III.

EMINENT DOMAIN

Definition
Bardillon v Barangau Masili GR. 146886 April 30, 2003
(to follow)

Estate of JBL Reyes v City of Manila GR 132431 Feb. 13, 2004

FACTS OF THE CASE:
Jose B. L. Reyes and petitioners Heirs of Edmundo Reyes are the pro-indiviso co-owners in
equal proportion of 11 parcels of land with a total area of 13,940 square meters situated at Sta. Cruz
District, Manila. These parcels of land are being occupied and leased by different tenants, among whom
are respondents Abiog, Maglonso and members of respondent Sampaguita Bisig ng Magkakapitbahay,
Incorporated (SBMI). Jose B.L. Reyes and petitioners Heirs of Edmundo Reyes filed ejectment
complaints against respondents Rosario Abiog and Angelina Maglonso, among others. Upon his death,
Jose B.L. Reyes was substituted by his heirs. Petitioners obtained favorable judgments against said
respondents. Respondents Abiog and Maglonso appealed the MTC decisions but the same were denied
by the RTC. Their appeals to the Court of Appeals were likewise denied. As no appeals were further
taken, the judgments of eviction against respondents Abiog and Maglonso became final and executory
in 1998.

Meanwhile, during the pendency of the two ejectment cases against respondents Abiog and
Maglonso, respondent City filed a complaint for eminent domain (expropriation) of the properties of
petitioners at the RTC. The properties sought to be acquired by the City included parcels of land
occupied by respondents Abiog, Maglonso and members of respondent SBMI. The complaint was based
on Ordinance No. 7818 authorizing the City Mayor of Manila to expropriate certain parcels of land to be
distributed to the intended beneficiaries, who were the occupants of the said parcels of land who (had)
been occupying the said lands as lessees or any term thereof for a period of at least 10 years.

The complaint alleged that, respondent City thru City Legal Officer Angel Aguirre, Jr. sent the
petitioners a written offer to purchase the subject properties but the same was rejected. Respondent
City prayed that an order be issued fixing the provisional value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the real properties and that it be authorized to enter and take possession thereof upon the
payment of the deposit with the trial court.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for eminent domain

The trial court allowed respondent City to take possession of the subject property upon payment
of the deposit based on the offer by respondent City to petitioners which the trial court fixed as the
provisional amount of the subject properties. Respondent City filed an opposition to petitioners motion
to dismiss. The Citys complaint for eminent domain was dismissed and respondent Citys motion for
reconsideration was denied. It appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision reversing the trial court judgment and
upholding as valid respondent Citys exercise of its power of eminent domain over petitioners properties.

From the aforementioned decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners filed petition for review
before this Court. Alleging that respondent City cannot expropriate the subject parcels of land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent City may legally expropriate the subject properties of the
petitioners?

RULING:
Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279 specifically provide that:
Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land.Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in
the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including
government-owned or-controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas of Priority Development,

Zonal Improvement sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have
not yet been acquired;

(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired;
and
(f)Privately-owned lands.

Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries,
the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give budgetary
priority to on-site development of government lands.

Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition.The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act
shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land
banking, donation to the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation:
Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have
been exhausted: Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by
small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: Provided, finally, that abandoned
property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to
the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.

In Filstream vs. Court of Appeals, we held that the above-quoted provisions are limitations to
the exercise of the power of eminent domain, specially with respect to the order of priority in acquiring
private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquire the same. Private
lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation
proceedings are to be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted.
Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of oftentimes
helpless owners of private property against violation of due process when their property is forcibly taken
from them for public use.
We find that herein respondent City failed to prove strict compliance with the requirements of
Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279.

Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power
of eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of the State to expropriate private
property as long as it is for public use always takes precedence over the interest of private property
owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the exercise of
such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this superior right cannot
override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated.
In this regard, vigilance over compliance with the due process requirements is in order.

Due to the fatal infirmity in the Citys exercise of the power of eminent domain, its complaint for
expropriation must necessarily fail.

Who exercises the power?

City of Manila vs. Chinese Cemetery of Manila, 40 Phil 349 (1919)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The city of Manila presented a petition to expropriate certain parcels of land situated in the Block
83 of Binondo for the purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal
Avenue, Manila.
The plaintiff alleged that the expropriation was necessary. The defendants, Comunidad de
Chinos de Manila, Ildefonso Tambunting and Feliza Concepcion de Delgado, with her husband, Jose
Maria Delgado, and each of the other defendants, each alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said
expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many
years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be converted
into a street for public purposes.
Upon the issue thus presented by the petition and the various answers, the Honorable Simplicio
del Rosario, judge, decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of
land in question, and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint,
without any finding as to costs.
From that judgment the plaintiff appealed.

ISSUES: Whether or not the City of Manila has the right to exercise the right of expropriation? And
whether or not a private property devoted for public use be expropriated?

RULING:
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can
exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine
the question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the
present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First,
the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that
neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that
the right is being exercised in accordance with law.

The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that
necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or
accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511;
Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)
the record does not show conclusively that the plaintiff has definitely decided that there exists
a necessity for the appropriation of the particular land described in the complaint. Aside from insisting
that there exists no necessity for the alleged improvements, the defendants further contend that the
street in question should not be opened through the cemetery. One of the defendants alleges that said
cemetery is public property. If that allegations is true, then, of course, the city of Manila cannot
appropriate it for public use. The city of Manila can only expropriate private property.
It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery used
by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while the latter is used only by a family, or a
small portion of the community or neighborhood. (11 C. J., 50.)
Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken
for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and
unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future use. (Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 434, and
cases cited.)
It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general
community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would
make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff
must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate
public property.
But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a
public street, especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery,
should be a question of great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until
it is fully established that the greatest necessity exists therefor.

Moday v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 368 (1997)

FACTS OF THE CASE:
On July 23, 1989 the sangguniang bayan of the municipality of bunawan in agusan del sur
passed a resolution, authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate the petition for expropriation of a 1 hectare
portion of lot along the national highway owned by the petitioner Percival Moday for the site of bunawan
farmers center and other government sports facilities. The resolution was approved by the municipal
mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and was transmitted to the sangguniang panlalawigan for their approval.The
sangguniang panlalawigan disapproved said resolution and returned it with the comment that
expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in bunawan for the
establishment of the government center.The municipality of bunawan, herein public respondent,
subsequently filed a petition for eminent domain against petitioner Percival moday before the RTC.Public
respondent municipality field a motion to take or enter upon the possession of the subject matter of this
case stating that it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount in
accordance with section 2, rule 67 of the revised rules of court and that it would be in the governments
best interest for public respondent to be allowed to take possession of the property The RTC granted
respondent municipality motion to take possession of the land. It ruled that sangguniang panlalawigan
failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective. It added that the duty of sangguninang
panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and resolutions passed by the sangguniang bayan.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The latter affirmed the decision of the RTC. The
municipality had erect 3 buildings on the subject property.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution
invoking imminent domain.

RULING:
YES, eminent domain, the power which the municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant
case is a fundamental state power that is inseparable from the sovereignty. It is governments right to
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the state, private property for public use or purpose.
Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated
to local governments, other public entities and public utilities.For the taking of private property by the
government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation.

The municipalitys power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly
provided for BP337, the local government code in force at the time of the expropriation proceedings
were initiated.what petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right
since the sangguniang panlalawigan disapproved resolution no. 43-89.

The sangguninang panlalawigans disapproval of the resolution is an affirm action which does
not render said resolution null and void. The law, section 153 of B.P blg 337, grants the sangguniang
panlalawigan the power to declare resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of
the sangguninag bayan or the mayor issue.

(VELAZCO VS BLAS) The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any
municipal resolution, ordinance or order invalid in when such is beyond the powers conferred upon the
council or president making the same absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law . A strictly
legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution, Ordinance or
order. The provincial disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically
upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred
by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative function of the municipal council
or president. Such has been the consistent course of executive authority.

Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal
Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of
eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the
earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and
binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.

The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation
must be made and due process of law must be observed. The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of
such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the taking and the public use character or
the purpose of the taking, has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine
and of a public character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be
taken.

Constitutional limitation - Art. II, Sec. 9

Distinguished from destruction due to necessity
Objects of Expropriation
RP. v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620 (1969)

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers
through its branches and instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications.
The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT for short), is a public
service corporation holding a legislative franchise, to install, operate and maintain a telephone system
throughout the Philippines and to carry on the business of electrical transmission of messages within
the Philippines and between the Philippines and the telephone systems of other countries.
Soon after its creation, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government
Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the
PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. The Bureau has extended its services to the
general public since 1948, using the same trunk lines owned by, and rented from, the PLDT, and
prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule of rates.
The defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, complained to the Bureau of
Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch
Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for the
Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private
persons or the general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said
violations were not stopped, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections. When the PLDT received
no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau. The result was the isolation of the
Philippines, on telephone services, from the rest of the world, except the United States.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter into an
agreement with the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement; that under Executive Order 94,
establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to servicing government
offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since the PLDT knew, or ought
to have known, at the time that their use by the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence
the Bureau was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT; and, in view of serious
public prejudice that would result from the disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the preliminary
injunction permanent, although it dismissed both the complaint and the counterclaims.
Both parties appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the State can compel PLDT, a private corporation, to provide
telecommunication services for the government telephone system.

RULING:
while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may,
in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the
government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the
court.

the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession
of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of
to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It
is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of
way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow inter-service connection between both telephone
systems is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and
benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national
welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why
the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just
compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the
users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use.

"when the Bureau of Telecommunications subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or
should have known that their use by the subscriber was more or less public and all-embracing in nature,
that is, throughout the Philippines, if not abroad" (Decision, Record on Appeal, page 216).
 The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the
plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, continuously since 1948, implies
assent by the defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained for a long
time and the public has patronized both telephone systems, and their interconnection is to the public
convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now at liberty to
unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk lines.

Where Expropriation Suit is Filed

Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor, GR 138896 June 20, 2000
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu a Complaint to
expropriate a property of the respondents. In an Order dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed the
Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that an action for eminent domain is within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC and not with MTC.

The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent
domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine
whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. It appears from the current Tax Declaration
of the land involved that its assessed value is only P1,740.00. Pursuant to Section 3, paragraph (3), of
Republic Act No. 7691, all civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property with an assessed
value of less than P20,000.00 are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTCs. In the case at
bar, it is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC of Talisay, Cebu, where the property involved
is located.

Petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a pure question of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action for eminent domain is within the jurisdiction of the MTC?

RULING:
The Court ruled that the action for eminent domain is within the jurisdiction of the RTC. In the
present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money but it deals with the
exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use. The subject
of an expropriation suit is the governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. The value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for
the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. However, this is merely incidental to
the expropriation suit. The amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the
expropriation.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano, the Court held that "condemnation proceedings are
within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance," the forerunners of the RTCs. The said case was
decided during the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided
that courts of first instance had original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation." The 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were not
intended to change these jurisprudential precedents.

Also, the Court is not persuaded by respondents argument that the present action involves the
title to or possession of a parcel of land. They cite the observation of retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, an
eminent authority in remedial law, that condemnation or expropriation proceedings are examples of real
actions that affect the title to or possession of a parcel of land. Their reliance is misplaced. Justice Feria
sought merely to distinguish between real and personal actions. His discussion on this point pertained
to the nature of actions, not to the jurisdiction of courts. In fact, in his pre-bar lectures, he emphasizes
that jurisdiction over eminent domain cases is still within the RTCs under the 1997 Rules.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Orders SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court is directed to HEAR the case. No costs.
Taking
Definition and scope
Requisites of Taking
Republic vs. Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Philippine Air Force) occupied the land situated in
Floridablanca, Pampanga of Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, the judicial administratrix of the estate of the
late Alfonso de Castellvi since by virtue of a contract of lease. Before the expiration of the contract of
lease, the Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused, intending to subdivide the lots for
sale to the general public; filed civil case for ejectment of AFP. In view of the difficulty for the army to
vacate the premises due to permanent installations and other facilities, AFP filed expropriation
proceedings and was placed in possession of the lands on 10 August 1959.

In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the
above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was
not more than P2,000 per hectare (P.20/sqm), or a total market value of P259,669.10 when AFP first
had the taking of the said property by virtue of the special lease agreement. Respondents allege that
their lands are residential with a fair market value of not less than P15/sqm.

The trial court rendered its decision, finding that the unanimous recommendation of the
commissioners of P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots subject of the action is fair and just
compensation

ISSUES:

1. Whether the taking of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of the action
2. Whether the P10/sqm is fair and just compensation.

RULING:
1. The "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered
to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee. Elements
B & E were not present when Republic entered the properties in 1947.

The following are the requisites of a proper taking for the purpose of eminent domain:

a. Expropriator must enter a private property.

b. Entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period.
c. Entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority.
d. Property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected.
e. Utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
f. Whether the P10/sqm is fair and just compensation.

2. Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the just compensation is to be

determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint
for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
Herein, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority
of the court, on 10 August 1959.

The taking of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid
should not be paid based on 1947 fair market value amount.
 The basic guidelines in determining the value of the land to be expropriated are: a) same
considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property between private parties; and b) estimated by
reference to the use for which the property is suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of
the community, or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future.

In expropriation proceedings, therefore, the owner of the land has the right to its value for the use for
which it would bring the most in the market.

We have arrived at the conclusion that the price of P10/sqm is quite high. The price of P5/sqm would
be a fair valuation and would constitute a just compensation. We considered the resolution of the Provincial
Committee on Appraisal of the province of Pampanga informing, that in the year 1959 the lands could be
sold for from P2.50- P4/sqm, and the Court arrived at a happy medium between the price as recommended
by the commissioners and approved by the court, and the price advocated by the Republic.

City Govt. of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759 (1983)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Section 9 of ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY
OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:

"Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set
aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City
for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City.
Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for
operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application."

For several years, the aforementioned section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city
authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the
following resolution:

"RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the
City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon
City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6%... space intended for paupers
burial."

Pursuant to this resolution, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino,
Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced.

There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal, both petitioners and
respondent agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings.

The respondent court, therefore, rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of ordinance No.
6118, S-64 null and void.

A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council filed
the instant petition.

Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise
of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers.

On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation
of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property
such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner... of all beneficial use of
his property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance promulgated by the City Government of Quezon City was a valid
taking of property

RULING:
The ordinance enacted by the government of Quezon City is not a valid taking of private
property.

In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that the ordinance is actually a taking without just
compensation of a certain area of private cemeteries in order to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of creating or building public cemeteries, the State passes the burden to
private cemeteries. The exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just compensation
and the enactment of the ordinance without the payment of just compensation to the private owner would
amount to an unjust taking of real property.

Deprivation of Use
Republic vs. Fajardo , 104 Phil.443 (1958)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On Aug. 15, 1950, Juan Fajardo was the mayor of Baoo, Camarines Sur. During his term, the
municipal council passed Ordinance No. 7 which prohibited the construction or repair of any building
without a written permit from the mayor prior to construction or repairing.
In the year 1954, Fajardo and Babillonia (Fajardos son-in-law) applied for a permit to construct
a building adjacent to their gas station, still on Fajardos private land, separated from public plaza by a
creek wherein their request denied because it would destroy the view of the public plaza. They appealed
but were turned down.
Fajardo and Babillonia still proceeded to construct even without a permit because they claimed
that they needed a residence badly due to a typhoon destroying their previous place of residence
On Feb. 26, 1954, Fajardo et at., were charged and convicted by peace court of Baoo for
violating Ordinance no. 7. Affirmed by the CFI and the CA forwarded the case to the SC because the
appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise police power in its regulation of property.

RULING:
NO. Ordinance No. 7 went beyond the authority that the municipality could enact and is
therefore null and void. Fajardo et al., acquitted.
The ordinance is not merely lacking in providing standards to guide and/or control the discretion
vested by the ordinance. STANDARDS ARE ENTIRELY LACKING IN THIS CASE.
An ordinance grants mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant/deny construction/repair
permits. Legislation may validly regulate property in the interest of general welfare however, the state
may not under the guise of police power permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property
and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.
IN THIS CASE: Structures regardless of their own beauty and regardless of the fact that they
are built on private land are condemned by the ordinance appellants constrained would be constrained
to leave their land to idle without receiving just compensation for the virtual confiscation of their private
land.
Municipal government justified the ordinance under Revised Administrative Code Sec. 2243
C that municipal council shall have authority to exercise discretionary powers regarding establishing
fire limits in populous centers empowers municipal government to require construction/repair permits, to
charge fees for such permits

IN THIS CASE: there were no fire limits or safety regulations that the municipal council
promulgated in order to set a standard in the type of building that can be safely constructed in the public
plaza.

Napocor vs. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)

FACTS OF THE CASE:

 Plaintiff National Power Corporation (NPC), a government owned and controlled entity, in
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 120, is vested with the power of eminent domain for the
purpose of pursuing its objectives, which among others is the construction, operation, and maintenance
of electric transmission lines for distribution throughout the Philippines. For the construction of its 230
KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, plaintiff's lines have to pass the lands belonging to defendant
spouses Gutierrez. Chiefly, the only controversy existing between the partys litigants is the
reasonableness and adequacy of the disturbance or compensation fee of the expropriated properties. It
is the contention of petitioner that the Court of Appeals committed gross error by adjudging the petitioner
liable for the payment of the full market value of the land of P 10 pesos per square meter traversed by
its transmission lines, and that it overlooks the undeniable fact that a simple right-of-way easement (for
the passage of transmission lines) transmits no rights, except that of the easement. Full ownership is
retained by the private respondents and they are not totally deprived of the use of the land. They can
continue planting the same agricultural crops, except those that would result in contact with the wires.
On this premise, petitioner submits that if full market value is required, then full transfer of ownership is
only the logical equivalent otherwise, they are to pay only P1 per square meter as identified by the
corporation commissioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for
the land traversed by its transmission lines.

RULING:
While it is true that plaintiff is (sic) only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually
deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon
defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed.
Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to
life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all
plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said
affected portion of their property.
The nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the
limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use.
For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation.

Napocor v. San Pedro, G.R. 170945, September 26, 2006

FACTS OF THE CASE:
For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose 500 KV Transmission Line and Tower No.
SMJ-389, NPC negotiated with Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her son, Vicente, for an
easement of right of way over her property, Lot No. 2076. The property, which was partly agricultural
and partly residential land, was located in Barangay Partida, Norzagaray, Bulacan and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 00386.

The payment voucher for the residential portion of the lot valued at P6,000,000.00 (at P600.00
per square meter) was then processed.7 However, the NPC Board of Directors approved Board
Resolution No. 97-2468 stating that it would pay only P230.00 per sq m for the residential portion and
P89.00 per sq m for the agricultural portion, on the following premises:
The proposed land valuations were evaluated and analyzed using the joint appraisal report on
fair market value of lands by Cuervo Appraisal, Inc., Development Bank of the Philippines, and
the Land Bank of the Philippines and the fair market values established by the respective
Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Zambales, Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga and
Bulacan as well as the City Appraisal Committee (CAC) of San Carlos and Cabanatuan.
For lot acquisition, adopt PAC or CUERVO Appraisal, whichever is lower; if there is a problem
of acceptance, refer same to the Board;
For easement over agricultural lands, adopt median or average if there are several amounts
involved; and
Always oppose any proposals for conversion of agricultural lands.
On January 15, 1998, the NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bulacan against Maria and other landowners.
 Maria San Pedro filed her Answer on February 2, 1998, alleging that there had already been an
agreement as to the just compensation for her property. She prayed, among others, that she should be
paid the consideration stated in the Right of Way Grant, P600.00 per sq m for the residential portion of
the land as agreed upon by her and NPC, and to base the values from Resolution No. 97-00512 of the
Provincial Appraisal Committee.

During the pre-trial on January 25, 1999, the parties agreed that the only issue for resolution
was the just compensation for the property. The court appointed a committee of commissioners to
ascertain and recommend to the trial court the just compensation for the properties.

On June 6, 2001, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion of the heirs and denied
that of NPC. The RTC declared that the just compensation for the residential portion of the property
should be the same as that of the spouses Lagula's property, which was P499.00 per sq m. On the claim
of NPC in its motion for reconsideration that it should be made to pay only an easement fee, the trial
court ruled that Lot No. 2076 should be treated the same way as NPC treated the properties of the
spouses Lagula. It was pointed out that in the compromise agreements executed by plaintiff and spouses
Lagula, plaintiff paid P499.00 per sq m on the basis of a straight sale of their agricultural land, and not
merely an easement fee for a right of way thereon.

NPC appealed to the CA asserting that the lower court erred in its decision and prayed for modification.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner paid just compensation?

RULING:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.

The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to

the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in
the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between
one who receives, and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government.39 To determine the just compensation to be paid to the landowner, the nature and
character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion.40
In the July 12, 1999 Majority Report, the commissioners found that the property was located in
a highly-developed area and was accessible through an all-weather road. The fact that the property had
potential for full development as shown by the existence of building projects in the vicinity, and the long-
term effect of the expropriation on the lives, comfort and financial condition of petitioners was likewise
considered. The report also took into account the ocular inspection conducted by the commissioners on
May 11, 1999. The tax declaration of the subject property,41 the NPC sketch plan,42 the location plan,43
the zoning certificates,44 the zonal valuation of the BIR,45 and the opinion values46 were also
considered.
As had been amply explained by this Court in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay:
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for
expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering
several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are
never taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for
rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for
generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and
estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot
be absolute substitutes for just compensation.
To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors since they
had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of land owners accept unquestioningly
what is found in the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do
not even look at, much less analyze, the statements. The idea of expropriation simply never occurs until
a demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so.
It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in
the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow
the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and
arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair
and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent
domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission
lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use.

U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)

(Brief Fact Summary) Respondents claim that their property was taken, within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment, by the regular army and navy aircraft flights over their house and chicken farm.

(Synopsis of Rule of Law) The airspace is a public highway, but if the landowner is to have the
full enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control over the immediate reaches of the enveloping
atmosphere.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina.
Respondents property contained a house and a chicken farm. The end of one of the runways of the
airport was 2,220 feet from Respondents property, and the glide path passed over the property at 83
feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest tree. The
use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a lease beginning June 1, 1942, and ending June
30, 1942, with provisions for renewal until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national
emergency, whichever is earlier. The United States four motored bombers make loud noises when flying
above the property, and have very bright lights. Respondents chicken farm production had to stop,
because 150 chickens were killed by flying into walls from fright. In the Court of Claims, it was found that
the United States had taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the value of the
property depreciation as the result of the easement was $2,000.00. The United States petitioned for
certiorari, which was granted.

ISSUE: Has the respondents property been taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment

RULING:
Yes. But the case is remanded for a determination of the value of the easement and whether
theeasement was permanent or temporary.The court noted the common law doctrine of ownership of
land extending to the sky above the land.However, the court notes that an act of Congress had given
the United States exclusive national sovereigntyover the air space. The court noted that common sense
made the common law doctrine inapplicable.However, the court found that the common law doctrine did
not control the present case. The United Stateshad conceded in oral argument that if flights over the
Respondents property rendered it uninhabitable thenthere would be a taking compensable under the
Fifth Amendment. The measure of the value of the propertytaken is the owners loss, not the takers
gain.The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious that if the landowner is to have the full enjoyment
of hisland, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. If
this werenot true then landowners could not build buildings, plant trees or run fences.The airspace, apart
from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain. The court doesnot set the
precise limits of the line of demarcation. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless, likehere, they
are so low and frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment of theland. The
Court of Claims must, upon remand, determine the value of the easement and whether it is atemporary
or permanent easement.

PPI v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272 (1995)

FACTS OF THE CASE:
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) is before this Court assailing the constitutional validity
of Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) and its corresponding
Comelec directive dated 22 March 1995, through a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. Petitioner PPI
is a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers. On 2 March 1995,
Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 provides that the Commission shall procure free
print space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every
province or city for use as "Comelec Space.

Apparently in implementation of this Resolution, Comelec through Commissioner Regalado E.

Maambong sent identical letters, dated 22 March 1995, to various publishers of newspapers, requiring
the publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-
ready. The publishers were also reminded that the political parties/candidates may be accommodated
in their publication any day upon receipt of their materials until May 6, 1995 which is the last day for
campaigning.

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order, PPI asks the Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and
void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and
any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give
free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute
impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution.

On 20 April 1995, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining Comelec from
enforcing and implementing Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, as well as the Comelec directives
addressed to various print media enterprises all dated 22 March 1995. The Office of the Solicitor General
filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772
does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it
does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution.

At the oral hearing of this case held on 28 April 1995, respondent Comelec through its
Chairman, Hon. Bernardo Pardo, represented to the Court that Resolution and the related letter-
directives were merely designed to solicit from the publishers the same free print space which many
publishers had voluntarily given to Comelec during the election period relating to the 11 May 1992
elections.

On 5 May 1995, the Court received from the Office of the Solicitor General a manifestation
which attached a copy of Comelec Resolution No. 2772-A dated 4 May 1995. The operative portion of
this Resolution provides, among others, that Section 2 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed to mean
as requiring publishers of the different mass media print publications to provide print space, there being
no sanction or penalty for violation of said Section on the grant of "Comelec space."

ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 and the 22 March 1995 letter directives of
Comelec are unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation?

RULING:
The Court held that both are unconstitutional. To compel print media companies to
donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than
one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. The
threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are: one is the necessity for the
taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not
been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling
to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or
reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been
suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either
by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be
assumed.

The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but
not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying
compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission,
whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority
to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation,
or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A
attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from
voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling
publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for
Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in
part and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22
March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby
MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of
Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.

oOo