Wills & Succession

ATUN v. NUEZ
GR No.L-8018, October 26, 1955
87 PHIL 762

FACTS: Estefania Atun died without any issue leaving in the possession of the plaintiffs, her
neices and nephews, a parcel of land. Such land was delivered by plaintiff Gil Atun to Silvestra
Nuez (sister of defendant-appellee Eusebio Nuez) for cultivation, for which Silvestra paid the
Atuns a part of the harvest as rental. In 1940, Silvestra turned over the land to defendant Eusebio
Nuez, who thereafter refused to recognize plaintiffs' ownership or to deliver their share of the
produce. The defendant turn sold the land to his co-defendant Diego Belga, who took the
property with the knowledge that it belonged, not to Nuez, but to plaintiffs. There was no prior
judicial declaration, however, that the plaintiffs were the legal heirs of the decedent.

ISSUE: Has plaintiffs the right to recover the property as a successor of the decedent?

HELD: Yes. In the instant case, as the land in question still stands registered in the name of
Estefania Atun, now deceased, the present owners thereof would be her legal heirs. It is of record
that Estefania Atun died without any issue or ascendants and left as her only surviving heirs the
children of her brother Nicolas, plaintiffs herein; and the rule is settled that the legal heirs of a
deceased may file an action arising out of a right belonging to their ancestor, without a separate
judicial declaration of their status as such, provided there is no pending special proceeding for
the settlement of the decedent's estate.

LEDESMA v. MCLACHLIN
GR No.L-44837, November 23, 1938
66 PHIL 547

FACTS: Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin and her children as heirs.
Plaintiff Ana Ledesma, spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her mother, sued to
declare her as compulsory heir which the court however denied. Two years later, Lorenzo's father
Eusebio died, and because he left some personal and real properties without a will, an intestate
proceeding was instituted and a court order declaring his compulsory heirs did not of course
include Ana as one. Following such court action, the plaintiff proceeded to collect the sum
payable on a promissory note then issued in favor of her by Lorenzo by filing a claim in the
intestate proceedings of Eusebio's Estate claiming that the sum be paid out of the properties
inherited by the defendants represents that of the successional rights of Lorenzo as a compulsory
heir of his father Eusebio.

ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right collect the sum promised by her father from her grandfather's
estate?
HELD: No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by
representation are not subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father,
who died without leaving any property. While it is true that under the provisions of Articles 924
to 927 of the Civil Code, a child presents his father or mother who died before him in the
properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said
child answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may
be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances,
the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with
the properties received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco,
in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of
their father from whom they did not inherit anything.

LIMJOCO v. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGRANTE

GR No.L-770, April 27, 1948
80 PHIL 776

FACTS: Petitioner opposed the issuance by the Public Service Commission of a certificate of
public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan to the respondent
despite his demise, contending that the Commission erred in allowing the substitution of the
legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case
then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate
applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law.

ISSUE: Is the decision of the Commission correct and with basis?

HELD: Yes. If the respondent had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the
right to prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would
have denied him that right... The aforesaid right of respondent to prosecute said application to its
conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a
part of the assets of his estate, for which right was a property despite the possibility that in the
end the commission might have denied his application, although under the facts of the case, the
commission granted the application in view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain and
operate the ice plant.

USON v. DEL ROSARIO

GR No.L-4963, January 29, 1953
92 PHIL 530

FACTS: Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged wife Maria Uson,
the petitioner. The latter sued to recover the ownership and possession of five parcels of land
occupied by defendant Maria del Rosario, decedent's common-law-spouse and her children. As a
defense, defendant presented a deed of separation agreed upon and signed Faustino and Uson
containing among others an statement giving a parcel of land to Uson as an alimony and the
latter renouncing her rights to any inheritance from Faustino.
 The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate
children of the decedent and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights,
however, under the new Civil Code they are given the status and rights of natural children and
are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article
287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in
the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to
them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).

ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendants correct?

HELD: No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was
seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson
(Article 657, old Civil Code). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered
to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From
that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question
became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question in
view of her expressed renunciation to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire
and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into cannot be entertained for
the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be
renounced.
Nor does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply and be given
retroactive effect. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared
for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may
have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin... As already stated in the early part of
this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in
1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the
law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death
(Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the
illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the
vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

LITONJUA v. MONTILLA
GR No.L-4170, January 31, 1952, 90PHIL757
90 PHIL 757

FACTS: Pedro Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment of a sum
of P4,039. Failing to find or identify a property of Claudio to be levied, petitioner then proceeded
to file a claim in the intestate proceeding of the estate of Agustin Montilla Sr, father of the
deceased. The estate has not yet been properly probated.

ISSUE: Could the petitioner succeed in collecting the debt as against the estate of the debtor's
deceased parent?
HELD: No. In the case of Ortiga Brothers and Co. vs. Enage and Yap Tico, 18 Phil. 345, it was
held that the creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the
property which pertains by inheritance to said heirs, only after the debts of the testate or intestate
have been paid and when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs are known, because the
debts of the deceased must first be paid before his heirs can inherit. It was therein also held that a
person who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to intervene either in
the proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of the succession. The
foregoing pronouncements are perfectly applicable to the case at bar, because the appellant is not
a creditor of the deceased Agustin Montilla, Sr. and he seeks to collect his claim out of the
inheritance of Claudio Montilla, an heir, before the net assets of the intestate estate have been
determined.

DE GUZMAN vda. DE CARRILLO v. DE PAZ

GR No.L-4133, May 13, 1952
91 PHIL 265

FACTS: A lot had been mortgaged by spouses Severino Salak and Petra Garcia to Pedro Magat;
the latter then assigned the mortgage to Honoria Salak. After the death Petra, Severino
transferred 1/2 of his rights to the property to Honoria for the sum representing 1/2 of the
consideratioin paid by her to the mortgagees Magat. Severino later died leaving the defendants as
heirs. Honoria also died, with the plaintiff as heir. Intestate proceedings were instituted for the
settlement and distribution of the estate of the deceased Severino and Petra, including the lot in
question which was adjudicated, after proper proceedings in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff
sued for reconveyance of the 1/2 of the portion of the lot in her favor as heir of Honoria.

ISSUE: May the petition prosper?

HELD: No. The property now sought to be recovered from the defendants was adjudicated in
their favor after all claims, indebtedness and obligations chargeable against the intestate estate of
the deceased Severino Salak and Petra Garcia had been all paid and accounted for out of the
estate of the deceased; so that, in the eyes of the law, the properties now in the hands of the
defendants are presumed to be free from all claims whatsoever. The claim of the plaintiff set up
in the complaint should have been interposed during the pendency and progress of Special
Proceeding No. 3; but plaintiff not having done so, she cannot now bring this action against the
defendants, for it is clear that there exists no privity of contract between plaintiff and defendants
upon which plaintiff can predicate her action against the present defendants.

IBARLE v. PO
GR No.L-5064, February 27, 1953
92 PHIL 721

FACTS: Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving spouse Catalina
Navarro and some minor children. Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to Maria Canoy who
later sold the same land to the plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle. After some time, after her appointment
as guardian of her minor children, Catalina again sold 1/2 of the land in question, which portion
now belonged to the children as heirs, to herein defendant Esperanza Po.

ISSUE: Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the property?

HELD: The sale to defendant is valid. Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to
the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different
language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de
Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the
seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it
follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent
court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no
consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff
because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition.

OSORIO v. OSORIO
GR No.L-10474, March 29, 1916
41 PHIL 531

FACTS: Francisco Osorio y Garcia filed a written complaint alleging that he is a natural son of
one Francisco Osorio y Reyes who died in 1896; and that he had been in continuous possession
of the status of natural son of said Osorio y Reyes, as proven by direct acts of the latter and of his
family; that the defendant Soledad Osorio, lawful daughter and lawful heir of said Osorio y
Reyes, be ordered to recognize the plaintiff as a natural son of said Osorio y Reyes, and is
entitled to share in his father's estate; and, furthermore, that said defendant be ordered to furnish
subsistence to plaintiff in such amount as the court might deem proper to fix. The evidence
offered relating to the fact of filiation of Osorio y Garcia to Osorio Reyes is strong and
unimpeachable, so that the court found the legitimacy of claim of Osorio y Garcia to be properly
established.

ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right to be recognized as co-heir and be entitled to the rights
appertaining to his deceased father's estate?

HELD: Yes. Recognition of the child as a natural child must be made if he has been in
continuous possession of his filiation, proven by the attendance of his father at his baptism, in the
certificate in which his name and that of his mother appear, though the document contains errors,
and by his father's statement to various friends that the boy was his natural son, and by his
father's always having attended to the care, education and support of his son.
So that the plaintiff, Francisco Osorio y Garcia, according to the facts proven in this case and
the law on the subject, is entitled to have his half sister Soledad Osorio, a legitimate daughter of
the father of both of them, recognize him as being the natural, recognized son of Francisco
Osorio y Reyes and as entitled to the rights granted him by law in respect to his deceased father's
estate, all of which is in possession of the defendant spouses.

RAMIREZ v. BALTAZAR
GR No.L-25049, August 30, 1968
22 SCRA 918

FACTS: Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a real estate to spouses Baltazar, defendants in
this case. Upon demise of Victoriana, the mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, filed a
petition for the intestate proceedings of Victoriana's estate, alleging further that plaintiffs
Felimon and Monica Ramirez are heirs of the deceased. Felimon was later appointed as
adminstrator but did not qualify so that Artemio Diawan was appointed as judicial administrator
of the estate. The mortgagees then filed a foreclosure of the property in question and succeeded,
after Diawan failed to file an answer against the petition. The foreclosure sale ensued, the
property was bought by the mortgagees themselves and the sale was confirmed by the court.
Felimon sued for the annulment of the entire foreclosure proceedings, alleging among others the
failure of the judicial administrator to protect their interests. Defendants contended that plaintiffs
have no legal capacity to sue and hava no cause of action.

ISSUE: Have plaintiffs the cause of action against the defendant?

HELD: Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically transmitted to the
heirs from the moment of the death of the decedent. While, as a rule, the formal declaration or
recognition to such successional rights needs judicial confirmation, this Court has, under special
circumstances, protected these rights from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial
declaration. In Pascual vs. Pascual, it was ruled that although heirs have no legal standing in
court upon the commencement of testate or intestate proceedings, this rule admits of an
exception as "when the administrator fails or refuses to act in which event the heirs may act in
his place."

DE BORJA v. MENCIAS
GR No.L-20609, September 29, 1966
21 SCRA 1133

FACTS: Petitioners Juan De Borja et al. petitioned for the reversal of the order of Judge
Mencias, denying their petition cause the sale of the properties levied upon to satisfy the money
judgment in a civil case rendered in favor of petitioners against respondent Crisanto de Borja.
Petitioners levied aganst the rights, interest and
participation which Crisanto de Borja had in certain real properties, as an heir of the decedents
Josefa Tangco and Francisco de Borja, whose estates were then pending settlement in Special
Proceedings Nos. F-7866 and 1955 of the aforementioned court, respectively.
this Court hereby holds that whatever interest, claim or right which Crisanto de Borja may have
in the testate estate of Josefa Tangco and in the intestate estate of Francisco de Borja are subject
to attachment and execution for the purpose of satisfying the money judgment rendered against
the said heir
ISSUE: May the sale of the property levied for execution proceed?

HELD: The above question must be answered in the affirmative, provided it is understood that
the sale shall be only of whatever rights, interest and participation may be adjudicated to said
heir as a result of the final settlement of the estates, and that delivery thereof to the judgment
creditor or to the purchaser at the public sale thereof shall be made only after the final settlement
of the estates and in the manner provided by the legal provision mentioned above.

RODRIGUEZ v. DE BORJA
GR No.L-21993, June 21, 1966
17 SCRA 418

FACTS: Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of
Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the petitioners
filed a petition before the court to examine the purported will but which was later withdrawn,
and a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in
a another court in Rizal. The petitioners now sought the dismissal of the special proceeding on
the settlement of the decedent's estate based on the purported will, questioning therefore the
jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.

ISSUE: Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate proceedings?

HELD: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the
delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance was
filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken
steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices
conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court.
Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, intestate
succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the
absence of a valid operative will.

CHAVEZ v. IAC
GR No. L-68282, November 8, 1990

FACTS: Manuela Buenavista assigned her paraphernal property in equal pro-diviso among her 6
children, while possession of such property still remains with her. Three of her children sold each
their share to private respondent Concepcion, consolidating 4/6 portion thereof. Deeds of sale
were therefor executed with the conformity of Manuela. Despite such transfers, the latter sold the
entire property to one of the siblings, herein petitioner Raquel Chavez. Respondent sued for the
annulment of the later sale to Raquel which was denied by the trail court but which later decision
overturned by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, petitioner also contends that their mother has left
a last will and this will supercedes the earlier transfers.

ISSUE: Is partition inter-vivos, and sale based on such partition valid? Does a last will supercede
that of the partition inter-vivos?

HELD: Yes. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be
executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes
the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and
need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of
compulsory heirs. xxx The Deeds of Sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future
inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista
who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the
property owner herself, is valid.
It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the
sales she herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to
execute a simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale
she made of the property she had received in the partition inter vivos.

NERI v. AKUTIN
GR No.L-47799, May 21, 1943
74 PHIL 185

FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property by
universal title to the children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of
the children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was
contemplated by the testator with the belief that he had already given each of the children portion
of the inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the respondents over
which registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of
money which the respondents were indebted to their father.

ISSUE: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the omission of heirs? Is there
disinheritance in this case?

HELD: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the
ground that testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage,
without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief
that he had given them already more shares in his property than those given to the children by his
second marriage. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul
the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of
preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.

BARANDA v. BARANDA
GR No.73275 May 20, 1987
FACTS: Paulina Baranda died without issue, but before her demise, two of her supposed heirs,
the herein respondents Evangelina and Elisa Baranda, have already taken possession of 6 parcels
of land and caused the transfer of such by virtue of questionable sales which the late widow had
also sought the reconveyance which did not however materialized. The petitioners, siblings of
the decedent, now sought the annulment of the supposed sale or transfers. Respondents question
the petitioners legal standing, them being not a party-in-interest in the deed of sale.

ISSUE: Can the petitioners impugn the validity of the sales?

HELD: This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in
interest to commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased,
without separate judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said decedent, provided that there
is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate.
There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of Paulina Baranda's estate, the
petitioners, as her intestate heirs, had the right to sue for the reconveyance of the disputed
properties, not to them, but to the estate itself of the decedent, for distribution later in accordance
with law. Otherwise, no one else could question the simulated sales and the subjects thereof
would remain in the name of the alleged vendees, who would thus have been permitted to benefit
from their deception, In fact, even if it were assumed that those suing through attorneys-in-fact
were not properly represented, the remaining petitioners would still have sufficed to impugn the
validity of the deeds of sale.

BALAIS v. BALAIS
GR No.L-33924, March 18, 1988
159 SCRA 47

FACTS: On an action for recovery of real property filed by the respondents, spurious children of
the late Escolastico Balais who died in 1948, against the petitioners, legitimate children of the
deceased, the trial court decreed reconveyance of the portion of the property belonging to the
legitime and further declaring partition that sent 1/4 portion of the legitime to the respondents.
Petitioners come now questioning the partition and seeking the reconveyance of the 1/4 share
that went to the spurious children, relying on the provisions of the old civil code, and thereby
questioning the competence and jurisdiction of the trial court,

ISSUE: Is the court competent to decree the partition, without it being asked in the complaint?
Could the provisions of the new civil code be applied over a case which occurs prior to its
effectivity?

HELD: 1. Yes. The court acquired jurisdiction by estoppel. It must be noted that, in spite of the
broad challenge the appellants present against the jurisdiction of the trial court to order the
distribution of the property, they, in reality, question only that part of the decision awarding a
one-fourth part of the property to the illegitimate children of the deceased, upon the ground that
under the old Civil Code illegitimate children other than natural enjoyed no successionary rights.
They do not contest the delivery of the estate to the deceased's widow or to themselves in the
proportions decreed by the court.
2. No. The court erred in applying the provisions of the new code. But as stated, the error of the
court notwithstanding, the case is a closed chapter, the decision having been rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction, have become final and executory. A decision, no matter how
erroneous, becomes the law of the case between the parties upon attaining finality.

CONDE v. ABAYA
GR No.L-4275, March 23, 1909
13 PHIL 249

FACTS: Casiano Abaya died unmarried however leaving two unaknowledged children by herein
plaintiff-appellee Paula Conde. The latter, as a ascendant heir of her children, sued for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Casiano along with the acknowledgment of the two as natural
children of the deceased. The trial court, with the opposition of the defendant-appellant Roman
Abaya, brother of the deceased, rendered judgment bestowing the estate of Casiano to Conde as
legitimate heir of the decedent's natural children.

ISSUE: May the mother of a natural child now deceased, bring an action for the
acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his behalf to
receive the inheritance from the deceased natural father.

HELD: The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his
whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the
life of his presumed parents. An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an
exception, be exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event
of the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some
instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother, the
existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It
cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.

REIRA v. PALMAROLI
GR No.14851, September 13, 1919
40 PHIL 105

FACTS: Antonia Reira, widow of Juan Pons who was at the time of the latter's death residing at
Palma de Mallorca, sought the annulment of the order of the trial court admitting the probate of a
purported will of her husband. The purported will was submitted to be admitted to probate by
respondent Consul General Palmaroli. The petitioner contends that the probate of the will, in
view of her absence, deprived her of her right to contest the original application.

ISSUE: Should the probated will yield to the rights of the decedent's heir?
HELD: Yes. A will is nothing more than a species of conveyance whereby a person is permitted,
with the formalities prescribed by law, to control in a certain degree the disposition of his
property after his death. Out of consideration for the important interests involved the execution
and proof of wills has been surrounded by numerous safeguards, among which is the provision
that after death of the testator his will may be judicially established in court. xxx The probate of a
will, while conclusive as to its due execution, in no wise involves the intrinsic validity of its
provisions. If, therefore, upon the distribution of the estate of the decedent, it should appear that
any provision of his will is contrary to the law applicable to his case, the will must necessarily
yield upon that point and the disposition made by law must prevail.

MONTINOLA v. HERBOSA

FACTS: Montinola filed an action against the heirs of Dr. Jose Rizal for recovery of possession
of personal property (the RIZAL RELICS) allegedly sold to him by Doa Trinidad Rizal. The
trial court held that neither party is entitled to the possession of such property, relying principally
on the fact that in Rizal's Mi Ultimo Adios, there is a line where Rizal bequeathed all his
property to the Filipino people. The court argued that the handwritten work of Rizal constitutes a
holographic will giving the State all his property.

ISSUE: Does Mi Ultimo Adios constitute a last will?

HELD: No. An instrument which merely expresses a last wish as a thought or advice but does
not contain a disposition of property, and executed without Animus Standi cannot be legally
considered a will. Rizal's Mi Ultimo Adios is but a literary piece of work, and was so intended. It
may be considered a will in a grammatical sense but not in a legal or juridical sense. Moreover, it
also lacks the requirements of a holographic will such as a statement of the year month and day
of its execution and his signature.

MERZA v. PORRAS
GR No.L-4888, May 25, 1953
93 PHIL 142

FACTS: Pilar Montealegre died leaving a will (Exhibit A) and a so-called codicil (Exhibit B),
disinheriting her husband Pedro Porras and some of her relatives. The two documents were
submitted to probate but were denied by the trial court, upon the grounds such as the defect of
the attestation clause on Exh. A and that Exh. cannot be considered a codicil for it was executed
by the testator a day before Exhibit A, thus it cannot be included in the probate proceedings.

ISSUE: Should a document, expressly disinheriting certain heirs, executed by the testator prior to
a supposed last will, be probated?

HELD: Yes. The trial court and the CA is correct that Exhibit B having been executed one day
before Exhibit A could not be considered as a codicil "because a codicil, as the word implies, is
only an addition to, or modification of, the will." The Court of Appeals added that "the contents
of Exhibit B are couched in the language ordinarily used in a simple affidavit and as such, may
not have the legal effect and force to a testamentary disposition."
However, Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. A will is defined in article 667 of the
Civil code of Spain as "the act by which a person dispose of all his property or a portion of it,"
and in article 783 of the new Civil Code as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the
formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take
effect after his death. Exhibit B comes within this definition.

CASTAEDA v. ALEMANY
GR No.1439, March 19, 1904
3 PHIL 426

FACTS: Appellant constested the validity of the will of Doa Juana Moreno upon the ground
that although the attestation clause in the will states that the testator signed the will in the
presence of three witnesses who also each signed in each presence, the will was not actually
written by the testator.

ISSUE: Is it necessary that a will be written by the testator herself?

HELD: No. Section 618 of the Civil Code requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either
that the testator sign it himself or, if he does not sign it, that it be signed by some one in his
presence and by his express direction. Who does the mechanical work of writing the will is a
matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten in the office
of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence.

MICIANO v. BRIMO
GR No.L-22595, November 1, 1927
50 PHIL 867

FACTS: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national, died leaving a will which one of the clauses states
that the law of the Philippines shall govern the partition and not the law of his nationality, and
that legatees have to respect the will, otherwise the dispositions accruing to them shall be
annulled. By virtue of such condition, his brother, Andre Brimo, an instituted heir was thus
excluded because, by his action of having opposed the partition scheme, he did not respect the
will. Andre sued contending that the conditions are void being contrary to law which provides
that the will shall be probated according to the laws of the nationality of the decedent.

ISSUE: Is the condition as set by the testator valid?

HELD: No. A foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot
be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 of the Civil Code states said national law
should govern. Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered
unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and
effective even as to the herein oppositor.

Case Digests: Labor Law

CIR vs. Villa

Republic vs. Hizon

Marcos II vs. CA

Republic vs. Araneta

Fernandos Hermanos vs. Commissioner

Mambulao vs. Republic

Cabrera vs. The Provincial Treasurer of Tayabas

CIR vs. Vda. de Codiera

Republic vs CA and Nielson & Co.

CIR vs. CA, Atlas Consolidated

Abaya vs. Ebdane Jr.

Gonzales vs. Marcos

Maceda vs. Macaraig Jr.

CIR vs Pascor

CIR vs. CA

UNGAB vs. CUSI

Punsalan vs. Mun. Board of City of Manila

Lutz vs. Araneta

Gomez vs. Palomar

North Camarines vs. CIR

Philex Mining vs CIR

Philippiine Guaranty Inc. vs. CIR

Phil. Bank of Communications vs. CIR

Reyes vs. Almanzor

Marcos II vs. CA

Davao Gulf Lumber vs. CIR

CIR vs. YMCA

Commissioner vs. Algue, Inc.

CIR vs. CA, Citytrust Banking Corp.

Vera vs. Fernandez

CIR vs. Pineda

ESSO Standard vs. Acting Commissioner of Customs

Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong

Osmea vs. Orbos

Pepsi-Cola vs. Municipality of Tanauan

Pepsi-Cola vs. City of Butuan

Board of Assessment Appeals vs. CTA

Atlas Consolidated vs. CIR

Commissioner vs. BOAC

Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works

Bagatsing vs. Ramirez

City of Baguio vs. De Leon

Tio vs. VRB

Case Digests: Labor Law

CALALANG v. WILLIAMS, 70 PHIL 726, GR No. 47800, December 2, 1940

FACTS: The National Traffic Commission resolved that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along some major streets such a Rizal Ave. in Manila for a period of one year from
the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Secretary of Public Works approved
the resolution on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila
have enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not
allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only
of their owners but of the riding public as well.

ISSUE: Does the rule infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social
justice? What is Social Justice?

HELD: No. The regulation aims to promote safe transit and avoid obstructions on national roads
in the interest and convenience of the public. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State.
To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable,
or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principles of Salus Populi est Suprema Lex.(Justice Laurel)

CASTOR-GARUPA v. ECC, 487 SCRA 171

FACTS: Petitioner is resident physician in a hospital in Negros Oriental, who was diagnosed of
a kidney disease. After having her kidney transplant, she filed a work-related sickness
compensation claim with the respondent ECC through the GSIS, which denied the same, arguing
that the disease she contracted is not listed among the occupational diseases determined by them
to be compensable as work-related sickness. Petitioner appealed contending that the bacteria
causing the disease was contracted while being employed in the hospital since symptoms have
already manifested since 1994, and relying upon the theory that her employment poses an
increased risk in contracting the diseases.
ISSUE: Is the contention of the petitioner correct?

HELD: Yes. In determining whether an injury or sickness is work-related or not, what the law
requires is reasonable work connection, not a direct causal connection. It is observed that the
WCL has not ceased to be a social legislation, hence liberality of the law in the form of the
workingman or woman still prevails.

GSIS v. VALENCIANO, 487 SCRA 109

FACTS: While being an employee of the Philippine Ports Authority, respondent was inflicted
with tuberculosis, hypertension and diabetes. He then filed with the petitioner Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) a claim for compensation benefits under PD No. 626.
However, petitioner denied the respondents claim on the ground that the ailments are not
considered occupational diseases, and there is no clear evidence, such as medical records,
showing that he contracted the diseases during his work or his duties have increased the risk of
contracting said ailments. Petitioner rejected respondent's contention that there is probability of
contracting TB with the kind of job the respondent has.

ISSUE: How should PD 626 be applied with respect to determining compensability of work-
related diseases?

HELD: A social legislation should interpreted liberally. In applying liberality in the

interpretation of Workmen's Compensation Law, the degree of proof required by the law is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept to support a conclusion. Probability, not
certainty, is the touchstone. Any doubt on this matter has to be interpreted in favor of the
employees considering that PD 626 is a social legislation.

PRIMICIAS v. FUGUSO, 80 PHIL 71

FACTS: Mayor Fuguso refused to grant the petitioner and his party a permit to hold a public
meeting at Plaza Miranda, based on a city ordinance which grants the mayor the discretion to
regulate such conduct of public assemblies, as a lawful exercise of police power.

ISSUE: What is police power? How was it supposed to be exercised by the Manila City
Officials?

HELD: Police Power is the power of the State to enact laws and prescribe regulations that will
promote the health, morals, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the
People. However, in the exercise of police power the council may, in its discretion, regulate the
exercise of such rights in a reasonable manner, but cannot suppress them, directly or indirectly,
by attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any other officer. The ordinance
grants the mayor the power to regulate as to how, when and where a public assembly should be
held, but not the discretion to refuse the grant of such permit to derogate the right of the
petitioner to peaceably assemble and seek redress against the government.

PASEI v DRILON, 163 SCRA 386

FACTS: The Department of Labor and Employment issued an order suspending the deployment
of Filipino domestic and household workers, in view of the heightened abuses committed against
OFWs abroad. The petitioner, a local recruitment agency, petitioned for the invalidation of such
order for alleged violation of equal protection clause.

ISSUE: Is the deployment ban a valid exercise of police power? What is police power?

HELD: Yes, the deployment ban of domestic helpers is a valid exercise of police power. Police
Power is the inherent power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty and property in order to promote the general welfare.

CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER (CMC) v. MERIS,

FACTS: Petitioner closed its industrial service unit due to alleged loss and extinct demand
resulting to the termination of the employment of the respondent. The latter filed an illegal
dismissal case but the same was denied by the labor arbiter, and subsequently by the NLRC
contending that the same is part of the management prerogative.

ISSUE: Has employer the right to close its business even without basis resulting to the
displacement of the worker?

HELD: No. Employers are also accorded with rights and privileges to assure their self-
determination and independence and reasonable return of capital. This mass of privileges is
called management prerogatives. Although they may be broad and unlimited in scope, the State
has the right to determine whether an employer's privilege is exercised in a manner that complies
with the legal requirements and does not offend the protected rights of labor.

BREWMASTER INTERNATIONAL INC. v. NAFLU

FACTS: Private respondent Estrada is a member of the respondent labor union. He did not
report for work for 1 month due to a grave family problem as his wife deserted him and nobody
was there to look after his children. He was required to explain. Finding his reasons to be
unjustified, the petitioner terminated him, since according to company rules, absence for 6
consecutive days is considered abandonment of work.

ISSUE: Should a worker be summarily dismissed relying on some company rules?

HELD: No. While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations to
govern the conduct of his employees, these rules and their implementation must be fair, just and
reasonable. No less than the Constitution looks with compassion on the workingman and protects
his rights not only under a general statement of a state policy but under the Article on Social
Justice and Human Rights, thus placing labor contracts on a higher plane and with greater
safeguards. Verily, relations between labor and capital are not merely contractual. They are
impressed with public interest and labor contracts must, perforce, yield to the common good.

JAMER v. NLRC

FACTS: Petitioners are cashiers of Isetann Department Store who were dismissed for having
accumulated shortages. Petitioners admitted this in their affidavits. The labor arbiter ruled them
having been illegally dismissed. The NLRC reversed the ruling.

ISSUE: Were the petitioners validly dismissed?

HELD: Yes. The failure of the petitioners to report to the management the irregularities
constitute "fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed in them by their employer or duly
authorized representative"--one of the just causes of valid termination of employment. The
employer cannot be compelled to retain employees who were guilty of malfeasance as their
continued employment will be prejudicial to the former's best interest. The law, in protecting the
rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.

GANDARA MILL SUPPLY v. NLRC

FACTS: Private respondent Silvestre Germane did not report for work because his wife
delivered their first child. He did not however notify his employer, causing a disruption in the
business of the latter. When the respondent returned to work he was surprised upon knowing that
someone has been hired to take his place.

ISSUE: Was there a case of illegal dismissal?

HELD: Yes. It appeared that the respondent was illegally dismissed. While a prolonged absence
without leave may constitute as a just cause for dismissal, its illegality stems from the non-
observance of due process. Applying the WenPhil Doctrine by analogy, where dismissal was not
preceded by the twin requirement of notice and hearing, the illegality of the dismissal in
question, is under heavy clouds and therefore illegal.

PHIL MOVIE PICTURES WORKERS ASSOC. v. PREMIERE PRODUCTIONS, 92 PHIL 843

FACTS: Respondent filed 2 petitions with the CIR: 1.) to lay off its 44 employees on the ground
that the company is losing its operations, and 2.) to lease its equipment to certain individuals.
Judge Roldan of the CIR, after ocular inspection, approved the petitions, thereby leaving the
petitioners, if not unemployed, having nothing to do because of absence of equipment in the
studios. Petitioner assailed the ruling of the judge, and appealed to the CIR en banc.

ISSUE: Should the court grant a petition for mass dismissal without hearing the side of the
employees concerned?

HELD: No. A worker cannot be deprived of his job or his wages without due process of law. The
case was then remanded to CIR for proper hearing.

CALLANTA v. CARNATION PHILS., 145 SCRA 268, G.R. No. 70615 October 28, 1986

FACTS: Upon clearance approved by the MOLE Regional Office, respondent dismissed the
petitioner in June 1979. On July 1982, petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case with claim for
reinstatement with the Labor Arbiter, who granted it. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the
judgment based on the contention that the action by the petitioner has already prescribed, since
Art. 291 & 292 of the Labor Code is expressed that offenses penalized under the Code and all
money claims arising from employer-employee relationships shall be filed within 3 years from
when such cause of action arises, otherwise it will be barred.

ISSUE: Is ruling of the NLRC correct?

HELD: No. It is a principle well recognized in this jurisdiction, that one's employment,
profession, trade or calling is a property right, and the wrongful interference therewith is an
actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of the
Constitutional guarantee of due process of law.

Verily, the dismissal without just cause of an employee from his employment constitutes a
violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. Such violation, however,
does not amount to an "offense" as understood under Article 291 of the Labor Code. In its broad
sense, an offense is an illegal act which does not amount to a crime as defined in the penal law,
but which by statute carries with it a penalty similar to those imposed by law for the punishment
of a crime. The confusion arises over the use of the term "illegal dismissal" which creates the
impression that termination of an employment without just cause constitutes an offense. It must
be noted, however that unlike in cases of commission of any of the prohibited activities during
strikes or lockouts under Article 265, unfair labor practices under Article 248, 249 and 250 and
illegal recruitment activities under Article 38, among others, which the Code itself declares to be
unlawful, termination of an employment without just or valid cause is not categorized as an
unlawful practice.

DE LEON v. NLU, 100 PHIL 789

FACTS: The defendant-appellees had been picketing the Dalisay Theater owned by the plaintiff
for the purpose of securing reinstatement to their respective jobs in the theater when it was run
and operated by the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises (FTE), then a lessee of the parcel of land
owned by plaintiff on which the theater was erected. The defendant-appellees lost their jobs upon
termination of the lease contract between De Leon and the FTE, which turned over the rights to
the theater back to De Leon, the owner of the lot.

ISSUE: Has terminated employees the right to strike in this case?

HELD: Yes. Although the employees has no business with the owner of the establishment, they
have nevertheless the right to peaceful picketing which applies also to cases where employer-
employee relationship is absent. The picketing, a form of freedom of expression, is conducted
not to disrupt the business of the owner but to appeal for a humanitarian consideration, after
having been laid off due to the termination of the business of their previous employer.

PAFLU v. CLORIBEL, 27 SCRA 465

FACTS: Petitioner labor union picketed against Metrobank, which is occupying an office space
in the Wellington building. Wellington complained that the picketers were annoyingly blocking
the common passageway of the building, the only ingress and egress being used by the occupants
of the second to the sixth floors thereof as well as by their respective employees, clients and
customers, so that the picket has caused a disruption of the business of Wellington as well as the
other lessors in the building.

ISSUE: Does the court have the power to enjoin the picket, despite being peaceful?

HELD: Yes. The courts are vested with the power to limit the exercise of the right of peaceful
picketing to parties involved in the labor dispute, or having a direct interest to the context of this
issue. Wellington is a mere "innocent bystander" who is not involved in the labor dispute. Thus,
they are entitled to seek protection of their rights from the courts and the courts may,
accordingly, legally extend the same.

LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS v. PCWU, 108 SCRA 16

FACTS: The picket held by defendant-appellant union against their employer prevented herein
plaintiff-appellee's truck from loading and unloading of its products inside the premises of
Permanent Concrete Products, where the plaintiff-appellee was occupying as a sub-lessee.
Hence, the latter sought to enjoin the picket.

ISSUE: May a picket be enjoined at the instance of a third party?

HELD: Yes. Peaceful picketing, while being allowed as a phase of freedom of expression
guaranteed by the Constitution and could not be curtailed even in the absence of employer-
employee relationship, is not an absolute right. The courts are not without power to localize the
sphere of demonstration, whose interest are foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right
may be recognized at the instance of an "innocent bystander" who is not involved in the labor
dispute if it appears that the result of the picketing is create an impression that a labor dispute
exists between him and the picketing union.

KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CAMARA SHOES v. CAMARA SHOES, 111 SCRA

478

FACTS: Petitioner Ramos was suspended for writing the phrase "under protest" in the company
payroll to object to the P1.0 deduction made by the respondent for allegedly getting P500 worth
of lumber in 1964. The deduction started only in 1969, at the peak of union activities of the
petitioner when several complaints of unfair labor practices were filed by the union against the
respondent.

ISSUE: Is the action of the petitioner a lawful exercise of freedom of expression?

HELD: Yes. The freedom of expression is available to individual workers subject to legal
limitation of industrial peace to air valid grievances. It is thus too clear from the foregoing that
petitioner Ramos was justified in airing his grievances against the unauthorized and illegal
deductions made by respondent company. By writing "under protest" on the company payroll,
petitioner Ramos was well within the ambit of his constitutional freedom of expression as well as
the right to petition against what was obviously a calculated undue harassment amounting to
unfair labor practice perpetuated by respondent employer herein.

VICTORIANO v. ERWU, 59 SCRA 54

FACTS: Stepping on the provisions of RA 3350 exempting members of religious sects which
prohibit its members from joining associations, plaintiff-appellee, being of a faithful of Iglesia ni
Cristo, withdrew his membership from the appellant union. The latter, who have pact a closed-
shop provision in their collective bargaining agreement with respondent company sought the
separation of the plaintiff-appellee. The trial court enjoined the supposed dismissal, prompting
the union to assail the validity of RA 3350 particularly the provision granting exemption to
members of above-mentioned sects.

ISSUE: Does the law infringe the right or freedom of labor to associate?

HELD: No. Freedom of association implies not only the right to join a labor union, but also the
privilege of not joining one, of selecting which union to join, and of disaffiliating from a union.
It is clear that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of
association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects
from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to
affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the
members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in
deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does
not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the
employer or labor union compel them to join.

REPUBLIC SAVINGS BANK v. CIR, 21 SCRA 226

FACTS: Petitioner bank terminated private respondents for having written and published a
"patently libelous letter tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt not only the officers and
employees of the bank, but also their employer" by demanding the resignation of the bank
president on grounds of immorality, nepotism and favoritism. CIR ruled that the petitioner's act
constitutes an unfair labor practice.

ISSUE: Does the dismissal of employees airing their grievance against their employer constitute
unfair labor practice?

HELD: Yes. Even assuming that respondents acted in their individual capacities when they wrote
the letter, they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the
exercise of their right to self-organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and
protection, interference with which constitutes unfair labor practice.

The petitioner should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances as a mechanism in a
collective bargaining agreement. Collective bargaining... normally takes the form of negotiation
when major conditions of employment to be written into an agreement are under consideration,
and of grievance committee meetings and arbitration when questions arising from the
administration of an agreement are at stake.

SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOC. v. CA, 175 SCRA 686

FACTS: Petitioners went on strike after their employer SSS failed to act upon the union's
demands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed an injunction contending that
the petitioners are covered by Civil Service laws which prohibits employees of the government
from staging a strike. SSSEA on the other hand, argued that the NLRC has the jurisdiction of the
case by virtue of the provisions of the Labor Code.

ISSUE: Does the court have jurisdiction? Do employees covered by the Civil Service have the
right to strike?

HELD: On question of jurisdiction, yes. The RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction
under BP 129, has jurisdiction over petitioner's claim for damages and for the issuance of a writ
of injunction to stop the strike, since the Labor Code do not apply to government employees.

On the right to strike of government workers, No. The Constitution provides guarantee among
workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities. On the other hand,
EO 180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities in
government service shall be observed subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress.
Referring to Memo Circular No.6, s. 1987 of the CSC which states that prior to the enactment by
Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees, enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officials and employees from staging a strike,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service, the court ruled that in the absence of any
legislation allowing government employees to strike, they are therefore prohibited from doing so.

GARCIA v. PAL, GR 164856, Jan. 20, 2009

FACTS: PAL filed an administrative case against Garcia and Dumago after they were allegedly
caught sniffing shabu at the PAL Tool Room. After due notice, they were dismissed for
transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline. The petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of petitioners with an immediate reinstatement. A writ was
issued to such effect pending appeal with the NLRC.

ISSUE: Can the petitioners collect wages on the period of appeal from the Labor Arbiters order
up to the final decision of the higher court?

HELD: Yes. The State forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and
economic force. In short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has
determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its execution pending appeal. Therefore, the
petitioners can collect wages from the period of the execution of the decision of the labor arbiter
to the time of the final decision of the higher court.

MORTERA v. CIR, GR L-1340, Oct. 13, 1947

FACTS: All laborers of Canlubang Sugar Estate were ordered to return to work immediately and
stop the strike with the admonition that those who will fail to report will not only lose any
concession but the company was authorized by the public respondent herein to employ new
employees or laborers to take the places or positions of those who fail to report. The public
respondent ordered that picketing under any guise or form, is entirely prohibited considering that
the industry was into sugar, a very important and essential food, lack of supply would mean
destruction of sugar centrals of many provinces.

ISSUE: Was there a denial of the right to strike?

HELD: Yes. The order on prohibition to strike should be understood to cover only illegal
picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal means. Peaceful picketing cannot be
prohibited. It is part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Petitioners have
not shown reasons to annul the order. Petition dismissed.

FELIX UY v. COA, GR 130685, March 21, 2000

FACTS: Petitioners were among the more than 60 dismissed permanent employees of the Capitol
of Agusan del Sur by the newly incumbent Governor Paredes. They contended that the dismissal
was a political vengeance because he hired new employees. The Governor averred that the
dismissal was not illegal because it was due to the reduction in work force due to lack of funds
and it is a valid ground of terminating the services of the employees. The Merit System
Protection Board held the dismissal illegal and ordered their reinstatement but Governor Paredes
refused to abide from the order. The COA on the other hand affirmed the decision of the MSPB
but denied the motion of the petitioners stating that it is the personal liability of Governor
Paredes and not the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur.

ISSUE: Can government employees receive backwages and other monetary benefits from the
government?

HELD: Yes. If the MSPB found bad faith on the part of Governor Paredes, it would have
categorically decreed his personal liability for the illegal dismissal of the petitioners. To be sure,
even the petitioners did not proceed from the theory that their dismissal is the personal liability
of Governor Paredes. Familiar learning is our ruling that bad faith cannot be presumed and he
who alleges bad faith has the onus of proving it. In the case at bar, the decision of the MSPB by
itself does not meet the quantum of proof necessary to overcome the presumption of good faith.

TIRAZONA v. PHILIPPINE EDS TECHNO-SERVICE (PET) INC

FACTS: The petitioner, a managerial employee who was holding a position of trust and
confidence, was admonished by the latter of her improper handling of a situation involving a
rank-and-file employee. She admitted having read a supposed confidential letter for the PET
directors containing a legal opinion of the respondent's counsel regarding the status of her
employment. As a consequence, she was terminated for willful breach of trust reposed upon by
her employer. She claimed having been denied of due process.

ISSUE: Was her dismissal justified?

HELD: Yes. The petitioner has given the respondent more than enough reasons to distrust her.
The arrogance and hostility she has shown towards the company her stubborn uncompromising
stance in almost all instances justify the company's termination of her employment.

PANTRANCO v. PSC, GR 47065, June 26, 1940

FACTS: Petitioner wanted to have Sec. 1 of CA 454 be declared unconstitutional or that if

constitutional be declared inapplicable to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to its
enactment. This arose from the time petitioner applied for ten additional trucks to comply with
his existing certificates of public convenience issued before the enactment of the CA 454 because
he was not agreeable with the conditions set forth by PSC. He contended that this Act violates
the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contracts.

ISSUE: Was the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of obligations and contracts

violated?
HELD: No. Statutes for the regulation of public utilities are a proper exercise by the state of its
police power for the control and regulation of public utilities in order to protect the public. If one
voluntarily placed his property in public service, he cannot complain of the regulation of the
State through its police power. A regulation of public utilities applies not only to future but also
to present contracts in operation. Such statutes are, therefore, not unconstitutional, either
impairing the obligation of contracts, taking property without due process, or denying the equal
protection of the laws, especially inasmuch as the question whether or not private property shall
be devoted to a public and the consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for the owner to decide.

PALMERIA v. NLRC, 247 SCRA 57

FACTS: Palmeria was employed by private respondent Coca-cola, which later entered into a
contract of service with Lipercon Services. It was made to appear that the petitioner was an
employee of Lipercon, before being dismissed by Coca-cola. Petitioner was able to prove his
employment with Coca-cola, hence sought for reinstatement. The labor arbiter and NLRC ruled
that reinstatement could not be availed of because of the vehement refusal of the respondent to
accept back the petitioner.

ISSUE: Should the petition for reinstatement be granted despite the strained relations between
employee and employer?

HELD: Yes. The importance of the remedy of reinstatement to an unjustly dismissed employee
cannot be overstated. It is the remedy that most effectively restores the right of an employee to
his employment and all its benefits before its violation by his employer. Yet despite all its virtues,
reinstatement does not and cannot fully vindicate all of an employees injuries for reinstatement
no more than compensates for his financial damages. It cannot make up for his other sufferings,
intangible yet valuable xxx It is a right which cannot be allowed to be devalued by the
purchasing power of employers who are only too willing to bankroll the separation pay of their
illegally dismissed employees to get rid of them.

BANGALISAN v. CA, 276 SCRA 619

FACTS: Petitioners were among the 800 public school teachers who staged mass actions on
September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances against the alleged failure of the
government to implement measures intended for their material benefit. The Education Secretary
issued a Return-to-Work Order but the petitioners failed to comply. Hence they were charged by
the Secretary with several administrative cases leading to their dismissal from service.

ISSUE: Can government employees engage in a strike?

HELD: No. As a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memo
Circ. No.6 public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in work stoppage against a
public employer. The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages public
employees was clearly recognized at common law. To grant employees of the public sector the
right to strike there must be a clear and direct legislative authority therefor. In the absence of any
express legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or
regulating the exercise of the right, employees in the public service may not engage in strike,
walk-outs and temporary work stoppage like workers in the private sector.

KAISAHAN v. GOTAMCON SAWMILLS, 80 PHIL 521

FACTS: During the pendency of the labor dispute between the petitioners and the respondents,
the CIR managed to forge a voluntary agreement which results into a return-to-work order, and
the respondents was prohibited to, among others, lay-off any of the petitioners. Barely 4 months
the contract, petitioners again staged a strike, violating the condition of the agreement. The latter
countered by assailing the Sec 19 of CA 103, the law upon which the voluntary agreement was
based, arguing that the same results to involuntary servitude.

ISSUE: Should a voluntary agreement with a condition that workers must return to work be
voided upon a ground of involuntary servitude?

HELD: No. An employee entering into a contract of employment voluntarily accepts, among
other conditions, those prescribed in Section 19 of CA 103. The voluntariness of the employee's
entering into it or not--with such implied condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary
servitude ensuing.

MABEZA v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118506 April 18, 1997

FACTS: The petitioner and her co-employees were asked by their employer to sign an instrument
attesting to the latters compliance with minimum wage and other labor standard provision, and
that they have no complaints against the management. The petitioner signed the affidavit but
refused to go to the Citys Prosecutors Office to confirm the veracity and contents of the
affidavit as instructed by management. That same day she was ordered by the hotel management
to turn over the keys to her living quarters and to remove her belongings in the hotels premises.
She then filed a leave of absence which was denied by her employer. She attempted to return to
work but the hotels cashier told her that she should not report to work and instead continue with
her unofficial leave of absence. The management defended upon a ground of loss of confidence.

ISSUE: Was the dismissal of the petitioner valid?

HELD: No. The pivotal question in any case where unfair labor practice on the part of the
employer is alleged is whether or not the employer has exerted pressure, in the form of restraint,
interference or coercion, against his employees right to institute concerted action for better terms
and conditions of employment. Without doubt, the act of compelling employees to sign an
instrument indicating that the employer observed labor standard provisions of the law when he
might not have, together with the act of terminating or coercing those who refuse to cooperate
with the employers scheme constitutes unfair labor practice.
BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORP. v. SANCHEZ, 144 SCRA 628

FACTS: Supervisors and managers in petitioner company formed a union separate from that of
the rank-and-file union, petitioned for certification election, and staged a strike against the
petitioner, prompting the latter to seek a permanent injunction.

ISSUE: Are supervisors or managers allowed by law to form a union?

HELD: No. The supervisory employees of petitioner firm may not, under the law, form a
supervisors union, separate and distinct from the existing bargaining unit (BEU), composed of
the rank-and-file employees of the Bulletin Publishing Corporation. It is evident that most of the
private respondents are considered managerial employees. xxx The rationale for this inhibition
has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated
with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident
conflict of interests. The Union can also become company- dominated with the presence of
managerial employees in Union membership.
Posted 9th July 2013 by cLutz