understood and voluntarily executed this Complaint/Affidavitat 11.
For all intents and purposes, the LOPEZ COMPLAINT is a mere restatement of the ORIGINAL
LOZANO COMPLAINT.
36
96. Under the RULES OF PROCEDURE, a complaint found to be insufficient in
form shall be referred back to Secretary General, with a written explanation of
insufficiency. The Secretary General then returns it to the complainant along
with the committees explanation.68
97. Three reasons prevent the LOPEZ COMPLAINT from acquiring any legal
validity at all in the present impeachment proceeding.
98. In the first place, the complainant withdrew it.
99. In the second place, having withdrawn it, he cannot have the House of
Representatives re-institute it by the mere expediency of filing a Rescission
of Withdrawal for the reasons that (a) there is no such rescission under
either the Constitution or the RULES OF PROCEDURE, or even the 1997
REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE [Hereinafter, RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE] or RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] and (b) granting that
such a rescission is allowed, the re-institution will still be of no legal effect
because the LOPEZ COMPLAINT has not been properly verified. In other
words, he cannot re-institute a complaint that cannot at all have any legal
effect because of a formal and jurisdictional infirmity.
68The pertinent provision states thus: - Upon due referral, the Committee on Justice shall
determine whether the complaint is sufficient in form and substance. If the committee finds
that the complaint is insufficient in form, it shall return the same to the Secretary General
within three (3) session days with a written explanation of the insufficiency. The Secretary
General shall return the same to the complainant or complainants together with the
committee's written explanation within three (3) session days from receipt of the committee
resolution finding the complaint insufficient in formRULES OF PROCEDURE, RULE III, 4.
37
100. In the third place, while the complainant may in fact reformulate his
complaint to comply with the verification requirement, he may no longer file
the reformulated complaint within the same year because it will be barred by
the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Francisco case considering the
existence of the Amended Complaint, which alone meets formal and
substantive requirements of the Constitution of the three impeachment
complaints, as will be shown in the succeeding sections of this pleading.
Under the Constitution, the issue

of verification of an impeachment
complaint is jurisdictional. In the
absence of a proper verification in
an impeachment complaint, the
Committee on Justice cannot take
cognizance of it.
101. That the presence (or absence of) verification in an impeachment
complaint is a jurisdictional matter is clearly borne out in the language of the
Constitution. It speaks of a verified69 complaint.
102. The verification of an impeachment complaint is a formal requirement
that cannot be dispensed with. The Constitution specifically provided that an
impeachment complaint must be verified. Without a proper verification,
there can be no valid impeachment complaint. Without a proper verification,
the House of Representatives cannot assume jurisdiction over an
impeachment complaint. Under the Constitution, the RULES OF
6969 See CONST. art. XI, 3 (2) and (4).
38
PROCEDURE, the RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE and jurisprudence, the
JURAT as used in the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT and the LOPEZ
COMPLAINT cannot be considered as substantial compliance with the
verification requirement.
103. The RULES of PROCEDURE,70 in keeping with the Constitutional
mandate, simply re-stated the verification requirement. For the integrity of
the impeachment proceedings in the House of Representatives to be honored,
the verification requirement must be complied with. In the absence of this
jurisdictional fact, any impeachment complaint is a mere scrap of paper.
Under the Constitution, the

RULES OF PROCEDURE, and the
RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, the AMENDED
COMPLAINT has already
superseded the ORIGINAL LOZAN
COMPLAINT and its supplements.
104. In the United States, the impeachment proceeding is likened to a grand
jury proceeding.71 In the Philippines however, the Constitution explicitly
provides that the House of Representatives has the sole power to initiate
impeachment complaints.72 Moreover, the RULES OF PROCEDURE provide
that the House of Representatives, through the Committee on Justice,
70 See RULES OF PROCEDURE, RULE II, 2 and RULES OF PROCEDURE, RULE IV, 13.
71 State v. Leese, 55 NW 798; 63 Am. Jur. 2d sec. 174.
72CONST. art XI, 3.
39
determines the existence of probable cause.73 As such it acts as the Office of
the Prosecutor.
105. The procedure for the determination of an impeachment complaints
sufficiency of form and substance is therefore akin to that of the Preliminary
Investigation and related matters74 undertaken by the Office of the
Prosecutor.
106. The RULES OF PROCEDURE allows this:
The Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court
shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment
proceedings before the House.75
107. It is noteworthy that the RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, and not
those of RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, is invoked in the impeachment
proceeding in a suppletory manner.
108. With this in mind, it is easy to see why the argument about the need for a
leave of court before an amendment of the impeachment complaint can be
made is patently erroneous.
73RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule III 4- 8.
74See RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rules 110 to 127.
75RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule VII, 16.
40
109. Anyone vaguely familiar with the conduct of preliminary investigation
before the Office of the Prosecutor knows that complainants may amend,
alter, withdraw or substitute their complaint-affidavit at will prior to filing of
the information.
110. In fact, in criminal procedure, even after the filing of the information in
court, the Prosecutor may amend it in form or in substance without leave of
court, provided that the accused has yet to be arraigned. The pertinent
provision of the RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE thus provides:
A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in

substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court
and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the
rights of the accused76
111. For this reason, the AMENDED COMPLAINT supersedes the ORIGINAL
LOZANO COMPLAINT and its supplements.
112. Do the changes made by the Amended Complaint prejudice the rights of
the Respondent, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo? This question is improper and
premature, for the determination of sufficiency in form of the AMENDED
COMPLAINT. The question goes into the substance of the AMENDED
COMPLAINT.
76 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 110 14.
41
113. In any case, the amendments were introduced prior to the determination
of sufficiency of form and substance. Thus, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Philippines, could not claim that she was prejudiced as she
can still file her ANSWER. Moreover, the inclusion of the additional offenses
in the AMENDED COMPLAINT does not increase the penalty against her.
The AMENDED COMPLAINT is the

only complaint that complies with
the formal and substantive
constitutional requirements for a
valid impeachment complaint.
114. In the instant case, the joint verification executed by the complainants in
the AMENDED COMPLAINT states:
1. We are Complainants in this case;
2. We have read the contents of this Complaint and

affirm that the allegations therein are true and correct to the
best of our own personal knowledge and/or based on
authentic records.
115. Notwithstanding the variance in the language used by complainants, their
joint verification clearly complies with the RULES OF PROCEDURE.
116. The joint verification executed by complainants, in fact, adheres to the
stricter requirement imposed by the RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.77
77 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 7, 4.
42
Hence, it is based not only on complainants knowledge and belief but
specifically on their personal knowledge and/or on authentic records.
117. The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good
faith.78
118. Rules of procedure are used to help secure and not override substantial
justice. Since rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice, their strict and rigid application which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice
must always be avoided.79
119. At any rate, no fault lies with the complainants in following the more
stringent requirements of the RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE since the
House of the Representatives had yet to adopt its rules on impeachment at the
time their amended impeachment complaint was filed. At the very least, the
verification in the AMENDED COMPLAINT may well be taken as substantial
compliance with the RULES OF PROCEDURE.
78 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 146923, 30 April 2003;
Torres, et al. v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 149634, 6 July
2004).
79 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 146923, 30 April 2003.
43
120. Clearly, the House of Representatives in plenary committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ratified by a
vote of 158-51, the decision of the Committee on Justice by majority vote, and
as recorded in COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, to treat the AMENDED
COMPLAINT as separate and distinct from the ORIGINAL LOZANO
COMPLAINT, considering that the defective ORIGINAL LOZANO
COMPLAINT has already been superseded by the AMENDED COMPLAINT
while the LOPEZ COMPLAINT, it being fraught with procedural and
substantive infirmities, IS OF NO LEGAL EFFECT.
III. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN PLENARY COMMITTED

AND AS EMBODIED IN COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, TO DISMISS
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, LIKE THE LOPEZ COMPLAINT, AS A
PROHIBITED PLEADING UNDER THE RULING IN THE FRANCISCO
CASE WHEN IT IS CLEAR THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND
THE VARIOUS APPLICABLE RULES OF PROCEDURE, THE ONE-
YEAR CONSTITUTIONAL BAR DOES NOT AT ALL APPLY.
90. Considering that the AMENDED COMPLAINT has already superseded
the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT and the LOPEZ COMPLAINT, it
being of no legal effect because of procedural and substantive
infirmities, the Francisco case80 does not apply in the present
impeachment proceeding against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of
the Philippines.
80G.R. No. 160206, November 10, 2003.
44
91. As the RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE applies in an impeachment
proceeding, the amendments made on the ORIGINAL LOZANO
COMPLAINT have a retroactive effect, such that the resulting
AMENDED COMPLAINT is deemed filed on the same date as the
superseded ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT.
92. For this reason, the LOPEZ COMPLAINT, it having been filed
subsequent to the ORIGINAL LOPEZ COMPLAINT, is barred under the
Francisco case.
93. In the alternative, assuming that the AMENDED COMPLAINT is
treated as separate from the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT, since
all three complaints were referred to the Committee on Justice at the
same time anyway, the bar in the Francisco case81 does not apply.
94. In the Francisco case, this Honorable Court, in interpreting Art. XI, 5
of the Constitution, held that an impeachment proceeding is deemed
initiated upon the filing of an impeachment complaint and its referral to
the Committee on Justice. This Honorable Court thus ruled,
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act

of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the
81G.R. No. 160206, November 10, 2003.
45
filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once
an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period82
95. All three complaints concerned, though filed on different dates, were
referred by the House of Representatives in plenary to the Committee on
Justice on the same day on July 26, 2005, and were received by the same
Committee on Justice at about the same time.83
96. For this reason, Petitioners also argue that in this instant case, there
really is only one impeachment proceeding to speak of, with three
impeachment complaints directed at the same impeachable officer,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines.
97. The impeachment proceeding is too important to be allowed to
degenerate into a contest of who files first; Yet, the Committee on
Justices constitutionally contemptible acts have precisely that effect; it
has conflated proceeding with complaint so that the constitutionally
sacrosanct procedure to remove from public office perfidious
impeachable officials of the land becomes open season to the
unscrupulous, of whom this country unfortunately does not seem to
82 G.R. No. 160206, November 10, 2003.
83See ANNEX G-2, a copy of the Order of Business of the House of Representatives in plenary, for
July 25, 2005, under the section Reference of Business, through which the three complaints were
simultaneously referred to the Committee on Justice.
46
lack. In fact, according to former Social Welfare Secretary Dinky
Soliman, this is what happened here: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Philippines, had a direct hand in the filing of a friendly
impeachment complaint the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT
ahead of the others, to ensure that she is not impeached. A copy of her
affidavit on this matter is attached to this Petition as ANNEX N.
98. But this is how constitutional law scholar, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., sees
things:
[W]e next look at what the Constitution prohibits. It

prohibits the initiation of more than one "impeachment
proceeding." It does not necessarily prohibit more than one
complaint. More than one complaint would be prohibited
only if the multiple complaints would require more than
"one proceeding." But if they can be logically and
conveniently combined into one proceeding, there would be
no violation of the Constitution.
In the current controversy, the so-called "amended

complaint" and the Lopez complaint, both transmitted on
the same day to the Justice Committee together with the
Lozano complaint, are nothing more than "bills of
particulars" to accompany the Lozano complaint. They both
elaborate on the one constitutional offense of "betrayal of
public trust." For constitutional purposes, therefore, what is
being initiated is only "one proceeding involving one
complaint but with an extended bill of particulars...84
IV. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF

MANDAMUS, CONSIDERING THAT BOTH THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES IN PLENARY AND THE COMMITTEE ON
JUSTICE REFUSED TO PERFORM A POSITIVE DUTY THE
CONSTITUTION DEMANDS OF THEM IN THE CONDUCT OF AN
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDING.
99. Under Rule 65, when any tribunal, corporation or board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
84Fr.Joaquin Bernas, Betrayal of Public Trust, Inquirer News Service, August 21, 2005, available
at http://news.inq7.net/opinion/index.php?index=2&story_id=47628&col=136 <last visited,
September 7, 2005>.
47
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the
court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason
of the wrongful acts of the Respondent.
100. As discussed above, there is no preliminary stage to determine the
existence of prejudicial questions or issues in the impeachment
proceedings as outlined in the Constitution and the RULES OF
PROCEDURE.
101. Upon referral to it by the House of Representatives sitting in plenary,
the Committee is duty-bound to conduct hearings to determine the
sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints referred to it in
an impeachment proceeding. Indeed, there is no half-way stage between
such referral and the determination of sufficiency of form and substance.
102. In the instant petition, Petitioners are prejudiced by the unconstitutional
act committed by the House of Representatives in plenary when it
48
ratified by a vote of 158-51 the constitutionally contemptible decision of
the Committee on Justice (a) to amend by a majority vote the
constitutional provisions outlining the duty of the same Committee in an
impeachment proceeding, that is, to determine the sufficiency of form
and of substance of an impeachment complaint; in this case, the
Committee on Justice added a preliminary stage by deliberating on so-
called prejudicial questions ahead of the constitutionally prescribed
duty of the Committee to determine the sufficiency of form and
substance of the complaint;(b) to treat the AMENDED COMPLAINT as
separate and distinct from the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT, and
(c) to dismiss the AMENDED COMPLAINT as being constitutive of an
impeachment proceeding barred under the Francisco case when, of the
three complaints, it was the only one that met the constitutional
requirements of sufficiency of form and substance, besides the fact that
all three complaints, in the very first place, were referred by the House of
Representatives in plenary to the Committee on Justice and therefore
constitute a single impeachment proceeding.
103. The Petitioners have a real interest in how the House of Representatives
in plenary and the Committee on Justice carried out their
constitutionally-mandated duty to determine the sufficiency in form and
in substance of the AMENDED COMPLAINT brought against Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines.
49
104. The Petitioners respectfully submit that the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases lodged by the Constitution before the House of
Representatives refers to that legally mandated ability of the House of
Representatives alone to accept, act on, investigate and decide on any
and all complaints for impeachment that comply with the requirements
set by the Constitution.
105. The Petitioners respectfully submit that the grant of that power to the
House of Representatives is not a grant of an unbounded and absolute
discretion to exercise that legally mandated ability. Such power, such
ability, is, as it has always been, coupled with the bounden duty to
exercise the same pursuant to the purposes such power has been
designed to address and within the limits set under the Constitution.
106. As such, that exclusive power carries with it or includes the positive duty
to accept, act on, investigate and decide preliminarily the merits of the
charges in any complaint or complaints that may be filed before it, much
like the judicial power which includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies85
107. Indeed, the Petitioners right to file an impeachment complaint against
an impeachable official in one impeachment proceeding has been
85 CONS. Art. VIII, 1(2).
50
arbitrarily denied them when the Committee on Justice dismissed the
AMENDED COMPLAINT in a capricious, arbitrary, whimsical, and
unconstitutional manner and when the House of Representatives in
plenary, voting 158-51, ratified such a constitutionally contemptible act.
108. The denial of their right is a direct injury that must be immediately
redressed, if their constitutional right is to be protected and upheld.
109. In the case of the Petitioner, Rep. Martinez, the Supreme Court itself has
this to say,
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the

power of each member thereof, since his office confers a
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.86
110. For what the Committee on Justice did was to resort to the most absurd
of technicalities to dismiss the AMENDED COMPLAINT but was liberal
in its acceptance of the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT as being
sufficient in form. What resulted was a most farcical exercise worthy of
the theatre of the absurd, except that the most cruel joke was inflicted
on a public hungry for the truth about the serious allegations being
raised in the impeachment proceeding against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Philippines.
86
Del Mar v. PAGCOR, G.R. No.138298, November 29, 2000.
51
111. What the Constitution demands is a liberal approach to the
impeachment proceeding one that would work for the interest of
justice, truth and fairness. As Constitutional Commissioner Christian
Monsod stressed in a sponsorship speech in one of the 1986
Constitutional Commission deliberations:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President,
With respect to the section on impeachment, we would like

the honorable Commissioners to note the inclusion of the
Ombudsman among the officers that are subject to
impeachment, and the addition of betrayal of public trust as
aground for impeachment. This is derived from a resolution
of Commissioner de los Reyes. In the section on the
procedure for impeachment, we were benefited by the
suggestions and advice of the honorable President of the
Commission. The principal author of this section is
Commissioner Romulo. What we seek to institute here
is a more liberal interpretation of the impeachment
procedures in order to avoid, for example, the deadlock
which happened in the last Batasan. While incorporating the
procedures arising from the bicameral nature of the future
legislation, the body will note that we provided here that a
majority of the Members of the House can initiate
impeachment upon vote. But what is important is that
any Member of the House or any citizen can file a
verified complaint. We used the majority rule of the
House, although in 1973 the provision was for 20 percent of
the Members of the National Assembly. In that case since it
was unicameral, the trying body was also the National
Assembly.
In the 1935 Constitution, the rule was two-thirds of the

House may initiate impeachment proceedings and three-
fourths of the Senate shall convict. However, in our proposal,
majority of the Members of the House may initiate and two-
thirds of the Senate shall convict. This is one section on
which we would like to consult with the Members of this
body. This is a very important provision, and we would be
advised by the consultations and wisdom of this body with
respect to this provision, particularly on the numbers and
vote necessary to initiate, to try or to convict...87
87II RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, 265 (1986).
52
112. Clearly, this is a matter of national interest, involving a transcendental
issue; as the people of the Republic have an unmistakable constitutional
right to demand of their representatives in public office, especially of the
President, to conduct themselves according to the democratic idea that a
public office is a public trust, so do they have an unmistakable interest in
the faithful performance by their elected representatives in Congress of
their duty to investigate an impeachable officer in an impeachment
proceeding according to well-defined constitutional parameters.
113. The Petitioners are therefore, entitled to a writ of mandamus directing
the Respondent House of Representatives to remand the AMENDED
COMPLAINT to the Committee on Justice so that the Committee on
Justice, in turn, may proceed forthwith to a constitutional determination
of its sufficiency of form and substance.
G. CONCLUDING STATEMENT
114. Clearly, the House of Representatives, when it ratified by a vote of 158-
51 the constitutionally contemptible acts of the Committee on Justice as
recorded in COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, committed an
unconstitutional act a grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
115. It exercised constitutionally-granted power in a despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility which is so patent and so gross as
53
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
that act enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.88
116. Indeed, the Committee on Justice by majority vote, seconded by the
House of Representatives in plenary by a vote of 158-51, rushed to make
the unjust decision without fear of its consequences, and, having made
an unjust decision, mulishly argued to justify the decision in order to
prevail.89
117. It is the bounden duty of this Honorable Court to resolve such a conflict
where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases of its
resolution.90 In the words of Dean Pacifico A. Agabin, another noted
scholar of constitutional law,
[T]he basic understanding behind our politico-legal culture

is that the function of our electorally accountable legislative
branch is to make policy choices; the function of our
electorally accountable executive branch is to administer
policy choices; and the function of our electorally
unaccountable judicial branch is merely to enforce policy
choices. Proceeding from this premise, it becomes clear that
it is the duty of our Supreme Court to enforce policy choices,
especially if these are provided for in the fundamental
law[I]t must now follow that it is the legitimate duty of the
judiciary to enforce policy which has been constitutionalized
by the people. It must be granted that policies
constitutionalized by the people constitute valid delegations
of power to the Supreme Court, which it cannot shirk to
enforce if its members are to be true to their oath to support
the constitution91
88 Alafriz v. Nable 72 Phil 28O.
89That is, to paraphrase the words of the ancient Jewish sages commenting in the Talmud on the
nature of presumptuous judgment. See THE LIVING TALMUD: THE WISDOM OF THE
FATHERS AND ITS CLASSICAL COMMENTARIES 164 (Goldin, ed., & trans., 1957)
90 Francisco, et al., v. House of Representatives, et al., G.R. No. 160206, November 10, 2003
91Pacifico A. Agabin, Judicial Review of Economic Policy under the 1987 Constitution, 72 PHIL.
L.J 176, 184 (1997)
54
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Petitioners respectfully
pray that this Honorable Court nullify the act of the House of Representatives in
plenary ratifying by a vote of 158-51, with six abstentions, the constitutionally
contemptible decision of the Committee on Justice by majority vote (a) to
discuss prejudicial questions ahead of a constitutional determination of
sufficiency of form and of substance of the three complaints, (b) to treat the
AMENDED COMPLAINT as separate and distinct from the ORIGINAL LOZANO
COMPLAINT, and (c) to hold the AMENDED COMPLAINT as a prohibited
pleading under the High Court ruling in the Francisco case.
Moreover, the Petitioners pray of this Honorable Court, after due
deliberation, to direct the House of Representatives, through the Office of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, to remand the AMENDED
COMPLAINT to the Committee on Justice so that it may proceed with a
determination of the sufficiency of its form and substance according to the
Constitution and the various applicable rules of procedure.
Makati City for the City of Manila, September 21, 2005.
ROQUE AND BUTUYAN LAW OFFICES

Unit 1904, Antel 2000 Corporate Center
No. 121 Valero Street, Salcedo Village
Makati City
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By:
H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR.

PTR No. 0008545, 1.7.05, Makati City
IBP No. 499912, 1.25. 00, Lifetime
Roll no. 36976
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COPY FURNISHED:
REP. JOSE DE VENECIA

SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
BATASAN COMPLEX,
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER
QUEZON CITY
REP. SIMEON DATUMANONG

CHAIRPERSON
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
BATASAN COMPLEX
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER
QUEZON CITY
57

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REP. CLAVEL A. MARTINEZ

yes, duty to, review cases and controversies.

dutyto settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally

a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.2

would have normally left to the political departments to decide.3

1See Taada v. Angara,G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997.

2 CONST., art. VIII, 1.

this innovation, would put it,

The judicial power is meant to be a check against all powers

5. The doctrinal reaffirmation of this bedrock principle of a constitutionally

canalized duty of judicial review finds a relevant restatement in a recent

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict,

government in this case, the legislature, in what, in other jurisdictions,

would constitute a political question immune to judicial intervention is

once again being invoked.

7. In this instance, the Petitioners argue that an impeachment proceeding

against the Chief Executive, though described by the same Constitution as

primarily an act of Congress, is not without well-defined constitutional

4 III RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 645-646 (1986).

prosecute an impeachable public officerin this case, Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo, President of the Philippines transgressed the bounds set by the

same Constitution for the exercise of such power, it would be a clear

stultification of its constitutional responsibility, to borrow from the

language of Justice Cardozo,6 if the Supreme Court refuses to lift a finger to

resolve a constitutional controversy of supreme transcendental and national

6 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 92 (1921).

According to Section 3, subparagraph 2, after a complaint for

MR. ROMULO. Yes, that is right.

MR. TREAS. May it not be subject of a judicial review?

MR. ROMULO. As the Commissioner knows, in the definition of judicial

constitutional decision-making involves policy-making and, in that sense,

9. But as it fulfilled its constitutionally-mandated duty in the Francisco case,9

Chief Justice, Hilario Davide Jr., as unconstitutional, so should it now

squarely confront this constitutional issue of transcendental ramifications on

our national life, and slay the hydra.

the President of the Philippines. She is an endorser of one of the

impeachment complaints the amended one in question in this instant case

maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers, and privileges vested by the

any official action which infringes their prerogatives as legislators.11

9G.R. No. 160206, November 10, 2003.

10 Del Mar v. PAGCOR, G.R. No.138298, November 29, 2000.

to constitutional processes of their elected representatives in Congress12:

11.1. Herminio Harry L. Roque Jr.;

11.2. Joel Ruiz Butuyan;

11.3. Roger R. Rayel;

11.4. Alfredo Ligon III;

11.5. Gary S. Mallari;

11.6. Romel Regalado Bagares; and

11.7. Christopher F.C. Bolastig.

12. Respondent, the House of Representatives of the 13th Congress, is represented

by Rep. Jose De Venecia, the incumbent House Speaker.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the

Datumanong, the incumbent Committee chairperson.

Representatives, Batasan Complex, National Government Center, Quezon

C. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

impeachment against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines

with the House of Representatives of the 13th Congress. hereinafter

ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT].13 It was endorsed by Rep. Rodante

17. On June 29, 2005, Lozano submitted to the House of Representatives a

second supplemental complaint of the same date.16

13 A copy of the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT is attached as ANNEX A.