ORIENT AIR SERVICES vs.

CA

FACTS:
American Airlines and Orient Air Services and Hotel Representatives entered into a General Sales Agency Agreement whereby American
authorized the latter to act as its exclusive general sales agent within the Philippines for the sale of air passenger transportation (services:
solicit and promote passenger traffic, servicing and supervising agents etc.)
o It was stipulated that neither Orient nor its sub-agents perform services for any other air carrier similar to those to be performed
hereunder for American without the prior written consent of American
o Remittances- ticket stock or exchange orders LESS commissions
o American will pay Orient sales agency commission and an overriding commission 3% of the tariff fares and charges for all
sales of transportation over Americans service by Orient or its sub-agents
o In case of default (remittance) American may terminate the agreement; otherwise either party may terminate without cause by
giving 30 days notice
American alleged that Orient failed to promptly remit the net proceeds of sales terminated the Agreement filed suit for accounting with
preliminary attachment or garnishment, mandatory injunction and restraining order
Orient denied allegations contending that after the application to the commission due it , plaintiff in fact still owed Orient a balance in
unpaid overriding commissions
TC: in favor of Orient termination was illegal and improper- ORDERED PLAINTIFF TO REINSTATE DEFENDANT AS ITS
GENERAL SALES AGENT
CA: affirmed TC with some modifications with respect to the monetary awards
AMERICAN claims overriding commission should be based only on ticketed sales-to be entitled to the 3% overriding commission, the sale
must be made by Orient Air and the sale must be done with the use of Americans ticket stocks
ORIENT: contractual stipulation of 3% overriding commission covers the total revenue of American not merely from the ticketed sales,
invoking its designation as the EXCLUSIVE General sales agent of american

ISSUE: extent of Orient Airs right to the 3% overriding commission

HELD: basis should be TOTAL REVENUE (in favor of Orient)

2 commissions; a) sales agency commission; b) overriding commission of 3% of tariff fares and charges for all sales of passenger transpo
over American air services. The latter type of commissions would accrue for sales of American made not on its ticket stock but on the
ticket stock of other air carriers sold by such carriers or other authorized ticketing facilities or travel agents. To rule otherwise would erase
any distinction between the 2 types of commissions
American air was the party responsible for the preparation of the agreement (contract of adhesion)
Since the American was still obligated to Orient for the said commission, Orient was justified in refusing to remit the sums demanded. The
termination was therefore WITHOUT cause and basis
(AGENCY PART) Appellate court erred in ordering American air to reinstate the defendant as its general sales agent
o Compelling American to extend its personality to Orient would be violative of the principles and essence of AGENCY
o AGENCY- contract whereby "a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of
another, WITH THE CONSENT OR AUTHORITY OF THE LATTER
o In an agent-principal relationship, the personality of the principal is extended through the facility of the agent
o The agent, by legal fiction, becomes the principal, authorized to perform all acts which the latter would have him do. Such a
relationship can only be effected with the consent of the principal, which must not, in any way, be compelled by law or by any
court

RALLOS vs FELIX GO CHAN

FACTS:
Concepcion and Gerundia both surnamed Rallos were sisters and registered co-owners of a parcel of land
The sisters executed a SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY in favor of their brother, Simeon Rallos, authorizing him to sell for and in their
behalf the said lot
March 3, 1955 Concepcion Rallos died September 12, 1955, Simeon sold the lot to Felix Go Chan- deed registered in the Registry of
Deeds and TCT was issued in the name of Felix Go Chan
Ramon Rallos, administrator of the Intestate estate of Concepcion filed a complaint praying that the sale be declared UNENFORCEABLE
and the share of Concepcion in the lot be reconveyed to her estate and that TCT in the name of Felix Go Chan be cancelled and a new one
be issued in the name of the corporation and the Intestate estate of Concepcion
TC: in favor of Ramon deed of sale declared null and void insofar as the share of Concepcion, and ordered Register of Deeds to issue
new TCT in the name of corporation and estate
CA: in favor of Felix Go Chan sales is VALID

ISSUE: what is the legal effect of an act performed by an agent AFTER the death of his principal? Is the sale valid?

HELD: NO
No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent him. A
contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or the legal representation or who has acted beyond his powers,
shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked
by the other contracting party
 o Out of the above given principles, sprung the creation and acceptance of the RELATIONSHIP OF AGENCY whereby one party,
called the principal (mandante), authorizes another, called the agent (mandatario), to act for and in his behalf in transactions with
third persons.
o The essential elements of agency are:
(1) there is consent, express or implied of the parties to establish the relationship;
(2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person;
(3) the agents acts as a representative and not for himself, and
(4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority
o AGENCY-basically personal representative and derivative in nature. The authority of the agent to act emanates from the powers
granted to him by his principal; his act is the act of the principal if done within the scope of the authority. Qui facit per alium
facit se. "He who acts through another acts himself"
ART 1919 CC- from A1709 of the Spanish CC- agency is extinguished by the death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the
principal or the agent
MANRESA: the juridical basis of agency is representation-it is not possible for the representation to continue to exist once the death of
either is established
POTHIER: agrees with Manresa; by the nature of agency, death extinguishes it
LAURENT: juridical tie between the principal and the agent is servered ipso jure
COMMON LAW: death of the principal effects instantaneous and absolute revocation of the authority of the agent unless the power be
coupled with an interest
GR: DEATH extinguishes agency
Exceptions:
1. Art 1930 if it has been constituted in the common interest of the principal and of the agent, or in the interest of a 3 rd person who
has accepted the stipulation in his favor
2. Art 1931 anything done by agent without the knowledge of the death of the principal is valid and fully effective with respect to
third persons who may have contracted with him in GF
Under 1931 there must be concurrence of the BOTH conditions below:
1. that the agent acted without knowledge of the death of the principal, and
2. that the third person who contracted with the agent himself acted in good faith (GF-3 rd person no knowledge of death of the
principal)
Since Ramon knew of the death of his sister Concepcion, Art 1931 is not applicable
Revocation by an act of the principal should be distinguished from revocation by operation of law such as the death of the principal. In the
latter, the extinguishment is instantaneously effective
CC does not impose a duty on the heirs to notify the agent of the death of the principal (it is the reverse which is required, heirs of agent
must notify principal of the death of the agent)
Whatever conflict of legal opinion was generated by Cassiday v. McKenzie in American jurisprudence, no such conflict exists in our own
for the simple reason that our statute, the Civil Code, expressly provides for two exceptions to the general rule that death of the principal
revokes ipso jure the agency

AIR FRANCE vs CA

FACTS:
The Ganas purchased from AIR FRANCE through Imperial Travels 9) "open-dated" air passage tickets for the Manila/Osaka/Tokyo/Manila
route. The tickets were valid until May 8, 1971.
Sometime in January 1971, Jose Gana sought assistance of Teresita Manucdoc for the the extension of the validity of the tickets. Teresita
enlisted the help of Lee Ella. Ella sent the tickets to Cesar Rillo, Office Manager of Air France.
The tickets were returned to Ella who was informed that extension was not possible unless the fare differentials resulting from the increase
in fares, triggered by an increase of the exchange rate of the US dollar to the Philippine peso and the increased travel tax were first paid.
Ella then returned the tickets to Teresita and informed her of the impossibility of extension.
The Ganas had scheduled their departure on May 7, 1971, day before the expiry.
Teresita requested Ella to arrange the revalidation of the tickets. Ella warned Teresita that although the tickets could be used by the
GANAS if they left on 7 May 1971, the tickets would no longer be valid for the rest of their trip because the tickets would then have
expired on 8 May 1971. Teresita replied that it will be up to the GANAS to make the arrangements. So Ella on his own, attached to the
tickets validating stickers for the Osaka/Tokyo flight
Notwithstanding the warnings, Ganas departed from Manila. However, for the Osaka/Tokyo flight, JAL refused to honor the tickets
because of their expiration. Same difficulty wrt their return trip to Manila as Air France also refused to honor the tickets
So upon their return, the Ganas commenced an action for damages arising from Breach of Contract of carriage
AIR FRANCE
o Ganas brought upon themselves the predicament they found themselves in
o Ellas affixing of validating stickers on the tickets without the knowledge and consent of Air France violated airline tariff rules
and regulation and was beyond the scope of his authority as a travel agent
o It was not guilty of any fraudulent conduct or bad faith
TC- in favor of Air France- dismissed the complaint
CA- reversed TC

ISSUE: WON Air France should be held liable

HELD: NO
Tickets are valid only for 1 yr- passenger must undertake the final portion of his journey by departing from the last point at which he has
made a voluntary stop- since tickets were already expired, Air France cannot be faulted for breach of contract
The Ganas cannot defend by contending lack of knowledge of those rules since the evidence bears out that Teresita, who handled travel
arrangements for the GANAS, was duly informed by travel agent Ella of the advice of Reno, the Office Manager of Air France, that the
tickets in question could not be extended beyond the period of their validity without paying the fare differentials and additional travel taxes
brought about by the increased fare rate and travel taxes
Teresita was the AGENT of the GANAS and notice to her of the rejection of the request for extension of the validity of the tickets was
notice to the GANAS, her principals
The validating sticker for the Osaka/Tokyo flight, without clearing the same with Air France was certainly in contravention of IATA rules
although as he had explained, he did so upon Teresitas assurance that for the onward flight, the Ganas would make other arrangements

SANTOS vs BUENCONSEJO

FACTS:
Lot- originally owned in common by Anatolio Buenconsejo (1/2) and Lorenzo and Santiago Bon (1/2)
Anatolios rights, interests and participation over the portion of the said lot was transferred and conveyed to Atty. Tecla San Andres Ziga
awardee in an auction sale (decision in juvenile delinquency and domestic relations court)
By virtue of Certificate of redemption- rights, interests, claim and/or participation of Atty Ziga were transferred and conveyed to petitioner
(Santos) in his capacity as attorney-in-fact of the children of Anatolio
It would appear that petitioner Santos had redeemed the aforementioned share of Anatolio , upon the authority of a special power of
attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by the children of Anatolio
Santos now claims to have acquired the share of Anatolio in the said lot caused a subdivision plan- he wants said to segregate his alleged
share in the lot and a TCT issued in his name

ISSUE: WON Santos can claim ownership over the said portion of the lot

HELD: NO
Said SPA athorized him to act on behalf of the children of Anatolio, hence, it could not have possibly vested in him any property right in his
own name
Children of Anatolio had no authotity to execute said power of attorney, because Anatolio is still alive, in fact he opposed the petition of
Santos
Assuming SPA-valid, Santos could have acquired no more than the share pro-indiviso of Anatolio so that he cannot, without the conformity
of the other co-owners, or a judicial decree of partition, adjudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate portion of said Lot

ALBALADEJO Y CIA vs The PHILIPPINE REFINING CO., as successor to The Visayan Refining Co.,

FACTS:
1918- Albaladejo y Cia (ltd part-engaged in buying and selling) and Visayan Refining (corp-engaged in manufacturing of oil) entered into a
contract whereby Albaladejoy binds itself to sell to Visayan, all the copra purchased by it- contract: 1yr
Due to the agreement- Albaladejo bought copra extensively for Visayan. At the end of 1 yr, both parties continued the existing agreement
by tacit consent
1920- Visayan closed down its factory at Opon Cebu and withdrew from the copra market
Because of the large requirements of Visayan, Albaladejo extended its business that during the course of the next 2-3 years, it established
some 20 agencies or sub-agencies
After the Visayan had ceased to buy copra, their accounts were liquidated. It appeared that per the last account rendered, a balance of P288
in favor of Visayan was shown Albaladejo expressed its approval of the said account- no dissatisfaction was expressed by Albaladejo
until 6 wks after when it filed a case
2 CoA:
1. Negligent failure of Visayan to provide opportune transportation for the copra collected by the plaintiff allegedly, it suffered the
diminishment of weight
2. Recovery of the amount expended by plaintiff in maintaining and extending its organization. It is alleged that the extension of
the business was due to the repeated assurances of Visayan that it would soon resume its business
TC: not negligent wrt 1st CoA but ordered Visayan to pay 30% of the costs wrt 2nd CoA
ALBALADEJO: contract between the plaintiff and the Visayan Refining Co. created the relation of principal and agent between
the parties, and the reliance is placed upon article 1729 of the Civil Code which requires the principal to indemnify the agent for
damages incurred in carrying out the agency

HELD: according to CoA

1. NO NEGLIGENCE
TC judge carefully examined the movements of the fleet of boats maintained by Visayan and found that Visayan had used
reasonable promptitude in its efforts to get the copra from the places where it had been deposited for shipment.
Shrinkage was extremely moderate and this fact goes to show that there was no undue delay on the part of the Visayan
As per agreement, copra should be paid for according to its weight upon arrival at Opon regardless of its weight when first
purchased
2. NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER
 Careful examination of the evidence, series of letters of Visayan to Albaladejo, convincing enough to support the ruling that
supposed liability does not exist
The correspondence sufficiently shows on its face that there was no intention on the part of the company to lay a basis for
contractual liability of any sort; and the plaintiff must have understood the letters in that light.
3. NO PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP
It is true that the Visayan Refining Co. made the plaintiff one of its instruments for the collection of copra; but it is clear that
in making its purchases from the producers the plaintiff was buying upon its own account and that when it turned over the
copra to the Visayan Refining Co., pursuant to that agreement, a second sale was effected.
In paragraph three of the contract it is declared that during the continuance of this contract the Visayan Refining Co. would
not appoint any other agent for the purchase of copra in Legaspi; and this gives rise indirectly to the inference that the
plaintiff was considered its buying agent. But the use of this term in one clause of the contract cannot dominate the real
nature of the agreement as revealed in other clauses, no less than in the caption of the agreement itself
In some letters, the term agents were used but But this designation was evidently used for convenience; and it is very clear
that in its activities as a buyer the plaintiff was acting upon its own account and not as agents, in the legal sense, of the
Visayan Refining Co. The title to all of the copra purchased by the plaintiff undoubtedly remained in it until it was delivered
by way of subsequent sale to said company.

THOMAS vs PINEDA

FACTS:
It appears that in 1931, Thomas bought the bar and restaurant known as Silver Dollar Caf at Plaza Sta Cruz.
He employed Pineda as a bartender-promoted to cashier and manager
During Japanese occupation, to prevent the business and its property from falling into enemy hands, Thomas made a fictitious sale to
Pineda fictitious sale was admitted by both parties; 2nd agreement (secret) stating that the sale was fictitious
Original building was destroyed by fire-Pineda was able to remove some furniture and a considerable qty of stocks to a place of safety-bar
was opened on Calle Bambang-after 4 months it was transferred to the original location
Thomas brought a CPA for the purpose of examining the books- Pineda threatened Thomas with a gun if they persisted in their purpose. So
Thomas filed a case and set up another bar with the same name on Echague St
1st CoA- Thomas sought to compel an ACCOUNTING of Pinedas operations during the time he was in control of the bar
o Pineda claims that there was a 3rd verbal agreement, the import of which was that he was to operate the business with no liability
other than to turn over to the plaintiff as the plaintiff would find it after the war
2nd CoA: ownership of Silver Dollar Caf trade name it appears that Pineda registered the business as his own

HELD:
1st CoA - valid
o Little or no weight can be attached to Pinedas assertion.As sole manager with full power to do as his fancies dictated, the
defendant could strip the business naked of all its stocks, leaving the plaintiff holding the bag, as it were, when the defendant's
management was terminated. Unless Thomas was willing to give away his property and its profits, no man in his right senses
would have given his manager an outright license such as the defendant claims to have gotten from his employer
o The conclusion thus seems clear that the defendant owes the plaintiff an accounting of his management of the plaintiff's business
during the occupation. The exact legal character of the defendant's relation to the plaintiff matters not a bit. It was enough to
show, and it had been shown, that he had been entrusted with the possession and management of the plaintiff's business and
property for the owner's benefit and had not made an accounting.
o It was error for the court below to declare at this stage of the proceeding, on the basis of defendant's incomplete and indefinite
evidence, that there were no surplus profits
o Monies and foodstuffs which the defendant said he had supplied the plaintiff and his daughters during the war are appropriate
items to be considered on taking account
o Upon plaintiffs release from the internment camp, he lost no time in looking for a site where he could open a saloon
o The use of the old name suggested that the business was in fact an extension and continuation of the Silver Dollar Caf
o Upon the reopening of the bar in the original place- lease was in the name of Thomas; calling cards saying Thomas is the
proprietor == defendant was only a manager
2nd CoA- Thomas is the owner of the trade name
o In the fictitious bill of sale Pineda acknowledged Thomas ownership of the business
o Business cards: Thomas is the proprietor
o No abandonment because when Thomas set up a new saloon it used the same name
o The most that can be said is that the the plaintiff instructed Pineda to renew the registration of the trade-name and the defendant
understood the instruction as permission to make the registration in his favor
o As legal proposition and in good conscience, the defendants registration of the trade name Silver Dollar Cafe must be deemed to
have been affected for the benefit of its owner of whom he was a mere trustee or employee.
o "The relations of an agent to his principal are fiduciary and it is an elementary and very old rule that in regard to
property forming the subject matter of the agency, he is estopped from acquiring or asserting a title adverse to that of
principal. His position is analogous to that of a trustee and he cannot consistently, with the principles of good faith, be
allowed to create in himself an interest in opposition to that of his principal or cestui que trust. A receiver, trustee,
attorney, agent or any other person occupying fiduciary relations respecting property or persons utterly disabled from
acquiring for his own benefit the property committed to his custody for management.
 o The rule stands on the moral obligation to refrain from placing one's self in position which ordinarily excite conflicts between
self-interest at the expense of one's integrity and duty to another, by making it possible to profit by yielding to temptation

PALMA vs CRISTOBAL

FACTS:
Teatro Arco approached Gonzalo Puyat & Sons. It was agreed between the parties that the latter would, on behalf of the plaintiff, order
sound reproducing equipment from the Starr Piano Company and that the plaintiff would pay the defendant, in addition to the price of the
equipment, a 10 per cent commission, plus all expenses, such as, freight, insurance, banking charges, cables, etc
Teatro was able to buy 2 equipment for $1,700 and $1,600 (bought the next yr)
About 3 yrs later, in connection with a civil case filed against Gonzalo, the officials of Arco discovered that the price quoted to them by the
defendant with regard to their two orders mentioned was not the net price but rather the list price, and that the defendants had obtained a
discount from the Starr Piano Company
They sought to obtain a reduction from the defendant or rather a reimbursement, and failing in this they brought the present action.
TC: contract between the parties was one of outright PURCHASE AND SALE
CA: relation between the parties was that of AGENT AND PRINCIPAL; even if it was purchase and sale, Gonzalo was guilty of fraud in
concealing the true price

ISSUE: what is the nature of the contract between the parties

HELD: PURCHASE AND SALE

Citing TC judge, Court said that "whatever unforseen events might have taken place unfavorable to the defendant (petitioner), such as
change in prices, mistake in their quotation, loss of the goods not covered by insurance or failure of the Starr Piano Company to properly
fill the orders as per specifications, the plaintiff (respondent) might still legally hold the defendant (petitioner) to the prices fixed of $1,700
and $1,600." This is incompatible with the pretended relation of agency between the petitioner and the respondent, because in agency, the
agent is exempted from all liability in the discharge of his commission provided he acts in accordance with the instructions received from
his principal (section 254, Code of Commerce), and the principal must indemnify the agent for all damages which the latter may incur in
carrying out the agency without fault or imprudence on his part (article 1729, Civil Code).
The provision on 10% commission is only an additional price which the respondent bound itself to pay, and which stipulation is not
incompatible with the contract of purchase and sale
To hold the petitioner an agent of the respondent in the purchase of equipment and machinery from the Starr Piano Company of
Richmond, Indiana, is incompatible with the admitted fact that the petitioner is the exclusive agent of the same company in the
Philippines. It is out of the ordinary for one to be the agent of both the vendor and the purchaser
The petitioner as vendor is not bound to reimburse the respondent as vendee for any difference between the cost price and the sales price
which represents the profit realized by the vendor out of the transaction. This is the very essence of commerce
The twenty-five per cent (25%) discount granted by the Starr piano Company to the petitioner is available only to the latter as the former's
exclusive agent in the Philippines. The respondent could not have secured this discount from the Starr Piano Company and neither was the
petitioner willing to waive that discount in favor of the respondent.
Gonzalo was not duty bound to reveal the private arrangement it had with the Starr Piano Company relative to such discount
It is well known that local dealers acting as agents of foreign manufacturers, aside from obtaining a discount from the home office,
sometimes add to the list price when they resell to local purchasers. It was apparently to guard against an exhorbitant additional price that
the respondent sought to limit it to 10 per cent, and the respondent is estopped from questioning that additional price

VALERA vs VELASCO

FACTS:
By virtue of the powers of attorney executed by the Valera, the Velasco was appointed attorney-in-fact of the said Valera with authority to
manage his property in the Philippines, consisting of the usufruct of a real property located of Echague Street, City of Manila
The liquidation of accounts revealed that the Valera owed the defendant P1,100, and as misunderstanding arose between them, the Velasco
brought suit against the Valera
TC: in favor of agent Velasco; sheriff levied upon Valeras right of usufruct, sold it at public auction and adjudicated it to Velasco in
payment of all his claim
Valera sold his right of redemption to Eduardo Hernandez- Hernandez conveyed the same right of redemption to Valera himself-but then
another person Salvador Vallejo, who had an execution upon a judgment against the plaintiff rendered in another case, levied upon said
right of redemption- right of redemption sold to Vallejo and was definitely adjudicated to him. Later, he transferred the said right of
redemption to Velasco (so ung right of redemption nauwi kay Velasco so in effect the title was consolidated in his name, ergo the agent got
the title to the right of usufruct to the aforementioned property)

ISSUE: WON the agency was terminated

HELD: YES:
Art 1732. Agency is terminated by: a) revocation, b)withdrawal of agent, c)death, interdiction, bankruptcy, or insolvency of the principal or
of the agent
A1736. An agent may withdraw by giving notice to principal. If principal suffer any damage, agent must indemnify him unless the agents
reason should be the impossibility of continuing to act as such without serious detriment to himself
 Cited syllabus of De la Pena vs Hidalgo (weird!) renouncing agency-agent about to depart because of health & medical reasons
The misunderstanding between the plaintiff and the defendant over the payment of the balance of P1,000 due the latter more than prove the
breach of the juridical relation between them; for, although the agent has not expressly told his principal that he renounced the
agency, yet neither dignity nor decorum permits the latter to continue representing a person who has adopted such an antagonistic
attitude towards him
When the agent filed a complaint against his principal for recovery of a sum of money arising from the liquidation of the accounts between
them in connection with the agency, Federico Valera could not have understood otherwise than that Miguel Velasco renounced the agency;
because his act was more expressive than words and could not have caused any doubt.
In order to terminate their relations by virtue of the agency the defendant, as agent, rendered his final account on March 31, 1923 to the
plaintiff, as principal.
Briefly, then, the fact that an agent institutes an action against his principal for the recovery of the balance in his favor resulting
from the liquidation of the accounts between them arising from the agency, and renders and final account of his operations, is
equivalent to an express renunciation of the agency, and terminates the juridical relation between them.
Hence, the said agent's purchase of the aforesaid principal's right of usufruct at public auction held by virtue of an execution issued upon
the judgment rendered in favor of the former and against the latter, is valid and legal
Moreover, the defendant-appellee, Miguel Velasco, having acquired Federico Valera's right of redemption from Salvador Vallejo, who had
acquired it at public auction by virtue of a writ of execution issued upon the judgment obtained by the said Vallejo against the said Valera,
the latter lost all right to said usufruct.
Neither did the trial court err in not ordering Miguel Velasco to render a liquidation of accounts from March 31, 1923, inasmuch as he had
acquired the rights of the plaintiff by purchase at the execution sale, and as purchaser, he was entitled to receive the rents from the date of
the sale until the date of the repurchase, considering them as part of the redemption price; but not having exercised the right repurchase
during the legal period, and the title of the repurchaser having become absolute, the latter did not have to account for said rents.

CUI vs CUI

FACTS:
Quo warranto (action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise)- administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili
(charitable institution-indigent invalids)
Initial management Don Pedro and Donya Benigna. Pedro and Benigna Benigna Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem Teodoro Cui
(son of Mauricio)
Plantiff Jesus and Defendant Antonio are brothers (sons of one of the nephews of the spouses)
Teodoro-resigned in favor of Antonio pursuant to a convenio Jesus had no prior notice of the convenio or of his brother;s assumption of
the position
Another person- Romulo Cui- grandson of another nephew of the spouses-also claims a right to the same office
Jesus holds the degree of Bachelor of laws-UST but failed the bar
Antonio- was a member of the bar- disbarred for immorality and unprofessional conduct -reinstated 2 wks prior to his assumption of the
position

ISSUE: what is the meaning of the term titulo de abogado

HELD: (Antonio won)

The term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due
admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law
In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as "testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" and the word
"abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses
de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos legales que se le consultan.
A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to
exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general
signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court; requires passing the Bar
examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court
Antonios reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the
first place. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment
were wiped out
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the prescription or laches 9filed more than 1 yr
after the right of Jesus to hold the office arose

ALLIED FREE WORKERS' UNION (PLUM) vs COMPAIA MARITIMA

FACTS:
MARITIMA is a local corporation engaged in the shipping business; AFWU is duly registered legitimate labor organization
 MARITIMA, through Teves, entered into a CONTRACT with AFWU; MARITIMA hereby engage the services of the Allied
Free Workers' Union to do and perform all the work of stevedoring and arrastre services of all its vessels or boats calling in
the port of Iligan City; MARITIMA shall not be liable for the payment of the services rendered by the Allied Free Workers'
Union; same is payable by the owners and consignees of cargoes,
During the first month AFWU rendered satisfactory service, subsequently, former complained to the latter of unsatisfactory
and inefficient service by the laborers doing the arrastre and stevedoring work
AFWU presented to MARITIMA a written proposal5 for a collective bargaining agreement
MARITIMA answered, alleging lack of employer-employee relationship between the parties.
MARITIMA informed AFWU of the termination of the CONTRACT because of the inefficient service rendered by the latter
which had adversely affected its business
AFWU charged MARITIMAwith ULP
MARITIMA filed an action9 to rescind the CONTRACT , enjoin AFWU members from doing arrastre and stevedoring work in
connection with its, vessels, and for recovery of damages against AFWUand its officers
CFI: ordered the rescission of the contract
Complaint for ULP-dismissed
AFWU: citing jurisprudence, claims that it can be considered a mere agent of MARITIMA

ISSUE:
1. WON there was EER
2. WON AFWU is an agent of MARITIMA
3. WON termination of contract was done in BF

HELD:
1. NO
4-fold test not present (POWER: hire, dismiss, pay wages, Control- means and results)
Under the law the duty to bargain collectively arises only between the "employer" and its "employees". Where neither
party is an "employer" nor an "employee" of the other, no such duty would exist. Needless to add, where there is no duty
to bargain collectively the refusal to bargain violates no right.
AFWU independent contractor of MARITIMA
AFWU is the employer of the laborers
2. NO
Suffice it to say on this point that an agent can not represent two conflicting interests that are diametrically opposed. And
that the cases sought to be relied upon did not involve representatives of opposing interests.
3. NO
Evidence is clear that Teves, in representation of the principal, the respondent Compaia MARITIMA, has also acted, in
good faith in implementing the provisions of their existent CONTRACT (Exhibit "A"), and when he advised the union of
the rescission of the said CONTRACT effective August 31, 1954, he did so in the concept that the employer firm may so
terminate their contract pursuant to paragraph 4 of Exhibit "A" which at the time was the law controlling between them
Termination was due to the unsatisfactory service of the union laborers
There was a showing that the laborers employed by the union were inefficient in performing their jobs, and the business
of the respondent company in Iligan City suffered adversely during the year 1954; and this was due to the fact that
respondents' vessels were forced to leave cargoes behind in order not to disrupt the schedule of departures. The Union
laborers were slow in loading and/or unloading freight from which the respondent Compaia MARITIMA secured its
income and/or profits