GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, vs CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and DR.

MANUEL
BARADERO, respondents.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and MATILDE S. BELO, respondents.

Dr. Manuel Baradero was a government employee, who occupied the position of Medical Officer IV in the Philippine
Medical Care Commission, until he reached the mandatory age of retirement of 65 years old.

He served the Philippine Army as an enlisted man from November 17, 1942 until June 30, 1945. He resumed his
government career on January 1, 1976, when he was elected a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
La Castellana, Negros Occidental. As such, he received per diem for every session attended. He resigned from the
Sangguniang Bayan on October 10, 1976. On October 20, 1978, he was appointed Medical Officer I at the Philippine
Medical Care Commission, where he served until he reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years old

Prior to turning 65 years old, Dr. Baradero applied for compulsory retirement with petitioner, which credited in his favor 13
years of government service, excluding his term as a Sangguniang Bayan member. He requested an extension of service
from the CSC to enable him to complete 15 years of government service. This was necessary so that he may avail of
retirement benefits.

The request was denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 90-642 dated July 16, 1990. Instead, it ruled that Dr. Baradero's
two-year stint as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan be considered as creditable service, hence completing the
mandatory 15-year service and making him eligible for retirement The GSIS contested the resolution, alleging that:

(1) Per diem was expressly excluded in the definition of compensation in RA 1573 on June 16, 1956.
Prior to this, services paid on per diem basis were considered creditable.

(2) Per diems were excluded from the definition of compensation because " per diems, by themselves are
usually of minimal amounts which cannot actually support an insurance coverage" (Office of the General
Counsel Opinion 08-85, June 3, 1985). It had been maintained that "salary is essential to insurance in the
System, as it serves as the basis for the determination of the monthly premiums or contributions"
(Government Corporate Counsel Opinion No. 198, s. 1957).

The GSIS advised that the CSC extend the services of Dr. Baradero until he completes the required 15 years so that he
may avail of retirement benefits.

On September 20, 1990, the CSC issued an order directing the GSIS to implement Resolution No. 90-642 (Rollo, p. 35).

The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration of the order (Rollo, p. 37), which was denied by the CSC in its Resolution No.
91-526 dated April 23, 1991. Hence, this petition where the GSIS charges the CSC with grave abuse of discretion in ruling
that: (1) services rendered on a per diem basis is creditable for purposes of retirement; and (2) it has exclusive jurisdiction
in the determination of services which are creditable.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment," which submitted its position that
the law expressly excludes services rendered on per diem basis in determining creditable government service for
retirement purposes.

The Solicitor General is of the opinion that the CSC's resolutions and order crediting such services were in violation of the
law, and encroached on the power of the GSIS to administer and implement retirement laws. He therefore recommended
that the instant petition be given due course (Rollo, p. 100).

G.R. No. 102449

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, to reverse and set aside three orders of the
CSC, namely: (1) the Resolution dated June 7, 1989, which resolved as creditable for retirement purposes the services
rendered by respondent Matilde S. Belo, who served as Vice-Governor of Capiz in a hold-over capacity from December
31, 1976 to January 1, 1979; (2) the Order dated July 18, 1991 directing the President and General Manager of petitioner
to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for the delay in the implementation of CSC Resolution No. 89-
368; and (3) the Order dated October 3, 1991, finding the President and General Manager of petitioner guilty of indirect
contempt with penalty of a fine of P1,000.00 per day of defiance until the implementation of CSC Resolution
No. 89-368.

Matilde Belo retired from the government service on February 2, 1988. At the time of her retirement, Belo was the Vice-
Governor of Capiz in a
hold-over capacity. She served as Governor of Capiz from January 25, 1972 until February 1, 1988.

As an elected government official, Belo received a fixed salary of P13,000.00 per annum from January 25, 1976 until
December 31, 1976. Thereafter, she held the same position in a hold-over capacity and was remunerated as follows: (1)
from December 31, 1976 until January 1, 1979, she received per diem for every session attended of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan; and (2) from December 31, 1979 until February 1, 1988, she received a fixed salary ranging from
P23,000.00 to P45,000.00 per annum (Rollo, p. 25).

Belo sought an opinion from the CSC to determine if the services she rendered from December 31, 1976 until January 1,
1979, in which period she was paid on a per diem basis, is creditable for retirement purposes.

In response to the query, the CSC issued Resolution No. 89-368 dated June 7, 1987, which affirmed that her services for
said period was creditable (Rollo, pp. 25-26).

Belo's application for retirement was referred to the GSIS Committee on Claims, which adopted a position contrary to that
of the CSC.

On October 3, 1991, the CSC issued an order finding the President and General Manager of GSIS guilty of indirect
contempt. Both were meted a penalty of P1,000.00 fine for each day of defiance until the implementation of Resolution
No. 89-368. The CSC noted that the mere pendency of the case of Dr. Baradero cannot prevent the implementation of its
resolution unless this Court issues a temporary restraining order, and that said case had nothing to do with the case of
Belo (Rollo, p. 34).

The GSIS filed the instant petition, charging the CSC with committing the same errors in G.R. No. 98395.

She likewise contended that Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) vests in the CSC jurisdiction over
matters regarding
the accreditation of government services. She particularly cites Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V thereof which enumerates
the powers and functions of the CSC, among which is to:

xxx xxx xxx

17. Administer the retirement program for government employees and accredit government services and
evaluate qualifications for retirement (Emphasis supplied);

xxx xxx xxx

II

The issues to be resolved are: (1) Is government service rendered on a per diem basis creditable for computing the length
of service for retirement purposes; and (2) Is petitioner the proper government agency in determining what service is
creditable for retirement purposes?

Section 35 of P.D. No. 1146 (Government Service Insurance Act of 1987) vests in petitioner the power to implement the
provisions of said law, which includes the guaranty of retirement benefits.

Under the epigraph "Benefits," Section 10 thereof provides for the computation of service, and reads:

xxx xxx xxx

Computation of Service.
 For the purpose of this section, the term service shall include full time service with
compensation: Provided, That part-time and other services with compensation may be included under
such rules and regulations prescribed by the System (Emphasis supplied).

It is therefore material in the claim of retirement benefits that the employee should have rendered service with
compensation.

"Compensation" is defined by Section 1(c) of R.A. No. 1573, which amended Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186 (Government
Service Insurance Act), thus:

(c) "Salary, pay, or compensation" shall be construed as to exclude all bonuses, per diems, allowances
and overtime pay, or salary, pay or compensation given in addition to the base pay of the position or rank
as fixed by law or regulations (Emphasis supplied).

A similar definition is provided in Section 2(i) of P.D. No. 1146:

(i) Compensation the basic pay or salary received by an employee, pursuant to his
employment/appointments, excluding per diems, bonuses, overtime pay, and allowances (Emphasis
supplied).

The law is very clear in its intent to exclude per diem in the definition of "compensation." Originally, per diem was not
among those excluded in the definition of compensation (See Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186), not until the passage of the
amending laws which redefined it to exclude per

CENA CASE

Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metropolitan Manila, on 16 July 1987. He
reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years on 22 January 1991. By the latter date, his government
service would have reached a total of eleven (11) years, nine (9) months and six (6) days. Before reaching his 65th
birthday, Cena requested the Secretary of Justice, through the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority ("LRA")
that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the fifteen-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the
full benefit of an Old-Age Pension under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. If Cena's request were granted, he would
complete fifteen (15) years of government service on 15 April 1994, at the age of sixty-eight (68) years.

The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the Civil Service Commission on whether or not Cena's request could be
granted considering that Cena was covered by Civil Service Memorandum No. 27, Series of 1990. On 17 October 1990,
the Commission allowed Cena a one (1) year extension of his service from 22 January 1991 to 22 January 1992 under its
Memorandum Circular No. 27. Dissatisfied, Cena moved for reconsideration, without success. He then came to this Court,
claiming that he was entitled to an extension of three (3) years, three (3) months and twenty-four (24) days to complete
the fifteen-year service requirement for retirement with full benefits under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146.

This Court granted Cena' s petition in its Decision of 3 July 1992. Speaking through Mr. Justice Medialdea, the Court held
that a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but at the same
time has not yet completed fifteen (15) years of government service required under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 to
qualify for the Old-Age Pension Benefit, may be granted an extension of his government service for such period of time as
may be necessary to "fill up" or comply with the fifteen (15)-year service requirement. The Court also held that the
authority to grant the extension was a discretionary one vested in the head of the agency concerned. Thus the Court
concluded:

Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) and Department of
Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6
days of government to complete the fifteen-year service so that he may retire with full benefits under
Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146.13 (Emphases supplied)

The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and ordinary meaning" of Section 11 (b) of
P.D. No. 1146. Section 11 may be quoted in its entirety:

Sec. 11 Conditions for Old-Age Pension. (a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid to a member who
 (1) has at least fifteen (15) years of service;

(2) is at least sixty (60) years of age; and

(3) is separated from the service.

(b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an
employee at sixty-five-(65) years of age with at least fifteen (15) years of service; Provided, that if he has
less than fifteen (15) years of service, he shall he allowed to continue in the service to completed the
fifteen (15) years. (Emphases supplied)

The Court went on to rely upon the canon of liberal construction which has often been invoked in respect of retirement
statutes:

Being remedial in character, a statute granting a pension or establishing [a] retirement plan should be
liberally construed and administered in favor of persons intended to be benefitted thereby. The liberal
approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security and well-
being of government employees may be enhanced.14 (Citations omitted)

While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there were (and still are) two (2) administrative
issuances which prescribe limitations on the extension of service that may be granted to an employee who has reached
sixty-five (65) years of age.

DIONISIO M. RABOR, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. He entered the government service
as a Utility worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years.

Sometime in May 1991,1 Alma, D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City, advised Dionisio M.
Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had already reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7)
months, with thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of government service. Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a
"Certificate of Membership"2 issued by the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May 1988. At
the bottom of this "Certificate of Membership" is a typewritten statement of the following tenor: "Service extended to
comply 15 years service reqts." This statement is followed by a non-legible initial with the following date "2/28/91."

Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to the Regional Director of the Civil Service
Commission, Region XI, Davao City ("CSRO-XI"), informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice "as to what
action [should] be taken on this matter."

In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised Davao City Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte as
follows:

Please be informed that the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is contrary to M.C. No. 65 of the Office of
the President, the relevant portion of which is hereunder quoted:

Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years
shall not be retained the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case
the retention shall not exceed six (6) months.

IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that the services of Mr. Dominador [M.] Rabor as Utility
Worker in that office, is already non-extend[i]ble.3

Accordingly, on 8 August l991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of the 26 July 1991 letter of Director Cawad to Rabor and
advised him "to stop reporting for work effective August 16, 1991."4
Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, CSRO-XI, a letter dated 14 August 1991, asking for extension of his
services in the City Government until he "shall have completed the fifteen (15) years service [requirement] in the
Government so that [he] could also avail of the benefits of the retirement laws given to employees of the Government."
The extension he was asking for was about two (2) years. Asserting that he was "still in good health and very able to
perform the duties and functions of [his] position as Utility Worker," Rabor sought "extension of [his] service as an
exception to Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President."5 This request was denied by Director Cawad on
15 August 1991.

Petitioner Rabor next wrote to the Office of the President on 29 January 1992 seeking reconsideration of the decision of
Director Cawad, CSRO-XI. The Office of the President referred Mr. Rabor's letter to the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission on 5 March 1992.

In its Resolution No. 92-594, dated 28 April 1992, the Civil Service Commission dismissed the appeal of Mr. Rabor and
affirmed the action of Director Cawad embodied in the latter's letter of 26 July 1991. This Resolution stated in part:

In his appeal, Rabor requested that he be allowed to continue rendering services as Utility Worker in
order to complete the fifteen (15) year service requirement under P.D. 1146.

CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990 provides, in part:

1. Any request for extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen
years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees
in the career service who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) and shall be granted for a period of not exceeding one (1) year.

Considering that as early as October 18, 1988, Rabor was already due for retirement, his request for
further extension of service cannot be given due course.6 (Emphasis in the original)

On 28 October 1992, Mr. Rabor sought reconsideration of Resolution No. 92-594 of the Civil Service Commission this
time invoking the Decision of this Court in Cena v. Civil Service Commission.7 Petitioner also asked for reinstatement with
back salaries and benefits, having been separated from the government service effective 16 August 1991. Rabor's motion
for reconsideration was denied by the Commission.

Petitioner Rabor sent another letter dated 16 April 1993 to the Office of the Mayor, Davao City, again requesting that he
be allowed to continue rendering service to the Davao City Government as Utility Worker in order to complete the fifteen
(15) years service requirement under P.D. No. 1146. This request was once more denied by Mayor Duterte in a letter to
petitioner dated 19 May 1993. In this letter, Mayor Duterte pointed out that, under Cena grant of the extension of service
was discretionary on the part of the City Mayor, but that he could not grant the extension requested. Mayor Duterte's
letter, in relevant part, read:

The matter was referred to the City Legal Office and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, in the
advent of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Cena vs. CSC, et al. (G.R. No. 97419 dated July 3,
1992), for legal opinion. Both the City Legal Officer and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission are
one in these opinion that extending you an appointment in order that you may be able to complete the
fifteen-year service requirement is discretionary [on the part of] the City Mayor.

Much as we desire to extend you an appointment but circumstances are that we can no longer do so. As
you are already nearing your 70th birthday may no longer be able to perform the duties attached to your
position. Moreover, the position you had vacated was already filled up.

We therefore regret to inform you that we cannot act favorably on your request.8 (Emphases supplied)

At this point, Mr. Rabor decided to come to this Court. He filed a Letter/Petition dated 6 July 1993 appealing from Civil
Service Resolution No. 92-594 and from Mayor Duterte's letter of 10 May 1993.

The Court required petitioner Rabor to comply with the formal requirements for instituting a special civil action
of certiorari to review the assailed Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. In turn, the Commission was required to
comment on petitioner's Letter/Petition.9 The Court subsequently noted petitioner's Letter of 13 September 1993 relating
to compliance with the mentioned formal requirements and directed the Clerk of Court to advise petitioner to engage the
services of counsel or to ask for legal assistance from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). 10

The Civil Service Commission, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its comment on 16 November 1993. The
Court then resolved to give due course to the Petition and required the parties to file memoranda. Both the Commission
and Mr. Rabor (the latter through PAO counsel) did so.

In this proceeding, petitioner Rabor contends that his claim falls squarely within the ruling of this Court in Cena v. Civil
Service Commission. 11

Upon the other hand, the Commission seeks to distinguish this case from Cena. The Commission, through the Solicitor
General, stressed that in Cena, this Court had ruled that the employer agency, the Land Registration Authority of the
Department of Justice, was vested with discretion to grant to Cena the extension requested by him. The Land Registration
Authority had chosen not to exercise its discretion to grant or deny such extension. In contrast, in the instant case, the
Davao City Government did exercise its discretion on the matter and decided to deny the extension sought by petitioner
Rabor for legitimate reasons.

While the Cena decision is barely three (3) years old, the Court considers that it must reexamine the doctrine of Cena and
the theoretical and policy underpinnings thereof. 12

We start by recalling the factual setting of Cena.

Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metropolitan Manila, on 16 July 1987. He
reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years on 22 January 1991. By the latter date, his government
service would have reached a total of eleven (11) years, nine (9) months and six (6) days. Before reaching his 65th
birthday, Cena requested the Secretary of Justice, through the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority ("LRA")
that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the fifteen-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the
full benefit of an Old-Age Pension under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. If Cena's request were granted, he would
complete fifteen (15) years of government service on 15 April 1994, at the age of sixty-eight (68) years.

The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the Civil Service Commission on whether or not Cena's request could be
granted considering that Cena was covered by Civil Service Memorandum No. 27, Series of 1990. On 17 October 1990,
the Commission allowed Cena a one (1) year extension of his service from 22 January 1991 to 22 January 1992 under its
Memorandum Circular No. 27. Dissatisfied, Cena moved for reconsideration, without success. He then came to this Court,
claiming that he was entitled to an extension of three (3) years, three (3) months and twenty-four (24) days to complete
the fifteen-year service requirement for retirement with full benefits under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146.

This Court granted Cena' s petition in its Decision of 3 July 1992. Speaking through Mr. Justice Medialdea, the Court held
that a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but at the same
time has not yet completed fifteen (15) years of government service required under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 to
qualify for the Old-Age Pension Benefit, may be granted an extension of his government service for such period of time as
may be necessary to "fill up" or comply with the fifteen (15)-year service requirement. The Court also held that the
authority to grant the extension was a discretionary one vested in the head of the agency concerned. Thus the Court
concluded:

Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) and Department of
Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6
days of government to complete the fifteen-year service so that he may retire with full benefits under
Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146.13 (Emphases supplied)

The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and ordinary meaning" of Section 11 (b) of
P.D. No. 1146. Section 11 may be quoted in its entirety:

Sec. 11 Conditions for Old-Age Pension. (a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid to a member who

(1) has at least fifteen (15) years of service;

(2) is at least sixty (60) years of age; and

 (3) is separated from the service.

(b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an
employee at sixty-five-(65) years of age with at least fifteen (15) years of service; Provided, that if he has
less than fifteen (15) years of service, he shall he allowed to continue in the service to completed the
fifteen (15) years. (Emphases supplied)

The Court went on to rely upon the canon of liberal construction which has often been invoked in respect of retirement
statutes:

Being remedial in character, a statute granting a pension or establishing [a] retirement plan should be
liberally construed and administered in favor of persons intended to be benefitted thereby. The liberal
approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security and well-
being of government employees may be enhanced.14 (Citations omitted)

While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there were (and still are) two (2) administrative
issuances which prescribe limitations on the extension of service that may be granted to an employee who has reached
sixty-five (65) years of age.

The first administrative issuance is Civil Service Commission Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, which should be quoted in
its entirety:

TO : ALL HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS AND AGENCIES OF THE NATIONAL/LOCAL

GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING GOVERNMENT- OWNED AND/OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS.

SUBJECT : Extension of Service of Compulsory Retiree to Complete the Fifteen Years Service
Requirement for Retirement Purposes.

Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 90-454 dated May 21, 1990, the Civil Service Commission hereby
adopts and promulgates the following policies and guidelines in the extension of services of compulsory
retirees to complete the fifteen years service requirement for retirement purposes:

1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen
(15) years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanent
appointees in the career service who are regular members of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period not exceeding one (1) year.

2. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retiree to complete the fifteen
(15) years service requirement for retirement who entered the government service at 57
years of age or over upon prior grant of authority to appoint him or her, shall no longer be
granted.

3. Any request for the extension of service to complete the fifteen (15) years service
requirement of retirement shall be filled not later than three (3) years prior to the date of
compulsory retirement.

4. Any request for the extension of service of a compulsory retiree who meets the
minimum number of years of service for retirement purposes may be granted for six (6)
months only with no further extension.

This Memorandum Circular shall take effect immediately. (Emphases supplied)

The second administrative issuance Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President, dated 14 June 1988
provides:

xxx xxx xxx

 WHEREAS, this Office has been. receiving requests for reinstatement and/or retention in the service
of employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, despite the strict conditions
provided for in Memorandum Circular No. 163, dated March 5, 1968, as amended.

WHEREAS, the President has recently adopted a policy to adhere more strictly to the law providing for
compulsory retirement age of 65 years and, in extremely meritorious cases, to limit the service beyond
the age of 65 years to six (6) months only.

WHEREFORE, the pertinent provision of Memorandum Circular No. 163 or on the retention in the service
of officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, is hereby
amended to read as follows:

Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65

years shall not be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in
which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months.

All heads of departments, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities of the government including government-
owned or controlled corporations, are hereby enjoined to require their respective offices to strictly comply
with this circular.

This Circular shall take effect immediately.

By authority of the
President

(Sgd.)

CATALINO
MACARAIG, JR.
Executive Secretary

Manila, June 14, 1988.15 (Emphasis supplied)

Medialdea, J. resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2) administrative regulations by, firstly, considering
as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No. 27 and, secondly, by interpreting the Office of the President's Memorandum
Circular No. 65 as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena.

We turn first to the Civil Service Commission's Memorandum Circular No. 27. Medialdea, J. wrote:

The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an administrative
regulation, must be governed by the principle that administrative regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for
the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166,
October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30,
1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660;
Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). . . . . The rule on limiting to one the year
the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65)
years, but has less than fifteen (15) years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, S.
1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relationship or connection with any provision
of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not
merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply perceived
omissions in P.D. 1146. 16 (Emphasis supplied)

It will be seen that Cena, in striking down Civil Service Commission Memorandum No. 27, took a very narrow view on the
question of what subordinate rule-making by an administrative agency is permissible and valid. That restrictive view must
be contrasted with this Court's earlier ruling in People v. Exconde, 17 where Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes said:

It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that
corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate authority and
 promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the
reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is
that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to standards that the law prescribes.18 (Emphasis supplied)

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 19 the Court, in sustaining the validity of a MECS Order which established passing a uniform
admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as a prerequisite for eligibility for admission into
medical schools in the Philippines, said:

The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative
agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by
then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970])

The standards may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The Standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically.
It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the
Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained in Calalang v. William is "safe transit upon the roads."

We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act:
"the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the
body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the non-delegation principle.20 (Citations omitted; emphasis partly in the original and
partly supplied)

In Edu v. Ericta, 21 then Mr. Justice Fernando stressed the abstract and very general nature of the standards which our
Court has in prior case law upheld as sufficient for purposes of compliance with the requirements for validity of
subordinate or administrative rule-making:

This Court has considered as sufficient standards, "public welfare," (Municipality of Cardona v.
Municipality of Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547 [1917]); "necessary in the interest of law and order," (Rubi v.
Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 [1919]); "public interest," (People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 [1939]);
and "justice and equity and substantial merits of the case," (International Hardwood v. Pangil Federation
of Labor, 17 Phil. 602 [1940]). 22 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail in the statute to be implemented, went
against prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing or enabling statute is quite detailed and specific to begin
with, there would be very little need (or occasion) for implementing administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the
inability of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in respect of any relatively complex
subject matter, that makes subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative agencies so important and unavoidable.
All that may be reasonably; demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation consisting of administrative regulations
are germane to the general purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately
applied in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to this test we now turn.

We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined is the present Civil Service law found in
Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987 and not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." For
the matter of extension of service of retirees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that is covered by
both statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146. This is crystal clear from examination of many provisions of
the present civil service law.

Section 12 of the present Civil Service law set out in the 1987 Administrative Code provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Sec. 12 Powers and Functions. The [Civil Service] Commission shall have the following powers and
functions:

xxx xxx xxx

 (2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil
Service Law and other pertinent laws;

(3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and programsto
promote economical, efficient and effective personnel administration in the government;

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Formulate, administer and evaluate programs relative to the development and retention of aqualified
and competent work force in the public service;

xxx xxx xxx

(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil
Service including extension of service beyond retirement age;

xxx xxx xxx

(17) Administer the retirement program for government officials and employees, and accredit government
services and evaluate qualifications for retirement;

xxx xxx xxx

(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel agency and such other functions as
may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)

It was on the bases of the above quoted provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code that the Civil Service Commission
promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so, the Commission was acting as "the central personnel agency
of the government empowered to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective
personnel administration in the government." 23 It was also discharging its function of "administering the retirement
program for government officials and employees" and of "evaluat[ing] qualifications for retirement."

In addition, the Civil Service Commission is charged by the 1987 Administrative Code with providing leadership and
assistance "in the development and retention of qualified and efficient work force in the Civil Service" (Section 16 [10])
and with the "enforcement of the constitutional and statutory provisions, relative to retirement and the regulation for
the effective implementation of the retirement of government officials and employees" (Section 16 [14]).

We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached
sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present
Civil Service Law. The physiological and psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings are in fact
related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected from individual persons. The policy considerations
which guided the Civil Service Commission in limiting the maximum extension of service allowable for compulsory
retirees, were summarized by Grio-Aquino, J. in her dissenting opinion in Cena:

Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending the service of
compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the
government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age;
(2) delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for
employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various government
examination but must wait for jobs to be vacated by "extendees" who have long passed the mandatory
retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to complete 15 years so they may
qualify for old-age pension. 24 (Emphasis supplied).

Cena laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees or would be retirees, something that is, in itself, quite appropriate. At the
same time, however, we are bound to note that there should be countervailing stress on the interests of the employer
agency and of other government employees as a whole. The results flowing from the striking down of the limitation
established in Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 may well be "absurd and inequitable," as suggested by Mme.
Justice Grio-Aquino in her dissenting opinion. An employee who has rendered only three (3) years of government
service at age sixty-five (65) can have his service extended for twelve (12) years and finally retire at the age of seventy-
seven (77). This reduces the significance of the general principle of compulsory retirement at age sixty-five (65) very close
to the vanishing point.

The very real difficulties posed by the Cena doctrine for rational personnel administration and management in the Civil
Service, are aggravated when Cena is considered together with the case of Toledo v. Civil Service
Commission. 25 Toledo involved the provisions of Rule III, Section 22, of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and
Policies (CSRPAP) which prohibited the appointment of persons fifty-seven (57) years old or above in government service
without prior approval of the Civil Service Commission. Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1983 provided
that a person fifty-seven (57) years of age may be appointed to the Civil Service provided that the exigencies of the
government service so required and provided that the appointee possesses special qualifications not possessed by other
officers or employees in the Civil Service and that the vacancy cannot be filled by promotion of qualified officers or
employees of the Civil Service. Petitioner Toledo was appointed Manager of the Education and Information Division of the
Commission on Elections when he was almost fifty-nine (59) years old. No authority for such appointment had been
obtained either from the President of the Philippines or from the Civil Service Commission and the Commission found that
the other conditions laid down in Section 22 of Rule III, CSRPAP, did not exist. The Court nevertheless struck down
Section 22, Rule III on the same exceedingly restrictive view of permissible administrative legislation that Cena relied on.26

When one combines the doctrine of Toledo with the ruling in Cena, very strange results follow. Under these combined
doctrines, a person sixty-four (64) years of age may be appointed to the government service and one (1) year later may
demand extension of his service for the next fourteen (14) years; he would retire at age seventy-nine (79). The net effect
is thus that the general statutory policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-five (65) years is heavily eroded and effectively
becomes unenforceable. That general statutory policy may be seen to embody the notion that there should be a certain
minimum turn-over in the government service and that opportunities for government service should be distributed as
broadly as possible, specially to younger people, considering that the bulk of our population is below thirty (30) years of
age. That same general policy also reflects the life expectancy of our people which is still significantly lower than the life
expectancy of, e.g., people in Northern and Western Europe, North America and Japan.

Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent: that Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby declared valid and
effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We
reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the government agency concerned is vested with discretionary
authority to allow or disallow extension of the service of an official or employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of
age without completing fifteen (15) years of government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised
conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.

We do not believe it necessary to deal specifically with Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President dated
14 June 1988. It will be noted from the text quoted supra (pp. 11-12) that the text itself of Memorandum Circular No. 65
(and for that matter, that of Memorandum Circular No. 163, also of the Office of the President, dated 5 March
1968) 27 does not purport to apply only to officers or employees who have reached the age of sixty-five (65) years and
who have at least fifteen (l5) years of government service. We noted earlier that Cena interpreted Memorandum Circular
No. 65 as referring only to officers and employees who have both reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65)
and completed the fifteen (15) years of government service. Cena so interpreted this Memorandum Circular precisely
because Cena had reached the conclusion that employees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age, but who have
less than fifteen (15) years of government service, may be allowed such extension of service as may be needed to
complete fifteen (15) years of service. In other words, Cena read Memorandum Circular No. 65 in such a way as to
comfort with Cena's own conclusion reached without regard to that Memorandum Circular. In view of the conclusion that
we today reached in the instant case, this last ruling of Cena is properly regarded as merely orbiter.

We also do not believe it necessary to determine whether Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 is fully compatible
with Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65; this question must be reserved for detailed analysis in some
future justiciable case.

Applying now the results of our reexamination of Cena to the instant case, we believe and so hold that Civil Service
Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the appeal of petitioner Rabor and affirming the action of CSRO-XI
Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991, must be upheld and affirmed.

ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
HILARION BERONILLA, petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, its BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ET AL., respondents.

A special civil action for prohibition seeking to declare Resolution No. 1497 of the Board of Trustees of the respondent
Government Service Insurance System of August 9, 1963 to the effect that petitioner "Mr. (Hilarion) Beronilla be
considered compulsorily retired from the service (as Auditor of the Philippine National Bank) effective January 14, 1963"
as null and void for having been issued, in the words of the petition, "in excess of the powers granted to it by law, a
wanton abuse of discretion, violation of contracts, removal or forced retirement without due process of law and to declare
all acts heretofore taken in implementation thereof also void, and to prohibit said respondent and its representatives from
carrying out or implementing the aforesaid resolution." Acting on petitioner's prayer for preliminary injunction, on August
26, 1963, this Court issued the writ prayed for upon petitioner's filing an injunction bond in the amount of P1,000.00.

At the time of the filing of the present petition on August 23, 1963, petitioner was acting as and performing the duties of
Auditor of the Philippine National Bank. Before that, he had occupied many other positions in the government and had
been a member of the GSIS during all times required by law.

In his application for employment, his applications for life and retirement insurance as well as his application to be allowed
to take civil service examinations, ten times from 1917 to 1925, petitioner uniformly indicated that his date of birth is
January 14, 1898. He also indicated the same date of birth in his Member's Service Record which he submitted to the
GSIS on October 29, 1954 pursuant to the provisions of Section 13-A, Republic Act No. 660.

On September 29, 1959, he requested the Commissioner of Civil Service, thru the Auditor General, that his date of birth
indicated in the records be changed to January 14, 1900. According to the petition, it was only in 1955, before the demise
of his mother that petitioner discovered that his true date of birth is January 14, 1900; that his mother told him that in
1916, his uncle, Alvaro Beronilla, purchased a cedula for him showing in the same that he was already 18 years old for
the reason that his uncle wanted to take advantage of his being able to vote for him in La Paz, Abra in 1919, when he
would be already twenty-one years of age and the uncle a candidate for vice-president of the municipality; that since then
he had been looking for people who could attest to his true date of birth and it was only in September, 1959 that he came
upon two old persons of their town, Felix Alberne and Ricardo Lalin who could do so; that the former had been a member
of the provincial board and the latter is a retired justice of the peace; and that his letter to the Civil Service Commissioner
was supported by the affidavits of these two persons. This letter was endorsed by the Commission to the GSIS for action
"without the intervention of the Civil Service Commission."

In the GSIS, petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Legal Counsel who, on October 22, 1959, denied the same
since "all official records point to January 14, 1898 as the birthday of Mr. Hilarion Beronilla." Upon learning of this denial,
petitioner submitted additional evidence to support his request. This evidence consisted of photostat copies of the
yearbooks of the Philippine Institute of Accountants in 1954 and 1958 wherein his date of birth is shown as January 14,
1900. This additional evidence notwithstanding, on March 21, 1960 the Legal Counsel reiterated his former denial.
Whereupon, on May 21, 1960 petitioner appealed to the General Manager of the System who at that time was Mr.
Rodolfo Andal. Upon favorable recommendation of the 2nd Assistant General Manager, Mr. F. G. Araa in a
memorandum dated May 30, 1960, on June 2, 1960, Mr. Andal placed "OK." at the foot thereof over his initials, thus
indicating approval of the requested change.

Based on this action of the General Manager, notes of the adjustment of the date of birth of petitioner to January 14, 1900
were sent to the Auditor General and the Commissioner of Civil Service and the proceeds of petitioner's policy was re-
computed. The Legal Counsel whose title and rank had been meanwhile changed to Assistant General Manager for Legal
Affairs later communicated the aforesaid decision of the General manager to the Philippine National Bank on November 2,
1962 and the Deputy Auditor General on November 12, 1962, by letter and indorsement, respectively. As emphasized by
petitioner, in the letter to the Philippine National Bank, it is stated that "his date of birth has been adjusted by this office,
after careful study and deliberation." On the other hand, in the 2nd indorsement to the Deputy Auditor General, it was
made clear that relative to petitioner's life insurance policy No. N-2065 which had matured on November 30, 1957,
corresponding adjustment or recomputation of the maturity value had been effected on the basis of his changed date of
birth. In the meantime, upon application of petitioner, on October 1, 1960, he was issued a new life policy No. 335778
indicating his date of birth as January 14, 1900. Regarding his above-mentioned policy No. N-2065, on July 7, 1960,
demand was made upon petitioner to pay the System additionally the sum of P131.09, due to the adjustment of his date
of birth, which demand, petitioner promptly complied with.

Almost three years after Mr. Andal approved the change of petitioner's date of birth, more specifically, on May 6, 1963, Mr.
Ismael Mathay, then Auditor of the Central Bank detailed to the Philippine National Bank, wrote the Board of Trustees of
the GSIS about the service of petitioner and stated that "in the course of the audit of the transactions of the Philippine
National Bank, it was found that Mr. Hilarion Beronilla has been continuously paid since January 15, 1963, his salary
allowances and other fringe benefits as Auditor of said Bank notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Beronilla has attained his
sixty-fifth (65th) birthday last January 14, 1963, the date of his automatic and compulsory retirement from the government
service as fixed under Republic Act No. 3096 approved June 16, 1961." Acting on this letter, the Board referred the same
to Assistant General Manager and Actuary, Dr. Manuel Hizon, then in charge of the Claims Department. The latter
submitted a memorandum on August 6, 1963 stating the facts and evidence in the GSIS records concerning the
determination of the date of birth of petitioner, including the actions aforementioned taken thereon by Mr. Andal and the
Legal Counsel. On August 9, 1963, the Board adopted the disputed resolution without even notifying petitioner of Mr.
Mathay's letter and without giving him any opportunity to be heard regarding the same.

Upon these facts, it is the theory of petitioner that the approval by General Manager Andal of his request for the change of
the date of his birth in the official records of the GSIS from January 14, 1898 to January 14, 1900, after the same had
been previously denied by the Legal Counsel, could not be legally altered or modified by the Board of Trustees, not only
because the power to decide such matter finally is legally lodged in the General Manager and not in the Legal Counsel,
nor in the Board, but also because even if the Board were assumed to have authority to review the acts of the General
Manager, it was either guilty of laches or estopped from revising the same; and, furthermore, in approving the resolution in
dispute, the Board of Trustees had denied due process to petitioner and impaired the obligations of the contract between
petitioner and the GSIS regarding his retirement. In other words, the main issue before Us in this case is one of power
and does not call for Our determination of whether petitioner's real date of birth is January 14, 1898 or January 14, 1900.
Accordingly, all We have to decide is whether or not the GSIS Board of Trustees acted within its powers when it reversed
the approval by General Manager Andal of petitioner's request for the change of his date of birth, taking all circumstances
into account including petitioner's allegations of res adjudicata, laches, estoppel, denial of due process and
unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations. After carefully going over the facts on record and considering all
pertinent legal principles and statutory provisions, particularly Commonwealth Act 186, the Charter of the GSIS, as
amended, together with the relevant resolutions of the Board of Trustees, We have decided to uphold the superior
authority of the Board over the General Manager and to dismiss this petition.

We do not deem it necessary to pass upon petitioner's initial proposition, pressed vigorously, to be sure, to the effect that
as between the previous denial by the Legal Counsel and the subsequent approval by General Manager Andal of his
request for the change of his date of birth in the records, the latter, which was precisely the action on his appeal from the
Legal Counsel's denial, should prevail. Even granting it to be true that, pursuant to what is generally the practice and the
rule, applications for retirement annuities in the GSIS are subject to final approval by the General Manager after its being
approved by one of the Assistant General Managers and/or one or two Department Managers, 1 it is clear to Us that under
the GSIS charter, the General Manager's approval is not beyond review and reprobation by the Board of Trustees. It must
be borne in mind that under Section 16 of said charter, the System "shall be managed by the Board of Trustees ... " and
Section 17 adds that the Board "shall have the following powers and authority: (a) to adopt by-laws, rules and regulations
for the administration of the System and the transaction of its business." On the other hand, the extent of the functions
and powers of the General Manager are defined in Section 18 as follows:

SEC. 18. Personnel. The Board shall have the power to appoint a general manager, who shall be a
person of recognized experience and capacity in the subject of life and social insurance, and who shall be
the chief executive officer of the System, one or more assistant general managers, one or more
managers, a medical director, and an actuary, and fix their compensation. The general manager shall,
subject to the approval of the Board, appoint additional personnel whenever and wherever they may be
necessary to the effective execution of the provisions of this Act, fix their compensation, remove,
suspend, or otherwise discipline them, for cause. He shall have the power to prescribe their duties, grant
leave, prescribe certain qualifications to the end that only competent persons may be employed, and
appoint committees: Provided, however, That said additional personnel shall be subject to existing Civil
Service laws, rules and regulations.

xxx xxx xxx

It is thus obvious that by express statutory authority, the Board of Trustees directly manages the System and the General
Manager is only the chief executive officer of the Board. In the exercise of its power to adopt rules and regulations for the
administration of the System and the transaction of its business, the Board may lodge in the General Manager the
authority to act on any matter the Board may deem proper, but in no wise can such conferment of authority be considered
as a full and complete delegation resulting in the diminution, much less exhaustion, of the Board's own statutorily-based
prerogative and responsibility to manage the affairs of the System and, accordingly, to decide with finality any matter
affecting its transactions or business. In other words, even if the Board may entrust to the General Manager the power to
give final approval to applications for retirement annuities, the finality of such approval cannot be understood to divest the
Board, in appropriate cases and upon its attention being called to a flaw, mistake or irregularity in the General Manager's
action, of the authority to exercise its power of supervision and control which flows naturally from the ultimate and final
responsibility for the proper management of the System imposed upon it by the charter. Incidentally, it may be added that
the force of this principle is even more true insofar as the GSIS is concerned, for the fiduciary character of the
management of the System is rendered more strict by the fact that the funds under its administration are partly contributed
by the thousands upon thousands of employees and workers in all the branches and instrumentalities of the government.
It is indeed well to remember at all times that the System and, particularly, its funds do not belong to the government,
much less to any administration which may happen to be temporarily on the saddle, and that the interests of the mass of
its members can only be duly safeguarded if the administrators of the System act with utmost fidelity and care. Not for
nothing is its controlling and managing board called the Board of Trustees. It results, therefore, that the first contention of
petitioner cannot be sustained and We hold that any authority conferred upon the General Manager by the Board of
Trustees notwithstanding, the said Board may in appropriate cases and in the exercise of its own sound discretion review
the actions and decisions of the General Manager. The mere fact that the resolution granting the authority expressly gives
the character of finality to the General Manager's acts does not constitute such a representation to third persons dealing
with the System that such finality is definite even vis-a-vis the Board as to create any estoppel, for the simple reason that
it is not legally possible for the Board to divest itself of an authority which the charter of the System places under its direct
responsibility. From another point of view, since the law clearly vests the management in the Board and makes the
General Manager only its chief executive officer, all parties dealing with the System must be deemed to be on guard
regarding the ultimate authority of the Board to modify or reverse any action of the General Manager and they cannot
complain should the Board exercise its powers in the premises.

Petitioner posits, however, that even assuming that the Board may have the power to reverse or modify any action of the
General Manager in the exercise of his authority, because of the failure of the Board to act from June 2, 1960, when
General Manager Andal acted favorably on his request to August 9, 1963, when the Board approved the herein impugned
Resolution No. 1497, or for more than three years, during which time corresponding adjustments were made in his GSIS
records, payment and life insurance policies and due notices were served by the GSIS itself on all parties concerned on
the basis of his changed date of birth, respondent should be considered as guilty of laches or held in estoppel to change
or alter the action of Mr. Andal. While petitioner's posture is not entirely without logic, it falls short of the requirements for
the successful invocation of the pleas of laches and estoppel. We have carefully considered the lengthy and rather
impressive discussion by petitioner of these points in his petition, memorandum and reply to respondent's memorandum
as well as the equally detailed and authority-supported contrary arguments in the answer and memorandum of the
respondent, and We have arrived at the conclusion that petitioner's position cannot be sustained.

It may be stated at the outset that petitioner's twin points of laches and estoppel actually boil down in this particular case
to nothing more than estoppel by silence. With this clarification, it is meet to recall that "mere innocent silence will not work
estoppel. There must also be some element of turpitude or negligence connected with the silence by which another is
misled to his injury" (Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino, Vol. IV, p. 600) and that "the doctrine of estoppel having its
origin in equity and therefore being based on moral and natural justice, its applicability to any particular case depends, to
a very large extent, upon the special circumstances of the case." (Mirasol v. Municipality of Tabaco, 43 Phil. 610, 614.)
Important also it is not to overlook that as regards the actuations of government officials, the general rule is that their
mistakes and omissions do not create estoppel. (Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., L-18841, January
27, 1969, citing Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; and Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.
vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724. See also: Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., L-26862, March 30, 1970, and the
cases therein cited.)

Moreover, in computing the period of alleged silence or inaction of the Board, what is relevant is not the actual or, what
petitioner calls, imputable knowledge of said Board of the favorable action of Mr. Andal. Even if such knowledge had
come earlier than May 6, 1963, the date of Mr. Mathay's letter, what is decisive is that it was only thru Mr. Mathay's letter
that the Board got notice of the error in Mr. Andal's action. Precisely because it was not incumbent upon the Board, as
petitioner himself alleges, to spontaneously or in the ordinary course review the action of the General Manager, any
knowledge thereof by the Board, whether actual or imputable, could not, in logic and conscience, have placed the Board
on notice of any error or irregularity therein. Consequently, the immediate steps taken by the Board to have the facts
alleged in Mr. Mathay's letter verified are inconsistent with the charge of unreasonable delay, much more of laches.

The compulsory retirement of government officials and employees upon their reaching the age of 65 years is founded on
public policy which aims by it to maintain efficiency in the government service and at the same time give to the retiring
public servants the opportunity to enjoy during the remainder of their lives the recompense, inadequate perhaps for their
long service and devotion to. the government, in the form of a comparatively easier life, freed from the rigors of civil
service discipline and the exacting demands that the nature of their work and their relations with their superiors as well as
the public would impose upon them. Needless to say, therefore, the officials charged with the duty of implementing this
policy cannot be too careful in insuring and safeguarding the correctness and integrity of the records they prepare and
keep. In this case, all that the Board has done is to set aside what it found to be an erroneous decision of the General
Manager in approving the change of date of petitioner's birth, because from the evidence before it, the Board was
convinced that the originally recorded date of birth should not be disturbed. We cannot see where the charged inequity of
such action of the Board could lie.

Above all, it is a must consideration whenever principles of equity are invoked that for such invocation to succeed, it must
appear that if the plea is not heeded the party making the plea will suffer, in truth and in fact, inequity and injury, whether
pecuniary or moral or, at least, in a juridical sense. Such is not the case with petitioner. Examining the circumstances of
this case, We see nothing inequitous to petitioner in the questioned resolution of the Board of Trustees. For decades
back, repeatedly and uniformly, petitioner made it appear in all material government and public records and in all his
representations to respondent System that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. His rather belated request for a change of
said date to January 14, 1900 which would unquestionably favor his interests, pecuniarily or otherwise, and
correspondingly adversely affect those of the System and, of course, its members, was duly investigated and found not to
be sufficiently grounded to merit favorable action by the Legal Counsel in whom is lodged the authority to evaluate such
request. True this negative action was reversed by the General Manager, albeit by virtue of a procedure not strictly in
accordance with the established one as outlined in footnote 1 of this opinion, but on the other hand, the favorable action of
the General Manager was in turn reversed by the Board of Trustees, the final legal authority in the System, upon its being
informed of the error thereof. It is to be noted that, after all, it was always the petitioner who made representations to the
respondent System as to his date of birth, and not the other way around. All that the System did was to take his
representations for what they were worth. He was not believed by the Legal Counsel, but the General Manager did; on the
other hand, the authority higher than the General Manager found the action of the General Manager erroneous. Under
these circumstances, how could the System be in estoppel where the conflicting representations are of the petitioner
rather than of the System?

Anent petitioner's contention that he was denied due process when the Board of Trustees acted on the letter of Mr.
Mathay, without notifying him thereof or hearing him thereon, suffice it to say that since there is no showing that under the
procedure established in the GSIS, such notice and hearing are required, considering that the System operates as a
business corporation and generally notice and hearing are not indispensable for due process in corporations, and in any
event, inasmuch as what was considered by the Board was nothing more than petitioner's own conflicting representations,
and if petitioner really believed he should have been heard, he could have filed a motion for reconsideration or reopening,
it cannot be said that indeed he had not had due opportunity to present his side.

Finally, as regards petitioner's argument that the Board's resolution in question constitutes an impairment of the
obligations of his contract of insurance, it is obvious that the constitutional injunction that is evidently the basis of such
argument refers to the legislature and not to resolutions even of government corporations. Besides, petitioner's life
insurance policy, apart from not having any real relevance in this case, what is involved being his retirement, contains
specific provisions contemplating the correction of any error or mistake in the date of birth of the insured. On the other
hand, the retirement of government employees is imposed by law and is not the result of any contractual stipulation.

WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is dismissed, with costs against petitioner, and the writ of preliminary injunction
issued herein is hereby dissolved.

BERNANDINO S. MANIOSO, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondent.

Petitioner, Bernandino S. Manioso, appeals via Petition for Review on Certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which affirmed that of respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying his claim for additional
disability benefits under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 626, FURTHER AMENDING CERTAIN ARTICLES OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442 ENTITLED LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, as amended.
Petitioner started working on July 13, 1959 as Accounting Clerk I at the Budget Commission.
On August 10, 1959, he transferred to the Bureau of Forestry, now the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), with the same position of Accounting Clerk I.
On July 1, 1989, petitioner was promoted to the position of Senior Bookkeeper of DENR, Region IV, Manila.
In 1978, petitioner was found to be suffering from Hypertensive Vascular Disease (HVD). In 1983, he was diagnosed
with Coronary Artery Disease (CAD). In 1989, he was found to have Nephrolithiasis, Left, with associated renal
parenchymal disease prostatic concretions, which was confirmed in a medical examination conducted in 1992.
In 1994, the results of petitioners laboratory examinations indicated that he was suffering from cardiomegaly, LV
Form and Atherosclerotic aorta; pelvo-calycealithiasis (L) and early degenerative changes, spine. In the same year,
another diagnostic report revealed that petitioner was afflicted with staghorn calculi (L), cortical cyst, and a slightly
enlarged prostate gland.
 On January 11, 1995 up to January 20, 1995, petitioner was hospitalized in Batangas City after he experienced chest
heaviness, shortness of breath, and diaphoresis. The results of his examinations showed that he was suffering from Acute
Myocardial Infarction and HVD.
From January 11, 1995 up to May 15, 1995 when petitioner compulsory retired from government service on reaching
65 years of age and after serving almost 36 years, he no longer reported for work. His sick leave covering said period was
duly approved.
In the meantime, petitioner filed a claim for income benefits under PD 626 with the GSIS which found his ailments
work-related, hence, he was granted Temporary Total Disability (TTD) benefits for two months covering the period from
January 11, 1995 to March 11, 1995. He was later granted Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) benefits for eight (8)
months covering the period from May 15, 1995 to January 14, 1996.
It appears that petitioner appealed for more disability benefits with the GSIS which subjected him to a series of
medical tests.
In 1997, petitioner was brought to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) several times due to Chronic Renal
Infection (CRI) 2 to Obstructive Uropathy 2 to Staghorn Calculi (L) and Benign Prostatic Hypertrophy (BPH); Diabetes
Mellitus Neprophaty, Stage IV, and Hypertensive Nephrosclerosis.
Petitioner thereupon filed a request with the GSIS for additional disability benefits, claiming that the ailments for
which he was hospitalized several times in 1997 developed from his work-related illnesses.
The GSIS disapproved petitioners request upon the ground that he was already paid the maximum monthly income
benefit for eight (8) months covering the period from May 15, 1995 to January 14, 1996 commensurate to the degree of
his disability at the time of his retirement from service.[1]
On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the GSIS, it holding that petitioners physical condition at the time of his
retirement was not of such nature as to satisfy the criteria set for Permanent Total Disability (PTD). Additionally, it held
that since the ailments for which petitioner sought additional benefits developed after his retirement, they can no longer be
attributed to his former occupation but to factors independent thereof. [2]
Hence, the present petition proffering the following issues:
I

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS AILMENTS CONSISTING OF ACUTE MYOCARDIAL INFRACTION (SIC) AND
HYPERTENSIVE VASCULAR DISEASE, AND OTHER AILMENTS WHICH LATER DEVELOPED FALL UNDER THE
CATEGORY OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY, [AND]

II

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS RETIREMENT FROM SERVICE PREVENTS HIM FROM ENTITLEMENT TO
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS.[3]

Respecting the first issue, petitioner claims that the GSIS grant to him of TTD benefits for two (2) months covering
the period from January 11, 1995 to March 11, 1995, and PPD benefits for eight (8) months covering the period from May
15, 1995 up to January 14, 1996, showed that it acknowledged that he was suffering from PTD. [4] The GSIS though,
petitioner proffers, mistakenly categorized his ailments under PPD instead of PTD.
The Court finds for petitioner. Under Article 192 (c) of PD No. 442, as amended (the LABOR CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES), the following disabilities are deemed total and permanent: (1) Temporary total disability lasting
continuously for more that one hundred twenty days.[5]
Under Section 2(b), Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, [a] disability is total and
permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a
continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided under Rule X of these Rules.
The records show that the GSIS evaluated petitioners Myocardial Infarction and HVD as occupational diseases
under PD 626. Petitioner was on sick leave from January 11, 1995 up to his date of retirement on May 15, 1995 or for a
period of more than 120 days. Surely, the DENR, in approving his more than 120 days leave must have passed upon his
Medical Certificate relative to his ailments.
Petitioners disability having lasted for more than 120 days, he is entitled to PTD benefits.
 Under Article 192 (a) of the Labor Code, any employee who contacts sickness or sustains an injury resulting in PTD
shall, for each month until his death, be paid by the [GSIS] during such disability, an amount equivalent to the monthly
income benefit, plus ten percent thereof for each dependent child, but not exceeding five. And under Article 192 (b) of the
same Code, the only time the income benefits, which are guaranteed for five years, shall be suspended is if the employee
becomes gainfully employed, or recovers from his PTD or fails to be present for examination at least once a year upon
notice by the GSIS.
As petitioners medical records show that the ailments that he suffered in 1997 are complications that resulted from
his work-related ailments, the right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and
proximately and naturally resulting from compensable injury.[6]
Respecting the second issue, petitioners retirement from the service does not prevent him from availing of the PTD
benefits to which he is entitled. For as stated earlier, benefits due an employee due to work-related sickness shall be
provided until he becomes gainfully employed, or until his recovery or death. None of these is present in petitioners case.
It would be an affront to justice if petitioner, a government employee who had served for thirty six (36) years, is
deprived of the benefits due him for work-related ailments that resulted in his Permanent Total Disability.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another rendered declaring
petitioners disability as Permanent and Total and ordering the GSIS to pay petitioner, Bernandino S. Manioso, his benefits
arising therefrom.
SO ORDERED.
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION (ECC) and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(GSIS), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA S. ARREOLA, respondents.
Did the respondent Court of Appeals err in holding that the nature of the private respondents work increased the risk
of contracting ureterolithiasis, thereby entitling her to compensation under P.D. No. 626, as amended? This issue
confronts us in this petition for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals of 7 August 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No.
34223.[1]
The antecedent facts are summarized in the challenged decision as follows:
Lilia Arreola [private respondent herein] was employed as a Chemical Laboratory Technician in the National Bureau of
Investigation on March 23, 1972.
Thereafter, Arreola was promoted as Senior Chemical Technician, Chemical Engineer, and finally as Engineer II.
As Engineer II, Arreola performs the following duties:
1. Makes researches on and designs equipment needed to facilitate conclusive analysis by Forensic Chemist;
2. Computes cost of proposed equipment based on designs made;
3. Performs instrumental analysis of drugs, insecticides, volatile poisons, fuels and inorganic compounds, using
gas (GS) and liquid (LC) chromatograph, UV, VIS and IR Spectrophotometers;
4. Incharge (sic) of the supervision, maintenance and repair of modern chemical laboratory equipment installed
in the Bureau;
5. Computes cost of analysis performed;
6. Attends to field cases and takes paraffin casts at the morgue and in the office;
7. Renders holiday and night duties once a week and help the chemist in the examinations on incoming cases
during the tour of duty;
8. Assists the supervisor and chemist of the unit in conducting researches on some special cases;
9. May assist NBI Agents in field work re investigation of industrial companies engaged in nefarious activities;
10. Performs other duties assigned to me (her) by (sic) supervisor from time to time. (Annex B of the instant
Petition).
Sometime in May, 1993, Arreola suffered pains at her left flank accompanied by nausea, vomiting, and low moderate
fever. Her medical examination revealed the presence of stone deposits at her left urethra.
On May 18, 1993, Arreola underwent Ureterolithiasis (L) S/P Ureterolithomy (L) operation, followed by regular check-ups
and medication for one month. She spent P16,019.00 for her hospital bills, doctors fees, x-ray, laboratory analysis, and
medicine.
On June 16, 1993, Arreola filed with the GSIS an application for compensation benefit under PD No. 626, as amended.
On July 17, 1993, the GSIS denied her claim on the grounds that her ailment Ureterolithiasis left is a non-occupational
disease; and that she failed to show that her position as Engineer II of the NBI has increased the risk of contracting the
sickness.
 Upon the denial of Arreolas request for reconsideration with the GSIS, she interposed an appeal to the Employees
Compensation Commission, docketed as ECC Case No. 6494.
On December 2, 1993, the ECC rendered a decision, the pertinent portions of which read:
After a study of the records of the case, he failed to find proof that appellants ailment, Ureterolithiasis left,
Ureterolithomy, left, was brought about by her duties as Engineer II at the National Bureau of
Investigation. Where the ailment is not the direct or customary result of the employment and the herein appellant
failed to show proof that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by her work and working conditions,
the claim for compensation cannot be sustained. This is the clear implication of Section I(B) of Rule III of the
Rules Implementing PD 626, as amended, which explicitly provides that for the sickness and the resulting
disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under the
rules with conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting it is
increased by the working conditions.
xxx
Based on the foregoing discussions, the case therefore, is not meritorious for compensation benefits under the
Employees Compensation Law (PD 6262 (sic), as amended).
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant case is
Dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[2]

We also note that the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) made the following observations:
Moreover, medical findings show that Ureterolithiasis is the presence of renal stones in the ureter. The ureter conveys urine
from the renal pelvis to the bladder. When stones in the renal pappillae or within the urinary collecting system break loose,
they enter the ureter or occlude the ureteropelvic causing obstruction and pain.
Urinary stones usually arise because of the breakdown of a delicate balance. The kidneys must conserve water, but they
must also excrete materials that have low solubility. These two opposing requirements must be balanced against one
another during adaptation to a particular combination of diet and activity. (Reference: Harrisons Principles of Internal
Medicine, 11th Edition, pp. 1211-1212).[3]
Undaunted by the two adverse judgments, Arreola then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. She
insisted that she was entitled to compensation under P.D. No. 626, as amended, since she was able to prove that the
exigency and nature of her work as Engineer II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) greatly increased the risk of
contracting the ailment.
In their Comments to the above petition, herein petitioners (respondents below) Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) and ECC reiterated their stand that Arreolas disease was not included in the list of occupational diseases
and the risk of contracting it had not been proved to have been increased by the nature of the petitioners work. [4]
In its decision of 7 August 1995,[5] the Court of Appeals sustained the position of Arreola, reversed the appealed
decision of the ECC, and ordered the GSIS to pay Arreola the amount due her under P.D. 626, as amended.[6] In support
of its disposition, the appellate court stated:
The nature of the work of petitioner Arreola as Engineer II in the National Bureau of Investigation deals with research;
instrumental analysis of drugs, insecticides, volatile poisons, fuels, and inorganic compound; attendance to field cases;
taking of paraffin casts at morgue and in the office; and assisting NBI agents in field work in the matters of investigation of
industrial corporations engaged in nefarious activities.
It is, therefore, safe to conclude that the exingency (sic) of petitioners assigned tasks was such that she had to forego
urination in order not to interrupt the flow of concentration. In addition, tension, stress, and pressure must have aggravated
her physical condition.
The Supreme Court in Narazo vs. Employees Compensation Commission[7] held that x x x [i]t may be added that teachers
have a tendency to sit for hours on end, and to put off or postpone emptying their bladders when it interferes with their
teaching hours or preparation of lesson plans. From human experience, prolonged sitting down and putting off urination
result in stagnation of the urine.This encourages the growth of bacteria in the urine, and affects the delicate balance
between bacterial multiplication rates and the host defense mechanisms. Delayed excretion may permit the retention and
survival of micro-organisms posing factors to pyelonephritis and uremia. Thus, while We may concede that these illnesses
are not directly caused by the nature of the duties of a teacher, the risk of contracting the same is certainly aggravated by
their working habits necessitated by demands of job efficiency.
 Similarly, considering the nature of the work of herein petitioner, the same could have increased the risk of contracting the
disease. We thus find her entitled to receive compensation benefits under PD No. 626, as amended. [8]
In addition, the Court of Appeals commented that the ECC failed to appreciate the petitioners more than twenty years
of devoted public service, which earned her successive promotions to greater responsibilities and the fact that she had
been performing the strenuous and demanding task of Chemical Engineer. It also quoted Santos vs. Employees
Compensation Commission,[9] which reiterates that claims falling under the Employees Compensation Act should be
liberally resolved to fulfill its essence as a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working man and woman in our
society.[10]
The petitioners forthwith appealed to us from the decision of the Court of Appeals by way of this petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. They contend that the appellate courts determination that Arreolas work increased
the risk of her contracting ureterolithiasis is pure speculation. The petitioners pointedly state that there is no need to apply
Article 4 of the Labor Code on the liberal interpretation of social legislation when the provisions of such are clear.
In her Comment, Arreola posits that while it is true that ureterolithiasis is not a listed occupational disease, yet under
the increased risk theory, she has sufficiently proved that her claim for compensation is meritorious. Moreover, she
satisfactorily established that the nature of her work for the past twenty years, as former Chemical Lab Technician and
Chemical Engineer, and currently as Engineer II, made her miss important health habits such as regularly drinking water
and urinating. She then chides the petitioners for making her claim for compensation a circuitous and painful path.
After a further evaluation of the case and assessment of the arguments of the parties, we rule for the private
respondent and affirm the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals.
P.D. No. 626 (27 December 1974) further amended Title II of Book IV on the ECC and State Insurance Fund of the
Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 442, as amended). This law abandoned the presumption of compensability and
the theory of aggravation under the Workmens Compensation Act. [11] For the sickness and resulting disability or death to
be compensable, the claimant must prove that: (a) the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under
Annex A of the Rules on Employees Compensation, or (b) the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the
claimants working conditions.[12] This means that if the claimants illness or disease is not included in the said Annex A,
then he is entitled to compensation only if he can prove that the risk of contracting the illness or disease was increased by
his working conditions.[13]
Despite the abandonment of the presumption of compensability established by the old law, the present law has not
ceased to be an employees compensation law or a social legislation; hence, the liberality of the law in favor of the working
man and woman still prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social
justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, [14] especially in light of
the compassionate policy towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances. [15] Elsewise stated, a
humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution itself under the social justice policy, calls for a liberal and
sympathetic approach to legitimate appeals of disabled public servants; [16] or that all doubts to the right to compensation
must be resolved in favor of the employee or laborer. Verily, the policy is to extend the applicability of the law on
employees compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.[17]
The private respondent concedes that her ailment, ureterolithiasis, is not included in Annex A of the Rules on
Employees Compensation. Nevertheless, she asserts that she was able to prove that the risk of contracting it was
increased by the exigency and nature of her work. Her burden of evidence did not require the presentation of proof
beyond reasonable doubt nor a preponderance of evidence. It was enough that she adduced substantial evidence. In
cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, like the ECC, a fact is deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.[18] It was then enough if the private respondent was able to show that the nature of her work or her working
conditions increased the risk of her contracting ureterolithiasis. Certainly, it was not necessary for her to breach the
parameters of substantial evidence and to cross the difficult area of preponderance of evidence. We agree with the Court
of Appeals that the private respondent successfully discharged her burden of evidence and convincingly showed that,
indeed, the nature of her work or her working conditions increased the risk of contracting ureterolithiasis.
According to the ECC in its impugned decision, ureterolithiasis is the presence of renal stones in the ureter and
urinary stones usually arise because of the breakdown of a delicate balance. Quoting Harrisons Principles of Internal
Medicine, 11th edition, it added: The kidneys must conserve water, but they must excrete materials that have low
solubility. These two opposing requirements must be balanced against one another during adaptation to a particular
combination of diet and activity.[19]
In the 13th Edition of Harrisons Principles of Internal Medicine, vol. 2 (International Edition, 1994), page 1330, we
find the following entries:

PATHOGENESIS OF STONES
 Urinary stones usually arise because of the breakdown of a delicate balance. The kidneys must conserve water, but they
also must excrete materials that have a low solubility. These two opposing requirements must be balanced during
adaptation to diet, climate, and activity. The problem is mitigated to some extent by the fact that urine contains substances
that inhibit crystallization of calcium salts and others that bind calcium in soluble complexes. These protective mechanisms
are less than perfect. When the urine becomes supersaturated with insoluble materials because excretion rates are excessive
and/or because water conservation is extreme, crystals form and may grow and aggregate to form a stone. (Stress supplied)
Clearly then, diet, climate, and activity are important considerations in achieving the delicate balance. Note, however,
that climate was excluded from the quotation made by the ECC.
The following are factors which contribute to the development of stones:
Geographic factors contribute to the development of stones. In developing countries, children -- especially prepubescent
boys -- are prone to bladder calculi. In industrialized countries, most calculi are seen in adults as renal or ureteral
stones. Areas of high humidity and elevated temperatures appear to be contributing factors, and the incidence of
symptomatic ureteral stones is greatest during hot summer months.
Diet and fluid intake may be important factors in the development of urinary stones. Excess intake of calcium, oxalate, and
purines can increase the incidence of stones in predisposed individuals.Additionally, water or other fluid intake is important
in preventing urolithiasis. Persons in sedentary occupations have a higher incidence of stones than manual laborers.
Genetic factors may contribute to urinary stone formation. Cystinuria is an autosomal recessive disorder. Homozygous
individuals have markedly increased excretion of cystine and frequently have numerous recurrent episodes of urinary
stones despite attempts to optimize medical treatment. Renal tubular acidosis appears to be transmitted as a hereditary trait,
and urolithiasis occurs in up to 75% of patients affected with this disorder. [20] (Emphasis supplied)
It is thus medically established that the environment (included in geographic factor), water or other fluid intake and
the nature of the occupation -- sedentary or otherwise -- are important factors in the development or inhibition of urinary
stones or ureterolithiasis in general. Certainly, too, the regularity of urination plays an important role since withholding
urine for sometime may disturb the balance. It is not denied that the private respondents work exposed her to drugs,
insecticides, volatile poisons, fuels and inorganic compounds, and chemical laboratory equipment. Moreover, she
attended to field cases and rendered holiday and night duties once a week and helped the chemists in the examinations
of incoming cases. Neither have the petitioners refuted the claim of the private respondent that she missed some
important health habits such as regularly drinking enough water and urination. As to the latter, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the exigency of [Arreolas] assigned tasks was such that she had to forego urination in order not to interrupt
the flow of concentration.
All told then, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in its challenged decision. It is apropos at this
juncture to reiterate what we said in Vicente vs. Employees Compensation Commission:[21]
The court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the welfare of government workers, especially the
humble rank and file, whose patience, industry, and dedication to duty have often gone unheralded, but who, in spite of
very little recognition, plod on dutifully to perform their appointed tasks. It is for this reason that the sympathy of the law
on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in
their favor. It is likewise for this reason that the Court disposes of this case and ends a workingmans struggle for his just
dues.
The private respondent, however, is entitled to only twelve thousand six hundred and nineteen pesos (P12,619.00),
and not P16,619.00, as the records are bereft of any substantiation representing her expenses for X-ray (P1,600.00),
laboratory analysis (P300.00), and medicines (P1,500.00).
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34223 is hereby AFFIRMED, and the
Government Service Insurance System is hereby ordered to pay private respondent Ms. Lilia B. Arreola the sum
of P12,619.00 as compensation. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
RUFINA TANCINCO, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and EMPLOYEES
COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, praying for the reversal of the Resolutions[1] dated May 30, 1997 and March 5,
1998 issued by the former Sixteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44148. The first resolution dismissed
petitioners appeal from the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission, whereas the second resolution denied her motion
for reconsideration.
The facts are:
 At around noon of July 17, 1995, while he was repairing a service vehicle in front of his house along the National Road in
Barangay Palanas, Lemery, Batangas, SPO1 Eddie G. Tancinco was shot dead by five (5) unidentified armed men. SPO1 Tancinco
was a member of the NCR Security Protection Group of the Philippine National Police, and at the time of his death, was assigned as
part of the close-in security detail of then Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada. SPO1 Tancinco was off-duty at the time inasmuch as the
former Vice-President was in the United States for medical treatment.
His widow, petitioner Rufina Tancinco, filed a claim for benefits before the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). On
February 19, 1996, the GSIS denied petitioners claim on the ground that there was no proof that petitioners husbands death was work-
related. Petitioner appealed the denial to the Employees Compensation Commission (Commission) which, on December 19, 1996,
issued a Resolution[2] dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. As ruled by the Commission:

It is evident that the death of SPO1 Tancinco on July 17, 1995, when he was on off duty status did not arise out of and in the course of
his employment as a member of the PNP Security Command.

Apparently, the conditions aforementioned were not satisfied in the present case. Notably, SPO1 Tancinco was repairing his service
vehicle at the time of his death. He was neither executing an order for VP Estrada nor performing an official function on that fateful
day inasmuch as Police Superintendent Atilano Miranda duly certified that SPO1 Tancinco was on off-duty status on July 17, 1995.

We would like to stress once more that not all contingencies such as injury, disability, or death which befall an employee are
compensable. The same must be the result of accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Since the cause of SPO1 Tancincos death is no longer part of his official functions, the claim for compensation benefits under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, cannot be given due course.

Petitioner filed a petition for review from the aforesaid decision of the Commission before the Court of Appeals. On May 30,
1997, the appellate court issued the first assailed resolution [3] dismissing the petition for review on the following grounds: (a) that the
certification of non-forum shopping was defective; (b) that certified true copies of material portions of the record were not attached to
the petition; and (c) that the petition failed to state all the material dates which would establish the timeliness thereof. As admitted by
petitioner herself, she received a copy of the resolution on June 9, 1997, and yet it was only on January 27, 1998, or seven-and-a-half
(7 ) months later, that she filed a motion for reconsideration. As can be expected, the appellate court denied her motion in the second
assailed resolution[4] of March 5, 1998.
Petitioner seeks recourse before us via this petition for review on certiorari, arguing that:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
ENTERTAINING THE PETITION FILED BY PETITIONER WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE RULES AND
WAS ON ITS FACE MERITORIOUS.

In lieu of a comment, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation [5] signifying its solidarity with petitioner. The
Solicitor General adopts the view that SPO1 Tancincos death is work-related given the circumstances under which he was killed,
given that (a) the deceased was a policeman and (b) the killing was done in a professional manner. He speculates that the motive
behind the killing is likely to have arisen during the duration of the almost eighteen (18) years that he served as constable in the PC
and as a policeman.
With regret, we deny the petition.
The conclusion is inevitable because the instant petition was not timely filed.[6] Under section 1 of Rule 45 of the former Revised
Rules of Court, which was then still in effect, an appeal from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals to this Court must be made
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or the denial of a motion for reconsideration filed in due time. In the case at bar,
petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration from receipt of the resolution of dismissal two hundred thirty one (231) days late,
thereby rendering the said resolution final and executory. The gap of more than seven (7) months is too large for us to
ignore. Petitioner did not even offer any explanation to account for the tardiness. It behooves the party invoking liberality in the
application of procedural rules to at least explain his non-compliance therewith.[7] We have held that the period of appeal is not only
mandatory, but more importantly, it is jurisdictional. [8] Even we cannot ignore the immutable character of a final judgment.[9]
Prescinding from the finality of the appealed resolutions, the appeal will still fail on the merits. Rule III of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation provides:

SECTION 1. Grounds(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an
emploz`yment accident satisfying all of the following conditions:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.

xxx xxx xxx

The aforesaid requirements have not been met. Anent the first, as part of the former Vice-Presidents security detail, the decedent
was required to guard the person of the former; hence, his presence was officially required wherever the Vice-President would go. At
the time of his death, SPO1 Tancinco was off-duty since Vice-President Estrada was out of the country. In fact, he was at home; it is
not even known if he was temporarily re-assigned to another detail while the Vice-President was away. Clearly, he was not at the
place where his work required him to be.
As to the second requirement, it was not sufficiently established that SPO1 Tancinco died while performing his official
functions. In this regard, we held that policemen are regarded as being on twenty-four (24) hour alert. As we explained in Employees
Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals,[10]

xxx But for claritys sake and as a guide for future cases, we hereby hold that members of the national police, like P/Sgt. Alvaran, are
by the nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day. Except when they are on vacation leave, policemen are subject to
call at any time and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the
community.

xxx xxx xxx

We hold that by analogy and for purposes of granting compensation under P.D. No. 626, as amended, policemen should be treated in
the same manner as soldiers.

The twenty-four hour duty rule was originally applied to members of the armed forces, [11] until it was applied by extension to
policemen, as aforesaid, and eventually to firemen.[12]
However, in the more recent case of Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals,[13] we clarified that not all deaths
of policemen are compensable. Thus,

Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the
employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official
functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not
difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegres widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2
Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in
nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In the absence of such prior authority as
in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of the act attended to by the policeman at the time he died even without
the explicit permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no justification for holding that SPO2
Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines. That he may be called upon at any time to render police work as he is
considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at
considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman.In fact, he
was refusing to render one pointing out that he already complied with the duty detail. At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as
applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the
guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour
duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those
which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in character. [italics supplied]

In the present case, the decedent was repairing a service vehicle when he was killed. We have tried to view it from all possible
angles, but the inescapable conclusion is that he was not performing acts that are basically police service in character. As a policeman,
SPO1 Tancinco is part of an organized civil force for maintaining order, preventing and detecting crimes, and enforcing the
laws xxx.[14] Based on these parameters, it cannot be said that the deceased was discharging official functions; if anything, repairing a
service vehicle is only incidental to his job.
Neither was the last requirement satisfied. As the fatal incident occurred when SPO1 Tancinco was at home, it was incumbent on
petitioner to show that her husband was discharging a task pursuant to an order issued by his superiors. This also was not done.
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary to support a claim is substantial evidence, [15] which is that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. [16] Unfortunately, the burden was not
successfully met.
 In closing, we express our heartfelt commiseration with petitioner for the misfortune which has befallen her and her family. Even
this Court, the embodiment of justice dispensed impartially, can feel very human emotions, as it does so now. However, for reasons
both procedural and substantive, we cannot grant her petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated May 30, 1997 and March 5, 1998 are
AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.