REMEDIAL LAW
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. Classification of courts in the Philippines:
a. Courts of general jurisdiction: Those competent
to decide their own jurisdiction and to take cognizance of
all kinds of cases, unless otherwise provided by the law
or Rules. Example: Regional Trial Courts.
Courts of special or limited jurisdiction: Those
which have no power to decide their own jurisdiction and
can only try cases permitted by statute. Example:
Municipal Trial Courts.
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts had
the rank of Courts of First Instance but were courts of
special jurisdiction. Under B.P. Blg. 129, they have been
integrated into the Regional Trial Courts as branches
thereof.
b. Courts of original jurisdiction: Those courts in
which, under the law, actions or proceedings may
originally be commenced.
Courts of appellate jurisdiction: Courts which have
the power to review on appeal the decisions or orders of
a lower court.
c. Superior courts: Courts which have the power of
review or supervision over another and lower court.
Inferior courts: Those which, in relation to another
court, are lower in rank and subject to review and super-
vision by the latter.
While, in a generic sense, a court is considered an
inferior court in relation to the powers of another tribunal
higher in rank, in its technical sense and unless otherwise
intended, it was formerly provided that the phraseREMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“inferior court” referred to the then municipal or city
courts (former Sec. 1, Rule 5, in relation to R.A. 3820
and R.A. 3828), now called Metropolitan, Municipal, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Note, also, that under
Sec. 2, Rule 5, the term “municipal trial court” as used in
these revised Rules includes all other courts of the
same rank. In legal circles, they are also called “courts
of the first level.” In some official issuances, the Supreme
Court refers to them as “first level courts.”
However, the “inferior courts” whose decisions are
subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court (Sec. 17, R.A. 296) refer to all the courts lower
than the Supreme Court. The term “lower courts” is now
used for that purpose in the 1987 Constitution (Sec. 5/2],
Art. VIII), in lieu of “inferior courts” used in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions.
d. Courts of record: Those whose proceedings are
enrolled and which are bound to keep a written record
of all trials and proceedings handled by them (see Luzano
us. Romero, et al., L-33245, Sept. 30, 1971).
Courts not of record: Courts which are not required
to keep a written record or franscript of proceedings
held therein.
Prior to the effectivity of R.A. 6031 on August 4,
1969, inferior courts were not of record; but if a municipal
court of the capital of a province or a city court tried a
criminal case wherein the imposable penalty is
imprisonment of more than 6 months but not exceeding
6 years and/or a fine of more than P200 but not exceeding
P6,000, its proceedings were required to be recorded as
its decisions were appealable to the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court (R.A. 296, as amended by R.A. 2613
and R.A. 3828, Sec. 87{c], last paragraph). However,
under R.A. 2613, amending Sec. 45, R.A. 296, all inferior
courts are now required to record their proceedings and
are accordingly courts of record.
2GENERAL PRINCIPLES
e. Constitutional courts: Those which owe their
creation and existence to the Constitution and, therefore
cannot be legislated out of existence or deprived by law
of the jurisdiction and powers unqualifiedly vested in
them by the Constitution. The Supreme Court and the
Sandiganbayan are the only courts specifically provided
for in the Constitution. With regard to the latter, the
better view is that the Sandiganbayan is only a
constitutionally-mandated court since, although its
existence is provided for in the Constitution, its creation
was by statutory enactment.
Statutory courts: Those created, organized and
with jurisdiction exclusively determined by law.
Accordingly, all other courts in the Philippines are
statutory courts.
2. The Court of Tax Appeals created by R.A. 1125
has been held to be a part of the judicial system vested
with special jurisdiction to act only on protests of private
persons adversely affected by the tax, customs or
assessment laws (Ursal us. CTA, et al., 101 Phil. 209).
On March 30, 2004, said law was amended by R.A.
9282 expanding the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) and elevating its rank to the level of a
collegiate court with special jurisdiction, of the same level
as the Court of Appeals, and consisting of a Presiding
Justice and 5 Associate Justices who shall sit en banc or
in 2 divisions of 3 justices each. The court shall, inter
alia, have exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review
decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in
disputes arising from the tax law administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Regional Trial Courts in
local tax cases, the Commissioner of Customs in matters
administered by the Bureau of Customs, the Central Board
of Assessment Appeals in assessments of real property,
the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Trade
and Industry in matters specified therein. The decision
3REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM
of said court en banc may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (see Appendix CC).
3. The distinction obtaining in other jurisdictions
between courts of law and courts of equity, and among
civil, criminal and probate courts, does not apply in the
Philippines wherein all courts are courts both of law and
equity (Rustia vs. Franco, 41 Phil. 280; Roa, et al. vs.
CA, et al., L-27294, June 28, 1983; Galman, et al. vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 72670, Sept. 12, 1986);
and Regional! Trial Courts and, to a limited extent, the
lower courts, exercise jurisdiction, according to the case
involved, as civil, criminal or probate courts or courts of
land registration. Before B.P. Blg. 129 became operative,
there were special courts, such as the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, the Circuit Criminal Courts
and the Courts of Agrarian Relations, which were courts
exercising only limited and special jurisdiction.
4. Under our present statutory and jurisprudential
taxonomy, jurisdiction is classified, based on its nature,
as follows:
a. General jurisdiction, or the power to adjudicate
all controversies except those expressly withheld from the
plenary powers of the court; and special or limited
jurisdiction, which restricts the court’s jurisdiction only
to particular cases and subject to such limitations as may
be provided by the governing law.
b. Original jurisdiction, or the power of the court to
take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial
action for the first time under conditions provided by law;
and appellate jurisdiction, or the authority of a court
higher in rank to reexamine the final order or judgment
of a lower court which tried the case now elevated for
judicial review.
c. Exclusive jurisdiction, or the power to adjudicate
a case or proceeding to the exclusion of all other courts
4GENERAL PRINCIPLES
at that stage; and concurrent jurisdiction, sometimes
referred to as confluent or coordinate jurisdiction, which
is the power conferred upon different courts, whether of
the same or different ranks, to take cognizance at the
same stage of the same case in the same or different
judicial territories.
Concurrent original jurisdiction between trial courts
of different ranks has in the main been eliminated by
B.P. Blg. 129. For instance, there is no more concurrent
jurisdiction in adoption or guardianship proceedings
between inferior courts and the present Regional Trial
Courts as was provided by the Judiciary Act with respect
to the former Courts of First Instance, which Act also
provided for concurrence in criminal cases and special
civil actions. However, as among courts of the same rank,
it appears that a phase of concurrent original jurisdiction
still obtains in some instances as, for example, in civil
and criminal cases for libel or the settlement of the estate
of a nonresident with properties in different judicial
regions. Withal, in point of strict law, these situations
are matters of venue except in criminal cases for libel,
since in criminal procedure, venue is, as a rule,
jurisdictional. For a discussion of other criminal cases
covered by the same rule, see the Preliminary
Considerations in Criminal Procedure in Volume Two of
this work. Where such concurrence exists, the court first
taking cognizance of the case does so to the exclusion of
the other courts, although the Supreme Court may order
a transfer of venue or place of trial to another court of
competent jurisdiction.
At any rate, B.P. Blg. 129 provides for concurrent
original jurisdiction between the Supreme Court and
either the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Courts,
or among all three courts in certain cases. To illustrate,
the Supreme Court has concurrent original jurisdiction
with the Court of Appeals in petitions for the issuance of
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
5REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM
the Regional Trial Courts; with the Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Courts over the same petitions against
the inferior courts; and with the Regional Trial Courts
in actions affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls.
5. Also, under B.P. Blg. 129, delegated jurisdiction
is provided for, i.e., the grant of authority to inferior
courts to hear and determine cadastral and land
registration cases under certain conditions (see Sec. 34,
infra); and special jurisdiction, which is the power of
inferior courts to hear and decide petitions for a writ of
habeas corpus or applications for bail in the absence of
all the Regional Trial Judges in the province or city (see
Sec. 35, infra). This latter type of jurisdiction was
formerly included, with variations, in what was known
as the interlocutory jurisdiction of inferior courts under
the Judiciary Act.
6. Mention must also be made of the territorial
jurisdiction of a court, which refers to the geographical
area within which its powers can be exercised. As
already stated, this assumes importance in criminal cases
wherein considerations of the territory vis-d-vis the locus
of the crime determine not only the venue of the case
but the jurisdiction of the court; and, in civil cases, the
venue of real or mixed actions. In all cases, the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals have national jurisdiction;
the Regional Trial Courts have regional jurisdiction; and
the inferior courts have such territorial jurisdiction as
may be defined by the Supreme Court pursuant to Secs.
25, 28 and 31, B.P. Blg. 129.
Other classifications of original jurisdiction are based
on the subject-matter or the nature of the action being
tried by the court, such as civil, criminal, probate,
admiralty and maritime, juvenile and domestic relations,
agrarian, and land registration. Most of these different
areas of jurisdiction are exercised by the regular trial
6GENERAL PRINCIPLES
courts, since the special courts like the circuit criminal
courts and the juvenile and domestic relations courts have
been abolished. With respect to the latter, domestic cases
are now generally handled by the newly created Family
Courts, hereinafter discussed. Other subjects of
controversies requiring special training and knowledge,
such as taxation, labor and securities, are handled by
quasi-judicial agencies, subject to the power of judicial
review by the appellate courts.
7. Jurisdiction and venue are distinguished as
follows:
a. Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and
determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to
be heard or tried.
b. Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue,
of procedural law.
c. Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the
court and the subject-matter; venue, a relation between
plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent.
d. Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be
conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the
act or agreement of the parties (Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523).
In criminal cases, the venue of the crime goes into
the territorial jurisdiction of the court (Lopez us. Paras,
L-25795, Oct. 29, 1966), hence where the criminal action
is instituted not in the place specified by the Rules and
declared by the substantive law as within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court, the motion to quash should
be grounded on lack of jurisdiction, and not improper
venue.
8, The authority to decide a case and not the decision
rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction. Where
there is jurisdiction, the decision of all questions arising
in the case is but an exercise of jurisdiction (De la Cruz
7REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM
us. Moir, 36 Phil. 213; Associated Labor Union vs.
Ramolete, L-23527, Mar. 31, 1965). Consequently, a
court may have jurisdiction over the case but at the
same time act in excess of such jurisdiction.
9. The errors which a court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction differ from errors of judgment.
The former is reviewable in an original action for
certiorari, while the latter is correctible by appeal
(Henderson, et al. vs. Tan, etc., et al., 87 Phil. 466;
Maritime Co. of the Phil. vs. Paredes, L-24811, Mar. 3,
1967; Bulan vs. Masakayan, L-24428, June 26, 1968;
Palma us. Q & S, Inc., L-20366, May 19, 1986). Errors
of jurisdiction render a judgment void or, at least
voidable (see Sec. Ifa] and [b], Rule 16; Rule 65), while
errors of judgment are grounds for reversal only if it is
shown that prejudice has been caused thereby (Banco
Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 821; Bimeda us.
Perez, et al., 93 Phil. 636).
10. Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and
how the court acquires such jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This
is acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition or
initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or
petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent:
This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or
submission by the defendant or respondent to the
court or by coercive process issued by the court to
him, generally by the service of summons (Sharuff vs.
Bubla, L-17029, Sept. 30, 1964; Aban vs. Enage,
L-30666, Feb. 25, 1983).
c. Jurisdiction over the subject-matter: This is con-
ferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over the parties,
cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or
agreement of the parties.GENERAL PRINCIPLES
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is
determined and conferred by the pleadings filed in the
case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial
order or stipulation, or, at times, by their implied consent
as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an
issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5,
Rule 10 (see Lazo, et al. vs. Republic Surety & Insurance
Co., Inc., L-27365, Jan. 30, 1970).
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing
which is the subject of the litigation): This is acquired
by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the
thing in question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in
attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law
which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the
property or subject-matter within its territorial juris-
diction, as in land registration proceedings or suits
involving civil status or real property in the Philippines
of a nonresident defendant.
In two instances, the court acquires jurisdiction to
try the case, even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over
the person of a nonresident defendant, as long as it has
jurisdiction over the res, as when the action involves the
personal status of the plaintiff or property in the Phil-
ippines in which the defendant claims an interest (see
Sec. 15, Rule 14). In such cases, the service of summons
by publication and notice to the defendant is merely
to comply with due process requirements (Banco
Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; De Midgely
us. Ferandos, et al., L-34314, May 13, 1975). Under
Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code, while a foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines without a
license cannot sue or intervene in any action here, it may
be sued or proceeded against before our courts or
administrative tribunals.
11. As a general proposition, the jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action (People vs. Paderna,
9REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM
L-28518, Jan. 29, 1968; People vs. Mariano, et al.,
L-40527, June 30, 1976; Lee, et al. vs. Presiding Judge,
etc., et al., G.R. No. 68789, Nov. 10, 1986), unless such
statute provides for its retroactive application, as where
it is a curative legislation (Atlas Fertilizer Corp. us.
Navarro, etc., et al., G.R. No. 72074, April 30, 1987).
12. The settled rule is that the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject-matter is determined by the alle-
gations of the complaint (Edward J. Nell & Co. us.
Cubacub, L-20843, June 23, 1965; Time, Inc. us. Reyes,
et al., L-28882, May 31, 1971; Ganadin us. Ramos, et
al., L-23547, Sept. 11, 1980), but this rule is not without
exceptions. Thus, it was held that while the allegations
in the complaint make out a case for forcible entry, where
tenancy is averred by way of defense and is proved to be
the real issue, the case should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction as the case should properly be filed with the
then Court of Agrarian Relations (Ignacio vs. CFI of
Bulacan, L-27897, Oct. 29, 1971). However, with the
integration of the courts of agrarian relations as branches
of the Regional Trial Courts under B.P. Blg. 129, the
case was required to be filed with the corresponding
Regional Trial Court if it was within the jurisdiction
thereof, for assignment to the appropriate branch. Also,
although the allegations in the complaint make out a case
cognizable by a Regional Trial Court, where, however,
the acts complained of are shown at the trial to be
interwoven with an unfair labor practice case, the action
should be dismissed since jurisdiction is vested in the
National Labor Relations Commission. This is so since
the Rules now permit a motion to dismiss based upon
facts not alleged in the complaint (Mindanao Rapid Co.,
Inc. vs. Omandam, et al., L-23058, Nov. 27, 1971, jointly
deciding therein L-23473, 23871, 24232, 24718 and
24956).
13. Where the complaint is for actual damages of
P978, but the other claims for damages and attorney's
10GENERAL PRINCIPLES
fees bring the total relief sought to more than P10,000
(which was then the jurisdictional limit for civil cases in
the inferior courts), the totality of said claims puts the
case within the jurisdiction of the then Court of First
Instance and the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint upon its mere impression that the other claims
were “bloated” for the purpose of invoking its jurisdiction,
without hearing and proof of such fact (Enerio us.
Alampay, L-40010, May 26, 1975; Ratila vs. Tapucar,
L-45018, Jan. 24, 1977). This doctrine is still applicable
subject to the increased jurisdictional amount under
B.P. Blg. 129 and subsequent legislation.
14. The jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal
or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by
subsequent happenings or events although of a charac-
ter which would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first instance (Ramos, et al. vs. Central
Bank, L-29352, Oct. 4, 1971, and cases therein cited;
Dioquino vs. Cruz, et al., L-38579, Sept. 9, 1982) and it
retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case
(Republic us. Pielago, et al., G.R. No. 72218, July 21,
1986).
15. The constitutionality of a statute must be ques-
tioned at the earliest opportunity, except in criminal
cases where the question may be raised at any stage and,
in civil cases, if the determination of the question is
necessary for the decision of the case, even if raised for
the first time on appeal. A constitutional question will
also be considered by the appellate court at any time if it
involves the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The same
rule applies to ordinances (San Miguel Brewery, Inc. vs.
Magno, L-21879, Sept. 9, 1967).
16. Basic in the law on procedure is the doctrine that
the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of an
action is conferred only by the Constitution or the law
and that the Rules of Court yield to substantive law, in
llREMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM
this case, the Judiciary Act and B.P. Big. 129, both as
amended, and of which jurisdiction is only a part.
Jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the agreement of the
parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, en-
larged or diminished by, any act or omission of the
parties; neither can it be conferred by the acquiescence
of the court (De Jesus, et al. vs. Garcia, et al., L-26816,
Feb. 28, 1967; Calimlim, et al. vs. Ramirez, et al.,
L-34363, Nov. 19, 1982). Jurisdiction must exist as a
matter of law (People us. Casiano, L-15309, Feb. 16,
1961), Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be
raised for the first time on appeal even if such issue
was not raised in the lower court (Government us.
American Surety Co., 11 Phil. 203; Vda. de Roxas vs.
Rafferty, 37 Phil. 957; People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil.
640). A court can motu proprio dismiss a case which is
outside its jurisdiction (Sec. 1, Rule 9).
17. Nevertheless, in some cases, the principle of
estoppel by laches has been availed of by our appellate
courts to bar attacks on jurisdiction and this principle
has been applied to both civil and criminal cases, thus:
a. Inthe early case of Santiago, et al. vs. Valenzuela
(78 Phil. 397), it was held that if a motion to dismiss the
appeal, on the ground that said appeal was perfected out
of time, is filed for the first time with the appellate court
after the appellant had paid the docket fee and the cost
of printing the record on appeal, and after the filing of
appellant’s brief, the appellate court should deny the
motion as the appellee may be considered in estoppel by
his failure to object on time.
This doctrine was subsequently abandoned in
Miranda vs. Guanzon (92 Phil. 168) since the “require-
ment regarding the perfection of an appeal within the
reglementary period is not only mandatory but juris-
dictional,” a ruling subsequently reiterated in Garganta
vs. CA (105 Phil. 412), Valdez vs. Ocumen (106 Phil.
12GENERAL PRINCIPLES.
929), Galima us. CA (L-21046, Jan. 31, 1966), Antique
Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco (L-20051, May 30, 1966), Roque
us. Vda. de Del Rosario (L-24873, Sept. 23, 1966) and
Arellano, et al. us. CA, et al. (L-31856, Nov. 24, 1972).
b. In the later case, however, of Tijam us. Sibong-
hanoy, et al. (L-21450, April 15, 1968), the co-defendant
surety company never raised the issue of jurisdiction in
the Court of First Instance despite several opportunities
to do so and, although the claim being for only P1,908,
the case was within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the municipal court. It was only after the court of
Appeals had affirmed the decision of the trial court in
favor of the plaintiff but before the finality of this
decision of the Court of Appeals that the co-defendant
surety company filed its motion to dismiss on the ground
of lack of original jurisdiction of the trial court. Denying
said motion, the Supreme Court stated: “Were we to
sanction such conduct on its part, we would in effect be
declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present
case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel
the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more.
The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent
but revolting.” It further stated that “after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision
on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court .. . it is not right for
a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction
of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative
relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to
escape a penalty,” citing Pindangaz, etc. vs. Dans, et al.
(L-14591, Sept. 26, 1962), Young Men’s Labor Union,
etc. vs. CIR, et al. (L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965) and Mejia
us. Lucas (100 Phil. 277). See also Capilitan us. De la
Cruz, (L-29536-37, Feb. 28, 1974), Summit Guaranty vs.
CA, et al. (G.R. No. 51139, Dec. 14, 1981), Tajonera, et
al. vs. Lumaroza, et al. (L-48907 & L-49035, Dec. 19,
1981), Nieva vs. Manila Banking Corp. (L-30811,
13REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM
Sept. 2, 1983), Florendo, et al. vs. Coloma, et al. (G.R.
No. 60544, May 19, 1984), and Medijia us. Patcho
(L-30310, Oct. 23, 1984).
c. In Rodriguez us. CA (L-29264, Aug. 29, 1969), the
action involved property worth more than P200,000, at
that time within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. Despite several opportunities to raise that
issue in the Court of Appeals where the appeal was taken,
defendant did not challenge the appellate jurisdiction of
the court and did so only after decision was rendered
therein against him. He raised the issue of jurisdiction,
for the nullification of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
when the case was on appeal in the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court denied his plea under the doctrine of
estoppel by laches.
d. The same ruling was applied in Crisostomo vs.
CA, et al. (L-27166, Mar. 25, 1970) and Libudan us. Gil
(L-21163, May 17, 1972) under the justification that
“the principle of estoppel is in the interest of a sound
administration of the laws,” citing the Tijam case. The
Supreme Court pointed out that the doctrine of laches is
“based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for
the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims”
and “is principally a question of the inequity or unfair-
ness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted.”
e. In Sarmiento us. Salud (L-25211, Aug. 18, 1972),
the Supreme Court, in resolving the motion for recon-
sideration filed therein, held that while it is true that
a record on appeal must show on its face that it was
perfected on time and such requirement is jurisdictional
in nature, nevertheless if the record on appeal does not
comply with this requirement but the motion to dismiss
the appeal is filed more than 6 months after the appellee
filed his brief, the motion should be denied.
The same ruling was applied in Dequito vs. Lopez
(L-27757, Mar. 28, 1968) involving virtually the same set
14GENERAL PRINCIPLES
of facts. These rulings would still apply in cases wherein
a record on appeal is required, as where multiple appeals
are allowed or in special proceedings.
f. In Vera us. People (L-31218, Feb. 18, 1970), it
was held that while a judgment is null and void where it
was promulgated when the presiding judge had already
ceased to hold office, since the accused failed to raise that
issue in the trial court and only did so after the Court of
Appeals had rendered a judgment adverse to him, it
would be an injustice if all the proceedings had in the
case would be set aside since, after all, the court that
rendered sentence was one of competent jurisdiction.
The case of Carillo us. Allied Workers’ Association of the
Philippines (L-23689, July 31, 1968) was cited in support
of this ruling.
g-. In People us. Casuga (L-37642, Oct. 22, 1973),
the accused was convicted of grave slander, which
offense was within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
then Courts of First Instance and the municipal courts
of capitals of provinces or the City Courts. Instead of
appealing to the then Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court, as would have been proper, he appealed to the
Court of First Instance which affirmed said conviction.
On his subsequent challenge to the appellate jurisdiction
exercised by the Court of First Instance, the Supreme
Court held that the accused, having taken his appeal
to the Court of First Instance, is in estoppel to challenge
the appellate jurisdiction of the said court.
h. In People vs. Tamani (L-22160-61, Jan. 21,
1974), although the appeal of the accused was demon-
strably filed out of time, the Supreme Court nevertheless
reviewed the case and rendered a judgment on the merits
thereof, while declaring in the same decision the dismissal
of the appeal, in view of the fact that the filing of the
appeal out of time was due to the fault of the defense
counsel and the further consideration that the briefs for
the parties had already been filed.
16REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM
i. The doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sibong-
hanoy, supra, has been reiterated in many succeeding
cases and is still good case law. The rule up to now is
that a party’s active participation in all stages of a case
before the trial court, which includes invoking the court's
authority to grant affirmative relief, effectively estops
such party from later challenging the jurisdiction of
the said court (Gonzaga, et al. us. CA, et al., G.R.
No. 144025, Dec. 27, 2002).
j. See, moreover, the summary in Figueroa us. People
of the Philippines (G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008) which
apparently presents the prevailing position of the Supreme
Court on the issue of when a litigant is estopped by laches
from assailing the jurisdiction of a court, in light of its
other and subsequent holdings on the matter.
18. Jurisdiction over a person may also be acquired
even if he was never impleaded nor summoned in the
action as a defendant if he thereafter voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus,
where the spouses voluntarily signed the compromise
agreement to guarantee the payment by the original
impleaded defendants, and that compromise agreement
was approved and made the basis of the judgment
rendered by the court, said spouses are bound by the
judgment as they are in estoppel to deny the very autho-
rity which they invoked. By voluntarily entering into
the compromise agreement, they effectively submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court (Rodriguez,
et al. us. Alikpala, et al., L-38314, June 25, 1974).
19. Since a Court of First Instance (now, the
Regional Trial Court) is a court of general original
jurisdiction, whether a particular matter should be
resolved by it in the exercise of its general jurisdiction,
or in its limited jurisdiction as a probate or land
registration court, is not a jurisdictional question but
a procedural question involving a mode of practice
16GENERAL PRINCIPLES
which, therefore, may be waived (Manalo us. Mariano,
et al., L-33850, Jan. 22, 1976; Santos vs. Banayo,
L-31854, Sept. 9, 1982). Parenthetically, Sec. 2 of
P.D. 1529 has eliminated the distinction between the
general jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court and the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law
when acting as a cadastral court (Ligon us. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 107751, June 1, 1995). However, the holding
that such situations present only procedural, and not
jurisdictional, questions still applies.
20. Questions involving ownership of or title to real
property should be litigated in an ordinary civil action
or in the proceeding where the incident properly belongs,
before a court of general jurisdiction and not before a
land registration court (Santos vs. Aquino, L-32949,
Nov. 28, 1980).
21. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, but not to
actions which have already become final and executory
(Borre, et al. us. CA, et al., G.R. No. 57204, Mar. 14,
1988). Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense
and to that extent (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764;
Liam Law vs. Olympic Sawmill Co., et al., L-30771,
May 26, 1984; Yakult Philippines, et al. us. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 91856, Oct. 5, 1990). Thus, the provision of
B.P. Blg. 129 which eliminated the need for a record on
appeal was given retroactive effect to authorize the giving
of due course to an appeal, which should have been
perfected in 1982 with the required record on appeal, by
relieving the appellant of the need therefor in line with
the change of procedure under B.P. Blg. 129 (Alday us.
Camilon, G.R. No. 60316, Jan. 31, 1983; Ouano vs. CA,
et al., L-44823, June 27, 1985; De Guzman, et al. us.
CA, et al., G.R. No. 52738, July 23, 1985; Lagunzad vs.
CA, et al., G.R. No. 52007, Sept. 24, 1987; Mun. Gov't of
17REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM
Coron vs. Carino, et al., G.R. No. 65896, Sept. 24, 1987;
Sarmiento vs. Gatmaitan, et al., L-38173, Nov. 12, 1987).
However, new court rules apply to pending cases
only with reference to proceedings therein which take
place after the date of their effectivity. They do not
apply to the extent that in the opinion of the court their
application would not be feasible or would work injustice,
in which event the former procedure shall apply. Thus,
where the application of the Rule on Summary Procedure
will mean the dismissal of the appeal of the party, the
same should not apply since, after all, the procedure
they availed of was also allowed under the Rules of
Court (Laguio, et al. vs. Gamet, et al., G.R. No. 74903,
Mar. 21, 1980).
22. Substantive law is that part of the law which
creates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or the
powers of instrumentalities for the administration of
public affairs (Primicias vs. Ocampo, 81 Phil. 650).
Procedural law refers to the adjective laws which prescribe
rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be
able to administer justice (Lopez vs. Gloria, 40 Phil. 33).
Substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights,
as opposed to “adjective or remédial law” which prescribes
the method of enforcing the rights or obtaining redress
for their invasion (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.,
p. 1429; citations omitted).
Procedure is the mode of proceeding by which a legal
right is enforced, as distinguished from the law which
gives or defines the right, and which, by means of the
proceeding, the court is to administer. This term is com-
monly opposed to the sum of legal principles constituting
the substance of the law, and denotes the body of rules,
whether of practice or pleading, whereby rights are
effectuated through the successful application of the
Proper remedies (op. cit., pp. 1367-1368; id.).GENERAL PRINCIPLES
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the
Supreme Court abridges, enlarges or modifies any
substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by the substantive
low and for justly administering remedy and redress for
a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away
a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a
right, such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as
a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right, then the rule deals
merely with procedure (Fabian vs. Desierto, etc., et al.,
G.R. No. 129742, Sept. 16, 1998).
It is, therefore, the nature and the purpose of the
law which determines whether it is substantive or
procedural, and not its place in the statute or its inclusion
in a code. Thus, for instance, Arts. 539 and 1674 of the
Civil Code and Sec. 85, R.A. 296 provided injunctive rules
in ejectment cases in the trial and appellate stages, but
these have been properly incorporated with modifications
as Secs. 8 and 9, respectively, of Rule 70 of the 1964
Rules of Court (now, Sec. 15 of revised Rule 70). These
subsequent amendatory provisions on injunctions were
proper since the mere fact that those provisions on in-
junctions were formerly included in a substantive statute
or code does not convert them into or detract from the
fact that they are procedural laws, contrary to common
misimpression. In fact, there are many such procedural
rules found in the Civil Code or, for that matter, in other
codes or basically substantive laws but they do not
thereby lose their character as procedural laws.
This matter is being clarified and emphasized here
in view of the Constitutional provision that the rules
which the Supreme Court is authorized to promulgate
shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights
(Sec. 5 [5], Art. VIH, 1987 Constitution). The improbable
position that a clearly procedural provision becomes a
19REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM
substantive law by the mere fact that it is included in a
compilation, codification or statutory enactment of
substantive rights, although only to indicate the
remedial complement for the enforcement thereof,
would effectively subvert the Constitutional intent and
diminish the scope and extent of the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court.