MESINA VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO.
162489, JUNE 17, 2015 - MARY administrative inquiry into the missing city funds. Besides, he was not as of
ISSUE: Was Mesina under custodial investigation when he was investigated
on the whereabouts of the missing patubig collection and, thus, entitled to
Miranda Rights?
RULING: No. According to People v. Marra, custodial investigation
involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant manner. The safeguards during custodial investigation begin
to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into a
still unsolved crime, and the interrogation is then focused on a particular
suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then
direct interrogatory questions that tend to elicit incriminating statements. The
situation contemplated is more precisely described as one where
After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a
confrontation arises which at best may be termed unequal. The
detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there
questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He
finds himself in a strange and unfamiliar surrounding, and every
person he meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are
well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the
methods and means that experience and study has taught them to
extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most
detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional
rights.
And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the
officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into
silence x x x.15
Contrary to the petitioners claim, the fact that he was one of those being
investigated did not by itself define the nature of the investigation as
custodial. For him, the investigation was still a general inquiry to ascertain
the whereabouts of the missing patubig collection. By its nature, the inquiry
had to involve persons who had direct supervision over the issue, including
the City Treasurer, the City Auditor, the representative from different
concerned offices, and even the City Mayor. What was conducted was not an
investigation that already focused on the petitioner as the culprit but an
then in the custody of the police or other law enforcement office.
PEOPLE VS. OMILIG, G.R. NO. 206296, AUG. 12, 2015 - ANGEL
ISSUE: Was Peaflor denied the right to an independent and competent
counsel preferably of his own choice?
RULING: No. In People v. Tomaquin, the Courts discussion on the
meaning of preferably is relevant: Ideally, the lawyer called to be present
during such investigations should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice
of the individual undergoing questioning, but the word "preferably" does not
convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling his defense. What is imperative is that
the counsel should be competent and independent.
In this case and as borne by the records, the appointments of Atty. Cavales
and Atty. Cristobal as counsel de officio were with the conformity of accused
appellant Peaflor. They succeeded Atty. Padilla upon his discharge as
counsel for accused-appellant Peaflor. The prosecutors allowed accused
appellant Peaflor to engage the services of the new counsel.
PEOPLE VS. PEPINO, G.R. NO. 174471, JAN. 12, 2016 -CARMELA
ISSUE: Is the police lineup part of custodial investigation whereat the right
to counsel available?
RULING: NO. Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken
into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime
under investigation.47 As a rule, a police lineup is NOT part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted by counsel
attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the
accused during identification in a police lineup.
JORDA VS. JUDGE BITAS, A.M. NO. RTJ-14-236 & 14-237,
MARCH 5, 2014- MARVILIE
ISSUE: Is bail hearing required if the accused-applicant is charged with
Qualified Trafficking?
RULING: YES. In the instant case, Miralles was charged with Qualified
Trafficking, which under Section 10 (C) of R.A. No. 9208 is punishable by
life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00). Thus,
by reason of the penalty prescribed by law, the grant of bail is a matter of
discretion which can be exercised only by respondent judge after the
evidence is submitted in a hearing. The hearing of the application for bail
in capital offenses is absolutely indispensable before a judge can
properly determine whether the prosecutions evidence is weak or
strong.
Clearly, in the instant case, respondent judge's act of fixing the accused's bail
and reducing the same motu proprio is not mere deficiency in prudence,
discretion and judgment on the part of respondent judge, but a patent
disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such
error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross
ignorance of the law.
ENRILE VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 213847, AUGUST 18, 2015- KEN
Issue: Is the grant of bail for the purpose of preventing the accused from
committing additional crimes?
Ruling: No. It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the
accused from committing additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required
by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in his provisional
liberty before or during the trial, and the societys interest in assuring the
accuseds presence at trial.
Issue: When is bail a matter of right and when is it a matter of judicial
discretion?
Ruling: Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provide:
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
Issue: What are the guidelines to be observed by a judge in resolving a
bail application in capital offenses?
Ruling: In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines
outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify
the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require
him to submit his recommendation ;
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion;
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon
the approval of the bail bond. Otherwise petition should be denied.
Issue: Is Enriles admission to bail justified?
Ruling: Yes. Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his
health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his
health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration
during the trial.
PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ, G.R. NOS. 216007-09, DEC. 8, 2015-VALZ
ISSUE:
For purposes of the right to bail, how should the term punishable in
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution be construed?
RULING:
In Our mind, the term "punishable" should refer to prescribed, not
imposable, penalty.
People v. Temporada, which was even cited by petitioner, perceptibly
distinguished these two concepts:
The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the
felonies defined therein which consists of a range of period of time. This is
what is referred to as the "prescribed penalty."
xxx
Further, the Code provides for attending or modifying circumstances which
when present in the commission of a felony affects the computation of the
penalty to be imposed on a convict. This penalty, as thus modified, is
referred to as the "imposable penalty."
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, not bailable. (Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
ENRILE VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 213455, AUG. 11, 2015- RAM
ISSUE: In denying his motion for bill of particulars, did the Sandiganbayan
deny Enrile of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him?
Ruling: Yes. Some of the desired details are material facts that must be
alleged to enable the petitioner to properly plead and prepare his defense.
The Sandiganbayan should have diligently sifted through each detail sought
to be specified, and made the necessary determination of whether each detail
was an ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly after Enrile stated in his
Reply that the desired details could not be found in the bundle of
documents marked by the prosecution. We cannot insist or speculate that he
is feigning ignorance of the presence of these desired details; neither can we
put on him the burden of unearthing from these voluminous documents what
the desired details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely made
available by the Rules to enable an accused to positively respond and make
an intelligent defense.
GO VS. PEOPLE; G.R. NO. 185527, JULY 18, 2012- SHEILA
Issue: Can the conditional examination of a prosecution witness defeat the
rights of the accused to public trial and confrontation of witnesses?
Ruling: Yes. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a
judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the
Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the
witnessess against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most
satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the
witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is
not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the
conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as
testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of
conditional examination of witnesses both for the benefit of the defense, as
well as the prosecution. The Court's ruling in the case of Vda. de Manguerra
v. Risos15 explicitly states that
"x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide
for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to
an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of
witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections
12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional
examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses."
PEOPLE VS. FELICIANO, G.R. NO. 196735, MAY 5, 2014- BEVERLY
ISSUE: Was the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and case of the accusation against them violated with the inclusion of
the phrase wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise in the
information?
RULING: No. The inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks and/or other
forms of disguise" in the information does not violate their constitutional
rights.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being
alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating
circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It
was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating
circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the
information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be
admissible by the trial court.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to
prove that the accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent
them from including disguise as an aggravating circumstance. What is
important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there
was a concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in
the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused
that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with, they
tried to conceal their identity.
SEVILLA VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 194390, AUGUST 13, 2014- NIA
ISSUE: Can Sevilla be convicted of the felony of falsification of public
document through reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge
against him in the Information was for the intentional felony of falsification
of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC?
RULING: Yes. Sevillas claim that his constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated when
the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents, when the Information only charged the
intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is untenable. To
stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is
an offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of
public documents, the latter being the greater offense. As such, he can be
convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents notwithstanding that the Information only charged the willful
act of falsification of public documents.
However, there is a need to rectify the designation of the offense without
disturbing the imposed penalty for the guidance of bench and bar in strict
adherence to precedent. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code,
criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with
separately from willful offenses. It is not a question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use
of such descriptive phrase as homicide through reckless imprudence, and
the like; when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide; or simple imprudence causing damages
to property." Thus, the proper designation of the felony should be reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents and not
falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence.
PEOPLE VS. LIU AND CHUNG G.R. NO. 189272, JAN. 21, 2015-
YANG
Issue: Were the accused denied their constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of accusation against him?
Ruling: No. The Court notes that charging appellants with illegal possession
when the information filed against them charges the crime of importation
does not violate their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation brought against them. The rule is that when there is a
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and
that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved included in that which is charged. An offense charged
necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter.
CANCERAN VS. PEOPLE, G~R. NO. 206442, JULY 1, 2015 - KYLE
ISSUE: Was the accused denied of his constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of accusation against him?
RULING: YES. In this case, although the evidence presented during the trial
prove the crime of consummated Theft, he could be convicted of Attempted
Theft only. Regardless of the overwhelming evidence to convict him for
consummated Theft, because the Information did not charge him with
consummated Theft, the Court cannot do so as the same would violate his
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the allegations against him.
An accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he
was charged in the complaint or information and on which he was tried. It
matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an
accused cannot be convicted in the courts of any offense, unless it is charged
in the complaint or information on which he is tried, or necessarily included
therein. He has a right to be informed as to the nature of the offense with
which he is charged before he is put on trial, and to convict him of an offense
higher than that charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried
would be an unauthorized denial of that right. Indeed, an accused cannot be
convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily
included in the information filed against him. An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter.
MANGILA V. JUDGE PANGILINAN, G.R. NO. 160739, JULY 17,
2013-RUTH
Issue: Is Mangila entitled to the writ of habeas corpus?
Ruling: No. To begin with, Judge Pangilinan issued the order of arrest after
examining Palayon, one of the complainants against Mangila and her
cohorts. If he, as the investigating judge, considered Palayons evidence
sufficient for finding probable cause against her and her cohorts, which
finding the Court justifiably presumes from his act of referring the case and
its records to the Office of the City Prosecutor on the day immediately
following the preliminary investigation he conducted, her petition for habeas
corpus could not be the proper remedy by which she could assail the
adequacy of the adverse finding. Even granting that there was a failure to
adhere to the law or rule, such failure would not be the equivalent of a
violation of her constitutional rights. It was clear that under Section 5, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the resolution of the
investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the review by the
public prosecutor who had the power to order the release of the detainee if no
probable cause should be ultimately found against her. In the context of the
rule, Mangila had no need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to
secure her release from detention. Her proper recourse was to bring the
supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the preliminary investigation
and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of the City
Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the most direct access to the
entire records of the case, including the warrant of arrest, following Judge
Pangilinans transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action.
The writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another
available remedy.
CARAM VS. ATTY. SEGUI, G.R. NO. 193652, AUG. 5, 2014-
MARVILIE
ISSUE: Can the issue of child custody and the exercise of parent rights over
a child be the subject of a writ of amparo?
RULING: NO. Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly
separating her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption,
supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify
the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost
child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting
custody over him.37 Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is
involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over
a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward
of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to
victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a
similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or
omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is
envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and
security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
MISION VS GALLEGOS; GR 210759; JUNE 23, 2015-EDGAR
Issue: Was the Writ of Amparo properly granted in this case?

Ruling: No, the RTCs grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo was
improper in this case as Ku for his whereabouts were never concealed, and as
the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security were unfounded and
unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the fundamental function of the
writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details concerning the
extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party. As
Ku and his whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need for the
issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the case at bar.
DACUDAO V SEC. OF JUSTICE, G.R. 188056, Jan. 8, 2013- SLYNN
ISSUE: Was Dacudaos right to speedy disposition of the case violated?
RULING: No. In The Ombudsman v. Jurado, the Court has clarified that
although the Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy disposition of
cases, such speedy disposition is a flexible concept. To properly define that
concept, the facts and circumstances surrounding each case must be
evaluated and taken into account. There occurs a violation of the right to a
speedy disposition of a case only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are sought and secured, or when, without cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. It is cogent to mention that a mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not determinant of the concept.
The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was ordered
obviously to obtain expeditious justice for the parties with the least cost and
vexation to them. Inasmuch as the cases filed involved similar or related
questions to be dealt with during the preliminary investigation, the Secretary
of Justice rightly found the consolidation of the cases to be the most feasible
means of promoting the efficient use of public resources and of having a
comprehensive investigation of the cases.
On the other hand, we do not ignore the possibility that there would be more
cases reaching the DOJ in addition to those already brought by petitioners
and other parties. Yet, any delays in petitioners cases occasioned by such
other and subsequent cases should not warrant the invalidation of DO No.
182. The Constitution prohibits only the delays that are unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive, and tend to render rights nugatory.
In fine, we see neither undue delays, nor any violation of the right of
petitioners to the speedy disposition of their cases.
COSCOLLUELA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NOS. 188056, ETC.,
JULY 15, 2013-DONNA
ISSUE: Were petitioners right to speedy disposition of their case
violated?
RULING: YES. First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation
proceedings took a protracted amount of time to complete. Second, the
above-discussed delay in the Ombudsmans resolution of the case largely
remains unjustified. Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted
for their alleged failure to assert their right to speedy disposition of cases.
Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners by
the lengthy delay in the proceedings against them.
A persons right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed
under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
provides All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
Examining the incidents in the present case, the Court holds that
petitioners right to a speedy disposition of their criminal case had been
violated.
PEOPLE VS. PEREZ, G.R. NOS. 188165, ETC., DEC. 11, 2013- MARQ
ISSUE: Did the Ombudsman violate respondents right to speedy disposition
of their case?
RULING: The right to the speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in Article
III of the Constitution, which declares:
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.While the concept of speedy disposition
is relative or flexible, such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient, the right to the speedy disposition of a case, like
the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated when the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause
or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried.
It is clear from the foregoing that the Office of the Ombudsman had taken an
unusually long period of time just to investigate the criminal complaint and
to determine whether to criminally charge the respondents in the
Sandiganbayan. Such long delay was inordinate and oppressive, and
constituted under the peculiar circumstances of the case an outright violation
of the respondents right under the Constitution to the speedy disposition of
their cases.
MARCOS VS. REPUBLIC, G.R. NO. 189434, APRIL 25, 2012-MARY
ISSUE: Can the right against self-incrimination be invoked in
forfeiture proceedings?
RULING: NO. Petitioner conveniently neglects to quote from the preceding
paragraphs of Cabal, which clearly classified forfeiture proceedings as quasi-
criminal, not criminal. And even so, Cabal declared that forfeiture cases
partake of a quasi-criminal nature only in the sense that the right against self-
incrimination is applicable to the proceedings, i.e., in which the owner of the
property to be forfeited is relieved from the compulsory production of his
books and papers:
Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture
of goods that seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment
against any person are deemed to be civil proceedings in
rem. Such proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent
that where the person using the res illegally is the owner or
rightful possessor of it, the forfeiture proceeding is in the
nature of a punishment.
xxx xxx xxx
Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered
to be civil and in the nature of proceedings in rem. The
statute providing that no judgment or other proceedings in
civil cases shall be arrested or reversed for any defect or
want of form is applicable to them. In some aspects,
however, suits for penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-
criminal nature and within the reason of criminal
proceedings for all the purposes of * * * that portion of the
Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. The proceeding is one against the owner, as well as
against the goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has
to be proved to establish the forfeiture and his property is
sought to be forfeited.
xxx xxx xxx
As already observed, the various constitutions
provide that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition
against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness
against himself applies only to criminal, quasi-criminal,
and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in
form for forfeiture of property by reason of the commission
of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty
recoverable is civil or remedial in nature. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The right of the Marcoses against self-incrimination has been amply
protected by the provisions of R.A. 1379, which prohibits the criminal
prosecution of individuals for or on account of any transaction, matter or
thing concerning which they are compelled -- after having claimed the
privilege against self-incrimination -- to testify or produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise. Since this cases inception in 1991, petitioners
have participated in the hearings, argued their case, and submitted their
pleadings and other documents, never once putting at issue their right against
self-incrimination or the violation thereof.
DE LA CRUZ VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 200748, JULY 23, 2014- ANGEL
ISSUE: Can the urine drug test of the petitioner arrested of extortion be used
against him without violating his right against self-incrimination?
RULING: No. The constitutional right of an accused against self-
incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in
the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the
assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the
right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving
of evidence against himself through a testimonial act.
In Gutang vs. People, the Court considered the taking of a urine sample as a
mechanical act of the accused since this was material, in relation, to his drug
case. In the present case, though, petitioner was arrested for extortion. The
Court failed to see how urine sample could be material to the charge of
extortion. It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine
extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine
test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved
futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing
under those circumstances. Therefore, the drug test was a violation of
petitioners right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
BRAZA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 195032 FEBRUARY 20,
2013-CARMELA
ISSUE: Will there be double jeopardy if the first information charged an
offense different from that charged in the second information but both
charges arose from the same transaction or set of facts?
RULING: NO. Although violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 and
violation of Sec. 3(e) of the same law share a common element, the accused
being a public officer, the latter is not inclusive of the former. The essential
elements of each are not included among or do not form part of those
enumerated in the other. For double jeopardy to exist, the elements of one
offense should ideally encompass or include those of the other. What the rule
on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two
offenses.
DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, G.R. NO. 203335, FEB. 18,
2014-MARVILIE
ISSUE: Does Sec. 7 of the Cybercrime Law, insofar as online libel and
child pornography are concerned, violate the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy?
RULING: YES. Section 7 provides:
Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under
this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for
violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, or special laws.
Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published
material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa,
that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two
offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the
other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the
same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG
itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is
one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c) (4) merely establishes
the computer system as another means of publication. Charging the
offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription
against double jeopardy.
The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2)
merely expands the ACPAs scope so as to include identical activities in
cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPAs definition of child
pornography in fact already covers the use of electronic, mechanical,
digital, optical, magnetic or any other means. Thus, charging the offender
under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
GEROCHE VS PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 179080, NOV. 25, 2014 -KEN
Issue: Can the accused who were charged with Violation of Domicile but
convicted with Less Serious Physical Injuries invoke double jeopardy if on
their appeal they were found guilty of Violation of Domicile?
Ruling: No. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on
any question including one not raised by the parties. When an accused
appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he or she waives the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case
open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render
such judgment as law and justice dictate.
Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial courts judgment of conviction for
Less Serious Physical Injuries, they are deemed to have abandoned their right
to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the assailed judgment.
Petitioners could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA set
aside the ruling of the RTC by finding them guilty of Violation of Domicile
as charged in the Information instead of Less Serious Physical Injuries.
PEOPLE AND AAA VS. CARAMPATANA, ET. AL. G.R. NO. 183652,
FEB. 25, 2015-VALZ
ISSUE: Can a judgment of acquittal be challenged on certiorari? Can it be
filed by the private respondent without the intervention of the Solicitor
General?
RULING: YES. Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the
accused may appeal, but only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision.
Or, said judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court,
in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of
judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the
assailed judgment null and void. If there is grave abuse of discretion,
granting petitioners prayer is not tantamount to putting private respondents
in double jeopardy.
YES. Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the
instance of her private counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the CA when it acquitted private respondents. As the
aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right to bring the action in her name
and maintain the criminal prosecution. She has an immense interest in
obtaining justice in the case precisely because she is the subject of the
violation. Further, as held in Dela Rosa v. CA, where the Court sustained the
private offended partys right in a criminal case to file a special civil action
for certiorari to question the validity of the judgment of dismissal and ruled
that the Solicitor Generals intervention was not necessary, the recourse of
the complainant to the Court is proper since it was brought in her own name
and not in that of the People of the Philippines. In any event, the OSG joins
petitioners cause in its Comment, thereby fulfilling the requirement that all
criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor.
CHIOK VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 179814, DEC. 7, 2015 - RAM
ISSUE: Whether or not the case is an exception to the rule on finality of
acquittal and the doctrine of double jeopardy?
Ruling: No. Exceptions to the rate on finality-of-acquittal and double
jeopardy doctrine do not apply.
One exception is in Galman v. Sandiganbayan, where the court remanded a
judgment of acquittal to a trial court due to a finding of mistrial. In that case,
the court concluded that there was a mock or sham trial because of the
overwhelming evidence of collusion and undue pressures made by former
President Marcos on the prosecution and the Justices who tried and decided
the case, which prevented the prosecution from fully ventilating its position
and offering all evidence.
In this case, Chua presents a report submitted by Judge Elvira D.C.
Panganiban showing irregularities in the BP 22 case against Chiok. The court
do not see the same evils presented in Galman when the alleged anomalies
pointed out by Chua were in a different case and when the main basis of the
acquittal is not on the credibility of the physical evidence but of the
testimony of Chua herself.
PEOPLE VS. BAYKER; G.R. NO. 170192, FEB. 10, 2016-SHEILA
Issue: Can an illegal recruiter be liable for the crimes of illegal recruitment
committed in large scale and estafa without the risk of being put in double
jeopardy?
Ruling: Yes. The conviction of the accused-appellant for illegal recruitment
committed in large scale did not preclude her personal liability for estafa
under Article 3l5(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code on the ground of
subjecting her to double jeopardy. The elements of estafa as charged are,
namely: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit; and (2) the offended party, or a third party suffered damage
or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. In contrast, the crime of illegal
recruitment committed in large scale requires different elements. Double
jeopardy could not result from prosecuting and convicting the accused-
appellant for both crimes considering that they were entirely distinct from
each other not only from their being punished under different statutes but
also from their elements being different.
DISINI VERSUS- SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, G.R. NO. 203335,
FEB. 18, 2014- BEVERLY

ISSUE: Is Sec. 20 of the Cybercrime Law a bill of attainder?

RULING: No. Since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation

of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1829, Section 20 necessarily incorporates
elements of the offense which are defined therein. If Congress had intended
for Section 20 to constitute an offense in and of itself, it would not have had
to make reference to any other statue or provision.

The act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done

"knowingly or willfully." There must still be a judicial determination of guilt,
during which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and justifications for
non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies
to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court.