LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES

CITY OF MANILA vs. TEOTICO and CA

G.R. No. L-23052

January 29, 1968

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

FACTS: Teotico fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue, Manila as he
was trying to board a jeepney, causing injuries which required him to incur medical expenses.

Teotico filed, with the CFI of Manila, a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer,
city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police.

The CFI of Manila rendered a decision in favor of Teotico and dismissing the amended complaint, without costs.

On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the CA, except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned,
which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. Hence, this appeal for certiorari by the
City of Manila.

ISSUE: WON the City of Manila should be held liable as the incident happened on a NATIONAL highway

HELD: the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed

YES

The question to be determined is if present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the
City of Manila) reading:

The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the
Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions.

or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:

Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person
by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision.

Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law,
intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire
Philippines.

The CA , however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application
is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the
subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating
the liability of the City of Manila for: damages or injury to persons or property Upon the other hand, Article
2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for
damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason specifically of the defective condition
of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision.

In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof,
whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to defective streets, in particular. Since the present action is based
upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

MUN. OF SAN FERNANDO VS FIRME

FACTS: A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union collided.
Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died. The heirs of Bania filed a
complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the jeepney, who, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint
against the Municipality and its dump truck driver, Alfredo Bislig. Municipality filed its answer and raised the
defense of non-suability of the State. After trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered Municipality
and Bislig to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Bania.

ISSUES:

1. Are municipal corporations suable?

2. Is the Municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee who was then engaged in the discharge of
governmental functions?

1
HELD:

1. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are
subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be
sued.

2. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions
and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting
such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in
its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized
by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.

In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to
get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck
was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.

Decision of the lower court modified. Petitioner municipality was absolved of any liability.

MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY vs. DUMDUM, JR.G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010,
Peralta,J:

FACTS:
A complaint was filed by Lim Chao against the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan for collection of sum of money and
damages. The complaint alleged that a contract was entered into by Lim Chao and the Municipality for the delivery
of motor vehicles, which supposedly were needed to carry out certain developmental undertakings in the
municipality. Lim Chao then delivered to the Municipality of Hagonoy 21 motor vehicles amounting to
P5,820,000.00. However, despite having made several deliveries, the Municipality allegedly did not heed Lim Chaos
claim for
payment. Thus, she filed a complaint for full payment of the said amount, with interest and damages and prayed
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the Municipality. The trial court issued the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment directing the sheriff "to attach the estate, real and personal properties" of the Municipality.

The Municipality filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the claim on which the action had been brought was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds, pointing out that there was no written contract or document that would
evince the supposed agreement they entered into with respondent. It also filed a Motion to Dissolve and/or
Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment already issued, invoking, among others, immunity of the state from
suit. The Municipality argued that as a municipal corporation, it is immune from suit, and that its properties are by
law exempt from execution and garnishment. Lim Chao on her part, counters that, the Municipalitys claim of
immunity from suit is negated by the Local Government Code, which vests municipal corporations with the power
to sue and be sued.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts order.

ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the Municipality of Hagonoy is valid.

HELD:
No. The universal rule is that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action "only up to
the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the
judgment is rendered. Since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public
funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriations as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects.

GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE

NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC. VS SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD

155 SCRA 421 Political Law Inquiry in Aid of Legislation LGUs

In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in connection with
pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing were the heads of NORECO II
(Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.) Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have
installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the SP and they alleged
that the power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to conform to
standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter of

2
the City of Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the SP such power.
The SP averred that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power to conduct
investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its
jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.

HELD: No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting local
legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a
constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a
subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be
deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena
power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist
as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative
agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue
compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the
petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to
claim that it can exercise these powers. Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to
issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The
contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter
of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body.

TANO VS SOCRATES
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine
GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997

FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the shipment of
all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching ,
gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the said
ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the due
process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section
2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged ordinances did not
suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any
of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily
not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nations
marine wealth. The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine
resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph
of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal
waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to
effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and
devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise
of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.

CITY GOVT. OF QUEZON CITY VS ERICTA

Facts:

Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery
shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon
City for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon City engineer required the respondent, Himlayang
Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners
thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.

The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and
void.

3
Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondents property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power
and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argued
that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, to make such
further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health
and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.

On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or confiscation of property was
obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.

Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

Held:

No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.

Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand,
there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1)
police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as
necessary attributes of sovereignty.

An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that would justify
the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified
under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and
occupation as may be established or practised in the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to
prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a
memorial park cemetery.

Police power is defined by Freund as the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of
the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to
promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury
sustained in consequence thereof.

Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a city, by virtue of its
police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and the best and highest interests of the
municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered and society, that every holder
of property, however absolute and may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious
to the rights of the community. A property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are
necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights,
are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to
such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and
controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the
police power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and
safety of the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that
such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong
and oppression.

However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of
the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health,
morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of
Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the
dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance it simply authorizes the city to provide
its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been
the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to
set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements
which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The
beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold
to home-owners.

4
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is affirmed.

BINAY VS DOMINGO

Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial
assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to
be taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission
approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the
implementation of the program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the
disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the resolution has no
connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds
must be disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit
a few individuals.

Issues:

1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

Held:

1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized
government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est
suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise
such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the
inherent powers of the State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto they are clothed
with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge
the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health,
safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and
general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.

2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore
its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to
exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as
consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all
legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it
is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the
community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of
them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything
worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to
attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As
correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared
towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as
well as human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty.
The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common
good.

3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may
receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of
the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-
farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution
No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social
justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a
family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death.
Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life,
should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for
municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or
otherwise. (Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991)

5
RIMANDO VS EMISSION TESTING CENTER INC.

The Facts:
Naguillian Emission Testing Center Inc., filed a petition for mandamus and damages against Abraham Rimando
(petitioner), the municipal mayor of Naguilian, La Union. In its complaint, the company alleged that from 2005 to
2007 its business is located on a land formerly belonging to the national government which was later certified as an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain by the DENR. On January 18, 2008, it applied for a renewal of its
business permit and paid the corresponding fees, but the petitioner refused to issue a business permit, until such
time that the company executes a contract of lease with the municipality; the respondent is amenable to signing
the contract but with some revisions, which the petitioner did not accept; no common ground was reached among
the parties, hence the company filed the petition. The RTC ruled in favour of the petitioner; ratiocinating that: (a)
the Municipality of Naguiian is the declared owner of the subject parcel of land by virtue of Tax Declaration No.
002-01197; (b) under Section 6A.01 of the Revenue Code of the Municipality of Naguilian, the municipality has the
right to require the petitioner to sign a contract of lease because its business operation is being conducted on a real
property owned by the municipality; and (c) a mayors duty to issue business permits is discretionary in nature
which may not be enforced by a mandamus writ.

On appeal, the CA proceeded to discuss the merits of the case even though the petition itself is dismissible on the
ground of mootness. It held that the factual milieu of the case justifies issuance of the writ; the tax declaration in
the name of the municipality was insufficient basis to require the execution of a contract of lease as a condition
sine qua non for the renewal of a business permit. The CA further observed that Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No.
2007-81, upon which the municipality anchored its imposition of rental fees, was void because it failed to comply
with the requirements of the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. It held the
mayor not liable for damages since he acted in the performance of his duties which are legally protected by the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty; the case against the mayor also was moot and
academic since his term as mayor expired. Nevertheless, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

The Issue:
Whether or not the issue had become moot and academic;

Whether or not the issuance of a business permit maybe compelled thru a petition for mandamus.

The Ruling:
We agree with the CA that the petition for mandamus has already become moot and academic owing to the
expiration of the period intended to be covered by the business permit.

An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a
determination thereof would be without practical use and value1 or in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.2
In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the applicant would be entitled to and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition.3 As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on
ground of mootness.4

The objective of the petition for mandamus to compel the petitioner to grant a business permit in favor of
respondent corporation for the period 2008 to 2009 has already been superseded by the passage of time and the
expiration of the petitioners term as mayor. Verily then, the issue as to whether or not the petitioner, in his
capacity as mayor, may be compelled by a writ of mandamus to release the respondents business permit ceased to
present a justiciable controversy such that any ruling thereon would serve no practical value. Should the writ be
issued, the petitioner can no longer abide thereby; also, the effectivity date of the business permit no longer
subsists.

While the CA is not precluded from proceeding to resolve the otherwise moot appeal of the respondent, we find
that the decretal portion of its decision was erroneously couched.

The CAs conclusions on the issue of ownership over the subject land and the invalidity of Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution No. 2007-81, aside from being unsubstantiated by convincing evidence, can no longer be practically
utilized in favor of the petitioner. Thus, the overriding and decisive factor in the final disposition of the appeal was
its mootness and the CA should have dismissed the same along with the petition for mandamus that spawned it.

More importantly, a mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the exercise of the
same is a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature. This was the pronouncement of this Court in
Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor5 where a determination was made on the nature of the power of a mayor to
grant business permits under the Local Government Code6, viz:

Central to the resolution of the case at bar is a reading of Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of
1991, which provides, thus:

SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall: x x x x

3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of
development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly
6
those resources and revenues programmed for agroindustrial development and country-wide growth and progress,
and relative thereto, shall:

xxxx

(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said
licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.

As Section 444(b)(3)(iv) so states, the power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to Section 16 of
the Local Government Code of 1991, which declares:

SEC. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective
territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments.
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. Evidently, the Local
Government Code of 1991 is unequivocal that the municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits
and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been
issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. x x x

xxxx

Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, whereby the power of the respondent mayor to issue
license and permits is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated police power of a municipal corporation.
Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the question of whether the power is validly
exercised, the matter is within the province of a writ of certiorari, but certainly, not of mandamus.7 (Citations
omitted)

Indeed, as correctly ruled by the RTC, the petition for mandamus filed by the respondent is incompetent to compel
the exercise of a mayors discretionary duty to issue business permits.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
112152 is hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC v. CA

G.R. No. 94759, Jan. 21, 1991, 201 SCRA

FACTS:

Technology Developers, a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export ofcharcoal briquette, received a
letter from acting mayor Pablo Cruz: 1) ordering the full cessation of its plant in Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan until
further order, and 2) requesting its Plant Manager to bring before the office of the mayor its building permit,
mayor's permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit.

Technology Developers undertook to comply with the request to produce the required documents. It sought to
secure the Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit although prior to the
operation of the plant, a Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation was issued to it. Petitioners also
sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to secure a mayors permit but were not entertained.

Eventually, the acting mayor ordered that the plant premises be padlocked, effectively causing the stoppage of
operation. This was done without previous and reasonable notice.

Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction against the acting mayor with Bulacan RTC, alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of
discretion.

The RTC found that the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was proper, ordering the acting
mayor to immediately revoke his closure order and allow Technology Developers to resume its normal business
operations until the case has been adjudicated on the merits.

Upon MR, the Provincial Prosecutor presented evidence as to the allegation that "Due to the manufacturing
process and nature of raw materials used, the fumes coming from the factory may contain particulate matters
7
which are hazardous to the health of the people. As such, the company should cease operating until such a time
that the proper air pollution device is installed and operational."

Reassessing the evidence, the RTC set aside its order granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The CA
denied Technology Developer's petition for certiorari for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

W/N the acting mayor had a legal ground for ordering the stoppage of Technology Developer

HELD:

YES. The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by
petitioner:

1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a
pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially
addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and NaturalResources, it
must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution,
and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close
the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the
community from the emissions in the operation of the business.

2. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose
offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that
petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders.

3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels.

4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in
her report observed that the fumes emitted by the plant goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no
proper air pollution device has been installed.

5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a
building permit issued by an official of Makati on March 6, 1987.

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control
Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any
effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any
hazard to the health of the residents of the community.

Court takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-earning industry. It must be
stressed however, that concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the
economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from the
deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.

The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound
judicial discretion of the trial court and its action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse of its discretion. By the
same token the court that issued such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances may
warrant.

AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties Corp.

G.R. No. 166744. November 2, 2006.

SCRA Citation: 506 SCRA 625

DOCTRINE: Private and public nuisance; definition The term nuisance is so comprehensive that it has been
applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the
enjoyment of property, or his comfort; A private nuisance is one which violates only private rights and produces
damage to but one or a few persons while a nuisance is public when it interferes with the exercise of public right by
directly encroaching on public property or by causing a common injury, an unreasonable interference with the right
common to the general public. In this case, the noise generated by an airconditioning system is considered a
private nuisance.

Noise emanating from air-con units not nuisance per se Noise becomes actionable only when it passes the limits
of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the
listener; Injury to a particular person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive characteristics will not render
the noise an actionable nuisance. Whether or not the noise is a nuisance is an issue to be resolved by the courts.
8
Test to determine noise as a nuisance The test is whether rights of property, of health or of comfort are so
injuriously affected by the noise in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss [i.e. Actual Physical
Discomfort]which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding
property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise although ordinary care
is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another owner who, though
creating a noise, is acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those affected by it.

Action to abate private nuisance; incapable of pecuniary estiation an action to abate private nuisance, even
wehere the plaintiff asks for damages is one incapable of pecuniary estimation

FACTS: AC enterprises (Petitioner) is a corporation owns a 10-storey building in Makati City. Frabelle (Respondent)
is a condominium corporation who's condominium development is located behind petitioner. Respondent
complained of the 'unbearable noise emanating from the blower of the air-conditioning units of petitioner.

ISSUES:
(1) Is it a nuisance as to be resolved only by the courts in the due course of proceedings or a nuisance per se?

(2) Is an action for abatement of a private nuisance, more specifically noise generated by the blower of an air-
conditioning system, even if the plaintiff prays for damages, one incapable of pecuniary estimation?

(3) What is the determining factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint?

HELD:
(1) It is a nuisance to be resolved only by the courts in the due course of proceedings; the noise is not a nuisance
per se. Noise becomes actionable only whenn it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the
locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener. Injury to a particular person in a peculiar
position or of especially sensitive characteristics will not render the house an actionable nuisance in the
conditions, of present living, noise seems inseparable from the conduct of many necessary occupations.

(2) Yes, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation because the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money.

(3) The determining factor is not its intensity or volume; it is that the noise is of such character as to produce actual
physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities rendering adjacent property less
comfortable and valuable.

G.R. Nos. 159017-18 March 9, 2011

PAULINO S. ASILO, JR., Petitioner,vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses VISITACION AND CESAR C. BOMBASI,
Respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 159059

VICTORIA BUETA VDA. DE COMENDADOR, INREPRESENTATION OF DEMETRIO T.COMENDADOR,Petitioner,vs.
VISITACION C. BOMBASI AND CESAR C.BOMBASI,Respondents.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On 15 March 1978, Private Respondent Visitacions late mother Marciana Vda. De Coronado (Vda. De Coronado)
and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna (represented by the then Municipal Mayor Crisostomo P. Manalang)
entered into a lease contract whereby the Municipality allowed the use and enjoyment of property comprising of a
lot and a store located at the corner of Coronado and E. Fernandez Sts. at Poblacion, Nagcarlan, Laguna, in favor of
the respondents mother for a period of twenty (20) years beginning on 15 March 1978 until 15 March 1998,
extendible for another 20 years.
The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado could build a firewall on her rented property which
must be at least as high as the store; and in case of modification of the public market, she or her heir/s would be
given preferential rights.

Visitacion took over the store when her mother died sometime in 1984. From then on up to January 1993,
Visitacion secured the yearly Mayors permits.

Sometime in 1986, a fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan. Upon Visitacions request for inspection on 15 May
1986, District Engineer Marcelino B. Gorospe (Engineer Gorospe) of the then Ministry of Public Works and
Highways, Regional Office No. IV-A, found that the store of Visitacion remained intact and stood strong. This finding
of Engineer Gorospe was contested by the Municipality of Nagcarlan.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna issuedResolution No. 183 authorizing Mayor Comendador to
demolish the store being occupied by Visitacion using legal means. Mayor Comendador relying on the strength of
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution Nos. 183and 156 authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo and Angeles
supervising the work.Visitacion, filed with a case for damages before the RTC. Spouses Bombasi, thereafter, filed a
criminalcomplaint against Mayor Comendador, Asilo andAngeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No.3019
otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman.Sandiganbayan
9
rendered a decision, finding theaccused Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Sec.3(e) of Republic Act. No. 3019

The counsel for the late Mayor also filed its Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the death of the late Mayor
had totally extinguished both his criminal and civil liability. The Sandiganbayan granted the extinction of the
criminal liability is concerned and denied the extinction of the civil liability holding that the civil action is an
independent civil action. Hence, these Petitions for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES
1. WON the accused is guilty of violating RA 3019
2 WON the actual damages prayed for is unconscionable

DECISION

The Supreme Court sustain the Sandiganbayanin its finding of criminal and civil liabilities against petitioner Asilo
and petitioner Mayor Comendador. The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the accused are public
officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit the prohibited acts
during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they caused undue
injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party;(4) OR that such injury is caused by giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the other party; and (5) that the public officers have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Clearly, the demolition of plaintiffs store was
carried out without a court order, and notwithstanding are straining order which the plaintiff was able to obtain.
The demolition was done in the exercise of official DUTIES WHICH apparently was attended by evident bad faith,
manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence as there is nothing in the two (2)resolutions which gave the
herein accused the authority to demolish plaintiffs store. The accused public officials were devoid of any power to
demolish the store. A closer look at the contested resolutions reveals that Mayor Comendador was only authorized
to file an unlawful detainer case in case of resistance to obey the order or to demolish the building using legal
means. Clearly, the act of demolition without legal order in this case was not among those provided by the
resolutions, as indeed, it is a legally impossible provision.2.The amount of actual damages prayed for is
unconscionable. To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable. n this case,
the Court finds that the only evidence presented to prove the actual damages incurred was the itemized list of
damaged and lost items prepared by Engineer Cabrega,an engineer commissioned by the Spouses Bombasi to
estimate the costs. The amount claimed by the respondent-claimants witness as to the actual amount of
DAMAGES
should be admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be supported
by independent evidence."Whatever claim the respondent witness would allege must be appreciated in
consideration of his particular self-interest. There must still be a need for the examination of the documentary
evidence presented by the claimants to support its claim with regard to the actual amount of damages. The price
quotation made by Engineer Cabrega presented as an exhibit partakes of the nature of hearsay evidence
considering that the person who issued them was not presented as a WITNESS.

10