G.R. No. 11263 ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.

This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. From a judgment
sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause
of action, followed by an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed.

It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be compelled to support the
plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation
from the defendant.

The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter established
their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff
returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows:

That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she
perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the
defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since that
date had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the
plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him
to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and
that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and
cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her
parents.

Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities established by
General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties. (Garcia vs.
Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of Civil Code.) Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a
conjugal partnership is formed between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this
extent a marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere contract. It
is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon
the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations .Marriage is an institution, in the
maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot
terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from this
relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from time to time, and none other. When the legal
existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state
or government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the
object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no
possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. With these principles to guide us, we
will inquire into the status of the law touching and governing the question under consideration.

Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep.,
34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were extended to the
Philippine Islands by royal decree on April 13, 1883 (Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of
this law read:

ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually assist each other.

ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second paragraph deals with the management of
the wife's property.)

ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when he charges his domicile or
residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just cause relieve her from this duty
when the husband removes his residence to a foreign country.

And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:

ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole extent specified in the
preceding article.

1. The consorts.

xxx xxx xxx

ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that
may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the right to the same.

Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease. The failure of the
wife to live with her husband is not one of them.

The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and obligations of the
spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and protect
his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence,
except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his
option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home. May the husband,
on account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the pension? Is the rule
established by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute? The supreme court of Spain in its decision of December 5,
1903, held:.

That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions dated May 11, 1897, November
25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which article 149 grants the person, obliged to furnish subsistence, between
paying the pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house the party who is entitled to the same, is not so
absolute as to prevent cases being considered wherein, either because this right would be opposed to the exercise
of a preferential right or because of the existence of some justifiable cause morally opposed to the removal of the
party enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be understood as being thereby restricted.

Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal was whether there was any reason
to prevent the exercise of the option granted by article 149 of the Civil Code to the person obliged to furnish
subsistence, to receive and maintain in his own house the one who is entitled to receive it; and inasmuch as
nothing has been alleged or discussed with regard to the parental authority of Pedro Alcantara Calvo, which he ha
not exercised, and it having been set forth that the natural father simply claims his child for the purpose of thus
better attending to her maintenance, no action having been taken by him toward providing the support until,
owing to such negligence, the mother was obliged to demand it; it is seen that these circumstances, together with
the fact of the marriage of Pedro Alcantara, and that it would be difficult for the mother to maintain relations with
her daughter, all constitute an impediment of such a nature as to prevent the exercise of the option in the present
case, without prejudice to such decision as may be deemed proper with regard to the other questions previously
cited in respect to which no opinion should be expressed at this time.

The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9 Phil. Rep., 576), wherein the court
held that the rule laid down in article 149 of the Civil Code "is not absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a
preexisting or preferential right in each of these cases which was opposed to the removal of the one entitled to
support. It is true that in the first the person claiming the option was the natural father of the child and had
married a woman other than the child's mother, and in the second the right to support had already been
established by a final judgment in a criminal case. Notwithstanding these facts the two cases clearly established
the proposition that the option given by article 149 of the Civil Code may not be exercised in any and all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of the supreme court of Spain, dated
November 3, 1905. In this case Don Berno Comas, as a result of certain business reverses and in order no to
prejudice his wife, conferred upon her powers to administer and dispose of her property. When she left him he
gave her all the muniments of title, mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in accounts receivable, and the key to the
safe in which he kept a large amount of jewels, thus depriving himself of all his possessions and being reduced in
consequence to want. Subsequently he instituted this civil action against his wife, who was then living in opulence,
for support and the revocation of the powers heretofore granted in reference to the administration and disposal of
her property. In her answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not legally in a situation to claim
support and that the powers voluntarily conferred and accepted by her were bilateral and could not be canceled
by the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendant wife appealed to the Audencia
Territorial wherein, after due trial, judgment was rendered in her favor dismissing the action upon the merits. The
plaintiff appealed to the supreme court and that high tribunal, in affirming the judgment of the Audencia
Territorial, said:

Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the spouses are mutually obliged to provide
each other with support, cannot but be subordinate to the other provisions of said Code which regulates the family
organization and the duties of spouses not legally separated, among which duties are those of their living together
and mutually helping each other, as provided in article 56 of the aforementioned code; and taking this for granted,
the obligation of the spouse who has property to furnish support to the one who has no property and is in need of
it for subsistence, is to be understood as limited to the case where, in accordance with law, their separation has
been decreed, either temporarily or finally and this case, with respect to the husband, cannot occur until a
judgment of divorce is rendered, since, until then, if he is culpable, he is not deprived of the management of his
wife's property and of the product of the other property belonging to the conjugal partnership; and

Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard
the marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will, thus establishing, contrary to the legal
provision contained in said article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal status entirely incompatible with the nature and
effects of marriage in disregard of the duties inherent therein and disturbing the unity of the family, in opposition
to what the law, in conformity with good morals, has established; and.

Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doa Adela Galindo are not legally separated, it is their duty
to live together and afford each other help and support; and for this reason, it cannot be held that the former has
need of support from his wife so that he may live apart from her without the conjugal abode where it is his place
to be, nor of her conferring power upon him to dispose even of the fruits of her property in order therewith to pay
the matrimonial expenses and, consequently, those of his own support without need of going to his wife;
wherefore the judgment appealed from, denying the petition of D. Ramon Benso for support, has not violated the
articles of the Civil Code and the doctrine invoked in the assignments of error 1 and 5 of the appeal.

From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quite clearly that the spouses separated
voluntarily in accordance with an agreement previously made. At least there are strong indications to this effect,
for the court says, "should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to
disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will." If this be the true basis upon
which the supreme court of Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine therein enunciated would not be
controlling in cases where one of the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or where
the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife seeks to force him to furnish support. That this is true
appears from the decision of the same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In this case the wife brought an
action for support against her husband who had willfully and voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode without
any cause whatever. The supreme court, reversing the judgment absolving the defendant upon the ground that no
action for divorce, etc., had been instituted, said:
In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito who left the conjugal abode, although he
claims, without however proving his contention, that the person responsible for this situation was his wife, as she
turned him out of the house. From this state of affairs it results that it is the wife who is party abandoned, the
husband not having prosecuted any action to keep her in his company and he therefore finds himself, as long as he
consents to the situation, under the ineluctable obligation to support his wife in fulfillment of the natural duty
sanctioned in article 56 of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of article 143. In not so holding, the trial court, on
the mistaken ground that for the fulfillment of this duty the situation or relation of the spouses should be
regulated in the manner it indicates, has made the errors of law assigned in the first three grounds alleged,
because the nature of the duty of affording mutual support is compatible and enforcible in all situations, so long as
the needy spouse does not create any illicit situation of the court above described.lawphil.net

If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of November 3, 1905,
and if the court did hold, as contended by counsel for the defendant in the case under consideration, that neither
spouse can be compelled to support the other outside of the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final
judgment granting the injured one a divorce or separation from the other, still such doctrine or holding would not
necessarily control in this jurisdiction for the reason that the substantive law is not in every particular the same
here as it is in Spain. As we have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in the Peninsula are not
in force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing the duties and obligations of husband and wife in this country
are articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the complaining spouse has, under article 105 of
the Civil Code, various causes for divorce, such as adultery on the part of the wife in every case and on the part of
the husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wife results therefrom; personal violence actually inflicted or
grave insults: violence exercised by the husband toward the wife in order to force her to change her religion; the
proposal of the husband to prostitute his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their sons or to
prostitute their daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the condemnation of a spouse to
perpetual chains or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only ground for a divorce is adultery. (Benedicto vs. De
la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34, 45.) This positive and absolute doctrine was announced by this court in the case just cited
after an exhaustive examination of the entire subject. Although the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of
the United States and the judgment rendered by this court was there reversed, the reversal did not affect in any
way or weaken the doctrine in reference to adultery being the only ground for a divorce. And since the decision
was promulgated by this court in that case in December, 1903, no change or modification of the rule has been
announced. It is, therefore, the well settled and accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction.

But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce or separation, as it
necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living separate
from her husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to
grant a separate maintenance must also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the
power to grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is not
dependent upon the other is apparent from the very nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act
of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so
much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband;
an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him
to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for
separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal
sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of
the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife;
as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro
tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which
marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker
one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals
may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the
wife in the situation of a feme sole.

The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for judgment, heretofore filed in this case,
rest.

Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

MARIANO B. ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant-appellee.

Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock by marriage in the year
1910, and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation, they have lived together as man and wife in the
city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their common home with the intention of living
thenceforth separate from her husband. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce her
to resume marital relations, this action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and
live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered, admitting the fact of marriage, and that she had left her
husband's home without his consent; but she averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been
compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Accordingly she in turn prayed for affirmative
relief, to consist of (1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership; (3) and an allowance for
counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. Upon hearing the cause the lower court gave judgment in
favor of the defendant, authorizing her to live apart from her husband, granting her alimony at the rate of P400
per month, and directing that the plaintiff should pay to the defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for his
services to defendant in the trial of the case. The plaintiff thereupon removed the case with the usual formalities
by appeal to this court.

The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the husband was more
to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her
abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. We have
carefully examined and weighed every line of the proof, and are of the opinion that the conclusion stated is wholly
untenable. The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an
aggravated degree; and to his cause are chiefly traceable without a doubt the many miseries that have attended
their married life. In view of the decision which we are to pronounce nothing will be said in this opinion which will
make the resumption of married relations more difficult to them or serve as a reminder to either of the mistakes
of the past; and we prefer to record the fact that so far as the proof in this record shows neither of the spouses has
at any time been guilty of conjugal infidelity, or has given just cause to the other to suspect illicit relations with any
person. The tales of cruelty on the part of the husband towards the wife, which are the basis of the cross-action,
are in our opinion no more than highly colored versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed
themselves from time to time to become involved and would have little significance apart from the morbid
condition exhibited by the wife. The judgment must therefore be recorded that the abandonment by her of the
marital home was without sufficient justification in fact.

In examining the legal questions involved, it will be found convenient to dispose first of the defendant's cross-
complaint. To begin with, the obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty
universally recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the Civil code. The
enforcement of this obligation by the wife against the husband is not conditioned upon the procurance of a
divorce by her, nor even upon the existence of a cause for divorce. Accordingly it had been determined that where
the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction,
compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance (Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil., 252); and he may
be required to pay the expenses, including attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation,
(Mercado vs.Ostrand and Ruiz, 37 Phil., 179.) Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at
large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate
maintenance of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses a state
which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision
should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued
cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband.

In Davidson vs Davidson, the Supreme Court of Michigan, speaking through the eminent jurist, Judge Thomas M.
Cooley, held that an action for the support of the wife separate from the husband will only be sustained when the
reasons for it are imperative (47 Mich., 151). That imperative necessity is the only ground on which such a
proceeding can be maintained also appears from the decision in Schindel vs. Schindel (12 Md., 294). In the State of
South Carolina, where judicial divorces have never been procurable on any ground, the Supreme court fully
recognizes the right of the wife to have provision for separate maintenance, where it is impossible for her to
continue safely to cohabit with her husband; but the same court has more than once rejected the petition of the
wife for separate maintenance where it appeared that the husband's alleged cruelty or ill-treatment was provoked
by the wife's own improper conduct. (Rhame vs. Rhame, 1 McCord's Chan. [S. Car.], 197; 16 Am. Dec., 597;
Boyd vs.Boyd, Har. Eq. [S. Car.], 144.)

Upon one occasion Sir William Scott, pronouncing the judgment of the English Ecclesiastical Court in a case where
cruelty on the part of the husband was relied upon to secure a divorce for the wife, made use of the following
eloquent words, which are perhaps even more applicable in a proceeding for separate maintenance in a
jurisdiction where, as here, a divorce cannot be obtained except on the single ground of adultery and this, too,
after the conviction of the guilty spouse in a criminal prosecution for that crime. Said he:

That the duty of cohabitation is released by the cruelty of one of the parties is admitted, but the question occurs,
What is cruelty? . . .

What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted where they are not accompanied with
bodily injury, either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a
want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm,
do not amount to legal cruelty: they are high moral offenses in the marriage-state undoubtedly, not innocent
surely in any state of life, but still they are not that cruelty against which the law can relieve. Under such
misconduct of either of the parties, for it may exist on the one side as well as on the other, the suffering party
must bear in some degree the consequences of an injudicious connection; must subdue by decent resistance or by
prudent conciliation; and if this cannot be done, both must suffer in silence. . . .

The humanity of the court has been loudly and repeatedly invoked. Humanity is the second virtue of courts, but
undoubtedly the first is justice. If it were a question of humanity simply, and of humanity which confined its views
merely to the happiness of the present parties, it would be a question easily decided upon first impressions. Every
body must feel a wish to sever those who wish to live separate from each other, who cannot live together with any
degree of harmony, and consequently with any degree of happiness; but my situation does not allow me to
indulge the feelings, much less the first feelings of an individual. The law has said that married persons shall not be
legally separated upon the mere disinclination of one or both to cohabit together. . . .

To vindicate the policy of the law is no necessary part of the office of a judge; but if it were, it would not be
difficult to show that the law in this respect has acted with its usual wisdom and humanity with that true wisdom,
and that real humanity, that regards the general interests of mankind. For though in particular cases the
repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may operate with great severity
upon individual, yet it must be carefully remembered that the general happiness of the married life is secured by
its indissolubility. When people understand that they must live together, except for a very few reasons known to
the law, they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know cannot shake off; they become
good husbands and good wives form the necessity of remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is a powerful
master in teaching the duties which it imposes. . . . In this case, as in many others, the happiness of some
individuals must be sacrificed to the greater and more general good. (Evans vs.Evans, 1 Hag. Con., 35; 161 Eng.
Reprint, 466, 467.)

In the light of the considerations stated, it is obvious that the cross-complaint is not well founded and none of the
relief sought therein can be granted.

The same considerations that require the dismissal of the cross-complaint conclusively prove that the plaintiff,
Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and that she is under an
obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the common home and cohabit with him. The only question which
here arises is as to the character and extent of the relief which may be properly conceded to him by judicial
decree.

The action is one by which the plaintiff seeks the restitution of conjugal rights; and it is supposed in the petitory
part of the complaint that he is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to
the conjugal home and live with him as a wife according to the precepts of law and morality. Of course if such a
decree were entered, in unqualified terms, the defendant would be liable to attachment for contempt, in case she
should refuse to obey it; and, so far as the present writer is aware, the question is raised for the first time in this
jurisdiction whether it is competent for the court to make such an order.

Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this
country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of
course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaled, an action for restitution of such rights can be
maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may
be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can be
effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of
these countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that
the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained
suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to
warrant it that court would make a mandatory decree, enforcible by process of contempt in case of disobedience,
requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes
criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon vs. Weldon (9 P. D., 52),
decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of
Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in
Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England,
could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to
the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of
imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of
disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the
character of alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever
attempted to make a peremptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case
where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New
Orleans. The decision referred to (Gahn vs. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of
Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently
has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing
cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148.)

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the supreme court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audencia
Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure
to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her
husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from
the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11.) but it does not appear that this order
for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that
would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.

We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute
order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint;
though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient
cause and that it is her duty to return.

Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is
declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and
she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special
pronouncement as to costs of either instance. So ordered.