NERI ET.AL., vs. HEIRS OF UY, G.R. No.

194366, October 10, 2012

Facts: During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children
namely: Eutropia and Victoria from her first marriage with Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo)
and petitioners Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa from her second
marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique). Throughout their marriage, Anunciacion
and Enrique acquired several homestead properties in Samal, Davao Del Norte.

On September 21, 1977 Anunciacion died intestate and Enrique in his capacity as a
natural guardian of the then minors Douglas and Rosa, together with their other
children, executed an Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Deed of
Sale on 1979 adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties and
conveying the same to the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Uy (spouses
Uy) for P80,000. Enrique later died in 1994.

Thereafter on 1996, the children of Enrique sought to annul the sale of the
properties against Spouses Uy assailing its validity for having been sold within the
prohibited period. The complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and
Victoria as plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as
legal heirs of Anunciacion.

The RTC decided to annul the sale holding that while the sale occurred beyond the
5-year prohibitory period, the sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria were
deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no authority to sell the
shares of Douglas and Rosa.

The Court of Appeals however reversed and set aside the RTC decision ruling that
the extrajudicial settlement and sale were valid. The appellate court held that,
while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement and
the sale of the subject properties and as such were not bound by it, the CA found it
unconscionable to permit the annulment of the sale considering spouses Uys
possession thereof of 17 years, and that Eutropia and Victoria belatedly filed their
action or more than two years from their knowledge that they were excluded as
heirs.

Issue: Whether or not the Extrajudicial Settlement with sale of the properties was
valid

Ruling:

NO. The Extrajudicial Settlement with absolute sale was not valid.

The Court held that in the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate
with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of Spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion
should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly
excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented

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therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a
total nullity.

In Segura vs Segura, the Court elucidated the effect of excluding the heirs in the
settlement of estate. To wit:

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question
which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers
only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it
excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned
property. Under the rule, no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. As the
participation was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not
correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had
prescribed after two years from its execution

However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of
the subject the properties made by Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and
Visminda, in favor of the respondents is valid but only with respect to their
proportionate shares therein.

With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of
the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented
them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time,
Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any
authority to dispose of their shares in the estate of their mother thus unenforceable.
Nevertheless, records revealed that Rosa ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate with absolute deed of sale.

Considering thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and therefore
not binding on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares of Enrique,
Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead properties have effectively
been disposed in favor of Spouses Uy.

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 BELEN SAGAD ANGELES vs. ALELI "CORAZON" ANGELES
MAGLAYA, G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005

Facts: On March 25, 1998, respondent Aleli Corazon Angeles Maglaya (Corazon)
filed a petition in the RTC of Caloocan City for letters of administration and her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles
(Francisco). In her petition, she alleged that Francisco died intestate leaving four
parcels of land and other valuable properties and that there is a need to appoint an
administrator. It was also alleged that she, being the child of Francisco in his first
marriage with Genoveva Mercado, and petitioner Belen Angeles (Belen),
Francisco's second wife, were the only surviving heirs of the deceased.

Belen opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be
made the administratrix of Franciscos estate. She argued that respondent could not
be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos
legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate
child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract
between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such
union. And evidently to debunk respondents claim of being the only child of
Francisco, petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their
marriage, legally adopted Concesa Yamat. In her reply, respondent alleged that the
proof of marriage of her parents Francisco and Genoveva, particularly the marriage
certificate, were destroyed.

Trial ensued and respondent testified regarding the profoundness of her case as a
legitimate child of Francisco and presented other witnesses to prove her filial
relation with the decedent, with respondent offering in evidence her birth
certificate among others. She also testified having been in open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child.

After respondent rested her case following her formal offer of exhibits, petitioner
filed a "Motion to Dismiss" on the ground that the petition failed "to state or prove
a cause of action", it being her stated position that Corazon, by her evidence, failed
to establish her filiation vis--vis the decedent, i.e., that she is in fact a legitimate
child of Francisco Angeles.

Eventually, the trial court ordered to dismiss the petition of Corazon on the ground
that she failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court and ruled that
respondent has sufficiently established her legitimate filiation with the deceased
Francisco. The appellate court also held that Belen's motion to dismiss actually
partakes a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 of the Rules of Court and that she
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thereby waived her right to present opposing evidence to rebut respondents
testimonial and documentary evidence.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Corazon Angeles-Maglaya should be admitted as

the administratrix of the estate of Francisco Angeles.

Held:

NO. Respondent's appointment as administratrix of the estate as held by the CA is

erroneous.

The court found that, save for respondents gratuitous assertion and an entry in her
certificate of birth as proof of his filiation with Francisco, there is absolutely no
proof of the decedents marriage to respondents mother, Genoveva Mercado. To
stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract doubtless the best evidence of
Franciscos and Genovevas marriage, if one had been solemnize was offered in
evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called to the
witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two.

While perhaps not determinative of the issue of the existence of marriage between
Francisco and Genoveva, we can even go to the extent of saying that respondent
has not even presented a witness to testify that her putative parents really held
themselves out to the public as man-and-wife. Clearly, therefore, the Court of
Appeals erred in crediting respondent with the legal presumption of legitimacy
which should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova. To
reiterate, absent such a marriage, as here, there is no presumption of legitimacy
and, therefore, there was really nothing for petitioner to rebut. And assuming that
there is a marriage between Francisco and Genoveva, the respondent did not even
bother to raise the bigamous marriage between her supposed father and Belen, who
in her own petition labeled the latter as her father's surviving spouse.

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the

estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the
decedent. When the law speaks of "next of kin", the reference is to those who are
entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedents property; one whose
relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed or, in
short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters
of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court
perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action
will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court
acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed relationship of
respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.

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5
 ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA AND MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL OF PARANAQUE RIZAL vs EL MONTE DE PIEDAD ET.AL.
G.R. NO. L-45496, MAY 5, 1939

Facts:

On September 30, 1911, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, filed

with the then Court of Land Registration an application for the registration of three
parcels of land in Paraaque, Rizal, alleging that the property had been acquired
thru donation from Doa Ana Maria de Araujo for religious purposes. On
December 1, 1911, the court granted the application and a certificate of title was
subsequently issued. Thereafter, the property was transferred to "El Monte de
Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Manila" and to the Asiatic Petroleum except one
portion occupied by the "Padres Redentoristas" and another which was
expropriated by the Province of Rizal for public road purposes.

Twenty-four years after the issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, the municipality of Paraaque, Rizal filed
in the registration proceedings with the CFI of Rizal a petition seeking a
declaration of escheat in its favor on the property. After hearing, lower court
denied the petition on the ground that the same could not be entertained in the
registration proceedings. From this order the municipality appealed.

The municipality contended that the property had not been really donated by
Doa Ana Maria de Araujo to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila but that
she merely constituted, on November 13, 1677, a chaplaincy allotting one hundred
pesos (P100) yearly for masses to be said for the repose of her and her parent's
soul; that this amount should be taken from the rents of the property in question
and given to Bachiller Felipe de los Reyes who, after being ordained as priest and
later as a chaplain, may say the masses above mentioned; and that as chaplain
Bachiller died without heirs, the property should escheat in favor of the
municipality.

Issues:

Whether or not the subject property should be escheated in favour of the

municipality

Ruling:

NO. It should be noted that Doa Ana Maria de Araujo and the chaplain Felipe de
los Reyes died more than two hundred fifty (250) and one hundred fifty (150)
years ago, respectively. The right then to escheat claimed by the municipality has
existed long prior to the registration proceedings instituted by the by the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, and, as the same has not been asserted in said
proceedings, it is deemed to have been completely waived.

Under the Torrens system of registration, claims and liens of whatever

character, except those mentioned by law, existing against the land prior to the

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issuance of the certificate of title, are cut off by such certificate if not noted
thereon, and the certificate so issued binds the whole world including the
Government.

The municipality seemed to aver that as the property over which the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila has acquired a certificate of title has never been
really transferred to him (Archbishop of Manila) by Doa Ana Maria de Araujo, an
implied trust has been created which may be enforced against him in favor of the
successors in interest of said Doa Ana Maria de Araujo. This contention is
completely untenable; and, even assuming it to be right, the appropriate remedy is
not a petition in the land registration proceedings but a separate action. This rule is
especially applicable where, as in the instant case, there are third persons affected,
i.e., El Monte de Piedad, the Asiatic Petroleum , and the "Padres Redentoristas." It
is argued that the transfers made to these entities are null and void. Be that as it
may, the nullity of such transfers cannot be determined by a motion in the
registration proceedings but in a separate action.