G.R. Nos.
169829-30 April 16, 2008
STEEL CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
SCP EMPLOYEES UNION-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS,
Respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition is seeking to set
aside the Decision[1] rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 28, 2005 in the consolidated cases CA-
G.R. SP Nos. 79446 and 82314, wherein the CA denied the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 while partially granting
the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, as well as the Resolution[2] dated September 22, 2005 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP) is engaged in manufacturing construction materials,
supplying approximately 50% of the domestic needs for roofing materials.[3] On August 17, 1998, SCP-Federated
Union of the Energy Leaders General and Allied Services (FUEL-GAS) filed a petition for Certification Election in its
bid to represent the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner.[4] Respondent SCP Employees Union (SCPEU)
National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) intervened, seeking to participate and be voted for in such election[5]
but the same was denied for having been filed out of time.[6]
On September 14, 1998, a consent election was conducted, with FUEL-GAS and NO UNION as choices.
Said election was however declared a failure because less than a majority of the rank-and-file employees cast their
votes. FUEL-GAS filed an Election Protest claiming that the certification election was characterized by and replete
with irregularities.[7] On September 21, 1998, NAFLU, the mother federation of respondent, filed a petition for
Certification Election for and on behalf of its affiliate, seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of
petitioner.[8] The Med-Arbiter denied the election protest of FUEL-GAS and granted the petition for certification
election filed by NAFLU and further ordered the
conduct of the election with NAFLU and NO UNION as choices. Both petitioner and FUEL-GAS appealed to the
Secretary of Labor, which appeals were later consolidated.[9]
On August 27, 1999, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Undersecretary rendered a
consolidated decision ordering the conduct of a certification election with FUEL-GAS, respondent and NO
UNION as choices.[10] Subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied on October 18, 1999.[11] Unsatisfied,
petitioner and FUEL-GAS appealed to the CA by way of certiorari.[12]
On April 14, 2000, the certification election, as ordered by the Med-Arbiter, proceeded. FUEL-GAS
participated without prejudice to the decision of the CA in its pending petition. In said election, respondent
emerged as winner; hence, the second election protest filed by FUEL-GAS.[13]
On July 12, 2000, the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721, rendered a Decision[14] which annulled and set aside the
August 27, 1999 decision and October 18, 1999 resolution of the Undersecretary. The CA further directed the
holding of a certification election with FUEL-GAS and NO UNION as choices, to the exclusion of respondent.[15]
On July 31, 2000, the Med-Arbiter dismissed FUEL-GAS election protest but deferred the request of respondent to be
declared winner in the certification election until final resolution of the pending petitions with the CA.[16] Not
satisfied with the deferment of their certification as winner, respondent appealed to the Labor Secretary.[17] It
further filed a Manifestation before the CA pointing out that in the April 14, 2000 certification election, it emerged as
winner, and thus, the election should be considered as an intervening event sufficient to bar another certification
election.[18] The CA, however, dismissed said manifestation on December 28, 2000.[19]
Meanwhile, on October 16, 2000, the Undersecretary rendered a Decision[20] certifying respondent as the
exclusive bargaining agent of petitioners employees. Petitioner and FUEL-GAS timely filed motions for
reconsideration of the aforesaid decision.[21]
As a consequence of its certification as the exclusive bargaining agent, respondent sent to petitioner CBA
proposals. Petitioner, however, held in abeyance any action on the proposals in view of its pending motion for
reconsideration.[22]
Finding no justification in petitioners refusal to bargain with it, respondent filed a Notice of Strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on December 11, 2000. The union raised the issue of unfair labor
practice (ULP) allegedly committed by petitioner for the latters refusal to bargain with it.[23]
On January 19, 2001, FUEL-GAS moved for the conduct of a certification election pursuant to the CA decision.[24]
On February 27, 2001, the Undersecretary affirmed its October 16, 2000 decision.[25]
On March 16, 2001, the labor dispute was certified to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
compulsory arbitration, which case was docketed as Cert. Case No. 000200-01.[26] Again, on April 2, 2001, another
Notice of Strike[27] was filed by respondent for non-recognition as a certified union; refusal to bargain;
discrimination against union officers and members; harassment and intimidation; and illegal dismissal, which was
later consolidated with the certified case.
On December 13, 2001, acting on the January 19, 2001 petition for certification election, the Med-Arbiter
recommended the holding of another certification election but with respondent and FUEL-GAS as contenders.[28]
The decision was appealed to the Labor Secretary. The Labor Secretary in turn dismissed the motion to conduct
certification election in a Resolution dated October 17, 2002.[29]
Meanwhile, in Cert. Case No. 000200-01, the NLRC issued a Resolution dated April 17, 2002, declaring
petitioner as having no obligation to recognize respondent as the certified bargaining agent; dismissing the charge
of unfair labor practice; declaring as illegal the strike held by the union; and declaring the loss of employment of the
officers of the union.[30] Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration[31] of the resolution praying that
additional employees be dismissed. For its part, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[32]
On May 20, 2002, respondent filed another Notice of Strike alleging as grounds, petitioners refusal to bargain and
union busting.[33] The notice was later dismissed and respondent was enjoined from holding a strike.[34]
On January 7, 2003, respondent filed another Notice of Strike on the grounds of refusal to bargain and union
busting.[35] Respondent thereafter went on strike on February 4, 2003. On February 7, 2003, the Labor Secretary
certified the dispute to the NLRC and directed the employees to return to work.[36] The second certified case was
docketed as NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03. On September 8, 2003, the NLRC rendered a Decision[37] ordering
petitioner to bargain collectively with respondent as the duly certified bargaining agent. In addition, it ordered the
reinstatement of the employees who were dismissed in connection with the February 4, 2003 strike, without loss of
seniority rights and diminution of salary.[38] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the
Resolution[39] dated January 26, 2004. The decision and resolution became the subject of a petition before the CA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314.
Meantime, in the first certified case, Cert. Case No. 000200-01, the NLRC, in a Decision[40] dated February 12,
2003 opted to resolve the parties respective motions for reconsideration collectively. In said decision, the NLRC
modified its earlier resolution by ordering the reinstatement of the union officers whom it previously ordered
terminated, which in effect denied petitioners motion for partial reconsideration.[41] Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated June 30, 2003.[42] These decision and resolution became
the subject of a petition before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446.
The petitions before the CA were later consolidated. In CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, herein petitioner argued that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE
REINSTATEMENT OF THE OFFICERS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT UNION DESPITE ITS CONCLUSION THAT [PRIVATE]
RESPONDENT HAD CONDUCTED AN ILLEGAL STRIKE.[43]
In the other case, CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, petitioner herein argued that:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DIRECTING
PETITIONER TO RECOGNIZE PRIVATE RESPONDENT UNION DESPITE THE DECISION OF THIS COURT DIRECTING THE
HOLDING OF ANOTHER CERTIFICATION ELECTION.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
REVERSED ITS OWN DECISION IN THE SAME CASE WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT THE STRIKE CONDUCTED BY SCPEU-NAFLU IS NOT ILLEGAL.
IV
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE
REINSTATEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEES WHO DEFIED THE RETURN TO WORK ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR.[44]
On February 28, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision[45] denying the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 while
partially granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314. The decretal portion of which stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 is DENIED while the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
82314 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, decreeing herein contending parties to comply with the directives of this Tribunal in
CA-G.R. SP No. 55721.
SO ORDERED.
In denying the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, the CA found no cogent reason to reverse the assailed decision of
the NLRC in Cert. Case No. 000200-01. The CA concluded that petitioners claims are based on pure allegations
and not supported by any substantial evidence.[46]
In partially granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, the CA reasoned that by virtue of its decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 55721 dated July 12, 2000, the second certification election was, in effect, nullified and set aside. It is to be
noted that FUEL-GAS participated in the second election without prejudice to the petition it filed in court. The CA
added that since it did not recognize the second certification election held on April 14, 2000, wherein NAFLU was
voted as the duly-elected bargaining agent of petitioners rank-and-file employees, clearly it has no basis for its
claim and it has no right to demand that petitioner collectively bargain with it.[47]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[48] which was denied in the Resolution[49] dated September 22, 2005.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN
IT AFFIRMED THE REINSTATEMENT OF OFFICERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE.
II
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE AS ILLEGAL THE STRIKE
HELD BY THE UNION ON FEBRUARY 4, 2003.
III
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO INVALIDATE THE ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION DIRECTING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE STRIKERS WHO DEFIED THE RETURN-
TO-WORK ORDER OF THE LABOR SECRETARY.
IV
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE NLRC HAS
RECONSIDERED ITS CONCLUSION ON THE ILLEGALITY OF THE MARCH 2001 STRIKE.
V
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION MAY RECONSIDER IN THE SECOND CERTIFIED CASE ITS DECISION ON THE FIRST
CERTIFIED CASE WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.[50]
Petitioner contends that the February 2003 strike held by respondent is illegal. To buttress its claim, petitioner
argues that respondent has no right to demand that it bargain with the latter. Its refusal to recognize respondent as
the bargaining representative of its employees is based on the directive of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721 to
conduct another certification election. Petitioner maintains that respondent never denied that its purpose for
holding the strike was to force it to recognize the latter over the other union. Since the strike is a union-recognition-
strike, it is illegal.[51]
Petitioner further argues that the strike was manifestly illegal for it was in gross violation of the Labor Code,
particularly Art. 264,[52] which expressly prohibits the declaration of a strike over an issue that is pending arbitration
between the parties.[53] Since the labor dispute in the first certified case, Cert. Case No. 000200-01, was still
pending compulsory arbitration at the time of the strike on February 4, 2003, and since the said strike was based
substantially on the same grounds, i.e., the alleged refusal by petitioner to recognize the union, the strike is illegal by
express provision of the law.
Moreover, petitioner adds that the issue of illegality of the February 2003 strike was already resolved by the NLRC in
Cert. Case No. 000200-01 involving a strike in March 2001 over the same labor dispute, namely, the alleged refusal of
petitioner to recognize respondent. As such, the NLRCs decision in Cert. Case No. 000200-01 constitutes res
judicata in the second certified case, NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03.[54]
Petitioner also contends that the union officers who participated in the illegal strike are all deemed to have lost their
employment. Unlike ordinary members of the union, whose dismissal requires that the employer prove that they
committed illegal acts, mere participation of the union officers in an illegal strike warrants their termination from
employment. Consequently, since the strike was illegal, it follows that the termination from employment of the union
officers was warranted.[55]
Petitioner maintains that it was erroneous on the part of the CA not to have reversed the NLRC decision[56] ordering
the reinstatement of the employees which were dismissed in connection with the February 4, 2003 strike. It argues
that since the termination of the employees was due to their refusal to comply with the return-to-work order issued
by the Labor Secretary, not to their alleged participation in an illegal strike, the CA erred in affirming the
decision.[57]
Finally, petitioner avers that the CA also committed serious errors on procedural issues when it concluded that the
NLRC may reconsider in Cert. Case No. 000200-01 its decision in NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03.[58]
The petition is meritorious.
Whether or not respondent is the recognized collective bargaining agent had been finally resolved in the negative.
Consequently, as correctly concluded by the CA, it could not compel petitioner to bargain with it. Thus, the only
issues left for determination are: the validity of the strike participated in by the officers of the respondent union; and
the validity of their termination from employment by reason of such participation.
The strike is a legitimate weapon in the human struggle for a decent existence. It is considered as the most effective
weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. But to
be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means for the attainment of social
justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. The law provides limits for its exercise.[59]
In the instant case, the strike undertaken by the officers of respondent union is patently illegal for the following
reasons: (1) it is a union-recognition-strike which is not sanctioned by labor laws; (2) it was undertaken after the
dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration; and (3) it was in violation of the Secretarys return-to-work
order.
Respondents notices of strike were founded on petitioners continued refusal to bargain with it. It thus staged
the strike to compel petitioner to recognize it as the collective bargaining agent, making it a union-recognition-
strike. As its legal designation implies, this kind of strike is calculated to compel the employer to recognize ones
union and not other contending groups, as the employees bargaining representative to work out a collective
bargaining agreement despite the striking unions doubtful majority status to merit voluntary recognition and lack of
formal certification as the exclusive representative in the bargaining unit.[60]
The certification election that was conducted where respondent emerged as winner, not having been recognized
as valid, it has no authority to represent the rank and file employees of petitioner. Thus, it could not ask
petitioner to bargain with it. As the issue of its identity had been the subject of a separate case which had been
settled by the court with finality,[61] petitioner cannot, therefore, be faulted in refusing to bargain. Neither could this
Court sustain respondents imputation of unfair labor practice and union busting against petitioner. With more
reason, this Court cannot sustain the validity of the strike staged on such basis.
Even if this Court were to uphold the validity of respondents purpose or objective in staging a strike, still, the strike
would be declared illegal for having been conducted in utter defiance of the Secretarys return-to-work order and
after the dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration. Although ostensibly there were several notices of
strike successively filed by respondent, these notices were founded on substantially the same grounds petitioners
continued refusal to recognize it as the collective bargaining representative.
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code provides:
When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified
in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all
striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The
Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to
ensure the compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. x x x.[62]
The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an
exercise of the police power of the State, aimed at promoting the public good. When the Secretary exercises these
powers, he is granted great breadth of discretion to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these
powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place.[63]
The moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national
interest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. It was
not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another order directing a return to work. The mere issuance
of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a return-to-work order, even if the
directive to return to work is not expressly stated in the assumption order.[64]
A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived.
While the workers may choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their
employer.[65]
Says the Labor Code:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities.
xxx
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after
certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases
involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must
return to his job together with his co-workers so that the operations of the company can be resumed and it can
continue serving the public and promoting its interest. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is
aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests.
Regardless of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and
all acts that undermine or tend to undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or
certification order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices on
the part of the company, to justify their action.[66]
Respondent, in the instant case, after the assumption of jurisdiction and certification of the dispute to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration, filed notices of strike and staged the strike obviously contrary to the provisions of labor laws.
Worse, it filed not one but several notices of strike which resulted in two certified cases which were earlier
consolidated. These disputes could have been averted had respondent respected the CAs decision. That way,
the collective bargaining agent would have been determined and petitioner could have been compelled to
bargain. Respondent, through its officers, instead opted to use the weapon of strike to force petitioner to recognize
it as the bargaining agent. The strike, having been staged after the dispute had been certified for arbitration and
contrary to the return-to-work order, became a prohibited activity, and was thus illegal.

Strikes exert disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management, but also on the
general peace and progress of

society, not to mention the economic well-being of the State. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or
destroy the union and members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. Hence,
the decision to wield the weapon of strike must therefore rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed
by the tempers and tantrums of a few, and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should not
however be antithetical to the public welfare. In every strike staged by a union, the general peace and progress of
society and public welfare are involved.[67]

Having settled that the subject strike was illegal, this Court shall now determine the proper penalty to be imposed on
the union officers who knowingly participated in the strike.

Article 264 of the Labor Code further provides:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities. x x x

Any workers whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to
reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker
or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have
lost his employment status: Provided, that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute
sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during
such lawful strike. x x x.

It bears stressing that the law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. A worker merely
participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts
during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment

status. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participating in the commission of illegal acts during a strike,
the law provides that a union officer may be terminated from employment. The law grants the employer the option
of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. It possesses the right
and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service.[68] Otherwise, the workers will simply refuse to return to
their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge
and preventing management from filling up their positions.[69]

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 28, 2005 in the
consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos. 79446 and 82314 and its Resolution dated September 22, 2005 are MODIFIED in
that the strike in question is found ILLEGAL and the order to reinstate the union officers who participated in the illegal
strike is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149610 August 20, 2004 10) Magdeline P. Borromeo - Member Executive Board[7]

ROSENDO PIERO, DUMAGUETE CATHEDRAL COLLEGE FACULTY AND STAFF ASSOCIATION (DUCACOFSA) and On October 28, 1994, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision as follows:
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES UNION (NAFTEU),
Petitioners, WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the strike illegal and declaring
the respondent union officers to have lost their employment status effective on the date of this decision.
- versus -
All other claims are dismissed for lack of legal and factual basis.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FOURTH DIVISION, CEBU CITY and DUMAGUETE CATHEDRAL COLLEGE,
INC., SO ORDERED.[8]
Respondents.
Unfazed, the union officers appealed[9] to the NLRC.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
Meanwhile, on November 29, 1991, the said officers returned to work by virtue of a Memorandum of
DECISION Agreement entered into by DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU and private respondent allowing them to resume service without
prejudice to the outcome of the instant case then pending appeal with the NLRC.[10]

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the May 25, 2001 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 52084 which affirmed the resolution[2] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No.
V-0002-95 sustaining the Labor Arbiters decision[3] in RAB-VII-011-0315-91-D. The assailed decision declared as
illegal the strike staged by Dumaguete Cathedral College Faculty and Staff Association-National Federation of
Teachers and Employees Union (DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU), and ordered the dismissal of the officers thereof.
On December 19, 1995, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.[11] In addition to the failure to
comply with strike vote requirements, the NLRC ratiocinated that the strike was illegal because DUCACOFSA-
NAFTEU, not being a legitimate labor organization, has no personality to hold a strike. The union officers filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied.[12]
Petitioner Rosendo U. Piero filed with this Court a petition for certiorari[13] which was referred to the Court of
Appeals[14] pursuant to the ruling in St. Martins Funeral Home v. NLRC.[15]

Private respondent Dumaguete Cathedral College, Inc.,[4] an educational institution, is the employer of the
faculty and staff members comprising the labor union DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU. On December 19, 1986, DUCACOFSA
(then affiliated with the National Alliance of Teachers and Allied Workers NATAW) and private respondent entered
into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective for 3 years.[5] Upon the expiration of their CBA in 1989, the
parties failed to conclude another CBA which led DUCACOFSA (now affiliated with NAFTEU) to file a notice of strike
with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on the ground of refusal to bargain.[6]
On March 25, 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the NLRC, thus
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the Resolutions of the NLRC (4th Division) promulgated on
December 19, 1995 and February 16, 1996, respectively, in NLRC Case No. V-0002-95 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[16]

On November 4, 1991, DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU conducted a strike in the premises of private respondent without On August 29, 2001, Pieros Motion for Reconsideration was denied.[17] Hence, the instant petition.
submitting to the DOLE the required results of the strike vote obtained from the members of the union.
The issues to be resolved are: (1) Was the strike staged by DUCACOFSA- NAFTEU illegal? (2) If yes, should Piero
Consequently, on November 21, 1991, private respondent filed with the DOLE a complaint to declare the strike be dismissed?
illegal and to dismiss the following officers of DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU, to wit:
The NLRC declared the strike illegal on the grounds that DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU is legally non-existent and
1) Rosendo U. Piero President therefore has no personality to hold a strike; and that the strike was conducted without the requisite strike vote.
2) Monica A. Sison Vice President for Elementary
3) Godofreda D. Flores Vice President for High School Anent the first ground, we find that DUCACOFSA-NAFTEUs status as a legitimate labor organization has been
4) Eugenio O. Magos Vice President for College settled in a final and executory decision of the NLRC in NLRC Case No. V-0432-93,[18] which affirmed the decision of
5) Carmen P. Baylon Secretary the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. RAB VII-02-0025-93-D,[19] finding private respondent guilty of unfair labor
6) Teresita Baylosis Treasurer practice and recognizing DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU as an existing legitimate labor organization. Pertinent portions of the
7) Consolacion C. Unabia Liaison Officer Labor Arbiters findings which were adopted by the NLRC are as follows
8) Pablo T. Tuble Member Executive Board
9) Hermenia C. Nazareno Member Executive Board
 x x x The record further shows that the herein Complainant Union or Association formally disaffiliated from
National Alliance of Teachers and Allied Workers (NATAW) and at the same time affiliated itself with the National
Federation of Teachers and Employees Union (NAFTEU) in its resolution dated April 8, 1991 marked as Exhibit C. By
reason of such affiliation NAFTEU, sent a formal notice Exh. D, to the Department of Labor and Employment
received by the DOLE Docket Section on March 24, 1992 informing the latter of additional local union affiliated with
the Federation among which was DUCACOFSA. Said notice however, does not show that respondent DCCI
[Dumaguete Cathedral College, Inc.] was furnished a copy. Other documents on record, Annex 1 x x x is a
Certification dated September 13, 1991 issued by Bartolome C. Amoguis, certifying x x x that x x x DUCACOFSA, x x x
is not a registered labor organization. Similar certification dated September 24, 1991 signed by Johnny P. Garcia of
the Bureau of Labor Relations, also certified that based on records, the Dumaguete Cathedral College Faculty and
Staff Association-NATAW has not been reported as one of the affiliates of the x x x (NATAW). The same office of the
Bureau of Labor Relations issued another certification, Annex 3, dated September 23, 1991, certifying that based
on records, the Dumaguete Cathedral College Faculty and Staff Association-NAFTEU has not been reported as one
of the affiliates of x x x (NAFTEU).
By reason of the foregoing certification Annexes 1, 2 and 3 respondent [Dumaguete Cathedral approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot
College, Inc.] alleges that complainant [union] does not legally exist hence, respondent cannot be held liable for
Unfair Labor Practice.
We disagree.
xxx xxx xxx
The averment that complainant is not existing by reason of the certifications marked as Annexes 1, 2 and
3 cannot be upheld for the reason that per resolution marked as Exh. C and the letter signed by Evelyn B. In the case at bar, DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU failed to prove that it obtained the required strike-vote among its members
Quijano, Deputy Secretary-General marked as Exh. D which was duly received by the DOLE Docket Section on
March 25, 1992 shows otherwise. We cannot also sustain the averment that the union was dissolved by reason of
the resignation of some members for mere resignation of some members does not ipso facto dissolve a union.[20]
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment which is also known as preclusion of issues or collateral
estoppel, issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between
the same parties involving a different cause of action.[21] Accordingly, private respondent is now barred from
challenging the status of DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU.
Anent the second ground, however, there is no doubt that the strike staged by DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU is illegal for
non-compliance with the strike-vote requirements. The relevant provisions of Article 263 of the Labor Code read:
Article 263. x x x
(c) x x x the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a
notice of lockout with the Department at least 30 days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor
practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining
agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in
case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-
laws, which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off
period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision
to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association or
of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose. The decision shall be
valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout
vote was taken. The Department may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the
conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Department the results of
the voting at least seven days before the intended strike or lock-out, subject to the cooling-off period herein
provided.
Under the aforequoted provisions, the requisites for a valid strike are as follows: (a) a notice of strike filed with the
DOLE thirty days before the intended date thereof or fifteen days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote
in a meeting called for that purpose; (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days
before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and failure of a union to comply therewith renders
the strike illegal.[22]
Pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code, any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared
to have lost his employment status.
and that the results thereof were submitted to the DOLE. The strike was therefore correctly declared illegal, for non-
compliance with the procedural requirements of Article 263 of the Labor Code, and Piero properly dismissed from
service.
The Court notes that petitioner Piero turned 60 years old and retired on March 1, 1996[23] after 29 years[24] of
service, rendering his dismissal from service moot and academic. However, in view of the propriety of his
termination as a consequence of the illegal strike, he is no longer entitled to payment of retirement benefits
because he lost his employment status effective as of the date of the decision of the Labor Arbiter October 28,
1994.[25]
An employee who is dismissed for cause is generally not entitled to any financial assistance. Equity considerations,
however, provide an exception. Equity has been defined as justice outside law, being ethical rather than jural and
belonging to the sphere of morals than of law. It is grounded on the precepts of conscience and not on any
sanction of positive law, for equity finds no room for application where there is law.[26]
Although meriting termination of employment, Pieros infraction is not so reprehensible nor unscrupulous as to
warrant complete disregard of his long years of service.[27] Moreover, he has no previous derogatory
records. Weighed on the scales of justice, conscience and reason tip in favor of granting financial assistance to
support him in the twilight of his life after long years of service.
Under the circumstances, social and compassionate justice dictate that petitioner Piero be awarded financial
assistance equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of service[28] computed from his date of
employment up to October 28, 1994 when he was declared to have lost his employment status. Indeed, equities of
this case should be accorded due weight because labor law determinations are not only secundum rationem but
also secundum caritatem.[29]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 52084, affirming the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. V-0002-
95 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, Rosendo U. Piero is awarded financial assistance equivalent to
one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of service computed from his date of employment up to October 28,
1994.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160058 June 22, 2007
1. Requiring employees to execute undated resignation letters prior to regularization as a condition for
PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION, continued employment.
Petitioner, 2. Preventing employees from displaying Union flags and CBA's slogans.

3. Prohibiting employees from conducting and preventing employees from participating in Union activities.
- versus -
4. Requiring employees to render forced overtime to prevent them from attending Union meetings and
PILIPINO TELEPHONE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PILTEA), PELAGIO S. BRIONES II, GEORGE L. DE LEON, LECEL M. FIDEL, activities after office hours.
AUGUSTO C. FRANCISCO, OLIVER B. ANTONIO, RONALDO B. CORONEL, CHRISTOPHER L. HERRERA and GEM TORRES,
Respondents. 5. Using vulgar and insulting language such as "Kahit sa puwet n'yo isaksak ang mga banderang yan!"
x-----------------------------x
6. Threatening employees who join concerted Union activities with disciplinary action.

7. Discouraging employees from participating in Union activities by branding the activities illegal and
G.R. No. 160094 prohibited by law.

PILIPINO TELEPHONE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PILTEA), PELAGIO S. BRIONES II, GEORGE L. DE LEON, and GEM 8. Abuse of Company Rules and Regulations to prevent the free exercise by the Union and its members of
TORRES, their right to self organization and free expression (e.g. issuing show cause memos for refusal to render overtime and
Petitioners vandalism).

9. Utilizing security guards to harass employees who participate in Union activities by requiring the guards to
take down the names of employees who participate in the Union activities.[6]
- versus -
The Company filed a petition for Consolidated Assumption of Jurisdiction with the Office of the Secretary of
Labor. On August 14, 1998, then Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION, states:
Respondents. WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the entire labor dispute at Pilipino
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Telephone Corporation pursuant to Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended.

Accordingly, any strike or lockout, whether actual or intended, is hereby enjoined.

DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
At bar are two consolidated petitions seeking review of the decision[1] and resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59799 which modified the decision[3] of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) by affirming the illegality of the strike conducted by Pilipino Telephone Employees Association (the Union)
but reducing the penalty against union officers Pelagio S. Briones II, George De Leon, Lecel M. Fidel and Gem Torres
from dismissal to suspension for six (6) months.
First, we unfurl the facts.
The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Union and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (the
Company) was due to expire on December 31, 1997. On October 30, 1997, the Union submitted to the Company its
proposals for the renegotiation of the non-representation aspects of their CBA. As there was a standstill on several
issues, the parties submitted their dispute to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for preventive
mediation.[4] The conciliation proceedings before the NCMB failed.
On July 13, 1998, the Union filed a Notice of Strike[5] with the NCMB for unfair labor practice due to the
alleged acts of "restraint and coercion of union members and interference with their right to self-organization"
committed by the Companys Revenue Assurance Department (RAD) Manager Rosales and its Call Center
Department Manager, Manny Alegado, to wit:
Furthermore, the parties are likewise directed to cease and desist from committing any or all acts that might
exacerbate the situation.
To expedite the resolution of the dispute, the parties are hereby directed to file their respective position
papers and documentary evidence within TEN (10) days from receipt of this Order.
SO ORDERED.[7] (Emphases supplied.)
On September 4, 1998, the Union filed a second Notice of Strike[8] with the NCMB on the grounds of: a) union
busting, for the alleged refusal of the Company to turn over union funds; and b) the mass promotion of union
members during the CBA negotiation, allegedly aimed at excluding them from the bargaining unit during the CBA
negotiation. On the same day, the Union went on strike.
On September 9, 1998, Secretary Laguesma directed the striking Union officers and members to return to work
within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the Order and for the Company to accept all strikers under the same
terms and conditions of employment prior to the strike. The Union and its members complied.
On December 7, 1998, the Company filed with the NLRC a petition[9] to declare the Union's September 4, 1998 strike
illegal. On August 16, 1999, Labor Arbiter Aliman D. Mangandog issued a decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 4, 1998 strike conducted by PILTEA is declared illegal.
 Accordingly, the following union officers of PILTEL/MKP, namely: George de Leon, Pelagio S. Briones, Nelson
C. Pineda, Rolando U. Sta. Ana, Elna E. Escalante, Gem P. Torres, Ma. Rica D. Hilotin, Gerald Joseph P. Tayas, Lecel
M. Fidel and Jose Rudylin R. Gamboa are declared to have lost their employment status.
While the following members, namely: Romeo Anonuevo, Jonathan Molaer, Cris Herrera, Edgar Alan Aquino,
Aris Ablis, Dorothy Zulieta, Ronald Cornel, Arnel Garcia, Ranelio Mendoza, Oliver Antonio, Alvin Usman, Augusto
Francisco, Celia Mogol and Erlinda Madrid are hereby suspended for six (6) months without pay.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The Labor Arbiter found the strike illegal for having been conducted in defiance of Secretary Laguesma's August 14,
1998 assumption order and for non-compliance with the procedural requirements for the conduct of a strike under
the Labor Code and its implementing rules. The Labor Arbiter cited Scholastica's College v. Ruben Torres[11] which
ruled that a strike undertaken despite the issuance of an assumption or certification order by the Secretary of Labor
is a prohibited activity, hence, illegal under Article 264 of the Labor Code. He found that the grounds relied upon
by the Union in its second notice of strike were substantially the same as those set forth in its first notice of strike.
Moreover, he held that the Company's alleged refusal to turn over the checked-off union dues was not a strikeable
issue as it was not a gross and blatant violation of the economic provisions of the CBA. He also held that the mass
promotion of the Union's members was not tantamount to dismissal, hence, did not constitute union busting. The
staging of the strike was likewise found to suffer from fatal procedural defects, to wit: a) the notice of strike was filed
on the same day that the strike was conducted; b) the fifteen (15)-day cooling-off period was not observed; c) the
Union failed to conduct a strike vote within the time prescribed by law; and d) the result of the strike vote was not
furnished to the NCMB at least seven (7) days prior to the intended strike. Certain illegal acts were likewise found to
have been committed during the strike, among which were the following:
1) striker Manny Costales prevented the Company's Director, Lilibeth Pasa, from entering the Bankers Centre
Building;
2) union officers Judilyn Gamboa and Rolly Sta. Ana physically blocked the front entrance of the same building;
3) striker Aris Ablis drove a company vehicle and used it to block the driveway of PILTEL Centre II, thus, the cars
inside the building were prevented from going out. The tires of said company vehicle were found deflated the
following day;
4) strikers Dorothy Zulieta and Ronald Cornel prevented the Warehousing Manager assigned at the PILTEL
Metropolitan Warehouse from going out of his office;
5) the strikers, led by Nelson Pineda, blocked the Detachment Supervisor of Protection Specialists and the
uniformed company guards from delivering food to the non-striking employees trapped inside PILTEL Call Center at
the Manila Memorial Park Building;
6) in General Santos City, some union members tied the entrance doors of the PILTEL Building and tied the company
vehicles together;
7) Fe Carandang, Estrella Anonical, Zaldy Logos and Jovencio Laderas blocked the main entrance of the Boac,
Marinduque office of the Company;
8) strikers Edna Carrion, Celia Mogol, Erlinda Madrid, Raul Montalan, Rolly Miraflor, Zaldy de Chavez and Dina
Madla of the Company's office in Boac, Marinduque were also heard telling the Company's clients not to transact
business with the company; and 9) strikers Zaldy Logos, Rizaldy de Chavez, Raul Montalan, Rolly Milaflor and
Jovencio Laderas were seen preventing the free ingress and egress of the Company's office premises in Boac,
Marinduque. The Labor Arbiter ruled that since the September 4, 1998 strike was illegal, the Union officers were
deemed to have lost their employment status. He further ruled that the illegal acts committed during the strike
were not serious enough to merit the dismissal of the erring Union members as they were merely acting at the order
of their leaders. Hence, the erring union members were merely suspended for six (6) months.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto.[12] The Union, its dismissed officers and its
suspended members filed a motion for reconsideration, to no avail.[13]
The Union, its officers Briones, De Leon, Fidel and Torres, and its members Francisco, Antonio, Coronel and Herrera
filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA, attributing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC.[14] On September 20, 2002, the CA modified the ruling
of the NLRC as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the NLRC dated February 29, 2000 is MODIFIED. Petitioners Pelagio S.
Briones, George L. De Leon, Lecel M. Fidel and Gem Torres shall be suspended for six (6) months without pay instead
of being dismissed. If already dismissed, petitioners shall be reinstated back to their former positions, or, if already
filled, then to any other equal positions and shall be entitled to backwages computed from date of dismissal until
date of actual reinstatement less the pay for the six (6) months suspension they were supposed to serve. The
suspension of petitioners Augusto C. Francisco, Oliver B. Antonio, Ronaldo B. Coronel and Christopher L. Herrera for
six (6) months without pay and the finding of illegality of the September 4, 1998 strike STANDS.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Both parties filed their respective partial motions for reconsideration - the company assailed the CA decision
decreasing the penalty of the union officers while the Union and its dismissed officers assailed the decision
declaring the strike illegal. Both motions were denied.[16]
Hence, the instant petitions.
In G.R. No. 160058, the Company raises the issue of:
[WHETHER] THE ASSAILED 20 SEPTEMBER 2002 DECISION AND 17 SEPTEMBER 2003 RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.[17]
It prays that the September 20, 2002 Decision and September 17, 2003 Resolution of the CA be reversed in part and
judgment be rendered affirming in toto the February 29, 2000 Decision of the NLRC.
In G.R. No. 160094, the Union and Union officers Briones, De Leon and Torres raise the issue of:
[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN UPHOLDING NLRCS FINDING
THAT THE 4 SEPTEMBER 1998 STRIKE HELD BY PILTEA WAS ILLEGAL AS IT IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING LAW OR
JURISPRUDENCE.[18]
They pray that this Court modify the September 20, 2002 Decision and September 17, 2003 Resolution of the CA
and: a) declare the Union's September 4, 1998 strike as legal; b) nullify the six-month suspension imposed on Briones,
De Leon and Torres; and c) order the Company to pay them backwages covering the period of their suspension.
The twin issues to be resolved are: a) the legality of the Union's strike and b) the penalty to be imposed on the Union
officers, if any.
First, the legality of the strike.
The Union and its officers maintain that their September 4, 1998 strike was legal. They allege that the Company was
guilty of union busting in promoting a substantial number of Union members and officers to positions outside the
bargaining unit during the period of CBA negotiations. Allegedly, said Union members and officers maintained the
same jobs and duties despite their promotion. They also capitalize on the CAs finding that the company was guilty
of unfair labor practice in refusing to turn over the deducted contingency fees of the union members to the union.
Citing Bacus v. Ople,[19] Panay Electric Company v. NLRC[20] and PNOC Dockyard and Engineering Corporation
v. NLRC,[21] they contend that this finding of unfair labor practice precludes the CA from ruling that the strike was
illegal and that the Union was in bad faith in conducting the strike.
These arguments do not sway.
Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6715,[22] and Rule XXII, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code outline the following procedural requirements for a valid strike:
1) A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically the Regional Branch
of the NCMB, copy furnished the employer of the union;
2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution of the strike
thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of unfair labor practice. However, in
the case of union busting where the unions existence is threatened, the cooling-off period need not be observed.
xxx xxx xxx
4) Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting, with a 24-hour prior
notice to NCMB. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot approval of majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned.
5) The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before the intended strike
or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period.[23]
It is settled that these requirements are mandatory in nature and failure to comply therewith renders the strike
illegal.[24]
In the case at bar, the Union staged the strike on the same day that it filed its second notice of strike. The Union
violated the seven-day strike ban. This requirement should be observed to give the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the approval of the majority
of the union members. [25]
Moreover, we agree with the CA that there was no union busting which would warrant the non-observance of the
cooling-off period. To constitute union busting under Article 263 of the Labor Code, there must be: 1) a dismissal
from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws; and 2) the
existence of the union must be threatened by such dismissal. In the case at bar, the second notice of strike filed by
the Union merely assailed the mass promotion of its officers and members during the CBA negotiations. Surely,
promotion is different from dismissal. As observed by the Labor Arbiter:
x x x Neither does that (sic) PILTELs promotion of some members of respondent union constitutes (sic) union busting
which could be a valid subject of strike because they were not being dismissed. In fact, these promoted
employees did not personally come forward to protest their promotion vis--vis their alleged option to remain in the
union bargaining unit of the rank and filers.[26]
This is consistent with our ruling in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez[27] that a promotion which is manifestly
beneficial to an employee should not give rise to a gratuitous speculation that it was made to deprive the union of
the membership of the benefited employee.
The contention of the Union and its officers that the finding of unfair labor practice by the CA precludes the ruling
that the strike was illegal is unmeritorious. The refusal of the Company to turn over the deducted contingency funds
to the union does not justify the disregard of the mandatory seven-day strike ban and the 15-day cooling-off period.
The Unions reliance on Bacus v. Ople,[28] Panay Electric Company v. NLRC[29] and PNOC Dockyard and
Engineering Corporation v. NLRC[30] is likewise unavailing.
Nowhere in Panay Electric Company and PNOC Dockyard and Engineering Corporation did the Court rule that the
procedural requirements for a valid strike may be dispensed with if the striking workers believed in good faith that
the company was committing acts of unfair labor practice. In both cases, the striking union members complied
with the procedural requirements for a valid strike. It is correct that this Court, in Bacus, held that "a strike staged by
the workers inspired by good faith does not automatically make the same illegal," but said case was decided
before the effectivity of R.A. No. 6715 on March 21, 1989. We have ruled that with the enactment of R.A. No. 6715,
the requirements as to the filing of a notice of strike, strike vote, and notice given to the DOLE are mandatory in
nature.[31]
Moreover, we agree with the NLRC that the subject strike defied the assumption order of the Secretary of Labor.
The NLRC correctly affirmed the Labor Arbiter that the second notice of strike was based on substantially the same
grounds as the first notice of strike. The Union and its officers and members alleged that the mass promotion of the
union officers and members and the non-remittance of the deducted contingency fees were the reasons for their
concerted activities which annoyed the Companys RAD Manager and made him commit acts of unfair labor
practice, eventually leading to the Unions filing of the first notice of strike. Clearly then, the issues which were made
as grounds for the second notice of strike, viz, the mass promotion of the union members and officers and the non-
remittance of the deducted contingency fees, were already existing when the Secretary of Labor assumed
jurisdiction over the entire labor dispute between the Company and the Union on August 14, 1998.
Article 264 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities.x x x
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after
certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases
involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
Having settled that the subject strike was illegal, we shall now determine the proper penalty to be imposed on the
union officers who knowingly participated in the strike.
Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC imposed the penalty of dismissal on the striking union officers after finding that:
a) the strike was illegal for having been conducted in defiance of Secretary Laguesma's August 14, 1998 Order of
assumption of jurisdiction and for non-compliance with the procedural requirements for the conduct of a strike
under the Labor Code and its implementing rules; b) the grounds relied upon by the Union in its second notice of
strike were substantially the same as those set forth in its first notice of strike; c) the Company's alleged refusal to turn
over the checked-off union dues was not a strikeable issue as it was not a gross and blatant violation of the
economic provisions of the CBA; d) the mass promotion of the Union's members was also not tantamount to
dismissal, hence, did not constitute union busting; and e) certain illegal acts were found to have been committed
during the strike.
On the other hand, the CA reduced the penalty of the union officers from dismissal to suspension for six months after
finding that the "supreme penalty of dismissal" imposed on union officers Briones, De Leon, Fidel and Torres was "so
harsh" considering that the Union did not defy the Secretary of Labor's Assumption Order and that the Company
did not have "clean hands" when it filed the instant case for having committed an unfair labor practice by refusing
to turn over the union dues to the Union.
We find that the CA committed a reversible error in modifying the rulings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
For a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to prosper, the tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions must be proven to have acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[32] Grave abuse of discretion has been
defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough, it must be so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[33]
We note that although the CA modified the ruling of the NLRC, nowhere in its decision did it attribute grave abuse
of discretion to the NLRC. And rightly so.
Article 264 of the Labor Code further provides:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. x x x
Any workers whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to
reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have
lost his employment status: Provided, that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute
sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during
such lawful strike. x x x
We have explained the meaning of this provision as follows:
The effects of illegal strikes, as outlined in Article 264 of the Labor Code, make a distinction between ordinary
workers and union officers who participate therein. Under established jurisprudence, a union officer may be
terminated from employment for knowingly participating in an illegal strike. The fate of union members is different.
Mere participation in an illegal strike is not a sufficient ground for termination of the services of the union members.
The Labor Code protects ordinary, rank-and-file union members who participated in such a strike from losing their
jobs provided that they did not commit illegal acts during the strike.[34]
In Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. NLRC,[35] the Court held that "[t]he law, in using the word may, grants
the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his
employment." Thus, in a number of cases,[36] proof that an employee who knowingly participated in an illegal
strike is a union officer was enough to warrant his dismissal from employment.
This rule was relaxed in the case of PAL v. Brillantes[37] where the Court "invoke[d] its judicial prerogative to resolve
disputes in a way to render to each interested party the most judicious solution, and in the ultimate scheme, a
resolution of a dispute tending to preserve the greater order of society." In said case, the Court dismissed the
petition of PAL seeking the termination from employment of certain Union members and officers who staged a strike
in violation of the Secretary of Labor's return-to-work order. The Court found that both parties contributed to the
volatile atmosphere that emerged despite the Secretary of Labor's status quo order as PAL terminated en masse
the employment of 183 union officers and members. It noted the finding of the Acting Secretary of Labor that PAL
"did not come to this office with 'clean hands' in seeking the termination of the officers and members of PALEA who
participated in the 16 June 1994 strike."[38]
This Court exercised this judicial prerogative sparingly in Nissan Motors Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor.[39] In
said case, the Court also found Nissan equally guilty of exacerbating the situation after the assumption order of the
Secretary for suspending a substantial number of Union officers and members with threat of eventual dismissal and
perceived illegal lockout and union busting. However, while it affirmed the ruling of the Secretary of Labor
suspending the union members who participated in the illegal strike, the Court sustained the dismissal of the union
officers, viz:
While the employer is authorized to declare a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his
employment, his/its option is not as wide with respect to union members or workers for the law itself draws a line
and makes a distinction between union officers and members/ordinary workers. An ordinary striking worker or union
member cannot, as a rule, be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike; there must be proof that he
committed illegal acts during the strike.[40]
having been conducted all through out the offices of PILTEL all over the country. Evidently, the strike was planned.
Verily, they cannot now come to court hiding behind the shield of good faith. Be that as it may, petitioners claim
good faith only in so far as their grounds for the strike but not on the conduct of the strike. Consequently, they still
had to comply with the procedural requirements for a strike, which, in this case, they failed to do so.[43]
Thus, in imposing the penalty of dismissal, the NLRC correctly held:
x x x the point We wish to stress is that the [open, blatant] and willful defiance by the respondents of the Order
emanating from the Secretary of Labor and Employment in this labor dispute only goes to show that the
respondents have little or no regard at all for lawful orders from duly constituted authorities. For what their officers
and members have suffered they have no one else to blame.[44]
It cannot be overemphasized that strike, as the most preeminent economic weapon of the workers to force
management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital, exert some disquieting
effects not only on the relationship between labor and management, but also on the general peace and progress
of society and
economic well-being of the State.[45] This weapon is so critical that the law imposes the supreme penalty of
dismissal on union officers who irresponsibly participate in an illegal strike and union members who commit unlawful
acts during a strike. The responsibility of the union officers, as main players in an illegal strike, is greater than that of
the members as the union officers have the duty to guide their members to respect the law.[46]
The policy of the state is not to tolerate actions directed at the destabilization of the social order, where the
relationship between labor and management has been endangered by abuse of one partys bargaining
prerogative, to the extent of disregarding not only the direct order of the government to maintain the status quo,
but the welfare of the entire workforce though they may not be involved in the dispute. The grave penalty of
dismissal imposed on the guilty parties is a natural consequence, considering the interest of public welfare.[47]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition in G.R. No. 160094 is DENIED. The petition in G.R. No. 160058 is GRANTED. The
Decision and Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 59799 dated September 20, 2002 and September 17, 2003,
respectively, are REVERSED and the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC dated February 29, 2000 and April 28,
2000, respectively, are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

The Court further explained the reason:

x x x Thus in Association of Independent Union in the Philippines vs. NLRC,[41] we held that the responsibility of
union officers, as main players in an illegal strike, is greater than that of the members and, therefore, limiting the
penalty of dismissal only for the former for participation in an illegal strike is in order. Of the same tenor, albeit
formulated a bit differently is our holding in Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. vs. NLRC.[42] (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, we do not find any reason to deviate from our rulings in Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc.
and Nissan Motors Philippines, Inc. It bears emphasis that the strike staged by the Union in the
instant case was illegal for its procedural infirmities and for defiance of the Secretarys assumption order. The CA,
the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter were unanimous in finding that bad faith existed in the conduct of the subject
strike. The relevant portion of the CA Decision states:

x x x We cannot go to the extent of ascribing good faith to the means taken in conducting the strike. The
requirement of the law is simple, that is1. Give a Notice of Strike; 2. Observe the cooling period; 3. Observe the
mandatory seven day strike ban; 3. If the act is union busting, then the union may strike doing away with the
cooling-off period, subject only to the seven-day strike ban. To be lawful, a strike must simply have a lawful purpose
and should be executed through lawful means. Here, the union cannot claim good faith in the conduct of the
strike because, as can be gleaned from the findings of the Labor Arbiter, this was an extensively coordinated strike
G.R. No. 170351 March 30, 2011
LEYTE GEOTHERMAL POWER PROGRESSIVE EMPLOYEES UNION ALU TUCP,
Petitioner,
- versus -
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Under review is the Decision[1] dated June 30, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 65760, which
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Leyte Geothermal Power Progressive Employees Union
ALUTUCP (petitioner Union) to annul and set aside the decision[2] dated December 10, 1999 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Certified Case No. V-02-99.
The facts, fairly summarized by the CA, follow.
[Respondent Philippine National Oil Corporation]-Energy Development Corporation [PNOC-EDC] is a
government-owned and controlled corporation engaged in exploration, development, utilization, generation and
distribution of energy resources like geothermal energy.
Petitioner is a legitimate labor organization, duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) Regional Office No. VIII, Tacloban City.
Among [respondents] geothermal projects is the Leyte Geothermal Power Project located at the Greater
Tongonan Geothermal Reservation in Leyte. The said Project is composed of the Tongonan 1 Geothermal Project
(T1GP) and the Leyte Geothermal Production Field Project (LGPF) which provide the power and electricity needed
not only in the provinces and cities of Central and Eastern Visayas (Region VII and VIII), but also in the island of Luzon
as well. Thus, the [respondent] hired and employed hundreds of employees on a contractual basis, whereby, their
employment was only good up to the completion or termination of the project and would automatically expire
upon the completion of such project.
Majority of the employees hired by [respondent] in its Leyte Geothermal Power Projects had become
members of petitioner. In view of that circumstance, the petitioner demands from the [respondent] for recognition
of it as the collective bargaining agent of said employees and for a CBA negotiation with it. However, the
[respondent] did not heed such demands of the petitioner. Sometime in 1998 when the project was about to be
completed, the [respondent] proceeded to serve Notices of Termination of Employment upon the employees who
are members of the petitioner.
On December 28, 1998, the petitioner filed a Notice of Strike with DOLE against the [respondent] on the
ground of purported commission by the latter of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain collectively, union
busting and mass termination. On the same day, the petitioner declared a strike and staged such strike.
To avert any work stoppage, then Secretary of Labor Bienvenido E. Laguesma intervened and issued the
Order, dated January 4, 1999, certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Accordingly, all
the striking workers were directed to return to work within twelve (12) hours from receipt of the Order and for the
[respondent] to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment prior to the strike. Further,
the parties were directed to cease and desist from committing any act that would exacerbate the situation.
However, despite earnest efforts on the part of the Secretary of Labor and Employment to settle the dispute
amicably, the petitioner remained adamant and unreasonable in its position, causing the failure of the negotiation
towards a peaceful compromise. In effect, the petitioner did not abide by [the] assumption order issued by the
Secretary of Labor.
Consequently, on January 15, 1999, the [respondent] filed a Complaint for Strike Illegality, Declaration of Loss
of Employment and Damages at the NLRC-RAB VIII in Tacloban City and at the same time, filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Petitioners Certificate of Registration with DOLE, Regional Office No. VIII. The two cases were later
on consolidated pursuant to the New NLRC Rules of Procedure. The consolidated case was docketed as NLRC
Certified Case No. V-02-99 (NCMB-RAB VIII-NS-12-0190-98; RAB Case No. VIII-1-0019-99). The said certified case was
indorsed to the NLRC 4th Division in Cebu City on June 21, 1999 for the proper disposition thereof.[3]
In due course, the NLRC 4th Division rendered a decision in favor of respondent, to wit:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the officers and members of [petitioner] Union as project employees;
2. Declaring the termination of their employment by reason of the completion of the project, or a phase or portion
thereof, to which they were assigned, as valid and legal;
3. Declaring the strike staged and conducted by [petitioner] Union through its officers and members on December
28, 1998 to January 6, 1999 as illegal for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of the law on strike[;]
4. Declaring all the officers and members of the board of [petitioner] Union who instigated and spearheaded the
illegal strike to have lost their employment[;]
5. Dismissing the claim of [petitioner] Union against PNOC-EDC for unfair labor practice for lack of merit[;]
6. Dismissing both parties claims against each other for violation of the Assumption Order dated January 4, 1999 for
lack of factual basis[;]
7. Dismissing all other claims for lack of merit.[4]
Petitioner Union filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision, which was subsequently denied. Posthaste,
petitioner Union filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the
NLRC. As previously adverted to, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the Petition.
The assailed Decision dated December 10, 1999 of the NLRC 4th Division in NLRC Certified Case No. V-02-99 (NCMB-
RAB VIII-NS-12-0190-98; RAB Case No. VIII-1-0019-99) and its Order dated March 30, 2001 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the Petitioner.[5]
Hence, this appeal by certiorari filed by petitioner Union, positing the following questions of law:
1. MAY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SUSTAIN THE PROJECT CONTRACTS THAT ARE DESIGNED TO DENY AND
DEPRIVE THE EMPLOYEES THEIR RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE BY MAKING IT APPEAR THAT THEY ARE MERE PROJECT
EMPLOYEES?
2. WHEN THERE ARE NO INTERVALS IN THE EMPLOYEES CONTRACT, SUCH THAT THE SO-CALLED UNDERTAKING WAS
CONTINUOUS, ARE THE EMPLOYEES PROPERLY TREATED AS PROJECT EMPLOYEES?
3. MAY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORE THE FIRMS OWN ESTIMATE OF JOB COMPLETION, PROVING
THAT THERE IS STILL 56.25% CIVIL/STRUCTURAL WORK TO BE ACCOMPLISHED, AND RULE THAT THE EMPLOYEES WERE
DISMISSED FOR COMPLETION [OF] THE PROJECT?
4. MAY A FIRM HIDE UNDER THE SPURIOUS CLOAK OF PROJECT COMPLETION TO DISMISS EN MASSE THE EMPLOYEES
WHO HAVE ORGANIZED AMONG THEMSELVES A LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATION TO PROTECT THEIR RIGHTS?
5. WHEN THERE IS NO STOPPAGE OF WORK, MAY A PROTEST ACTIVITY BE CONSIDERED AS A STRIKE CONTRARY TO ITS
CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION UNDER ARTICLE 212 (O) OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES?
6. WHEN THE DISMISSAL IS AIMED AT RIDDING THE COMPANY OF MEMBERS OF THE UNION, IS THIS UNION BUSTING?[6]
Stripped of rhetoric, the issues for our resolution are:
1. Whether the officers and members of petitioner Union are project employees of respondent; and
2. Whether the officers and members of petitioner Union engaged in an illegal strike.
On the first issue, petitioner Union contends that its officers and members performed activities that were usually
necessary and desirable to respondents usual business. In fact, petitioner Union reiterates that its officers and
members were assigned to the Construction Department of respondent as carpenters and masons, and to other
jobs pursuant to civil works, which are usually necessary and desirable to the department. Petitioner Union likewise
points out that there was no interval in the employment contract of its officers and members, who were all
employees of respondent, which lack of interval, for petitioner Union, manifests that the undertaking is usually
necessary and desirable to the usual trade or business of the employer.
We cannot subscribe to the view taken by petitioner Union.
The distinction between a regular and a project employment is provided in Article 280, paragraph 1, of the
Labor Code:
ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided,
That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken,
shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment
shall continue while such actually exists.[7]
The foregoing contemplates four (4) kinds of employees: (a) regular employees or those who have been
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer; (b) project employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking[,] the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee; (c) seasonal employees or those who work or perform services which are seasonal in nature, and the
employment is for the duration of the season;[8] and (d) casual employees or those who are not regular, project, or
seasonal employees. Jurisprudence has added a fifth kind a fixed-term employee.[9]
Article 280 of the Labor Code, as worded, establishes that the nature of the employment is determined by law,
regardless of any contract expressing otherwise. The supremacy of the law over the nomenclature of the contract
and the stipulations contained therein is to bring to life the policy enshrined in the Constitution to afford full
protection to labor.[10] Thus, labor contracts are placed on a higher plane than ordinary contracts; these are
imbued with public interest and therefore subject to the police power of the State.[11]
However, notwithstanding the foregoing iterations, project employment contracts which fix the employment for a
specific project or undertaking remain valid under the law:
x x x By entering into such a contract, an employee is deemed to understand that his employment is coterminous
with the project. He may not expect to be employed continuously beyond the completion of the project. It is of
judicial notice that project employees engaged for manual services or those for special skills like those of carpenters
or masons, are, as a rule, unschooled. However, this fact alone is not a valid reason for bestowing special treatment
on them or for invalidating a contract of employment. Project employment contracts are not lopsided agreements
in favor of only one party thereto. The employers interest is equally important as that of the employee[s] for theirs is
the interest that propels economic activity. While it may be true that it is the employer who drafts project
employment contracts with its business interest as overriding consideration, such contracts do not, of necessity,
prejudice the employee. Neither is the employee left helpless by a prejudicial employment contract. After all, under
the law, the interest of the worker is paramount.[12]
In the case at bar, the records reveal that the officers and the members of petitioner Union signed employment
contracts indicating the specific project or phase of work for which they were hired, with a fixed period of
employment. The NLRC correctly disposed of this issue:
A deeper examination also shows that [the individual members of petitioner Union] indeed signed and
accepted the [employment contracts] freely and voluntarily. No evidence was presented by [petitioner] Union to
prove improper pressure or undue influence when they entered, perfected and consummated [the employment]
contracts. In fact, it was clearly established in the course of the trial of this case, as explained by no less than the
President of [petitioner] Union, that the contracts of employment were read, comprehended, and voluntarily
accepted by them. x x x.
xxxx
As clearly shown by [petitioner] Unions own admission, both parties had executed the contracts freely and
voluntarily without force, duress or acts tending to vitiate the worker[s] consent. Thus, we see no reason not to honor
and give effect to the terms and conditions stipulated therein. x x x.[13]
Thus, we are hard pressed to find cause to disturb the findings of the NLRC which are supported by substantial
evidence.
It is well-settled in jurisprudence that factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, which are
deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only
respect but even finality, and bind the Court when supported by substantial evidence.[14] Rule 133, Section 5
defines substantial evidence as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.
Consistent therewith is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this is strictly adhered to in labor
cases.[15] We may take cognizance of and resolve factual issues, only when the findings of fact and conclusions of
law of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC are inconsistent with those of the CA.[16]
In the case at bar, both the NLRC and the CA were one in the conclusion that the officers and the members
of petitioner Union were project employees. Nonetheless, petitioner Union insists that they were regular employees
since they performed work which was usually necessary or desirable to the usual business or trade of the
Construction Department of respondent.
The landmark case of ALU-TUCP v. NLRC[17] instructs on the two (2) categories of project employees:
It is evidently important to become clear about the meaning and scope of the term project in the present
context. The project for the carrying out of which project employees are hired would ordinarily have some
relationship to the usual business of the employer. Exceptionally, the project undertaking might not have an
ordinary or normal relationship to the usual business of the employer. In this latter case, the determination of the
scope and parameters of the project becomes fairly easy. x x x. From the viewpoint, however, of the legal
characterization problem here presented to the Court, there should be no difficulty in designating the employees
who are retained or hired for the purpose of undertaking fish culture or the production of vegetables as project
employees, as distinguished from ordinary or regular employees, so long as the duration and scope of the
project were determined or specified at the time of engagement of the project employees. For, as is evident from
the provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted earlier, the principal test for determining whether particular
employees are properly characterized as project employees as distinguished from regular employees, is
whether or not the project employees were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration
(and scope) of which were specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project.
In the realm of business and industry, we note that project could refer to one or the other of at least two (2)
distinguishable types of activities. Firstly, a project could refer to a particular job or undertaking that is within the
regular or usual business of the employer company, but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such,
from the other undertakings of the company. Such job or undertaking begins and ends at determined or
determinable times. The typical example of this first type of project is a particular construction job or project of a
construction company. A construction company ordinarily carries out two or more [distinct] identifiable construction
projects: e.g., a twenty-five-storey hotel in Makati; a residential condominium building in Baguio City; and a
domestic air terminal in Iloilo City. Employees who are hired for the carrying out of one of these separate projects,
the scope and duration of which has been determined and made known to the employees at the time of
employment, are properly treated as project employees, and their services may be lawfully terminated at
completion of the project.
The term project could also refer to, secondly, a particular job or undertaking that is not within the regular business
of the corporation. Such a job or undertaking must also be identifiably separate and distinct from the ordinary or
regular business operations of the employer. The job or undertaking also begins and ends at determined or
determinable times.[18]
Plainly, the litmus test to determine whether an individual is a project employee lies in setting a fixed period of
employment involving a specific undertaking which completion or termination has been determined at the time of
the particular employees engagement.
In this case, as previously adverted to, the officers and the members of petitioner Union were specifically hired
as project employees for respondents Leyte Geothermal Power Project located at the Greater Tongonan
Geothermal Reservation in Leyte. Consequently, upon the completion of the project or substantial phase thereof,
the officers and the members of petitioner Union could be validly terminated.
Petitioner Union is adamant, however, that the lack of interval in the employment contracts of its officer and
members negates the latters status
as mere project employees. For petitioner Union, the lack of interval further drives home its point that its officers and
members are regular employees who performed work which was usually necessary or desirable to the usual business
or trade of respondent.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioner Unions members employment for more than a year does equate to their regular employment with
respondent. In this regard, Mercado, Sr. v. NLRC[19] illuminates:
The first paragraph [of Article 280 of the Labor Code] answers the question of who are regular employees. It
states that, regardless of any written or oral agreement to the contrary, an employee is deemed regular where he is
engaged in necessary or desirable activities in the usual business or trade of the employer, except for project
employees.
A project employee has been defined to be one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee, or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season, as in the present case.
The second paragraph of Art. 280 demarcates as casual employees, all other employees who do not fall
under the definition of the preceding paragraph. The proviso, in said second paragraph, deems as regular
employees those casual employees who have rendered at least one year of service regardless of the fact that
such service may be continuous or broken.
Petitioners, in effect, contend that the proviso in the second paragraph of Art. 280 is applicable to their case
and that the Labor Arbiter should have considered them regular by virtue of said proviso. The contention is without
merit.
The general rule is that the office of a proviso is to qualify or modify only the phrase immediately preceding it
or restrain or limit the generality of the clause that it immediately follows. Thus, it has been held that a proviso is to be
construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is attached, and not to the
statute itself or to other sections thereof. The only exception to this rule is where the clear legislative intent is to
restrain or qualify not only the phrase immediately preceding it (the proviso) but also earlier provisions of the statute
or even the statute itself as a whole.
Policy Instruction No. 12 of the Department of Labor and Employment discloses that the concept of regular
and casual employees was designed to put an end to casual employment in regular jobs, which has been abused
by many employers to prevent so called casuals from enjoying the benefits of regular employees or to prevent
casuals from joining unions. The same instructions show that the proviso in the second paragraph of Art. 280 was not
designed to stifle small-scale businesses nor to oppress agricultural land owners to further the interests of laborers,
whether agricultural or industrial. What it seeks to eliminate are abuses of employers against their employees and
not, as petitioners would have us believe, to prevent small-scale businesses from engaging in legitimate methods to
realize profit. Hence, the proviso is applicable only to the employees who are deemed casuals but not to the
project employees nor the regular employees treated in paragraph one of Art. 280.
Clearly, therefore, petitioners being project employees, or, to use the correct term, seasonal employees, their
employment legally ends upon completion of the project or the [end of the] season. The termination of their
employment cannot and should not constitute an illegal dismissal.
Considering our holding that the officers and the members of petitioner Union were project employees, its claim of
union busting is likewise dismissed.
On the second issue, petitioner Union contends that there was no stoppage of work; hence, they did not strike.
Euphemistically, petitioner Union avers that it only engaged in picketing,[20] and maintains that without any work
stoppage, [its officers and members] only engaged in xxx protest activity.
We are not convinced. Petitioner Union splits hairs.
To begin with, quite evident from the records is the undisputed fact that petitioner Union filed a Notice of Strike on
December 28, 1998 with the Department of Labor and Employment, grounded on respondents purported
unfair labor practices, i.e., refusal to bargain collectively, union busting and mass termination. On even date,
petitioner Union declared and staged a strike.
Second, then Secretary of Labor, Bienvenido E. Laguesma, intervened and issued a Return-to-Work Order[21] dated
January 4, 1999, certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. The Order narrates the facts
leading to the labor dispute, to wit:
On 28 December 1998, [petitioner Union] filed a Notice of Strike against [respondent] citing unfair labor
practices, specifically: refusal to bargain collectively, union busting and mass termination as the grounds [therefor].
On the same day, [petitioner] Union went on strike and took control over [respondents] facilities of its Leyte
Geothermal Project.
Attempts by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board RBVIII to forge a mutually acceptable solution proved
futile.
In the meantime, the strike continues with no settlement in sight placing in jeopardy the supply of much
needed power supply in the Luzon and Visayas grids.
xxxx
The on-going strike threatens the availability of continuous electricity to these areas which is critical to day-to-
day life, industry, commerce and trade. Without doubt, [respondents] operations [are] indispensable to the
national interest and falls (sic) within the purview of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, which warrants
(sic) the intervention of this Office.
Third, petitioner Union itself, in its pleadings, used the word strike.
Ultimately, petitioner Unions asseverations are belied by the factual findings of the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA:
The failure to comply with the mandatory requisites for the conduct of strike is both admitted and clearly
shown on record. Hence, it is undisputed that no strike vote was conducted; likewise, the cooling-off period was not
observed and that the 7-day strike ban after the submission of the strike vote was not complied with since there was
no strike vote taken.
xxxx
The factual issue of whether a notice of strike was timely filed by [petitioner] Union was resolved by the
evidence on record. The evidence revealed that [petitioner] Union struck even before it could file the required
notice of strike. Once again, this relied on [petitioner] Unions proof. [Petitioner] Union[s] witness said:
Atty. Sinsuat : You stated that you struck on 28 December 1998 is that correct?
Witness : Early in the morning of December 1998.
xxxx
Atty. Sinsuat : And you went there to conduct the strike did you not?
Witness : Our plan then was to strike at noon of December 28 and the strikers will be positioned at their
respective areas.[22]
 Article 263 of the Labor Code enumerates the requisites for holding a strike:

Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. (a) x x x.

x x x x.

(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike
or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the Department at least 30 days before the intended date thereof.
In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified
bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members.
However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union
constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting, where the existence of the union is threatened, the
15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.
(d) The notice must be in accordance with such implementing rules and regulations as the Department of Labor
and Employment may promulgate.
(e) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the Department to exert all efforts at mediation and
conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement. Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite
number of days from the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may declare a
lockout.
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining
unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a
lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association or of the
partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid
for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote
was taken. The Department may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the
conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Department the results of
the voting at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein
provided.

In fine, petitioner Unions bare contention that it did not hold a strike cannot trump the factual findings of the NLRC
that petitioner Union indeed struck against respondent. In fact, and more importantly, petitioner Union failed to
comply with the requirements set by law prior to holding a strike.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65760 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner Union.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 117169 March 12, 1997
PHILTREAD WORKERS UNION (PTWU), MAURICIO BARTOLO, CESAR DAVID, EMMANUEL AGUSTIN, PECSON BARANDA,
NELSON BAGUIO, ROLANDO MATALOG, PEPITO DAMICOG, EDUARDO SANTOS, ISABELO GALOPE, REYNALDO MALEON,
AL PEDRIQUE, BAYANI HERNANDEZ, ROBERT LORESCA, LEONARDO LACSINA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY NIEVES R. CONFESOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, GEN. RECAREDO SARMIENTO,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, PHILTREAD TIRE & RUBBER CORPORATION, GERARD BRIMO, HARRY McMILLAN,
respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Petitioners challenge in this petition the order of the Secretary of Labor dated September 8, 1994, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office hereby certifies the entire labor dispute at Philtread Tire and Rubber
Corporation to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration.
Accordingly, any strike or lockout, whether actual or intended, is hereby strictly enjoined.
All striking workers, except those dismissed employees based on the 15 August 1994 decision of the Labor Arbiter
and those who have been retrenched by the Company and have received separation pay, are hereby directed to
return-to-work within twenty-four (24) hours upon receipt thereof.
The issue involving the retrenched employees who refused to receive separation benefits shall be included in the
certified case.
The parties are further directed to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that might exacerbate the
situation.
SO ORDERED.[1]
The records reveal the following facts:
On May 27, 1994, petitioner Philtread Tire Workers Union (PTWU), filed a notice of strike, docketed as NCMB-NCR
Case No. 05-281-94, on grounds of unfair labor practice, more specifically union busting and violation of CBA.[2] On
the other hand, on May 30, 1994, private respondent Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation filed a notice of lockout,
docketed as NCMB-NCR Case No. 05-013-94.[3] It also filed a petition to declare illegal the work slowdowns staged
by the petitioner Union. Both cases were then consolidated. Several conciliation meetings were conducted but the
parties failed to settle their dispute. Then on June 15, 1994, private respondent declared a company wide lockout
which continued until August 22, 1994. There were about eighty union members who were consequently dismissed.
This also brought about the filing of the union members of a notice to strike in self-defense in NCMB-NCR Case No.
05-281-94.[4]
On August 15, 1994, the National Labor Relations Commission declared the slowdowns illegal, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The slowdowns engaged in by respondents are
declared illegal and by engaging in such illegal activities, respondents whose name appear in Annex A of the
petition are deemed to have lost their employment with petitioner. However, this Office, as a measure of
compassion to the working man, resolves not to order respondents to pay petitioner the damages the latter prays
for. As for the costs and attorneys fees, since these were not substantiated by the petitioner, this Office likewise
resolves not to award them to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On August 31, 1994, private respondent corporation requested the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the
labor dispute. Hence, on September 8, 1994, Secretary Confesor issued the assailed order. Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on September 26, 1994 for lack of merit.
Petitioners now challenge the order of the public respondent, raising the following issues: 1) Whether or not Article
263 (g) of the Labor Code is unconstitutional; and 2) Whether or not public respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the questioned orders.
Petitioners contend that Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code violates the workers right to strike which is provided for by
Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution. The assailed order of the Secretary of Labor, which enjoins the strike, is an
utter interference of the workers right to self-organization, to manage their own affairs, activities and programs, and
therefore is illegal. The order is likewise contrary to Article 3 of the International Labor Organization Convention No.
87, which specifically prohibits public authorities from interfering in purely union matters, viz.:
Article 3.
1. Workers and Employers organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitutions and rules, to elect their
representatives in full freedom, to organize their administration and activities and to formulate their programs.
2. The public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the lawful
exercise thereof.[6]
Petitioners also argue that the assailed order was issued with grave abuse of authority. A cursory reading of Article
263 (g) allegedly shows that the power of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction or to certify a dispute for
compulsory arbitration is strictly restricted to cases involving industries that are indispensable to national interest.
Petitioners posit that the instant labor dispute does not adversely affect the national interest. The tire industry has
long ceased to be a government protected industry and, moreover, Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation is not
indispensable to the national interest. The strike in Philtread will not adversely affect the supply of tires in the market
and the supply of imported tires is more than sufficient to meet the market requirements.
The petition is devoid of merit.
On the issue of the constitutionality of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the same had already been resolved in
Union of Filipino Employees vs. Nestle Philippines, Inc.,[7] to wit:

In the case at bar, no law has ever been passed by Congress expressly repealing Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor
Code. Neither may the 1987 Constitution be considered to have impliedly repealed the said Articles considering
that there is no showing that said articles are inconsistent with the said Constitution. Moreover, no court has ever
declared that the said articles are inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution.
On the contrary, the continued validity and operation of Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code has been
recognized by no less than the Congress of the Philippines when the latter enacted into law R.A. 6715, otherwise
known as Herrera law, Section 27 of which amended paragraphs (g) and (l) of Article 263 of the Labor Code.
At any rate, it must be noted that Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code have been enacted pursuant to the
police power of the State, which has been defined as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within
constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society (People vs. Vera
Reyes, 67 Phil. 190). The police power, together with the power of eminent domain and the power of taxation, is an
inherent power of government and does not need to be expressly conferred by the Constitution. Thus, it is submitted
that the argument of petitioners that Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code do not have any constitutional
foundation is legally inconsequential.
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code does not violate the workers constitutional right to strike. The section provides in
part, viz.:
When in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration... .
The foregoing article clearly does not interfere with the workers right to strike but merely regulates it, when in the
exercise of such right, national interests will be affected. The rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute.
They are still subject to control and limitation to ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. The interests of both
the employers and employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given undue preference.
The Labor Code vests upon the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to
national interest. Thus, upon the determination of the Secretary of Labor that such industry is indispensable to the
national interest, it will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute of said industry. The assumption of jurisdiction is in
the nature of police power measure. This is done for the promotion of the common good considering that a
prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy. The Secretary of Labor acts to maintain
industrial peace. Thus, his certification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to impede the workers right to strike
but to obtain a speedy settlement of the dispute. This is well-articulated in International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. vs.
Secretary of Labor, in this wise:
Plainly, Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code was meant to make both the Secretary (or the various regional directors)
and the labor arbiters share jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions. Otherwise, the Secretary would not be able to
effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. To hold the contrary may even lead to the absurd and
undesirable result wherein the Secretary and the labor arbiter concerned may have diametrically opposed rulings.
As we have said, (i)t is fundamental that a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather
than defeat it.[8]
On the second issue raised by the petitioners, We find that the Secretary of Labor did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the certification for compulsory arbitration. It had been determined by the Labor Arbiter in
NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-05-04156-94 that the work slowdowns conducted by the petitioner amounted to illegal
strikes. It was shown that every time the respondent company failed to accede to the petitioners demands,
production always declined. This resulted to the significant drops in the figures of tires made, cured, and
warehoused. However, when the demand of the petitioner union for the restoration of overtime work was allowed,
production improved. The work slowdowns, which were in effect, strikes on installment basis, were apparently a
pattern of manipulating production depending on whether the petitioner unions demands were met. These strikes,
however, had greatly affected the respondent company that on November 11, 1994, it had indefinitely ceased
operations because of tremendous financial losses.
We do not agree with the petitioners that the respondent company is not indispensable to national interest
considering that the tire industry has already been liberalized. Philtread supplies 22% of the tire products in the
country. Moreover, it employs about 700 people. As observed by the Secretary of Labor, viz.:
The Company is one of the tire manufacturers in the country employing more or less 700 workers. Any work
disruption thereat, as a result of a labor dispute will certainly prejudice the employment and livelihood of its workers
and their dependents. Furthermore, the labor dispute may lead to the possible closure of the Company and loss of
employment to hundreds of its workers. This will definitely aggravate the already worsening unemployment situation
in the country and discourage foreign and domestic investors from further investing in the country. There is no
doubt, therefore, that the labor dispute in the Country is imbued with national interest.
At this point in time when all government efforts are geared towards economic recovery and development by
encouraging both foreign and domestic investments to generate employment, we cannot afford to derail the
same as a result of a labor dispute considering that there are alternative dispute resolution machineries available to
address labor problems of this nature.[9]
The intervention of the Secretary of Labor was therefore necessary to settle the labor dispute which had lingered
and which had affected both respondent company and petitioner union. Had it not been so, the deadlock will
remain and the situation will remain uncertain. Thus, it cannot be deemed that the Secretary of Labor had acted
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order as she had a well-founded basis in issuing the assailed
order. It is significant at this point to point out that grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment. Thus, an act may be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same
was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[10]
Considering the foregoing premises, we find no merit in the instant petition.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed order of the Secretary of Labor dated September 8, 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119293 June 10, 2003 Section 1. The UNION agrees that there shall be no strikes, walkouts, stoppage or slowdown of work, boycotts,
secondary boycotts, refusal to handle any merchandise, picketing, sit-down strikes of any kind, sympathetic or
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner, general strikes, or any other interference with any of the operations of the COMPANY during the term of this
Agreement.
vs.
Section 2. The COMPANY agrees that there shall be no lockout during the term of this Agreement so long as the
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Second Division, ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), procedure outlined in Article IV hereof is followed by the UNION.[3]
respondents.
On April 11, 1994, IBM, through its vice-president Alfredo Colomeda, filed with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike, docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-04-180-94, against petitioner for allegedly
DECISION committing: (1) illegal dismissal of union members, (2) illegal transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4) contracting out of jobs
AZCUNA, J.: being performed by union members, (5) labor-only contracting, (6) harassment of union officers and members, (7)
non-recognition of duly-elected union officers, and (8) other acts of unfair labor practice.[4]
Before us is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Second Division of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Injunction Case No. 00468-94 dated November 29, 1994,[1] and its The next day, IBM filed another notice of strike, this time through its president Edilberto Galvez, raising similar grounds:
resolution dated February 1, 1995[2] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. (1) illegal transfer, (2) labor-only contracting, (3) violation of CBA, (4) dismissal of union officers and members, and
(5) other acts of unfair labor practice. This was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-04-182-94.[5]
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and respondent Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM), exclusive
bargaining agent of petitioners daily-paid rank and file employees, executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement The Galvez group subsequently requested the NCMB to consolidate its notice of strike with that of the Colomeda
(CBA) under which they agreed to submit all disputes to grievance and arbitration proceedings. The CBA also group,[6] to which the latter opposed, alleging Galvezs lack of authority in filing the same.[7]
included a mutually enforceable no-strike no-lockout agreement. The pertinent provisions of the said CBA are
quoted hereunder: Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to Dismiss, on the grounds that the
notices raised non-strikeable issues and that they affected four corporations which are separate and distinct from
ARTICLE IV each other.[8]
GRIEVANCE MACHINERY
Section 1. - The parties hereto agree on the principle that all disputes between labor and management may be After several conciliation meetings, NCMB Director Reynaldo Ubaldo found that the real issues involved are non-
solved through friendly negotiation;. . . that an open conflict in any form involves losses to the parties, and that, strikeable. Hence on May 2, 1994, he issued separate letter-orders to both union groups, converting their notices of
therefore, every effort shall be exerted to avoid such an open conflict. In furtherance of the foregoing principle, the strike into preventive mediation. The said letter-orders, in part, read:
parties hereto have agreed to establish a procedure for the adjustment of grievances so as to (1) provide an
opportunity for discussion of any request or complaint and (2) establish procedure for the processing and settlement During the conciliation meetings, it was clearly established that the real issues involved are illegal dismissal, labor
of grievances. only contracting and internal union disputes, which affect not only the interest of the San Miguel Corporation but
also the interests of the MAGNOLIA-NESTLE CORPORATION, the SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC., and the SAN MIGUEL
xxx xxx xxx JUICES, INC.

ARTICLE V Considering that San Miguel Corporation is the only impleaded employer-respondent, and considering further that
ARBITRATION the aforesaid companies are separate and distinct corporate entities, we deemed it wise to reduce and treat your
Section 1. Any and all disputes, disagreements and controversies of any kind between the COMPANY and the Notice of Strike as Preventive Mediation case for the four (4) different companies in order to evolve voluntary
UNION and/or the workers involving or relating to wages, hours of work, conditions of employment and/or employer- settlement of the disputes. . . .[9] (Emphasis supplied)
employee relations arising during the effectivity of this Agreement or any renewal thereof, shall be settled by
arbitration through a Committee in accordance with the procedure established in this Article. No dispute, On May 16, 1994, while separate preventive mediation conferences were ongoing, the Colomeda group filed with
disagreement or controversy which may be submitted to the grievance procedure in Article IV shall be presented the NCMB a notice of holding a strike vote. Petitioner opposed by filing a Manifestation and Motion to Declare
for arbitration until all the steps of the grievance procedure are exhausted. Notice of Strike Vote Illegal,[10] invoking the case of PAL v. Drilon,[11] which held that no strike could be legally
declared during the pendency of preventive mediation. NCMB Director Ubaldo in response issued another letter to
xxx xxx xxx the Colomeda Group reiterating the conversion of the notice of strike into a case of preventive mediation and
emphasizing the findings that the grounds raised center only on an intra-union conflict, which is not strikeable, thus:
ARTICLE VI
STRIKES AND WORK STOPPAGES
xxx xxx xxx
A perusal of the records of the case clearly shows that the basic point to be resolved entails the question of as to
who between the two (2) groups shall represent the workers for collective bargaining purposes, which has been the
subject of a Petition for Interpleader case pending resolution before the Office of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. Similarly, the other issues raised which have been discussed by the parties at the plant level, are
ancillary issues to the main question, that is, the union leadership...[12] (Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, on May 23, 1994, the Galvez group filed its second notice of strike against petitioner, docketed as
NCMB-NCR-NS-05-263-94. Additional grounds were set forth therein, including discrimination, coercion of employees,
illegal lockout and illegal closure.[13] The NCMB however found these grounds to be mere amplifications of those
alleged in the first notice that the group filed. It therefore ordered the consolidation of the second notice with the
preceding one that was earlier reduced to preventive mediation.[14] On the same date, the group likewise notified
the NCMB of its intention to hold a strike vote on May 27, 1994.
On May 27, 1994, the Colomeda group notified the NCMB of the results of their strike vote, which favored the
holding of a strike.[15] In reply, NCMB issued a letter again advising them that by virtue of the PAL v. Drilon ruling,
their notice of strike is deemed not to have been filed, consequently invalidating any subsequent strike for lack of
compliance with the notice requirement.[16] Despite this and the pendency of the preventive mediation
proceedings, on June 4, 1994, IBM went on strike. The strike paralyzed the operations of petitioner, causing it losses
allegedly worth P29.98 million in daily lost production.[17]
Two days after the declaration of strike, or on June 6, 1994, petitioner filed with public respondent NLRC an
amended Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, Free Ingress and Egress
Order and Deputization Order.[18] After due hearing and ocular inspection, the NLRC on June 13, 1994 resolved to
issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) directing free ingress to and egress from petitioners plants, without
prejudice to the unions right to peaceful picketing and continuous hearings on the injunction case.[19]
To minimize further damage to itself, petitioner on June 16, 1994, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
with the respondent-union, calling for a lifting of the picket lines and resumption of work in exchange of good faith
talks between the management and the labor management committees. The MOA, signed in the presence of
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) officials, expressly stated that cases filed in relation to their dispute
will continue and will not be affected in any manner whatsoever by the agreement.[20] The picket lines ended and
work was then resumed.
Respondent thereafter moved to reconsider the issuance of the TRO, and sought to dismiss the injunction case in
view of the cessation of its picketing activities as a result of the signed MOA. It argued that the case had become
moot and academic there being no more prohibited activities to restrain, be they actual or threatened.[21]
Petitioner, however, opposed and submitted copies of flyers being circulated by IBM, as proof of the unions alleged
threat to revive the strike.[22] The NLRC did not rule on the opposition to the TRO and allowed it to lapse.
On November 29, 1994, the NLRC issued the challenged decision, denying the petition for injunction for lack of
factual basis. It found that the circumstances at the time did not constitute or no longer constituted an actual or
threatened commission of unlawful acts.[23] It likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution
dated February 1, 1995.[24]
Hence, this petition.
Aggrieved by public respondents denial of a permanent injunction, petitioner contends that:
A.
THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO ENFORCE, BY INJUNCTION, THE PARTIES RECIPROCAL
OBLIGATIONS TO SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION AND NOT TO STRIKE.
B.
THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN WITHHOLDING INJUNCTION WHICH IS THE ONLY IMMEDIATE AND
EFFECTIVE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE DISASTROUS ECONOMIC WARFARE THAT ARBITRATION IS DESIGNED TO AVOID.
C.
THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING THE TRO TO LAPSE WITHOUT RESOLVING THE PRAYER FOR
INJUNCTION, DENYING INJUNCTION WITHOUT EXPRESSING THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED AND
ISSUING ITS DENIAL FIVE MONTHS AFTER THE LAPSE OF THE TRO.[25]
We find for the petitioner.
Article 254 of the Labor Code provides that no temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case
involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity except as otherwise provided in
Articles 218 and 264 of the Labor Code. Under the first exception, Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code expressly confers
upon the NLRC the power to enjoin or restrain actual and threatened commission of any or all prohibited or
unlawful acts, or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or
performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in
favor of such party x x x. The second exception, on the other hand, is when the labor organization or the employer
engages in any of the prohibited activities enumerated in Article 264.
Pursuant to Article 218 (e), the coercive measure of injunction may also be used to restrain an actual or threatened
unlawful strike. In the case of San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC,[26] where the same issue of NLRCs duty to enjoin an
unlawful strike was raised, we ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the petition
for injunction to restrain the union from declaring a strike based on non-strikeable grounds. Further, in IBM v.
NLRC,[27] we held that it is the legal duty and obligation of the NLRC to enjoin a partial strike staged in violation of
the law. Failure promptly to issue an injunction by the public respondent was likewise held therein to be an abuse of
discretion.
In the case at bar, petitioner sought a permanent injunction to enjoin the respondents strike. A strike is considered
as the most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their
employment. However, to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds.[28] One of the procedural
requisites that Article 263 of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules prescribe is the filing of a valid notice of
strike with the NCMB. Imposed for the purpose of encouraging the voluntary settlement of disputes,[29] this
requirement has been held to be mandatory, the lack of which shall render a strike illegal.[30]
In the present case, NCMB converted IBMs notices into preventive mediation as it found that the real issues raised
are non-strikeable. Such order is in pursuance of the NCMBs duty to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation
to enable the parties to settle the dispute amicably,[31] and in line with the state policy of favoring voluntary
modes of settling labor disputes.[32] In accordance with the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, the said
conversion has the effect of dismissing the notices of strike filed by respondent.[33] A case in point is PAL v.
Drilon,[34] where we declared a strike illegal for lack of a valid notice of strike, in view of the NCMBs conversion of
the notice therein into a preventive mediation case. We ruled, thus:
The NCMB had declared the notice of strike as appropriate for preventive mediation. The effect of that
declaration (which PALEA did not ask to be reconsidered or set aside) was to drop the case from the docket of
notice of strikes, as provided in Rule 41 of the NCMB Rules, as if there was no notice of strike. During the pendency of
preventive mediation proceedings no strike could be legally declared... The strike which the union mounted, while
preventive mediation proceedings were ongoing, was aptly described by the petitioner as an ambush. (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, therefore, applying the aforecited ruling to the case at bar, when the NCMB ordered the preventive
mediation on May 2, 1994, respondent had thereupon lost the notices of strike it had filed. Subsequently, however, it
still defiantly proceeded with the strike while mediation was ongoing, and notwithstanding the letter-advisories of
NCMB warning it of its lack of notice of strike. In the case of NUWHRAIN v. NLRC,[35] where the petitioner-union
therein similarly defied a prohibition by the NCMB, we said:
Petitioners should have complied with the prohibition to strike ordered by the NCMB when the latter dismissed the
notices of strike after finding that the alleged acts of discrimination of the hotel were not ULP, hence not
strikeable. The refusal of the petitioners to heed said proscription of the NCMB is reflective of bad faith.
Such disregard of the mediation proceedings was a blatant violation of the Implementing Rules, which explicitly
oblige the parties to bargain collectively in good faith and prohibit them from impeding or disrupting the
proceedings.[36]
The NCMB having no coercive powers of injunction, petitioner sought recourse from the public respondent. The
NLRC issued a TRO only for free ingress to and egress from petitioners plants, but did not enjoin the unlawful strike
itself. It ignored the fatal lack of notice of strike, and five months after came out with a decision summarily rejecting
petitioners cited jurisprudence in this wise:
Complainants scholarly and impressive arguments, formidably supported by a long line of jurisprudence cannot
however be appropriately considered in the favorable resolution of the instant case for the complainant. The cited
jurisprudence do not squarely cover and apply in this case, as they are not similarly situated and the remedy sought
for were different.[37]
Unfortunately, the NLRC decision stated no reason to substantiate the above conclusion.
Public respondent, in its decision, moreover ruled that there was a lack of factual basis in issuing the injunction.
Contrary to the NLRCs finding, we find that at the time the injunction was being sought, there existed a threat to
revive the unlawful strike as evidenced by the flyers then being circulated by the IBM-NCR Council which led the
union. These flyers categorically declared: Ipaalala nyo sa management na hindi iniaatras ang ating Notice of
Strike (NOS) at anumang oras ay pwede nating muling itirik ang picket line.[38] These flyers were not denied by
respondent, and were dated June 19, 1994, just a day after the unions manifestation with the NLRC that there
existed no threat of commission of prohibited activities.
Moreover, it bears stressing that Article 264(a) of the Labor Code[39] explicitly states that a declaration of strike
without first having filed the required notice is a prohibited activity, which may be prevented through an injunction
in accordance with Article 254. Clearly, public respondent should have granted the injunctive relief to prevent the
grave damage brought about by the unlawful strike.
Also noteworthy is public respondents disregard of petitioners argument pointing out the unions failure to observe
the CBA provisions on grievance and arbitration. In the case of San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC,[40] we ruled that the
union therein violated the mandatory provisions of the CBA when it filed a notice of strike without availing of the
remedies prescribed therein. Thus we held:
x x x For failing to exhaust all steps in the grievance machinery and arbitration proceedings provided in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, the notice of strike should have been dismissed by the NLRC and private
respondent union ordered to proceed with the grievance and arbitration proceedings. In the case of Liberal Labor
Union vs. Phil. Can Co., the court declared as illegal the strike staged by the union for not complying with the
grievance procedure provided in the collective bargaining agreement. . . (Citations omitted)
As in the abovecited case, petitioner herein evinced its willingness to negotiate with the union by seeking for an
order from the NLRC to compel observance of the grievance and arbitration proceedings. Respondent however
resorted to force without exhausting all available means within its reach. Such infringement of the aforecited CBA
provisions constitutes further justification for the issuance of an injunction against the strike. As we said long ago:
Strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a collective bargaining agreement are illegal especially when
they provide for conclusive arbitration clauses. These agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their
ends have to be achieved.[41]
As to petitioners allegation of violation of the no-strike provision in the CBA, jurisprudence has enunciated that such
clauses only bar strikes which are economic in nature, but not strikes grounded on unfair labor practices.[42] The
notices filed in the case at bar alleged unfair labor practices, the initial determination of which would entail fact-
finding that is best left for the labor arbiters. Nevertheless, our finding herein of the invalidity of the notices of strike
dispenses with the need to discuss this issue.
We cannot sanction the respondent-unions brazen disregard of legal requirements imposed purposely to carry out
the state policy of promoting voluntary modes of settling disputes. The states commitment to enforce mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace is affirmed by no less than our Constitution.[43] Trade unionism and
strikes are legitimate weapons of labor granted by our statutes. But misuse of these instruments can be the subject
of judicial intervention to forestall grave injury to a business enterprise.[44]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the NLRC in Injunction Case No.
00468-94 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner and private respondent are hereby directed to submit the issues
raised in the dismissed notices of strike to grievance procedure and proceed with arbitration proceedings as
prescribed in their CBA, if necessary. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24993 December 18, 1968
UNITED RESTAUROR'S EMPLOYEES & LABOR UNION-PAFLU, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES, as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Rizal, 7th Judicial District, and
the DELTA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Leonardo C. Fernandez for petitioner.
Ponce Enrile Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for respondent Delta Development Corporation.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Certiorari to annul the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal ordering United
Restauror's Employees & Labor Union-PAFLU (Union, for short), its attorneys, representatives, agents and any person
assisting it to "REFRAIN from picketing on the property of plaintiff Delta Development Corporation within the Makati
Commercial Center."
The case arose from a verified complaint for injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction filed by Delta
Development Corporation (Delta), against the Union on January 16, 1965.1 It is there averred that: Delta is the
owner of the Makati Commercial Center situated at Makati, Rizal. It is in the business of leasing portions thereof. The
center has its own thoroughfares, pedestrian lanes, parking areas for the benefit of customers and clients of its
lessees. On the other hand, the Union is an association of some employees of Sulo Restaurant, a lessee of Delta. On
January 8, 1965, the Union sought permission from Delta to conduct picketing activities "on the private property of
plaintiff surrounding Sulo Restaurant." On January 11, Delta denied the request because it "may be held liable for
any incident that may happen in the picket lines, since the picketing would be conducted on the private property
owned by plaintiff." Despite the denial, the Union picketed on Delta's property surrounding Sulo Restaurant on
January 16 and continued to conduct said activity. Such act of the Union is violative of the property rights of, and
would cause great and irreparable injury to, Delta. No employer-employee relationship exists between Delta and
the Union members. Delta then prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction issue and that, after hearing, such
injunction be made permanent.
As aforesaid, respondent judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The Union's move to reconsider was denied on
January 26, 1965.
On January 19, 1965, the Union filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that the court had no jurisdiction to
try the case.
Without awaiting resolution of its motion to dismiss the Union commenced in this Court the present original petition
for certiorari on September 18, 1965, claiming that respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction in
issuing the injunctive writ "as no restraining order could be validly issued against the right to picket as part of
freedom of speech"; that respondent judge issued the questioned writ "without the benefit of a previous hearing";
that it was issued in violation of Section 9(d) of Republic Act 875; that jurisdiction over the case rests with the Court of
Industrial Relations (CIR) "for the same involves acts of unfair labor practice under Sec. 4(a) of Republic Act 875 in
connection with Sec. 5(a) thereof"; and that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
On September 29, 1965, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the Union's P1,000.00-bond.
On October 12, 1965, Delta answered. It alleged, amongst others, that respondent judge validly issued the
injunctive writ in question because the same "never enjoined petitioner from picketing against the Sulo-D & E, Inc.
but only from doing their picketing on the private property of respondent who is not in any way privy to the
relationship between Sulo-D & E, Inc. and petitioner"; that Republic Act 875 is not applicable to the case involving as
it does an action to protect Delta's property rights; that it has no labor relation or dispute of any kind with the Union;
and that the injunctive writ was issued after due hearing on January 19, 1965. Delta asked that the present petition
be denied.
After the submission of the parties' memoranda in lieu of oral argument, Delta moved to dismiss the proceeding at
bar on the ground that it has become moot and academic. It averred that the Union lost in the consent election
conducted by the Department of Labor on October 4, 1965 in CIR Cases 1455-MC and 1464-MC, and thereby also
lost its right to picket; and that in said election cases, a rival union Sulo Employees Labor Union (SELU, for short)
was certified by CIR as the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees of Sulo Restaurant pursuant
to CIR's order of December 23, 1965.
The Union opposed. It argued that the picketing was conducted on or about January 16, 1965, that is, around 8
months before the consent election on October 4, 1965; and that the issues that triggered the Union's labor strike of
January 16, 1965 are entirely distinct and foreign to the issues in Cases 1455-MC and 1464-MC.
The petition must be dismissed. Really, the case before us has become moot and academic.
When the Union struck and picketed on January 16, 1965, it might have been true that the Union commanded a
majority of Sulo's employees. Without need of certification, it could, under such circumstances, conclude a
collective bargaining agreement with Sulo.2 But it is not disputed that on October 4, 1965, i.e., shortly after this case
was filed on September 18, 1965, a consent election was held. Not controverted, too, is the fact that, in that
consent election, SELU defeated the Union, petitioner herein. Because of this, SELU was certified to the Sulo
management as the "collective bargaining representative of the employees ... for collective bargaining purposes as
regards wages, hours of work, rates of pay and/or such other terms and conditions of employment allowed them by
law."3
The consent election, it should be noted, was ordered by CIR pursuant to the Union's petition for direct certification
docketed as Case 1455-MC and a similar petition for certification filed by SELU docketed as Case 1464-MC. Verily,
the Union can no longer demand collective bargaining. For, it became the minority union. As matters stand, said
right properly belongs to SELU, which commands the majority. By law, the right to be the exclusive representative of
all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is vested in the labor union "designated or selected"
for such purpose "by the majority of the employees" in the unit concerned.4 SELU has the right as well as the
obligation to hear, voice out and seek remedies for the grievances of all Sulo employees, including employees who
are members of petitioner Union, regarding the "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment."
Indeed, petitioner Union's concerted activities designed to be recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of Sulo
employees must come to a halt.5 Collective bargaining cannot be the appropriate objective of petitioning Union's
continuation of their concerted activities. The record before us does not reveal any other legitimate purpose. To
allow said Union to continue picketing for the purpose of drawing the employer to the collective bargaining table
would obviously be to disregard the results of the consent election. To further permit the Union's picketing activities
would be to flaunt at the will of the majority.

The outcome of a consent election cannot be rendered meaningless by a minority group of employees who had
themselves invoked the procedure to settle the dispute. Those who voted in the consent election against the labor
union that was eventually certified are hidebound to the results thereof. Logic is with this view. By their very act of
participating in the election, they are deemed to have acquiesced to whatever is the consequence of the
election. As to those who did not participate in the election, the accepted theory is that they "are presumed to
assent to the expressed will of the majority of those voting."6

Adherence to the methods laid down by statute for the settlement of industrial strife is one way of achieving
industrial peace; one such method is certification election.7 It is the intent and purpose of the law that this
procedure, when adopted and availed of by parties to labor controversies, should end industrial disputes, not
continue them.8 Pertinent is the following observation to which we fully concur: "Before an election is held by the
Board9 to determine which of two rival unions represents a majority of the employees, one of the unions may call a
strike and demand that the employer bargain with it. A labor dispute will then exist. Nothing in the statute makes it
illegal for a minority to strike and thereby seek to obtain sufficient strength so as to become the sole bargaining
agent. But after the Board certifies the bargaining representative, a strike by a minority union to compel an
employer to bargain with it is unlawful. No labor dispute can exist between a minority union and an employer in
such a case."10

Upon the law then, the Union's right to strike and consequently to picket ceased by its defeat in the consent
election. That election occurred during the pendency before this Court of this original petition for certiorari lodged
by the Union the thrust of which is to challenge the power of the Court of First Instance to enjoin its picketing
activities. The Union may not continue to picket. The object of the case before us is lost.

WE, ACCORDINGLY, vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari as moot and academic, and to dissolve the writ of
preliminary injunction we heretofore issued herein, for being functus oficio.
No costs. So ordered.