RULE 114 Bail

A. Definition/Description
B. Conditions/Requirements
- effective upon approval and shall remain in force at all stages of the proceedings until
promulgation of judgment by the RTC
C. When:
- bail is a matter of right; a matter of discretion;
- bail as a constitutional right
D. Kinds:
a. corporate surety
b. property bond
c. cash bond
d. recognizance: is an obligation of record entered into before some court or magistrate duly
authorized to take it, with the condition to do some particular act particularly the appearance of
the accused for trial
E. Amount of bail; guidelines
F. Where to file bail
- RTC; MTC exercising special jurisdiction
G. Forfeiture vs. Cancellation of Bail
- forfeiture: failure to appear; jumping bail
- cancellation: death; conviction; acquittal; dismissal

Bail as a matter of discretion

Abroguea
FLORESTA VS. UBIADAS
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1774. May 27, 2004
Bail; Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if no charge has yet been filed in court
against a suspect-detainee, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor, or at
least his recommendation must be sought.Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if no
charge has yet been filed in court against a respondent-suspect-detainee, reasonable notice of hearing is
required to be given to the prosecutor, or at least his recommendation must be sought. So Fortuna v.
Penaco-Sitaca instructs: [A]dmission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in
accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded
an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the
basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the
accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines
of procedural due process, that is, after the evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any
order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice
and outright arbitrariness.

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Where the petition for bail was filed only the day before, at close to noontime, it cannot be said that the
prosecution was afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to present evidence after it received a copy
of the petition minutes before it was filed in court; Reasonable notice depends, of course, upon the
circumstances of each particular case, taking into account, inter alia, the offense committed and the
imposable penalties, and the evidence of guilt in the hands of the prosecution. True, a hearing of the
petition for bail was conducted in Crim. Case No. 271-99 on January 4, 2000 at 8:30 a.m. Given the filing
of the petition only the day before, at close to noontime, it cannot be said that the prosecution was
afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to present evidence after it received a copy of the petition
minutes before it was filed in court. It bears stressing that the prosecution should be afforded reasonable
opportunity to comment on the application for bail by showing that evidence of guilt is strong. While in
Section 18 of Rule 114 on applications for bail, no period is provided as it merely requires the court to
give a reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation,
and the general rule on the requirement of a three-day notice for hearing of motions under Section 4 of
Rule 15 allows a court for good cause to set the hearing on shorter notice, there is, in the case of
Mangohig, no showing of good cause to call for hearing his petition for bail on shorter notice. Reasonable
notice depends of course upon the circumstances of each particular case, taking into account, inter alia,
the offense committed and the imposable penalties, and the evidence of guilt in the hands of the
prosecution.

A judge is called upon to balance the interests of the accused who is entitled to the presumption of
innocence until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense
without being subject to punishment prior to conviction, against the right of the State to protect the people
and the peace of the community from dangerous elements.In Crim. Case No. 271-99, Mangohig was
arrested for violation of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, which is punishable by reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua, and subsequently indicted for statutory rape qualified by relationship which is
punishable by death. Under the circumstances, by respondents assailed grant of bail, the prosecution
was deprived of due process for which he is liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure which is a
serious charge under Sec. 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The charge carries the penalty of
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all or part of the benefits or suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for more than 3 but not exceeding 6 months or a fine of more than P20,000 but
not exceeding P40,000. This Court takes this occasion to reiterate the injunction that a judge is called
upon to balance the interests of the accused who is entitled to the presumption of innocence until his guilt
is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to
punishment prior to conviction, against the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the
community from dangerous elements.

Facts
By a Sworn Complaint dated January 24, 2000, then Provincial Prosecutor, Dorentino Z. Floresta
administratively charged Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
authority and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Complainant furthermore faults respondent for granting, without giving notice to the prosecution, the
petition for bail of Jose Mangohig, Jr. who was arrested by virtue of a warrant which found probable
cause against him for violation of Section 5(b), Art. III of Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). Mangohig was arrested for violation
of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, which is punishable by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, and
subsequently indicted for statutory rape qualified by relationship which is punishable by death.
The petition for bail of Mangohig who was then under preliminary investigation, which motion was filed on
January 3, 2000 on which same date a copy of said petition was furnished the public prosecutor, was as

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set by Mangohig heard on the morning of January 4, 2000 during which there was no appearance from
the Prosecutors Office; and that as the offense for which Mangohig was charged is ordinarily a bailable
offense, respondent granted him bail.
Issue
Whether or not the respondent Judge erred on granting Mangohig of bail on the ground that there is a
failure of notice to the prosecution.
Held
Yes, Judge Ubiadas committed a violation in granting bail to the accused.
Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if no charge has yet been filed in court against a
respondent-suspect-detainee, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor, or at
least his recommendation must be sought.
While in Section 18 of Rule 114 on applications for bail, no period is provided as it merely requires the
court to give a reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his
recommendation, and the general rule on the requirement of a three-day notice for hearing of motions
under Section 4 of Rule 15 allows a court for good cause to set the hearing on shorter notice, there is, in
the case of Mangohig, no showing of good cause to call for hearing his petition for bail on shorter notice.
Reasonable notice depends of course upon the circumstances of each particular case, taking into
account, inter alia, the offense committed and the imposable penalties, and the evidence of guilt in the
hands of the prosecution.
Under the circumstances, by respondents assailed grant of bail, the prosecution was deprived of due
process for which he is liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure which is a serious charge under
Sec. 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The charge carries the penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of all or part of the benefits or suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than 3 but not exceeding 6 months or a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.
This Court takes this occasion to reiterate the injunction that a judge is called upon to balance the
interests of the accused who is entitled to the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to
conviction against the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from
dangerous elements.

Hearing for Granting Bail

Bobiles
CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO R. ZUO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALEJADRINO C. CABEBE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos
Norte, respondent.
A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ November 26, 2004
Criminal Procedure; Bails; Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail
whether it is a matter of right or discretion; Even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a
hearing should still be held.

In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, we held that jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the
procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially
in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a

84
matter of discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a
matter of right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a
matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong,
and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which
remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a
hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no
petition for bail, a hearing should still be held

FACTS
Chief State Prosecutor Zuo alleged that a criminal case for illegal possession of prohibited or regulated
drugs was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte where respondent Judge
Cabebe was then the presiding judge, against three police officers and private individuals. Upon
arraignment, all the accused, pleaded not guilty. The prosecution the filed a petition for change of venue
but was denied. The accused filed a motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the proceedings before
respondent's court were suspended.
The accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking their right to a speedy trial. Respondent judge then motu
propio, without the accused's application or motion, issued an Order granting bail to the accused.
The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration. Instead of acting thereon, respondent judge
inhibited himself from further proceeding with the case.
Petitioner then filed this administrative case against respondent judge for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, gross ignorance of the law and partiality.
Respondent denied the charges, alleging, among others, that the granting of bail was premised on the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting, motu proprio, without the accused's application or
motion, bail to the accused.

HELD
The Court held in affirmative.
In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, the Court held that jurisprudence is replete with decisions
on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail,
especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
where bail is a matter of discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail
whether it is a matter of right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases
where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must
first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where
there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.
There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the accused without conducting a hearing, in
violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, quoted as follows:
"Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a
person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion

85
 perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is
strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for
additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to
testify."
"Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. In the application for bail under section 8 of this
Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to
submit his recommendation. (18a)"
In Cortes vs. Catral, we laid down the following rules outlining the duties of the judge in case an
application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section
18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence
of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bail bond (Section 19, id.); otherwise the petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail must
contain a summary of the evidence of the prosecution and based thereon, the judge should formulate his
own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the
accused.
Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and procedure enumerated in Cortes. He did not
conduct a hearing before he granted bail to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an opportunity
to interpose objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or weakness of
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, he should have conducted a hearing and thereafter made a
summary of the evidence of the prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of
evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due process for both the
prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
Neither did respondent require the prosecution to submit its recommendation on whether or not bail
should be granted.
He maintains that the prosecution did not object to the grant of bail to the accused, hence, he cannot be
held administratively liable for not conducting a hearing.
In Santos vs. Ofilada, we held that the failure to raise or the absence of an objection on the part of the
prosecution in an application for bail does not dispense with the requirement of a bail hearing. Thus
"Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an objection to the granting of bail to the
accused will not justify such grant without hearing. This Court has uniformly ruled that even if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any objection to the motion for bail, it
is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions
from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or lack of it, against the accused.

86
 Where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix
bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the
State's evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. Irrespective of respondent judge's
opinion that the evidence of guilt against the accused is not strong, the law and settled
jurisprudence demand that a hearing be conducted before bail may be fixed for the temporary
release of the accused, if bail is at all justified.
Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the
accused, the respondent judge therein should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for
hearing and diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter was not in fact contesting
the bail application. In addition, a hearing was also necessary for the court to take into
consideration the guidelines set forth in the then Section, 6, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure for the fixing of the amount of the bail, Only after respondent judge had
satisfied himself that these requirements have been met could he then proceed to rule on
whether or not to grant bail."
Clearly, therefore, respondent judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged absence of objection on the part
of the prosecution to the grant of bail to the accused.

Bail in Extradition Cases

Alim
Govt of HK Spec. Adm. Region vs. Olalia, 521 SCRA
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
While this Court in Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, 389 SCRA 623 (2002),
limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various
international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and
liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order. The Philippines, along with other
members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights. The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting
the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation
to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right
to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited
the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international
treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a
reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the Court sees no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed
in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951) and Chirskoff v.
Commission of Immigration, 90 Phil. 256 A (1951), this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom
no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of
deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no
justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the

87
Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be
invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt
of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extradite to apply for bail in this
jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning
respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in
favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is
not impaired.

Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the
surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty
of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines extradition as the removal of an accused from the
Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting
state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government. Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty,
to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding.
Even if the potential extradite is a criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such
punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations
between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extradite.
Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent
the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which
he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.

While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extradite and (b) the means employed to attain the
purpose of extradition is also the machinery of criminal law obviously, an extradition proceeding, while
ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. But while extradition is not a criminal
proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the
potential extradite and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also the machinery
of criminal law. This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which
mandates the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused if such will best serve the
interest of justice. We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state in case of urgency to ask
for the provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition; and that release
from provisional arrest shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for
extradition is received subsequently. Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extradite may be subjected to arrest,
to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings.
Temporary detention may be necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.

While our extradition law does not provide for grant of bail to an extradite, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. Records
show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been
detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an
extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this
prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. While our

88
extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extradite, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.

The prospective extradite this bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and
should be granted bail. The applicable standard due process, however, should not be the same as that
in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of
innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the
ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the temporary detention is the
possibility of flight of the potential extradite. This is based on the assumption that such extradite is a
fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extradite thus bears the onus probandi of
showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

An extraditee should not be deprived of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the
grant is satisfactorily met. The time-honored principle of pacta sunt survanda demands that the
Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and
defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process.
More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international
conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his
right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can
neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases the potential extradite must prove by clear and convincing
proof that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can
neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to
prevent the prospective extradite from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed
clear and convincing evidence should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him,
this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
evidence. The potential extradite must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk
and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing
that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case
should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the
basis of clear and convincing evidence.

Facts
In 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed
an Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons. It took effect in 1997. In 1997, Hong
Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region.
Juan Antonio Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense
of accepting an advantage as agent, in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery

89
Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to
defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him.
The DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest
of Muoz. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn,
filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of Muoz. The RTC,
Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest. Hence, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
Muoz filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of
Arrest. The CA declared the Order of Arrest void.
The DOJ filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari, praying that the Decision of the CA
be reversed. The SC rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of
the Order of Arrest against Muoz.
Meanwhile, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10.
Muoz filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there
is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high flight risk.
Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off
to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge Olalio.
Muoz filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was
granted by Olalio allowing private respondent to post bail subject to conditions.
Hence, this petition.
Issue
Whether the right to bail is applicable to extraditees
Held
Yes, the right to bail is applicable even to extraditees. However, an extraditee should prove in
clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk.
The constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused
who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless
his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not
apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to
criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,
have likewise been detained. To limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our
jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only. The Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In
fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of
administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international
conventions to uphold human rights.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

90
applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all,
both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in
the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the
Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a
criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and
forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. Temporary detention may be a
necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is
no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of
the accused. It is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail
arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the
arrest warrant and the temporary detention is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is
based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the
prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and
should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of
extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the
Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where
these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which
the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail,
provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying
bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to
prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed
clear and convincing evidence should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this
standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk
and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

Culla
OKABE VS. GUTIERREZ

Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; Right to be Informed; It is essential that the accused
of be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as he is presumed to have no independent knowledge

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of the facts that constitute the offense. The noble object of written accusations cannot be over
emphasized. This was explained in the US v. Karelsen: the object of this written accusations was First.
To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable to make his
defense; and second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution of the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that this
requirement that may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of
certain acts and intent; there must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularly of time, place,
names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis
supplied) It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him, as
he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The mere allegation in the amended information that the
offense was committed that the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient that phrase
is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the
offense charged and the discharge of the accuseds official duties. The stringent requirement that the
charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused
is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the
mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer
in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely as conclusion of law, not a factual averment
that would show the close intimacy that the offense charged and the discharge of the accuseds official
duties.

Same; Same; Same; Same; What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the
information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharged of the accuseds official duties
and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in
relation to public office. In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase
committed in relation to public office does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the
said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the
specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge
of the accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as
having been committed in relation to public office.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there is failure to show in the informations that the charge of
murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused Philippine
National Police officers, the offense charged is plain murder and, within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court. Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the
charged of murder was intimately connected with the discharge officials functions of the accused PNP
officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.

Facts
Cecilia Maruyama filed a case, charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe,
a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa.
The trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner with a recommended bond
of P40,000. On June 15, 2000, the petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount, duly
approved by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, the Presiding Judge of Branch 79 of the RTC of Quezon

92
City, who forthwith recalled the said warrant. The approved personal bail bond of the petitioner was
transmitted to the RTC of Pasig.
Upon her request, the petitioner was furnished with a certified copy of the Information, the
resolution and the criminal complaint which formed part of the records of the said case. The petitioner left
the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial courts permission, and returned to the
Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12,
2000.
Private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the hold departure order.
Petitioner filed a manifestation objecting to her arraignment prior to the resolution of her pending
motions. She alleged that her arraignment for the crime charged should not be made a condition for the
granting of her motion to recall the hold departure order issued against her.
Petitioner filed a motion for the postponement of her arraignment alleging that, in case the trial court ruled
adversely thereon, she would refuse to enter a plea and seek relief from the appellate court.
The court denied the petitioners motions on the following grounds:
(b) When the petitioner posted a personal bail bond for her provisional liberty, she thereby
waived her right to question the courts finding of the existence of probable cause for her arrest and
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court, more so when she filed the motion for the lifting of the
hold departure order the court issued, and the motion to defer the proceedings and her arraignment;
Petitioner then filed a petition asserting that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
COMPLETELY DISREGARDED THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 26, RULE 114 OF THE
REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WHICH TOOK EFFECT ON 01 DECEMBER 2000
WHICH IS FAVORABLE TO THE PETITIONER/ACCUSED.
By way of comment, the SolGen refuted that:
The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in ruling that the infirmity, if any, in
the issuance by the respondent Judge of the warrant of arrest against petitioner was cured when
petitioner voluntarily submitted to the trial courts jurisdiction when she posted bail and filed motions
seeking for affirmative reliefs from the trial court, such as the motion to lift/recall Hold Departure
Order (HDO) and to allow petitioner to travel regularly to Japan.
Issue
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in not applying Section 26, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure?
Held
YES, the court agrees with the contention of the petitioner.
The law provides:
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation.
- An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of
his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or
questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he
raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not
later than the start of the trial of the case.

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 It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new
one, intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail
by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on
the legalities or irregularities thereon.
The new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in
procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by
their essence retroactive in application.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it
cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail
the warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing
proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of
probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so
manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the
particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible.
Thus, the posting of a personal bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert her
incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of her right to assail her arrest. So this Court
ruled in People v. Red:
In view of these circumstances and the number of the accused, it may properly be held that the
furnishing of the bond was prompted by the sheer necessity of not remaining in detention, and in no way
implied their waiver of any right, such as the summary examination of the case before their
detention. That they had no intention of waiving this right is clear from their motion of January 23, 1929,
the same day on which they furnished a bond, and the fact that they renewed this petition on February
23, 1929, praying for the stay of their arrest for lack of the summary examination;

AU

LEVISTE vs. CA
615 SCRA 619
Criminal Procedure; Bail; Bail acts as reconciling mechanism to accommodate both accuseds interest in
pretrial liberty and societys interesting assuring the accuseds presence at trial.

- Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to
guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required,1 is the answer of the criminal justice
system to a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in
the "dubious interval," often years long, between arrest and final adjudication?2 Bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in pretrial liberty and societys interest in
assuring the accuseds presence at trial.

Same; Same; An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay debt to society
he has never owed; Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal is a delicate
balance between the interests of society and those of the accused; In the exercise of discretion in the
grant of bail pending appeal, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the
allowance of bail pending appeal be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong
reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.

- Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin

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serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail. An accused not released on bail is
incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously
convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed. Even if
the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accuseds interest in bail pending appeal includes
freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential
hardships of prison. On the other hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly
incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to
warrant prison time. Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the
prevention of the accuseds flight from court custody, the protection of the community from potential
danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment. Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail
pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the accused.
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to those
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental
principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave
caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial
court.

Same; Same; Penalties; The third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the
penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding 6 years the first scenario
deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph, and the second scenario contemplates
the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.

- The third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed
on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding 6 years. The first scenario deals with the
circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, or habitual
delinquency, or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape
from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification; commission of the offense while on probation, parole, under conditional pardon;
circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; or undue risk of committing the crime
during the pendency of the appeal, other similar circumstances). The second scenario contemplates the
existence of at least one of the said circumstances. The implications of this distinction are discussed with
erudition and clarity in the commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an
authority in remedial law: Under present revised Rule114, the availability of bail to an accused may be
summarized in the following rules: x x x x x x x x x x e. After conviction by the RTC wherein the penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but no more than 20 years is imprisoned, and not on of the
circumstances is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5); f. After conviction by the
RTC imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more that 20 years, and any of the
circumstances stated in Ec. 5 or any other similar circumstances is present and proved, no bail shall be
granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x.

Facts
Jose Leviste (petitioner) was charged with Murder for the death of Rafael de las Alas. He was
convicted by the RTC of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of
reclusion temporal as maximum.

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 He appealed his conviction to the CA. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence
of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
CA denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail
pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with
grave caution and only for strong reasons. Also, the CA made a preliminary evaluation of petitioners case
and made a prima facie determination that there was no reason substantial enough to overturn the
evidence of petitioners guilt. Thus, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issue
WON the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
Held
NO. The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty
imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals
with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual
delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape
from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon;
circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another
crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second
scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has
the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-
negating circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the
appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by
and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent
discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it
so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the
appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that
are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic
treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy
governing the grant of bail pending appeal.
In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it interprets the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court on
the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail
pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination of
whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of this position is that, if any
such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal.

96
 Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose
authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its discretion into merely filling out the checklist of
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty imposed by
the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioners
interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular
factual issue whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present.

Dequia
JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
Facts
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enriles motion, particularly on
the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily
surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law.
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to
Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame,
Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital , and his Motion to Fix Bail both
dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.
Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because:
(a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong;
(b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal , not
reclusion perpetua ; and
(c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously considered.
Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enriles Motion
Issue
Determination of bail as matter of right on the ground that the Petitioner- Senator may be deemed to fall
within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong which the prosecution fails to establish.
Held
Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent
The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process. The purpose of bail is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. Thus,
bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in his provisional liberty
before or during the trial, and the societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence at trial.

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 Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion
Section 7, Rule 114 provides Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an
offense that, under the law existing at the time of its commission and the application for admission to bail,
may be punished with death.
In all criminal cases within the jurisdiction of MTC or MCTC bail is a matter of right since these
courts has no jurisdiction to try cases with capital offenses or offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment .
However in RTC it is only a matter of right prior to conviction for any offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.
It becomes discretionary for RTC when the following circumstances are attendant
1. upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment;
2. if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided
none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, as follows:
i. That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
ii. That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification
iii. That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
iv. That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail
v. That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is
subject to judicial discretion.
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the
guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,
i. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended);
ii. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence
to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

98
iii. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
iv. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond

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RULE 115 Rights of the Accused
Distinguish the constitutional from statutory rights of the accused
1. Presumption of Innocence, Del Castillo vs. People, 664 SCRA
2. Right to be Heard, Miguel vs. Sandiganbayan, 675 SCRA
3. Right to Counsel, People vs. Lara, 678 SCRA; People vs. Espiritu, 302 SCRA
4. Right Against Self-Incrimination, People vs. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216
5. Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial, Villaruel vs. People 664 SCRA

Presumption of Innocence
Bartolazo
DEL CASTILLO vs. PEOPLE
664 SCRA
Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; Requisites for the
Issuance of a Search Warrant.The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable
cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge
must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Same; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; Defined.Probable cause for a search warrant is defined
as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that,
more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable
cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction.
The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to
him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances
standard. The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting
the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which
led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrates determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was
substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining
judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be
seized are in the place sought to be searched. A review of the records shows that in the present case, a
substantial basis exists.
Same; Constitutional Law; Search Warrants; The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to
be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid.The warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid.
A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In
the present case, Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-24 specifically designates or describes the residence
of the petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a
nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found
in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid
warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of petitioners constitutional

100
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. The OSG argues that, assuming that the items
seized were found in another place not designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be
admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private
individual, the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure being applicable only
against government authorities. The contention is devoid of merit.
Same; Same; Administrative Law; Agents of Persons in Authority; Barangay Tanods; The Local
Government Code contains a provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of
persons in authority.Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by
the police authorities who effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as
agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority and
agents of persons in authority as: x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an
individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be
deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a
person in authority. A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by
competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of
life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who
comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority. The Local
Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an
agent of persons in authority
Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; While it is not necessary that the
property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is
issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellants control or possession.
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under
appellants control or possession. The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated drugs
by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the
dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the
place where it is found. The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in
question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA,
merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the
petitioner being an electrician by profession.
Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Evidence; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; The accused, in all
criminal prosecutions, is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt.In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the laws own starting
perspective on the status of the accusedin all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the
charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the
conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence.

Facts
Pursuant to a confidential information that Del Castillo was engaged in selling shabu, the police
officers conducted surveillance and test buy operation at the house of Del Castillo. The authorities later
secured search warrant from RTC. Upon arrival, somebody shouted raid which prompted them to
immediately disembark the jeep and went directly to the house of Del Castillo. The said house is two-
storey house and Del Castillo was staying in the second floor. When they went upstair the police

101
operatives informed the wife of Del Castillo that they will implement the search warrant. However, before
they can search the area, Del Castillo runs towards a nipa hut in front of his house. The police chased
him but fail, because they were not familiar with the entrance and exit of the place. They all went back to
the house of Del Castillo, and searched the area in the presence of a barangay tanod and the elder sister
of Del Castillo. They have not found anything in the house however one barangay tanod was able to
confiscate from nipa hut several plastic packs contacting crystalline substance which was later positive for
shabu.
Issue
Whether there is a violation of petitioners constitutional rights against unreasonable search and
presumption of innocence.
Held
The search warrant specifically designates the residence of Del Castillo as the place to be
searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut 20 meters away from the
residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having found in a place other than the one described in
the search warrant, can be considered fruits of an invalid warrantless search, and the presentation of
which as an evidence is a violation of constitutional rights of Del Castillo against unreasonable searched
and seizure.
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is
under appellants control or possession. The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated
drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the
dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the
place where it is found. The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in
question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA,
merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the
petitioner being an electrician by profession.
In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the laws own starting perspective on the
status of the accusedin all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof
sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in
judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Right to be Heard
Desengano
MIGUEL v. SANDIGANBAYAN
675 SCRA
Same; Pre-Suspension Hearing; While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the
accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity
of the proceedings against him, no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct.-While a pre-
suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings against him, Luciano likewise emphasizes
that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct. With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in
mind, the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension
order.

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Same; Right to be heard; It is well settled that "to be heard" does not only mean oral arguments in
court; one may be heard also through pleadings.-Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due
process requirement, when an accused public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his
possible defenses against mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no
reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted. It is well settled that "to be heard" does not
only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due
process exists.

Facts
On year 1996, a letter-complaint was filed before the Ombudsman-Mindanao charging herein
petitioner Fernando Miguel with violation of the Anti-graft and corrupt practices act. The ombudsman
found probable cause against petitioner for violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act and Art.
171, par. 4 of the RPC. After the filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan the petitioner moved
for reinvestigation which was granted by the Sandiganbayan and gave petitioner 10 days to file his
counter-affidavit with the OSP. However, intead of submiting his counter-affidavit asked the
Sandiganbayan for a 30 days extension and before the the expiry date, petitioner asked the OSP for
another 30 days extension. Despite the two extension asked and granted, petitioner asked again for
another 20 days extension but failed to submit a counter-affidavit prompting the fiscal to declare him to
have waived his right to submit countervailing evidence. Arraigned was then conducted in whic the
petitioner pleaded not guilty, Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) then filed a motion to suspend
petitioner Pendente Lite which was assailed by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration contending that his right to an actual hearing was violated but was denied, he then filed a
certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether or not pre-suspension order is valid even without actual hearing?
Held
Yes. The pre-suspension is valid. There is no specific rules laid down for a pre-suspension hearing. it
is sufficient that the accused was given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the
criminal proceedings againsthim. Since apre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement,
when an accused public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses
then the accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted. It is well
settled that to be heared does not only mean oral arguments in courts; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings has been
accorded, no denial of procedural due process exist. Here, petitioner was given several extensions to file
his counter affidavit yet still failed to submit the same, he was then given the opportunity to be heard but
have waived it.

Right to Counsel
Briez
PEOPLE OF THE PHIPPINES vs. ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA
G.R. No. 199877 August 13, 2012
Criminal Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired
through compulsory process such as a warrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as
when he surrenders to the police or to the court. Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is
deemed waived.- Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through compulsory

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process such as a warrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to
the police or to the court. Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An accused
submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a plea and participating actively in the trial and
this precludes him invoking any irregularities that may have attended his arrest. Furthermore, the illegal
arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a conviction that was arrived upon
a complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error.

Facts
Lara is charged with robbery with homicide filed in the RTC. The ground of the charge was for the
robbery from an accounting staff of San Sebastian Allied Services, Enrique Sumulong, and the killing of
Joselito M. Bautista whilst doing the robbery.
On May 31, 2001 at around 9 am, Sumulong withdrew 230K from Metrobank-Mabini Branch,
Pasig City to defray the salaries of employees of San Sebastian. Going to the bank, he rode a pick-up
accompanied by Virgilio Manacob, Jeff Atie and Joselito Baustista. Upon withdrawal, he put the money in
a black bag and immediately left. At around 10:30 am, in an intersection Lara appeared at the front of the
passenger side and pointed a gun to Sumulong asking him to give him the money. Baustista at the back
said not to and Sumulong threw the bag at Bautistas direction. Bautista went out with the bag, Lara
followed. Sumulong went towards Mercedez Plaza and called up the office of San Sebastian to relay the
accident. When he went back, he saw blood on the ground. The bystanders said that Bautista was shot
and the bag was taken from him. While on his way to San Miguel, Pasig City, he saw Lara walking and
alerted the police and thereafter he was arrested. Atie and Manacob testified against Lara.
On Laras defense, on May 31, 2001, he was at his house digging a sewer trench while his
brother was working on constructing a comfort room. They worked from 8am until 9am. At around June 7,
2001, while he was at his cousins, police officers arrived, ask and confirmed that he is Arturo Lara. The
police asked him to come with them to the barangay hall. He was brought to the police station instead of
the barangay hall where he was investigated for robbery with homicide. He told the police that he was at
home when the subject took place. His statement was challenged and was asked to produce witnesses.
The police told Sumulong and Atie to point on Lara so they can go home already. Witnesses arrived the
next day and Lara was told that he will be subjected to inquest.
In the RTC, Lara was convicted. He appealed to CA but the latter affirmed his conviction.
Issue
WON the identification made by Sumulong, Atie, and Manacob in the police line-
up is inadmissible because Lara stood there in without the assistance of counsel
Held
NO. When he was placed in a police line-up did not validate the proceedings leading to his
conviction. That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel did not render
Sumulongs identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the
precise moment custodial investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial investigation. As the court previously ruled in People v. Amestuzo:
The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution or the so-called Miranda Rights,
may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts
when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus
on particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial

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investigation; hence the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this
stage.

Right Against Self-Incrimination

Dizon
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region,
Baguio City, and FELIPE RAMOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; 2 sets of Rights under Sec. 20, Art. IV of 1873 Constitution.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the
section, namely: 1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to
be a witness against himself set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section
18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the
American Constitution, and 2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every
suspect "under investigation for the commission of an offense."
Same; Same; Same; Right against self-incrimination; Rights in custodial interrogation; The 1987
Constitution more clearly indicates the disparateness of these rights.
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and
disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against self-
incrimination, "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section
17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The lights of a person in custodial interrogation, which have been
made more explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Subpoena; Meaning of rights against self-incrimination.
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of
subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a
witness against himself." The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. It prescribes an
"option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a
witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refue to answer any particular incriminatory question,
i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be
claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot
be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to
appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a
subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only
when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some
offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Nature of rights against self-incrimination; Must be claimed by or in behalf of
the witness.
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be
claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that
the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.

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Same; Same; Same; Same; Right in custodial investigation; Miranda Rule summarized the procedural
safeguards laid down for a person in-custody interrogation, Objective of.
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person
in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary
proceeding against the suspect. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and
until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as
a result of interrogation can be used against him. The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement
without full warnings of constitutional rights."
Same; Same; Same; Same; Custodial interrogation, meaning of.
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody
interrogation of accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is
meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." The situation contemplated has also
been more precisely described by this Court." x x After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation
begins a confrontation arises which at best may be tanned unequal. The detainee is brought to an army
camp or police headquarters and there questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in strange and unfamiliar
surroundings, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained
and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study have
taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are
unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and
coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section
20 of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial
interrogation.
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under
custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been
ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors' office). Hence, with
respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's office), there
is no occasion to speak of his right while under "custodial interrogation" laid down by the second and
subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious reason that he is
no longer under "custodial interrogation."
Same; Same; Same; Same; Right of an accused in court or undergoing preliminary investigation before
the public prosecutor.
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation before the
public prosecutor), in common with all other persons, possesses the right against self- incrimination set
out in the first sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to answer
a specific incriminatory question at the time that it is put to him. Additionally, the accused in a criminal
case in court has other rights in the matter of giving testimony or refusing to do so. An accused "occupies

106
a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness." Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal
prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others1) to be exempt from being a witness against
himself, and 2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be
cross-examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any
manner prejudice or be used against him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Accused cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in
the criminal case against him.
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself'
signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the
accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or
order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused,
or even for himself. In other words unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be
compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory
question at the time it is put to him-the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He
can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. And, as the law categorically states,
"his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him."
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rights of a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently
charged with its commission in court.
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its
commission in court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit: 1)
BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation),
but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and
on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and 2) AFTER
THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT a) to refuse to be a witness; b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever
result to him by such refusal; c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the
prosecution; d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate
him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judges; Respondent judge misapprehended the nature and import of the
disparate rights set forth in Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution; Case at bar.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature
and import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken
them as applying to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly
erred. To be sure, His Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and
logical. The thesis was however so far divorced from the actual and correct state of the constitutional and
legal principles involved as to make application of said thesis to the case before him tantamount to totally
unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse
of discretion. They should be as they are hereby, annulled and set aside.
Facts
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines and was allegedly involved in
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets. The PAL management notified him of an investigation to be
conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline,
and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association
(PALEA) to which Ramos pertained.

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 A handwritten notes was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the irregularities. The
findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also
stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did
not ensue.
Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. On arraignment on this charge,
Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission and
statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being
represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded
of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the
prosecutors was denied.
Issue
Whether or not the respondent judge is correct that the admission and statement of Ramos is
inadmissible evidence against him.
Held
No. The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under custodial
investigation when his statements were taken.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under
custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative
inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The
constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that
Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative
investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having
thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A,
just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February
8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities,
was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-
called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the judge's expressed
apprehensions may be realized, that violence or intimidation, undue pressure or influence be brought to
bear on an employee under investigation or for that matter, on a person being interrogated by another
whom he has supposedly offended. In such an event, any admission or confession wrung from the
person under interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence, on proof of the vice or defect vitiating
consent, not because of a violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, but simply on the
general, incontestable proposition that involuntary or coerced statements may not in justice be received
against the makers thereof, and really should not be accorded any evidentiary value at all.

Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial

Corpuz
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 151258
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14 (2) and 16, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive
delays. The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of
trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or

108
justifiable motive. In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. The
conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed. Also to be considered are factors
such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon
the defendant.
Facts
Seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their
intention to join the Aquila Fraternity. The neophytes were briefed what to expect during the initiation rites.
The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. The
neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites. The neophytes were also
indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation, and also the morning
of their second day. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to
torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of
hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially
ended. After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members demanded that the rites be
reopened. The head of initiation rites initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal,
however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity member then subjected the neophytes to paddling
and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so
strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no
longer walk. After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny's shivering and
incoherent mumblings. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the
Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep
him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced
dead on arrival.
Issue
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of the right of the
accused to speedy trial.
Held
No. The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14 (2) and 16,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious
or oppressive delays. The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified
postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and
for no cause or justifiable motive. In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do
more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the
case. The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed. Also to be considered are
factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought
upon the defendant.
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the several factors
contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case like the fact that the records of the case
were elevated to the Court of Appeals and the prosecution's failure to comply with the order of the court a
quo requiring them to secure certified true copies of the same.

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RULE 116 Arraignment and Plea
A. What is arraignment
How; When, Where, Why
B. Kinds of Plea:
(a) conditional
(b) unconditional
(c) negative/indirect (refusal to plead)
(d) inverted (pleads guilty with exculpatory evidence)
(e) improvident plea (not knowing fully well)
C. Plea of guilty to a capital offense vs. non-capital offense
- requirements
D. Presentation or Inspection of evidence in prosecutions possession
- modes of discovery (Rules 23-29)
E. Suspension of arraignment
a) when suffering from unsound mental condition
b) prejudicial question
c) petition for review
d) absence of judicial personnel
Read: People vs. Estomaca, 256 SCRA 421
People vs. Pangilinan, 518 SCRA 359
Daan vs. Sandiganbayan, 560 SCRA 233
People vs. Janjalani, 639 SCRA 157
F. Bill of Particulars, Read Enrile vs. People, August 11, 2015

Enriquez
PEOPLE V ESTOMACA
256 SCRA 421
Facts:
Estomaca is an illiterate laborer charged with raping his own daughter Estelita. Five complaints were filed
and two of them are being challenged in this appellate review. The two instances which are the subject of
the complaints happened on December 1993 and March6, 1994. They both took place inside their
residence in Iloilo. Lower court imposed penalty of RP for sexual assault in 1993, and Death for rape
allegedly committed in 1994. From a perusal of the records of the case, it appears that the procedural
rules to be observed for the validity of the arraignment of the accused were irregularly complied with;
similar to what happened in the case of Alicando. Estomaca claims to have performed only 2 out 5 cases
filed against him, but he pleaded guilty to all five cases. This shows that the accused did not really
understand the consequences of his actions during the arraignment.

110
 Issue
Whether or not Estomacas arraignment was valid.
Held
[People v Albert]: Rationale behind the rule governing pleas of guilty to a capital offense is that courts
must proceed with more care where possible punishment is death because execution of such sentence is
irrevocable and experience has shown that innocentpersons have at times pleaded guilty.
Improvident pleas of guilt have to be avoided because the accused may forfeit his life and liberty
without having fully understood the meaning, significance, and consequences of his plea.
Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that:
1. Arraignment should be made in open court by judge or by clerk of court
2. The accused be furnished a copy of complaint or information with list of witnesses stated therein
3. Reading of complaint or information in the language or dialect that is known to him (mandatory
requirement)
4. Asking him what his plea is to the charge
The arraignment is an avenue for the accused to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation against him and allows him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. This
is an integral aspect of the due process clause. the transcript of the arraignment shows that it merely
consisted of the bare reading of the five complaints. It was reported in the transcript that: Reading the
information/complaint to the accused in Ilonggo/local dialect.
Since it was stated in the singular, Court speculates whether all five criminal complaints were
actually read, translated or explained to Estomaca on a level within his comprehension considering his
limited education. It is apparent that there was irregularity in the arraignment because after the accused
pleaded guilty to the 5 complaints, he subsequently stated that he wasnt guilty of the 3 cases filed
against him. Conducting the mechanical process of arraignment as outlined in Section 1 does not mean
that there was the necessary degree of compliance by the court below. Other considerations reveal how
flawed the arraignment was:
1. No showing WON Estomaca or his counsel de oficio was furnished copy of each of complaint
with list of witnesses
against him, in order that he may duly prepare and comply with his responsibilities.
2. Estomaca was not warned that on his plea of guilty, he would definitely be given the death
penalty under RA 7659
3. Estomaca was not advised that his plea of guilty would not affect or reduce the death
sentence as he may have believed or
have been erroneously advised.
4. The fact that complaints were supposedly read to appellant in Ilonggo/local dialect.
No statement that Estomaca understood it.
Ilonggo/Hiligaynon is a regional language. In the place where the offenses were committed and
where Estomaca was staying, the localdialect is kinaray-a. Such dialect is not readily understandable to
those who speak Hiligaynon and vice versa.

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 Since all complaints are not only in English but in technical legal language, the Court doubts
whether and how indictments were translated to Ilonggo and/or kinaray-a or that Estomaca was truly
made aware of the consequences of his guilty plea. Court must fully discharge duty to conduct the
requisite searching inquiry to show that accused had not only made a clear, definite, and unconditional
plea, but that he did so with a well-informed understanding and full realization of consequences. Asking
accused about his educational attainment and warning him that he might have admitted the crime
because of his poor intelligence is not the logical approach in making sure that his plea of guilty is
sufficient.
No definite and concrete rule of how trial judge may go about the matter of a proper searching
inquiry, but it is advisable to require accused to fully narrate incident or by making him reenact manner of
perpetrating crime, or by causing him to furnish and explain to the court the missing details of
significance.
Since the arraignment was void, the judgment of conviction was likewise void; and in justice to
the offended party, the case was remanded to trial court for further proceedings.

Cortez
PEOPLE v. PANGILINAN
518 SCRA 359
Jurisdictions; Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest
or voluntary appearance.- Appellant is mistaken. When the hearings for his petition for bail were
conducted, the trial court had already acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. In the
case at bar, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the appellant when he was arrested on
19
March 1997. His arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his person.

Criminal Procedure; Arraignment; Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the
constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus,
to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the
crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is
mobilized against him.

Same; Same; His counsels active participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully
aware of the charges against him, otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of
this blunder. Appellants belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured
when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be
arraigned. In fact, his counsel even crossexamined the prosecution witnesses. His counsels active
participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him;
otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest
was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure
undertaken by the trial court. It is only now, after being convicted and sentenced to two death sentences,
that appellant cries that his constitutional right has been violated. It is already too late to raise this
procedural defect. This Court will not allow it.

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Same; Same; We held that while the arraignment of appellant was conducted after the cases had been
submitted for decision, the error is nonprejudicial and has been fully cured. In People v. Cabale and
People v. Atienza where the same issue was raised under similar circumstances, we held that while the
arraignment of appellant was conducted after the cases had been submitted for decision, the error is
nonprejudicial and has been fully cured. Since appellants rights and interests were not prejudiced by this
lapse in procedure, it only follows that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him was not violated.

Facts
Pangilinan married BBB. BBB had 4 children, one of which was AAA. On the evening of
September 9, 1995, AAA, the daughter of Pangilinan, was sleeping with her brother and 2 other sisters.
Suddenly, she felt her father approach their bed, remove her shorts and lay on top of her. AAA could not
move and she struggled to move because her hands were pinned down by her father above her head.
She cried and shouted for help but her father covered her mouth. She resisted and Pangilinan left her.
The following night, he tried to his daughter again. She resisted but this time, her energy expired and he
succeeded in raping her. The next day, she suffered complications from this incident and she was
continuously molested and raped by her father until January 1997. BBB found out about the incident that
happened to her daughter and decided to leave Pangilinan. She later on filed a case for rape against him.
On October 1997 the prosecution formally offered its evidence. On April 1998, Pangilinan applied
for bail but the same was denied. On June 9, 1999 the trial court, having discovered that appellant had
not yet been arraigned, scheduled his arraignment and with the assistance of counsel de oficio, he
pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. The RTC ruled rendering Pangilinan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt with the imposition of death penalty which was appealed to the CA and the same court
affirmed the decision, thus the automatic review by the SC.

Issues
1. Whether or not RTC had jurisdiction because of his arraignment
2. Whether or not Pangilinans rights and interests prejudiced by the fact that he was arraigned only at
this stage of the proceedings
Held
1. The RTC had jurisdiction. Pangilinan assails his conviction because he was not properly arraigned.
Since he was arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision, said irregularity, he argues, is a
procedural error which is prejudicial to him and is tantamount to denial of his constitutional right to be
informed of the accusation against him. He claims that his subsequent arraignment did not cure the
defect in the trial proceedings because at the time the petition for bail was heard, the trial court had not
yet acquired jurisdiction over his person.
He is mistaken. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had
already acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. In the case at bar, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over Pangilinan when he was arrested; his arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the trial
court jurisdiction over his person.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose of
arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending

113
on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of
the State is mobilized against him.
In the case at bar, his arraignment was done before he could plea. Even if the same was done
after his trial for bail, the same was still done prior to his plea. Again, the purpose of arraignment is to
apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom or to inform him why he is being prosecuted.
Jurisdiction over him was obtained upon his arrest and upon such arrests, he was informed of why he
was being arrested. His later arraignment does not change the fact that the court already had jurisdiction
over him.
2. No, his belated arraignment was not prejudicial. This procedural defect was cured when his counsel
participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his
counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsels active participation in the
hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel
would have objected and informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when he was
subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is only
now, after being convicted and sentenced to two death sentences, he cries that his constitutional right
has been violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect. This Court will not allow it.
In People v. Cabale and People v. Atienza, where the same issue was raised under similar
circumstances, we held that while the arraignment of him was conducted after the cases had been
submitted for decision, the error is non-prejudicial and has been fully cured. Since his rights and interests
were not prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only follows that his constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him was not violated.

Diolata
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN vs THE HON OF SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R.163972-77 March 28, 2008
Facts
Said accused, together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before this Court for
three counts of malversation of public funds involving the sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and P13,528.00,
respectively, which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given
period making it appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building
of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus,
in addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted before this Court for three
counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty and substitute
the same with a plea of guilty, provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and
voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable,
said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of not guilty to the crime of falsification of public
document by a public officer or employee with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of falsification of a
public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused
offered to substitute their plea of not guilty thereto with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of failure of
an accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the
proposal of the accused to plead guilty to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private
individual.

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 Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was likewise amenable to the
offer of said accused to plead guilty to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render
accounts because: x x x JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount of
P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002.
In short, the damage caused to the government has already been reinstituted.
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution, dated March 25, 2004, denied petitioners
Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that
no cogent reason was presented to justify its approval.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his
plea bargaining offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not an accountable officer and he merely
affixed his signature on the payrolls on a routinary basis, negating any criminal intent; and that the
amount involved is only P18,860.00, which he already restituted.
Issue
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea bargaining?
Held
YES. Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the
defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea
bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,
and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. The rules however use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of
discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts are
exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not
supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's
exercise of its discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical
exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law.
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that
petitioner and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the
public.
Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states when an offense includes or is included in the
other, to wit: SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged
in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.

115
 In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to hold
petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents,
petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does
not appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and
payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of
offenses charged in this case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to
such lesser offenses.

Plea of Guilty
Huerto
PEOPLE VS. JANJALANI
639 SCRA 157
Criminal Procedure; Plea of Guilty; All trial judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an
accuseds plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be
extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his
plea and the import of an inevitable conviction; The requirement for a judge to conduct a searching inquiry
applies more so in cases of re-arraignment.As early as in People v. Apduhan, 24 SCRA 798 the
Supreme Court has ruled that all trial judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accuseds
plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea
and the import of an inevitable conviction. Thus, trial court judges are required to observe the following
procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 3.
Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.When the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiryinto the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. The requirement to conduct a
searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. In People v. Galvez, 378 SCRA 389 (2002),
the Court noted that since accused-appellants original plea was not guilty, the trial court should have
exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his plea to guilty.
Same; Same; The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in
cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a guilty plea to the
accusedthe conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the
rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken
impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea.
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was
the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a guilty plea to the accused, as it appears in
this case. In People v. Alborida, 359 SCRA 495 (2001), this Court found that there was still an
improvident plea of guilty, even if the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had
explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the
accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to him; and that he had not been
intimidated, bribed, or threatened. We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a
searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that
the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the
significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement is stringent and mandatory.
Same; Same; Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the
sole basis of the judgment.In People v. Oden, 427 SCRA 634 (2004), the Court declared that even if
the requirement of conducting a searching inquiry was not complied with, [t]he manner by which the plea

116
of guilt is made loses much of great significance where the conviction can be based on independent
evidence proving the commission by the person accused of the offense charged. Thus, in People v.
Nadera, 324 SCRA 490 (2000), the Court stated: Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt
are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on
sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained,
because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his
commission of the offense charged.
Facts
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 30 June
2008, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476
and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter Decision convicted the three accused-appellants namely,
Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu
Jackie or Zaky of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, and sentenced
them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence to reclusion
perpetua as required by Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death Penalty).
On feb 14 2005, a bus was going from Navotas to Alabang. Two men got on the bus. Both
seemed suspicious according to Elmer Andales, the conductor. The two men alighted in Ayala Ave. and
the bus exploded. After the explosion, the spokesperson for abu sayyaff announced over radio that the
explosion was a valentines gift. Accused Asali, member of abu sayaff, gave a television
interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The
bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad and confirmed that they were the two
men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February. Asali testified that he had given
accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. Accused-appellants
Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not conduct a searching inquiry after they had changed
their plea from not guilty to guilty.
Issue
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants plea of guilt despite
insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of
the said plea.
Held
The court ruled that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains in the duty of judges, as they are
mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress;
mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty
plea. This requirement is stringent and mandatory.
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was conducted
or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court observes that
accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge multiple murder based on the
same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that prior to the
change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt one
through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during
pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing
circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the searching inquiry in this
instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused plea of guilt was not
the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration.

117
Suspension of Arraignment
Falucho
ABS-CBN Corporation v. Gozon
53 SCRA 1

Criminal Procedure; Arraignment; Rule 116, Section 11(c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure allows
the suspension of the accuseds arraignment in certain circumstances only.- Rule 116, Section 11(c) of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the suspension of the accuseds arraignment in certain
circumstances only: SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment.- Upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases: (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an
unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him
and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if
necessary his confinement for such purpose; (b) There exist a prejudicial question; and (c) A petition for
review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of
the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the
filing of the petition with the reviewing office.

In Samson v. Daway, this court acknowledged the applicability of Rule 116, Section (c) in a criminal
prosecution for infringement under the Intellectual Property Code. However, this court emphasized the
limits of the order of deferment under the Rule: While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for
suspension of the arraignment, the provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60
days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the
expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment. The suspension of the arraignment should always be within the limits of the Law. The trial
court erred in failing to resume the proceedings after the designated period.

Facts

The controversy arose from GMA-7s news coverage on the homecoming of Filipino overseas
worker and hostage victim Angelo dela Cruz. GMA Network, Inc. and ABS-CBN made their respective
broadcasts and coverage of the live event. ABS-CBN conducted live audio-video coverage and
broadcasted the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. ABS-CBN allowed
Reuters Television Service to air the footages it had taken earlier under a special embargo agreement
stating that No other Philippine subscriber of Reuters would be allowed to use ABS-CBN footage without
the latters consent. GMA-7, to which Dela Pea-Reyes and Manalastas (Respondents) are connected,
assigned and stationed news reporters at the NAIA for its live broadcast and non-live news coverage of
the arrival of dela Cruz. GMA-7 subscribes to both Reuters and Cable News Network. It received a live
video feed of the coverage of Angelo dela Cruzs arrival from Reuters and immediately carried the live
news feed in its program Flash Report prompting ABS-CBNs filing of Complaint for copyright
infringement of Intellectual Property Code. Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution finding
probable cause indicting respondents. On January 4, 2005, respondents filed the Petition for Review
before the Department of Justice and Secretary Gonzales issued a Resolution referred to as Gonzales
Resolution favoring respondents and held that good faith may be raised as a defense in the case. Both
parties moved for reconsideration of the Gonzales Resolution. On January 19, 2005, the trial court
granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by respondents. Under Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, once a petition for review is filed with the Department of Justice, a

118
suspension of the criminal proceedings may be allowed by the court. On July 29, 2010 Department of
Justice Under Secretary Agra issued a Resolution referred to as Agra Resolution reversing Gonzales
Resolution.

Issue

Whether or not the suspension of arraignment/criminal proceedings be allowed.

Held

In Samson v. Daway, this court acknowledged the applicability of Rule 116, Section (c) in a criminal
prosecution for infringement under the Intellectual Property Code. However, this court emphasized the
limits of the order of deferment under the Rule: While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for
suspension of the arraignment, the provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60
days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the
expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment. The suspension of the arraignment should always be within the limits of the Law. The trial
court erred in failing to resume the proceedings after the designated period.

119
 RULE 117 Motion to Quash
A. Motion to Quash vs. Motion to Dismiss; Grounds
B. When and How to move to quash
C. Effects when motion is granted; denied
D. Remedies against denial/grant of motion

Remedies against denial/grant of motion

Javier
PEOPLE V. LACSON
400 SCRA 267
Criminal Procedure Provisional Dismissals Requisites of First Paragraph, Section 8, Rule 117
ofthe Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure reads: Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal.A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with
the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of
offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall
become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With
respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal
shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the
respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely: 1) the
prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin
perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal
of the case; 2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3) the
court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and 4) the public
prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
Same Same Time-Bar Statutory Construction Second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 should
be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year or two years,
as the case may be, after the service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has
control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived.Although the second
paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall permanent one year after the issuance
thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public
prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public
prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of
dismissal.

Same Same Same The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for provisional
dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to
express consent A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express
consent to such provisional dismissal If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the
express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply.Express
consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal
consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the
motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the
writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere
inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object
to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent. A motion of the accused for a provisional

120
dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is be revived
only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally
dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply.
The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused
to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the
statute of limitations.

Facts
Before the court is the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated May 23, 2002, for the
determination of several factual issues relative to the application of sec. 8 rule 117 of Revised rules of
criminal procedure on the dismissal of the two cases filed against the respondents. The respondent and
his co-accused were charged with multiple murder. The court confirmed the express consent of the
respondent in the provisional dismissal of the aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial
determination. The court also ruled the need to determine whether the other facts for its application are
attendant.
Issue
Whether or not Lacsons motion had the effect of a quashal?
Held
Yes. The dismissal by then Judge Agnir of the cases against Lacson was premised on Section 2, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution. In his Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and for
Examination of Witnesses filed with Judge Agnir, Lacson prayed for the following relief:
That a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article 111 of the Constitution
be conducted by this Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the
prosecution to present the private complainants and their witnesses at a hearing scheduled therefor;
and 2) That warrants for the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime
until the resolution of this incident.
Lacsons motion had the effect of a quashal, since he clearly filed the same prior to his arraignment
before Judge Agnirs court. Judge Agnir held that: xxx the documents attached to the Information in
support thereof have been rendered meaningless, if not absurd, with the recantation of the principal
prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants. There is no more evidence to
show that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof. xxx. Under
the circumstances then obtaining, the prosecution had to its disposal certain remedies against the
order of dismissal. Prior to its amendment, the Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Section 6, Rule
117 provides that the quashal of the Information is not a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense except when the motion was based on the extinction of criminal action or liability or on the
fact that the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of
the offense charged.
There is no dispute that the dismissal by Judge Agnir of the information filed against Lacson does not
fall under any of the above stated exceptions. As of the time of the re-filing on June 6, 2001 of the
information for murder, a little over two years have elapsed since the original information were
dismissed on March 29, 1999. If one added to that the four years that have elapsed from the time the
crime happened on May 18, 1995 until the dismissal of the cases by Judge Agnir on March 29, 1999,
then only six years would have passed since the crime happened. The period of six years is
computed without even taking into consideration the suspension of the running of the period due to

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 the filing of the information. This period of six years is well within the 20-year period of prescription,
under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, for prosecution for murder. Denying to the State the right
to prosecute Lacson and his co-accused after March 29, 2001, two years from the date the original
cases were dismissed, effectively nullifies the right of the State to prosecute the accused. This cuts
short the prescriptive period for murder from 20 years to a mere six years. The filing of the complaint
or information interrupts the period of prescription of offenses, but said period shall commence to run
again after such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to the accused. Undeniably, the proceedings
before the trial court was terminated without Lacson being convicted or acquitted, hence the period of
prescription for his offense commenced to run again after the date of termination. However, by the
time the prosecution filed new information against him, based on new investigations conducted
thereon, only six years (as computed above) have passed, which is clearly still within the prescriptive
period of the crime for which Lacson is being charged.

Remedies against denial/grant of motion

Navarroza
PANAGUITON VS. DOJ
G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008
Facts
This is a petition for Review of CA resolutions dismissing Luis Panaguiton, Jr. petition for
certiorari and motion for reconsideration
In 1992, Cawili borrowed money from petitioner and later issued checks as payment both signed
by Cawili and his business associate Tongson. But checks were dishonored either for insufficiency of
funds or closure of account.
Panaguiton then made a formal demands to Cawili and Tongson to pay but to no avail.
So Panaguiton filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating BP Blg. 22 before QC
Prosecutor's Office.
During PI, Tongson filed his counter-affidavit claiming that he had been unjustly included as
party-respondent since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in Cawili's personal capacity. He averred that
he was not Cawili's business associate and claimed that he himself has criminal cases against Cawili.
Tongson also denied that he had issued bounced checks and that his signatures on the checks had been
falsified.
As cpunter, Panaguiton presented documents showing Tongson's signature which was the same
as the signatures on the checks. Panaguiton presented also an affidavit of adverse claim wherein
Tongson claimed to be Cawili's business associate.
December 1995, Prosecutor found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges
against Tongson. Panaguiton filed a partial appeal before DOJ even the case against Cawili was filed
before the proper court.
Later on July 1997, after finding that Tongson was possible to co-sign the bounced checks and
had altered his signature in pleadings submitte during PI, Chief State Prosecutor directed the City
Prosecutor of QC to conduct reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and refer the signatures to NBI.
On March 1999, Asst. City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring
to the NBI, holding that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act. No. 3326, stating that in this

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case the 4 year period started on the date the checks were dishonored and that the filing of complaint in
QC prosecutor's office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period as the law contemplates
judicial and not administrative proceedings. Four years had elapsed and no information was filed against
Tongson. And the order to refer the matter to NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule
112 of rules of criminal procedure because the initiative should come from the petitioner himself and not
from the investigating prosecutor.
Petitioner appealed to DOJ through undersecretary Teehankee but was dismissed. Petitioner
then filed a motion for reconsideration of DOJ and through undersecretary Gutierrez ruled in his favor and
declared that the prescription period was interrupted by the filing of the complaint in the Prosecutor's
office.
However, in August 2004, DOJ acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson ruled
the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered the withdrawal of 3 informations for violation of
BP Blg. 22 against Tongson. DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do
not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder.
Panguiton thus filed a petition for Certiorari before CA assailing the august resolution of the DOJ,
but was dismissed by CA in view of failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum
shopping.
Panaguiton then filed for instant petition claiming that CA committed grave error on dismissing his
petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was without merit and questions are
too unsubstantial.
The DOJ stated that CA did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the rules of
court.
Then Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment arguing that CA did not err in dismissing the
petition for certiorari, and they also claim that the offense of violation of BP Blg. 22 has prescribed and the
long delay, attributable to petitioner and the State violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition
of cases. The petition is meritorious.
Issues
(1) Technical Issues
(2) Substantive Aspects
Held
1) verification is merely formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are
alleged are true and correct-the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on
them and waive strict compliance so that the ends of justice may be served. We find that by attaching
pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner has sufficiently complied with the
verification requirement.We also agree that CA erred in dismissing the petition on the ground of failure to
attach a certified copy or duplicate original of the 3 resolution of DOJ.
(2) This court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for PI suspends the running of the
prescriptive period.The delay was beyond petitioner's control but that of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions
and misapplications.

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Remedies against denial/grant of motion
Josue
G.R. No. 168918 March 2, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HERMENEGILDO DUMLAO y CASTILIANO and
EMILIO LA'O y GONZALES, Respondents.
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (republic act No. 3019); Motion to Quash; Violation of
Sec. 3 (g), Republic Act No. 3019; elements; The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of
material averments of an information is whether the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essentials elements of the crime defined by law evidence aliunde, or
matters extrinsic of the Information, are not be considered. The ground raised by respondent Dumlao in
his Motion to Quash/Dismiss is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. The fundamental test
in determining the sufficiency of the material averments of an information is whether the facts alleged
therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essentials elements of the crime defined
by law. Evidence aliunde, or matters extrinsic of the Information, are not be considered. The elements of
the crime under Sec. 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 are as follows: (1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract
or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. After examining the
information, we find that the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted, will prove all the elements of
Section 3 (g) as against respondent Dumlao.

Same; Same; Same; Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash
insufficiency of evidence is a ground for a dismissal of action only after the prosecution rests its case. It
can be gathered from the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that it did consider the ground invoked by
Dumlao (that the facts charged do not constitute an offense); otherwise, it could have denied respondent
Dumlaos motion. From the reasoning given by the Sandiganbayan, it is clear that it is dismissed the case
because of insufficiency of evidence. Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to
Quash. The grounds, as enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
are as follows: (a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) That the court trying the case
has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
person of the accused; (d) The officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; That it does
not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) That more than one offense is charged except when a
single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law; (g) That the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished; (h) that it contains averments which if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and (i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged,
or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Insufficiency
of evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case.

Same; Same; Same; Where the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against the accused for insufficiency
of evidence, even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence, it violated the
prosecutions right to due process. In the case under consideration, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the
case against the respondent for insufficiency of evidence, even without giving the prosecution the
opportunity to present its evidence. In so doing, it violated the prosecutions right to due process. It
deprived the prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case and to prove the accuseds culpability. It
was therefore erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case under the premises. Not only did it
consider the ground invoked by Respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed the case on a ground not raised
by him, and not at the appropriate time. The dismissal was this without basis and untimely.

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 Facts
On or about May 10, 1982, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines,
Hermenegildo C. Dumlao, Aber Canlas, Jacobo C. Clave, Roman A. Cruz, Jr., and Fabian C. Ver, being
then the members of the Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) which is
a government corporation and therefore all public officers, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, while in the performance of their official functions, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into contract of lease-purchase with Emilio G. Lao, a private
person whereby the GSIS agreed to sell to said Emilio G. Lao, a GSIS acquired property consisting of
three parcels of land with an area of 821 square meters together with a 5-storey building situated at 1203
A. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila, known as the Government Counsel Centre for the sum of P2,000,000.00
with a down payment of P200,000.00 with the balance payable in fifteen years at 12% interest per annum
and granting Emilio G. Lao the right to sub-lease the ground floor for his own account, from which he
collected yearly rentals in excess of the yearly amortization which contract is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
On 9 November 2004, respondent Dumlao pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged.
On 21 February 2005, respondent Dumlao filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense. On 14 July 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed
resolution. It ruled:
The Court finds the motion meritorious that the Board failed to approve the Lease-Purchase
Agreement in question. In order to validly pass a resolution at least a majority of four (4) members of the
Board of Trustees must sign and approve the same.
On 2 September 2005, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Ombudsman, thru the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Sandiganbayan Resolution dismissing the
case against respondent Dumlao.
Issue
Whether the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence when it resolved to dismiss
the charge against respondent Dumlao after the pre-trial and before the petitioner could present its
witnesses and formally offer its exhibits.
Held
Yes, It can be gathered from the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that it did consider the ground invoked
by Dumlao (that the facts charged do not constitute an offense); otherwise, it could have denied
respondent Dumlaos motion. From the reasoning given by the Sandiganbayan, it is clear that it
dismissed the case because of insufficiency of evidence.
Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash. The grounds, as
enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, are as follows:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

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 (f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses
is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Insufficiency of evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its
case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity
to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
In the case under consideration, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against respondent for
insufficiency of evidence, even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its
evidence. In so doing, it violated the prosecutions right to due process. It deprived the
prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case and to prove the accuseds culpability.
It was therefore erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case under the premises. Not only did it
not consider the ground invoked by respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed the case on a ground not
raised by him, and not at the appropriate time. The dismissal was thus without basis and untimely.

Remedies against denial/grant of motion

Quiniquini
SORIANO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 159517-18
Remedial Law; Certiorari; In its juridical sense, the term grave abuse of discretion connotes
capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.The term grave abuse of discretion, in its juridical sense, connotes capricious, despotic,
oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be
of such degree as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner by reason of passion and
hostility. The word capricious, usually used in tandem with the term arbitrary, conveys the notion of willful
and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice
and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative.

Same; Same; A special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a
motion to quash an information.The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is
not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in
such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the
special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse
decision is rendered, to appeal there from in the manner authorized by law.

Criminal Procedure; Information; Duplicity of Offenses; Duplicity of offenses in a single information is

a ground to quash the Information under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure;
Duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint or information that charges more than one offense.
Duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information under Section 3(e), Rule
117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules prohibit the filing of duplicitous information to

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avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. By duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint
or information that charges more than one offense. x x x Otherwise stated, there is duplicity (or
multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense.

Same; Same; Same; A single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense.
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a single act or incident might offend two or more entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law, thus justifying the filing of several charges against the accused.
In Loney v. People (482 SCRA 194 [2006]), this Court, in upholding the filing of multiple charges against
the accused, held: As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or
incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying
the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional
prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. In People
v. Doriquez, we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not the samex x x if
one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, x x x.
Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from
the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the
other. x x x x x x x x x Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although
based on the same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.

Same; Same; Same; Motion to Quash; The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash
anchored on Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is the sufficiency of the
averments in the information; that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish
the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law.The fundamental test in considering a
motion to quash anchored on Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is the
sufficiency of the averments in the information; that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law. The trial court
may not consider a situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or information. Facts that
constitute the defense of the petitioners against the charge under the information must be proved by them
during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the
information on the ground that the material averments do not constitute the offense.
Facts
Soriano and Ilagan were the Presidents and General Manager, respectively, of the Rural Bank of San
Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM). During their incumbency, petitioners indirectly owned a loads from RBSM.
They falsified the loan application and other bank records so that it made to appear that Virigilio Malang
and Rogelio Maaol obtained loans worth Php 15 Million.
The State Prosecutor charged them with violation of General Banking act as amended by PD no. 1795 or
Violation of the Director, Officer Stockholder or related interest rules (DOSRI Rules). And on the same
date, they were charged by estafa thru falsification of commercial document.
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that: (a) more than 1 offense is charged; and (b)
the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Also, petitioners argued that the prosecutor charged more
than one offense for a single act.
RTC denied then the motion to quash. Petitioner then appealed to CA but the CA denied such motion.
Issue
W/n the duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to motions to quash the information.

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 Held
No. In this case, Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one offense, but with
more than one information, each charging a different offense - violation of DOSRI rules in one, and estafa
thru falsification of commercial documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged
with estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in separate informations. Thus, petitioners
erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Information.
In the case at bar, there are differences between the two (2) offenses. A DOSRI violation consists in the
failure to observe and comply with procedural, reportorial or ceiling requirements prescribed by law in the
grant of a loan to a director, officer, stockholder and other related interests in the bank, i.e. lack of written
approval of the majority of the directors of the bank and failure to enter such approval into corporate
records and to transmit a copy thereof to the BSP supervising department. The elements of abuse of
confidence, deceit, fraud or false pretenses, and damage, which are essential to the prosecution
for estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation. The filing of several charges against Soriano was,
therefore, proper.
Verily, there is no justification for the quashal of the Information filed against petitioners. The RTC
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the motions.

Remedies against denial/grant of motion

Lozada
JOSEPH CEREZO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 185230 June 1, 2011
Former Conviction or Acquittal; Double Jeopardy; Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court; When
an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same
offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been
acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In this
case, the fifth requirement was not met as the Trial Court was found to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion in reinstating the case after dismissing it, failing to determine the merits of the case based on
his own judgment. Furthermore, the case was remanded to the said RTC.
Criminal Procedure; Discretion of the Court; It is a well-entrenched rule that once a case is filed
with the Court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the Court.
The RTC acted with abuse of discretion when it failed to assess the merits of the case independently. It is
a well-entrenched rule that once a case is filed with the Court, any disposition of it rests on the sound
discretion of the Court and should then rely on his own determinations of the merits rather than solely rely
on the resolutions or findings of the prosecution.
Facts

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On September 12, 2002, petitioner Cerezo filed a case of libel against private respondents Yaneza,
Abunda JR., and Afulugencia as well as Mapalo before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office (OP-QC).
Finding probable cause against the respondents, the OP-QC filed the corresponding Information before
the RTC. However, on November 20, 2003, the OP-QC reversed its earlier findings and recommended
the dismissal of the case in its Resolution. They then filed before the RTC a Motion to Dismiss and
Withdraw Information but the respondents already were arraigned and pleaded not guilty before such
filing was done. The RTC granted the petitioners motion and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case.
Petitioner then moved for a Reconsideration arguing that the resolution was still subject for review before
the Secretary of Justice. RTC then deferred the action for the motion until the DOJ already presented its
resolution. On June 26, 2006, the Secretary of Justice promulgated its resolution reversing the OP-QC
resolution and directed the Information for libel to be refiled whereby the RTC granted the petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration. Respondents motion for Reconsideration was denied.
The Court of Appeals, through a petition for Certiorari filed by the respondents, found that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in reinstating the case and found that elements of double jeopardy existed
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration on the CAs Decision was denied, hence, this appeal.
Issue
Whether or not the double jeopardy is present.
Held
The Court decided in the negative. Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a
first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a
second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered;
and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. In this case the Court ruled that the Decision of the court on
granting the dismissal of the case and thereafter allowing the subsequent filing of it was made with grave
abuse of discretion. The Court ordered the case to be remanded to the RTC thereby not acquitting,
convicting, nor dismissing the case as required for the first jeopardy to attach.
It is a well-entrenched rule that once a case is filed before the court, it is, then, within the sound discretion
of the court so much so that the Courts should assess the merits of the case independently and should
not only rely on the resolutions or findings of the prosecution. In this case, the RTC failed to make its own
decision based on its own determination on whether or not the respondents should be in trial. It simply
followed the recommendations of the prosecutors as it granted the Motion to Dismiss and Withdrawal by
the prosecution but afterwards allowed its refiling based on the resolution of the DOJ.

Remedies against denial/grant of motion

Montilla
PEOPLE VS. DE LEON
754 SCRA 147, MARCH 23, 2015
Double jeopardy: elements of - Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid
complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent. In case at bar, it is undisputed the presence of all the
elements of double jeopardy: (1) a valid Information for robbery with homicide was filed; (2) the
Information was filed in the court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused pleaded not guilty to the
charge; and (4) the RTC acquitted Danilo for the crime of robbery for lack of sufficient evidence, which

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amounted to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Indeed the conviction for murder was
premised on the fact that robbery was not proven. The RTC Decision which found accused guilty of the
crime of murder and not of robbery with homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence is a judgment
of acquittal as to the crime of robbery alone.

Doctrine of finality of judgements: a judgment of acquital is final and unappealabe - As it stands, the
acquittal on the crime of robbery based on lack of sufficient evidence is immediately final and cannot be
appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. A judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. In fact, the
Court cannot, even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence, review the verdict of
acquittal of the trial court due to the constitutional proscription, the purpose of which is to afford the
defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard from government oppression through the
abuse of criminal processes. The crime of robbery was not proven during the trial. As we discussed, the
acquittal of the accused-appellant, including Danilo, is not reversible.

Facts
Accused-appellant Danilo, armed with a sumpak, allegedly hit Emilio with a bakal while accused-
appellant Antonio, who was armed with a samurai, hacked Emilio in the forehead and struck him with a
lead pipe at the right back portion of his legs and middle back portion of his torso. The accused were
charged with robbery and homicide. The RTC did not find the accused guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide as charged in the Information, but found all the accused guilty of the crime of murder. On the
other hand, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the ruling of the RTC and found all of the
accused guilty of the crime of murder. However, contrary to the findings of the RTC with regard to the
crime of robbery, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the RTC and found accused Danilo guilty of
the separate crime of robbery.
Issue
Whether or not there is a ground for motion to quash in this case
Held
YES, on the ground of double jeopardy. The appellate court erred for violating the constitutional right of
Danilo against double jeopardy as enshrined in Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a
court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was
acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
In case at bar, it is undisputed the presence of all the elements of double jeopardy: (1) a valid Information
for robbery with homicide was filed; (2) the Information was filed in the court of competent jurisdiction; (3)
the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge; and (4) the RTC acquitted Danilo for the crime of robbery
for lack of sufficient evidence, which amounted to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Indeed
the conviction for murder was premised on the fact that robbery was not proven.
The RTC Decision which found accused guilty of the crime of murder and not of robbery with homicide on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal as to the crime of robbery alone. As the
first jeopardy already attached, the appellate court is precluded from ruling on the innocence or guilt of
Danilo of the crime of robbery. To once again rule on the innocence or guilt of the accused of the same
crime transgresses the Constitutional prohibition not to put any person twice x x x in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense.

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RULE 118 Pre-Trial
A. Pre-Trial in civil cases vs. Pre-trial in criminal cases. Distinguish
B. Non-appearance at the pre-trial; effects
C. The Pre-trial Order; when and how done; effect of lack of Order

RULE 119 Trial

A. The Speedy Trial Act/RA 8493
- the time requirement
- exclusions
- remedies
B. Order of Trial
- civil vs. criminal cases
C. Modes of Discovery in criminal cases
D. The State-Witness rule; requirements
E. Mistake in charging the proper offenses; effects
F. Demurrer to Evidence
G. Reopening vs. New Trial

Reopening vs. New Trial

Abroguea
SALVANERA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 143093. May 21, 2007.

Conspirators being a witness- Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the
conspirators is essential because only they have knowledge of the crime. The other prosecution
witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except the conspirators
knew and witnessed the murder.
In Mapa v. Sandiganbayan, it was held:
The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is
essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher
objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of
having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of
the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the
delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are
questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute includes
the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute.
It further ruled: In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the
respondent court is limited. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to
get involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then, the
prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify,
any more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense. For fairness demands that courts keep

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the scales of justice at equipoise between and among all litigants. Due process demands that courts
should strive to maintain the legal playing field perfectly even and perpetually level.
Cancellation of bail bond- Lastly, the court ruled in favor of the appellate court in canceling the bail bond
of Salvanera. The grant of petitioners application for bail is premature. It has to await the testimony of
state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix. Their testimonies must be given their proper weight in determining
whether the Salvanera is entitled to bail.
Facts

In an Information, petitioner Rimberto Salvanera, together with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo

Lungcay and Domingo Tampelix, is charged with the murder of Ruben Parane, committed as follows:

That on or about October 23, 1995, in the Municipality of Gen. Trias, Province of Cavite,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, with treachery and evident premeditation, then armed with
a firearm, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one RUBEN
PARANE Y MAGSAMBOL, inflicting gunshot wound on his body, resulting to his instantaneous death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.

Salvanera applied for bail while the prosecution moved for the discharge of accused Feliciano
Abutin and Domingo Tampelix, to serve as state witnesses.

The trial court granted petitioners application for bail and denied the prosecutions motion for the
discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix. The prosecution moved for reconsideration but the motion
was denied.

The prosecution then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals sustained the
prosecution. It discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the Information to
become state witnesses, and canceled the bail bond of petitioner Salvanera.

Hence, this appeal.

Issues

1. Whether or not the prosecution can use Abutin and Tampelix as witnesses against Salvanera.

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the bail of Salvanera.

Held

1. As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the conspirators.
Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because
only they have knowledge of the crime. The other prosecution witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the
crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except the conspirators knew and witnessed the murder.
The testimonies of the accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly link
petitioner to the commission of the crime.

The prosecutor knows the evidence in his possession and the witnesses he needs to establish his
case. In Mapa v. Sandiganbayan, we held:

The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution
process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to

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 achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who
appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State
to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm
of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended the
privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the
prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the
corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute.

It further ruled:

In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the respondent
court is limited. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get
involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then, the
prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to
rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense. For fairness demands that
courts keep the scales of justice at equipoise between and among all litigants. Due process
demands that courts should strive to maintain the legal playing field perfectly even and perpetually
level.

2. Lastly, the court ruled in favor of the appellate court in canceling the bail bond of Salvanera. The grant
of petitioners application for bail is premature. It has to await the testimony of state witnesses Abutin and
Tampelix. Their testimonies must be given their proper weight in determining whether the Salvanera is
entitled to bail.

Reopening vs. New Trial

Romero
G.R. No. 152643 August 28, 2008
CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON. RAMON C. CODILLA, JR.,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, petitioners,
vs.
RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. GAMALIEL D.B.
BONJE, respondents.
CONDITIONAL EXAMINATION OF BOTH THE DEFENSE AND PROSECUTION WITNESSES;

It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the
judge. This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to
face. It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions as they deem
material and necessary to support their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule
enables the judge to observe the witnesses demeanor.

This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the
different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted
either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings,
Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect
on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.

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 Facts
Respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document before the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19. The case arose from thefalsification of a deed of real estate
mortgage allegedly committed by respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of
the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document.
Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined
atthe Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for
further treatment.
Respondents then filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in Criminal Case No. CBU-52248 on
the ground of prejudicial question.
They argued that Civil Case No. CEB-20359, which was an action for declaration of nullity of the
mortgage, should first be resolved. On May 11, 2000, the RTC granted the
aforesaid motion. Concepcions motion for reconsideration was denied on June 5, 2000. This prompted
Concepcion to institute a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals seeking the
nullification of the May 11 and June 5 RTC orders. The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take
the latters deposition. He explained the need to perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to her
weak physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility. RTC granted the motion and
ordered the taking of the deposition before the Clerk of the Makati RTC.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals;
Court of Appeals rendered a judgment favorable to the respondents. Court of Appeals ratiocinated that
the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.
The latter provision, said the appellate court, only applies to civil cases.
Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcions deposition should have been
taken before the judge or the court where the case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before
the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed order,
the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.
Issue
Whether or not Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies to the deposition of Concepcion, who
was granted a conditional examination, and may thus be applicable to criminal prosecution?
Held
The court ruled in the negative.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the
judge. This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face.
It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions as
they deem material and necessary to support their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses.
Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses' demeanor.
This rule however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide
for different MODES OF DISCOVERY that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are
adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery.
In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13, and 15 of Rule 119, which took effect
1 December 2000, allow theconditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses. In

134
the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness who according to the
petitioners was too sick to travel and appear before the trial court.
Section 15 of Rule 119 comes into play and it provides:
Section 15. Examination of witness for prosecution When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court
where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence, after
reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same
manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after
notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the
accused
Petition was subsequently DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution.

Reopening vs. New Trial

Naca
JIMENEZ v. PEOPLE
G.R. 209195, 209215 Sept. 17, 2014
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; The well-settled rule is that a petition for certiorari
against a court which has jurisdiction over a case will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is
clear and patent.

The well-settled rule is that a petition for certiorari against a court which has jurisdiction over a case will
prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is clear and patent. The burden is on the part of the petitioner to
prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order. Notably, mere abuse of discretion is not
enough; the abuse must be grave. Jurisprudence has defined grave abuse of discretion as the
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.

Same; Same; Same; To the prosecution belongs the control of its case and the Supreme Court
(SC) cannot dictate on its choice in the discharge of a state witness, save only when the legal
requirements have not been complied with.

In the present case, not one of the accused-conspirators, except Montero, was willing to testify on the
alleged murder of Ruby Rose and their participation in her killing. Hence, the CA was correct in ruling that
Judge Docena acted properly and in accordance with jurisprudence in ruling that there was absolute
necessity for the testimony of Montero. He alone is available to provide direct evidence of the crime. That
the prosecution could use the voluntary statements of Montero without his discharge as a state witness is
not an important and relevant consideration. To the prosecution belongs the control of its case and this
Court cannot dictate on its choice in the discharge of a state witness, save only when the legal
requirements have not been complied with. The prosecutions right to prosecute gives it a wide range of
discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court is given the power to discharge a state witness only after
it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused.

135
Same; Same; Same; To resolve a motion to discharge under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules only require that the testimony of the accused sought to
be discharged be substantially corroborated in its material points, not on all points.

We emphasize at this point that to resolve a motion to discharge under Section 17, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules only require that that the testimony of the accused
sought to be discharged be substantially corroborated in its material points, not on all points. This rule is
based on jurisprudential line that in resolving a motion to discharge under Section 17, Rule 119, a trial
judge cannot be expected or required, at the start of the trial, to inform himself with absolute certainty of
everything that may develop in the course of the trial with respect to the guilty participation of the
accused. If that were practicable or possible, there would be little need for the formality of a trial.

Same; Same; Same; It is still the trial court that determines whether the prosecutions preliminary
assessment of the accused-witness qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the procedural
norms.

In the present case, the CA cited Quarto v. Marcelo, 658 SCRA 580 (2011), in ruling that the trial court
must rely in large part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by the prosecuting officer,
thus: A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute certainty at the very
outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed in the course of the trial in regard to the guilty
participation of the accused in the commission of the crime charged in the complaint. If that were
practicable or possible there would be little need for the formality of a trial. He must rely in large part upon
the suggestions and the information furnished by the prosecuting officer in coming to his conclusions as
to the necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; as to the availability or
nonavailability of other direct or corroborative evidence; as to which of the accused is most guilty, and
the like. We deem it important to place this ruling in its proper context lest we create the wrong impression
that the trial court is a mere rubber stamp of the prosecution, in the manner that Jimenez now argues. In
Quarto, we emphasized that it is still the trial court that determines whether the prosecutions preliminary
assessment of the accused-witness qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the procedural norms.
This relationship is in reality a symbiotic one as the trial court, by the very nature of its role in the
administration of justice, largely exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutors findings and
evaluation.

Facts
Manuel A. Montero confessed his participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda. On the course of
such confession, he included Manuel J. Jimenez and several others as his co-conspirators. His
statements detailed where the alleged steel casing containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to
the recovery of a cadaver near the place which he pointed. Moreover, he mentioned that Ruby Rose was
made to wear a busal which was contended by Jimenez.
Montero filed a motion for discharge as a state witness for the prosecution. It was opposed by Jimenez.
The motion to discharge was granted by Judge Zaldy B. Docena stating that the prosecution had
presented clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence showing compliance with the requisites of granting
the said motion.
Jimenez opposed Judge Docenas ruling averring that the Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting the motion to discharge because: (1) the requirements for granting a motion were not properly
complied with; (2) there is no absolute necessity of the testimony of Montero; (3) Monteros testimony do
not corroborate with the prosecutions evidence; (4) and Montero is favored as a state witness though he
appears to be the most guilty.

136
 Issue
Whether or not Judge Docena gravely abused his discretion upon granting of the motion to discharge
Montero as a state witness on the ground that Montero's testimony did not satisfy the requisites in Sec
17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
Held
No. Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion. His decision is in keeping with the requisites
under Section 17, Rule 19.
In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions must be
present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed
state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
Jimenez disputed the satisfaction of the conditions 3 and 5 (a) to (d).
First, the Court found that there was an absolute necessity for the testimony of Manuel. All the accused-
conspirators did not want to cooperate, except for Manuel.
Secondly, Montero's testimony can be substantially corroborated despite the alleged discrepancies for
purposes of motion to discharge. The discrepancies may be properly dealt with during the trial itself.
Moreover, Montero was not the most guilty. By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the highest degree of
culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean the
severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of
conspiracy, yet one may be considered to have lesser or the least guilt taking into account his degree of
participation in the commission of the offense.

Reopening vs. New Trial

Parulan
People v De Grano
Criminal Procedure; Trial in Absentia; Stages of the Trial Where the Presence of the Accused is
Required.Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused
to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea,

137
whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c)
at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by
counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be
waived.
Facts
An Information for murder committed against Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas, against Joven de Grano (Joven), Armando de Grano (Armando),
and Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho (Leonides),
Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil (Leonardo).
Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded "not guilty" to the crime as charged; while their
co-accused Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large. Thereafter, respondents filed a motion
for bail contending that the prosecutions evidence was not strong.
The prosecution then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was denied. They sought recourse
before this Court. the decision of the CA together with the Order of the RTC granting bail to the
respondent was set aside. The RTC was also ordered to immediately issue a warrant of arrest against the
accuse. As a result, Estanislao was re-arrested, but Joven and Armando were not.
However, upon respondents motion for reconsideration, this Court resolved to remand the case to the
RTC. The RTC found several accused guilty of the offense as charged. But the case as against accused
Leonides Landicho and Leonardo Genil was sent to the files or archived cases to be revived as soon as
said accused are apprehended.
Only Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the other respondents.
In its Opposition, the prosecution pointed out that while the accused jointly moved for the reconsideration
of the decision, all of them, except Estanislao, were at-large. Having opted to become fugitives and be
beyond the judicial ambit, they lost their right to file such motion for reconsideration and to ask for
whatever relief from the court.
Respondents filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration praying that the Decision be reconsidered and set
aside and a new one be entered acquitting them. The RTC issued an Order modifying its earlier decision
by acquitting Joven and Armando, and downgrading the conviction of Domingo and Estanislao from
murder to homicide.
Estanislao filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC issued an Order denying the motion and giving due course
to Estanislaos notice of appeal.
Petitioner, filed a Petition for certiorari before the CA arguing that the private respondents, having
deliberately evaded arrest after being denied bail and deliberately failing to attend the promulgation of the
Decision despite due notice, lost the right to move for reconsideration of their conviction and that the
grounds relied upon by respondent RTC in modifying its Decision are utterly erroneous.
Respondent De Grano filed a Motion to Dismiss,arguing that the verification and certification portion of
the petition was flawed, since it was signed only by counsel and not by the aggrieved party. Also, the
petition did not contain the conformity of the Solicitor General.
Petitioner filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and explained that, for lack of material time, it failed to
secure the conformity of the OSG when it filed the petition, but it would nevertheless obtain it.
Anent the verification and certification of the petition having been signed by the private prosecutor,
petitioner explained that private complainant Teresita was in fear for her life as a result of the acquittal of

138
former Mayor Joven de Grano, but she was willing to certify the petition should she be given ample time
to travel to Manila.
However, the petition was dismissed outright by the CA on the grounds that it was not filed by the OSG
and that the assailed Orders were only photocopies and not certified true copies.
Petitioner timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Meanwhile, in its 1st Indorsement, DOJ Secretary
Raul M. Gonzalez, endorsed the petition filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor, with the assistance of the
private prosecutor, to the Solicitor General for his conformity.
On April 5, 2005, the CA issued a Resolution denying the motion.
Issue
Whether or not the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies
available in the Rules against the judgment.
Held
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules applicable at the time the
Decision was promulgated, provides:
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the
accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light
offense the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the
judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by
the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or
detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment
shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided,
that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-
bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused, personally or through his bondsman or warden
and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in
absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last
known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the
promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy
thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he
shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.
Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment however, the accused may surrender and file a
motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the
scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed
to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Thus, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in the
Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, the accused may
surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion the
reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days from notice.

139
Reopening vs. New Trial
Pulido
JOCELYN ASISTIO y CONSINO, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MONICA NEALIGA,
G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction; In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the averments of the complaint or information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of
the filing of the complaint or information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time
of its commission Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, provides that the MeTC has exclusive
jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years, irrespective of the
amount of fine: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxxx (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicted thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided, however,
That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Regional Trial Courts; Offenses punishable with imprisonment exceeding
six (6) years, irrespective of the amount of fine, fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), in accordance with Sec. 20 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129, as amended.
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body, except
those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall
hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Conciliation; Mediation; Conciliation or mediation is not a prerequisite to the
filing of a criminal case for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 6938 against petitioner, because such case
is not an intra-cooperative dispute. On whether the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was
violated when the Cooperative filed a criminal case against petitioner without undergoing
conciliation/mediation proceedings pursuant to the Cooperative Code and the Bylaws of the Cooperative,
the Court rules in the negative. Conciliation or mediation is not a prerequisite to the filing of a criminal
case for violation of RA 6938 against petitioner, because such case is not an intra-cooperative dispute.
As aptly pointed out by the CA: Neither can the accused-appellee insist that this is an intra-cooperative
dispute and should have been resolved at the cooperative level. As aptly argued by the People, this is not
an intra-cooperative dispute. Intra-cooperative dispute is a dispute arising between or among members of
the same cooperative .The instant case is a dispute between the Cooperative and its former chairperson,
the accused-appellee. The Board Resolution authorizing the filing of the criminal complaint by the Board
of Directors, for and in behalf of the Cooperative, is proof that this is not an intra-cooperative dispute, and
within the jurisdiction of the regular court.
Same; Same; Prosecution of Offense; Civil Liability; It is well-settled that in criminal cases where
the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is
limited to the civil liability, and her role in the prosecution of the offense is limited to that of a witness for
the prosecution. In petitioners criminal case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, the State is the real
offended party, while the Cooperative and its members are mere private complainants and witnesses
whose interests are limited to the civil aspect thereof. Clearly, such criminal case can hardly be

140
considered an intra-cooperative dispute, as it is not one arising between or among members of the same
cooperative.
Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; On whether the remand of the criminal case to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) violated her right against double jeopardy due to its earlier dismissal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, the Court rules in the negative and upholds the Court of Appeals (CA) in ruling that the
dismissal having been granted upon petitioners instance, double jeopardy did not attach.
Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; Requisites of Section 7 of Rule 117 layws down the requisites
in order that the defense of double jeopardy may prosper. There is double jeopardy when the following
requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy is for the
same offenses as in the first. As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered;
and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
Same; Same; It is basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be charged with as many
crimes as defined in our penal laws even if these arose from one incident Since the Information filed
against the petitioner were for separate and distinct offenses as discussed above the first against Article
172 (2) of the Revised Penal Code and the second against Section 46 of the Cooperative Code (RA
6938) one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy. Besides, it is
basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be charge with as many crims as defined in our penal
laws even if these arose from one incident. Thus, where a single act is directed against one person but
said act constitutes a violation of two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, or by a
special law and the Revised Penal Code, as in this case, the prosecution against one is not an obstacle
to the prosecution of the other.
Facts
Jocelyn Asistio y Consino, the herein petitioner, was charged with violation of Section 46 of the
Cooperative Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 6938). As provided by the information filed against
her, that on or about July 27, 1998, an exclusive dealership agreement regarding the sale of Coca-Cola
soft drinks at A. Mabini Elementary School was executed between Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.,
and the petitioner, who is the chairperson and managing director of A. Mabini Elementary School
Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative. This act of the petitioner was said to be in violation of her duty as
the chairperson. Despite the direction of the principal requiring the petitioner to submit financial reports
during her tenure as chairperson, the petitioner claimed that the principal had no authority to require her
to submit such documents since said reports were posted on the school bulletin board. Thereafter, an
audit committee was created by the principal, which eventually found out that the petitioner defrauded the
Cooperative and its members for three (3) years. They requested the petitioner to return the said amounts
to the Cooperative, but she refused to do so. Hence, a board resolution which authorized the filing of
criminal charges against the petitioner was issued by the Cooperative.
After the prosecution presented its evidence, the petitioner moved to dismiss the case by
way of Demurrer to Evidence with leave of court and argued that the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction over the case. Thus, the RTC dismissed the case because of lack of jurisdiction. The private
prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC for lack of merit. The order of the
dismissal of the case was appealed by the Office of the Solicitor General which represents the People of
the Philippines before the Court of Appeals. A decision reversing and setting aside the RTCs decision
was rendered by the CA. The case was remanded to RTC for further proceedings. Thereafter, the
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court was filed by the petitioner before this Court.

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 Issue
Whether or not the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on demurrer to evidence amounts to
an acquittal, hence, final and unappealable.
Held
The Court ruled in the negative. As provided in Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, a demurrer to
evidence in criminal cases is filed after the prosecution had rested its case. When demurrer to evidence is
granted, it calls for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to
warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits,
tantamount to an acquittal of the accused (People vs. Sandiganbayan). Further, the dismissal of the case
cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
In the case at bar, demurrer to evidence was granted by the RTC for lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged and not because of insufficiency of evidence. As it was stated by the CA, acquittal is
always based on the merits wherein the evidence does not show that the defendants guilt is beyond
reasonable doubt. On the other hand, dismissal terminates the proceedings because of lack of jurisdiction
which the RTC had done in this case. Thus, the dismissal of the case, which is only based on the lack of
jurisdiction of the court and not on merits, does not amount to an acquittal and can still be appealed.
The petition was denied, and the CAs decision and resolution were affirmed.

Reopening vs. New Trial

Quillope
ANTONIO CABADOR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 186001 October 2, 2009
Criminal Procedure; Demurrer to Evidence; Because some accused have in the past used
the demurrer in order to delay the proceedings in the case, the remedy now carries a caveat
when the accused files a demurrer without leave of court, he shall be deemed to have waived the
right to present evidence and the case shall be considered submitted for judgment.

The trial proper in a criminal case usually has two first stages: first, the prosecutions presentation
of evidence against the accused and, second, the accuseds presentation of evidence in his defense. If,
after the prosecution has presented its evidence, the same appears insufficient to support a conviction, te
trial court may at its own initiative or on motion of the accused dispense with the second stage and
dismiss the criminal action. There is no point for the trial court to hear the evidence of the accused in such
a case since the prosecution bears the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The order of
dismissal amounts to an acquittal. But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to
delay the proceedings in the case, the remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused files a demurrer
without leave of court, he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case
shall be considered submitted for judgment. On occasions, this presents a problem such as when, like the
situation in this case, the accused files a motion to dismiss that, to the RTC, had the appearance of a
demurrer to evidence. Cabador insists that it is not one but the CA, like the lower court, ruled that it is.

Same; Same; Motion to Dismiss Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Dismiss,

Distinguished; Pleadings and Practice; to determine whether the pleading filed is a demurrer to
evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the allegations in it made in good
faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party
filing it.

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This Court held in Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections that, to determine whether the pleading filed is
a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the allegations in it made in
good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party
filing it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Speedy Trial; In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on
the ground of denial of the accuseds right to speedy trial.

In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accuseds right to
speedy trial. This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault
of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial. This was the main
thrust of Cabadors motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial court.
Cabador of course dropped a few lines in his motion to dismiss in paragraphs "11 (sic)" and 12, saying
that the trial court "has no evidence to consider," "the charge has no leg to stand on," and that "the
witnesses x x x had no knowledge of any connection with or any participation by the accused in the
incident." But these were mere conclusions, highlighting what five years of trial had accomplished.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already
rested its case; where the accused filed his motion to dismiss before he could object to the
prosecutions formal offer before the trial court could act on the offer, and before the prosecution
could rest its case, it could not be said that he had intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a
demurrer to evidence.

A demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. Section 23,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads: Demurrer to evidence. After the
prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1)
on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the
evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. (Emphasis supplied) Here, after the
prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits on August 1, 2006, the same day Cabador filed his motion to
dismiss, the trial court still needed to give him an opportunity to object to the admission of those exhibits.
It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And only after such a ruling could the prosecution be deemed to
have rested its case. Since Cabador filed his motion to dismiss before he could object to the
prosecutions formal offer, before the trial court could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could
rest its case, it could not be said that he had intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to
evidence.

Facts
A petition for review on certiorari, assailing the CA Decision and Resolution that affirmed the
Order of the RTC of Quezon City.
The public prosecutor accused Cabador before the RTC of Quezon City of murdering, in
conspiracy with others, Atty. Jun N. Valerio. After presenting only five witnesses over five years of
intermittent trial, the RTC declared at the end the prosecutions presentation of evidence and required the
prosecution to make a written or formal offer of its documentary evidence within 15 days from notice. But
the public prosecutor asked for three extensions of time, the last of which was to end on July 28, 2006.
Still, the prosecution did not make the required written offer.
Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case complaining of a turtle-paced proceeding in the case
since his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial. Further, he claimed that in
the circumstances, the trial court could not consider any evidence against him that had not been formally

143
offered. He also pointed out that the prosecution witnesses did not have knowledge of his alleged part in
the crime charged.
The RTC issued an Order treating petitioner Cabadors motion to dismiss as a demurrer to
evidence. And, since he filed his motion without leave of court, the RTC declared him to have waived his
right to present evidence in his defense. The trial court deemed the case submitted for decision insofar as
he was concerned. Cabador filed a motion for reconsideration of this Order but the RTC denied it.
Cabador questioned the RTCs actions before the CA but the latter denied his petition and affirmed the
lower courts actions. With the CAs denial of his motion for reconsideration, the petitioner came to this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Whether Cabadors motion to dismiss before the trial court was in fact a demurrer to evidence filed
without leave of court.
Held
The trial proper in a criminal case usually has two stages: first, the prosecutions presentation of
evidence against the accused and, second, the accuseds presentation of evidence in his defense. If,
after the prosecution has presented its evidence, the same appears insufficient to support a conviction,
the trial court may at its own initiative or on motion of the accused dispense with the second stage and
dismiss the criminal action. There is no point for the trial court to hear the evidence of the accused in such
a case since the prosecution bears the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The order of
dismissal amounts to an acquittal.
But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the proceedings in the
case, the remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused files a demurrer without leave of court, he
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall be considered submitted
for judgment. On occasions, this presents a problem such as when, like the situation in this case, the
accused files a motion to dismiss that, to the RTC, had the appearance of a demurrer to evidence.
Cabador insists that it is not one but the CA, like the lower court, ruled that it is.
This Court held in Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections that, to determine whether the pleading
filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the allegations in it
made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the
party filing it.
In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accuseds right
to speedy trial. This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without
fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial. This was the
main thrust of Cabadors motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial
court.
The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any demurrer. He
did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to show in what respects such
evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime charged. His so-called "demurrer" did not touch on any
particular testimony of even one witness. He cited no documentary exhibit. Indeed, he could not because,
he did not know that the prosecution finally made its formal offer of exhibits on the same date he filed his
motion to dismiss.To say that Cabador filed a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to the proverbial blind
man, touching the side of an elephant, and exclaiming that he had touched a wall.
Besides, a demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case.
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads:

144
 Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of
court.
In sum, tested against the criteria laid down in Enojas, the Court finds that petitioner Cabador
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to evidence.
He cannot be declared to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense. On a final note, a
demurrer to evidence shortens the proceedings in criminal cases. Caution must, however, be exercised in
view of its pernicious consequence on the right of the accused to present evidence in his defense, the
seriousness of the crime charged, and the gravity of the penalty involved.

Reopening vs. New Trial

Ramirez
PEOPLE VS HERSON TAN
G.R. No. 117321. February 11, 1998
Criminal Procedure; Demurrer to Evidence; Grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an
acquittal and is thus final and unappealable. - In People v. Sandiganbayan, 447 scra 291 (2004), this
Court explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is,
thus, final and unappealable, to wit: The demurrer to evidence in criminal, such as the one at bar, is filed
after the prosecution had rested its case, and when the same is granted, it calls for an appreciation of
the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable
doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused. Such
dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would
be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.

Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; Elements of Double Jeopardy. - The elements of double
jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused
was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent.

Same; Same; Same; The rule on double jeopardy is not without exceptions; The only instance
when double jeopardy will not attach is when the Regional Trial Court (RTC) acted with grave abuse of
discretion.- The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr.,
518 SCRA 393 (2007), this Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is
when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Same; Same; Same; Prosecution denied due process of law when the trial was but a mock trial.-
In Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986), this Court ruled that the prosecution was denied due
process of law when the trial was but a mock trial, to wit: More so does the rule against the invoking of
double jeopardy hold in the case at bar where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where
the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and
closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total
absolution as innocent of all the respondents-accused. In addition, in People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166
(1985), this Court ruled that there is no double jeopardy when the prosecution was not allowed to
complete its presentation of evidence by the trial court.

Same; Same; Same; The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which cannot be

145
attributed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) simply because it chose not to hold in abeyance the
resolution of the demurrer to evidence.- While it would have been ideal for the RTC to hold in abeyance
the resolution of the demurrer to evidence, nowhere in the rules, however, is it mandated to do so.
Furthermore, even if this Court were to consider the same as an error on the part of the RTC, the same
would merely constitute an error of procedure or of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction as
persistently argued by petitioner. Errors or irregularities, which do not render the proceedings a nullity,
will not defeat a plea of antrefois acquit. We are bound by the dictum that whatever error may have been
committed effecting the dismissal of the case cannot now be corrected because of the timely plea of
double jeopardy. To reiterate, the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which cannot be
attributed to the RTC simply because it chose not to hold in abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to
evidence.

Same; Same; Same; The fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against
double jeopardy is to afford defendant who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from
government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. - It bears to stress that the fundamental
philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford defendant who has
been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of
criminal processes. While petitioner insists that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, this Court
finds that none can be attributed to the RTC. Consequently, the CA did not err when it affirmed the
assailed Orders of the RTC.

FACTS
That on December 5, 1988, at about 7:00 oclock p.m., tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his
wife, Delfa, at Our Lady of Angels Academy in Atimonan, Quezon, to inform her that he will drive both
accused to Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time, however, that Freddie was seen alive. He was found
in Malinao, Atimonan sprawled on the ground with fourteen stab wounds in different parts of his body.
Accused-appellant Herson Tan, along with Lito Amido, were charged with the crime of
highway robbery with murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, of Gumaca, Quezon Province.
At the trial, Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their
headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the latter that he was a
suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery cases allegedly committed in Lucena
City. In the belief that they were merely conversing inside the police station, he admitted that he did not
inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he
reduce the supposed confession to writing. Appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually
transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of
the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra.
The RTC found Herson Tan guilty beyond reasonable doubt sentenced him to suffer an imprisonment of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and further ordered to indemnify the family of the deceased in the amount of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the confession of an accused given before a police investigator upon invitation and
without the benefit of counsel be admissible in evidence against him.

146
 HELD
NO. It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever
information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.
Article III, Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 12 (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible against him.
Republic Act No. 7438 (R.A. No. 7438), reinforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of
persons under custodial investigation.
As used in this Act, custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person
who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to
the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. The
rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody,
and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements
that the rule begins to operate.
Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the investigating
officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a
meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory reading by
the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice.
Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must
satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be voluntary,
knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel.

Reopening vs. New Trial

Santos
NELSON IMPERIAL, ET AL. vs. MARICEL JOSON, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 160067, 170410, 171622 November 17, 2010
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Like prohibition; the rule is settled that certiorari may be issued only for the
corrections of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
It bears emphasizing at the outset that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition petitioners filed before
the CA were all anchored on the grave abuse of discretion supposedly imputable against the RTCs of
Naga, Lucena and Paraaque for issuing the rulings therein assailed. Like prohibition, however, the rule
is settled that certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Because their function is limited to keeping inferior

147
courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction, the writs therefor may be issued only in cases lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the context of said
special civil actions, it has been consistently held that grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.
Same; Same; A writ of certiorari cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as
to its intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case; The rule is settled that errors of
judgment involving the wisdom or legal soundness of a decision are beyond the province of a petition for
certiorari.
Consistent with its function as a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, however, the rule is
settled that errors of judgment involving the wisdom or legal soundness of a decision are beyond the
province of a petition for certiorari. Not being intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling, a
writ of certiorari cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as to its intrinsic
correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case. As long as the trial court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged error committed in the exercise of its discretion will, therefore, amount to nothing
more than mere errors of judgments, correctible by an appeal and not by a petition for certiorari.
Same; Actions; Litis Pendentia; Factors to be considered in the determination of which court would be in
a better position to serve the interests of justice.
Under the interest of justice rule, moreover, the determination of which court would be in a better
position to serve the interests of justice also entails the consideration of the following factors: (a) the
nature of the controversy; (b) the comparative accessibility of the court to the parties; and, (c) other
similar factors. Considering the majority of the parties live closer to the Paraaque RTC, we cannot
hospitable entertain petitioners insistence that the abatement of the case before said court in favor of the
one they filed before the Naga RTC would promote the expeditious and inexpensive disposition of the
parties complaints for damages against each other which are indisputably personal in nature.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Right to Speedy Trial; Right is considered violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays; Factors to be considered in
determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and
to a speedy trial.
Designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him
for an indefinite time and to prevent delays in the administration of justice, said right is considered
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In the
case of Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan, 442 SCRA 294 (2004), this Court significantly ruled as follows: x x x
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c)
the defendants assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Xxxx
Same; Same; Same; In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more
than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case
and to give particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concededly mandates the commencement of the trial
within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order and the continuous conduct thereof for a period not
exceeding 180 days, Section 3 a (1), Rule 119 provides that delays resulting from extraordinary remedies
against interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence. In
determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, moreover, courts are required to do more than a

148
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case and to
give particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
Remedial Law; Default; Time and again, the Court has espoused a policy of liberality in setting aside
orders of default which are frowned upon.
Inasmuch as procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases, courts have
likewise been exhorted to afford party-litigants the amplest opportunity to have their cases justly
determined, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has espoused a policy
of liberality in setting aside orders of default which are frowned upon, as a case is best decided when all
contending parties are able to ventilate their respective claims, present their arguments and adduce
evidence in support thereof. Thus, the issuance of the orders of default should be the exception rather
than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the
orders of the trial court.

Facts
On 11 May 2001, along the National Highway in Barangay Concepcion, Sariaya, Quezon, an
Isuzu ten-wheeler truck collided with a Fuso six-wheeler truck. The Isuzu ten-wheeler truck was owned by
petitioner Nelson Imperial and was then being driven by petitioner Santos Francisco. On the other hand,
the Fuso six-wheeler truck was driven by respondent Santiago Giganto, Jr., who was, at the time,
accompanied by a helper or pahinante, respondent Samuel Cubeta. After colliding with the Fuso six-
wheeler truck, the Isuzu ten-wheeler truck further rammed into a Kia Besta Van which was driven by
respondent Arnel Lazo. The Kia Besta van was owned by Noel Tagle who was then on board the said
vehicle together with 13 other passengers.
The accident resulted in the death of Noel Tagle and seven other passengers. Respondents
Arnel Lazo, Evelyn Felix, and Jasmin Galvez all suffered serious physical injuries and were immediately
brought to the nearest hospital for treatment.
A criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide, Multiple Serious
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property was filed against petitioners Santos Francisco and Noel
Imperial. Petitioners Francisco and Imperial also filed a complaint for damages against respondents
Giganto and Cubeta, the driver and pahinante of the Fuso six-wheeler truck, respondent Leticia Pedraja,
the alleged registered owner of the truck, and respondent Maricel Joson, the alleged present owner. In
turn alleging that the mishap was attributable to the negligence of the driver of the Isuzu ten-wheeler
truck, respondent Giganto joined respondent Maricel Joson and her husband, Gerard Ferdinand Joson, in
filing against petitioners Francisco and Imperial a complaint for damages.
A mandatory pre-trial conference was made by the Sariaya MTC in Criminal Case No. 01-99 after
petitioner Francisco entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment scheduled in the case. Petitioner
Francisco proposed the facts for stipulation to Prosecutor Rodolfo Zabella, Jr., which the latter refused to
stipulate. Despite said refusal, the Sariaya MTC went on to issue a pre-trial order. As a consequence,
petitioner Francisco filed a motion to compel and disqualify Prosecutor Zabella and to correct the pre-trial
order on the ground that the latter cannot refuse to stipulate on matters of which he has personal
knowledge and that the Judges recollection of the proposed stipulation was different from that actually
proposed.
The Sariaya MTC denied petitioner Franciscos motion. He thereafter filed a motion for
reconsideration which the MTC also denied. The Sariaya MTC then directed that the pre-trial conference
be set anew in view of the reassignment of the case to Prosecutor Francis Sia and the appearance of a
new private prosecutor in the case. Dissatisfied, petitioner Francisco filed a petition for certiorari,

149
prohibition, and mandamus. Likewise contending that the nine postponements of the pre-trial conference
in Criminal Case No. 01-99 were capricious, vexatious, and oppressive, petitioner Francisco moved for
the dismissal of the case on 14 March 2004, on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy trial
had been violated.
Issue
Whether or not the nine postponements of the pre-trial conference amounted to a violation of
petitioner Franciscos constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Held
No. The nine postponements of the pre-trial conference did not amount to a violation of petitioner
Franciscos constitutional right to a speedy trial. Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
concededly mandates commencement of the trial within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order and the
continuous conduct thereof for a period not exceeding 180 days, Section 3 a (1), Rule 119 provides that
delays resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing
the time within which trial must commence.
Moreover, in determining the right of an accused to a speedy trial, courts are required to do more
than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case
and to give particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Considering the
procedural antecedents in the case at bar as well as the further reassignment of the case to Prosecutor
Baligod as a consequence of Prosecutor Sias subsequent transfer to another government office, the
Court of Appeals (CA) correctly brushed aside petitioner Francisco's claim that the postponements of the
pre-trial conferences in the case before the Sariaya MTC were violative of his right to a speedy trial.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the
delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
The delays entailed by the postponements of the aforesaid hearings were, to a great extent,
attributable to petitioner Franciscos own pursuit of extraordinary remedies against the interlocutory
orders issued by the Sariaya MTC and the assignment of at least three public prosecutors to the case,
namely, Prosecutors Zabella, Sia, and Baligod. Thus, due to the foregoing facts and for lack of merit, the
Supreme Court affirmed the CAs decision denying petitioner Franciscos motion to dismiss the case.

Reopening vs. New Trial

Abroguena
Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr. vs. Sally Go Bangayan
G.R. No. 172792. October 19, 2011
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; In criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.This Court
leans toward Resallys contention that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition for certiorari before
the CA. It has been consistently held that in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal
of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The
private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil
liability of the accused is concerned.

Double Jeopardy; Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer
to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground by insufficiency of evidence because to do so will

150
place the accused in double jeopardy.A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested
its case and the trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is
sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds that
the evidence is not sufficient and grants the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is one on
the merits, which is equivalent to the acquittal of the accused. Well-established is the rule that the Court
cannot review an order granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence because to do so will place the accused in double jeopardy.

Elements of Double Jeopardy to Attach; Jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal is
considered final even if it was made on motion of the accused.Double jeopardy attaches if the following
elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the
defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. However, jurisprudence
allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal is considered final even if it was made on motion of the
accused, to wit: (1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the
prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal. (2)
Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a
speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute.

The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy is
when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case
against the accused or where the trial was a sham.The only instance when the accused can be barred
from invoking his right against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution
was not allowed the opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham. For
instance, there is no double jeopardy (1) where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of
the prosecutions evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence; and (2)
where the case was dismissed at a time when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication.

An acquittal by virtue of a demurer to evidence is not appealable because it will place the accused in
double jeopardy.As previously discussed, an acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not
appealable because it will place the accused in double jeopardy. However, it may be subject to review
only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.

The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly establish that the trial court
blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to dispense justice.Grave abuse
of discretion has been defined as that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly establish that the trial court
blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to dispense justice.

Constitutional Law; Due Process; Jurisprudence dictates that in order for a decision of the trial court to be
declared null and void for lack of due process, it must be shown that a party was deprived of his
opportunity to be heard.As regards Sally Gos assertion that she had been denied due process, an
evaluation of the records of the case proves that nothing can be further from the truth. Jurisprudence
dictates that in order for a decision of the trial court to be declared null and void for lack of due process, it

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must be shown that a party was deprived of his opportunity to be heard. Sally Go cannot deny that she
was given ample opportunity to present her witnesses and her evidence against petitioners. Thus, her
claim that she was denied due process is unavailing.

FACTS
On March 7, 1982, Benjamin, Jr. married Sally Go in Pasig City. Later, Sally Go learned that Benjamin, Jr.
had taken Resally as his concubine whom he subsequently married on January 5, 2001 under the false
name, Benjamin Z. Sojayco. Furthermore, Sally Go discovered that on September 10, 1973, Benjamin,
Jr. also married a certain Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City.
The City Prosecutor of Caloocan City conducted a preliminary investigation and thereafter issued a
Resolution recommending the filing of an information for bigamy against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for
having contracted a marriage despite knowing that he was still legally married to Sally Go. The
information was duly filed on November 15, 2002.
After the arraignment, during which petitioners both pleaded not guilty to the charge against them, the
prosecution presented and offered its evidence. On September 8, 2003, Benjamin, Jr. and Resally
separately filed their respective motions for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. This was granted by the
RTC in its Order dated September 29, 2003.
In its December 3, 2003 Order,the RTC dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for
insufficiency of evidence. It reasoned out that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that Benjamin, Jr. used the fictitious name, Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr., in contracting his marriage with
Resally. Corollarily, Resally cannot be convicted of bigamy because the prosecution failed to establish
that Resally married Benjamin, Jr.
Aggrieved, Sally Go elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. On March 14, 2006, the CA
promulgated its Decision granting her petition and ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for further
proceedings.
Petitioners motions for reconsideration were both denied by the CA in a Resolution dated May 22, 2006.
Hence, these petitions.
ISSUE
Whether or not Sally Go had the legal standing to file a petition for certiorari before the CA despite the
lack of consent of either the Office of the Solicitor General or the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Caloocan.
HELD
No. Sally does not have a legal standing in the filing the appeal.
Only the OSG, and not the private offended party, has the authority to question the order granting the
demurrer to evidence in a criminal case.
It has been consistently held that in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private
complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability
of the accused is concerned.28 As explained in the case of People v. Santiago:
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the
offense, the complainants role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be

152
undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the
People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal.
However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the
accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on
other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved.
A perusal of the petition for certiorari filed by Sally Go before the CA discloses that she sought
reconsideration of the criminal aspect of the case. Specifically, she prayed for the reversal of the trial
courts order granting petitioners demurrer to evidence and the conduct of a full blown trial of the criminal
case. Nowhere in her petition did she even briefly discuss the civil liability of petitioners. It is apparent that
her only desire was to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioners.
Thus, Sally Go did not have the requisite legal standing to appeal the acquittal of the petitioners.

Reopening vs. New Trial

Bobiles
G.R. No. 191015 August 6, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES,** Respondents.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Demurrer to Evidence Demurrer to evidence is an objection
by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which is his adversary produced
is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.

Demurrer to the evidence is "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence
which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a
verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required
to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a
verdict of guilt. x x x Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in
character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the
circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the
crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused." Thus, when the accused files a
demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the
conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Same; Same; Same; The grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to acquittal and cannot be
appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy.

The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling
on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion." As to effect, "the
grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place
the accused in double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." When grave abuse of discretion is
present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null and void.

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Same; Same; Same; The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly
establish that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its
authority to dispense justice.

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly
establish that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to
dispense justice."

FACTS
Respondent Jose Go executed fictitious loans in favor of two entities Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile
Mills, Inc. in which two managers checks representing the supposed proceeds of these fictitious loans
were issued but made payable to two different entities Philippine Recyclers Inc. and Zeta International
without any documents issued by the supposed borrowers Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.
assigning the supposed loan proceeds tothe two payees. Thereafter, these two managers checks
together with several others were encashed, and then deposited in the OCBC Savings Account of Jose
Go. Then, several automatic transfer deposits were made from Jose Gos savings account to his OCBC
Current Account which were then used to fund Gos previously dishonored personal checks.
Upon knowledge of the same, PDIC filed a for two (2) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of
CommercialDocuments in the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila against the private
respondents . After finding probable cause, the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila filed
Informations against the private respondents.
Upon arraignment, private respondents pleaded not guilty. A pre-trial was conducted. Thereafter, trial of
the cases ensued and the prosecution presented its evidence. After the presentation of all of the
prosecutions evidence, the private respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence to
which was granted by the RTC.
Consequently, private respondents filed their Demurrer to Evidence. On July 2, 2007, the RTC issued an
Order granting the motion and dismissed the case.
No motion for reconsideration of the July 2, 2007 was filed by the handling public prosecutor, Only
complainant Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
On January 4, 2008, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an original
Petition for Certiorari with the CA assailing the July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court. The CA denied the
said petition on the ground that the assailed July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court became final since the
prosecution failed to move for the reconsideration thereof, and thus double jeopardy attached.
The assailed Order was received by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila on July 3, 2007 and by the
Private Prosecutor on July 5, 2007. While the Private Prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
said Order, the Public Prosecutor did not seek for the reconsideration thereof. It is the Public Prosecutor
who has the authority to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the said order and the Solicitor General who
can file a petition for certiorari with respect to the criminal aspect of the cases. The failure of the Public
Prosecutor to file a Motion for Reconsideration on or before July 18, 2007 and the failure of the Solicitor
General to file a Petition for Certiorarion or before September 1, 2007 made the order of the trial court
final.

154
The OSG moved for reconsideration, but in the assailed January 22, 2010 Resolution, the CA stood its
ground. Hence, the instant Petition was instituted.
Petitioner admitted that the public prosecution indeed filed the motion for reconsideration beyond the
period allowed, begs the Court to excuse its mistake in the name of public interest and substantial justice
ISSUE
Whether or not the Petition for Certiorary filed by the prosecution through the OSG belatedly assailing the
granting by the RTC and CA of private respondents Demurrer to Evidence be granted in the name of
public interest and substantial justice.
HELD
The Court granted the Petition.
The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be exercised with great caution, because
not only the rights of the accused - but those of the offended party and the public interest as well - are
involved. Once granted, the accused is acquitted and the offended party may be left with no recourse.
Thus, in the resolution of demurrers, judges must act with utmost circumspection and must engage in
intelligent deliberation and reflection, drawing on their experience, the law and jurisprudence, and
delicately evaluating the evidence on hand.
Demurrer to the evidence is "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence
which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a
verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required
to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a
verdict of guilt. x x x Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in
character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the
circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the
crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused." Thus, when the accused files a
demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the
conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
"The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling
on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion." As to effect, "the
grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place
the accused in double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorariif it was issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction." When grave abuse of discretion is present, an
order granting a demurrer becomes null and void.
As a general rule, an order granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal. There
are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the
accuseds demurrer to evidence,its judgment is considered void, as this Court ruled in People v. Laguio,
Jr.:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts
granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action
of certiorariunder Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does
not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an

155
 appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused
against double jeopardy is not violated.
In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court when it granted the accuseds demurrer to evidence, we deem its consequent
order of acquittal void.
The Court declares that the CA grossly erred in affirming the trial courts July 2, 2007 Order granting the
respondents demurrer, which Order was patently null and void for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion and manifest irregularity, thus causing substantial injury to the banking industry and public
interest. The Court finds that the prosecution has presented competent evidence to sustain the indictment
for the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and that respondents appear to be
the perpetrators thereof. In evaluating the evidence, the trial court effectively failed and/or refused to
weigh the prosecutions evidence against the respondents, which it was duty-bound to do as a trier of
facts; considering that the case involved hundreds of millions of pesos of OCBC depositors money not
to mention that the banking industry is impressed with public interest, the trial court should have
conducted itself with circumspection and engaged in intelligent reflection in resolving the issues.
Finally, it must be borne in mind that "[t]he granting of a demurrer to evidence should x x x be exercised
with caution, taking into consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also the right of the private
offended party to be vindicated of the wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the accused is
acquitted and the private complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In such instances, although
the decision of the court may be wrong, the accused can invoke his right against double jeopardy. Thus,
judges are reminded to be more diligent and circumspect in the performance of their duties as members
of the Bench xx x."

Reopening vs. New Trial

Alim
PEOPLE VS. PEPINO, 779 SCRA 170
G.R. No. 174471 | EN BANC | January 12, 2016
The illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free form error. It is settled that [a]ny objection to the procedure followed
in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. As we held in
People v. Samson, 244 SCRA 146 (1995): [A]ppellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in
the manner of his arrest as he failed to move for the quashing of the information before the trial court.
Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial. At any
rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. Simply put, the illegality of the warrantless arrest
cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their
culpability. It is much too late in the day to complain about warrantless arrest after a valid information had
been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced and had been completed, and a
judgment of conviction had been rendered against her.

Facts
The RTC convicted Pepino and Gomez of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty.

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 The RTC held that Edward positively identified Pepino and Gomez as two of the persons who
forcibly abducted him at gunpoint inside Kilton Motors, and who consequently detained him somewhere in
Quezon City for four (4) days until he was released inside the UP Diliman Campus after the payment of
ransom. The RTC added that Jocelyn corroborated Edward's testimony on material points. It also pointed
out that Edward identified both Pepino and Gomez at the lineup conducted inside the NBI compound,
although Jocelyn only recognized Gomez.
The RTC further ruled that the accused were already estopped from questioning the validity of
their arrest after they entered their respective pleas.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision with the modification that the amounts of moral
and exemplary damages. The CA held that Pepino and Gomez were deemed to have waived any
objection to the illegality of their arrests when they did not move to quash the information before entering
their plea, and when they participated at the trial. The CA further ruled that Pepino and Gomez conspired
with each other to attain a common objective, i.e., to kidnap Edward in exchange for ransom.
While the case was under review by the Supreme Court, Pepino filed an urgent motion to
withdraw his appeal, which the Court granted.
In her brief and supplemental brief, Gomez maintained that it was impossible for Edward to have
seen her in the front seat of the getaway car because he (Edward) was blindfolded. She also alleged that
the prosecution failed to prove that she had conspired with the other accused.
Gomez further claimed that Edward's identification of her during trial "may have been
preconditioned x x x by suggestive identification" made at the police lineup. She further argued that the
death penalty imposed on her is no longer proper due to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346.
Issue
Whether Gomez can question the legality of her arrest after trial
Held
No. At the outset, Gomez did not question before arraignment the legality of her warrantless
arrest or the acquisition of RTC's jurisdiction over her person. Thus, Gomez is deemed to have waived
any objection to her warrantless arrest.
It is settled that any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
Gomez is now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of her arrest as she failed to
move for the quashing of the information before the trial court. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to
her arrest was cured when she voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering
a plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial.
At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. Simply put, the illegality of the
warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on
record point to their culpability. It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after
a valid information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced and had
been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against her.

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RULE 120 Judgment
1. Nature of judgment in criminal cases vs. civil cases
2. Judgment of conviction vs. judgment of acquittal
3. Judgment for two or more offenses; accused
4. Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment

Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment

Culla
LLAMAS VS CA
601 SCRA 288
Actions; Criminal Law; Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgment; Appeals; Procedural
Rules and Technicalities; The remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases, -
In People v. Bitanga (525 SCRA 623 [2007]), the Court explained that the remedy of annulment of
judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases, tuhs Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of court, limits the
scope of the remedy of annulment of judgment to the following: Section 1. Coverage.- This rule shall
govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments of final orders and resolutions in civil actions
of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. Te remedy cannot be
resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal case. The 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal procedure itself does not permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the
enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Proceduere which have suppletory
application to criminal cases. Section 18, Rule 124 thereof, provides: Sec. 18. Application of certain rules
in civil procedure to criminal cases.- The provisions of rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to
procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be
applied to in criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Rule.

Remedial Law; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is
that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
court.- Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. In this case, at the time
of the filing of the information, the applicable law was Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, approved on August
14, 1981.

Facts
Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati with, as aforesaid, the crime of
"other forms of swindling". RTC rendered its Decision3 on June 30, 1994, finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision in CA-G.R. CR
No. 18270, affirmed the decision of the trial court. Appellate court further denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Since it subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration the judgment of
conviction became final and executory.
With the consequent issuance by the trial court of the Warrant of Arrest, the police arrested, on,
petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas for her to serve her 2-month jail term. The police, nevertheless, failed to
arrest petitioner Francisco R. Llamas because he was nowhere to be found. Petitioner Francisco moved
for the lifting or recall of the warrant of arrest, raising for the first time the issue that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged.

158
 There being no action taken by the trial court on the said motion, petitioners instituted, the instant
proceedings for the annulment of the trial and the appellate courts decisions.
Issue
Whether the petitioner can institute the annulment of judgment upon the decision of the CA and the RTC
for their inability to act upon the said motion?
Held
No. The court held that, in People v. Bitanga,13 the Court explained that the remedy of annulment of
judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases, thus
Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of judgment to the
following:
Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or
final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.a1f
The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal
case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such recourse, for it excluded
Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which have
suppletory application to criminal cases. Section 18, Rule 124 thereof, provides:
Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. The provisions of Rules 42, 44
to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and
appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Rule.
There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to extend the scope of Rule 47 to criminal cases. As we
explained in Macalalag v. Ombudsman, when there is no law or rule providing for this remedy, recourse
to it cannot be allowed.

Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment

Andres
PEOPLE V. MONTECLAROS
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect, and,
generally, appellate courts will not overturn said findings unless the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will
alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case.---The findings of the trial courts carry great
weight and respect, and, generally, appellate courts will not overturn said findings unless the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will
alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.
Same; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites for Circumstantial Evidence to be
Sufficient for Conviction.---Although ABC was asleep and unconscious at the time the sexual
debasement was committed by Tampus, circumstantial evidence established beyond doubt that it is
Tampus who raped ABC. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In cases like the one

159
at bar, the Court takes into consideration the events that transpired before and after the victim lost
consciousness in order to establish the commission of the act of coitus.
Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Schizophrenia; Schizophrenia may be considered
mitigating under Art. 13(9) if it diminishes the exercises of the willpower of the accused. ---We
have previously held that schizophrenia may be considered mitigating under Art. 13(9) if it diminishes the
exercise of the willpower of the accused. In this case, the testimony of Dr. Costas shows that even though
Ida was diagnosed with Schizophrenia, she was not totally deprived of intelligence but her judgment was
affected. Thus, on the treated for schizophrenia a few months prior to the incident, and on the testimony
of Dr. Costas, Idas schizophrenia could be considered to have diminished the exercise of her willpower
although it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts.
Same; Information; Every information must state the qualifying and the aggravating
circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the imposition
of the penalty.---Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should be given retroactive effect
following the rule that statutes governing court proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, every Information must state the qualifying and
the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the
imposition of the penalty. Since in the case at bar, the Information in Criminal Case No. 013324-L did not
state that Ida is the mother of ABC, this circumstance could not be appreciated as a special qualifying
circumstance. Ida may only be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua.

Facts
Two informations were filed charging Bartolome Tampus of raping ABC, 13 years old, and Ida
Montesclaros, mother of ABC, for giving permission to Bartolome Tampus to rape ABC. The trial court
convicted Tampus of 2 counts of rape, as principal. Ida was found guilty as an accomplice in one of
criminal cases. The trial court appreciated in Idas favor the mitigating circumstance of illness which would
diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to
Article 13(9) of the RPC.
Pending resolution of the appeal before the CA, Tampus died and his appeal was dismissed.
Thus, the appeal before the CA dealt only with that of Ida. CA affirmed the trial courts decision with
modification. It appreciated the mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found that Ida failed
to prove that she was completely deprived of intelligence. On the basis of the medical report and the
testimony of the attending physician, Idas schizophrenia was determined by both the trial court and the
CA to have diminished the exercise of her will-power though it did not deprive her of the consciousness of
her acts.
Issue
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of relationship may be appreciated although the same was
not alleged in the information.
Held
No. The undisputed fact that Ida is the mother of ABCwho was 13 years old at the time of the
incidentcould have been considered as a special qualifying circumstance which would have increased
the imposable penalty to death, under Article 266-B of the RPC. Both the circumstances of the minority
and the relationship of the offender to the victim, either as the victims parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of

160
the parent of the victim, must be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in order for them to
serve as qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B of the RPC.
Although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship with the accused as
the latter's daughter was not properly alleged in the Information, and even though this was proven during
trial and not refuted by the accused, it cannot be considered as a special qualifying circumstance that
would serve to increase the penalty of the offender. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
should be given retroactive effect following the rule that statutes governing court proceedings will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, every
Information must state the qualifying and the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the
crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Since in the case at bar, the Information
did not state that Ida is the mother of ABC, this circumstance could not be appreciated as a special
qualifying circumstance. Ida may only be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua. In any event, Republic Act No. 9346, entitled an "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law on June 24, 2006 prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty.

Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment

Dequina
G.R. Nos. 174813-15 March 17, 2009
NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIO REPRESENTING
JAYCEE CORSIO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL REPRESENTING ARTHUR VILLARUEL, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of Justice, Quezon City,
Branch 86, Respondent.
Criminal complaint is within the jurisdiction of trial court in all proceedings:
Mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.
In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Information can be compelled by
mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny
such Motion.
In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Information; he had
already acted on it by denying the same.
Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore.
In Crespo v. Mogul,:
The Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case or
dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and
discretion of the trial court.
The trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
A motion to dismiss the case filed by the public prosecutor should be addressed to the court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion
to withdraw the Information or to dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the accused.
The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or
the right of the People or the private complainant to due process of law.

161
 When the trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the
Information, or to withdraw the Information in compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or
to deny the said motion, it does so not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary
of Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative
In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals,:
Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's motion
for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the
arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating
prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is
already final in that no appeal was taken thereon to the Department of Justice.
Facts
On 15 December 2003, two information for the crime of rape and one information for the crime of
acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur Villaruel and two
others before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as a Family Court, presided by
respondent Judge Bay.
On 19 May 2004, petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City
Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged.
Issue
Can the hon. Supreme court compel respondent judge bay to dismiss the case through a writ of
mandamus by virtue of the resolution of the office of the city prosecutor of quezon city finding no probable
cause against the accused and subsequently filing a motion to withdraw information
Held
In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court,
any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive
jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court.
The trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
A motion to dismiss the case filed by the public prosecutor should be addressed to the court who
has the option to grant or deny the same.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the
Information or to dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the accused.
The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the
accused or the right of the People or the private complainant to due process of law.
When the trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the
Information, or to withdraw the Information in compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or
to deny the said motion, it does so not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary
of Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative.
In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation and directed the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the reinvestigation. The former was, therefore,
deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-
called new relevant and material evidence and determine whether the information it had filed should
stand.

162
 The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition
thereof, such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of
the court. While the prosecutor retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot
impose his opinion on the court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case.
Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor before or after the arraignment, or after
a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records upon
reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of the court must not,
however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
In sum, petitioners resort to a Petition for Mandamus to compel the trial judge to grant their
Motion to Withdraw Information is improper. While mandamus is available to compel action on matters
involving judgment and discretion when refused, it is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
either. The trial court, when confronted with a Motion to Withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of
probable cause, is not bound by the resolution of the prosecuting arm of the government, but is required
to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion, a requirement satisfied by the
respondent judge in the case at bar.

Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment

Au
PEOPLE vs. LORENZO
619 SCRA 389
Criminal Procedure; Evidences; Conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecutions evidence and
not on the weakness of the defense.
The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed
out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of
the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the
strength of the prosecutions evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
Same; Same; Appeals; Factual of the trial court and its calibration of the testimonies of the witness and its
conclusions anchored on tits findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive
effect, more so when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Consistent with the rulings of this Court, it is but a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the
trial court and its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its conclusions anchored on its
findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive, more so when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. The exception is when it is established that the trial court ignored, overlooked,
misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will change the
outcome of the case.
Facts
Two informations were filed against Paterno Lorenzo y Casas (Lorenzo). It alleged that he
violated Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
Conrado Estanislao y Javier (Estanislao) was similarly charged in a different Information. He was
accused of possessing illegal drugs in violation of the provisions of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165.
On arraignment, both accused entered NOT GUILTY pleas. The 3 cases have been consolidated,
joint trial on the merits ensued.

163
 The prosecution presented as its witness, PO1 Noel P. Pineda, who was a member of the buy-
bust team. Lorenzo and Estanislao stood before the witness stand and presented their version of the
facts.
Weighing the testimonies of the prosecution and defense witnesses, as well as the other
evidence presented during trial, the trial court gave more veracity to the prosecutions version: Lorenzo
was caught in flagrante delicto selling illegal drugs to a poseur-buyer during a buy-bust operation. The
trial court gave credence to the prosecutions evidence in accordance with the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions accorded to police officers. According to the trial court, the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the buyer in the buy-bust operation and the
seller, object and consideration, including the delivery of the shabu sold by Lorenzo and the payment of
the buy-bust money.
Invoking his innocence, Lorenzo appealed his conviction questioning the procedure followed by
the police operatives in the seizure and custody of the evidence against him.
Issue
WON the guilt of Lorenzo was proven beyond reasonable doubt
Held
NO. The Court observed that the prosecution did not present the poseur-buyer who had personal
knowledge of the transaction. The lone prosecution witness was from a distance where it was impossible
for him to hear the conversation between Lorenzo and the poseur-buyer. This created doubt as to
whether the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the same ones that were
released to Camp Crame and submitted for laboratory examination. In sum, the totality of the evidence
presented in the instant case failed to support accused-appellants conviction for violation of Sections 5
and 11, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
all the elements of the offense.
The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle,
fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is
guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on the strength of
the prosecutions evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to meet the
required quantum of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its behalf. In
which case, the presumption of innocence shall prevail. Hence, the accused shall be acquitted. However,
once the presumption of innocence is overcome, the defense bears the burden of evidence to show
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment

Desengano
People vs. Baron
Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Judgments; Requisites; A
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances
proved form an unbroken chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.- There is no direct evidence proving that the appellant
conspired and participated in committing the crime. However, his complicity may be proved by
circumstantial evidence, which consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience if: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been
established; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt

164
beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained
when the circumstances proved from an unbroken chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.

Facts
On June 28, 1995, at around 8:30 in the evening, Juanito Berallo (victim), who was a tricycle driver
was contracted by herein appellant Rene Baron, to take latter and his companions to a place known as
hacienda caridad, wherein the former agreed for a fee of P30.00. The next morning, Berallo was found
dead with his wallet, wrist watch, ring and motorcycle missing.
An information was then filed before the RTC, charging Rene Baron and two other accused with the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide, in which the pertinent portion of the information states
that:
"On or about 9 o'clock in the evening of June 28, 1995 at Hda. Sta. Ana, Brgy. Burgos, Cadiz
City, Negros Occidental...., Rene Baron, Rey Villatama and one alias Dedong Bargo, conspiring,
confederating and helping oneanother with evident premeditation and treachery and with intent to kill, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assualt, attack and stab to death one Juanito Berallo
in order to rob and steal."
Apellant (Baron) denied any participation in the crime. He said that he was just a mere passenger riding
his way home, when the other two accused announced a hold-up. Thereafter, the driver was dragged
towards the sugarfield and he no longer knew what happened to the latter for he was threatened to stay
and not to leave the tricycle. According to Baron after dismantling the sidecar the two passengers
accompanied him home and at gunpoint threatened him and his wife not to report to the authorities. Thus,
Baron claims that he was under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. However,
the RTC and CA was not convince of appellant's defense and found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as a co-conspitrator. Unsatisfied with the findings of the lower courts the case was
brought to the SC for final review.
Issue
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, even though there was no direct evidence proving that the appellant conspired and participated in
the commission of the crime charged?
Held
No. The trial court did not commit an error in finding Rene Baron guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
According to the Supreme Court, even though there is no direct evidence proving that Baron conspired
and participated in the commission of the crime, his complicity may be proved by circumstial evidence,
which consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact
may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been more than one circumstance; (c) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an
unbroken chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion
of all others, as the perpetratior. Here, the appellant was present throughout all the stages of the crime;
he hired the victim, he was there when the victim was killed, he rode the motorcycle with the two other
accused after the killing and all of them were together in hiding the said motorcycle.

165
Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment
Bartolazo
FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses SAAPIA B. ALONTO and DIAGA ALONTO
655 SCRA 683
Criminal Procedure; Judgments; It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal
shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if
the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.It is an established rule in
criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist. When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the
same criminal action. In other words, the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist.

Facts
Abellana extended a loan to spouses Alonto secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a
lot located in Cebu. Subsequently, Abellana convey the said lots and the spouses signed the Deed of
Absolute Sale however it was notarized without the spouses appearing before the notary public.
Thereafter Abellana caused the transfer of title to his name and sold the lots to third persons. An
Information was filed charging Abellana with Estafa through Falsification of Public Document and RTC
found him guilty.
The CA set aside the trial courts Decision because it convicted petitioner of an offense different
from or not included in the crime charged in the Information. However, the RTC found that the spouses
Alonto actually signed the document although they did not personally appear before the notary public for
its notarization. Hence, the RTC instead convicted petitioner of falsification of public document.
On appeal, the CA held that petitioners conviction cannot be sustained because it infringed on
his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The CA, however, found
no reversible error on the civil liability of petitioner as determined by the trial court and thus sustained the
same.
Issue
Whether the judgement of acquittal of the crime of Falsification of a Public Document should
include the act or omission from which civil liability may arise.
Held
It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the
offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist.

166
Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment
Dizon
G.R. No. 173089 August 25, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
Hon. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Biliran Province, Branch 16, and JAIME ABORDO, Respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Certiorari; Finality-of-Acquittal Doctrine; A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not
appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level;
In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final
and unappealable; Exception.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal
whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal
doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule, however, is not without
exception. In several cases, the Court has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of
the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases. Thus, in People v. Louel Uy, 1 the Court has held: Like
any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal
in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon
clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not
merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
Same; Same; Same; The rule is that "while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal,
the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice."
A review of the records, however, shows that the case need not be remanded to the CA for
appropriate proceedings. The OSGs petition for certiorari, which forms part of the records, would not
merit a favorable review even if it would be given due course simply because it is bereft of merit. For said
reason, We deem that a remand of the case would only prolong the disposition of the case. It is not
without precedent. "On many occasions, the Court, in the interest of public service and for the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits, instead of remanding them for further
proceedings, as where the ends of justice would not be sub-served by the remand of the case." The rule
is that "while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an
extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice." The case of Galman v.
Sandiganbayan, presents an instructive exception to the rule on double jeopardy, that is, when the
prosecution has been denied due process of law. "The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment
rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this
reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy."
Same; Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ
of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of
discretion.
What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be
resolved without violating Abordos constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy. An
appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial courts evaluation of the evidence and

167
factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only
correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion.
Facts
Abordo was riding his motorcycle on his way home when an altercation ensued between himand
the three offended parties Montes, Calvez, and Majait. The accused Abordo shot Majait in the leg while
Calvez was hit in the abdomen. Montes escaped unhurt.
Abordo was charged with two counts of attempted murder and one count of frustrated murder.
The RTC held Abordo liable only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less
Serious Physical Injuries with regard to Majait, when it found no treachery and evident premeditation.
Four mitigating circumstances were appreciated in favor of Abordo. Abordo was acquitted with respect to
the complaint of Montes.
The OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA based on the ground that
Judge Asis of the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering its decision of acquitting Abordo in one case, only holding him liable for Serious Physical
Injuries and Less Serious Physical Injuries In the two other cases.
The CA dismissed the petition, saying that the filing of the petition for certiorari was the wrong
remedy. It said that as the State was questioning the verdict of the acquittal and findings of lesser
offenses by the trial court, the remedy should have been an appeal.
Issue
1. Whether or not the proper remedy to question a verdict of acquittal is a petition for certiorari; and
2. Whether or not an error of judgment can be remedied by certiorari.
Held
1. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal
whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-
acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule, however, is
not without exception. In several cases, the Court has entertained petitions for certiorari
questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases. Thus, in People v.
Louel Uy, the Court has held:
Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering
the assailed judgment void.
2. What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be
resolved without violating Abordos constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy. An
appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial courts evaluation of the evidence
and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of
certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse
of discretion. In the case of People v. Hon. Tria-Tirona, it was written:
In such a case, any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of
judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court

168
 may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible
only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial
court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said
findings and its conclusions of law. Since no error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public
respondent in her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not lie.

Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment

Brinez
RODOLFO BASILONIA , Petitioners, v. HON. DELANO F. VLLLARUZ Respondents
G.R. Nos. 191370-71, August 10, 2015
Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Aside from the civil indemnity arising from the crime, costs and incidental
expenses of the suit are part of the judgment and it is incumbent upon the prevailing party in whose favor
they are awarded to submit forthwith the itemized bill to the clerk of court.- Aside from the civil indemnity
arising from the crime, costs and incidental expenses of the suit are part of the judgment and it is
incumbent upon the prevailing party in whose favor they are awarded to submit forthwith the itemized bill
to the clerk of court. Manifestly, the heirs of Atty. Roblete failed to do so. Their indifference, if not
negligence, is indicative of lack of interest in executing the decision rendered in their favor. To remind,
the purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for executing judgments or orders is to prevent
obligors from sleeping on their rights. Indeed, inaction may be construed as waiver.

Same; Same; Same; It is opportune to remind judges that once a judgment of conviction becomes final
and executory, the trial court has the ministerial duty to immediately execute the penalty of imprisonment
and/or pecuniary penalty (fine). A motion to execute judgment of conviction is not necessary.- It is
opportune to remind judges that once a judgment of conviction becomes final and executory, the trial
court has the ministerial duty to immediately execute the penalty of imprisonment and/or pecuniary
penalty (fine). A motion to execute judgment of conviction is not necessary. With respect to the penalty
of imprisonment, the trial court should cancel the bail bond and issue a warrant of arrest, if the accused is
not yet under detention. If the convicted accused is already under detention by virtue of the warrant of
arrest issued, the trial court should immediately issue the corresponding mittimus or commitment order for
the immediate transfer of the accused to the National Penitentiary to serve his sentence, if the penalty
imposed requires the service of sentence in the National Penitentiary. The commitment order should
state that an appeal had been filed, but the same had been withdrawn/dismissed/decided with finality.

Criminal Procedure; Judgments; In cases where the accused is a detention prisoner, i.e., those convicted
of capital offenses or convicted of noncapital offenses where bail is denied, or refused to post bail, a ed to
post bail, a mittimus or commitment order should be immediately issued after the promulgation of
judgment by the trial court as long as the penalty imposed requires the service of sentence in the National
Penitentiary.- In cases where the accused is a detention prisoner, i.e., those convicted of capital offenses
or convicted of noncapital offenses where bail is denied, or refused to post bail, a mittimus or commitment
order should be immediately issued after the promulgation of judgment by the trial court as long as the
penalty imposed requires the service of sentence in the National Penitentiary. The filing of a motion for
reconsideration, motion for new trial, or notice of appeal should not stop the lower court from performing
its ministerial duty in issuing the commitment order, unless a special order has been issued by the Court
in specific cases- to the effect that the convicted accused shall remain under detention in the provincial
jail or city jail while the motion is being heard or resolved.

169
 Facts
In this case, a decision was promulgated against petitioners for capital offenses. Thus,
petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on July 30, 1987, which the trial court granted on August 3, 1987. On
January 23, 1989, failure of petitioners to file brief despite extensions of time given, the CA dismissed the
appeal and the resolution was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment on September 18, 1989.
Thereafter, the entire case records were remanded to the trial court on October 4, 1989. Almost two
decades passed from the entry of judgment, on May 11, 2009, private respondent Dixon C. Roblete,
claiming to be the son of the deceased victim, Atty. Roblete, filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment. He
alleged, among others, that despite his request to the City Prosecutor to file a motion for execution, the
judgment has not been enforced because said prosecutor has not acted upon his request
Issue
Whether respondent trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in granting a motion for execution which was filed almost twenty (20) years after a judgment
in a criminal case became final and executory.
Held
No, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Upon the judgment, the period for
prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment commences from
the time the judgment became final. These two modes of execution are available depending on the
timing when the judgment creditor invoked its right to enforce the court's judgment. Execution by motion is
only available if the enforcement of the judgment was sought within five (5) years from the date of its
entry.
An action for revival of judgment is not intended to reopen any issue affecting the merits of the
case or the propriety or correctness of the first judgment. 30 The purpose is not to re-examine and re-try
issues already decided but to revive the judgment; its cause of action is the judgment itself and not the
merits of the original action.31 However, being a mere right of action, the judgment sought to be revived is
subject to defenses and counterclaims like matters of jurisdiction and those arising after the finality of the
first judgment or which may have arisen subsequent to the date it became effective such as prescription,
payment, or counterclaims arising out of transactions not connected with the former controversy.
In the instant case, it is obvious that the heirs of Atty. Roblete did not file a motion for execution
within the five-year period or an action to revive the judgment within the ten-year period. Worse, other
than the bare allegation that the judgment has not been enforced because the public prosecutor has not
acted on the request to file a motion for execution, no persuasive and compelling reason was presented
to warrant the exercise of Our equity jurisdiction. Unfortunately for private respondent Roblete, the instant
case does not fall within the exceptions afore-stated. It cannot be claimed that the delay in execution was
entirely beyond their control or that petitioners have any hand in causing the same. 43 As regards the civil
aspect of a criminal case is concerned, it is apt to point that Litigants represented by counsel should
not expect that all they need to do is sit back and relax, and await the outcome of their case.

Enriquez
Morillo vs. People, 777 SCRA 207
Facts
In July, 2003, Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil, representing themselves as contractors
with business in Pamanga, bought contraction materials from Armilyn, worth P500,054.00. Per their

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agreement, 20% of the amount should be paid within seven days, while the remaining 80% shall be paid
within 35 days, with post-dated checks. After the last delivery, Richard paid P20,000.00 and issued two
post-dated checks drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga branch. Upon maturity, Armilyn deposited the
checks in her account with Equitable PCI Bank; they were however. When Armilyn communicated the
fact of dishonour to Richard, the latter replaced the checks with two post-dated Metrobank checks, which
again were dishonored. Despite demand, Richard and his partners failed to make good on the checks,
hence Armilyn filed a case for BP 22 against Richard and Milo Malong before the MeTC of Makati City.
After trial, the MeTC Makati City convicted Richard as charged, hence he appealed to the RTC, arguing
that the MeTC of Makati City had no jurisdiction over the case. He asserted that since the subject checks
were issued, drawn, and delivered to petitioner in Subic, the venue of the action was improperly laid for
none of the elements of the offense actually transpired in Makati City. He also assailed the absence of
the public prosecutor, as the latter delegated the prosecution of the case to the private prosecutor.
The RTC affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the lower courts. It ruled that
MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case, as all the elements of the crime of BP 22 happened in
Pampanga. The checks were issued in Richards office in Pampanga; the knowledge of dishonor also
happened in Pampanga, when Armilyn proceeded to Richards office and informed him of the dishonor of
the checks; the third element of dishonor of the checks by the drawee bank also occurred in Pampanga,
where Metrobank Pampanga is located. Since all the elements of the crime happened in Pampanga,
thhe case should have been filed in Pampanga, not where Armilyn deposited the checks, in Makati City.
Aggrieved, Armilyn appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether or not the court of the place where the checks were deposited, had jurisdiction to try a case for
BP 22.
Held
It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning
that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one
municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crimes
essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged
with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense
was in part committed
The OSG, relying on our ruling in Rigor v. People, concluded that the Supreme Court regarded the place
of deposit and the place of dishonor as distinct from one another and considered the place where the
check was issued, delivered and dishonored, and not where the check was deposited, as the proper
venue for the filing of a B.P. Blg. 22 case. The Court, however, cannot sustain such conclusion.
In said case, She accused therein obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila, and in
payment thereof, he issued a check drawn against Associated Bank of Tarlac. Thereafter, Rural Bank
deposited the check at PS Bank, San Juan, but the same was returned for the reason that it had been
dishonored by Associated Bank of Tarlac. When all other efforts to demand the repayment of the loan
proved futile, Rural Bank filed an action against the accused for violation of BP 22 at the RTC of Pasig
City, wherein crimes committed in. San Juan are triable. The accused, however, contends that the RTC of
Pasig had no jurisdiction thereon since no proof had been offered to show that his check was issued,
delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of beneficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San
Juan. The Court, however, disagreed and held that while the check was dishonored by the drawee.

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Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, evidence clearly showed that the accused had drawn, issued and
delivered it at Rural Bank, San Juan, viz.:
Lastly, positioner contends that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig had no jurisdiction over this case since
no proof has been offered that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of
insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.

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173
RULE 121 New Trial or Reconsideration
1. In civil cases vs. criminal cases
2. Grounds; effect

Grounds; effect
Corpuz
MUNIB S. ESTINO and ERNESTO G. PESCADERA vs .
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 163957-58. April 7, 2009
Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction becomes
final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably
change the judgment. Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it
appears to us that petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its production during trial was
unnecessary.
Facts
For review before the Court under Rule 45 are the April 16, 2004 Decision and June 14, 2004
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 26192 and 26193 entitled
People of the Philippines v. Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera. In G.R. Nos. 163957-58,
petitioners Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera appeal their conviction of violation of Section 3(e),
Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for failure to pay the
Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) of the provincial government employees of Sulu. In
G.R. Nos. 164009-11, petitioner Pescadera alone appeals his conviction of malversation of public funds
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code for failure to remit the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) contributions of the provincial government employees amounting to PhP 4,820,365.30.
In these consolidated appeals, petitioners pray for their acquittal.
Estino was elected Vice-Governor of Sulu in the May 1998 elections along with Gov. Abdusakur
Tan. On June 23, 1998, this Court issued a status quo order in G.R. No. 133676, suspending the effects
of the proclamation of Gov. Tan and ordering Vice-Gov. Estino to assume the position of Governor until
further orders. Thus, Estino acted as Governor of Sulu from July 27, 1998 up to May 23, 1999 when this
Court lifted the suspension order against Gov. Tan. Ernesto G. Pescadera, on the other hand, was
Provincial Treasurer of Sulu during Estino's stint as Acting Governor. Pursuant to Commission on Audit
(COA) ARMM Office Order No. 99-165 dated August 26, 1999, a special audit team was created upon the
request of the Provincial Government of Sulu. An audit of the disbursement vouchers and payrolls for the
period starting July 27, 1998 up to May 23, 1999 was then conducted by COA State Auditor II Mona U.
Balabaran and her team. The COA Special Audit Report stated that there were anomalies in the payment
of salary differentials, allowances, and benefits, among others.
The Sandiganbayan found the accused both guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec.
3(e) of R.A. 3019, and pursuant to Section 9 thereof. Hence, Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial which were denied in the
June 14, 2004 Sandiganbayan Resolution.
Issue
Whether or not a new trial is proper in the determination the guilt of the petitioners in non-
payment of RATA in violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019.

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 Held
YES. Petitioners defense is anchored on their payment of RATA, and for this purpose, they
submitted documents which allegedly show that they paid the RATA under the 1998 reenacted budget.
They also claim that the COA Report did not sufficiently prove that they did not pay the RATA because
the alleged disbursement vouchers, which were supposed to be annexed to the COA Report as proof of
nonpayment of RATA, were not submitted with said report.
Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction
becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted
would probably change the judgment. Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly
discovered, it appears to us that petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its production during trial
was unnecessary.

Grounds; effect
Huerto
BRIONES vs. PEOPLE
588 SCRA 345
Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Words and Phrases; Probable Cause; Warrants of
Arrest; There is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest; and the preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the
offender should be held for trial or be released.It is well to remember that there is a distinction between
the preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and the
preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be
released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made by the
judge. The preliminary investigation properwhether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense chargedis the function of the investigating prosecutor.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the
court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of
the accused; Meaning of Probable Cause.As enunciated in Baltazar v. People (560 SCRA 278
[2008]), the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Probable cause
is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical
knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify
conviction.

Same; Same; Same; Purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the
arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the
tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first
determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely
charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

175
 Same; Same; Same; Function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination of
probable cause is exclusive; The consequent implementation of a warrant of arrest cannot be deferred
pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the finding of probable
cause.The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination of probable cause
is exclusive; thus, the consequent implementation of a warrant of arrest cannot be deferred pending the
resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the finding of probable cause, a
function that is executive in nature. To defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an
encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the judge. It must be emphasized that petitioner filed with
the trial court a motion to suspend proceedings and to suspend the implementation of the warrant of
arrest in pursuance of a DOJ circular, and not a motion to quash the warrant of arrest questioning the
issuance thereof. Thus, there is no contest as to the validity or regularity of the issuance of the warrant of
arrest.

Same; Same; Same; Nowhere in Section 9 of Department Circular No. 70 does it state that the court
must hold the proceedings in abeyance.The above provision of the Department Circular is directed
specifically at the appellant and the trial prosecutor, giving them latitude in choosing a remedy to ensure
that the proceedings in court are held in abeyance. However, nowhere in the said provision does it state
that the court must hold the proceedings in abeyance. Therefore, the discretion of the court whether or
not to suspend the proceedings or the implementation of the warrant of arrest, upon the motion of the
appellant or the trial prosecutor, remains unhindered. This is in consonance with the earlier ruling of this
Court that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal,
or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court, as it is the
best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it.

Same; Same; Factual antecedents in Ledesma, Solar Team Entertainment, Inc., Dimatulac and
Marcelo clearly show that a common issue among them is whether the arraignment of an accused may
be deferred pending resolution by the Secretary of Justice of a petition for review on the finding of
probable cause, to which the Court ruled in the affirmative; Said decisions did not state that the
implementation or enforcement of the warrant of arrest was also deferred or suspended.Petitioner has
put emphasis on his argument that the suspension of the proceedings in court, including the suspension
of the implementation of a warrant of arrest pending a resolution of an appeal by the Secretary of Justice,
is in consonance with jurisprudence laid down by this Court in Marcelo v. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 39
[1994]), Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307 [1996]), Ledesma v. Court of Appeals (278
SCRA 656 [1997]), Dimatulac v. Villon (297 SCRA 679 [1998]), and Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v.
How (338 SCRA 511 [2000]). A close reading of the factual antecedents in Ledesma, Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc.,Dimatulac and Marcelo clearly show that a common issue among them is whether
the arraignment of an accused may be deferred pending resolution by the Secretary of Justice of a
petition for review on the finding of probable cause, to which this Court ruled in the affirmative. Nowhere
in the said decisions did it state that the implementation or enforcement of the warrant of arrest was also
deferred or suspended, as herein petitioner prays for.

Facts

The instant case arose from a Complaint dated August 2, 2010 filed by Virgilio C. Briones (Briones) for
Nullity of Mortgage Contract, Promissory Note, Loan Agreement, Foreclosure of Mortgage, Cancellation
of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 290846, and Damages against Cash Asia before the RTC. In his
complaint, Briones alleged that he is the owner of a property covered by TCT No. 160689 (subject
property), and that, on July 15, 2010, his sister informed him that his property had been foreclosed and a
writ of possession had already been issued in favor of Cash Asia. Upon investigation, Briones discovered

176
that: (a) on December 6, 2007, he purportedly executed a promissory note, loan agreement, and deed of
real estate mortgage covering the subject property (subject contracts) in favor of Cash Asia in order to
obtain a loan in the amount of P3,500,000.00 from the latter; and (b) since the said loan was left unpaid,
Cash Asia proceeded to foreclose his property. In this relation, Briones claimed that he never contracted
any loans from Cash Asia as he has been living and working in Vietnam since October 31, 2007. He
further claimed that he only went back to the Philippines on December 28, 2007 until January 3, 2008 to
spend the holidays with his family, and that during his brief stay in the Philippines, nobody informed him
of any loan agreement entered into with Cash Asia. Essentially, Briones assailed the validity of the
foregoing contracts claiming his signature to be forged. For its part, Cash Asia filed a Motion to
Dismiss dated August 25, 2010, praying for the outright dismissal of Brioness complaint on the ground of
improper venue. In this regard, Cash Asia pointed out the venue stipulation in the subject contracts
stating that "all legal actions arising out of this notice in connection with the Real Estate Mortgage subject
hereof shall only be brought in or submitted tothe jurisdiction of the proper court of Makati City." In view
thereof, it contended that all actions arising out of the subject contracts may only be exclusively brought in
the courts of Makati City, and as such, Brioness complaint should be dismissed for having been filed in
the City of Manila. In response, Briones filed an opposition, asserting, inter alia, that he should not be
covered by the venue stipulation in the subject contracts as he was never a party therein. He also
reiterated that his signatures on the said contracts were forgeries. The RTC rendered its decision
denying the motion to dismiss of Cash Asia for lack of merit. Cash Asia then filed for petition for certiorari
to the CA. CA annulled the RTC Orders, and accordingly, dismissed Brioness complaint without prejudice
to the filing of the same before the proper court in Makati City. It held that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in denying Cash Asias motion to dismiss, considering that the subject contracts clearly provide
that actions arising therefrom should be exclusively filed before the courts of Makati City only. As such,
the CA concluded that Brioness complaint should have been dismissed outright on the ground of
improper venue, this, notwithstanding Brioness claim of forgery.

Issue
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in ordering the outright dismissal of Brioness
complaint on the ground of improper venue.

Held
The court ruled that the general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the
venue of personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides,
at the election of the plaintiff. In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed
restrictive in nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the
courts of Makati City. However, it must be emphasized that Briones' s complaint directly assails the
validity of the subject contracts, claiming forgery in their execution. Given this circumstance, Briones
cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as his compliance therewith would
mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Hence, pursuant to the general rules on venue, Briones
properly filed his complaint before a court in the City of Manila where the subject property is located.In
conclusion, the CA patently erred and hence committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Briones's
complaint on the ground of improper venue.

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Grounds; effect
Cortez
SALUDAGA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
619 SCRA 364

Criminal Law; AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); Elements of the Offense under the
AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. The essential elements of the offense are as follows: 1. The
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and 3. That his action caused
any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.

Same; Same; There are two (2) acts or modes of committing the offense, thus: a) by causing any undue
injury to any party, including the government; or b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference, it does not mean that each act or mode constitutes a distinct offense. There
are two (2) acts or modes of committing the offense, thus: a) by causing any undue injury to any party,
including the
government; or b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference, it does
not mean that each act or mode constitutes a distinct offense. An accused may be charged under either
mode or under both should both modes concur.

Criminal Procedure; Newly Discovered Evidence; Requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the
evidence was discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation); (b) such evidence could not have
been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the
judgment. Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered
evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation); (b) such
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that
it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted,
will probably change the judgment.

Same; Courts; Supreme Court; Ombudsman; The Court cannot interfere in the exercise by the Office of
the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutory powers. Without good and compelling reasons,
the Court cannot interfere in the exercise by the Office of the Ombudsman of its investigatory and
prosecutory powers. The only ground upon which it may entertain a review of the Office of the
Ombudsmans action is grave abuse of discretion.

Grave Abuse of Discretion; Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not
based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism. Grave abuse of discretion is an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation
of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and
despotism.

Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Certiorari; To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of
discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be

178
equivalent tohaving acted without jurisdiction. The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasijudicial function that acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion
must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to
having acted without jurisdiction.

Facts
Herein petitioners Saludaga and Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of
Barangay Day Care Centers without conducting a competitive public bidding as required by law, which
caused damage and prejudice to the government. An information was filed for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of
RA 3019 by causing undue injury to the Government. The information was quashed for failure to prove
the actual damage, hence a new information was filed, now for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by
giving unwarranted benefit to a private person. The accused moved for a new preliminary investigation to
be conducted on the ground that there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the first
information.
September 13, 2000 Information:
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses
QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED (THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT), committed as
follows:
That in or about the months of November and December, 1997, at the Municipality of Lavezares,
Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, public officials, being the Municipal Mayor and PNP Member of Lavezares, Northern Samar in
such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually
helping with one another, and with the late Limpio Legua, a private individual, with deliberate intent, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into a
Pakyaw Contract for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for Barangays Mac-arthur and
Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, each in the amount of FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00), Philippine Currency, or a total amount of NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P97,000.00), Philippine Currency, without conducting a competitive public bidding, thus
depriving the government the chance to obtain the best, if not, the most reasonable price, and thereby
awarding said contracts to Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and non-accredited NGO, in violation
of Sec. 356 of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) and COA Circular No. 91-368, to the
damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
New Information:
The undersigned Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of the Ombudsman,
hereby accuses, MAYOR QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for the violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
committed as follows:

179
 That in or about the months of November and December, 1997 at the Municipality of Lavezares,
Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA, a high ranking public official being then the Mayor of Lavezares, Northern
Samar, and committing the crime herein charged while in the discharge of his official administrative
function, conspiring and conniving with accused SPO2 FIEL B. GENIO, a member of Lavezares Police
Force (PNP) and with the late OLIMPIO LEGUA, a private individual, with deliberate intent, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefit or advantage to the late Olimpio Legua,
a non-license contractor and non-accredited NGO, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality by
then and there entering into a Pakyaw Contract with the latter for the Construction of Barangay Day Care
Centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, in the amount of FORTY
EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00) each or a total of NINETY SEVEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00) Philippine Currency, without the benefit of a competitive public bidding
to the prejudice of the Government and public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order assailing the July 14, 2008 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal, which denied the Motion for Preliminary Investigation filed by the petitioners
who were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The initial information was
quashed for lack of amount of actual damaged cause in the alleged crime which is essential. The
information was re-filed thus, petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation which was strongly
opposed by the prosecution. Petitioners contend that there was a substitution of the first Information
which should have been preceded by a preliminary investigation. Further, they claim that newly
discovered evidence mandates re-examination of the finding of a prima facie cause to file the case.
The prosecutors on the other hand argues that the re-filed information did not change the nature of the
offense charged, but merely modified the mode by which accused committed the offense. The substance
of such modification is not such as to necessitate the conduct of another preliminary investigation.
Moreover, no new allegations were made, nor was the criminal liability of the accused upgraded in the re-
filed information. Thus, new preliminary investigation is not in order.
Issue
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order the preliminary investigation and if so, is such a sufficient
ground for new trial.
Held
The court found no merit on the petition. Petitioners insist that the offenses charged in the first
and second Information are not the same, and what transpired was a substitution of Information that
required prior conduct of preliminary investigation. Even assuming there was no substitution, substantial
amendments were made in the second Information, and that its submission should have been preceded
by a new preliminary investigation.
The court ruled that the use of the disjunctive term or connotes that either act qualifies as a
violation of Section 3 paragraph (e), as 2 different modes of committing the offense. This does not
however indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be
charged under either mode or under both which implies that theres no substituted information.
Preliminary investigation is applicable only when there was substantial amendment in the
Information such as the facts which was altered however; no such circumstance is obtaining in this case,

180
because there was no modification in the nature of the charged offense. Consequently, a new
preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the petitioners.
Finally, the newly discovered evidence mandates due re-examination of the finding of prima
facie cause to file the case, deserves scant consideration. But the court ruled that it cannot be considered
as newly found evidence because it was already in existence prior to the re-filing of the case.

Grounds; effect
Lasam
LUMANOG v. PEOPLE
642 SCRA 248
Facts
Appellants were convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 103 for the
ambush-slay of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla, the former Chief of the Metropolitan Command Intelligence and
Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary, in June 13, 1996 along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City.
Their conviction was based mainly on the testimony of the security guard Freddie Alejo who, at the time
of the killing, was on duty at a building fronting the crime scene and located only a few meters away. The
accused, for their part, raised among others the defense of alibi.
Accused Lumanog filed a motion for reconsideration which assailed the inconsistencies in the
declarations of Alejo. Accused Joel de Jesus followed suit by filing a motion for a new trial, based on
newly discovered evidence to present two witnesses. Such motions, however, were denied by the RTC.
The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of the accused-appellants based on the credible
eyewitness testimony of Alejo.
Issue
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in denying the motions for a new trial and reconsideration of
the accused based on the testimony of a sole witness.
Held
No. The testimony of a sole eyewitness is sufficient to support conviction so long as it is clear,
straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court. The Court accords high respect, even with
finality, to the evaluation made by the lower court of the testimonies of the witnesses presented before it.

Grounds; effect
Diolata
G.R. No. 151911 July 25, 2011
EDGAR PAYUMO, ET AL vs HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.

G.R. NO. 154535

NESTOR DOMACENA vs HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL, RESPONDENTS.

Criminal Procedure; New Trial; It must emphasized that an erroneous admission or rejection of evidence
by the trial court is not a ground for a new trial or reversal of the decision if there are other independent
evidence to sustain the decision, or if the rejected evidence, if it had been admitted, would not have
changed the decision. Granting arguendo that the First Division erred in admitting the testimonies of the
Payumos given during the first trial, which proceedings were nullified by this Court in the Cabigao case,

181
the same would still not justify a new trial. It must be emphasized that an erroneous admission or
rejection of evidence by the trial court is not a ground for a new trial or reversal of the decision if there are
other independent evidence to sustain the decision, or if the rejected evidence, if it had been admitted,
would not have changed that decision.

Same; Same; A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the
following requisites are met; (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence, (c)
that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such
weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment. A motion for new trial based on newly-
discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met; (a) that the evidence was
discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative
or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the
judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the
evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it.

Criminal Procedure; New Trial; It has been held that the mistakes of the attorney as the competency of a
witness, the sufficiency, relevancy, materiality or immateriality of a certain evidence, the proper defense,
or the burden of proof are not proper grounds for a new trial. The matter of presentation of evidence for
the defense if not for the trial court to decide. Considering that the defense counsels have control over the
conduct of the defense, the determination of which evidence to present rests upon them. The Court notes
that the defense presented a substantial number of witnesses and exhibits during trial de novo to belie
the accusation against the accused and to prove the defenses they interposed. It has been held that the
mistakes of the attorney as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy, materiality or
immateriality of a certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof are not proper grounds for
a new trial.

Facts
Criminal Case No. 4219 involving a shooting incident in Sitio Aluag, Barangay Sta. Barbara, Iba,
Zambales. A composite team of Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Integrated National Police (INP) units
allegedly fired at a group of civilians instantly killing Amante Payumo and wounding Teofilo Payumo,
Barangay Captain of Sta. Barbara at Cabatuhan River; Edgar Payumo, Reynaldo Ruanto; Crisanto
Ruanto; Apolinario Ruanto; and Exequiel Bonde. The following were indicted for Murder with Multiple
Frustrated and Attempted Murder before the Sandiganbayan: Domiciano Cabigao, Nestor Domacena,
Rolando Doblado, Ernesto Pampuan, Edgardo Prado, Romeo Dominico, Rodolfo Erese, Ramon Garcia
and Carlos Pacheco.
Accused Rodolfo Erese, however, died before the arraignment. When arraigned, the rest of the
accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. During the trial, the accused interposed the defenses
of lawful performance of duty, self-defense, mistake of fact, and alibi. They insisted that the incident was
a result of a military operation, and not an ambush as claimed by the prosecution.
The accused filed their Motion for New Trial anchored on the following grounds: (1) Error of law or
irregularities have been committed during the trial prejudicial to the substantive rights of the accused; and
(2) the accused were denied procedural due process of law.
In view of the appeal (G.R. No. 69422) before this Court, the Sandiganbayan Second Division
issued a Resolution denying accused's Motion for New Trial on the ground that it no longer had any
jurisdiction over the case. Thus, Criminal Case No. 4219 was remanded to the Sandiganbayan and was
raffled to the First Division. Meanwhile, upon motion of the accused, the Court clarified in its Resolution

182
that the conduct of a new trial should not be limited to the mere presentation of newly discovered
evidence but "should be full and complete, taking into account the other serious allegations touching on
due process." Accordingly, the First Division received anew all the evidence of the parties, both
testimonial and documentary.
Petitioners allege that the Ombudsman and OSP negligently failed to protect their interest and
that of the State when they did not file any opposition to the Omnibus Motion to Set Aside Judgment and
for New Trial and, later, a motion for reconsideration of the challenged resolution. They claim that the
Ombudsman and the OSP slept on their lawful duty to protect their interest and that of the State.
Issue

Whether the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted a new trial of
Criminal Case No. 4219?

Held

YES. The Court finds and so rules that the Sandiganbayan Special Fifth Division acted in excess
of its jurisdiction when it nullified the Decision and granted a new trial for Criminal Case No. 4219. There
is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent court, being clothed with the power to determine the case,
oversteps its authority as determined by law.

On the propriety of the grant by the Special Fifth Division of the motion for new trial in Criminal
Case No. 4219, the Court finds the same to be devoid of any legal and factual basis. The majority of the
Special Fifth Division granted a new trial on the following grounds: (1) serious irregularity during the trial
due to the erroneous admission of the testimonies of Teofilo and Edgar, which according to the
Sandiganbayan, were tainted with irregularities of the "too frequent rotation of Justices hearing the
case" and, thus, had to be taken anew; and (2) to afford the accused the opportunity to present in
evidence the records of the JAGO relative to the incident that happened in Sitio Aluag, Brgy. Sta Barbara,
Iba, Zambales to shed light on the crucial issue as to whether the shooting incident was an ambush or the
result of a military operation.

Rule 121, Section 2 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure enumerates the grounds for a new
trial, to wit: Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds: (a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have
been committed during trial; and (b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the
accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if
introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.

Granting arguendo that the First Division erred in admitting the testimonies of the Payumos given
during the first trial, which proceedings were nullified by this Court in the Cabigao case, the same would
still not justify a new trial. It must be emphasized that an erroneous admission or rejection of evidence by
the trial court is not a ground for a new trial or reversal of the decision if there are other independent
evidence to sustain the decision, or if the rejected evidence, if it had been admitted; would not have
changed the decision. In the case at bench, a meticulous reading of the Decision reveals that the
combined testimonies of the other complainants, namely, Reynaldo Ruanto, Crisanto Ruanto, Apolinario
Ruanto, and Exequiel Bonde, have sufficiently established the commission of the crime charged in the
information and the participation of the accused in the said crime. Seemingly, it- would not debilitate the
cause of the prosecution even if the testimonies of the Payumos would be expunged from the records.

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 To begin with, the records of the JAGO relative to the incident do not meet the criteria for newly
discovered evidence that would merit a new trial. A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered
evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered
after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the
judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the
evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. In this case, however, such records
could have been easily obtained by the accused and could have been presented during the trial with the
exercise of reasonable diligence. Hence, the JAGO records cannot be considered as newly discovered
evidence. There was nothing that prevented the accused from using these records during the trial to
substantiate their position that the shooting incident was a result of a military operation.

184
185
RULES 122-125 Appeals
1. Appeals in Civil cases vs. appeals in criminal cases
2. Similarities and differences

Similarities and differences

Navarroza
MACAPAGAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
717 SCRA 425
Facts
On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of
Estafa for misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount of P800,000.00, which is the value of
the unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry. Petitioner received the decision on January 13, 2009 then
she timely moved for reconsideration, but was likewise denied in an Order dated May 20, 2009 which the
petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She supposedly filed a Notice of Appeal . On August 3,
2009, but the same was denied on June 29, 2010 for having been filed out of time.
Issue
Whether or not the regional trial court of manila, Branch 9 gravely erred in denying the notice of
appeal filed by the herein petitioner.
Held
The Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural infirmities which this Court
cannot ignore and are fatal to petitioners cause. It appears that petitioner assails not only the denial by
the RTC of her notice of appeal but likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction for estafa. For reasons
that will be discussed below, the petition is bound to fail, because of petitioners complete disregard of the
procedural rules and the orders of the Court.
First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial courts denial of her notice of
appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the rules on
where, how and when appeal is taken.
Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for
violation of the hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC
and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be directed. Direct resort to this
Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically
spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case.
Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an appeal of the
trial courts decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so for yet another fatal procedural
shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated earlier, petitioner elevated to this Court not only the Order
denying her notice of appeal but also the Decision convicting her of estafa and the Order denying her
motion for reconsideration. In utter disregard of the rules of procedure, petitioner attached to the petition
only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order denying her notice of appeal but she failed to attach a clearly legible
duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order
denying her motion for reconsideration. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court must contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or

186
judgment. Failure to comply with such requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition.

Similarities and differences

Falucho
PEOPLE vs. MORALES
616 SCRA 223
Same; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; A unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case is that the
appeal throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.-We draw attention
to the unique nature of an appeal in criminal case: the appeal throws the whole case open for review and
it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether
they are assigned or unassigned. On the basis of such review, we find the present appeal meritorious.
Same; Same; Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs; Elements.- On the other hand, in the
prosecutions for dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or
an object identified to be prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and
(3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Similarly, in this
case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial courts findings of fact, especially when affirmed by
the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this
rule admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and
material bearing on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.
Evidence presented and relevant law and jurisprudence, we hold that this case falls under the exception.
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established:
(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or
the illicit drug as evidence. On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug,
it must be shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely
and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. In this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti
must be established beyond reasonable doubt. While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the
buy-bust team with Section 21 of RA 9165 is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground therefor, for
and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team, these conditions were not met. No explanation was offered by the testifying police
officers for their failure to observe the rule. PO1 Roy admitted that he was not a PDEA operative and the
other witness, PO3 Rivera, testified that he was not aware of the procedure involved in the conduct of
anti-drug operations by the PNP. There is serious doubt whether the drug presented in court was the
same drug recovered from the appellant. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the corpus delicti.
Furthermore, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to reveal the identity of the person who
had custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending presentation in court. Thus,
the prosecution likewise failed to establish the chain of custody which is fatal to its cause. The identity of
the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. There was likewise a break in the
chain of custody which proves fatal to the prosecutions case. Since the prosecution has failed to
establish the element of corpus delicti with the prescribed degree of proof required for successful
prosecution of both possession and sale of prohibited drugs, we resolve to ACQUIT Roldan Morales.

187
 Facts
PO1 Eduardo Roy and PO3 Armando Rivera of Quezon City Police District made a buy-bust operation
and caught Morales having two sachets of shabu together with marked money. Morales, on his part
averred that two male persons in civilian clothing who identified themselves as police officers handcuffed
and frisk him without finding anything. On their way to the police station, Roy produced a sachet of shabu
from his pocket and upon reaching the station presented it as evidence against Morales.
Quezon City RTC found Morales guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence,
this appeal.
Issue
Whether or not the concurring judgment of RTC and CA be disturbed on appeal to SC.
Held
Supreme Court draw attention to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case: the appeal throws the
whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in
the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold
that the trial courts findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to
great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this rule admits of exceptions and does not
apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the
case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. Evidence presented and relevant law and
jurisprudence, we hold that this case falls under the exception.
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established:
(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or
the illicit drug as evidence. On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug,
it must be shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely
and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. In this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti
must be established beyond reasonable doubt. While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the
buy-bust team with Section 21 of RA 9165 is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground therefor, for
and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team, these conditions were not met. No explanation was offered by the testifying police
officers for their failure to observe the rule. PO1 Roy admitted that he was not a PDEA operative and the
other witness, PO3 Rivera, testified that he was not aware of the procedure involved in the conduct of
anti-drug operations by the PNP. There is serious doubt whether the drug presented in court was the
same drug recovered from the appellant. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the corpus delicti.
Furthermore, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to reveal the identity of the person who
had custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending presentation in court. Thus,
the prosecution likewise failed to establish the chain of custody which is fatal to its cause. The identity of
the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. There was likewise a break in the
chain of custody which proves fatal to the prosecutions case. Since the prosecution has failed to
establish the element of corpus delicti with the prescribed degree of proof required for successful
prosecution of both possession and sale of prohibited drugs, we resolve to ACQUIT Roldan Morales.

188
Similarities and differences
Javier
ROSIE QUIDET V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
April 8, 2010
Criminal Procedure Conspiracy Appeals An appeal taken by one or more of several accused
shall not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is
favorable and applicable to the latter.

The crime committed was attempted homicide and not frustrated homicide because the stab wounds that
Andrew sustained were not lifethreatening. Although Taban and Tubo did not appeal their conviction, this
part of the appellate courts judgment is favorable to them, thus, they are entitled to a reduction of their
prison terms. The rule is that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those
who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to
the latter.

FACTS
The petitioner together with Taban and Tubo were charged with homicide for the death of
Tagarda and frustrated homicide with the injuries sustained by Andrew. The RTC found that the stabbing
of Tagarda and Andrew was previously planned by the accused. The active participation of all three
accused proved conspiracy in the commission of the crime. The Court of Appeals disagreed with trial
courts finding that the accused are liable for frustrated homicide with respect to the injuries of Andrew.
Only the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that there is no conspiracy
between the three of them when the stabbing incident has happened.
ISSUE
Whether or not an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not those who did not appeal
except insofar as the judgement of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter?
HELD
No. The Supreme Court has held that the crime committed was attempted homicide and not frustrated
homicide because the stab wounds that Andrew sustained were not life threatening. Although Taban and
Tubo did not appeal their conviction, this part of the appellate courts judgment is favorable to them, thus,
they are entitled to a reduction of their prison terms. The rule is that an appeal taken by one or more of
several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellate
court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

Similarities and differences

Quiniquini
BALABA V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 169519
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Jurisdiction; Sandiganbayan; Malversation of Public Funds; Upon the
conviction by the trial court of a public officer for malversation of public funds, his remedy should be an
appeal to the Sandiganbayan, not to the Court of Appeals.Upon Balabas conviction by the trial court,
his remedy should have been an appeal to the Sandiganbayan. Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic Act
No. 8249 (RA 8249), which further defined the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, reads:
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or

189
orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. There is nothing in said paragraph which can conceivably justify
the filing of Balabas appeal before the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the Court
of Appeals is bereft of any jurisdiction to review the judgment Balaba seeks to appeal.

Same; Same; Same; Courts; Pleadings and Practice; While an error in designating the appellate
court is not fatal to the appeal, the correction in designating the proper appellate court should be made
within the 15-day period to appeal.In Melencion v. Sandiganbayan (554 SCRA 345 [2008]), we ruled:
An error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal. However, the correction in
designating the proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made
within the said period, the designation of the correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records of
the case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of
the Rules of court would apply. The second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court reads:
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate
court but shall be dismissed outright. In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing
the appeal only after the expiration of the period to appeal. The trial court promulgated its Decision on 9
December 2002. Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14 January 2003. The Court of Appeals issued the
Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on
27 January 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of the trial court.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it dismissed Balabas appeal because of
lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS
The decision of the CA dismissed the petitioners appeal and finding him guilty of Malversation of Publc
Funds. The State Auditors discovered a cash shortage of Php 56, 321.04, unaccounted cash tickets of
Php 7,865.30 and an unrecorded check of Php 50,000 payable to Balaba, or a total shortage of Php
114,186.32.
Three demand letters were sent to Balaba asking him to explain the discrepancy in the accounts.
Unsatisfied with Balabas explanation, an information for Malversation of Public funds was filed against the
petitioner.
It was stated in the information that by virtue of his position, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, embezzle and take away from said funds, in which he converted to his personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
During his arraignment, he (Balaba) entered a plea of not guilty. Then trial soon followed.
The lower court rendered decision finding Balaba guilty. Balaba filed his appeal to the CA but the same
was dismissed. The CA declared that it had no jurisdiction to act on the appeal because the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case.
Hence, the petition.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his appeal instead of certifying the case to the proper
court
HELD
No. In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the expiration of
the period to appeal. The trial court promulgated its Decision on 9 December 2002. Balaba filed his notice
of appeal on 14 January 2003. The Court of Appeals issued the Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction

190
on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on 27 January 2005, clearly beyond the 15-
day period to appeal from the decision of the trial court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit
any error when it dismissed Balabas appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.

Similarities and differences

Josue
G.R. No. 177768 July 27, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. CHARMEN OLIVO y ALONG, NELSON DANDA y
SAMBUTO, and JOEY ZAFRA y REYES, Appellants.
Appeals; Evidence; The well-entrenched rule us that findings of the trial court affirmed by the appellate
court are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, by the Supreme Court, absent clear and
convincing that the tribunals ignored, misconstrued or misapplied facts and circumstances of substances
such that, if considered, the same will warrant the modification or reversal of the outcome of the case. It
is settled that when the issue is the evaluation of the testimony of a witness of his credibility, this Court
accords the highest respect and even finality to the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that it
committed palpable mistake, misappreciation of facts and grave abuse of discretion. It is the trial court
which has the unique advantage of observing first-hand the facial expressions, gestures and the tone of
voice of a witness while testifying. The well-entrenched rule is that findings of the trial court affirmed by
the appellate court are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court, absent clear and
convincing evidence that the tribunals ignored, misconstrued or misapplied facts and circumstances of
substances such that, if considered, the same will warrant the modification or reversal of the outcome o
the case. Factual findings of trial court, when substantiated by the evidence on record, command great
weight and respect on appeal save only when certain material facts and circumstances were overlooked
and which, if duly considered, may vary the outcome of the case.

Criminal Procedure; Appeals; the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused
shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is
favourable and applicable to the latter. One final note. The other accused, Joey Zafra, who is identically
circumstanced as the other appellants and who was likewise convicted on the same evidence does not
appeal to have perfected an appeal from the trial courts judgment, the record does not show the reason
therefor, Be that as it may, the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused shall
not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favourable
and applicable to the latter. Our pronouncements here with respect to the insufficiency of the prosecution
evidence to convict the appellants beyond reasonable doubt are definitely favourable and applicable to
accused Joey Zafra. He should not therefore be treated as the odd man out and should benefit from the
acquittal of his co-accused. In fact, under similar conditions and on the same ratiocination section 11 (a),
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court has justified the extension of our judgment of acquittal to the co-accused
who failed to appeal from the judgment o the trial court which we subsequently reversed.

FACTS

Olivo, Danda and Zafra were charged in an Information dated November 29, 2000 as follows:
The undersigned accuses CHARMEN OLIVO Y ALONG alias Lipay, NELSON DANDA Y SAMBUTO alias
Teng, and JOEY ZAFRA Y REYES, of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of November 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of force,
violence, and intimidation against persons, to wit: by then and there armed with guns forcibly entered the

191
hardware store of Mariano Constantino [y] Zoleta located at Eagle Street, Sitio Veterans B, Bgy. Bagong
Silangan, this City, then announced that it was [a] HOLD-UP and ordered Maricel Permejo, storekeeper
thereat, at gunpoint to give them the money of said store, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously took, rob and carry away the total amount of P35,000.00 Philippine Currency, representing the
days earnings of said hardware store, that on the occasion of and by reason of the said robbery and in
pursuance of their conspiracy, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one MARIANO
CONSTANTINO Y ZOLETA, by then and there shooting him with a gun hitting him on the trunk and
extrem[i]ties, thereby inflicting upon said Mariano Constantino [y] Zoleta serious and mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
Mariano Constantino [y] Zoleta.
The arraignment was made on January 22, 2001, all of the accused pleaded not guilty.
The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the oral testimonies of Maricel Permejo, storekeeper of
the victim Mariano Constantino, Pablito Constantino, the victims brother, SPO2 Joseph Dino (SPO2
Dino), medico-legal officer Dr. Winston Tan, and Emelita Constantino, the victims wife. The defense, for
its part, presented accused-appellants Olivo and Zafra, Dominica Bernal, who was the landlady of Olivo
and Danda, and Rodel de Belen who corroborated Zafras testimony.
On August 24, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision convicting accused Charmen Olivo y Along, Nelson
Danda y Sambuto and Joey Zafra y Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide.
The accused Olivo and Danda appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated November 30, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTCs decision.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellants Charmen Olivo and
Nelson Danda of the crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
HELD
After review, we find that the accused-appellants should be acquitted.
The well-entrenched rule is that findings of the trial court affirmed by the appellate court are accorded
high respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court, absent clear and convincing evidence that the
tribunals ignored, misconstrued or misapplied facts and circumstances of substances such that, if
considered, the same will warrant the modification or reversal of the outcome of the case.
In this case, the material fact and circumstance that the lone alleged eyewitness, Maricel Permejo,
was not able to identify the accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, varies the
outcome of this case. This circumstance was established during the direct examination of Olivo and was
not rebutted by the prosecution during cross-examination or in its pleadings.
The fact that Permejo was not able to identify accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime
impinges heavily on the credibility of prosecutions evidence. For if, indeed, the accused-appellants
were the malefactors of the crime who did not hide their faces during the robbery, the eyewitness,
who had such close, traumatic encounter with them, should automatically have recalled their
faces upon seeing them. It behooves this Court to declare that she was not able to do so positively.

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Having ignored the abovementioned important circumstance, the trial court misconstrued and
misapplied facts and circumstances of the case, warranting the modification or reversal of the
outcome of the case. The trial court grievously erred when it ruled that the lone prosecution eyewitness
categorically and positively identified accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.
Other circumstances tend to prove that the accused-appellants were not the perpetrators of the crime.
One, they were not arrested for the crime of robbery with homicide but were arrested during a
buy-bust operation.
Two, they were brought to Camp Karingal for dubious reasons. During the direct examination, SPO2
Dino stated that it was standard operating procedure (SOP) that when the case is murder and robbery
and the amount is more than P1 million, the case will be handled by the Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU)
in Camp Karingal instead of where the crime occurred, i.e, Batasan Area. Apparently realizing his mistake
that the amount taken was only P35,000.00 when asked the same question during cross-examination,
SPO2 Dino replied that it was SOP that if the case is murder or homicide and if there is no available
police investigator for that police station, then Camp Karingal will be the one to conduct the investigation.
The abovementioned testimony of SPO2 Dino makes his credibility doubtful.
Trial courts are mandated not only to look at the direct examination of witnesses but to the totality of
evidence before them. In every case, the court should review, assess and weigh the totality of the
evidence presented by the parties. It should not confine itself to oral testimony during the trial.
We cannot convict appellants for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide when the evidence
relied upon by the trial court is plainly erroneous and inadequate to prove appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty, whether it proceeds
from direct or circumstantial evidence.
One final note. The other accused, Joey Zafra, who is identically circumstanced as the other appellants
and who was likewise convicted on the same evidence, does not appear to have perfected an appeal
from the trial courts judgment.
Be that as it may, the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable
and applicable to the latter. Our pronouncements here with respect to the insufficiency of the
prosecution evidence to convict appellants beyond reasonable doubt are definitely favorable and
applicable to accused Joey Zafra. He should not therefore be treated as the odd man out and should
benefit from the acquittal of his co-accused. In fact, under similar conditions and on the same
ratiocination, Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court has justified the extension of our
judgment of acquittal to the co-accused who failed to appeal from the judgment of the trial court
which we subsequently reversed.

Similarities and differences

Ramoso
Guasch vs Dela Cruz
Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Motion for Reconsideration; As a general rule, the statutory
requirement that when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, the decision
attains finality and becomes executory in due course must be strictly enforced; Purposes for such
Statutory Requirement.As a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for
reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes executory
in due course must be strictly enforced as they are considered indispensable interdictions against
needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. The purposes for such statutory

193
requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to
make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at
the risk of occasional errors, which are precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on
indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period
of time.

Same; Same; Appeals; Elements to Consider for the Appeal to be Given Due Course.In
exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due course to an
appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure. Certain elements
are considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby.

Facts
Respondent Dela Cruz filed a complaint against Guasch with the City Prosecutor of Manila. He
alleged that petitioner was his neighbor and kumadre and that on several occasions transacted with him
by exchanging cash for checks of small amounts. He alleged that petitioner gave her a check worth 3,300
PHP and assured that she will have the funds to cover the said check. On the date of maturity and upon
presentment the check was dishonored for the reason that the account against which it was drawn was
already closed. City Prosecutor recommended that an information for estafa be filed against petitioner.
Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and after the prosecution rested its case, petitioner filed a
Motion With Leave To Admit Demurrer to Evidence. The demurrer to evidence was granted and the case
was dismissed. Respondent filed a Motion to Amend to include a finding of civil liability of the petitioner. In
the Manifestation respondents counsel justified the failure to file the motion within the 15 day
reglementary period because all postal offices in Metro Manila were allegedly ordered closed in the
afternoon due to the rally staged on Ayala Avenue.
The trial court denied the motion finding that counsel was inexcusably negligent, hence, the
dismissal is now final and executory. Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA and was
granted. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied respondents Motion to Amend
Held:
The court affirmed the ruling of the CA. As a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no
motion for reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, the decision attains finality and
becomes executory in due course must be strictly enforced as they are considered indispensable
interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. The purposes for
such statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus,
procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and, second, to put an end to judicial
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which are precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot
drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite
period of time.
However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of
due course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure.

194
Certain elements are considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced
thereby

Similarities and differences

Lozada
PEOPLE VS FRANCISCO TARUC
GR NO. 185202, February 18, 2009
Criminal Procedure; Accused fails to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite
notice; The promulgation of judgment shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and
serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
The counsel of the accused has been given the notices of his trial. In the event that he changes
residence, he must inform the Court of such change thru his counsel. In this case, the accused-appellant
failed to inform his counsel of his whereabouts.
Same; Same; Failure to appear was without justifiable cause; Accused shall be deemed to have waived
his right to avail remedies.
Under Section 6, Rule 120, the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was
without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the
court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused
may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons
for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
The accused-appellant has escaped and has therefore puts himself beyond the reach of the law. He then
loses his standing and unless he surrenders or submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court, his right to
appeal, among other remedies, is deemed waived.
Same; Same; Dismissal of Appeal for Abandonment or failure to Prosecute; The Court of Appeals may
also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison
or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.
Under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court the Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee
or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to
file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a
counsel de officio.
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal.

FACTS
Francisco Taruc, accused-appellant, was found guilty of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code for the death of Emelito Sualog on June 29, 2005 by the RTC of Bataan, Branch 3.
As the punishment for murder was death, the case was brought for automatic review before the Court of

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Appeals. Accused-appellant, through his PAO lawyer, filed for a Motion to File Extension of Time to File
Appellant Brief. The Court of Appeals issued a Notice to File Brief to the accused-appellant but the same
was later on returned with the postal notion moved out. When the warden directed accused-appellants
PAO lawyer to furnish it with the complete and present address, they were later informed that the
accused-appellant had escaped prison and his whereabouts were unknown. Still, the Motion for
Extension was granted but the PAO lawyer failed to file the said brief. The Court of Appeals required the
PAO for an explanation why they should not be cited for contempt and found the reasons to be valid,
thus, the case was considered submitted for decision. The CA confirmed the decision of the RTC with
some modifications. Accused-appellant, through the PAO lawyer filed for a Notice of Appeal before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused- appellant is allowed the remedy of appeal.

HELD
No. Under Rule 120, Section 6, Paragraph 4 and 5, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, in case the
accused failed to appear on the scheduled date of the promulgation of judgment without justifiable case,
he shall lose the remedies available in the Rules, one of which is the remedy of appeal. Upon escaping, it
was deemed that he had waived his right to avail of the remedies accorded to him as he puts himself
beyond the reach and application of the law.

Similarities and differences

Romero
TIU VS. CA
586 SCRA 118 GR No. 162370

Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring and defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines or represent the people or State in criminal proceedings before the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.

At the outset, the Court finds that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the Solicitor General.
Instead, it was filed by Tiu, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 96-413, through his counsel.
Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before this Court and the Court
of Appeals.20 Tiu, the offended party in Criminal Case No. 96-413 is without legal personality to appeal
the decision of the Court of Appeals before this Court. Nothing shows that the Office of the Solicitor
General represents the People in this appeal before this Court. On this ground alone, the petition must
fail.

FACTS
The case resulted from a criminal charge for slight physical injuries filed by Edgardo Postanes against
Remigio Pasion .On the other hand, David Tiu (Tiu) filed a criminal charge for grave threats against
Postanes. Upon motion of Pasion, the two criminal cases were consolidated and jointly heard before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City.
After trial, Metropolitan Trial Court rendered judgment dismissing both charges on ground of insufficiency
of evidence.

196
Tiu filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Afterwards, Tiu,
through his counsel, filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Pasay City. The RTC of Pasay City
rendered a decision declaring void the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court and ordered the case to
be remanded in the Metropolitan Trial Court. Postanes moved for reconsideration, which was denied by
the RTC.
Postanes filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari (with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order), challenging the decision of the RTC. The Court
of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and affirmed the dismissal of the two cases. In annulling the RTC
decision, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC has granted upon the State, through the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, the right to appeal the decision of acquittal which right the government does not
have.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was Double Jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari questioning the
acquittal of Postanes by the Metropolitan Trial Court;
HELD
(YES) The court rules in the affirmative.
The Court finds that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the Solicitor General. Instead, it was
filed by Tiu, the private complainant, through his counsel.
General rule provides that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before this Court and
the Court of Appeals.
Tiu, the offended party in the criminal case is without legal personality to appeal the decision of the Court
of Appeals before the Supreme Court. Nothing shows that the Office of the Solicitor General represents
the People in this appeal before the Court. On this ground alone, the SC says the petition must not
prosper.
However, the Court opted to resolve the query of double jeopardy.
The elements of double jeopardy are: (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and
had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his
express consent.
All the elements were present given the following: (1) the Information filed in the criminal case against
Postanes was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the Metropolitan Trial Court
had jurisdiction over the criminal case; (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-guilty plea; and (4)
the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed the Criminal Case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
amounting to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Clearly, for the court to grant the petition and
order the Metropolitan Trial Court to reconsider its decision, just what the RTC ordered the Metropolitan
Trial Court to do, is to transgress the Constitutional proscription not to put any person twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense.

197
Similarities and differences
Montilla
COLINARES VS. PEOPLE
662 SCRA 266 , DECEMBER 13, 2011
Probation Law - The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have
appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement "outlaws the element
of speculation on the part of the accusedto wager on the result of his appealthat when his conviction
is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence
inevitable, he now applies for probation as an escape hatch thus rendering nugatory the appellate
courts affirmance of his conviction."

Instances where the probation law should not be granted to the accused - On the other hand, probation
should not be granted to the accused in the following instances: 1.) When the accused is convicted by the
trial court of a crime where the penalty imposed is within the probationable period or a fine, and the
accused files a notice of appeal; and 2.) When the accused files a notice of appeal which puts the merits
of his conviction in issue, even if there is an alternative prayer for the correction of the penalty imposed by
the trial court or for a conviction to a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the crime in which he
was convicted where the penalty is within the probationable period.

FACTS
Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone and fell unconscious. Arnel
claimed self-defense. The RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated homicide. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six
years, Arnel did not qualify for probation. Arnel appealed to the CA, invoking self-defense and,
alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction
of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the award for lost
income. Arnel comes to the SC on petition for review. SC required Arnel and the Solicitor General to
submit their respective positions on whether or not, assuming Arnel committed only the lesser crime of
attempted homicide with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for
probation upon remand of the case to the trial court. Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he
should be entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his
offense probationable. The language and spirit of the probation law warrants such a stand. The Solicitor
General, on the other hand, argues that under the Probation Law no application for probation can be
entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
ISSUE
Whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court
HELD
YES. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the
judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the
lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be
lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of
prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply
for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement outlaws the element of speculation

198
on the part of the accusedto wager on the result of his appealthat when his conviction is finally
affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he
now applies for probation as an escape hatch thus rendering nugatory the appellate courts affirmance of
his conviction.
The Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition.

Similarities and differences

Naca
VILLAREAL v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 151258 December 01, 2014
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Though the Supreme Court (SC) has recognized
that the acquittal of the accused may be challenged where there has been a grave abuse of discretion,
certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that the Court of Appeals (CAs) Decision dismissing
the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Though we have recognized that the acquittal of the accused may be challenged where there has been a
grave abuse of discretion, certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that the CAs Decision
dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed judgment constitutes a patent and gross abuse of
discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by
law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the
court of its very power to dispense justice. Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court
simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.

Criminal Law; Penalties; The Revised Penal Code (RPC) has carefully delineated the imposable
penalties as regards felonies committed by means of culpa on the one hand and felonies
committed by means of dolo on the other in the context of the distinctions it has drawn between
them.

Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we cannot agree with the
argument of the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for intentional felony can also be applied to
the present case on the ground that the nature of the imprudence or negligence of the accused was so
gross that the felony already amounted to malice. The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the
imposable penalties as regards felonies committed by means of culpa on the one hand and felonies
committed by means of dolo on the other in the context of the distinctions it has drawn between them.
The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are mandatorily applied if the death of
a person occurs as a result of the imprudence or negligence of another. Alternatively, the penalties
outlined in Articles 246 to 261 (Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the death was a result of
the commission of a forbidden act accompanied by a malicious intent. These imposable penalties are
statutory, mandatory, and not subject to the discretion of the court. We have already resolved and the
OSG agrees that the accused Dizon and Tecson, et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus
iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is what is
applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

199
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Finality of Judgments; Probation; Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once the accused applies for
probation.

Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once the accused
applies for probation, viz.: SECTION 7. Modification of judgment.A judgment of conviction may, upon
motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected.
Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the
accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 117 and Section 1 of Rule 122, it can be culled from the foregoing
provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the relief
being sought is the correction or review of the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order to give
life to the constitutional edict against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. It is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy if the state
appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an acquittal or even to increase criminal liability. Thus,
the accuseds waiver of the right to appeal as when applying for probation makes the criminal
judgment immediately final and executory.

Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; The rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is
inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the
criminal judgment.

It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer
blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in our Decision that the rule on
double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the
very jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal judgment. The reasoning behind the exception is
articulated in People v. Nazareno, 595 SCRA 438 (2009), from which we quote: In such instance,
however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in an appeal, actually takes place;
the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether
the verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate
jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In
other words, the review is on the question of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not on
the question of the decisions error or correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the
burden a very heavy one is on the shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the presence
of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and
gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction; Any residual jurisdiction of the court of origin
shall cease including the authority to order execution pending appeal the moment the complete
records of the case are transmitted to the appellate court.

Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in which the criminal action has been properly instituted.
If a party appeals the trial courts judgment or final order, jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court.
The execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing party is concerned. The court of
origin then loses jurisdiction over the entire case the moment the other partys time to appeal has expired.
Any residual jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease including the authority to order execution
pending appeal the moment the complete records of the case are transmitted to the appellate court.

200
Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have the authority to wield the power to hear, try, and
decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That
power and authority shall remain with the appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction
cannot be ousted by any subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.

Criminal Law; Probation; Words and Phrases; Probation is a special privilege granted by the state
to penitent qualified offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right
to appeal.

We find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the probation applications of Tecson, et al. It
had neither the power nor the authority to suspend their sentence, place them on probation, order their
final discharge, and eventually declare the case against them terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux
pas is a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law or an underhanded one-upmanship on the
part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson, et al., or both to which this Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.
In any event, Tecson, et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for it. Probation is a
special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who immediately admit their liability
and thus renounce their right to appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate and willingness to be
reformed, the state affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of an incarceration record by making them
undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major purposes of the law are to help offenders to
eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self-respecting individuals, as well as to assist them
in their reintegration with the community. It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the
accused. Rather, it is an act of grace or clemency conferred by the state.

Same; Same; All offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for
appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation.

Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have appealed the
conviction. In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 298, this Court was faced with the
issue of whether a convict may still apply for probation even after the trial court has imposed a non-
probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers the original penalty to a sentence within the
probationable limit. In that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to a maximum term of eight years
of prisin mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only became eligible for
probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1 year, 8 months and 21
days of prisin correccional. In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco v. Court
of Appeals, 243 SCRA 384 (1995), and ruled that the accused was ineligible for probation, since they had
filed an appeal with the CA. In Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no
ambiguity and does not provide for any distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clear is that all
offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for appealing, are disqualified
by the law from seeking probation. Accordingly, this Court enunciated in Lagrosa that the accused are
disallowed from availing themselves of the benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to
apply for probation only on appeal as a result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-
probationable to probationable.

Same; Same; One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to suspend the execution of
the sentence, and not to replace the original sentence with another.

A void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is as if no judgment had been
rendered at all. Considering our annulment of the Orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to
the probation proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits that technically do not exist. In any event,

201
Tecson, et al. cannot invoke Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we find it inapplicable to this case.
One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to suspend the execution of the sentence, and
not to replace the original sentence with another, as we pointed out in our discussion in Baclayon v.
Mutia, 129 SCRA 148 (1984): An order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather
in effect a suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an
interlocutory judgment in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the
supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the
conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are
violated. (Emphases supplied) Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson, et al. remains.

FACTS
Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification were filed by the People and the accused parties in this case.
The following motions were filed in connection with the case involving the death of Leonardo Lenny Villa
due to fraternity hazing. Some of the questions posed in this case are the following: who are eligible for
probation, the validity of the prior probation proceedings and the validity of the concomitant orders of thw
lower courts.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in the said case was partially modified by the Supreme Court. Dizon
and Villaruel were held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Meanwhile,Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug, Jr. were held guilty of slight physical injuries by CA. However, the SC modified the decision
and convicted them of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
The parties to the second case (Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, Jr.) filed a Motion for Clarification or
Reconsideration insofar as their criminal liabilities and services of sentences are concerned. The former
applied for probation after the pronouncement of CA's decision since slight physical injuries is a
probationable offense.
The accused contended that they were discharged from the criminal liability and cases against them are
closed and terminated because of the RTC's grant of probation upon their completion of the terms and
conditions of the probation. Moreover, they said that the CA decision lapsed into finality when they waived
their right to appeal and applied for probation.
ISSUE
Whether or not the finality of CA's decision barred the state from seeking the annulment of the judgment.
HELD
No. The finality of a decision of the CA will NOT BAR the state from seeking the annulment of the
judgment via a Rule 65 petition.
According to Rule 122, Section 1,
Any party may appeal from judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.
In a reading of Rule 122, Section 1 with Rule 117, Section 7 and Rule 120, Section 7 only the accused
may appeal the criminal aspect of the criminal case. Furthermore, the accused's waiver of the right to
appeal (e.g. application for probation) makes the criminal judgment final and executory. However, the
application of double jeopardy in NOT ABSOLUTE. It is not a blanket of invincibility on criminal
judgments. As an exception to the foregoing rule, the State may assail the jurisdiction of the court that
issued the criminal judgment.

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As an application, there was no irregularity in the SC's partial annulment of the CA decision in spite of pf
finality because judgment was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
As to the probation of the accused, the orders of RTC Branch 130 as to their probation have no legal
effect. The same were issued without jurisdiction. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all.
By it, no rights are divested. Through it, no rights are can be attained.

Similarities and differences

Parulan
DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., Petitioners,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on the
appeal from the Court of Appeals (CA) to the Supreme Court (SC) when the penalty imposed is either
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision
reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court authority. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it
a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law. Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on the
appeal from the CA to the Court when the penalty imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. According to the said provision, [i]n cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty.
The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.

Same; Same; Same; An accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had
been imposed by the Court of Appeals (CA), can simply file a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an
appeal as a matter of right before the Supreme Court (SC). An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire
case for review on any question including one not raised by the parties. Hence, an accused, upon
whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had been imposed by the CA, can simply file
a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a matter of right before the Court. An appeal in a
criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised by the parties.
Section 13(c), Rule 124 recognizes the constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the Court in all criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. An accused, nevertheless, is not
precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via Rule 45 under the Rules of Court. An
appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law. Moreover, such
review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons.
Facts
The Dungo and Sibal were charged of violation of RA 8049 before the RTC Branch 36, Calamba City.
Dungo filed a motion to quash for lack of probable cause, but it was denied by the trial court because the
ground cited therein was not provided by law and jurisprudence. When arraigned, the petitioners pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued. The RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the
crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

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Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In their brief, they contended that the prosecution failed
to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating R.A. No. 8049. They also assailed the
constitutionality of Section 4 of the said law, which stated that mere presence in the hazing was prima
facie evidence of participation therein, because it allegedly violated the constitutional presumption of
innocence of the accused.
The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit. It stated that, in finding them guilty
of violating R.A. No. 8049, the RTC properly relied on circumstantial evidence adduced by the
prosecution. The CA painstakingly discussed the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence to convict
Dungo and Sibal as principals in the crime of hazing.
Dungo and Sibal moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the CA in the assailed
October 8, 2013 Resolution. The petitioners through a petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse
and set aside the decision of RTC and the decion of CA.
Issue
Whether or not the Petitioners can validly appeal from the CA to SC through a petition of certiorari under
Rule 45 assailing a question of fact.
Held
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court
authority. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law.
Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03,
dated October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on the appeal from the CA to the Court when the penalty
imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. According to the said provision, "[i]n cases
where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall
render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court
by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals."
Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had been imposed
by the CA, can simply file a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a matter of right before
the Court. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one
not raised by the parties. Section 13(c), Rule 124 recognizes the constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of
the Court in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via Rule 45
under the Rules of Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall raise only
questions of law. Moreover, such review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will
be granted only when there are special and important reasons. In other words, when the CA imposed a
penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may: (1) file a notice of appeal under
Section 13( c ), Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a matter of right before the Court and open the entire
case for review on any question; or (2) file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an
appeal as a matter of discretion and raise only questions of law.
In this case, the CA affirmed the R TC decision imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon the
petitioners. The latter opted to appeal the CA decision via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
Consequently, they could only raise questions of law. Oddly, the petitioners began to assail the existence
of conspiracy in their reply, which is a question of fact that would require an examination of the evidence

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;presented. In the interest of justice, however, and due to the novelty of the issue presented, the Court
deems it proper to open the whole case for review.

Similarities and differences

Pulido
ADINA B. MANANSALA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 215424, December 9, 2015

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide
open for review and the reviwing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgement, or even reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds other than those that the parties
raised as errors The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise the judgement appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite
the proper provision of the penal law.

FACTS
On May 31, 1999, Marissa Bautista, who is the secretary of private complainant Kathleen Siy,
former Vice President for Finance of UMC Finance and Leasing Corporation, was asked by the latter to
withdraw the amount of Php 38,000.00 from her Metrobank and Bank of the Philippine Islands bank
accounts. However, Bautista got the said of money from the petty cash custodian of UMC because the
ATM was offline. On June 9, 1999, Siy was informed by UMC Finance Manager Violeta Q. Dizon-
Lacanilao regarding her cash advance of Php 38, 000.00 as provided in the petty cash replenishment
report prepared by petty cash custodian Manansala, the herein petitioner. Subsequently, Siy issued two
(2) checks to reimburse the petty cash account of UMC. After the checks were encashed, petitioner
Manansala was instructed by Lacanila to delete the entry in their subject report with regards to Siys cash
advance. On June 11, 1999, the incident was reported by Lacanila to UMC President Conrado Marty.
In March 2000, petitioner Manansala was instructed again by Lacanilao to retrieve the subject
report and revise the same by re-inserting the entry with regard to Siys alleged cash advance. This report
was reprinted on scratch paper and was repeatedly folded in order to make the paper look old. Because
of this, an administrative charge was filed against Siy for using office funds for personal use. A month
after, the company terminated Siy and Lacanilao succeeded the former in her position. Siy filed criminal
charges against Marty, Lacanilao, and petitioner Manansala for falsification of private documents. But, the
criminal charge against Marty was withdrawn while an amended information was filed against Lacanila
and Manansala before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. In the defense of herein petitioner, she
contended that she just followed the orders of her superior even though she had some suspicion over the
said report. The MTC both found that Lacanilao and Manansala are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the crime of Falsification of Private Documents. The mitigating circumstance of acting under
an impulse of uncontrollable fear was appreciated by the Court in favor of the petitioner. Then, a motion
for reconsideration was filed by Manansala but was denied. The case was elevated to RTC through
appeal, and the RTC affirmed the decision of MTC. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Manansala
but was denied. Subsequently, she elevated the matter to CA through petitioner for review however, the
CA also affirmed RTCs ruling. A motion for reconsideration was filed again by the petitioner but was
denied. Hence, this petitioner for review on certiorari.

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 ISSUE
Whether or not the reviewing tribunals failed to correct the errors even though these errors are
not assigned in the appealed judgement.
HELD
YES. As provided in the Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, an appeal
throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though
unassigned in the appealed judgement, or even reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds other
than those that the parties raised as errors. In the case at bar, the RTC and CA failed to correct the
mistake made by the MTC in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of acting under an impulse of
uncontrollable fear. It was said that acting under an impulse of controllable fear is an exempting
circumstance and not mitigating circumstance. Further, there was no evidence that there was real, and
imminent threat, intimidation, or coercion that would have compelled Manansala to do what she did,
which could be appreciated in her favor. Thus, the petition is DENIED, the CAs decision was hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing Manansala to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
indeterminate period of 6 months of arresto mayor as minimum to 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prison
correccional, as maximum.

RULE 126 SEARCH AND SEIZURE

1. The constitutional provision on searches and seizures
2. Search Warrant vs. Warrant of Arrest
3. When searches and seizures allowed without warrants
4. Motion to Quash

Motion to Quash
Quillope
ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 176077 August 31, 2011
Criminal Law; Searches and Siezures; Arrests; Estoppel; Criminal Procedure; An accused
is estoppped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move
for the quashal of the information against him on his ground before arraignment.
It is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates
that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect
in his arrest.11 An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this
issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any
objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.
Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Arrests; In Flagrante Delicto; Requisites.
For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be
present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is

206
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.
Same; Same; Warrantless Searches and Seizures; What constitute a reasonable or
unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the
uniqueness of the circumstances involed, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made,
the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.
No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and consequent seizure must be
carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable, and any evidence obtained
therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The right against warrantless
searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal and judicial exceptions, namely: 1. Warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; 2. Search of evidence in "plain view"; 3. Search of a moving vehicle; 4.
Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency
circumstances. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose
of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.

FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of CA
which in turn affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC convicting petitioner of Violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In an Information Miclat Jr. was charged for Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165.
That on November 8, 2002, in Caloocan City, without the authority of law, did then and there willfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control [Methamphetamine] Hydrochloride (SHABU)
weighing 0.24 gram, knowing the same to be a dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-cited
law.
When the group of SPO4 Palting arrived at Palmera Spring II, Caloocan City at around 3:50
oclock that same afternoon, they were [at] once led by their informant to the house of one Alias "Abe
Miclat." PO3 Antonio then positioned himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the members
of the group deployed themselves nearby. Thru a small opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3
Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of 1 meters, he saw "Abe" arranging several pieces of
small plastic sachets which he believed to be containing shabu. Immediately placed the suspect under
arrest and brought him and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets.
Upon arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.
ISSUE
Whether peeping through a curtain-covered window is within the meaning of "plain view doctrine" for a
warrantless seizure to be lawful.
HELD
In the present case, at the time of petitioners arraignment, there was no objection raised as to
the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In
effect, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to

207
the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient
cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It
will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
Verily, no less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and consequent seizure must
be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable, and any evidence obtained
therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The right against warrantless
searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal and judicial exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view";
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial
question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.
It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic sachets
in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police
officer. The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not only
incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview of the "plain view" doctrine.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that
view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The
"plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he
can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial
intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such
lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object
must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight.
Since petitioners arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest
and the evidence seized from the petitioner was the result of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting officer, the results of the ensuing search and
seizure were admissible in evidence to prove petitioners guilt of the offense charged.

Ramirez
PEOPLE VS BELEN MARIACOS, GR NO. 188611, JUNE 16, 2010
Searches and Seizures; Warrantless Searches and Seizures. - Law and jurisprudence have laid
down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. These are: (1) Warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 (now Section 13), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by

208
prevailing jurisprudence; (2) Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are: (a) a prior
valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere
seizure of evidence without further search. (3) Search of moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in
public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity; (4) Consented warrantless search; (5) Customs search; (6) Stop
and frisk; and (8) exigent and emergency circumstances.
Same; Same; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; It is well to remember that in the instances
recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting
the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause; Probable cause is
defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to induce a cautious man to believe that a person accused is guilty of the offense charged , and, the
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. - It is well to remember that in the instances recognized as exceptions
to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must
have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must
be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. Without probable cause,
the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the person arrested. Probable cause is
defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to induce a cautious man to believe that a person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to
the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection
with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched. The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Same; Same; Same; Search of Moving Vehicles; A search warrant may readily be obtained when
the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure, but it is impractical to obtain a
warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since
they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought. Over the
years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle
is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could
be obtained, the place, things, and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the
issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where moving vehicle is used
to transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. This exception is easy to understand. A
search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other
immobile structure. But it is impractical to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile
ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought. Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the
search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to
leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him
to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in

209
this case. The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to
board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.
Same; Same; Same; Search Incident to Lawful Arrest; A search substantially contemporaneous
with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of
the search. This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful
arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. For this
rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is
necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit: x x x Be that as
it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if
the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.
FACTS
Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information of violating Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act [No.] 9165. During the trial, the prosecution has established the following:
On October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc met with a secret agent
of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on
a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and
one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc
then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he
found the black backpack with an O.K. marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks
of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the
owner of the bag, but no one knew.
Upon reaching the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other passengers. The said
bag and three (3) other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2)
women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman and that they were under
arrest One was apprehended but one of the women got away.
The RTC, Branch 29 of San Fernando, La Union found the accused guilty as charged.
Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She claimed that her right against unreasonable
unreasonable search was flagrantly violated by PO2 Pallayoc when the latter searched the bag, without
a search warrant and without permission from her. She averred that PO2 Pallayocs purpose for
apprehending her was to verify if the bag she was carrying was the same one he had illegally searched
earlier. Moreover, appellant contended that there was no probable cause for her arrest.
Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. She
alleged that the apprehending police officers violated Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of
1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, which prescribes the procedure in the
custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles. The said
regulation directs the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs and/or
paraphernalia, immediately after seizure or confiscation, to have the same physically inventoried and
photographed in the presence of appellant or her representative, who shall be required to sign copies of
the inventory. The failure to comply with this directive, appellant claimed, casts a serious doubt on the
identity of the items allegedly confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the prosecution failed to
prove that the items allegedly confiscated were indeed prohibited drugs, and to establish the chain of
custody over the same.

210
 The People, through the OSG, argued that the warrantless arrest of appellant and the
warrantless seizure of marijuana were valid and legal, justified as a search of a moving vehicle. It
averred that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had committed the crime of
delivering dangerous drugs based on reliable information from their agent, which was confirmed when he
peeked into the bags and smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana. The OSG also argued that appellant
was now estopped from questioning the illegality of her arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of not
guilty upon arraignment and participated in the trial and presented her evidence. The OSG brushed aside
appellants argument that the bricks of marijuana were not photographed and inventoried in her presence
or that of her counsel immediately after confiscation, positing that physical inventory may be done at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team, whichever was practicable.
The CA dismissed appellants appeal and affirmed the RTC decision in toto. It held that the
prosecution had successfully proven that appellant carried away from the jeepney a number of bags
which, when inspected by the police, contained dangerous drugs. The CA ruled that appellant was
caught in flagrante delicto of carrying and conveying the bag that contained the illegal drugs, and thus
held that appellants warrantless arrest was valid.
ISSUE
Whether or not the search was valid as well as the arrest.
HELD
Yes, the search was valid, appellants arrest based on the search was also valid.
DOCTRINES:
Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid.
These are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now Section 13],
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the
right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public

211
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that
the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant.
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a
warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions therefore, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with section 7 of Rule 112.
Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.

Motion to Quash
Santos
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ESTELA TUAN y BALUDDA
[G.R. Nos. 176066 August 1, 2010]

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Witnesses; In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Law, the case becomes a contest of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies.
In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, such as Criminal Case No. 17619-
R, a case becomes a contest of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. In such a
situation, this Court generally relies upon the assessment by the trial court, which has the
distinct advantage of observing the conduct or demeanor of the witnesses while they were

212
testifying. Hence, its factual findings are accorded respecteven finalityabsent any showing
that certain facts of weight and substance bearing on the elements of the crime have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.
Same; Same; Illegal Possession of Prohibited or Regulated Drugs; Elements.
Illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the following elements
concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possesses the said drug.
Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the
crime, do not impair their credibilitytestimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other
on important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence.
These alleged inconsistencies and contradictions pertain to minor details and are so
inconsequential that they do not in any way affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract
from the established fact of illegal possession of marijuana by accused-appellant at her house.
The Court has previously held that discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the
crime, do not impair their credibility. Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other
on important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence. Inconsistencies as to
minor details and collateral matters do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor the veracity
or weight of their testimonies. Such minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen their
credibility as they negate any suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Informants; Non-presentation of corroborative witnesses does not
constitute suppression of evidence and is not fatal to the prosecutions case; The presentation
of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a
successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative.
The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to present as witnesses.
The prosecution need not present each and every witness but only such as may be needed to
meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with if they are
merely corroborative in nature. The Court has ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative
witnesses does not constitute suppression of evidence and is not fatal to the prosecutions case.
Although Criminal Case No. 17619-R involves illegal possession of marijuana, the following
pronouncement of this Court in People vs. Salazar, 266 SCRA 607 (1997), relating to the illegal
sale of the same drug, still rings true: Neither is her right to confront witnesses against her
affected by the prosecutions failure to present the informer who pointed to her as a drug
pusher. The presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for
conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony
would be merely corroborative and cumulative. In a case involving the sale of illegal drugs,
what should be proven beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of the sale itself. Hence, like the
non-presentation of the marked money used in buying the contraband, the non-presentation of

213
the informer on the witness stand would not necessarily create a hiatus in the prosecutions
evidence.
Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; Requisites.
The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be
issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself
and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the
judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter
may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized.
Same; Same; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; Although probable cause eludes exact and
concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; A magistrates determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing
court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination; Substantial basis means
that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be
searched.
In People v. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 (1998), the Court defined probable cause as follows:
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he
is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure
and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. It ought to be emphasized that in
determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting
to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he
relies on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in abundance. The
same quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to search. Before
a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought
are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be
found in the place to be searched. A magistrates determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was
substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the
examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection
with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched. Such substantial
basis exists in this case.

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Same; Same; Same; A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places
in the community. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case at bar, the address and description of the
place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough. There was only one house
located at the stated address, which was accused-appellants residence, consisting of a
structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.
FACTS
On 24 January 2000, two male informants namely, Jerry Tudlong (Tudlong) and Frank Lad-ing (Lad-ing)
arrived at the office of the 14th Regional Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG) at DPS
Compound, Marcoville, Baguio City, and reported to SPO2 Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug
Enforcement Unit, that a certain Estela Tuan (Tuan) had been selling marijuana at Barangay Gabriela
Silang, Baguio City.
SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and Lad-ing. On the same day, he gave Tudlong
and Lad-ing P300.00 to buy marijuana, and then accompanied the two informants to accused-appellant
Tuans house. Tudlong and Lad-ing entered Tuans house while SPO2 Fernandez waited at the adjacent
house. After thirty minutes, Tudlong and Lad-ing came out of Tuans house and showed SPO2
Fernandez the marijuana leaves they bought.
Thereafter, SPO2 Fernandez, together with Tudlong and Lad-ing, filed an application for a search warrant
before Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (Judge Cortes) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Baguio City. Judge Cortes personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad-ing, after which, she
issued a search warrant, being satisfied of the existence of a probable cause.
Before going to Tuans house, SPO2 Fernandez invited barangay officials to be present when the search
warrant was to be served, but since no one was available, he requested one Eliza Pascual, Tuans
neighbor, to come along. Even though Tuan was not around, the CIDG team was allowed entry into the
house by Magno Baludda, Tuans father, after he was shown a copy of the search warrant.
The CIDG team searched the first and second floors of Tuans house. They saw a movable cabinet in
Tuans room, below which they found a brick of marijuana and a firearm. At around six oclock that
evening, Tuan arrived with her son. The police officers asked her to open a built-in cabinet, in which they
saw eight more bricks of marijuana.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Tuan guilty of illegal possession of marijuana and illegal
possession of firearm. Tuan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), but the latter affirmed the RTCs
decision. However, the CA modified the RTC judgment, acquitting Tuan of the charge for illegal
possession of firearm, stating that the absence of a firearm license was simply presumed by the police
officers.
The case was further elevated to the Supreme Court (SC), with Tuan alleging that the search warrant
issued against her was void for the following reasons: (1) the informants, Tudlong and Lad-ing, made
misrepresentation of facts in the application for search warrant filed with the MTCC; and (2) the search

215
warrant failed to particularly describe the place to be searched because the house was a two-storey
building composed of several rooms.
ISSUE
Whether or not the search warrant issued against Tuan was void.

HELD
No. The search warrant issued against Tuan was not void. Pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III of
the Constitution and Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the validity
of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any
other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued
must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
The second and third factors for a validly issued warrant were complied with. What is contested in the
case at bar are the first and fourth factors.
Probable cause generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged. The SC ruled that Judge Cortes found probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrant for Tuans residence after said judges personal examination of SPO2
Fernandez, the applicant; and Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants. Hence, the first factor stated above
was satisfied.
Next, a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. In the case at bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the search
warrant was specific enough. There was only one house located at the stated address, which was Tuans
residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms. Thus, the fourth
factor has been complied with.
With the foregoing facts, the SC upheld the validity of the search warrant for Tuans house issued by
MTCC Judge Cortes, and any items seized as a result of the search conducted by virtue thereof, may be
presented as evidence against Tuan.

Motion to Quash
Aguinaldo
Esquillo v People
629 SCRA 370

Facts:

Susan Esquillo was convicted of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts. Police officers were
assigned in Malibay, Pasay to conduct surveillance on a notorious snatcher named Ryan. It was during
that time the police officers noticed the petitioner. Two police officers came to Esquillo and another
person while they were transacting. They saw the latter place inside a yellow cigarette case a plastic
sachet containing a white substance. They approached the petitioner and introduced themselves as
police officer. Subsequently, they inquired regarding the sachet the petitioner placed inside the case.
The petitioner acted suspiciously and even tried to flee. The police officers prevented her from doing so.

216
They apprised the petitioner of her constitutional rights and then they confiscated the sachet. They
marked the sachet with initials SRE and took the petitioner to the police station.
The petitioner contends against the police officers statement. The petitioner said that she was
resting at home when policemen barged inside and asked her whether or not she knew a certain Ryan.
She replied in the negative. Afterwards, she was forcibly taken to the police station and was detained
there. During her detention, the police officers were claiming that there was shabu inside the wallet they
seized from her Esquillo argues that the arrest was invalid and that the officers planted evidence against
her.
The lower cause said that the officers had probable cause to search Esquillo under the stop-and-
frisk doctrine.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid

Held:
The issue whether the arrest was valid was waived by the petitioner when she did not quash it
before arraignment. The issue was only raised the first time during appeal on the appellate court.
The circumstances before the eventual arrest gave the police officers a reasonable belief
that a search on her was warranted. The police officer saw IN PLAIN VIEW that the petitioner was placing
a plastic sachet containing a white substance inside her cigarette case. Given the training of police
officers, they would likely be drawn to curiosity and approach her to inquire regarding such matter. The
petitioners reaction of attempting to flee after the police officer introduced his self gave more reason for
the officer to check the petitioner.
Warrantless searches are valid in these situations: a) consented searches, b) searches incident
to a lawful arrest, c) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, custom and drug laws, d)
searches of moving vehicles, e) searches of automobiles at borders, f) the prohibited articles are in plain
view, g.) searches of buildings to enforce fire, sanitary and other regulations, h.) stop and frisk situations
On regards her arrest, when the officer saw the white substance from a distance, the plain view
doctrine was imposed. When searched the officers followed the definition and requirements of a valid
stop-and-frisk as stated in People v. Chua - that he should properly introduce himself and make initial
inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to
check the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons.

Motion to Quash
Bobiles
G.R. No. 158467 October 16, 2009
SPOUSES JOEL AND MARIETTA MARIMLA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. OMAR T. VIOLA, RTC Judge, Branch 57, Angeles
City, Respondents.
Searches and Seizure; A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC; Hierarchy of Courts; The general rule is that a party
is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts, but, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling
reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed

217
directly before it, such as one involving the application of the rules promulgated by this Court in
the exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution.
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional
cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take
cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. In this case, the Court opts to take cognizance of the
petition, as it involves the application of the rules promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-
making power under the Constitution.
At the heart of the present controversy are A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, Clarifying the Guidelines on the
Application for the Enforceability of Search Warrants, which was enacted on January 25, 2000; and A.M.
No. 00-5-03-SC, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000,
specifically, Section 2, Rule 126 thereof.
Same; Same; A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of
the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search
warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling , dangerous drugs and illegal possession of
firearms on application filed by the Philippine National Police (PNP), National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF), and Reaction
Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF).

From the above, it may be seen that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice
Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants
involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on
application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF. On the other hand, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the application for search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any
court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b) for compelling reasons, any court
within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is
known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

Same; Same; Administrative Law; Nothing in A.M. No. 99-09-SC prohibits the heads of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF), and Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF)
from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search warrant to their
assistant heads.

Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF from
delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search warrant to their assistant heads.
Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or other
subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties as may be specified by their superior or head, as
long as it is not inconsistent with law. The said provision reads:

Chapter 6 POWERS AND DUTIES OF HEADS OF BUREAUS AND OFFICES

Sec. 31. Duties of Assistant Heads and Subordinates. (1) Assistant heads and other subordinates in
every bureau or office shall perform such duties as may be required by law or regulations, or as may be
specified by their superiors not otherwise inconsistent with law.

(2) The head of bureau or office may, in the interest of economy, designate the assistant head to
act as chief of any division or unit within the organization, in addition to his duties, without
additional compensation, and

218
 (3) In the absence of special restriction prescribed by law, nothing shall prevent a subordinate
officer or employee from being assigned additional duties by proper authority, when not
inconsistent with the performance of the duties imposed by law.

Same; Same; The guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled
Guidelines on their Selection and Designation of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers,
Prerogatives and Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in
special criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) of Manila and Quezon City shall be an
exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners also assert that the questioned Search Warrant was void ab initio. They maintain that A.M. No.
99-10-09-SC, which was enacted on January 25, 2000, was no longer in effect when the application for
search warrant was filed on February 15, 2002. They argue that the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, should have been applied, being the later law.
Hence, the enforcement of the search warrant in Angeles City, which was outside the territorial
jurisdiction of RTC Manila, was in violation of the law.

The petitioners contention lacks merit.

A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants provided
therein shall continue until further orders from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC
are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive
Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in
the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall be
an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court

Facts
Special Investigator (SI) Ray C. Lagasca of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division filed two (2)
applications for search warrant with the RTC of Manila seeking permission to search: (1) petitioners
house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City and (2) the premises on Maria Aquino
St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga, both for Violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended. The said applications uniformly alleged that SI Lagascas request for
the issuance of the search warrants was founded on his personal knowledge as well as that of witness
Roland D. Fernandez (Fernandez), obtained after a series of surveillance operations and a test buy made
at petitioners house.
Executive Judge Mario Guaria III (Judge Guaria III) examined in writing and under oath SI Lagasca and
Fernandez, in the form of searching questions and answers, and found that based on facts personally
known to SI Lagasca and Fernandez, petitioners had in their possession and control, inside their house
located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City, an undetermined amount of as shabu and
marijuana. Pursuant these findings, Judge Guaria III issued a search warrant.
On the strength of this warrant, members of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division with SI Lagascain
coordination with the Philippine National Police of Angeles City, searched petitioners house. Therein,
they were able to seize, among others, dried marijuana leaves.
An Information for Violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, was
filed against petitioners before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 57. Subsequently, petitioners filed a
Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized arguing, among others, that
(1) the application for search warrant was filed outside the territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the

219
court where the alleged crime was committed; (2) the court which issued the questioned search warrant
committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the same because under the law it cannot issue a
search warrant outside its territorial jurisdiction; (3) the evidence illegally seized by virtue of the
questioned search warrant is therefore inadmissible in evidence.
In its Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Quash, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Angeles City claims
that the questioned search warrant does not fall within the coverage of Sec. 2 of Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, but under A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, which authorizes the Executive Judges
and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search
warrants involving dangerous drugs, among others, filed by the NBI, and provides that said warrants may
be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City.
The motion to quash by petitioners was denied by the RTC Angeles. Petitioners then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was likewise denied.
Petitioners claiming that the search warrant was issued in violation of A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC and Section
2 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure filed this petition.
Issue
Whether or not the Executive Judges and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City
in all applications for search warrants involving dangerous drugs, among others, filed by the NBI, and
issue warrants to be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction, such as in Angeles City, of the
RTCs of Manila and Quezon City.
Held
At the heart of the present controversy are A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, Clarifying the Guidelines on the
Application for the Enforceability of Search Warrants, which was enacted on January 25, 2000; and A.M.
No. 00-5-03-SC, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000,
specifically, Section 2, Rule 126 thereof. We quote the pertinent portions of the two issuances below:
Administrative Matter No. 99-10-09-SC
Resolution Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application for the Enforceability of Search Warrants
In the interest of an effective administration of justice and pursuant to the powers vested in the
Supreme Court by the Constitution, the following are authorized to act on all applications for
search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal
possession of firearms.
The Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Manila and Quezon
City filed by the Philippine National Police (PNP), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) and the Reaction Against Crime
Task Force (REACT-TF) with the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City.
The applications shall be personally endorsed by the Heads of the said agencies, for the
search of places to be particularly described therein, and the seizure of property of things as
prescribed in the Rules of Court, and to issue the warrants of arrest, if justified, which may be
served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of said courts.
xxx
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
Rule 126
SEARCH AND SEIZURE

220
 Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search
warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or
any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in
the court where the criminal action is pending.
From the above, it may be seen that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice
Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants
involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on
application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF. On the other hand, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the application for search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any
court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b) for compelling reasons, any court
within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is
known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
Petitioners also assert that the questioned Search Warrant was void ab initio. They maintain that A.M. No.
99-10-09-SC, which was enacted on January 25, 2000, was no longer in effect when the application for
search warrant was filed on February 15, 2002. They argue that the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, should have been applied, being the later law.
Hence, the enforcement of the search warrant in Angeles City, which was outside the territorial
jurisdiction of RTC Manila, was in violation of the law.
The petitioners contention lacks merit.
A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants provided
therein shall continue until further orders from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC
are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive
Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in
the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall be
an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Chapter V. Specific Powers, Prerogatives and Duties of Executive Judges in Judicial Supervision
Sec. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts
of Manila and Quezon City. The Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official
leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of
the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-
Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling,
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering
Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may
hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court.
The applications shall be personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies and shall
particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be
seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive

221
 Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.
The Executive Judges and the authorized Judges shall keep a special docket book listing
names of Judges to whom the applications are assigned, the details of the applications and
the results of the searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued.
This Section shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
In sum, we cannot find any irregularity or abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Omar T. Viola for
denying petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized. On the
contrary, Judge Guaria III had complied with the procedural and substantive requirements for issuing the
questioned search warrant.

Motion to Quash
Alim
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERRY PUNZALAN AND PATRICIA PUNZALAN
G.R. No. 199087 | November 11, 2015 | THIRD DIVISION | VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC clearly authorizes the Executive Judges and Vice
Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and Quezon City to issue warrants to be
served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction in special criminal cases such as those involving
heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as in this case, for as long as the parameters under
the said section have been complied with. We find no merit in accused-appellants claim that the RTC of
Manila, Branch 17, had no authority to issue assailed search warrant since the place to be searched is
outside territorial jurisdiction. As aforecited, Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC clearly
authorizes the Executive Judges and the Vice Executive Judges of the RTC Manila and Quezon City to
issue search warrants to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction in special criminal cases
such as those involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions
as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as in this case, for as long as
the parameters under the said section have been complied with.
There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in the issuance of search warrants. It is a
matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial function.
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires such facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place to be searched. There is no exact test for the determination
of probable cause in the issuance of search warrants. It is a process of exercising their judicial function.
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the
finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts.
FACTS
Intelligence Agent 1 Liwanag Sandaan (IA1 Sandaan) and her team implemented a search warrant
issued by then Manila RTC Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. to (i) make an immediate search of the
premises/house of Jerry and Patricia Punzalan, Vima Punzalan, Jaime Punzalan, Arlene Punzalan-Razon
and Felix Razon who are all residents of 704 Apelo Cruz Compound, Barangay 175, Malibay, Pasay City;
and (ii) to seize and take possession of an undetermined quantity of assorted dangerous drugs, including
the proceeds or fruits and bring said property to the court.

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Since there are three houses or structures inside the compound believed to be occupied by Jerry and
Patricia Punzalan, a sketch of the compound describing the house to be searched was prepared and
attached to the search warrant.
The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Team tasked to conduct the search was composed of
IA1 Sandaan as team leader, SI2 Esteban and IO2 Jessica Alvarado (IO2 Alvarado) as arresting officers
and IO1 Pagaragan as seizing officer. IO1 Pagaragan made lateral coordination with the Southern Police
District, Tactical Operations Unit, as evidenced by the Pre-Operation Report dated November 3, 2009
and Authority to Operate.
Before proceeding to the target area, they passed by the barangay hall to coordinate with Barangay
Chairman Reynaldo Flores, Kagawad Larry Fabella and Kagawad Edwin Razon. The team likewise
brought with them a media representative affiliated with "Sunshine Radio" to cover the operation. From
the barangay hall, they walked toward the target place using as a guide the sketch they prepared.
When they were already outside the house of the Punzalans, which is a three-storey structure, IA1
Sandaan knocked on the door. A woman, later identified as Patricia Punzalan, slightly opened the door.
When they introduced themselves as PDEA agents and informed the occupant that they have a search
warrant, Patricia immediately tried to close the door but was not successful since the PDEA agents
pushed the door open. The team was able to enter the house of Jerry and Patricia Punzalan who were
both surprised when found inside the house. IO1 Pagaragan showed and read the search warrant infront
of the Punzalans.
Inside the house, the team immediately saw plastic sachets placed on top of the table. I01 Pagaragan
was able to seize nine (9) heat-sealed plastic sachets, two (2) square-shaped transparent plastic
containers and a small round plastic container. All three (3) plastic containers contained smaller heat-
sealed plastic sachets of white crystalline substance of suspected shabu. There were also other
paraphernalia, guns, money and a digital weighing scale. Accordingly, SI2 Esteban and IO2 Alvarado
effected the arrest of accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan after informing them of their
constitutional rights. I01 Pagaragan immediately marked the seized items by placing the marking "ADP".
After searching and marking the evidence found on the first floor, the team, together with the barangay
officials and accused-appellants, proceeded to, and conducted the search on the second and third floors
but found nothing. They went downstairs where they conducted the inventory of recovered items. I01
Pagaragan prepared the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized and a Certification of Orderly Search which
were later signed by the barangay officials.
After their arrest, the Punzalans were brought to the PDEA Office in Quezon City for investigation. IO1
Pagaragan presented the seized evidence to Atty. Benjamin Gaspe, who prepared the Booking Sheet
and Arrest Report, Request for Drug Test/Physical and Medical Examination. They likewise caused the
preparation of their respective affidavits. Photographs were also taken during the actual search and
inventory. Laboratory examination of the seized pieces of drug evidence gave positive results for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous drug.
Thereafter, the Punzalans were charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for illegal
possession of 40.78 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous
drug.
The trial court convicted the Punzalans. The trial court held that the issuance of a search warrant against
the premises of different persons named therein is valid as there is no requirement that only one search
warrant for one premise to be searched is necessary for its validity. Also, the address of the Punzalans
was clearly and adequately described. A sketch that specifically identifies the places to be searched was
attached to the records and such description of the place was unquestionably accurate that the PDEA

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agents were led to, and were able to successfully conduct their operation in the premises described in the
search warrant.
The trial court also ruled that the implementation of the search warrant sufficiently complied with the
requirements of the law. Despite the Punzalans' assertion that they were arrested outside their house and
were made to board a van parked along the street beside the river and were not allowed by the PDEA
agents to witness the search conducted inside the house, the trial court was convinced that the
Punzalans were in fact inside their house and were physically present during the conduct of the search.
In its findings, the trial court observed that there were actually two phases of the search done in the
Punzalan house. The first or initial search was done at the ground floor of the house, immediately after
the PDEA agents gained entry and was beyond doubt made in the presence of both accused. This is
where the bulk of illegal drugs were found, confiscated and consequently marked. The trial court further
stated that it is of no moment that the barangay officials were not able to witness the said initial search
and their failure to arrive on time to witness the first or initial search at the ground floor of the Punzalan
house, or even their total absence thereat, will not render the subject search invalid and unlawful
inasmuch as their presence is not required. The trial court held that the prosecution successfully and
sufficiently established that the two accused were present during the initial search, thus, satisfying the
requirement of a lawful and valid search.
The second phase of the search was conducted at the upper floors of the house after the markings on the
293 sachets of confiscated specimens were completed by I01 Pagaragan. This was witnessed and
participated in by the barangay officials. Finally, after the search of the entire house was concluded, it is
not disputed that an inventory of all the items seized was conducted by I01 Pagaragan in compliance with
the provisions of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In fact, it was admitted by the barangay officials
that they were requested to wait for the DOJ representative, to which they willingly acceded.
The Punzalans filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the Punzalans. The CA held that there was a valid search
and seizure conducted and the seized items are admissible in evidence. The prosecution was able to
prove all the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the search warrant and the subsequent search were valid
HELD
Yes, the search warrant and the subsequent search were valid.
Valid search warrant
A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, entitled "Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and
Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties" as approved by the Court in its Resolution of January 27,
2004, as amended, provides:
SEC. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTC of Manila and
Quezon City. - The Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are
not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and
Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF),
for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and

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 ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code,
as amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included
herein by the Supreme Court.
The applications shall be endorsed by the heads of such agencies or their respective duly authorized
officials and shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to
be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges
concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the said courts.
The search warrant issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 17 satisfactorily complies with the requirements
for the issuance thereof as determined by the issuing court, thus:
Pursuant to Section 2, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution, Sections 2 to 5, Rule 126 of the 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure, modified by Section 12 of Supreme Court En Banc Resolution in
A.M. No. 03-08-02-SC dated January 27, 2004, and Certification dated October 28, 2009, it
appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after personally examining under oath Agent
Liwanag B. Sandaan and Agent Derween Reed both of Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
Metro Manila Regional Office, that there is probable cause, there are good and sufficient reasons,
to believe that undetermined quantity of assorted dangerous drugs, particularly shabu, including
the proceeds or fruits and those used or intended to be used by the respondents as a means of
committing the offense, you are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in
the day or night of the premises above described and forthwith seize and take possession of the
undetermined quantity of assorted dangerous drugs including the proceeds and fruits and bring
said property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
As aforecited, Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC clearly authorizes the Executive Judges and
the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTC of Manila and Quezon City to issue search warrants to be served
in places outside their territorial jurisdiction in special criminal cases such as those involving heinous
crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as in this case, for as long as the parameters under the
said section have been complied with.
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires such facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in
connection with that offense are in the place to be searched. There is no exact test for the determination
of probable cause in the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of
trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial function. When a finding of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts.
Valid search
Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses. - No
search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the
lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses
of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
As correctly ruled by the CA, even if the barangay officials were not present during the initial search, the
search was witnessed by the Punzalans themselves, hence, the search was valid since the rule that "two

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witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality" must be present applies only in
the absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family.

RULE 127 PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

1. Relate to Rules 57-61
2. What provisional remedies are not applicable in criminal cases
3. Is petition for relief from judgment available in criminal cases? Yes, according to Hilario vs. People, 551
SCRA 191, April 14, 2008

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