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G.R.No.83896February22,1991

CIVILLIBERTIESUNION,petitioner,
vs.
THEEXECUTIVESECRETARY,respondent.

G.R.No.83815February22,1991

ANTIGRAFTLEAGUEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,INC.andCRISPINT.REYES,petitioners,
vs.
PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, as Secretary of
Agriculture LOURDES QUISUMBING, as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports FULGENCIO
FACTORAN,JR.,asSecretaryofEnvironmentandNaturalResourcesVICENTEV.JAYME,asSecretaryof
Finance SEDFREY ORDOEZ, as Secretary of Justice FRANKLIN N. DRILON, as Secretary of Labor and
EmploymentLUISSANTOS,asSecretaryofLocalGovernmentFIDELV.RAMOS,asSecretaryofNational
DefenseTEODOROF.BENIGNO,asPressSecretaryJUANITOFERRER,asSecretaryofPublicWorksand
Highways ANTONIO ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of Science and Technology JOSE CONCEPCION, as
Secretary of Trade and Industry JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ, as Secretary of Tourism ALFREDO R.A.
BENGZON, as Secretary of Health REINERIO D. REYES, as Secretary of Transportation and
CommunicationGUILLERMOCARAGUE,asCommissioneroftheBudgetandSOLITAMONSOD,asHead
oftheNationalEconomicDevelopmentAuthority,respondents.

IgnacioP.Lacsina,LuisR.Mauricio,AntonioR.QuintosandJuanT.Davidforpetitionersin83896.
AntonioP.Coronelforpetitionersin83815.

FERNAN,C.J.:p

Thesetwo(2)petitionswereconsolidatedperresolutiondatedAugust9,19881andarebeingresolvedjointlyasbothseekadeclarationoftheunconstitutionality
ofExecutiveOrderNo.284issuedbyPresidentCorazonC.AquinoonJuly25,1987.ThepertinentprovisionsoftheassailedExecutiveOrderare:

Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in
addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor Provided, that this limitation shall not
apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the
Chairman.

Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive official of the
Executive Department holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must
relinquishtheexcesspositioninfavorofthesubordinateofficialwhoisnextinrank,butinnocaseshallany
officialholdmorethantwopositionsotherthanhisprimaryposition.

Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in governmentowned or controlled
corporations, at least onethird (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a
secretary,orundersecretary,orassistantsecretary.

PetitionersmaintainthatthisExecutiveOrderwhich,ineffect,allowsmembersoftheCabinet,theirundersecretaries
andassistantsecretariestoholdothergovernmentofficesorpositionsinadditiontotheirprimarypositions,albeit
subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,2 which
providesasfollows:
 Sec. 13. The President, VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,holdanyotherofficeoremploymentduringtheirtenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business,orbefinanciallyinterestedinanycontractwith,orinanyfranchise,orspecialprivilegegrantedby
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or
controlledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.Theyshallstrictlyavoidconflictofinterestintheconductoftheir
office.

ItisallegedthattheabovequotedSection13,ArticleVIIprohibitspublicrespondents,asmembersoftheCabinet,
alongwiththeotherpublicofficialsenumeratedinthelistattachedtothepetitionsasAnnex"C"inG.R.No.
838153and as Annex "B" in G.R. No. 838964from holding any other office or employment during their tenure. In
additiontoseekingadeclarationoftheunconstitutionalityofExecutiveOrderNo.284,petitionerAntiGraftLeague
of the Philippines further seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the issuance of the extraordinary writs of prohibition and
mandamus,aswellasatemporaryrestrainingorderdirectingpublicrespondentsthereintoceaseanddesistfrom
holding, in addition to their primary positions, dual or multiple positions other than those authorized by the 1987
Constitution and from receiving any salaries, allowances, per diems and other forms of privileges and the like
appurtenanttotheirquestionedpositions,andcompellingpublicrespondentstoreturn,reimburseorrefundanyand
allamountsorbenefitsthattheymayhavereceivedfromsuchpositions.

Specifically,petitionerAntiGraftLeagueofthePhilippineschargesthatnotwithstandingtheaforequoted"absolute
and selfexecuting" provision of the 1987 Constitution, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoez, construing
Section13,ArticleVIIinrelationtoSection7,par.(2),ArticleIXB,renderedonJuly23,1987OpinionNo.73,series
of 1987,5 declaring that Cabinet members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold
otherpublicoffice,includingmembershipintheboardsofgovernmentcorporations:(a)whendirectlyprovidedforin
theConstitutionasinthecaseoftheSecretaryofJusticewhoismadeanexofficiomemberoftheJudicialandBar
CouncilunderSection8,paragraph1,ArticleVIIIor(b)ifallowedbylawor(c)ifallowedbytheprimaryfunctions
oftheirrespectivepositionsandthatonthebasisofthisOpinion,thePresidentofthePhilippines,onJuly25,1987
ortwo(2)daysbeforeCongressconvenedonJuly27,1987:promulgatedExecutiveOrderNo.284.6

PetitionerAntiGraftLeagueofthePhilippinesobjectstobothDOJOpinionNo.73andExecutiveOrderNo.284as
theyallegedly"lumpedtogether"Section13,ArticleVIIandthegeneralprovisioninanotherarticle,Section7,par.
(2), Article IXB. This "strained linkage" between the two provisions, each addressed to a distinct and separate
group of public officers one, the President and her official family, and the other, public servants in general
allegedly "abolished the clearly separate, higher, exclusive, and mandatory constitutional rank assigned to the
prohibition against multiple jobs for the President, the VicePresident, the members of the Cabinet, and their
deputiesandsubalterns,whoaretheleadersofgovernmentexpectedtoleadbyexample."7ArticleIXB,Section7,
par.(2)8provides:

Sec.7......

Unlessotherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,noappointiveofficialshallhold
any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.

TheSolicitorGeneralcountersthatDepartmentofJusticeDOJOpinionNo.73,seriesof1987,asfurtherelucidated
andclarifiedbyDOJOpinionNo.129,seriesof19879andDOJOpinion No.155,seriesof1988,10beingthefirst
officialconstructionandinterpretationbytheSecretaryofJusticeofSection13,ArticleVIIandpar.(2)ofSection7,
Article IXB of the Constitution, involving the same subject of appointments or designations of an appointive
executiveofficialtopositionsotherthanhisprimaryposition,is"reasonablyvalidandconstitutionallyfirm,"andthat
Executive Order No. 284, promulgated pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987 is consequently
constitutional.ItisworthnotingthatDOJOpinionNo.129,seriesof1987andDOJOpinionNo.155,seriesof1988
construed the limitation imposed by E.O. No. 284 as not applying to exofficio positions or to positions which,
althoughnotsodesignatedasexofficioareallowedbytheprimaryfunctionsofthepublicofficial,butonlytothe
holding of multiple positions which are not related to or necessarily included in the position of the public official
concerned(disparatepositions).

In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the principal
submissionthatitaddsexceptionstoSection13,ArticleVIIotherthanthoseprovidedintheConstitution.According
topetitioners,byvirtueofthephrase"unlessotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,"theonlyexceptionsagainst
holdinganyotherofficeoremploymentinGovernmentarethoseprovidedintheConstitution,namely:(1)TheVice
PresidentmaybeappointedasaMemberoftheCabinetunderSection3,par.(2),ArticleVIIthereofand(2)the
SecretaryofJusticeisanexofficiomemberoftheJudicialandBarCouncilbyvirtueofSection8(1),ArticleVIII.

PetitionersfurtherarguethattheexceptiontotheprohibitioninSection7,par.(2),ArticleIXBontheCivilService
CommissionappliestoofficersandemployeesoftheCivilServiceingeneralandthatsaidexceptionsdonotapply
and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the President, VicePresident,
MembersoftheCabinetandtheirdeputiesorassistants.
ThereisnodisputethattheprohibitionagainstthePresident,VicePresident,themembersoftheCabinetandtheir
deputiesorassistantsfromholdingdualormultiplepositionsintheGovernmentadmitsofcertainexceptions.The
disagreement between petitioners and public respondents lies on the constitutional basis of the exception.
Petitionersinsistthatbecauseofthephrase"unlessotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution"usedinSection13of
ArticleVII,theexceptionmustbeexpresslyprovidedintheConstitution,asinthecaseoftheVicePresidentbeing
allowedtobecomeaMemberoftheCabinetunderthesecondparagraphofSection3,ArticleVIIortheSecretaryof
JusticebeingdesignatedanexofficiomemberoftheJudicialandBarCouncilunderArticleVIII,Sec.8(1).Public
respondents,ontheotherhand,maintainthatthephrase"unlessotherwiseprovidedintheConstitution"inSection
13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article IXB insofar as the appointive officials mentioned
thereinareconcerned.

Thethresholdquestionthereforeis:doestheprohibitioninSection13,ArticleVIIofthe1987Constitutioninsofaras
Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive
officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IXB which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless
otherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,noappointiveofficialshallholdanyotheroffice
or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government
ownedorcontrolledcorporationortheirsubsidiaries."

Weruleinthenegative.

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration.
Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplishedbyitsadoption,andtheevils,ifany,soughttobepreventedorremedied.Adoubtfulprovisionwillbe
examinedinthelightofthehistoryofthetimes,andtheconditionandcircumstancesunderwhichtheConstitution
was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particularprovisionandthepurposesoughttobeaccomplishedthereby,inordertoconstruethewholeastomake
thewordsconsonanttothatreasonandcalculatedtoeffectthatpurpose.11

The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the governing
bodiesorboardsofvariousgovernmentagenciesandinstrumentalities,includinggovernmentownedandcontrolled
corporations, became prevalent during the time legislative powers in this country were exercised by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law authority. There was a proliferation of newlycreated
agencies,instrumentalitiesandgovernmentownedandcontrolledcorporationscreatedbypresidentialdecreesand
other modes of presidential issuances where Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants were designated to
headorsitasmembersoftheboardwiththecorrespondingsalaries,emoluments,perdiems,allowancesandother
perquisitesofoffice.Mostoftheseinstrumentalitieshaveremaineduptothepresenttime.

Thispracticeofholdingmultipleofficesorpositionsinthegovernmentsoonledtoabusesbyunscrupulouspublic
officialswhotookadvantageofthisschemeforpurposesofselfenrichment.Infact,theholdingofmultipleofficesin
governmentwasstronglydenouncedontheflooroftheBatasangPambansa.12Thiscondemnationcameinreaction
tothepublishedreportoftheCommissiononAudit,entitled"1983SummaryAnnualAuditReporton:Government
OwnedandControlledCorporations,SelfGoverningBoardsandCommissions"whichcarriedasitsFigureNo.4a
"RoasterofMembershipinGoverningBoardsofGovernmentOwnedandControlledCorporationsasofDecember
31,1983."

Particularlyodiousandrevoltingtothepeople'ssenseofproprietyandmoralityingovernmentservicewerethedata
containedthereinthatRobertoV.Ongpinwasamemberofthegoverningboardsoftwentynine(29)governmental
agencies,instrumentalitiesandcorporationsImeldaR.Marcosoftwentythree(23)CesarE.A.Virataoftwentytwo
(22)ArturoR.Tanco,Jr.offifteen(15)JesusS.HipolitoandGeronimoZ.Velasco,offourteeneach(14)CesarC.
Zalamea of thirteen (13) Ruben B. Ancheta and Jose A. Roo of twelve (12) each Manuel P. Alba, Gilberto O.
Teodoro,andEdgardoTordesillasofeleven(11)eachandLiliaBautistaandTeodoroQ.Peaoften(10)each.13

TheblatantbetrayalofpublictrustevolvedintooneoftheseriouscausesofdiscontentwiththeMarcosregime.It
was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986
Constitutional Commission, convened as it was after the people successfully unseated former President Marcos,
shoulddraftintoitsproposedConstitutiontheprovisionsunderconsiderationwhichareenvisionedtoremedy,ifnot
correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and employment. In fact, as keenly
observedbyMr.JusticeIsaganiA.Cruzduringthedeliberationsinthesecases,oneofthestrongestsellingpoints
ofthe1987Constitutionduringthecampaignforitsratificationwastheassurancegivenbyitsproponentsthatthe
scandalouspracticeofCabinetmembersholdingmultiplepositionsinthegovernmentandcollectingunconscionably
excessivecompensationtherefromwouldbediscontinued.

ButwhatisindeedsignificantisthefactthatalthoughSection7,ArticleIXBalreadycontainsablanketprohibition
against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive
public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII,
specifically prohibiting the President, VicePresident, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from
holdinganyotherofficeoremploymentduringtheirtenure,unlessotherwiseprovidedintheConstitutionitself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the
intentoftheframersoftheConstitutionwastoimposeastricterprohibitiononthePresidentandhisofficialfamilyin
sofarasholdingotherofficesoremploymentinthegovernmentorelsewhereisconcerned.

Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article VII with other provisions of the
Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from holding other offices or
employment.UnderSection13,ArticleVI,"(N)oSenatororMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesmayholdany
other office or employment in the Government . . .". Under Section 5(4), Article XVI, "(N)o member of the armed
forcesintheactiveserviceshall,atanytime,beappointedinanycapacitytoacivilianpositionintheGovernment,
includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsoranyoftheirsubsidiaries."EvenSection7(2),ArticleIXB,
relieduponbyrespondentsprovides"(U)nlessotherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,
noappointiveofficialshallholdanyotherofficeoremploymentintheGovernment."

Itisquitenotablethatinalltheseprovisionsondisqualificationstoholdotherofficeoremployment,theprohibition
pertains to an office or employment in the government and governmentowned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that "(T)he President, Vice
President,theMembersoftheCabinet,andtheirdeputiesorassistantsshallnot,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthis
Constitution,holdanyotherofficeoremploymentduringtheirtenure."Inthelatterprovision,thedisqualificationis
absolute,notbeingqualifiedbythephrase"intheGovernment."TheprohibitionimposedonthePresidentandhis
officialfamilyisthereforeallembracingandcoversbothpublicandprivateofficeoremployment.

GoingfurtherintoSection13,ArticleVII,thesecondsentenceprovides:"Theyshallnot,duringsaidtenure,directly
or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract
with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These
sweeping, allembracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not
similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil
service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the
Presidentandhisofficialfamilyasaclassbyitselfandtoimposeuponsaidclassstricterprohibitions.

Suchintentofthe1986ConstitutionalCommissiontobestricterwiththePresidentandhisofficialfamilywasalso
succinctlyarticulatedbyCommissionerVicenteFozafterCommissionerRegaladoMaambongnotedduringthefloor
deliberationsanddebatethattherewasnosymmetrybetweentheCivilServiceprohibitions,originallyfoundinthe
GeneralProvisionsandtheanticipatedreportontheExecutiveDepartment.CommissionerFozCommented,"We
actuallyhavetobestricterwiththePresidentandthemembersoftheCabinetbecausetheyexercisemorepowers
and,therefore,morecheeksandrestraintsonthemarecalledforbecausethereismorepossibilityofabuseintheir
case."14

Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
governmentduringtheirtenurewhensuchisallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsoftheirpositions,members
oftheCabinet,theirdeputiesandassistantsmaydosoonlywhenexpresslyauthorizedbytheConstitutionitself.In
otherwords,Section7,ArticleIXBismeanttolaydownthegeneralruleapplicabletoallelectiveandappointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President,theVicePresident,MembersoftheCabinet,theirdeputiesandassistants.

Thisbeingthecase,thequalifyingphrase"unlessotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution"inSection13,ArticleVII
cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IXB of the 1987 Constitution. To
construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and meaningless the
manifestintentandpurposeoftheframersoftheConstitutiontoimposeastricterprohibitiononthePresident,Vice
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or
employmentinthegovernmentduringtheirtenure.Respondents'interpretationthatSection13ofArticleVIIadmits
oftheexceptionsfoundinSection7,par.(2)ofArticleIXBwouldobliteratethedistinctionsocarefullysetbythe
framers of the Constitution as to when the highranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to
AssistantSecretary,ontheonehand,andthegeneralityofcivilservantsfromtherankimmediatelybelowAssistant
Secretarydownwards,ontheother,mayholdanyotherofficeorpositioninthegovernmentduringtheirtenure.

Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in question would render certain parts of the Constitution
inoperative. This observation applies particularly to the VicePresident who, under Section 13 of Article VII is
allowedtoholdotherofficeoremploymentwhensoauthorizedbytheConstitution,butwhoasanelectivepublic
officialunderSec.7,par.(1)ofArticleIXBisabsolutelyineligible"forappointmentordesignationinanycapacityto
any public office or position during his tenure." Surely, to say that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" found in Section 13, Article VII has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article IXB would render
meaninglessthespecificprovisionsoftheConstitutionauthorizingtheVicePresidenttobecomeamemberofthe
Cabinet,15 and to act as President without relinquishing the VicePresidency where the President shall not nave
beenchosenorfailstoqualify.16Suchabsurdconsequencecanbeavoidedonlybyinterpretingthetwoprovisions
under consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of Article IXB providing the general rule and the other, i.e.,
Section13,ArticleVIIasconstitutingtheexceptionthereto.InthesamemannermustSection7,par.(2)ofArticleI
XBbeconstruedvisavisSection13,ArticleVII.

ItisawellestablishedruleinConstitutionalconstructionthatnooneprovisionoftheConstitutionistobeseparated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be
broughtintoviewandtobesointerpretedastoeffectuatethegreatpurposesoftheinstrument.17Sectionsbearing
on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution18andonesectionisnottobeallowedtodefeatanother,ifbyanyreasonableconstruction,thetwocan
bemadetostandtogether.19

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will
rendereverywordoperative,ratherthanonewhichmaymakethewordsidleandnugatory.20

Sincetheevidentpurposeoftheframersofthe1987ConstitutionistoimposeastricterprohibitiononthePresident,
VicePresident, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or
employmentinthegovernmentduringtheirtenure,theexceptiontothisprohibitionmustbereadwithequalseverity.
Onitsface,thelanguageofSection13,ArticleVIIisprohibitorysothatitmustbeunderstoodasintendedtobea
positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily,
whereverthelanguageusedintheconstitutionisprohibitory,itistobeunderstoodasintendedtobeapositiveand
unequivocal negation.21 The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the VicePresident
beingappointedasamemberoftheCabinetunderSection3,par.(2),ArticleVIIoractingasPresidentinthose
instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII and, the Secretary of Justice being exofficio
memberoftheJudicialandBarCouncilbyvirtueofSection8(1),ArticleVIII.

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified
thereinwithoutadditionalcompensationinanexofficiocapacityasprovidedbylawandasrequired22bytheprimary
functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on
saidofficials.23Tocharacterizethesepostsotherwisewouldleadtoabsurdconsequences,amongwhichare:The
PresidentofthePhilippinescannotchairtheNationalSecurityCouncilreorganizedunderExecutiveOrderNo.115
(December 24, 1986). Neither can the VicePresident, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of National
Defense, Justice, Labor and Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which would then have no
reasontoexistforlackofachairpersonandmembers.Therespectiveundersecretariesandassistantsecretaries,
wouldalsobeprohibited.

TheSecretaryofLaborandEmploymentcannotchairtheBoardofTrusteesoftheNationalManpowerandYouth
Council(NMYC)orthePhilippineOverseasEmploymentAdministration(POEA),bothofwhichareattachedtohis
departmentforpolicycoordinationandguidance.NeithercanhisUndersecretariesandAssistantSecretarieschair
theseagencies.

The Secretaries of Finance and Budget cannot sit in the Monetary Board.24 Neither can their respective
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. The Central Bank Governor would then be assisted by lower ranking
employeesinprovidingpolicydirectionintheareasofmoney,bankingandcredit.25

Indeed,theframersofourConstitutioncouldnothaveintendedsuchabsurdconsequences.AConstitution,viewed
as a continuously operative charter of government, is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the
impracticableandunreasonableorabsurdconsequences,ifpossible,shouldbeavoided.26

Toreiterate,theprohibitionunderSection13,ArticleVIIisnottobeinterpretedascoveringpositionsheldwithout
additionalcompensationinexofficiocapacitiesasprovidedbylawandasrequiredbytheprimaryfunctionsofthe
concernedofficial'soffice.Thetermexofficiomeans"fromofficebyvirtueofoffice."Itreferstoan"authorityderived
from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the
officialposition."Exofficiolikewisedenotesan"actdoneinanofficialcharacter,orasaconsequenceofoffice,and
withoutanyotherappointmentorauthoritythanthatconferredbytheoffice."27Anexofficiomemberofaboardis
one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment.28 To
illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the exofficio
ChairmanoftheBoardofthePhilippinePortsAuthority,29andtheLightRailTransitAuthority.30

The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an exofficio position in Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel
ControlandInspectionBoard,31thus:"Anexaminationofsection2ofthequestionedstatute(R.A.3137)revealsthat
forthechairmanandmembersoftheBoardtoqualifytheyneedonlybedesignatedbytherespectivedepartment
heads.Withtheexceptionoftherepresentativefromtheprivatesector,theysitexofficio.Inordertobedesignated
theymustalreadybeholdingpositionsintheofficesmentionedinthelaw.Thus,forinstance,onewhodoesnothold
apreviousappointmentintheBureauofCustoms,cannot,undertheact,bedesignatedarepresentativefromthat
office. The same is true with respect to the representatives from the other offices. No new appointments are
necessary.Thisisasitshouldbe,becausetherepresentativessodesignatedmerelyperformdutiesintheBoardin
additiontothosealreadyperformedundertheiroriginalappointments."32

Theterm"primary"usedtodescribe"functions"referstotheorderofimportanceandthusmeanschieforprincipal
function.Thetermisnotrestrictedtothesingularbutmayrefertotheplural.33Theadditionaldutiesmustnotonly
becloselyrelatedto,butmustberequiredbytheofficial'sprimaryfunctions.Examplesofdesignationstopositions
byvirtueofone'sprimaryfunctionsaretheSecretariesofFinanceandBudgetsittingasmembersoftheMonetary
Board, and the Secretary of Transportation and Communications acting as Chairman of the Maritime Industry
Authority34andtheCivilAeronauticsBoard.

If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or
otherwisealientotheprimaryfunctionofacabinetofficial,suchadditionalfunctionswouldfallunderthepurviewof
"any other office" prohibited by the Constitution. An example would be the Press Undersecretary sitting as a
member of the Board of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation. The same rule applies to such
positionswhichconferonthecabinetofficialmanagementfunctionsand/ormonetarycompensation,suchasbutnot
limitedtochairmanshipsordirectorshipsingovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.

Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, VicePresident, Cabinet Members, their deputies or
assistantswhicharenotinconsistentwiththosealreadyprescribedbytheirofficesorappointmentsbyvirtueoftheir
special knowledge, expertise and skill in their respective executive offices is a practice longrecognized in many
jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination
among the different offices in the Executive Branch in the discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing and
implementinglawsaffectingnationalinterestandgeneralwelfareanddeliveringbasicservicestothepeople.Itis
consistentwiththepowervestedonthePresidentandhisalteregos,theCabinetmembers,tohavecontrolofall
theexecutivedepartments,bureausandofficesandtoensurethatthelawsarefaithfullyexecuted.35Withoutthese
additionaldutiesandfunctionsbeingassignedtothePresidentandhisofficialfamilytositinthegoverningbodiesor
boardsofgovernmentalagenciesorinstrumentalitiesinanexofficiocapacityasprovidedbylawandasrequiredby
their primary functions, they would be supervision, thereby deprived of the means for control and resulting in an
unwieldyandconfusedbureaucracy.

It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions may not transgress the prohibition
embodiedinSection13,ArticleVIIofthe1987Constitution,suchadditionaldutiesorfunctionsmustberequiredby
theprimaryfunctionsoftheofficialconcerned,whoistoperformthesameinanexofficiocapacityasprovidedby
law,withoutreceivinganyadditionalcompensationtherefor.

Theexofficiopositionbeingactuallyandinlegalcontemplationpartoftheprincipaloffice,itfollowsthattheofficial
concernedhasnorighttoreceiveadditionalcompensationforhisservicesinthesaidposition.Thereasonisthat
theseservicesarealreadypaidforandcoveredbythecompensationattachedtohisprincipaloffice.Itshouldbe
obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an exofficiomember
thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining
policyinmonetaryandbankingmatters,whichcomeunderthejurisdictionofhisdepartment.Forsuchattendance,
therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per them or an
honorariumoranallowance,orsomeothersucheuphemism.Bywhatevernameitisdesignated,suchadditional
compensationisprohibitedbytheConstitution.

ItisinterestingtonotethatduringthefloordeliberationsontheproposalofCommissionerChristianMonsodtoadd
to Section 7, par. (2), Article IXB, originally found as Section 3 of the General Provisions, the exception "unless
requiredbythefunctionsofhisposition,"36expressreferencetocertainhighrankingappointivepublicofficialslike
membersoftheCabinetweremade.37RespondingtoaqueryofCommissionerBlasOple,CommissionerMonsod
pointedoutthatthereareinstanceswhenalthoughnotrequiredbycurrentlaw,membershipofcertainhighranking
executiveofficialsinotherofficesandcorporationsisnecessarybyreasonofsaidofficials'primaryfunctions.The
examplegivenbyCommissionerMonsodwastheMinisterofTradeandIndustry.38

WhilethisexchangebetweenCommissionersMonsodandOplemaybeusedasauthorityforsayingthatadditional
functionsanddutiesflowingfromtheprimaryfunctionsoftheofficialmaybeimposeduponhimwithoutoffending
the constitutional prohibition under consideration, it cannot, however, be taken as authority for saying that this
exceptionisbyvirtueofSection7,par.(2)ofArticleIXB.ThiscolloquybetweenthetwoCommissionerstookplace
intheplenarysessionofSeptember27,1986.UnderconsiderationthenwasSection3ofCommitteeResolutionNo.
531 which was the proposed article on General Provisions.39 At that time, the article on the Civil Service
CommissionhadbeenapprovedonthirdreadingonJuly22,1986,40whilethearticleontheExecutiveDepartment,
containingthemorespecificprohibitioninSection13,hadalsobeenearlierapprovedonthirdreadingonAugust26,
1986.41ItwasonlyafterthedraftConstitutionhadundergonereformattingand"styling"bytheCommitteeonStyle
that said Section 3 of the General Provisions became Section 7, par. (2) of Article IXB and reworded "Unless
otherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition...."

Whatwasclearlybeingdiscussedthenweregeneralprincipleswhichwouldserveasconstitutionalguidelinesinthe
absence of specific constitutional provisions on the matter. What was primarily at issue and approved on that
occasionwastheadoptionofthequalifiedanddelimitedphrase"primaryfunctions"asthebasisofanexceptionto
the general rule covering all appointive public officials. Had the Constitutional Commission intended to dilute the
specificprohibitioninsaidSection13ofArticleVII,itcouldhaverewordedsaidSection13toconformtothewider
exceptions provided in then Section 3 of the proposed general Provisions, later placed as Section 7, par. (2) of
ArticleIXBontheCivilServiceCommission.

ThatthisexceptionwouldinthefinalanalysisapplyalsotothePresidentandhisofficialfamilyisbyreasonofthe
legalprinciplesgoverningadditionalfunctionsanddutiesofpublicofficialsratherthanbyvirtueofSection7,par.2,
ArticleIXBAtanyrate,wehavemadeitclearthatonlytheadditionalfunctionsandduties"required,"asopposedto
"allowed,"bytheprimaryfunctionsmaybeconsideredasnotconstituting"anyotheroffice."

Whileitispermissibleinthisjurisdictiontoconsultthedebatesandproceedingsoftheconstitutionalconventionin
ordertoarriveatthereasonandpurposeoftheresultingConstitution,resorttheretomaybehadonlywhenother
guidesfail42 as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. 1wphi1

Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicatingthereasonsfortheirvotes,buttheygiveusnolightastotheviewsofthelargemajoritywhodidnottalk,
muchlessofthemassofourfellowcitizenswhosevotesatthepollsgavethatinstrumenttheforceoffundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face."43 The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.44

It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, VicePresident, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure
multipleofficesoremploymentinthegovernment,exceptinthosecasesspecifiedintheConstitutionitselfandas
aboveclarifiedwithrespecttopostsheldwithoutadditionalcompensationinanexofficiocapacityasprovidedby
lawandasrequiredbytheprimaryfunctionsoftheiroffice,thecitationofCabinetmembers(thencalledMinisters)
asexamplesduringthedebateanddeliberationonthegeneralrulelaiddownforallappointiveofficialsshouldbe
considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution's manifest intent and the people'
understandingthereof.

InthelightoftheconstructiongiventoSection13,ArticleVIIinrelationtoSection7,par.(2),ArticleIXBofthe1987
Constitution,ExecutiveOrderNo.284datedJuly23,1987isunconstitutional.Ostensiblyrestrictingthenumberof
positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary
position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations, Executive Order No.
284actuallyallowsthemtoholdmultipleofficesoremploymentindirectcontraventionoftheexpressmandateof
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the
1987Constitutionitself.

TheCourtisalertedbyrespondentstotheimpracticalconsequencesthatwillresultfromastrictapplicationofthe
prohibitionmandatedunderSection13,ArticleVIIonthe operationsofthe Government,consideringthat Cabinet
memberswouldbestrippedoftheirofficesheldinanexofficiocapacity,byreasonoftheirprimarypositionsorby
virtue of legislation. As earlier clarified in this decision, exofficio posts held by the executive official concerned
withoutadditionalcompensationasprovidedbylawandasrequiredbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisofficedonotfall
under the definition of "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. With respect to
other offices or employment held by virtue of legislation, including chairmanships or directorships in government
ownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries,sufficeitto saythat the fearedimpracticalconsequences
aremoreapparentthanreal.Beingheadofanexecutivedepartmentisnomeanjob.Itismorethanafulltimejob,
requiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are to be derived from a
departmenthead'sabilityandexpertise,heshouldbeallowedtoattendtohisdutiesandresponsibilitieswithoutthe
distraction of other governmental offices or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts,
attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and
inefficiency. Surely the advantages to be derived from this concentration of attention, knowledge and expertise,
particularlyatthisstageofournationalandeconomicdevelopment,faroutweighthebenefits,ifany,thatmaybe
gainedfromadepartmentheadspreadinghimselftoothinandtakinginmorethanwhathecanhandle.

Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the court hereby orders respondents Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local Government45 Luis Santos,
Secretary of National Defense Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the
Budget Guillermo Carague to immediately relinquish their other offices or employment, as herein defined, in the
government,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.Withrespecttotheother
namedrespondents,thepetitionshavebecomemootandacademicastheyarenolongeroccupyingthepositions
complainedof.

During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such
entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.46It has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure,
officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties
pertainingthereto,islegallyentitledtotheemolumentsoftheoffice,andmayinanappropriateactionrecoverthe
salary,feesandothercompensationsattachedtotheoffice.Thisdoctrineis,undoubtedly,supportedonequitable
groundssinceitseemsunjustthatthepublicshouldbenefitbytheservicesofanofficerdefactoandthenbefreed
fromallliabilitytopayanyoneforsuchservices.47Anyperdiem,allowancesorotheremolumentsreceivedbythe
respondentsbyvirtueofactualservicesrenderedinthequestionedpositionsmaythereforeberetainedbythem.

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification abovestated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is
herebydeclarednullandvoidandisaccordinglysetaside.

SOORDERED.

Narvasa,MelencioHerrera,Gutierrez,Jr.,Cruz,Paras,Feliciano,Gancayco,Padilla,Bidin,Medialdea,Regalado
andDavide,Jr.,JJ.,concur.
SarmientoandGrioAquino,JJ.,tooknopart.

Footnotes
1
P.71,RolloinG.R.No.83815andp.28,RolloinG.R.No.83896.
2
Emphasissupplied.
3
pp.2930,Rollo.
4
pp.1021,Rollo.
5
Annex"A",Petition,G.R.No.83815,pp.2124,Rollo.
6
Thereby,petitioneralleges,elicitingadversepublishedcommentariesfromCONCOMCommissionersFr.
JoaquinG.Bernas,S.J.andRegaladoE.Maambong,CongressmanRodolfoAlbanoofIsabela,andretired
SupremeCourtJusticeFelixQ.Antonio,Annexes"D","E"and"F",Petition,G.R.No.83815,pp.4064,Rollo.
CONCOMVicePresidentAmbrosioB.Padilla,inapublishedarticlecitedintheannexes,alsocommentedon
EO284.
7
p.11,RolloinG.R.No.83815.
8
Emphasissupplied.
9
Annex"I",Comment,G.R.No.83896,pp.6267,Rollo.
10
Annex"2",Ibid.,pp.6871,Rollo.
11
Maxwellvs.Dow,176U.S.581,20Sup.Ct.448,44L.Ed.597.
12
R.B.No.95,Monday,March11,1985,RecordoftheBatasan,VolumeIV,pp.835836.
13
pp.1114.
14
Recordofthe1986ConstitutionalCommission,Vol.1,p.553.
15
Sec.3,Ibid.
16
Sec.7,ArticleVII.
17
OldWayneMut.LifeAsso.vs.McDonough,204U.S.8,51LEd345,27SCt236Wallacevs.Payne,197
Cal539,241P.879.
18
Grantzvs.Grauman(Ky)320SW2d364Runyonvs.Smith,308Ky73,212SW2d521.
19
Peoplevs.Wright,6Col.92.
20
ThomasM.Colley,ATreatiseontheConstitutionalLimitations,Vol.I,p.128,citingAttorneyGeneralvs.
DetroitandErinPlankRoadCo.,2Mich.114Peoplevs.Burns,5Mich.114DistrictTownshipvs.Dubuque,
7Iowa262.
21
Varneyvs.Justice,86Ky5966S.W.457Huntvs.State,22Tex.App.396,3S.W.233.
22
Asopposedtotheterm"allowed"usedinSection7,par.(2),ArticleIXBoftheConstitution,whichis
permissive."Required"suggestsanimposition,andtherefore,obligatoryinnature.
 23
Martinv.Smith,140A.L.R.1073Ashmorev.GreaterGreenvilleSewerDistrict,173A.L.R.407.
24
ExecutiveOrderNo.16,May9,1986,82O.G.2117.
25
Sec.20,Art.XII,1987Constitution.
26
Hirabayashivs.UnitedStates,320U.S.81,87L.Ed.1774,63S.Ct.1375OppCottonMills,Inc.vs.
AdministratorofWageandHourDiv.,312U.S.126,85L.Ed.624,61S.Ct.524Gagevs.Jordan,23Cal2d
794,174P2d,287citedin16AmJur2d,pp.100,464.
27
Black'sLawDictionary,p.51615AWordsandPhrases,p.392.
28
15AWordsandPhrases,p.392.
29
Sec.7,E.O.778.
30
Sec.1,E.O.210.
31
21SCRA336(1967).
32
Emphasissupplied.
33
33AWordsandPhrases,p.210,citingCollectorofRevenuevs.LouisianaReadyMixCo.,La.App.,197S.
2d141,145.
34
Sec.7,P.D.No.474.
35
Section17,ArticleVII.
36
ThephrasethatappearsintheConstitutionisnot"Unlessrequiredbytheprimaryfunctions"but"Unless
otherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctions..."
37
Recordofthe1986ConstitutionalCommission,Vol.V,pp.165166.
38
Emphasissupplied,Ibid.,p.165.
39
Ibid.,Vol.V.,pp.8081.
40
Ibid.,Vol.II,p,94.
41
Ibid.,Vol.III,p.710.
42
16CorpusJurisSecundum,2.31,p.105.
43
Commonwealthvs.Ralph,111Pa.365,3Atl220.
44
HouseholdFinanceCorporationvs.Shaffner,203,S.W.2d734.356Mo.808.
45
NowDepartmentofInteriorandLocalGovernments.
46
Castillovs.Arrieta,G.R.No.L31444,November13,1974,61SCRA55.
47
Pattersonvs.Benson,112Pac.801,32L.R.A.(NS)949.

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