CASES FOR WEEKS 2 & 3 An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order
were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
1 G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
petition was made.
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
DECISION

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
CORONA, J.:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
compatible with his present sex.

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from
inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She
pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out
came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the
man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas
and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a persons sex? May
a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to
reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of
his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The
petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment],
petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the
physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own
doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition
would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc]
and the realization of their dreams.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
"male."
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of
as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and
a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological petitioners gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery 2 in
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he
the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name
have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from
or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court
"male" to "female."
of Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the

1
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of
this petition. first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10 dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

The petition lacks merit. (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex.
As found by the trial court:
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended
to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth
does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding
records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled
to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or
any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local
civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth
RA 9048 provides:
certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does
not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
Reassignment
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules
and regulations.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to order.
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now
down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule
108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 23
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
2
 SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an
entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of
the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: 24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage;
(6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8)
adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or
(12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as
a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including
those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts,
events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status
and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized
nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities
and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or
less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his
being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive
term status include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity
to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed
by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is
fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent
of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register.
Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the
local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife
in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a)
date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and
religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status
of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be
required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there
is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time
of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in
the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In
this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish
a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33Female is "the sex that
3
produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for
fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include
persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless
the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used
then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-
female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change
of the entries in his birth certificate.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a
law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can
only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and
[the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground
Costs against petitioner.
of Equity

SO ORDERED.
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to
anyone. This is wrong. 2 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166676
Petitioner,
Present:
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioners first step
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its
TINGA,
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
VELASCO, JR., and
female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
BRION, JJ.
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who
has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Promulgated:
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
Respondent.
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of
September 12, 2008
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 41 among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
petitioners petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render DECISION
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license QUISUMBING, J.:
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not
to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1]dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
(RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what
Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name Jennifer Cagandahan changed to Jeff Cagandahan and (2)
proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer
on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to gender from female to male.
conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.

4
 The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate[2] before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further
alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests
revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast
or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind
and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected
such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to
Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3)
consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor
abovementioned ruling.
General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his
behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines Philippine General
Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondents condition is known as
CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male
hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and
male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully developed
because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that
respondents condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent
has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be
advantageous to her.
entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that
he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to
the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It
was medically proven that petitioners body produces male hormones, and first
his body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to
be male. He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as
a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil,
Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following corrections in the birth
[c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF
CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters registry,
baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to
conform with the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE
NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF SEX
OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL
CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A
MALE.[4]
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of
5

the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable
party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, respondents petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.[5] The
OSG further contends respondents petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent
is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior
to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. [6] The OSG
argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents
claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male. [7]
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil,
Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate,
nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on
December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the
proceedings,[8] respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be
corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,[9] change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108,[10] and
respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court.[11]
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the
petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in
the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed and
verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his
behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province
where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the
date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is
sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance,
the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and
place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be
published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive
weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as
the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty
(30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last
publication of the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose
the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall
appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the
order that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations
of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears
for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in
accordance with the prayer of the petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection with
this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where
the court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in
the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded
in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of
natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship;
(l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
6
 SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by
an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication
of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought
may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue
an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a
certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar
concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondents petition did not implead the local civil
registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the
local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the
civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be
had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same
shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules. [13] The corresponding
petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have
or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby. [14] Respondent, however, invokes
Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally
to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
the matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when
respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and
the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic
Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of
such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in
entries in the civil register.[18]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is
not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.[19]
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth.[20]
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or inappropriate
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too
much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually
7
has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often
appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract
such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to
appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About
1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth
century, medicine adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human beings who cannot be
classified as either male or female.[22] The term is now of widespread use. According
to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither
exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both
male and female sexes.
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most
societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender
role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with
ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or
female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a disorder
which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime
medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or
female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. It has been
suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals
who are neither truly male nor truly female.[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by
mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a
change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony
and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than female, then achange in the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and
categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female
(XX) chromosomes. However, respondents body system naturally produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features
of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual,
like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her
sex.Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels
of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being
male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps
to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to
that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to
do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents development to reveal more fully his
male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning
a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not
to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider
respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a
female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in
order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human
species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human
right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of
what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the
absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent [27] and in the absence of evidence to show
8

that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to
protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and his
personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondents
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make
his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of
name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons
adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28] The trial courts grant of respondents change of
name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering
the consequence that respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find
merit in respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his
birth certificate from female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED
3 G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed
the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage
of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I.
Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage
with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made
in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed
a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On
October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a
determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty
Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any
right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
9
SO ORDERED.6 On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence
to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable Ruling of the Court
her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole
the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the
purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the
$2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
ground of lack of consent?
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
The Court resolves in the negative.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for
motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed the purposes of immigration.
to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and
used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that
the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE
CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST,
HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of
being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter
being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The
parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise,
the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of
marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages
where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been
referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered
into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the
time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve
immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they
were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited
purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose
marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to
every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the
contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true
10
that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they
have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive
others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, 19 which declared as
valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a
valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or
sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is
first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving"
limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have
upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into
for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should
not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSGs motion for reconsideration,
the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely
give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only
as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand
the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the
marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the
marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended
to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of consent. Under
Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code
provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence
of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such
as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in
that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial
or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was
also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was
freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the
legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary
to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as
a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. 27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be
real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but
for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely
no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1wphi1 Albios and Fringer
had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow
them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage
status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly
present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of
marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if
it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites
prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it
shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate
on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into
the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. 29 The right to
marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit,
to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so
on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,31are
equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause
for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondents marriage may be
11
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and 4 G.R. No. 182438, July 02, 2014
continues to be valid and subsisting.
RENE RONULO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the
Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud,
DECISION
namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by
the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit BRION, J.:
shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the
sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo
Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or
challenging the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which
innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

The Factual Antecedents

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry
declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.
they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to
cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a
misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown,
again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation. together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino
Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest,
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded they had no marriage certificate.
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He
when no longer needed. conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests. 4

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed
CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit. against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly
performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner entered the plea of not guilty to the crime charged on arraignment.

The prosecutions witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the ceremony.
Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne
testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their wedding
rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.6 She heard the petitioner instructing the principal
sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch and took
pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given to her by
Joey.7

Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony
that they take each other as husband and wife. 8 Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal
local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was
given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple. 9

The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the
couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law. 10

The MTC Judgment

12
 Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and imposed ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert
on him a P200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioners act of the blessing into a marriage ceremony.19
giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the
cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife. 11 It further ruled that in performing a marriage Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the blessing in good faith for purposes
ceremony without the couples marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC of giving moral guidance to the couple.20
which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied
Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of any of its provisions that Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as
is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of amended, should preclude the filing of the present case against him. 21
not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than one month, or both, in the
discretion of the court. Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is not
covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its provisions
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the latter nor a regulation promulgated thereafter. 22
law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of P200.00. 12
THE COURTS RULING:
The RTC Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act of
the petitioner in blessing the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. The elements of the crime
It further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more credence punishable under Article 352 of the
than the petitioners negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the fine should RPC, as amended, were proven by
be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law. the prosecution

The CA Decision Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform
or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in
determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage.
must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they take Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged blessing by the petitioner is
each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal age. 14 According to tantamount to the performance of an illegal marriage ceremony which is punishable under Article
the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added that the presence of a marriage 352 of the RPC, as amended.
certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a marriage ceremony and
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioners criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as what constitutes its illegal performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these
amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article matters. These provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was
350 of the same Code.16 copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments.

The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the Article 625 of the Family Code provides that [n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the
Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting
such as the RPC. parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not
less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.26
The Petition
Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage
ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds:
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in
the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and does not define what constitutes an illegal
marriage ceremony. Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear
in Article 55 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal
that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. However,
declaration that the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate
as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage
containing the declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to
ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a
by the solemnizing officer.17 The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove
solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that
that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife. 18
they take each other as husband and wife.

13
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this
fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal
petitioners allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife. conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the
Family Code, as discussed above.
The petitioners allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to
persuade us. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of the
questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime.
relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position
taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he The penalty imposed is proper
propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party. 28
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty
timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity. provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows:

In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioners admission regarding Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
the circumstances of the ceremony, support Floridas testimony that there had indeed been the
declaration by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage without
disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear and convincing pieces being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing
of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by the parties or
Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner. parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or officer, priest, or
minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof require banns or
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who
precludes the State from qualifying the church blessing into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any
petitioners allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act, shall be punished by
it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is required. imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine of not less than two
This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]
marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable
social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract,
Section 44. General Penal Clause Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished
the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To
by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or
this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as
both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of
marriage.
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that
the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage
the Marriage Law.
ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may
view this merely as a blessing, the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case. As correctly
marriage ceremony qualified this blessing into a marriage ceremony as contemplated by Article
found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but
3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this
provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely under the
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony
provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation of the
was illegal.
regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which
was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a
valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of P200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of
had no marriage license, yet he conducted the blessing of their relationship.
the Marriage Law.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3,
essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage
2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioners knowledge of the absence of these requirements
negates his defense of good faith.
SO ORDERED.
14
5 [G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision[1] dated October 21, 1999
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment[2] dated August 5,
1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court
found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and
sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the
resolution[3] of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The
former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada,
they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada.
Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce
against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on
February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago[4] at the Virgen sa
Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in
the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among
others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information [5] filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. [6]
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His
motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution.
When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years
and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first
marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[8] the trial court
ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,[9] which
held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or
both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to
determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not
entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the second
marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,[10] everyone is presumed to know
the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not
exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the
appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage
between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal
was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
15
SO ORDERED.[11]
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit
Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 [12] of the Revised Penal Code
is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the
CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a
bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 [13] of the
Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article
17[14] of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment
promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that the
doctrine in Mendiola v. People,[15] allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect
of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. [16] However,
the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR No.
20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis.
The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no
first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and
since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN
CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE
REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE
SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS.
BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH
AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT.[17]
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and
if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce
decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly
and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues
that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime
of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence,
good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a
difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it
does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an
intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the
instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling
in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[18] which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the
elements concur, stressing that under Article 40[19] of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of
nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said
Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that
petitioners contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the
Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must
first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis,[20] we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the
first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No.
6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the
marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar,
Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the
marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio
and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
16
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the
marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This simply means that there was no
marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of
the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused
was, under the eyes of the law, never married.[24] The records show that no appeal was taken from
the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and
executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus,
there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being
declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is
null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The
existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it
is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage
to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.[25] In the
latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the
second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statutes as void.[26]
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just
once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six
months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to
have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless
he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in
favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to
ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has
not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his
defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court
dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the
ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
6 G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor
children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT
CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its
President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S.
Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr.
& Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho &
Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves
and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C.
Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C.
Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C.
Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey
C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander
R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita
Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho &
Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho,
Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R.
Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho,
Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel
Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture
and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and
Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-
General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson,
Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented
by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato Marcos,Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
17
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners, PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National
vs. President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan,
Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno
Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
Government, Respondents. vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
x---------------------------------x
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS
II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN,
G.R. No. 204988 Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN,
Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO,
Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as
Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission
President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr.
on Women, Respondents.
Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in his personal capacity,
ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G.
NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners, x---------------------------------x
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
G.R. No. 205478
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents. JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY
PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE
NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For
x---------------------------------x
Life, Petitioners,
vs.
G.R. No. 205003 HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the
Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education;
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
vs.
Government, Respondents.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents. x---------------------------------x

x---------------------------------x G.R. No. 205491

G.R. No. 205043 SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for
themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY x---------------------------------x
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205720

x---------------------------------x
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive
Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A.
G.R. No. 205138 CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY,
WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
18
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, vs.
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents. and Management,Respondents.

x---------------------------------x DECISION

G.R. No. 206355 MENDOZA, J.:

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO- Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this
GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners, Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
vs. broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others
HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents. and with the common good."1

x---------------------------------x To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed
country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While
governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning
G.R. No. 207111
dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every
member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a
Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners, whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact
vs. laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to
HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its
Government, Respondents. solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds
Philippine society together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
x---------------------------------x
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control,
abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the
G.R. No. 207172
subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television
debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND by members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious
FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society.
and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners, Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known
vs. as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Congress on December 21, 2012.
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes
Government, Respondents.
down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may
produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two
x---------------------------------x (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:

G.R. No. 207563 (1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and
Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and
on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a
domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);
19
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines,
Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche 7 and several others8 in their
personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and
Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City,
Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution,
and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic
Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines, 16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers
(Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of
Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others, 21 in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny
C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of
those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of
the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation
Inc.24 and several others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its
associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon
Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their
capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several
others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc.
and several others,31in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim
in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a
citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an
accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of
RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law
would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.35
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to
contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health
problems.36
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH
Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of
public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public
funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the
constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer
patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full
and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their
religious beliefs and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-
IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to,
Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health
physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically
charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. 40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in
schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs. 41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue
that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest
test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to
the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude
because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide
forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal
prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43
20
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical
practitioner would effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of
PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail
of the practitioners services.44
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH
Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the
government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather
than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. 45
The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it
is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the
RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by
removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of
health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management
prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their
own discretion and judgment.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range
of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own
preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is
granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to
refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or
procedure.48
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the
Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive
health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in
accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health
procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of
spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the
same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are
deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives.50
The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative
authority. The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to
determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency
Drugs List (EDL).51
The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ),
Article VI of the Constitution.52
The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law,
providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM,
infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government
Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-
intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel
C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan,
and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana
Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-
Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano
was also granted leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and,
therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to
question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which
the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took
effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status
Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a
period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013. 62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to
determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which
these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13,
and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered
extended until further orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60)
days and, at the same time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the
parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted
R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they
could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a
21
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing
of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was
provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing
conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any
person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which
recognized that the population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term
economic development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to
mitigate population growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August
16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on
Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of
a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space
or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential
Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part
of a broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health
care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino
citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner
ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence
of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is
mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to
the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided
under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives
are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners
find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the
entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest
areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the
fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all
forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread
dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and
supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized
and refined them to the following principal issues:

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health,
particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to
freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the 1] Power of Judicial Review
commitments made in the International Conference on Population and Development. 70 Thus, on
August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which,
2] Actual Case or Controversy
among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for
women, including family planning and sex education.71
3] Facial Challenge
The RH Law
4] Locus Standi
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an
uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population 5] Declaratory Relief
of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010. 72 The executive
and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and
information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to
provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of modem
family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health
1] Right to Life
education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its
mandates.
2] Right to Health
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current
laws on contraception, women's health and population control. 3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

22
 4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the
Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to
the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting
of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an
inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review
social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion
to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in
particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern
Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the
petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature. 79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet
to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive
and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord
due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of
powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and
is supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and
in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government. 85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers
which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their
respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the
Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution. 86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability,
the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts
performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the
same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to
determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were
undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or
grave abuse of discretion results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to
protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited,
the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial
scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to
the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the
executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure
that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them
by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then,
it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review. 90 This is in line with Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in
Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In
Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial
23
rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional
provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court
is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is
essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of
powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance
of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed
the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing
operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority
to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule
that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or
controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised
by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with
violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has
been adversely affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH
Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to
satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-
definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In
other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one
hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to
himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 103 where
the constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues
raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and
the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question
being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to
render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough
to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is
ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have
already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it
is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only
becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. 104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations
thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending
that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure. 105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected
speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. 106 These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom
of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating
free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The
underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court,
under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 110 Verily, the framers of
Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional
human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been
violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these
petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this
24
Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It
contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed
law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, 111 and the government has yet to distribute
reproductive health devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their
status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. 113 It
requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one
from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure,
hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." 116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, 117 the Court held that in cases of paramount
importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be
relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party
claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 118 ordinary citizens and
taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they
had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-
applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement.
It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material
interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance
is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on
more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not
have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in
Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition,
the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the
issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is
in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the
bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law
drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of
religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the
issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad
spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental
importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the
right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a
life to be taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in
the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or
her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief
over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are
praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications
and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule
65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section
26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them,
being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the
constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population control
measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control
measure,124 and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both
interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a
population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the
country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also
promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to
provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full
25
range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or
modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births
in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A
large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access
to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care
services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception
pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law. 126 Indeed, remove the
provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very
foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance,
maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive
tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling,
Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the
title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where,
as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical
construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive
health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to
control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child
under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to
abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH
Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after
fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to
afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in
abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life. 131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that
the State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of
man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the
assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that
the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and
supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not
be used for abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable
Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate
human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education
the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health
and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with
care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134
their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so
abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment
various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in
or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one
the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination
subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression
and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive. 135
or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which
violated considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of
bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under
the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law
its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the
specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized
public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
ovum are allowed.136

26
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and,
therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and
transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is
not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966,
prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the
promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, 139 and the ratification of numerous international
agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the
use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years,
however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a
component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health,
particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and
the overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or
"The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna
Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national
population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-
abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not
merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection
expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the
Court could express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of
Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable
because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the
Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has
arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact
that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at
implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization"
of the female ovum by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert
that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council: 144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based
on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in
which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and
second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the
people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of
law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as
described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant,
formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a
being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the
female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation
under normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano, 147 it was
written:
27
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before
he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of
the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the
State "has respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial
interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to,
or cited, as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding
the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it
clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm
that there is human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was
explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be
answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is
alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins
doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it
multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are
vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of
conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from
the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A
chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized
ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized
ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is
human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment
of fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before
with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we
want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it
was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a
Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's
own admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life
to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now
determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about
it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too. 153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of
the questions I was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed
already. The provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain
contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-
called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already
occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root.
What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to
reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives
should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and,
therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
28
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by
certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even
proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.154 condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157

From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution Atty. Noche:
emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child
from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to
prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Justice Bersamin:
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading There is no life.
the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of
whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the
Atty. Noche:
courts to decide on based on established evidence.155

So, there is no life to be protected.

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be
deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union
of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization Justice Bersamin:
should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
To be protected.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
Atty. Noche:
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 12, yes.
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I
would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the
Justice Bersamin:
world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic
implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I
raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of So you have no objection to condoms?
Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.
Atty. Noche:
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception" we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are
Not under Section 12, Article II.
already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree
with me?
Justice Bersamin:
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no
unborn yet. That is yet unshaped. Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as Atty. Noche:
the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking
route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing
these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Justice Bersamin:

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

Alright.

29
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor. 158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing,
and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be
the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the
embryo develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), 161 used by medical schools in
the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization
with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique
genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins
after the union of male and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization
(conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm
(spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the
haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell.
This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium,
of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote:
"Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary
circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of
23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the
diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a
genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the
Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its
strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human
life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new
lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and
human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no
point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can
be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific
fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life
of a new human being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This
conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical,
moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos. 164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more
importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is
that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a
scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life
begins at implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and
successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous." 166 Citing a
letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized
ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be
medically detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It
does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote
is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46
chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had
population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law
but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or
device that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative
and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the
unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing
abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers
was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from
conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress
or any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes
abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it
finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the
30
policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the
uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal
Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and
supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-
related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and
personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and
responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to
make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to
have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and
reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion,
and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree
or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary
to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise
known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be
clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon
determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with
the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a
bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any
drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to
that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any
drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to
mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not
declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise
suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already
has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way
until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded
protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or
device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the
RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at
fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its
viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started
earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills
or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product
or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said
product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as
empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not
31
all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the
contraceptive product or supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient
contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the
legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must
have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition
that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the
second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency
contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other
forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their
office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as
follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis
supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning
method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does
not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the
mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as
"abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they
pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must
be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is
indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared
invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the
approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such
qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an
"abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the
implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives
which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives
cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a)
of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that
contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that
do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but
also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle
that laws should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its
implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word "
primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary
effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives
which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional
protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the
National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals.176Citing various studies on the matter, the
petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in
women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out
that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended
that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of
venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate
effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual
32
health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed
legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives. 180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it
being a mere statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory,
the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the
health of women.181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is
replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the
Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the
people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and
undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's
health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation,
self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or
hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the
provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila
Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been,
that
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine
when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question
contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No.
5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are
dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions
of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its
requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of
respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation
of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices
will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists
adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available
to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and
used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of
Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other
Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with
the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are
particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or
otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless
such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company
and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used
exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and
33
 "(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into
the female reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished
with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or
more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or
drug of whatever nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or
otherwise be made available to the consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or
hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes,
the pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of
contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and baseless. 186 [Emphases in
the Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which
provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure,
distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The
DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this
procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among
others, the current levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their
children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program
consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by
Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life
resulting from or incidental to their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA
pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are
declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available
to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the
attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must
first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the
case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal
contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of
Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the
mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and
approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular
hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the
third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family
planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There
must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that
the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper
scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the
constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and
background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of
these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of
contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with
contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital
chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the
spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human
life."188
34
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the
expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since
contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments
by making provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless
violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient
seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide
for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to
cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs. 190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the
recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23
(a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and information - no escape
is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking
reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously
object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers
involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public
schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize. 191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to
refer the matter to another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those
objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to do the act against their
will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular
that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with
abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to
indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are required. 192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person
seeking reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion
as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under
Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts
prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public. 193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of
religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It
does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable
human development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions according to
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being
threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom. 194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend
family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance.
They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law
even if it contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of
fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that
the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception
against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode
or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any
religion or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by
providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child
health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the
Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive
others of their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to
guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his
religion against his free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the
petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right
they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law. 200 In other words, by seeking the
declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize
only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the
entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the
interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer
-and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the
health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession
given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely
exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is
limited in duration, location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a
reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information
regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those
who object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are
not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to reject any
information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life
without intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the
only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys
on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout
the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in
planning their families.
The Church and The State
35
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people
of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our
government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial
groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant
towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that
our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call
for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present
Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and
humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote
the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity,
the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in
our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is
embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion
in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of
the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent
and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary
of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach
into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was,
thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual
respect.1wphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less
question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate
against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the
Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers
to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a
religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the
State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in
Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any
penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring
any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious
groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public
resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from
unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith. 208 Explaining the
concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union 209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or
the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed
or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also
assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has
been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all
religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden
may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S.
Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has
for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect
burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such
burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes.
They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest
terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties
for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from
inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two
religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to
influence individual religious beliefs and practices.210
36
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of
religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's
belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education: 211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and
thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One
may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to
others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between
the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. 212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be
enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief
is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the
doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor,
(Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory
or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution." 215 In the
same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The
purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or
institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its
'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is
proper.218Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a
fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it
was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first
case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and
present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in
subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of
permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and
law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine
that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least
restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the
"compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag
then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly
recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case
of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present
danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious speech as
this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German
cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and
law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag
which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that
employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was
inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo
where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as
speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from
having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not
appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct
arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is
involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some
effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would
protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is
therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to
religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of
rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is
sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire
constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher
sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane
society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances
a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling
interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the
state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter
religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall
prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The
"compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time
affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert
which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest"
test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without
which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of
contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is
moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma
or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of
worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters
which are outside the province of the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should
be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands
without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have
authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and
convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his
religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting
religious freedom are the following:
37
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to
equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the
right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the
right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions,
ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of
Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family
which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of
family planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically
safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical
research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized
as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization:
Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of
family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and
their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of
children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources
available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their
religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in
accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's
obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's
organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is
crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and
programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and
aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to
determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children
according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness,
health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions.
[Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To
some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema.
Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither
cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not
cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to
adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its
population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use
is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate
secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse
to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church
and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things
that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects
diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be
reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a
hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services
under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections
based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or
practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of
Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim
to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of
an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption
from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom
has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a
conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his
religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The
scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are
incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious
belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will,
refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures
and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act
against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the
basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false
compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that
they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot
38
do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by
indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free
speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to
be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should
be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for
simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his
mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. 223 While the RH Law seeks to provide
freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the
religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect,
in the practice of one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand,
and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number
and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom
of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a
conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he
would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of
"the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of
Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board, 225 that the midwives claiming to
be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be
required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in
abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the
person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and
uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they
could not be forced to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the
RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer
under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being
violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to
Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services
and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care
service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary 228 it
was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this
Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others
and with the common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure
compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to
be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation of
a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The
punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another,
or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible
religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs
of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are
specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules,
cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection
clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no
perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law.
The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical
practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the
freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free
exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of
human values. The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious
sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other
candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such
concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and
freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law
itself but also because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting
respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must
prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned
RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious
convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have
read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
39
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected Justice De Castro:
the nuances of the provisions.
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in
Justice Mendoza: imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his
religious belief?
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it
says: " .... skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are
specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules,
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?

Justice De Castro:
Congressman Lagman:

What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?

I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Justice Mendoza:

In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be
an ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free
conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors.
exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between medical doctors and
Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the religious belief?
their patients.231

Congressman Lagman:
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause
of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail. 230 grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious
freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State
intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232
Compelling State Interest

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the
or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to
subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain
act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief. 233
conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof
that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the
law. Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the
perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and
spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was
mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or whether
curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the
she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who
curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious
object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on
convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The
reproductive health matters.
Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious
Justice De Castro:
objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's fundamental right to
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. .. religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show
that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means. 234 Other
than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious
freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the
Yes, Justice. State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health
concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive
40
health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is
forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last
vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to
health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the
Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710,
otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to
health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health
services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all
times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and
programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of
women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health
services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to
found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible
parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and
substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy
and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health
services without prejudice to the primary right and duty of parents to educate
their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including
sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and
cervical cancers, and other gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related
complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children
victims and survivors shall be provided with comprehensive health services
that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and
assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant
to ethical norms and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of
women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and
promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of
diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors
with appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated
aspects of women's health in government education and training programs, with due regard to the
following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth and the development of moral character and the right of children to be
brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and
strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility
awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state
interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies,
lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures
from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino
maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH
Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of maternal
deaths constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for
Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on
religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While
generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care
procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-
threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the
right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a
mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested:
41
"the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
not contemplate an emergency."237 shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one protected by the State.
should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Section 3. The State shall defend:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of
Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between
demands of responsible parenthood;
the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both
lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically
impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from
principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is development;
never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally valuable. 238
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the
child may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of
quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been
policies and programs that affect them.
more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains
Family Planning Seminars
provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or
the father from participating in the decision making process regarding their common future
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply
license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at
all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family
The Family and Spousal Consent
planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning
methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by
the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information
they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the
The following acts are prohibited:
intervention of the State.

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the
legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following
Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and
instances:
fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total development. 240

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision
The Court cannot but agree.
of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy
institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and
the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the
ARTICLE XV Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One
THE FAMILY person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3,

42
their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be
them " is equally recognized. undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law
provides:
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute
authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. x x x.
participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in
bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or
population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an
artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning
inviolable social institution.241
without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent
or has had a miscarriage.
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the
couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent
because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The decision
or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor
whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one
with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already
cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless
cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.
it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that
they chart their destiny together as one family.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance
of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as
providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-
the "Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to
family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to
marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the number and spacing of their
protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared
responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray
the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and
absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure. 242 primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government." 247 In this regard,
Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and
such state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the
Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc, 243 where The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the
the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the State. 248 [Emphases supplied]
accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v.
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their
Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very
purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and
than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that
and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. foundation of the family and society.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only
criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by
couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
First Exception: Access to Information
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second
paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to information about
family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and
The Family and Parental Consent modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is

43
concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor
referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take
proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child.
Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the
protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with respect to reproductive
health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental
control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over
their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that
require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has
already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack
of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care
urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) 249 should be struck down. By
effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it
denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-
surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused
child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of
their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching
of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or
imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these
provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if
they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students. 250 Citing various studies
conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that
the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and
breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the
aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is
premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the
content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and
whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to
rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in
preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance
on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be
"primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State. 252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral
development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing
the youth and their important role in nation building. 253 Considering that Section 14 provides not
only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the
development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and
violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy;
physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights;
responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule
10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of
responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among
adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision
supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development
of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education
program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious
beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners'
contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit. 254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation
in the reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the
ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an
actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process
clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service
provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private health
care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes
reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated
by religious groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning
methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive
health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under
Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of
incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
44
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague,
words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to
other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service
provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health
service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly
licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for
health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from
illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing
care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3)
public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker
who has undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who
voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having been accredited to
function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the
Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of
"private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason
that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to
render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from
being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health
procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be
exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning
methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are
broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service
providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding
reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby
quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally
provide incorrect information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including
the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or
with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or
propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means
with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l),
they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature
and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that
health care service providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with
what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from
expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive
health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public
deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the
Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the
government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively
reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with
the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles 259 and definition of terms260 of the
law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive
health education program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept
of equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right
which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws
is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements
of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut
it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed."
It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In
other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and
it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
45
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests
between public educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because
there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of
reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional
persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation
members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
requiring private and non-government health care service providers to render forty-eight (48)
It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the
hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because
members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity
it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will. 262
will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as
long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be
of the law to him." considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have
the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out
that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who
may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude"
those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded] The point of the OSG is well-taken.

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care
program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article
XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of
the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the
contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law
admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1)
explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the
advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not
impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the
assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in
a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to
simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote
basic reproductive health care.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest
that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a
privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori,
this power includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of
professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the
public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking
such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of
force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the
assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non- government
reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation
with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-
government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind
of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it
all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service
against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with
PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a
necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that
conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and
convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive
health education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of
those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial
46
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL). 266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also
the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only
government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be
understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with
what is ordinarily understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be
under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and
regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this
Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products
standards, and to recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill
of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for
the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations
regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers,
drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by
the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance
of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers,
retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA
any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the
death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health
products, whether or not registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health
products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for
sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product
found to have caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or
is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to
require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for
the issuance of the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable
the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that
ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the
necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary
implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting
only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of
the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are
proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was
explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of
the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of
society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required
direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the
powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code.
Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic
services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising
the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They
shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices
devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise
such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are
necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic
services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
47
 While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies
on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions,
paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the National
Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent
executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not
covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit
concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities,
programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, 276 suffice it to say that the Court
does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is
the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law,
the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To
begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere
thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The
jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the
actual law of the past or present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law,
it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 278 the very case cited
by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action
and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be
used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no
law is applicable.279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU
allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the
is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which
government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily
funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act,
available to the public, especially to the poor.
even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. 269 A
complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities
and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. 270 Facts and Fallacies

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of and the Wisdom of the Law
health care facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay
health workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide
implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it
access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive
comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like
healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious
the RH Law.
freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to
achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these accountable to an authority higher than the State.
services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the
availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be
Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed
allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough
by the local governments.
room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that
peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
The ARMM
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said
applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of
Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth
Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the remains in the hands of the very few.
policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the
petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European
can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation
and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with
that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM,
ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their
the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium
economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped
et imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional governments. 274 Except for the
them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their
express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to
programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of
general concern or common interest.275
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino
Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would
11 - Natural Law
48
happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer younger
generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility
rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman. 280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive
measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it.
Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the
law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or
what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look
into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it
the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of
a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in
the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out
the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and
mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must
confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body. 281
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or
one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5
.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive
health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a
reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of
pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in
securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the
"primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and,
prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the
therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section
Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No.
12, Article II of the Constitution.
6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna
Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the
same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated
method should be maintained. July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein
declared as constitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No.
10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are SO ORDERED.
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
7 [G.R. NO. 167746 : August 28, 2007]
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner, v. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening
APPEALS,Respondents.
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from DECISION
their parents or guardian/s;
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5
.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
denying petitioner's appeal and affirming the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they annulment of marriage.
allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of
The antecedent facts are:
the spouse;

A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara
alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage
49
license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a
marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev.
Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. 4 They got married on the same
day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the
San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured
in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of
Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the
said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988,
they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be
issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding
marriage contract5 and its entry on file.6
Answering petitioner's petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their
marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification
from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioner's representation,
respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to
another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992. 7 Petitioner has a mistress with
whom he has three children.8Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage.9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against
petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60. 10 Respondent prays
that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as
follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for
Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage
license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the
Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered as
evidence during the trial, and was not the Marriage license number appearing on the face of the
marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling
laid down by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy v. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April
2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the
observance of procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants. 14
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated,
there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt
with a "fixer" who arranged everything for them. 15 The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila
City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage
belongs.16 He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license.
Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the
respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification states that "Marriage License number
7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario"17 but their
marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per
effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was
month as support for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of each month;
the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
andcralawlibrary

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
3. To pay the costs.11
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)18 in relation to Article 58 of the
same Code.19
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioner's appeal. His
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April
Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties
2005.12
states:

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties'
marriage contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under
Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.13 (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution: (2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; andcralawlibrary

50
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement
and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.21
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage.
The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering
the marriage void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of
due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182
was issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of "due search and inability to find" a
record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of
a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
In Cario v. Cario,23 the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court
held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of
the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage
license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the
marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year
after the ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion
is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage
void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on
the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar
that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between
the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was
also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. 25 The certification moreover is precise in
that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto
Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the
parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No.
7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8,
1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal
purpose or intents it may serve.26
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the
issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business.27 The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of
doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness.28 Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license
was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.29
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that
neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no
sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent's marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a
city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage
license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for
publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. 30 An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.31
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification
of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No.
7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is
number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the
same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the
overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or
7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of
said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, 32 petitioner cannot
pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists
took place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took
place because he "initiated it."33 Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by
profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and
voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to
extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer
palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt
to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith. 34
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year
utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding
ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a
whimper on the part of the petitioner.rbl r l l lbrr
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de
Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the
Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioner's testimony as follows'
WITNESS
51
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding. officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the
absence of any showing to the contrary.37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
COURT
registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the
competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.38
Manuguit church.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the
WITNESS marriage.39 Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The
Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary,
the presumption is of great weight.
I don't remember your honor.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the
COURT
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?cralaw library
SO ORDERED.
WITNESS

I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I don't
know if it is good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.

COURT

In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already
a Marriage Contract?cralaw library

WITNESS

Yes your honor.

COURT

That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage
Contract issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.

WITNESS

Yes your honor.35

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place
at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby
cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.36

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner - - that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged
everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a
Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel - - will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the

52
8 G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-
LUNA,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine
law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial
approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent
marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
138, in Makati City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the
husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second
marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip,
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his
first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially
married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Paraaque, Rizal on September
10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on
September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNAs marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely:
Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio
Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of
marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February
1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written agreement
entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12,
1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the
Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto.
Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY.
LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD
returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and
Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development
Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa
St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for 1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment
basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas law office of
LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed
on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing
the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia
P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and
TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of
ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to
Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the
following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia
P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the
partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated
that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA
thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a
portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of
ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNAs son of
the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit
belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato
G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books,
office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the
heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the
existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since
they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY.
LUNA to the extent of pro-indiviso share consisting of her share in the said properties plus her
share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latters last will and
testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her
share in the subject properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the
portion of the subject properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on
the condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be
appointed to preserve ad administer the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be
ordered to pay attorneys feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.3
Ruling of the RTC
53
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned
facts,4 disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR
of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate
of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE
METERS is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit,
hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of
Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
Zaballero Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
condominium unit and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as
appropriate arrangements have been madefor transport and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS
ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE
TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY
FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS
ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF
THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT
THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE
FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE
APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION
FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE.7
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN
THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFFS
MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNAS LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID
FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED
AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,9 holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latters death on July 12,
1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not
terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not
recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity,
Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the
KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title
No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is
54
 hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole
industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-
Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other concept
over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 of the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces
Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first
marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. 13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation and
Property Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable;
hence, their conjugal partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic
courts approval of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce
sufficient proof of actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the
subjectcondominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the
subject law books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to the
25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher
on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should
determine, firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia)
had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage entered into by
the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Lunas first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the
Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the
Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the
nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by
virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July
12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code,16 even
if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad. 17 Indeed, the only two types of defective marital
unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against
such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the
annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained
abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the
time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life. 20 The non-
recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of
the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid
marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce
decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and
enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement) that
the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the divorce
proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate
their conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible
error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the
55
time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had
not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the
Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common
fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide
equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of termination
enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court
was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of
property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.
(1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed
when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of
the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the
court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The
provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be
applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna
and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as an
incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications
for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the action for
divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being
contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also
legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains
of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Lunas subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976
was void for being bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia
had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of
the Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the
first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. 23 A bigamous
marriage is considered void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its
being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules
on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
56
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married,
ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact.1wphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer
proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-
ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the
Court explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership
ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential.
The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and
adulterousunion is without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they
contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals,
we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual contribution
in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings
or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponents defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the
plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.1wphi1 The plaintiff is not automatically entitled
to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of protection as the plaintiff must
still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court
isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact
has the burden of proving it and a mereallegation is not evidence. 26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase of
the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least 306,572.00, consisting in direct
contributions of 159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex
Financing and Banco Filipino totaling 146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate contributions of
306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
condominium unit amounting to 362,264.00 of the units purchase price of 1,449,056.00. 28 The
petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof of
which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note;29 that she had the financial capacity to make
the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own
due to the meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioners assertions on her actual
contributions through the following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds
were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin this
case proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family
Code to apply as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together
as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article
144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily
applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied only if the parties
were not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for it would be
absurd to create a co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute
community between the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the Family
Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in
proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were
prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual
contribution was required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money
and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the
co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share
shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on
forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the exception while
conjugal partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social
institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme
Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escao, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to
prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish
that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of
ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court,
viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for 55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on
January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit
"7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of 97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was
payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan of Atty. Luna.
The third check which was for 49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for
payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for 4,072.00 was dated December
17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for
the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The connection was simply not established. x x x"
SOLEDADs claim that she made a cash contribution of 100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly,
there is no basis for SOLEDADs claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the condominium
unit and the trial court correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole industry of
ATTY. LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty.
Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee
or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The
loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans of Atty.
Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for them fully or
partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES
LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium
57
unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase "married to"
preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA. Respondent. Promulgated:

SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no October 5, 2005
participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove
that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law office
amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who x--------------------------------------------------x
bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than
embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed. 30

The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were DECISION
substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo
them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden
of proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence, 31 did not serve the purpose. QUISUMBING, J.:
In contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the
presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort
remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their
conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the
25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to
the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna. Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS
as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

8 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154380

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on
Petitioner,

this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.

Present:

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May 15,

Davide, Jr., C.J.,

2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
- versus - (Chairman),
its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had
Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago, declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the

Carpio, and
impugned Decision reads:
Azcuna, JJ.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of
the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by
58
 his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE[4]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a

Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for

daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. annulment or for legal separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs

respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few

determination.[6]
years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce

when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live

likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. [7]
at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph

constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court

Court provides:
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
RULE 63

sought reconsideration but it was denied. DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

59
 Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2)
the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking
the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between
two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing
the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen,
insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest
in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when
respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the
case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first
place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order
No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
60
 On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien

the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the

remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings [9] on the Family Code, the Catholic
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
Article 26:
naturalization?
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose
spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are
divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners
who validly divorce them abroad can. The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce

even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The
divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced
here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The
into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign

spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Legislative Intent

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
61
the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the

naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse

allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the capacitating the latter to remarry.

marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a

of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene
valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the

the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly,

disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases
the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.

not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.[12]
Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino

Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer
spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would

married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the

contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated

Article 26 as follows: Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a

Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating

him or her to remarry. concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one

who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.[13]
62
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The

naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolutiondated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court

our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[14] Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts
No pronouncement as to costs.
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and

proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife SO ORDERED.

10 GERBERT R. CORPUZ, G.R. No. 186571

to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to Petitioner,
Present:

declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
BERSAMIN,
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
- versus - *ABAD, and

been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on

record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was
Promulgated:

naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, August 11, 2010

DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR

that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon GENERAL,

Respondents. -- -
respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

63
 DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.[3] On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to
the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his
wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and
filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January
8, 2006.[5]
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to
love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office
(NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine
law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.[6]
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned,
Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation
to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file
a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,
requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse
can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, [8] in order for
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III;[10] the provision was enacted to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
64
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the

Filipino spouse.[11] The alien spouse can claim no

right under the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code as
the substantive right it establishes
is in favor of the Filipino spouse
THE PETITION

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief,

similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the

second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void [15] and

second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or

the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,

in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.[17] Our family

he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.[18]

considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and
there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the
an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry
Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,[14] both
present wording, as follows:
support Gerberts position.

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition

of a foreign divorce decree.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
THE COURTS RULING validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
65
 paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as

basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into
alien spouse.
the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases,

the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts

divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited
divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn
to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the
v. Romillo that:
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to

contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be
the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity
considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged are generally governed by his national law.[26]
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the
alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. [22]
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the

provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this

situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a provision.

divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.[23] The legislative intent is for the benefit of the

Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce

decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the
The foreign divorce decree is
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered presumptive evidence of a right
that clothes the party with legal
as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of Article 26 interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction
of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding

instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no

significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the

marital bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is

66
not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of
legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign
divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing,
the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of
the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person,
the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors
in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an
alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law.[27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice
Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.[28] This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. [29] The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof,
either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as
well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,[30] but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition
67
for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to on the mere presentation of the decree.[34] We consider the recording to be legally improper;

the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status

interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry of

petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and

judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature,

jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being

state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is married or not.[35]

made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata[32] between the

parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. [33]

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal

capacity and status that must be recorded.In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of

divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:

spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Code provides. (a) births;

(b) deaths;

Considerations beyond the (c) marriages;

recognition of the foreign divorce
(d) annulments of marriages;
decree

(e) divorces;
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
(f) legitimations;
has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based
(g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

68
 (i) naturalization; and
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
(j) changes of name.
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,[36] and Department of Justice Opinion No.

181, series of 1982[37] both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine

xxxx court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it,

nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the

foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in
their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the produce any legal effect.
proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may

extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages. contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and

naturalization register. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or

corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by

specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be

judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The
cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that
law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil
before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet
registry is located;[38] that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be
exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally
made parties to the proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert
newspaper of general circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in
and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule

108 of the Rules of Court.

69

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition
of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the
foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October
30, 2008 decision of the RegionalTrial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
11 MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON
CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City,
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of
law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to
file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2)
that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles
35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The RTC cited the following
70
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC): between Marinay and Maekara.

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred"
when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may
be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
by the husband or the wife.
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." 20Moreover, petitioner alleged
xxxx that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its
the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays
the petitioner. x x x for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal,
i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,]
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or
it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x." 24
the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void,
and not Fujiki.
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza emphasized
SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the
[for correction of entry] x x x."27
petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts. 12 petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was
not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted
the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay
be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd and Maekara
because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of
course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and
therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of
a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules
of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement that the
3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code. 16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which
"marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC sought (among
this Court explained:
71
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during
the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had
already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a
reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is
protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object
of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in
the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by
Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a persons legal capacity and status x x
x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and
should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which declared that
"[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-
Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or
wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may
be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and
contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the
setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will
litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every
judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on
his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the
Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require,
for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
72
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a
person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment
or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a
foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to
capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the State pursuant
to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death
or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General,
in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." 67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis
supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances 68) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the
moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouses right in
a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase,
or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any
case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question
the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a)
states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties
in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the
wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the
civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on
the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil
aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured
party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior
spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and
the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden
to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to
declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is
73
effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for
entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry. divorce.

III. The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results
from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose
laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction
extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing
this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91
Marinay and Maekara.

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment
citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The
nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The
principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws
for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC will be discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds
for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation,
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under
have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil
of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as
registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has
the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural criminal prosecution for bigamy.
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.
8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect
one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
of the foreign court.
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to
the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this
with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The
parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
74
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public 12 G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
records in the Philippines.1wphi1
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice vs.
to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability
under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent
from the Philippine archipelago."
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2
March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 DECISION
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition
for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

SO ORDERED.
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12,
1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in
SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was
the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708
which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent
was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the

75
decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and
son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at 30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further
claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress
of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking
the dismissal 10of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the
two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised
the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove
that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family
Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of
the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It
ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition
and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and
academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S.
Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date,
Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The
case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers
on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995,
Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion
for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on
June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held
that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province
of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It
also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and
did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimos legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said
motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the
records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to
the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for
letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved
by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a
subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment
of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view sweeping
statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic
policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the
law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law.
The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino
divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage
between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute
the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
76
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the
Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was
granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition
for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person
can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it
was performed during the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that
paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and
ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of
Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has
legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at
the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal
rule for determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as
the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis
supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say,
there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the
time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5,
1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August
to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang
Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by
the deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards 49 stating that
his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa
was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to
rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife,
which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the
properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
77
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either.
A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly
was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
considered still marriedto private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter x x x x
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not Legislative Intent
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.54 (Emphasis added)
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2
of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee,
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance
of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in
effect.
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between precedent.1awphi1.net
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of
treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59In Garcia v.
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital
bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under
Brief Historical Background Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in the
cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if
the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:

78
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent.
An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is
to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to
apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are
apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
"where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and
the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well
as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments.
It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity
and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we
find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration,
as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and
direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in
the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to
prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may
be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired
through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to
the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as
husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that
even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect,
Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership
of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential.
xxx
79
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings 13 A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842 February 24, 2014
or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent [Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2491-MTJ]
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponents defense. x x x 81
REX M. TUPAL, Complainant,
vs.
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City,
letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co- Negros Occidental, Respondent.
owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
RESOLUTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming
the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss
LEONEN, J.:
and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is
AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage
they will solemnize.
SO ORDERED.

Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint against Judge Remegio V.
Rojo for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law. 1

Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental. Judge Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He
instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation2 and issued them to the contracting parties. 3 He
notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties marriage. 4 These "package marriages" are
allegedly common in Bacolod City.5

Rex annexed to his complaint-affidavit nine affidavits of cohabitation all notarized by Judge Rojo. All
affidavits were notarized on the day of the contracting parties marriages. 6 The affidavits contained
the following jurat:

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this [date] at Bacolod City, Philippines.

(sgd.)
HON. REMEGIO V. ROJO
Judge7

For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized, Judge Rojo
allegedly violated Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990.8 Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal
trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with
their official functions and duties. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a
judges official functions and duties as solemnizing officer.9 Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex
officio affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized.

Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Judge Rojo
notarized affidavits of cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits. He also did not
require the parties to present their competent pieces of evidence of identity as required by law.

These omissions allegedly constituted gross ignorance of the law as notarial rules "[are] x x x simple
and elementary to ignore."10

80
Judge Rojo commented on the complaint.11 He argued that Rex was only harassing him. Rex is the
father of Frialyn Tupal. Frialyn has a pending perjury case in Branch 5 for allegedly making false
statements in her affidavit of cohabitation. Rex only filed a complaint against Judge Rojo to delay
Frialyns case.12
Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation. He argued that notarizing affidavits
of cohabitation was connected with his official functions and duties as a judge. 13 The Guidelines on
the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary 14 does not prohibit judges from
notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize.15 Thus, Judge
Rojo did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is a judge, not
a notary public. Thus, he was not required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he notarized. 16
Also, Judge Rojo argued that he need not notarize the affidavits with the parties presenting their
competent pieces of evidence of identity. Since he interviewed the parties as to the contents of their
affidavits, he personally knew them to be the same persons who executed the affidavit.17 The
parties identities are "unquestionable."18
Judge Rojo alleged that other judges in Bacolod City and Talisay City also notarized affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriage they solemnized. 19 He pleaded "not to make him
[complainant Tupals] doormat, punching bag and chopping block"20 since other judges also
notarized affidavits of cohabitation.
In its report dated July 30, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Rojo violated
Circular No. 1-90. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Rojo be fined
9,000.00 and sternly warned that repeating the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
The Office of the Court Administrator ruled that affidavits of cohabitation are documents not
connected with municipal trial court judges official functions and duties. Under the Guidelines on
the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, 21 a judges duty is to personally
examine the allegations in the affidavit of cohabitation before performing the marriage
ceremony.22 Nothing in the Guidelines authorizes judges to notarize affidavits of cohabitation of
parties whose marriage they will solemnize.
Since Judge Rojo notarized without authority nine affidavits of cohabitation, the Office of the Court
Administrator recommended a fine of 1,000.00 per affidavit of cohabitation notarized. 23
The issue is whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross
ignorance of the law.
This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross
ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public. However,
they may do so only in their ex officio capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and other
conveyances only in the exercise of their official functions and duties. Circular No. 1-90 dated
February 26, 1990 provides:
Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judges are empowered to
perform the function of notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as
amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised
Administrative Code. But the Court hereby lays down the following qualifications on the scope of
this power:
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of documents
connected only with the exercise of their official functions and duties x x x. They may not, as
notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents,
contracts and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the performance of their
functions as judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their
extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties, but also
prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).
They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their
courts territorial jurisdiction. They must certify as to the lack of lawyers or notaries public when
notarizing documents ex officio:
However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities which have
neither lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or
circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in the capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform
any act within the competency of a regular notary public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged
be for the account of the Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer (Lapena, Jr. vs.
Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and, (2) certification be made in
the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or
circuit.24
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the
exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of
cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his courts territorial
jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview the contracting
parties and examine the requirements they submitted.25 The parties must have complied with all the
essential and formal requisites of marriage. Among these formal requisites is a marriage license. 26
A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications and
none of the legal disqualifications to contract marriage. 27 Before performing the marriage ceremony,
the judge must personally examine the marriage license presented.28
If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no
legal impediment to marry, they are exempt from the marriage license requirement. 29 Instead, the
parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths.30 The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of
cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
the absence of any legal impediment to marry each other.31 The judge must also execute a sworn
statement that he personally ascertained the parties qualifications to marry and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.32 Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:
81
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
Section 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary also
provides:
Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the solemnization of the marriage in legal
ratification of cohabitation. In the case of a marriage effecting legal ratification of cohabitation,
the solemnizing officer shall (a) personally interview the contracting parties to determine their
qualifications to marry; (b) personally examine the affidavit of the contracting parties as to the fact
of having lived together as husband and wife for at least five [5] years and the absence of any legal
impediments to marry each other; and (c) execute a sworn statement showing compliance with (a)
and (b) and that the solemnizing officer found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary,
the person who notarizes the contracting parties affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who
will solemnize the parties marriage.
As a solemnizing officer, the judges only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine
whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to
marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties affidavit of
cohabitation.
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judges official function and
duty to solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to
examine the parties requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of
cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavits statements before performing
the marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of
cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that he solemnized the marriage despite
the irregularity or false allegation.
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will
solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with their official function and
duty to solemnize marriages.
Judge Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties "on the same day [he
solemnized their marriages]."33 He notarized documents not connected with his official function and
duty to solemnize marriages. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary does not expressly prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation. Thus, he
cannot be prohibited from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation.
To accept Judge Rojos argument will render the solemnizing officers duties to examine the affidavit
of cohabitation and to issue a sworn statement that the requirements have been complied with
redundant. As discussed, a judge cannot objectively examine a document he himself notarized.
Article 34 of the Family Code and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members
of the Judiciary assume that "the person authorized by law to administer oaths" who notarizes the
affidavit of cohabitation and the "solemnizing officer" who performs the marriage ceremony are two
different persons.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90 only prohibits municipal trial court judges from notarizing
"private documents x x x [bearing] no direct relation to the performance of their functions as
judges."34 Since a marriage license is a public document, its "counterpart," the affidavit of
cohabitation, is also a public document. Thus, when he notarizes an affidavit of cohabitation, he
notarizes a public document. He did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until notarized. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document, "[rendering the document] admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity."35 The affidavit of cohabitation, even if it serves a "public purpose,"
remains a private document until notarized.
Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he notarized nine private
documents. As discussed, affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judges official duty to
solemnize marriages. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90s purpose is to "eliminate competition between judges and
private lawyers in transacting legal conveyancing business."36 He cited Borre v. Judge Moya37 where
this court found City Judge Arcilla guilty of violating Circular No. 1-90 for notarizing a deed of sale.
Judge Rojo argued that when he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he did "not compete with
private law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing business." 38 Thus, he
did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
In Borre, Judge Arcilla notarized a deed of sale. This is the context in which this court stated that
"[judges] should not compete with private [lawyers] or regular notaries in transacting legal
conveyancing business."39
At any rate, Circular No. 1-90s purpose is not limited to documents used to transact "legal
conveyancing business." So long as a judge notarizes a document not connected with his official
functions and duties, he violates Circular No. 1-90.
Thus, in Mayor Quiones v. Judge Lopez, Jr.,40 this court fined Judge Lopez for notarizing a certificate
of candidacy. In Ellert v. Judge Galapon, Jr.,41 this court fined Judge Galapon for notarizing the
verification page of an answer filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.
The documents involved in these cases were not used to transact "legal conveyancing business."
Nevertheless, this court found Judge Lopez and Judge Galapon guilty of violating Circular No. 1-90.
Since Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were not connected with his official
function and duty to solemnize marriages, he violated Circular No. 1-90.
Also, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries
public are lacking in Bacolod City. Failure to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in the
municipality or circuit of the judges court constitutes violation of Circular No. 1-90.42
82
That other judges have notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriages they
solemnized does not make the practice legal. Violations of laws are not excused by practice to the
contrary.43
All told, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the
signatory is not personally known to him. Otherwise, the notary public must require the signatory
to present a competent evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. x x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person appearing before the notary public is
the signatory to the instrument or document to be notarized. If the notary public does not
personally know the signatory, he must require the signatory to present a competent evidence of
identity.
In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized, he only stated that the parties
subscribed and swore to their affidavits before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the parties were
personally known to him or that the parties presented their competent pieces of evidence of
identity. Thus, Judge Rojo violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Judge Rojo argued that he personally knew the parties to the affidavits of cohabitation. They
personally appeared before him to subscribe to their affidavits of cohabitation. He also interviewed
them on their qualifications to contract marriage. Thus, the parties to the affidavit of cohabitation
need not present their competent pieces of evidence of identity. 44
That the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and that he interviewed them do not make the parties
personally known to him. The parties are supposed to appear in person to subscribe to their
affidavits. To personally know the parties, the notary public must at least be acquainted with
them.45 Interviewing the contracting parties does not make the parties personally known to the
notary public.
For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice nine times, Judge Rojo is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Rojo argued that he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation in good faith. He cited Santos v.
Judge How46where this court held that "[g]ood faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations x x x"47were defenses against gross ignorance of the law charges. His good
faith in notarizing affidavits of cohabitation should not hold him administratively liable.
However, this court also held in Santos that "good faith in situations of fallible discretion [inheres]
only within the parameters of tolerable judgment x x x."48 Good faith "does not apply where the
issues are so simple and the applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible
margins of error."49
Circular No. 1-90 requires judges to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their
courts territorial jurisdiction before notarizing documents. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
requires notaries public to personally know the signatory to the document they will notarize or
require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity. These are basic legal principles
and procedure Judge Rojo violated. Failure to comply with these basic requirements nine times is
not good faith.
Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct on integrity,50 "[j]udges shall ensure that not only is their
conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer."51 If
the law involved is basic, ignorance constitutes "lack of integrity."52 Violating basic legal principles
and procedure nine times is gross ignorance of the law.
This court may impose the following sanctions for gross ignorance of the law or procedure, it being
a serious charge:53
a. dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations;54
b. suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
not exceeding six (6) months;55 or
c. A fine of more than 20,000.00 but not exceeding 40,000.00.56
This court does not condone violations of law. Judges have been dismissed from the service for
gross ignorance of the law. However, Judge Rojo may have been misled by other judges practice of
notarizing affidavits of cohabitation in Bacolod City and Talisay City. Thus, this court finds
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for six (6) months sufficient sanction.
Trial court judges are advised to strictly comply with the requirements of the law.1wphi1 They
should act with caution with respect to affidavits of cohabitation. Similar breach of the ethical
requirements as in this case will be dealt with strictly.
WHEREFORE, Judge Remegio V. Rojo, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental is SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE without salary and other benefits
for SIX (6) MONTHS. His suspension is effective upon service on him of a copy of this resolution.
SERVE copies of this resolution to all municipal trial courts in Bacolod City and Talisay City.
SO ORDERED.
83
14 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175581 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Petitioner,

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are

- versus - Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and

Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision[1]of the Court of
G.R. No. 179474
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between
JOSE A. DAYOT, Present:
Respondent. Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
x------------------x
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at
Petitioner, Acting Chairperson,
the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.[2] In lieu of a marriage
TINGA,* license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,[3] also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that

CHICO-NAZARIO, both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as

VELASCO,** and husband and wife for at least five years.

REYES, JJ.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint[4] for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
- versus -
Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his
Promulgated:
marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that

he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at

March 28, 2008 least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the
JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent.
same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa

requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent

DECISION to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia.At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from

Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose

84
needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do
so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her
brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and
gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he
had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table
at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his
marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of
their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with
him on account of their age difference.[5] In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual
(Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against
Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating
Board.[6] The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct,
and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument.[7]
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[8] dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence
presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint
does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled
case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].[9]
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses version of the story as
implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any
attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have
already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City
Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the
pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion
that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission,
[Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the
papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to discover that the
pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage
contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to
be taken in for a ride by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by
the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote
[Felisas] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled
up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is
now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the
name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court
does not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his
company I.D. was because he was residing there then.This is just but a lame
excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he
would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she
testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in
the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further
testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the
signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage
contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was
asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was
really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all
the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.[10]
85

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed. It cited
Article 87[11] of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must
be commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud.Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was
obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have
filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible
opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage
contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest
instance. x x x.[12]
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of
Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without
merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it
was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86 [14] of the
Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by
law. The Court of Appeals struck down Joses appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on
Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof
had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that
the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party
was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party
within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years
from the time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was
allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until February,
1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was
only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage
to Felisa.[15]
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to Felisa
was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under
Article 76[16] of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit
of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and
Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the
validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained
therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the
solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the
dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that
he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no
legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument that
neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According
to the Court of Appeals, Article 56[17] of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the
contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers church or religious
sect. The prescription was established only in Article 7[18]of the Family Code which does not govern
the parties marriage.
86

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His
central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a
marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In
particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together
as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the
affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it
rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET
ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot
and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.[19]
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Nial v.
Bayadog,[20] and reasoned that:
court rendered a Resolution[22] dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion.
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they
had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together
for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the
Supreme Court ruled as follows:
(OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of
Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and
x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,
which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-
year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning
no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that
is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use
the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license
unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or
has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known
to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized
without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be
void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is
not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is,
therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.[21]
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
87
that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate
Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate courts Amended
Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of
uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution. [23]
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of
its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE
VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.[24]
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Nial.[25] She
differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing
prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose.Finally, Felisa
adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and
an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the
declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a
considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented
by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the
claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts
ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.[26] To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the
affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It
is the Republics position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity
of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing
officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated
a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five
years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their marriage
was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their
witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition,
88
the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and

Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25

July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that
Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first
Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID
being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those

under Article 75.[28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed

without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. [30] This is
affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code.A survey of the prevailing rules is in order. in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,[31] whereby the absence of a marriage license did not

make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the

Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. [32]

1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their

union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title

III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with: the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular

marriages,[33] (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5)

Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.[34]

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given; The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the

Civil Code, which provides:

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
character. (Emphasis ours.)
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit

89
 before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. [41] For the
took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have
parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband

and wife for at least five years.

The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity

attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but

from legalizing their status.[36] to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies

only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry

each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five

years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a
precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that they have attained the age
language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot
of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other.[37] One of the central issues in
of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting
the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the
parties shall state the requisite facts[42] in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the
administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also
marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the

contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

We answer in the affirmative.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at

the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
celebration of their marriage.[43] The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly [38] but reasonably construed.[39] They
introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
EDSA Revolution.[44] The appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June
general provisions rather than the exception.[40] Where a general rule is established by statute with
1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.[45]

90
 Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same

finds no applicability to the case at bar.Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum
is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[49] Restated more explicitly,
truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.[46] Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
this Courts review.[47] It is already well-settled that:
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.[50] The present case does not

involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986,
on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory
findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such
findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.[48]

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code[51] that every intendment of law or fact

leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from

the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and
requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation

of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent

and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the
license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.[52] The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as
were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
well.[53] To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must
license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should
be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the

requirement of a marriage license.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage

under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a

91
marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.[56] Jose and Felisas

five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it

of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be

all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and raised any time.

Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement

for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law

precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year
the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from
as if there was no affidavit at all. the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the

absence of a marriage.[57] It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage,

characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on - and continuity that is unbroken.[58]

equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby

profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no

room for application where there is a law.[54] There is a law on the ratification of marital WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals,

cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa
authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No
to their criminal liability.[55] costs.

SO ORDERED.
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped

from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and

Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina

Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of

nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

92
15 G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No.
69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and
(2) that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a
competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus
they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September
1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in
sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license
had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites.
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes
and did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the
childs birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist
and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to
petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her
"as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab
initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon
by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible
administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental
advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as
husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it
declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the
child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be
subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the
child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and
filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with
respondent, saying that petitioners "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of
his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the
affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the
legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the
trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same
case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it
that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for
declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests
upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in
the instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the
obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and
voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent. 7 The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the
legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13
March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a
competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of
Appeals.9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent
because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated
without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license,
contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as
husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the
absence of a marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the
appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support
and not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case,
petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage
since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for support. Citing several
authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus,
there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same
evidence and parties would be presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be
time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden of the courts. 12 Finally, petitioner
claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the
childs paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his
legitimate child.
93
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition. 13
In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the
finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate
court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only
be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the
filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony,
petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters.
Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly
objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation. 15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the
trial court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for
support. Citing the case of Nial v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a
marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence
of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court
showed that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage
license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court
correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid. 17 In addition, the
OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and
thus entitled to support.18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support
and second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an
affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. 24 However, respondent
herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination,
thus
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and
wife for the last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for
a marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact,
there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so
they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.
They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a
marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter, and therefore
the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
entitled to support.
attacked.19 Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, we held:

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare
evidence as legitimate children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of
a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
the Rules of Court and special laws.28
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of
Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of the child, thus stating:
remarriage.20
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on
Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Paraaque, Metro Manila; 30
to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits.
Reiterating Nial, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to
prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.22 That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only
by the testimony of the latter, but also by respondents own admission in the course of his

94
 testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they 16 G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015
were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latters house or clinic. At times, they
would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While
respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the
pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and DECISION
"C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2"
and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is
SERENO, C.J.:
seen putting the wedding ring on petitioners finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-
1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner.31
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232 2 convicting her of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch
bigamy.
70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.

THE FACTS
SO ORDERED.
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and
Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded not guilty, while her
putative husband escaped the criminal suit.5redarclaw

The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June
1974,6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow then, married
Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she
wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was without responsibility.7redarclaw

Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime
of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married.
She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be
proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the
lack of a marriage license.

Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which
occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation
and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already
married Santos.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of
his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the
affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was
incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos. 8redarclaw

The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, her marriage was celebrated
without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an
admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage. 9 Thus, the
trial court convicted petitioner as follows:10redarclaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised
95
Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.
Prision Correctional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
No pronouncement as to costs.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which proceedings.
provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her In Montaez v. Cipriano,15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as
case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for five follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively
rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11redarclaw has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements,
celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court can not do.
The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno,
of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these Jr.16 instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v.
proceedings. Archilla17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouses existing
prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes
THE CA RULING her responsible as an accomplice.

On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond The Ruling of the Court
reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known
of the previous marriage of Santos. The penalty for bigamy and petitioners
knowledge of Santoss first marriage
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses narration. It likewise
disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each
stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question. other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained
Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12redarclaw in Nepomuceno:18redarclaw

THE ISSUES ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because
she was not aware of Santoss previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt.
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on
the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved
marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis
supplied)

Citing People v. De Lara,13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioners knowledge of Santoss marriage to
a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality
exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as of the following circumstances:19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house
husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records that she married of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned
Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the five-year person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible
requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void. witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly
testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of
In the Comment14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the Santos.
argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her
husbands subsequent marriage. As regards petitioners denial of any knowledge of Santoss first After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of
marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the the RTC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial

96
courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained
opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.
trial.20redarclaw
Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a marriage
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was license had they cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years before their
validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts imposition of the marriage.31redarclaw
principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty
within the range of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum. Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February
199632 and that after six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla21 holds that the second spouse, if objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in
indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was
Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that a person, whether man or woman, who residing in the house of her in-laws,34and her children from her previous marriage disliked
knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as him.35 On cross-examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in
an accomplice in the crime of bigamy.22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets. 36redarclaw
accomplice to the crime.
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the five years prior to their marriage.
criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the
penalty next lower in degree,23prision correccional, which has a duration of six months and one day Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the
to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the
imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented
two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 24 petitioner shall be that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other.
entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage,37 in which the
has a duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment. solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage
was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The criminal liability of petitioner
resulting from her marriage to The legal effects in a criminal case
Santos of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the
marriage
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an
evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26 In this case, petitioner has anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions
consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the
celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.28redarclaw cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage
contract.
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not
pass judgment on the validity of the marriage. The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an
her union with Santos was in vain. effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts,29 and given between spouses.38In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the
that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now resolves to States penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals to
correct the error of the courts a quo. deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place promise of futurity and commitment.
without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their
Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioners illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in
Code. The provision reads as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of
the sanctity of marriage.40redarclaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will lend its aid to x x x one who has
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized founded.41If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a

97
transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42As a result, litigants The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails
shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or the Order,1 dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43redarclaw Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its Order,2 dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating
respondents' Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of
bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad
license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated
Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their
and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.3 They begot seven children, herein
marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while
respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd. 4 On 1
knowing fully well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement
May 2004, Trinidad died.5On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal
under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to
Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.6 Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away. 7
allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.

The applicability of People v. De Lara In impugning petitioner's marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered into
without the requisite marriage license. They argued that Article 348 of the Family Code, which
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five years without any legal
ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because
that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local they could not have lived together under the circumstances required by said provision. Respondents
Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter's death, or on 1
was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner.
bigamy. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract ceremony due to Eulogio's serious illness which made its performance impossible.
a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage,
and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore,
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under
unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as
one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a
innocent of the crime.
marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed
Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further contended that the
No less than the present Constitution provides that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 45 It must be safeguarded from the
Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground
whims and caprices of the contracting parties.46|||In keeping therefore with this fundamental policy,
that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of
this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy.
marriage.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago
is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,9 granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,10 dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated on its position in the following manner:
the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision
correccional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
The Complaint should be dismissed.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which took effect on
March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a)11 that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
[G.R. NO. 173614 : September 28, 2007]
a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The language of this rule is plain and
simple which states that such a petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The rule is
LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD clear and unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the petition for Declaration of
CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO, Respondents. Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of this Court is that the right to bring such petition
is exclusive and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse
cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the marriage null and
DECISION
void.12 (Emphasis supplied.)

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:

98
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the answer is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs de
officio.13
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by petitioner of her
Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an Order14 dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of
11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed
Order ignored the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog,15 which was on the authority for holding that the
heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the
latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife,
applies only where both parties to a void marriage are still living.16 Where one or both parties are
deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage void. The RTC
expounded on its stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Nial v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in
which the Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a deceased person may file a petition
for the declaration of his marriage after his death. The Order subject of this motion for
reconsideration held that the case of Nial v. Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the
Supreme Court has rejected the case of Nial v. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void
Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the only parties
allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage and such right is purely personal
and is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Nial v. Bayadog and Section
2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Nial v. Bayadog and the
Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to determine [the] basic rights of the parties. The rights of the
legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced particularly with
respect to their successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an
inchoate right over the property of the said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it
would be proper that it should solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a petition to
declare his marriage void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have already a vested
right over whatever property left by the parent. Such vested right should not be frustrated by any
rules of procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by substantive
law. The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their parent, especially
when the marriage is illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such union because
the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for the annulment of the marriage. Such void
marriage will be given a semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the petition after
the death of the parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage is applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon the death
of anyone of the guilty party to the void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the (sic)
marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband or the wife. It shall be
the ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable.17
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated October 31, 2005
and reinstate this case.18
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order; however, on 1 June
2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the ground that no new matter was raised therein. 19
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the sole question
of whether the case law as embodied in Nial, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the
Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court, countenancing the
hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs
of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking a direct recourse
to this Court.20 Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court
of last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the competence of the
Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of courts. 21 However,
it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate
exercise of its jurisdiction.22 Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition for
its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the
case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A contrario, respondents
posit that it is Nial which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased person were granted
the right to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents' Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their father's marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father,
we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Nial recognized that the
applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code,
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.23 What we have before us belongs to a
different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity
of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner's marriage to Eulogio was celebrated
in 2004.rbl r l l lbrr
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:
99
Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends
only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3
August 1988.24
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to
reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Nial, because they vary in
scope and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to
Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC.
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect
their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional
Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses,
not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity
of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the latter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which
provides:

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.'

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)

There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the language of
the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the
sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage.

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the
following manner, viz:

1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory
or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse
filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and
not to seek its dissolution.25 (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for
respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
100
[G.R. NO. 179922 : December 16, 2008]
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, Petitioner, v. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA.
DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and
TEOFILO CARLOS II, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the
effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and
annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which reversed and set aside the summary judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of
money, and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly
described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land
Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang,
Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four
Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd. project),
being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd - Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of
Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by
Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road
widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS,
more or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa
Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6
by Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing
an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la
parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts.
Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on
el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial
de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la
parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts.
Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on
el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial
de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.3
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was
made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and
turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo.
These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and
TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son,
Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of
respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by
TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
101
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval
of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their
respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes
the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the
remaining land of the first parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of
land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was
later divided between petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17,
1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise
agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts,
the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against
respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of
marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money
and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He
likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad
with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of
title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of
title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of
petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite
marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that
Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment.
Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage.
Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate,
the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of
irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own
motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of
Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of
respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384,
entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her testimony, respondent
Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.5
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report
and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted
and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at
Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null
and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally
adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together
with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the portion
adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds
of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another title in
the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null
and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of
Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null
and void;
102
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and defendant
minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the
exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and defendant
Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the
sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7,
1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.6
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the
trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the
marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo,
Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu
thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo contrary to law
and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first
sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee.
Not being an action "to recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on
summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue
was presented and the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a
misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly
prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically
amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have traditionally been
applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death
of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact,
however, that appellee's own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband
and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the
latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for a closer
and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary
nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect that the
material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section
1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved." (Underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case
at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still
not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is among the
formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the
marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and
appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside
from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the
existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit
executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to
wit:
"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14,
1962 as basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but
the number of said marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the
reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn,
may have overlooked the same."
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view that the
veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the same
should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage - is not proof
that a marriage did not take place, neither should appellants' non-presentation of the subject
marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy of a
particular party, the same may be said of the trial court's rejection of the relationship between
appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant
Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims
regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the
illegitimate son of appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the
said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement
to inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's bare allegation
that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could well be a minor's total
forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her
previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation
of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight
years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his
household. The least that the trial court could have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on
103
the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant
Teofilo Carlos II.8
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente,
Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof,
and in denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with
respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of
Appeals committed a grave reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code,
despite the fact that the circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and
intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of this Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another
remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully
submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule
19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of
Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another
remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully
submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial
admissions, made findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise
committed misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the facts.9(Underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab
initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a
trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in
bringing the action for nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 1910 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary
judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on
judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the
provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case
at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still
not be warranted. x x x11
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in
reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of summary
judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been
stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on
March 15, 200312 is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation
of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of
the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.
(Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We
excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of its
nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of
actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty
to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the
public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. 15
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney
to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that
there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the
104
public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court
is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the
State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that
the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence. 16
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party
outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages
or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse
filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and
not to seek its dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving,
peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of
marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the
directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide
when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends
only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August
3, 1988.18
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of
the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the
surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their
successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate
heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. 19
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March
15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the
new Rule which became effective on March 15, 200320 is prospective in its application. Thus, the
Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines, and is prospective in its application.22(Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The
marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon
when the marriage took place.23
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law
is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. 24But the Civil Code is silent
as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can
bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?cra lawlibrary
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a
license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.26
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected
by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the
case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.27
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held:
105
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married,
or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same.
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
x x x
In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a
remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine
whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which
granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral
damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00.
On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to
remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the
ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the
same.29 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-
interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving
compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession,
successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory
heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.30
Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and
Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code. 31
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral
relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to
succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to
the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral
relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives. 32 Conversely,
if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. 33
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of
his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like
a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and
without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but
petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half
being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a
real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds
to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage
case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or
illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner
has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent
Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence, does
not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void from
the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant,
illegitimate,34 or even an adopted child35excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the
decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or
nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the
nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is
a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of
petitioner.
106
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper No costs.
and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of
action before it.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case
G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010
concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave the
matter hanging in limbo.
ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner,
vs.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case. 36

DECISION
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case,
petitioner's bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is
insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We are BERSAMIN, J.:
not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the
illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of
court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA
his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the legal issue to be
of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a
determined in this appeal brought by the petitioner whose action for that purpose has been
child, to wit:
dismissed by the lower courts on the ground that he, not being a party in the assailed marriage, had
no right to bring the action.
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring
Antecedents
supplied)cralawlibrary

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949
is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An
between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.1 The case was docketed as Special
assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child
Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano
born or conceived within a valid marriage.37
Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning
reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said
disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and
void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and
filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between respondent
Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby
rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He
insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled
him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him
a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the
marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to
the marriage being void ab initio.2
Ruling of the RTC

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late
Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for lack
of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this
case priority in its calendar.
On October 18, 2000, 3 the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:
Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved to DISMISS the
petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had long prescribed) and 2)
petitioner is not a party to the marriage (contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila
Nonato on December 26, 1949 and solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).
SO ORDERED.

107
The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion for WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R.
reconsideration on November 14, 2000. CV NO. 69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209 AND
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to
seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that:

Ruling
The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the petitioner is
not a party to the marriage.
The petition is meritorious.
In its decision dated January 30, 2003,4 however, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC,
thus: A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to
the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the
requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force
While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does not
at the time the marriage is contracted.6 As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already
prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the proper party,
celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. 7 To illustrate, a
which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. In the instant case, the
marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore
petition was filed by Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse, who is not a party to the
prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect
marriage contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The contention of petitioner-
the void nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime
appellant that he is considered a real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
of the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is
Civil Procedure, as he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply
governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.8
misplaced. Actions for annulment of marriage will not prosper if persons other than those specified
in the law file the case.
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative
Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the subject
Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.
petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a
party to said case.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal are hereby
limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.
those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.9 Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends
only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a
SO ORDERED.5 procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after
March 15, 2003.10
Hence, this appeal.
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,11 the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage
are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
Issues

1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC;
The petitioner raises the following issues:
and

I.
2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and,
those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R.
CV. NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26,
BRANCH 49 AT CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN
1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the
ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE;
marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to
initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had
II. absolutely no application to the petitioner.

108
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog,12 the children were allowed to file after the
death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their fathers marriage to their
stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the Court
distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and when each might
be impugned, thuswise:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to
their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned,
it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far
as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken
place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil
court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the
husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot
be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so
that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and
such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the
law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the
ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or
a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.13
It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be
construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a
marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval,14 the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be
benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law
that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. 15 Thus,
only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action. 16Interest within the
meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere
incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is
dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.17
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving heir.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the
estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother
like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to
succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article
1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to
the other half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of
the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceaseds
estate.18 Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior
determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or
illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresencianos surviving heir. Such prior
determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this case. We
reverse their error, in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresencianos
surviving wife,19stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is
relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required
a marriage license for their validity;20 hence, her participation in this action is made all the more
necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage
license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a
marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein:
xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power.1avvphi1 It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court [that] the action
should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.21
We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025
entitled Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro
and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were the legal owners of the
property involved therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was decided on November 26, 2009,
and the petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on June 23, 2010. As a defendant in that
action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila
and Leila, were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was
another indispensable party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely
affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.
109
The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action, however,
considering that Section 11,22 Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder
of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory
pleading in order to implead her, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead an
indispensable party may be made "on motion of any party or on (the trial courts) own initiative at
any stage of the action and on such terms as are just."
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.
We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals.
Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are
returned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings, with
instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead
Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants; then to determine
whether the late Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants, descendants, or children (legitimate or
illegitimate) at the time of his death as well as whether the petitioner was the brother and surviving
heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to succeed to the estate of said deceased; and thereafter
to proceed accordingly.
No costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of the
December 10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari under
Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as CA-
G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage between petitioner and
respondent final and executory.
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as
JDRC No. 6211.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2,
2006, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S.
BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under
Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copy of
this decision.
SO ORDERED.2
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of
Appeal on September 11, 2006.
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilos failure
to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilos appeal was likewise denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and
executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul
the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to Danilos
appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the September 19,
2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decision as final
and executory. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the
essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the
family home and their children.
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the
RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took
effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli 3 to the effect that the
"coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with Motion for Extension of
Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable
Courts Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, in its February 11, 2009
Resolution,4 denied the motion for extension of time considering that the 15-day reglementary
period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997
Rules on Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion for partial
reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following
110
ISSUES
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED
DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS.
MEDINACELI IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE
FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE
COURT IS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS.
MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE
FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO THE WORD "PETITIONS"
RATHER THAN TO THE WORD "MARRIAGES."
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON
DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS
A PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY HEREIN RESPONDENT.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A
PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS NOT
PROPER IN HIS CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED
FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THIS CASE.
III
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE
AND THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW
OF THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION IS
MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5
From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved is whether or not
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its decision to
an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even involve a marriage solemnized
before the effectivity of the Family Code.
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case constituted a
decision on its merits, still the same cannot be applied because of the substantial disparity in the
factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to be
declared null were solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the effectivity
of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage was
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was
filed and decided after the effectivity of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage
with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity. He further stresses
the meritorious nature of his appeal from the decision of the RTC declaring their marriage as null
and void due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere "failure" of the parties
who were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render marital obligations as required
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its
scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends
only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code
and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation that the phrase "under the
Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word
"marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for
application.9 As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning
rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of
intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a
statute there should be no departure."10
There is no basis for petitioners assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty
and importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules
in her favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully
complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial
merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain
111
proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their
promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory. 12 preservation is not the concern alone of the family members. 17

The appellate court was correct in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
for reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion for
reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
SO ORDERED.
Revenue, 13

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, G.R. No. 169766

The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible.
Petitioner,
The Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the
Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil
Present:

Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate courts denial of petitioners motion - versus - CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,
for reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioners earlier motion for extension of time VELASCO, JR.,
did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when DEL CASTILLO, and
petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already beyond REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PEREZ, JJ.
the review jurisdiction of this Court. HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD
A. TAMANO, Promulgated:
Respondents. March 30, 2011
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due
x--------------------------------------------------------x
course to respondents appeal and denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration.
DECISION

Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a final DEL CASTILLO, J.:
judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a
party of his right to appeal.14 In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the
Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage laws, no
essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a married couple.
party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision[1] dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits
of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage. Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution[2] dated September 13, 2005, which

No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. This affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita
constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and
inviolability, thus: Juliano-Llaves (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of
the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the Factual Antecedents
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.16
laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City[3] and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in
which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid and

112
RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.[4] In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status rites, as had been averred in the latters disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano.[12] Estrellita argued that the

was indicated as divorced. RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the

Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim

Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamanos wife, and marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts.

upon his death, his widow.

The trial court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son nullity.[13] Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with this Court questioning the denial of her

Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos legitimate children Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA[14] which was docketed thereat as

with Zorayda,[5] filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.

Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint[6] alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married

Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since there can be no

in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that: default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was

allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented their evidence. When it was Estrellitas
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been
celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on Article turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such purpose[15] were postponed mostly at her instance until the
35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal
with Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted the same while his prior trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings[16] in view of the CAs temporary restraining order
marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being declared as
divorced has no factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced Complainant issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing the case.[17]
Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so because divorce is not
allowed under the New Civil Code;

11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated
Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the
September 30, 1996.[18] Estrellita then elevated the appellate courts judgment to this Court by way of a petition
Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased
with Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one
for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.[19]
contracted under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they
(deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus
covered by this law;[7]
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her

evidence on June 26, 1997.[20] As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to July 9,
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the court for an
1997.[21] The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a postponement.[22]
extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4, 1995,[8] and again, another 15 days[9] or until

February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted.[10]

Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case

for decision,[23] reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss[11] on February 20,
she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.[24]
1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the Muslim
113
 In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,[32] the CA held that Estrellita can no

On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City,[25] stating as one of the longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be heard but simply ignored it by

reasons that as sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of marriages asking for numerous postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse of around 60 days, a period

celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, is not precluded longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition

from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated August 24, 1998,[26] we denied Estrellitas for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an independent and original action, it does not interrupt the

motion for reconsideration[27] with finality. proceedings in the trial court.

A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the aforementioned As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano is

judgment declaring Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.[28] void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is governed by the

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first nuptial celebration was under

civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had

The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen. the legal standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamanos wife and, hence, the injured party in the senators

Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being bigamous under Article 35 of the Family subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.

Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.[29] The court said:

In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,[33] the CA denied Estrellitas Motion for
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second
marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the additional errors she
his first marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the
very beginning. The fact that the late Senator declared his civil status as divorced will not raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public prosecutors report on the existence of collusion in
in any way affect the void character of the second marriage because, in this jurisdiction,
divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an acceptable method of terminating the violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court[34] and Article 48 of the Family Code[35] will not
effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent marriage was
solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.[30] invalidate the trial courts judgment as the proceedings between the parties had been adversarial, negating the

Ruling of the Court of Appeals existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been joined before the RTC, the same is attributable to

Estrellitas refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellitas allegation that the trial court erroneously
In her appeal,[31] Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as
rendered its judgment way prior to our remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No.
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R.
126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity of
No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her to file her answer after the denial of her motion
Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano.
to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry her as his marriage and subsequent divorce

with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zoraydas lack of legal standing to question
The Parties Respective Arguments
the validity of her marriage to the deceased.

114
 Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol Gen says that

upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity to file an this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit that obviously shows the

answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the validity of her marriage. She claims lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents legal standing to challenge the validity of

that Judge Macias v. Macias[36] laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer Estrellitas purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any proper interested party may attack directly

suspends the period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to suspend proceedings while or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right to file the action as they are the ones

her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains prejudiced by the marital union.

that she merely participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial courts assurance that the proceedings will be

without prejudice to whatever action the High Court will take on her petition questioning the RTCs jurisdiction Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.

and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months Issues

before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.[37] She also questions the

lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite The issues that must be resolved are the following:

before further proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration of nullity

of marriage. 1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts judgment, even though the latter was rendered

prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting for the Supreme Courts final resolution of

Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as the latter was her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due process;

already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts that such law automatically and c) the public prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;

applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their consent to be covered by it,
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous; and
as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen.

Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased.[38] 3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellitas marriage declared void ab

initio.

Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because only the Our Ruling

husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme Court
Estrellitas refusal to file an answer
Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.[39] eventually led to the loss of her right to
answer; and her pending petition for
certiorari/review on certiorari questioning
the denial of the motion to dismiss before
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CAs reasoning and stresses that the higher courts does not at all suspend
the trial proceedings of the principal suit
Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an original action for certiorari does not stay before the RTC of Quezon City.
the proceedings of the main action before the RTC.

115
 Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. She was never
declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias[40] to justify the suspension of the period to file an answer
and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the denial of her
Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the following reasoning of the CA
which, apparently, is Estrellitas basis for her argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to Dismiss, instead of filing
an Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her
to file her Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the
Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to suspend the
hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its
Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the
period provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days
computed from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within
which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x x[41] (Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial court is
mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it. Nothing in the above
excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should the issue of the propriety or impropriety
of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due
process in the course of the proceeding of the case because after it denied the wifes motion to dismiss, it
immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue
haste even when, under the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case,
Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended period
earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for extension of time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first for
the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this Court. However, in upholding
the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certioraridoes not suspend the proceedings
before the trial court. An application for certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a continuation of
the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of.[42] Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit
in stating that [t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding
in the case.[43] In fact, the trial court respected the CAs temporary restraining order and only after the CA rendered
judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any order
precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous requests for
postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence when it was
her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to
file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable only to herself and she should not be
allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the trial
court correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her
right to present her side of the story. Neither should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to
become final and executory, nor should it wait for its records to be remanded back to it because G.R. No. 126603
involves strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC)[44] also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. It specifically
mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to determine whether there is collusion between the
parties:
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within one month after
receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public
prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion
and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis
thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of
116
 collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the
report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the
petition.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set
the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at divorce under PD 1083,[52] the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit
the pre-trial.
Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to marriage and divorce wherein both parties

are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the required
Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that Article 13 of
report,[45] which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua
PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.[53]
in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,[46] wherein he attested that there could be no collusion between the

parties and no fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private respondents.
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively

override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there is a lack of
former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise provided:
report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v. Court of

Appeals,[47] the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and
legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the
parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion
existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was
suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are
convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion
between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial
court.[48]
The Civil Code governs the marriage of
Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD
1083. Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage
to Estrellita is void ab initio.
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts executed prior to the effectivity of
this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing
herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or
operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws
operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and
unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be
resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the
general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and
implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil
Code in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Codes enactment.[54]
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in
accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim
civil and Muslim rites.[49] The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non- law provided the spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.

Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given

time.[50] Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered as one

Republic Act No. 394[51] which was not availed of during its effectivity. contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still

117
 compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file
the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate
we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at the time of the rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the
celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other
married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio. hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to
seek its dissolution.[57]
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties,
have the legal personalities to file the
declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the
husband or the wife the filing of a petition aggrieved or injured spouse. If Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from
for nullity is prospective in application and
does not shut out the prior spouse from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.
filing suit if the ground is a bigamous
subsequent marriage.

Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines,[55] Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10- The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during

SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section 2(a)[56] thereof, only the husband or the wife, the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished.

to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they

Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage. would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the injured spouse who should

be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as

Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage

declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a

bigamy. reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the

Constitution.

In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the exclusion

of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said: Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the subsequent

marriage. But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in
Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
application and does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003.[58]
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file
petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages.Such petitions cannot be filed
by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage in November
State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a
petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
118

has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.[59] Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has
property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had
filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.[60]
Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in a way
that would preserve their respective rights which include striking down bigamous marriages. We thus find the
CA Decision correctly rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued on September 13, 2005, are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No.
86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008,
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of
a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his
marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued
at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this
information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in
1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. 4 He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at
his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law
arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony,
one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know
that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go
to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July
of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage
license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license
number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the
marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another
marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads
as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No.
9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on
January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA
F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it
may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and
2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on
whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel. 8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was
issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993. 9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers
are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and
119
signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19,
1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely
9969967, to any other person.11
solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their
residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria
Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay
captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she
he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on
did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who
January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and
celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.31
Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is
familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the
marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by The Ruling of the RTC
his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by
with that office.17
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No.
9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and
Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo. 18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the
secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family
same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the marriage Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack
license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on
contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola. 21
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and
that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house. 22 She testified
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent
that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and
declaring as follows:
that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with the
application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house,
showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, 1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent
the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona. 25 She
also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the
Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47
respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
nullity of the marriage of the parties.

As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics
the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in
Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage
the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her
contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January
testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
9, 1993 in Manila.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract
SO ORDERED.34
bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing
a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house
and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same,
application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
The Ruling of the CA
120
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors: Grounds in Support of Petition

I I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT
MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE. AND CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.

II II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING
MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH MARRIAGE.42
OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO
WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
The Ruling of this Court

III
The petition is meritorious.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or
THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW. 35
the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply
to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded
probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that
Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
down by law.37
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also
considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.38
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case
No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article
Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas
45.
contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
SO ORDERED.39
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was denied by the
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41

xxxx
Hence, this petition.

121
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal
requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor
is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter
2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid
marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had
been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the
marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license.
To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification
that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 43 such certification was
allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-
issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not
to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative
value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed
was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was
presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not
appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not
comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and
since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent
search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is worth noting
that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage
license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely
stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their
records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted
a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty
has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil
Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as
Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the
names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the
presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She
failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she
presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license,
having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria
and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the
license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could
have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present
this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the
marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage
license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria
inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license
issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove
the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cario further held that the presumed validity of the
marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a
valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had
been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple
irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license
was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and
Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias
failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were
validly married. To quote the CA:
122
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and
appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by
law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by
the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee
admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other
members of appellants family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant
where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which
shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea
Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before
he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the
Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only
after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We
are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom
and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the
Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family
Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except
those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having
been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1wphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives
are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make
up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight
of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him,
as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage
license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay
City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with
respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of
their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they
are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated July
18, 2012 and Resolution3 dated June 3, 2013. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
Decision4of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicting petitioner Norberto Abella
Vitangcol (Norberto) of bigamy punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 5 Norberto
was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.6
In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged
Norberto with bigamy.7 The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about December 4, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then
legally married to GINA M. GAERLAN, and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with
ALICE G. EDUARDO-VITANGCOL which second marriage has all the legal requisites for its validity
with the said accused NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL knowing fully well prior to and at the time
of the celebration of the second marriage he was already married to the said GINA M. GAERLAN.
Contrary to law.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. 9
According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice) at
the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. Born into their union were three (3) children.10
After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously married to another
womanf.]"11 She eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M.
Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National
Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto. 12
On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime in
1987.13"After much prodding by their friends and relatives, [he and Alice] decided to get married in
1994."14
Before finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a "fake
marriage"15 with his college girlfriend, a certain Gina Gaerlan.16 Nevertheless, despite Norberto's
revelation, Alice convinced him that they proceed with the wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice were
married on December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had three children. 17
Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice was having an
affair with a married man. He was able to confirm the affair after hearing Alice in a phone
conversation with her paramour.18

G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016 Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on convinced Alice to end the
affair. The lawyer also warned Alice of the possible criminal liability she may incur if she continued
NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. seeing her paramour.19

123
 Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere certifications by the civil registrar. For
Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her, Alice filed the criminal Complaint more than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his alleged
for bigamy against Norberto.20 spurious first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending, he did not present any
decision from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.
Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting valid marriage
with Gina, Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Norberto of bigamy. The I
dispositive portion of the Decision dated September 1, 2010 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds accused Norberto Abella Vitangcol Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY defined and penalized under Article 349 ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. - The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum imprisonment to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
maximum imprisonment. in the proper proceedings.
For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following
SO ORDERED.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary elements:
On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but modified the [first,] that the offender has been legally married;
penalty imposed in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 reads: [second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
Manila, Branch 25, dated September 1, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the
penalty to which appellant is previously sentenced. Accordingly, he is now meted to suffer an [third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. [lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.34ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first marriage with Gina because the civil
Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration,23 which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution registrar of the municipality where they were married had no record of the marriage license
dated June 3, 2013.24 allegedly issued in their favor.
Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. The People of the Philippines, Contrary to petitioner's claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was still
through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Comment 25 to which Norberto filed a Reply.26 legally married to Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the
crime charged.
Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case.27 He presents as evidence a
Certification28 from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner's first marriage was solemnized
no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that on July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code of the Philippines became effective on August 3,
with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriagethe marriage licensethe 1988.35Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines 36 govern the validity of his first
prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage. 29 marriage.

In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which
crime of bigamy. According to Norberto, nothing in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code that renders the marriage void from the beginning:37
punishes bigamy mentions that requirement.30 Stating that "[a]ny reasonable doubt must be Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
resolved in favor of the accused[,]"31 Norberto prays for his acquittal.32 with:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of Norberto's prior valid marriage with (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
Gina as evidenced by the marriage contract they had executed. The prosecution likewise proved that
the first marriage of Norberto with Gina was not legally dissolved; that while his first marriage was (2) Their consent, freely given;
subsisting, Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice; and that the second marriage would
have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Norberto, therefore, should be (3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
convicted of bigamy.33
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it The fourth requisitethe marriage licenseis issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
has no record of the marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife where either contracting party habitually resides. 38 The marriage license represents the state's
Gina proves the nullity of petitioner's first marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy charge. "involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested."39
The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license is
suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was no marriage license. To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, "the law requires that the

124
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to
the parties."40
Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states:
[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage License and
License Issuance available in this office, no record could be found on the alleged issuance of this
office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA M.
GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.41ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This Certification does not prove that petitioner's first marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist. 42
Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract
between him and his first wife, Gina.43 The marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is a
positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner's first marriage.44 This "should be given
greater credence than documents testifying merely as to [the] absence of any record of the
marriage[.]"45
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro46 was originally an action for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage.47 As part of its evidence, the plaintiff presented a certification that states that the
marriage license "cannot be located as said license . . . does not appear from [the local civil
registrar's] records."48
This court held that "[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local civil registrar] being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license."49 This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of 'due search and inability to
find' sufficiently proved that [the local civil registrar] did not issue [a] marriage license ... to the
contracting parties."50
The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for declaration
of nullity of marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The certification
in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being no prosecution for
bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To
our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having been issued to Norberto for
him to evade conviction for bigamy.
The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of
its presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the
certification in relation to the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish
a doctrine that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite
statement that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now cannot
be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.
A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are
concerned. Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The
motivation to do this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade prosecution.
This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario. In Cario,51 the marriage contract
between Santiago Cario and his first wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no marriage license number. 52 In
addition, the local civil registrar certified that it has no record of any marriage license issued to
Santiago Cario and Susan Nicdao.53 This court declared Santiago Cario's first marriage void for
having been solemnized without a marriage license. 54
In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number freely
and voluntarily signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing
officer. The first marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage was entered into
on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days,
petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first marriage. Even while the
bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as spurious was presented. In
other words, petitioner's belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue by his own
actuations.
This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar suspect. The prosecution has to prove that despite the existence of a valid first marriage,
petitioner nevertheless contracted a second or subsequent marriage. The admission of a marriage
contract with proof of its authenticity and due execution suffices to discharge the burden of proving
beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage exists. The burden of evidence will, thus, pass on to
the defense. Mere presentation of a certification from the civil registrar that the marriage license
cannot be found is not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no such marriage license was
issued.
The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract. 55 There is no
evidence to show that the number series of that license is spurious or is not likely to have been
issued from its source. There is no proof as to whether the licenses issued before or after the
document in question still exists in the custody of the civil registrar. There is no evidence that
relates to the procedures for safekeeping of these vital documents. This would have shown whether
there was unfettered access to the originals of the license and, therefore, would have contributed to
the proper judicial conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar implies.
This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official
functions to the civil registrar for the purposes sought by petitioner. In other words, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions is too remotely detached to the
conclusion that there is no marriage license.
At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrar's function without the
context just discussed can lead to the conclusion that he in good faith could not find the marriage
license in his office. This presumption does not mean that the marriage license did not exist. Nor
does it mean that the marriage license was issued.
However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage contract duly
executed by petitioner and his first spouse as well as by the solemnizing officer. The marriage
contract is in the custody of the civil registrar. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions by a public officer should likewise be applicable to infer a conclusion that the
marriage license mentioned in that contract exists.
Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate imposition of a penalty amounting to a
deprivation of liberty. It is not a far-fetched conclusionalthough this is not always the casethat a
well-connected accused will use all means, fair or foul, to achieve an acquittal. Many criminal cases
can turn on documentary evidence the issuance of which is within the discretion of a government
employee. The temptations for the employee to issue a document, which may be accurate but which
he knows the accused will be able to use for a different purpose, can easily be created by an accused.
Much of the bases of this conclusion will depend on how the trial court judge evaluates the
demeanor of the witnesses. We can defer to that discretion as much as to make our own judgment
based on evidence conclusively admitted and weighed by the trial court. Using both, we have no
reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court.
125
II
Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months
Assuming without conceding that petitioner's first marriage was solemnized without a marriage of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner's first marriage was not judicially The ranges of the minimum and maximum penalties are within the ranges as previously computed.
declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil The indeterminate penalty imposed was proper.
Code.56 The second element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in this case.
Nevertheless, "[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law 'to uplift and
As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.57 that redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent liberty and economic usefulness[,]'"68 we lower the minimum of the indeterminate penalty to six (6)
courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is months and one (1) day of prision correccional. Petitioner is, thus, sentenced to suffer the
beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight
prosecuted for bigamy.58ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article 40
of the Family Code:59 WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on July 18, 2012 and Resolution dated June 3, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33936 are AFFIRMED with
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. MODIFICATION. Petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime of of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1)
bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code becomes useless. "[A]ll that an adventurous bigamist has day of prision mayor as maximum.
to do is to ... contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the
first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
declaration of nullity of the first."60 Further, "[a] party may even enter into a marriage aware of the
absence of a requisiteusually the marriage licenseand thereafter contract a subsequent
G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016
marriage without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the
first marriage is void."61
RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B.
For these reasons, the Landicho ruling remains good law. It need not be revisited by this court En KHO, Respondents.
Banc as petitioner insists.62
DECISION
The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that he
subsequently married Alice G. Eduardo on December 4, 1994. 63 As for the last element of bigamy,
that the subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity, it is presumed. The crime PERALTA, J.:
of bigamy was consummated when petitioner subsequently married Alice without his first marriage
to Gina having been judicially declared void.64
Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-GR.
With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted of the crime
CV No. 69218. The assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial
charged.
Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 464, which ruled in petitioner's
favor in an action he filed for declaration of nullity of his marriage with private respondent, while
III the CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed on The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein
petitioner is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under petitioner with the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as follows:
the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the minimum term of the penalty shall be within the chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. The
court then has the discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next
lower to the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances are x x x x
considered.65
3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio
The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor.66 The penalty next lower to that is prision Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to
correccional. Prision correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were required for the intended marriage between
years;67 hence, the minimum penalty can be any period within this range. petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to
exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony;
As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period,
there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Prision mayor in its medium period ranges 4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which
from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years. actually took place at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there was a

126
public dance held in the town plaza which is just situated adjacent to the church whereas the venue The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the requisite
of the wedding, and the dance only finished at around 2:00 o'clock of same early morning of June 1, marriage license when the marriage between petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As such,
1972; the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
absence of the said marriage license rendered the marriage between petitioner and respondent null
5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license and void ab initio.
and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement of
a marriage license; Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA promulgated
its assailed Decision, disposing thus:
6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's office chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
was told to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for the purpose WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25 September 2000 of Branch 2 of the
of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the actual marriage was celebrated before dawn of Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage
June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore could have been validly issued, thereby rendering the between the petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho is declared valid and subsisting for
marriage solemnized on even date null and void for want of the most essential requisite; all intents and purposes.

7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage aforestated was SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
solemnized sans the required marriage license, hence, null and void from the beginning and neither The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending parties, there is a
was it performed under circumstances exempting the requirement of such marriage license; presumption that a marriage license was issued for that purpose and that petitioner failed to
overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled that the absence of any indication in the marriage
x x x x certificate that a marriage license was issued is a mere defect in the formal requisites of the law
which does not invalidate the parties' marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after
due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered: Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated January
14, 2009.
1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on June 1, 1972, at
Arteche, Eastern Samar, null and void ab initio and of no legal effect; Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x x4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING A SO-CALLED
"ETHICAL DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED LIAISON WITH
Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification 5 issued by the Municipal
ANOTHER WOMAN AS A FACTOR IN REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH
Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil
VOIDED HIS MARRIAGE IN QUESTION WITH RESPONDENT;
Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with
respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST
PETITIONER THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK,
Respondent filed her Answer6praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of
EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;
action because there is no evidence to prove petitioner's allegation that their marriage was
celebrated without the requisite marriage license and that, on the contrary, both petitioner and
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALTOGETHER
respondent personally appeared before the local civil registrar and secured a marriage license
DISREGARDING PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF
which they presented before their marriage was solemnized.
LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AND GIVING WEIGHT INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS
IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION; and
Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was subsequently transferred to the RTC of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, where the parties submitted their respective pleadings as well
4 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR
as affidavits of witnesses.
REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE
On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. The dispositive portion
LICENSE.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
of the said Decision reads:
Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of the CA to give
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
due credence to petitioner's evidence which established the absence or lack of marriage license at
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage contracted between
the time that petitioner and respondent's marriage was solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA
Raquel G. Kho and Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of
erred in deciding the case not on the basis of law and evidence but rather on the ground of what the
the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the Family Code. The foregoing is without prejudice to the
appellate court calls as ethical considerations as well as on the perceived motive of petitioner in
application of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar for
The Court finds for the petitioner.
proper registration of this decree of nullity of marriage.
At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a procedural
SO ORDERED.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
127
question by arguing that the issues presented by petitioner in the present petition are factual in Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
nature and it is not proper for this Court to delve into these issues in a petition for review first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party
on certiorari. habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not
those under Article 75.14 Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by
The Court does not agree. Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo
mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular
The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application of existing law and marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6)
prevailing jurisprudence. However, intertwined with these issues is the question of the existence of Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's
the subject marriage license, which is a question of fact and one which is not appropriate for a marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule, nonetheless, is not
without exceptions, viz.: Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.15 The rationale for the
compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their
capacity to contract marriage.16Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested.17
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a marriage license
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; which they presented to the solemnizing officer before the marriage was performed.

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage and
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; that any doubt should be resolved to sustain such validity. Indeed, this Court is mindful of this
principle as well as of the Constitutional policy which protects and strengthens the family as the
(7) When the findings arc contrary to those of the trial court; basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Arteche,
based; Eastern Samar, coupled with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence to
prove the absence of the subject marriage license.
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly in his
favor.
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario.18 There, it was held that the certification of the
In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not there was indeed a Local Civil Registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage license, was adequate to prove the
marriage license obtained by petitioner and respondent, are conflicting. Hence, it is but proper for non-issuance of said license.19 It was further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the
this Court to review these findings. parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to
prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. 20
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code.12 Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar
Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit: of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M.
ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with: Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972."21 Thus, on the basis of such
Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she
who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to discharge that burden.
(2) Their consent, freely given;
It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and court. In addition, the Certificate of Marriage22 issued by the officiating priest does not contain any
entry regarding the said marriage license. Respondent could have obtained a copy of their marriage
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional contract from the National Archives and Records Section, where information regarding the marriage
character.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary license, i.e., date of issuance and license number, could be obtained. However, she also failed to do
so. The Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's observation that the

128
statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well as respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
marriage ceremony was conducted but neither one of them testified that a marriage license was presumption must stand. x x x31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
issued in favor of petitioner and respondent. Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim that she
and petitioner were able to obtain a marriage license, she failed to present evidence to prove such
In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding of the absence of the
allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
subject marriage license which rendered the marriage void.
allegation is not evidence.23
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on
with respondent's failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to
the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar
show that such license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid
that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. 32
marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was
a simple defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which would not affect the
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. 33 As
license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed without the
cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a
corresponding marriage license is null and void.
license is void from the beginning, except marriages of exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79
of the same Code. As earlier stated, petitioner's and respondent's marriage cannot be characterized
As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG further argues that, on the basis of this Court's
as among the exceptions.
ruling in Sevilla v. Cardenas,24 the certification issued by the local civil registrar, which attests to the
absence in its records of a marriage license, must categorically state that the document does not
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be that his
exist in the said office despite diligent search.
motives are less than pure - that he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit
affair with another woman. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court considered the certification
respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented
issued by the Local Civil Registrar as a certification of due search and inability to find the record or
by petitioner. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil
entry sought by the parties despite the absence of a categorical statement that "such document does
Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.chanrobleslaw
not exist in their records despite diligent search." The Court, citing Section 28, 26 Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, held that the certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry as to
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
the purported marriage license, issued by the civil registrar, enjoys probative value, he being the
Appeals, Cebu City, dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan,
license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that
Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is REINSTATED.
would render the marriage void ab initio.
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,27 this Court
considered the marriage of the petitioner and her deceased husband as void ab initio as the records EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,
reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number vs.
and, as certified by the local civil registrar, their office has no record of such marriage license. The ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non- REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement,
DECISION
the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling was
reiterated in the more recent case of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr.28
NACHURA, J.:
Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas,29 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic v.
CA30 that, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, this Court
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation
relied on the Certification issued by the local civil registrar, which stated that the alleged marriage
in our laws, has become a clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this
license could not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Contrary to petitioner's
case, however, with much ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has
asseveration, nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally
conducted a diligent search. In this respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and devoid of any definition.
Court does not require a categorical statement to this effect. Moreover, in the said case, this Court
ruled that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867.
has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The The petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution2 denying the motion for the
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or reconsideration of the challenged decision.
failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil

129
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in
a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially
attracted to Rowenas close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided
to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and
respondent, a freshman.3
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a
certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their
first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was
young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to
Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket. 4
However, Edwards 80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and
daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go
back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his
family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit
suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place. 5
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years
old, and she, 20.6 The two then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated like
a prisonerhe was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns
and warned the latter not to leave Rowena.7 At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to
his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents home and live with them. Edward
relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they
could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told
Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home. 8
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his parents. His
family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him. 9
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live
with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways. 10
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis
of the latters psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.11
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the
parties.12 In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings. 13
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if
there was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits. 14
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated,
and made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again
Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is
currently unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He
presented himself at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for
Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now
residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his
parents are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient.
This said virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself
to be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he
tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job
incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His
interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate
himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear
its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient wife.
She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her
boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation
of their intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is
having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family
and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had insisted to
petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared
as they are both young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage
because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of
eloping and she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to
the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of
respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment.
The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they
should go back and seek help from petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the house of
petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her
home for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of separation,
respondent called petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded
immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he
appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit suicide.
Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent would call by phone every now and then
and became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent went to the extent of
threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner
asked her how he would be able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the
idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April
23, 1996, respondents uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,]
petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually never
applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of
petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go
home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns.
130
Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission their
military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he
should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[ ]and relatives[ ]houses. Sometime
in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his
predicament and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner,
however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew
about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact
respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of petitioners parents while they
are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she would only live with him if they
will have a separate home of their own and be away from his parents. She also intimated to
petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so
they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner already
settled his differences with his own family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where
he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents. He
told her already that he was disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not be able
to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore, respondent
stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and
weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their
young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still
egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive
upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on
marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to
commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is
absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social
interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he
finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of
respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and
timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of
woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She
is seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her
good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used force
and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is
really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before
submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a
serious institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner and
respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for
granted as they are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of
weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is
extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in
her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable
presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only
manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities that made marriage a
big mistake for them to take.15
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision16 declaring the marriage of the parties null
and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.17 The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of
appeal.18
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision19 in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867,
reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the
psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine
respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum,
the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina21 needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.22 The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification
of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the
case may be, the petition.23 The CA later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the
likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.24
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June
15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.25
In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of
respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties psychological incapacity.
Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine
respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because the latter
131
represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court
orders and notices.27
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum, 28 that the annulment petition filed before the
RTC contains no statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it
medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally
examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina29 were not
satisfied.30
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the
marriage between the parties is null and void.31
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of
jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code,
Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero
elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals: 33
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of
the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-
Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on
absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked
by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor
of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de facto.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of
marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation
between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a
married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such
a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code
Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee
started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed
and formulated the definition of marriage as
a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by law.
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and
society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce
would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the
great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the
idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not
only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church
annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was,
thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of
marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present
Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on
grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the
preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages
with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void
marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.
Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe.
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be dissolved
or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that
since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of
"lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce,
like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder
or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise
perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who
refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in
tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
132
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly. 34
In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest after the celebration."
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" and to
"mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There
being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there
is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not
refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense,
insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention
of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase."
He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity
to discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is
incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how
they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet,
the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested
that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations,"
hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage
which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are
void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters,
now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the
time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with
respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment
process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as
to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil
marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict,
quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbofreed from the marriage bonds
in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws.
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Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law
Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the
Family Codeand classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally
inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly
for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three
old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to be capable according to law in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of the major elements
required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and
external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced
two distinct but related grounds for annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of due
competence. Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid
consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence
means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made
during the wedding ceremony."
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to
the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the
first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was
probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The
nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a
cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970.
Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the
ceremony.36
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by
so doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. 37 The law is then so designed as to allow
some resiliency in its application.38
Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 40 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render
help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.41 This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made between
the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary
judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge,
explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to
Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive law to enter such
contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a different
locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown
to both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third
paragraph does not deal with the psychological process of giving consent because it has been
established a priori that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both know well the
object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the
consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The
consent as a psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is
directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction:
the third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with positing the object of consent.
The person may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the
responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity
with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to
understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies.
Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case
imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect,
discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they
arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual
condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free
human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies
of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either
with respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself
[sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether
possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an
adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can
choose marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person can assume those
responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to understand them. In this latter
hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity
to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial
steps taken by church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit
consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the
conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the
moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable
conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary
freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this irresistible
impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that
the intellect is always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It would seem
entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there are certain cases in which one
who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage
is and what it implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot
posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with
usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is
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juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house
he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more clearly
through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the inability
to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his
opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually able
to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent
consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent,
experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal
judge, had likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing the
object of consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him,
such an affliction usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding and evaluating intact.
What it affects is the object of consent: the delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence
cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity
to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can
coexist in the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a
mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram Sabattani concerning a
nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the moment
of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision
concludes that a person in such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of
fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in understanding what the obligations of marriage are,
nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this
ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific
incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact
the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it
from the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the
anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent
that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to
the principle affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not
capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where
one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how
to begin a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second
incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a
heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could
arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The canon
speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of
realizing or contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would
be deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite
capable of procuring the economic good and the financial security of the other, but not capable of
realizing the bonum conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for
detained and individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns a
person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent
may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not
capable of assuming them because of his "constitutional immorality."
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of
responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the
moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it
means that the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration
that must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to assume the
obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to assume
and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at
matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity
of the respondent to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the
person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards the
rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the
presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and experience how
others feel) is common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable
treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others
are taken advantage of in order to achieve ones ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of
them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically
centered around the good of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do
not have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or
even all of these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship is impossible.
Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective
immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality
was understood to be invalidating of marriage that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because
of the inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its
obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to
assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity,
homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to
be unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of
matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium
totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to account for the complex
phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in
very few exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse.
Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave
lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and
intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities of
marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the
invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity
specified by the canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the
clause is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference
to the psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic
constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is
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incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in
this juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic
constitution which impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in
ones consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating incapacity. The
difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the development of the
habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic constitution. It would seem then that the law insists
that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom. 42
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine
whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower
courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 43 ruled that the findings of the trial
court are final and binding on the appellate courts.44
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the
pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 45 explained that when private respondent testified
under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of
Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,46 thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee
from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect.
Here, the State and the Churchwhile remaining independent, separate and apart from
each othershall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting
and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
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 (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General from the very beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.47
disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of
the latters disorder recurring in their marriage.
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in the
ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply
concurred "in the result" and another threeincluding, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to
declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there is need to
compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
"each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations,
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the
but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."48
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,49 the Court has applied the aforesaid
II.
standards, without too much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church We now examine the instant case.
tribunals."
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996,
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral
alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of the
OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." 50 The narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.56
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites,
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. 57
bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
account of the personality disorders of the said individuals. 51
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about
through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and
evidence.52 The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-
it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed
that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. 53 Let
that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that
it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void
a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid

137
consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses
from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong
relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the
capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person;
that the spouses must be other oriented since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving
love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is
more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of
the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent
and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary
stresses and strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure
of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to
fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of
loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real
freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall
short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a
case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to
assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was
entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to
carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into." 581avvphi1
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos 60 asserts, there is no requirement that the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. 61 Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.62 Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,63 an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert
for an independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will
assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties
prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate,
produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat,
dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder
for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders as
follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a persons recent and
long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated
episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual
mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal functioning.
Personality disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood
and become less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more than one personality
disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of
character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and
occupational adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as
overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such
qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of
life and often a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals with personality
disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent.
Such traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of
personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain
wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain
personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
138
Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types.
Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive
from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness
were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to
lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate relationships.lawphil.net However, later
researchers have found little evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of
development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the etiology
of antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other
personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality
may be related to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found that
low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of
aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with
low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial
personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of
borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared
with 19 percent in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized
into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who
have these disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality disorders.
Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not otherwise specified," that can be
used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the
specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus
therapy may be long-term.64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such
individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and
are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others
through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this
disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others,
may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree
with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things
on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people,
feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.65 and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent
physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to
blame others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of
remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals
who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the
rights of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The
term described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in
reasoning.lawphil.net
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic"
personality disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic. 66
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case,
finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the
marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties psychological incapacity. We
further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses deportment,
arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering
help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows
others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people
even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do
things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. 67 As clearly shown in
this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure,
weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has
no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with
antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This
finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and
control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the
conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.68 Moreover, as shown in this case,
respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her
threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
139
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void. 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 97-

1282.[2] The reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyns marriage with respondent Angelito
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5,
2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of psychological incapacity.
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. THE FACTS

JOCELYN M. SUAZO, G.R. No. 164493 Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were residents of
Petitioner,
Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some
Present: friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding

CARPIO, J., Chairperson, them, brought them back to Bian, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelitos marriage was

BRION, arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian.

DEL CASTILLO,

- versus - ABAD, and

Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelitos parents after
PEREZ, JJ.
their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for

Angelitos relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most of
Promulgated: the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted because of

Jocelyns efforts.

ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, March 10, 2010

Respondents.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION with whom he has since lived. They now have children.

BRION, J.:

Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for

declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed that

We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the July 14, 2004 Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In

Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which reversed the January 29, addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged in her complaint:

140
 remained firm on these declarations but significantly declared that Angelito had not treated her
xxxx
violently before they were married.

8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987,
their relationship had been marred with bitter quarrels which caused
unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part of the plaintiff because Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:
defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every time they had a
troublesome encounter; Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent before
you got married?

9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the
defendant to work or his indolence and his excessive drinking which makes A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.
him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations making
life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff causing their separation in
fact in July 1987;
Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will you
describe his behavioural (sic) pattern before you got married?

10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the time
of their marriage and became very apparent as time went and proves to be
A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.
continuous, permanent and incurable;

Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of violent

xxxx
nature before you got married (sic), is there any signs (sic) of violence?

A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.

Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a psychological

examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired by Jocelyn).
Q. Even to other people?
The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no collusion existed

between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the trial.
A. He also quarrel (sic).[3]

Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony.

In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition, including the

alleged incidents of physical beating she received from Angelito. On cross-examination, she

141
When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:
Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).

A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such

Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical because psychological disorder are not detrimental to men but to others
interpretation of his behavior? particularly and this (sic) because the person who have this kind of disorder do
not know that they have this kind of disorder.

A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent during

the time of the marriage the respondent is suffering from anti-social Q. So in other words, permanent?
personality Disorder this is a serious and severe apparently incurable
(sic). This disorder is chronic and long-standing before the marriage. A. Permanent and incurable.

Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present during
petitioner? the wedding or at the time of the wedding or became manifest thereafter?

A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no A. Yes, maam.

pattern of lying when I examined her, the petitioner was found to be very
responsive, coherent, relevant to marital relationship with respondent.

xxxx

Q. And the last page of Exhibit E which is your report there is a

statement rather on the last page, last paragraph which state: It is the clinical
opinion of the undersigned that marriage between the two, had already hit Court:
bottom rock (sic) even before the actual celebration of marriage.Respondent(s)
immature, irresponsible and callous emotionality practically harbors (sic) the
possibility of having blissful relationship. His general behavior fulfill(s) the
diagnostic criteria for a person suffering from Anti Social Personality Disorder. Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?
Such disorder is serious and severe and it interferred (sic) in his capacity to
provide love, caring, concern and responsibility to his family. The disorder is
chronic and long-standing in proportion and appear(s) incurable. The disorder
was present at the time of the wedding and became manifest thereafter due to A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on Anti-
stresses and pressure of married life. He apparently grew up in a dysfunctional Social Personality Disorder (sic).
family. Could you explain what does chronic mean?

Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?

A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has been
there long before he entered marriage apparently, it came during early
developmental (sic) Basic trust was not develop (sic).

142
 A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without any Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?
employment exploitative and silent (sic) on the part of the respondent is
clearly Anti-Social Disorder.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of psychological

disorder (sic)?
Court:

A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not

admit that they are suffering that kind of disorder (sic). Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?

Court: A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the

respondent (sic).

Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers a lot

(sic)? Court:

A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital Q. How was the petitioner tortured?
relation to the respondent (sic).

A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated by the
Court: respondent (sic).

Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the Court:

parents (sic)?

Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?

A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due
respect more often than not he even shouted at them for no apparent reason A. Yes, sir.
(sic).

Court:
Court:

Q. Why did you know?

143
 A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself,
the respondent is not aware that this kind of personality affect the other party
(sic). Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital
obligation?

Court:
A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-
Social Personality Disorder, he is good for nothing person.[4]

Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?

The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The Report pertinently
A. They do not have children because more often than not the
respondent is under the influence of alcohol, they do not have peaceful states:[5]
harmonious relationship during the less than one year and one thing what is
significant, respondent allowed wife to work as housemaid instead of he who
should provide and the petitioner never receive and enjoy her earning for the
five months that she work and it is also the petitioner who took sustainance of Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a
the vices. (sic) petitioner for Nullity of Marriage versus ANGELITO D. SUAZO

Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown love to GENERAL DATA
the petitioner?

[This pertains to Jocelyns]

A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain the
marital relationship but what he need is to sustain his vices thru the petitioner
(sic).
BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY

Court:
xxxx

Q. What are the vices?

Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year high
school, a part time tricycle driver, eldest among 4 siblings. Father is a machine
operator, described to be an alcoholic, womanizer and a heavy gambler. While
A. Alcohol and gambling. mother is a sales agent. It was a common knowledge within their vicinity that
she was also involved in an illicit relationship. Familial relationship was
described to be stormy, chaotic whose bickering and squabbles were part and
parcel of their day to day living.
Court:

144
 TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is
adequately suppressed so much so that it does not create inner tension and
anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of drives and motivation particularly in
uplifting not, only her socio-emotional image but was as her morale.She may
be sensitive yet capable of containing the effect of such sensitiveness; in order
to remain in goodstead (sic) with her immediate environment.
She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward for a
better future in spite of difficulties she had gone through in the past. She is
fully aware of external realities of life that she set simple life goals which is
(sic) commensurate with her capabilities and limitations. However, she needs
to prioritize her interest in order to direct her energy toward specific
goals. Her tolerance for frustration appears to be at par with her coping
mechanism that she is able to discharge negative trends appropriately.
REMARKS :
[Already cited in full in the psychologists testimony quoted above][6]
The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of the Philippines strongly opposed the
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage. Through a Certification filed with the RTC, it
argued that the psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what she said about him was
purely hearsay.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:
While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a
person may be considered as psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic) some
admitted grounds that would render a person to be unfit to comply with his
marital obligation, such as immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational
judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the
husband to support the family or excessive dependence on parents or peer
group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person
lives for the next drink and the next drinks (The Family Code of the Phils, Alicia
Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)
The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the
petitioner and Dr. Tayag, points (sic) to one thing that the petitioner failed to
establish a harmonious family life with the respondent. On the contrary, the
respondent has not shown love and respect to the petitioner manifested by the
formers being irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst
of all a wife beater. The petitioner, unable to bear any longer the misbehavior
and attitude of the respondent, decided, after one year and four months of
messy days, to leave the respondent.
In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the
start of her married life with the respondent, she already suffered from
maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon her and that she was the
one who worked as a housemaid of a relative of her husband to sustain the
latters niece (sic) and because they were living with her husbands family, she
was obliged to do the household chores an indication that she is a battered
wife coupled with the fact that she served as a servant in his (sic) husbands
family.
This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be attributed
to the fact that at the time of their marriage, she and her husband are still
young and was forced only to said marriage by her relatives. The petitioner
and the respondent had never developed the feeling of love and respect,
instead, the respondent blamed the petitioners family for said early marriage
and not to his own liking.
145
Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by this Court
in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[7] the RTC concluded:
The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling that:
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist
testimony quoted above] would only tend to show that the respondent was,
indeed, suffering from psychological incapacity which is not only grave but also
incurable.
Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs.
Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198, wherein the Supreme Court held
that:
x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]
The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony
of the petitioner and Dr. Familiar (sic) [the psychologist who testified in this
case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar] attesting that there is
psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to comply with the
essential marital obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven and,
therefore, petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for.
A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological
incapacity of the respondent is a speculation and conjecture and without moral
certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy as the battered
wife/petitioner will still be using the surname of the respondent, although they
are now separated, and a grim and sad reminder of her husband who made
here a slave and a punching bag during the short span of her marriage with
him. The law on annulment should be liberally construed in favor of an
innocent suffering petitioner otherwise said law will be an instrument to
protect persons with mental illness like the serious anti-social behavior of
herein respondent.[8]
THE CA RULING
True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set
in Santos vs Court of Appeals and Republic vs Court of Appeals do not require
that a physician personally examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the totality of evidence approach
which allows the fact of psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence
that medically or clinically identify the root causes of the illness. If the totality
of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to. Applied in Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony of the aggrieved
spouse, children, relatives and the social worker were not found to be
sufficient to prove psychological incapacity, in the absence of any evaluation of
the respondent himself, the person whose mental and psychological capacity
was in question.
In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the
respondent was psychologically incapable of entering into the marriage state,
that is, to assume the essential duties of marriage due to an underlying
psychological illness. Only the wife gave first-hand testimony on the behavior
of the husband, and it is inconclusive. As observed by the Court in Marcos, the
respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has
resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were
manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or
medically identified. The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was
suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage
was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The
evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show
that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity
or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, Pesca
vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or the failure or refusal to work could have been the
result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been forced into
a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not under a permanent
compulsion because he had later on shown his ability to engage in productive
work and more stable relationships with another. The element of permanence
or incurability that is one of the defining characteristic of psychological
incapacity is not present.
146
 There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the (3) who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations
same roof, the married life of the petitioner with the respondent was an of matrimony due to causes of a psychic nature.
unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this reason be extinguished. As the
Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be a
reminder of the inviolability of the marriage institution in our country and the
The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these criteria. The RTC,
foundation of the family that the law seeks to protect. The concept of
psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality are being clothed with discretionary functions, applied its finding of psychological incapacity based on
convenient excuses of parties to separate and divorce.
existing jurisprudence and the law itself which gave lower court magistrates enough latitude to

define what constitutes psychological incapacity. On the contrary, she further claims, the OSG relied

on generalities without being specific on why it is opposed to the dissolution of a marriage that

actually exists only in name.

THE PETITION Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with

Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the CA ruling

based on the following arguments:

THE COURTS RULING
1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally
disregarded the legal basis of the RTC in declaring the marriage null and
void Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate, should be Tuason v. Court
of Appeals) holds that the finding of the Trial Court as to the existence or non- We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in
existence of petitioners psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is
final and binding on us (the Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns marriage with Angelito a nullity
shown that the trial courts factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of
private respondents witnesses vis--vis petitioners defenses are clearly and under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
manifestly erroneous;

2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity;

this omission was intentional to give the courts a wider discretion to interpret The Law, Molina and Te
the term without being shackled by statutory parameters. Article 36 though
was taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which gives three
conditions that would make a person unable to contract marriage from mental
incapacity as follows: Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the
1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital

obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;
solemnization.

(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment

A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely
concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties which are to be
mutually given and accepted; introduced an abstract concept psychological incapacity that disables compliance with the

contractual obligations of marriage without any concrete definition or, at the very least, an

147

illustrative example. We must therefore apply the law based on how the concept of psychological
incapacity was shaped and developed in jurisprudence.
Santos v. Court of Appeals[9] declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It
must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[10]
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
the law in Republic v. Court of Appeals[11](Molina) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties or one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone
of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[12]
148
 The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any,
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic requirements of Santos.[13] as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of
the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[14] further clarified that there is no requirement that the

defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a

Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence presented, including
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose of these pieces of
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of
evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference the
the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and
advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt
its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.[15]
disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the

absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.

Pesca v. Pesca[16] clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already

pending, under the reasoning that the courts interpretation or construction establishes the
All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that came to us were
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so interpreted and construed would thus
invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the state of law and
constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this
jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-Te[17] (Te) which revisited
Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be
the Molina guidelines.
applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good

faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.

On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did not
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court took give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the
effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently provides: applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that

the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the

(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties
that, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision
were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such itself was taken from the Canon Law.[18] Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the law is so
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
designed to allow some resiliency in its application.[19]

149
 Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is consistent with
that of the Canon Law.
Going back to its basic premise, Te said:
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case
basis, that should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically
incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment
in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial court are final
and binding on the appellate courts.
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its
decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals, explained that when private respondent testified under oath before
the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of
parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of
procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency with which the
concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as
so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict
standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be
bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment
of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that should also
govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v.
Velez-Ting[20] follows Tes lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from
abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the
explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages:[21]
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root
cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written
report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too
expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor
litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not
available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent
requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a
party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation
of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-
trial conference.
Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,[22] merely stands for a more
flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on
psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in these cases, which it
expounded on as follows:
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological
and mental temperaments of the parties.
xxxx
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of
presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys
psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by
a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical
or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself.
150
 This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for
emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough The Present Case
and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for
a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.[23] [Underscoring supplied]
As the CA did, we find Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological

incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. We so conclude based on our own examination
This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.[24]
of the evidence on record, which we were compelled to undertake because of the differences in the

trial court and the appellate courts appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyns presented evidence.
Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases on

Article 36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to
a. The Expert Opinion Evidence
confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders,

clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to

Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show
the marriage; that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of
the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos alleged psychological condition.
the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of

the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.[25] It is
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence
not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
the psychologists testimony and the psychological evaluation report that Jocelyn presented. Based
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a
on her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelitos psychological condition only
natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents personality
in an indirect manner she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose
structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations
bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the
must be shown.[26] Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill
psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with
will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined
condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity
above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist
and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the

essential obligations of marriage.[27]

In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be

psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not
If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos juridical
a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not be
antecedence, gravity and incurability requisites. This is proof of Santos continuing doctrinal
practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a
validity.
determination though of a partys complete personality profile, information coming from persons

intimately related to him (such as the partys close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an

151
approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not

totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to what

doubtful sources of information. extent was Angelitos personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the disorder on

Angelitos awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager information

coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important concerns

could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos psychological or requisites of psychological incapacity, all of which are critical to the success of Jocelyns cause.

condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyns psychological

condition, this is not true for Angelitos. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the b. Jocelyns Testimony

required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be

suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report and the

can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists. psychologists testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyns testimony, to find out

whether she provided the court with sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelitos psychological

Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologists report and testimony incapacity.

simply provided a general description of Angelitos purported anti-social personality disorder,

supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist Unfortunately, we find Jocelyns testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on

was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise Angelitos habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings

to the characterization she gave. These particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can she received from him all of which occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she declared in her

they be found in her testimony. testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a

personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with

For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelitos personality disorder is chronic or incurable; him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of the

Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his marriage with Jocelyn or even during celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings exactly took place whether it

his early developmental stage, as basic trust was not developed. However, she did not support this was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or months or years after. This is a clear

declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she based her conclusion on the presumption evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require

that Angelito apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though, is the that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

psychologists own equivocation on this point she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself may

have realized that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is highly suspect, for it Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of

was based entirely on Jocelyns assumed knowledge of Angelitos family background and upbringing. psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply

152

indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited
jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the
absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness.
The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different treatment. While
we may concede that physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality
patterns, such violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity.Jurisprudence
holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus is
irretrievably lost in the present case under our finding that the opinion of the psychologist cannot
be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyns account of the physical beatings she received
from Angelito were true, this evidence does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related
jurisprudence, specifically the Santos requisites.
On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases we now
find to be clearly and manifestly erroneous.Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the finality of the
factual findings of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyns main anchor in her present
appeal with us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the contrary, the CA correctly
applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts and the evidence of the present case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack
merit. We AFFIRM the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443. Costs
against the petitioner.
-SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las
Pias City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo),
filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and daughter. The petition was
opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia
was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma.
Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Las Pias City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she
is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were
both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry,
Elise impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for
having been contracted during the subsistence of the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico
(Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for
Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same
petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth 2,040,000.00 and personal properties
worth 2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its
value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate.
of
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of his death.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, 7 the petition for settlement of
decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Pias City. In addition to
their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for
Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to
Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was
153
properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that
Eliseos last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or
incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the decedent
Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by
this Court of a bond in the amount of 100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the
RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the
RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Pias City. The petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the
following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON
WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-
QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING
MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT
SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. 12
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate
of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial
Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he
had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far
as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence
or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. 14 Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant."15In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. 17 Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. 18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons actual
residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the
ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las
Pias City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate
may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseos
Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled.
While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedents residence at the time
of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court
of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and
wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in
1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous. 20 That Eliseo
went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable
petitioners position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her
children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners submission that the lower courts findings
arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
Amelias marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken
place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly
or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and
Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Nial v.
Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no uncertain terms,
allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage
to therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable
marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
154
That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
party may attack a void marriage.24
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the other person as the court may select.
source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally
without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 25
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must
be filed by an interested person, thus:
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration
after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action
must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a
compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void (a) The jurisdictional facts;
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish
such cause of action.
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the
creditors, of the decedent;
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to
determine whether or not the decedents marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by
the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in
Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish
the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an
was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the
be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently,
phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are
in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos
entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28
marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and,
therefore, void ab initio.27
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise has not shown any
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in
interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
the administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse
the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the
the issuance of letters of administration, thus: law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. 29 Having a vested right in
the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as
an interested party within the purview of the law.
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will,
or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in
toto.
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; SO ORDERED.

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to

155
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T. Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille
BRAZA, Petitioners, and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between
vs. Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth
THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use
ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, represented by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C. of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as
TITULAR,Respondents. guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and
filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth
certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as
"Pablito Sicad Braza," were married1 on January 4, 1978. The union bore Ma. Cristinas co-
petitioners Paolo Josef2 and Janelle Ann3 on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian
Carlo4 on June 4, 1980.
Pablo died5 on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.
On Patricks Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order 9 of September 6,
2007, dismissed the petition without prejudice, it holding that in a special proceeding for correction
of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction
over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and
order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an
ordinary adversarial action.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order 10 of November 29, 2007, they
filed the present petition for review.

During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on
Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar. Citing Cario v. Cario,11 Lee v.
her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Court of Appeals12 and Republic v. Kho,13 they contend that even substantial errors, such as those
Patrick's birth certificate6 from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with sought to be corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108. 14
the following entries:
The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages
Name of Child : PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL TITULAR
and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
Date of Birth : 01 January 1996
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code15 charts the procedure by which
Mother : Lucille Celestial Titular an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein
Father : Pablito S. Braza may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in
the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding;
Date Received at the Local January 13, 1997 an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such
Civil Registrar : as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the
parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in
Annotation : "Late Registration" which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. 16

Annotation/Remarks : "Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza

on January 13, 1997"
Remarks : Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents
on April 22, 1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child shall be
known as Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify
the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patricks
filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patricks birth
records17 and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.

Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy7 of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were
married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before
the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition 8 to correct the entries in
the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.
Petitioners position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo
and Lucilles marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy, which causes of
action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15,
2003, and Art. 17118 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family
Court as expressly provided in said Code.1avvphi1

156
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral
attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.
Petitioners reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.
Cario v. Cario was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return of one-half
of the death benefits received by the first after the death of the husband. Since the second wife
contracted marriage with the husband while the latters marriage to the first wife was still
subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity of the two marriages, it being essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the petitions filed by
the therein petitioners before the lower courts were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was
not to declare that the petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their
records of birth but to establish that they are not the latters children, hence, there was nothing to
impugn as there was no blood relation at all between
the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of the name of
Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners mother and the substitution thereof with "Tiu Chuan" who is
their biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack was allowed and the petition deemed as
adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the entries in their
respective birth records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that their citizenship is "Filipino,"
not Chinese, because their parents were never legally married. Again, considering that the changes
sought to be made were substantial and not merely innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings
under Rule 108 to be adversarial in nature, upheld the lower courts grant of the petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from those obtaining in the
present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Regional
Trial Court1(RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order3 dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No.
16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for
cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the assailed order denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon
receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean
National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of
Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the
marriage certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage
Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. 5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared
before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was
allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao
Pharma. She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she
recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a
receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny
Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to
obtain a passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee
of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their
office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent.7 Lastly, a
document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged. 8
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the petitioner,
Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries in the
WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED.9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of respondent,
the court found basis in granting the latters prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible
mistake.10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1)
there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for
it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of
all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage
void ab initio.11
157
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration couched
in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic of the
Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor General, the petitioners
counsel, and all concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED.12
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for
correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the
appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondents identity was used by an
unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for
respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void
marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the following
grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE
ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE ALLEGED
MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO. 14
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or corrected, because
the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided by the person who appeared
and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latters personal
circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife portion of the certificate of
marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null and void ab initio. 16Thus, the petition
instituted by respondent is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a
Rule 108 proceeding.17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and final
orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a
question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does
not call for the examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties. 18 Here, the issue
raised by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in
effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a
pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with
the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery
of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may
make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for
the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same
in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical,
then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship
or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with
the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the
appropriate adversarial proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where
the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
158
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. 21 marriage.1wphi1 Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was
entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary
evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been
summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires
given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and
publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim
all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought,
interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar
not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the
and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may
record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in
make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the
allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof,
petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule
the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and
changes in entries of the civil register.22
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial
Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the
AFFIRMED.
personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged
and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she
claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into SO ORDERED.
such contract. It must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it
appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries
G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009
in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.

VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner,

In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil
vs.
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with.
The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the
Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was DECISION
conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was
conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the
signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondents signature
appearing in some of her government issued identification cards. 23 The court thus made a This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that
categorical conclusion that respondents signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and, the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution2 dated July 8,
therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such 2004, be reversed and set aside.
marriage was celebrated.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:
Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General of the National Statistics Office24 that:
INFORMATION

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute
for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds
for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under
the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil
registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being
previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on January 12,
1999.
159
Contrary to law.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony
solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-
2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding
ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated
November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on
October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos
Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26,
1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding
in Manila (Exh. E).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City x
x x.
xxxx
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS
of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of accuseds
bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. This aspect is being
determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.
Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order dated
2 August 2001.3
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and
void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the
celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack
of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to
Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003,
the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel
Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and
void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still
existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence,
petitioners contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy
had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003,
declaring petitioners 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of
Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her
motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the
reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v.
Court of Appeals,4 denied reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of
her first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said
marriage is not without legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy."5
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where
petitioner alleges that:
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE
DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION
OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE
FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL
JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38
BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE
INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE
MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE
LICENSE.
160
V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND
THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true that
right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the
proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners
marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she
also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter,
was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension, while
the CA struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,6 the Court categorically stated that:
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in
such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity. x x x
xxxx
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to
be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal
backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent
entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the
civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question. x x x7
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People, 8 where it was held thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior
to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners
assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could
simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as
a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.9
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioners conviction of the crime
of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners two
marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment
petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared
null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration
of the second marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and
void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial
declaration of the nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy make any difference. 10 As held in Tenebro,
"[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate
that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage."11
Petitioners defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is
classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that
"[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years," while Article 91
states that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x ."
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence,
prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense
has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of
its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving.12 Thus, for petitioners
defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as early as
the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present
sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioners testimony that her own mother told Uy in
1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally
unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:
x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother the person who allegedly actually told Uy
about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory testimony
of her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay. 13
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 "the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should
be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the
bigamous marriage.15 Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of prescription
began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.1avvphi1
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised
Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The
Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine
the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without
161
any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. 16
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper. Under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The
penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The
minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the
duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances proven in
this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium period, which is
from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of
10 years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioners marriage to Alocillo has after
all been declared by final judgment17 to be void ab initio on account of the latters psychological
incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it
proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the
penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164435 June 29, 2010
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration1 dated November 11, 2009 and respondent's
Comment2thereto dated March 5, 2010.
In the Decision dated September 29, 2009, the Court affirmed petitioner's conviction for bigamy.
Petitioner is moving for reconsideration of the Decision, arguing that since petitioner's marriages
were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of
the Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent
marriage.
Petitioner's argument lacks merit.
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr.,3 the Court already made the declaration that Article
40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family
Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that
as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. 4
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,5 the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of
Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy.
He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge
by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void
for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage
aware of the absence of a requisite usually the marriage license and thereafter contract a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that
the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on bigamy. x x
x 6lawphil
The foregoing scenario is what petitioner seeks to obtain in her case, and this, the Court shall never
sanction. Clearly, therefore, petitioner's asseveration, that Article 40 of the Family Code should not
be applied to her case, cannot be upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 11, 2009
is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAES, Complainant,
vs.
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Order 1 dated
September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in
Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL which dismissed the lnformation for Bigamy filed against respondent
Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC Resolution2 dated January 2, 2008 denying the
motion for reconsideration.
162
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan.3 On January 24,
1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio)
in San Pedro, Laguna.4 In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latters
psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code, which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an Amended
Decision5 declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became
final and executory on October 13, 2003.6
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montaez, Silverios daughter from the first
marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint 7 for Bigamy against
respondent, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the complaint was an
Affidavit8 (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August 23, 2004, thumb-marked and signed by
Silverio,9 which alleged, among others, that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still
married to Socrates. On November 17, 2004, an Information 10 for Bigamy was filed against
respondent with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 4990-SPL. The Information reads:
That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with one SILVERIO CIPRIANO
VINALON while her first marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by
proper judicial authorities.11
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash
Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint)12 alleging that her marriage with Socrates
had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior
to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e.,
two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the second marriage was held
in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment 13 arguing
that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her petition for
declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage which appears
to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been annulled or declared void
by the court.
In its Order14 dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent's argument that
with the declaration of nullity of her first marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak of and
thus the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to have been laid to rest by our
ruling in Mercado v. Tan15 where we held:
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage
declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. For
contracting a second marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. x x x16
As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found that while the
second marriage indeed took place in 1983, or more than the 15-year prescriptive period for the
crime of bigamy, the commission of the crime was only discovered on November 17, 2004, which
should be the reckoning period, hence, prescription has not yet set in.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 claiming that the Mercado ruling was not
applicable, since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family Code; that
the petition for annulment was granted and became final before the criminal complaint for bigamy
was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because this
will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of a completely
void prior marriage.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,18 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a new one be entered
quashing the information. Accordingly, let the instant case be DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second marriage on January
24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not require a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage; that
jurisprudence before the Family Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage. The RTC found that both marriages of
respondent took place before the effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the unsettled state
of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before
commencing a second marriage and the principle that laws should be interpreted liberally in favor
of the accused, it declared that the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not prejudice
the accused whose second marriage was declared once and for all valid with the annulment of her
first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by respondent.
In a Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that the
judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or
confirmation that said marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in contracting a
second marriage cannot be considered criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the following issues:
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the
pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a valid
defense for a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage prior to the enactment of the
Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the
Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of securing a
declaration of nullity of the first marriage before entering a second marriage ambivalent, such that a
person was allowed to enter a subsequent marriage without the annulment of the first without
incurring criminal liability.19
163
Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of the Information for
bigamy was filed by private complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which
should represent the government in all judicial proceedings filed before us. 20
Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had done in the past. In Antone v.
Beronilla,21 the offended party (private complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA)
the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her husband, and the CA dismissed
the petition on the ground, among others, that the petition should have been filed in behalf of the
People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases. In a
petition filed with us, we said that we had given due course to a number of actions even when the
respective interests of the government were not properly represented by the OSG and said:
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order ruling of the
trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order
or ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff People of the
Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required the
OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in some cases. In light of its Comment, we
rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for the People of the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)22
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, which it did, praying
that the petition be granted in effect, such Comment had ratified the petition filed with us.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in quashing
the Information for bigamy filed against respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as follow:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage
has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The
felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.23 It is
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. 24
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in 1983,
her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been
annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were alleged
in the Information. In her Motion to Quash the Information, she alleged, among others, that:
xxxx
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage with said Socrates
Flores was declared void ab initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City. The said decision was never appealed, and became final and
executory shortly thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage with Mr.
Flores had already been declared void from the beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In other words,
there was only one marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is therefore
wanting.25
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity was
declared only in 2003. The question now is whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first
marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.
We rule in the negative.
In Mercado v. Tan,26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
In Abunado v. People,27 we held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the
first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. 28 Even if the accused
eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first
and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.29
In Tenebro v. CA,30 we declared that although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage
is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To
hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.31
And in Jarillo v. People,32 applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the accused's conviction
for bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused contracted a second marriage without the previous
one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated
because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, the accuseds first marriage which had
164
not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and
subsisting.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting
as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she
contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was
properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were
sufficiently alleged.
In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration nullity of his first
marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy.
He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge
by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void
for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage
license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of
the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the
provision on bigamy.38

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 24,
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the declaration of nullity of the
2007 and the Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna,
previous marriage came after the filing of the Information, unlike in this case where the declaration
Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-
was rendered before the information was filed. We do not agree. What makes a person criminally
SPL is ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.
SO ORDERED.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is [G.R. No. 183824 : December 08, 2010]
so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists.34 Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration MYRNA P. ANTONE, PETITIONER, VS. LEO R. BERONILLA, RESPONDENT.
of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.35
DECISION
Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were contracted prior
PEREZ, J.:
to the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect
because this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a judicial declaration of
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify
nullity of a completely void marriage.
and set aside the issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 102834, to wit: (a) the
Resolution[1]dated 29 April 2008 dismissing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which assailed
We are not persuaded. the trial court's Orders[2] dated 20 September 2007 and 6 December 2007 in Criminal Case No. 07-
0907-CFM for Bigamy; and (b) the Resolution[3] dated 18 July 2008 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the first resolution.
In Jarillo v. People,36 where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration, argued that since her
marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is
The trial court quashed the Information on the ground that the elements of Bigamy were rendered
Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613),37 instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires
incomplete after herein respondent presented documents to prove a fact, which the court believed
a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent
would negate the allegation in the Information that there was a first valid marriage. The evidence
marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious and said:
presented showed that respondent later obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of the first union
following the celebration of a subsequent marriage.
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that Article
40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family The Antecedents
Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus: On 12 March 2007, herein petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint[4] for Bigamy
against Leo R. Beronilla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. She alleged that her
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in 1991.
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.1wphi1 On 21 June 2007, the prosecution filed the corresponding Information[5] before the Regional Trial
Court, Pasay City. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM and raffled to Branch
115.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of
Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit: Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, herein respondent moved to quash the Information
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.[6] He informed the court that his
marriage with petitioner was declared null and void by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval,

165
Biliran on 26 April 2007;[7] that the decision became final and executory on 15 May 200[7];[8] and that jurisdiction when it dismissed the case of bigamy and denied her motion for reconsideration.
such decree has already been registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar on 12 June 2007. [9] He
argued that since the marriage had been declared null and void from the beginning, there was In its Resolution of 29 April 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition stating that:
actually no first marriage to speak of. Absent a first valid marriage, the facts alleged in the
Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy.[10] The present petition xxx is fatally infirm in form and substance for the following reasons:

In its comment/opposition to the motion,[11] the prosecution, through herein petitioner, maintained 1. The verification is defective as it does not include the assurance that the allegations in the petition
that the respondent committed an act which has all the essential requisites of bigamy. The are based on authentic records.
prosecution pointed out that the marriage of petitioner and respondent on 18 November 1978 has
not yet been severed when he contracted a second marriage on 16 February 1991, for which reason, 2. Since the petition assails the trial court's dismissal of the criminal information for bigamy filed
bigamy has already been committed before the court declared the first marriage null and void on 27 against private respondent Leo Beronilla, the petition, if at all warranted, should be filed in behalf of
April 2007.[12] The prosecution also invoked the rulings of the Supreme Court holding that a motion the People of the Philippines by the Office of the Solicitor General, being its statutory counsel in all
to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information, and that facts contrary appealed criminal cases.
thereto are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence. [13]
3. There is a violation of the rule on double jeopardy as the dismissal of the subject criminal case is
After a hearing on the motion,[14] the court quashed the Information.[15] Applying Morigo v. tantamount to an acquittal based on the trial court's finding that the first essential element of
People,[16]it ruled: bigamy, which is a first valid marriage contracted by private respondent is wanting. There is no
clear showing in the petition that the dismissal was tainted with arbitrariness which violated
Hence, contrary to what was stated in the Information, accused Beronilla was actually never legally petitioner's right to due process. Notably, petitioner filed her comment/opposition to private
married to Myrna Antone. On this score alone, the first element appears to be respondent's motion to quash before the trial court issued its Order dated September 20, 2007
missing. Furthermore, the statement in the definition of Bigamy which reads "before the first dismissing the information. Hence, if there is no denial of due process, there can be no grave abuse
marriage has been legally dissolved" clearly contemplates that the first marriage must at least be of discretion that would merit the application of the exception to the double jeopardy rule. [28]
annullable or voidable but definitely not void, as in this case. xxx [I]n a similar case, [the Supreme
Court] had the occasion to state: On 18 July 2008, the Court of Appeals denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforequoted Resolution for lack of merit. [29]
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, Hence, this petition.[30]
there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being
declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." xxx The existence and the Our Ruling
validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a
conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. xxx[17] I

The prosecution, through herein petitioner, moved for reconsideration of the said Order[18] on the We are convinced that this petition should be given due course despite the defect in the pleading
ground, among others, that the facts and the attending circumstances in Morigo are not on all fours and the question of legal standing to bring the action.
with the case at bar. It likewise pointed out that, in Mercado v. Tan,[19] this Court has already settled
that "(a) declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause The Rules of Court provides that a pleading required to be verified which lacks a proper verification
of action or a ground for defense."[20] shall be treated as unsigned pleading.[31]

In its Order of 6 December 2007,[21] the court denied the motion for reconsideration stating
that Mercado has already been superseded by Morigo.
In the interim, in a Petition for Relief from Judgment[22] before the Regional Trial Court of Naval,
Biliran, petitioner questioned the validity of the proceedings in the petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage in Civil Case No. B-1290 on 5 October 2007. On 24 March 2008, the court set
aside its Decision of 26 April 2007 declaring the marriage of petitioner with respondent null and
void, and required herein petitioner (respondent in Civil Case No. B-1290) to file her "answer to the
complaint."[23] On 21 July 2008, the court DISMISSED the petition for nullity of marriage for failure
of herein respondent (plaintiff in Civil Case No. B-1290) to submit his pre-trial brief.[24] Respondent,
however, challenged the orders issued by the court before the Court of Appeals. [25] The matter is
still pending resolution thereat.[26]
Meanwhile, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed on 26 March 2008
before the Court of Appeals,[27] herein petitioner alleged that the Pasay City trial court acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
This, notwithstanding, we have, in a number of cases, opted to relax the rule in order that the ends of
justice may be served.[32] The defect being merely formal and not jurisdictional, we ruled that the
court may nevertheless order the correction of the pleading, or even act on the pleading "if the
attending circumstances are such that xxx strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in
order that the ends of justice xxx may be served."[33] At any rate, a pleading is required to be verified
only to ensure that it was prepared in good faith, and that the allegations were true and correct and
not based on mere speculations.[34]
There is likewise no dispute that it is the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which has the
authority to represent the government in a judicial proceeding before the Court of Appeals. The
Administrative Code specifically defined its powers and functions to read, among others:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government
of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
166
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. xxx It shall have the following opportunity to present their side[s]. xxx The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in
specific powers and functions: court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case.[46]

(1)Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and
all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or
any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.[35]
As an exception to this rule, the Solicitor General is allowed to:
(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the
Solicitor General and appear or represent the Government in cases involving their respective offices,
brought before the courts and exercise supervision and control over such legal officers with respect
to such cases.[36]
Thus, in Republic v. Partisala,[37] we held that the summary dismissal of an action in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, when not initiated by the Solicitor General, is in order. [38] Not even the
appearance of the conformity of the public prosecutor in a petition for certiorari would suffice
because the authority of the City Prosecutor or his assistant to represent the People of the
Philippines is limited to the proceedings in the trial court. [39]
We took exceptions, however, and gave due course to a number of actions even when the respective
interests of the government were not properly represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.
In Labaro v. Panay,[40] this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order or ruling of the
trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order
or ruling before us.[41] xxx
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff People
of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we
required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in some cases. [42] In light of its
Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for the
People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
II
We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the filing of this petition is in violation of the
respondent's right against double jeopardy on the theory that he has already been practically
acquitted when the trial court quashed the Information.
Well settled is the rule that for jeopardy to attach, the following requisites must concur:
(1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a
valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is
otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent. [47]
The third and fourth requisites are clearly wanting in the instant case as (a) respondent has not yet
entered his plea to the charge when he filed the Motion to Quash the Information, and (2) the case
was dismissed not merely with his consent but, in fact, at his instance. [48]
We reiterate, time and again, that jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on account of an
order sustaining a motion to quash.[49] More specifically, the granting of a motion to quash anchored
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is "not a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense."[50] Thus:
It will be noted that the order sustaining the motion to quash the complaint against petitioner was
based on Subsection (a) of Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court - that the facts charged in the
complaint do not constitute an offense. If this is so then the dismissal of said complaint will not be a
bar to another prosecution for the same offense, for it is provided in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court [now Section 6 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure] that an order sustaining the
motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was
based on the grounds specified in Section 2, Subsection[s] (f) and (h) of this rule [now substantially
reproduced in Section 3, Subsections (g) and (i) of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure] xxx. [51]
III

In Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, We now determine the merit of the petition did the trial court act without or in excess of
Inc.,[43]without requiring the Office of the Solicitor General to file a comment on the petition, this jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion when it sustained respondent's motion to quash on the
Court determined the merits of the case involving a novel issue on the nature and scope of basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the information?
jurisdiction of the Cooperative Development Authority to settle cooperative disputes as well as the
battle between two (2) factions concerning the management of the Dolefil Agrarian Reform Petitioner maintains that the trial court did so because the motion was a hypothetical admission of
Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI) "that inevitably threatens the very existence of one of the the facts alleged in the information and any evidence contrary thereto can only be presented as a
country's major cooperatives."[44] matter of defense during trial.

And, lest we defeat the ends of justice, we opt to look into the merit of the instant petition even Consistent with existing jurisprudence, we agree with the petitioner.
absent the imprimatur of the Solicitor General. After all, "for justice to prevail, the scales must
balance, for justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone."[45] To borrow the words of then We define a motion to quash an Information as
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario in another case where the dismissal of a criminal case pending with
the trial court was sought: the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed
against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face
[T]he task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our democratic society under of the Information.[52]
the rule of law, ensuring that all those who [come or are brought to court] are afforded a fair
This motion is "a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Information,"[53] for which

167
reason, the court cannot consider allegations contrary to those appearing on the face of the
information.[54]
As further elucidated in Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals:[55]
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute
the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss/quash on the ground that it charges no offense
may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash on this ground is
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the
offense as defined in the law.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, a reading of the information will disclose that the essential
elements of the offense charged are sufficiently alleged. It is not proper therefore to resolve the
charges at the very outset, in a preliminary hearing only and without the benefit of a full-blown
trial. The issues require a fuller examination. Given the circumstances of this case, we feel it would
be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to dismiss the informations
on the basis only of the petitioner's evidence, such as [this].[56]
As in the recent case of Los Baos v. Pedro,[57] where we found no merit in respondent's allegation
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because "the Information duly charged a specific
offense and provide[d] the details on how the offense was committed," [58] we see no apparent defect
in the allegations in the Information in the case at bar. Clearly, the facts alleged in its accusatory
portion, which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1991, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, LEO R. BERONILLA, having been
united in a lawful marriage with one MYRNA A. BERONILLA, which marriage is still in force and
subsisting and without having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo, which subsequent marriage of the
accused has all the essential requisites for validity.[59]
sufficiently constitute an offense. It contained all the elements of the crime of Bigamy under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code hereunder enumerated:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. [60]
The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the marriage of petitioner and
respondent is null and void from the beginning; and (2) such judgment has already become final and
executory and duly registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval, Biliran are pieces of
evidence that seek to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the Information that a first valid
marriage was subsisting at the time the respondent contracted a subsequent marriage. This should
not have been considered at all because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
Neither do we find a justifiable reason for sustaining the motion to quash even after taking into
consideration the established exceptions to the rule earlier recognized by this Court, among others:
(1) when the new allegations are admitted by the prosecution;[61] (2) when the Rules so permit, such
as upon the grounds of extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy; [62] and (3) when facts
have been established by evidence presented by both parties which destroyed the prima facie truth
of the allegations in the information during the hearing on a motion to quash based on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and "it would be pure technicality for the court to
close its eyes to said facts and still give due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to
be weak even to support possible conviction xxx."[63]
For of what significance would the document showing the belated dissolution of the first marriage
offer? Would it serve to prevent the impracticability of proceeding with the trial in accordance
with People v. dela Rosa thereby warranting the non-observance of the settled rule that a motion to
quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information? We quote:
[W]here in the hearing on a motion to quash predicated on the ground that the allegations of the
information do not charge an offense, facts have been brought out by evidence presented by both
parties which destroy the prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the
hypothetical admission thereof, as is implicit in the nature of the ground of the motion to quash, it
would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts and still give due course
to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even to support possible conviction,
and hold the accused to what would clearly appear to be a merely vexatious and expensive
trial, on her part, and a wasteful expense of precious time on the part of the court, as well as
of the prosecution.[64] (Emphasis supplied.)
We find that there is none.
With the submission of the documents showing that the court has declared the first marriage
void ab initio, respondent heavily relied on the rulings[65] in People v. Mendoza and Morigo declaring
that: (a) a case for bigamy based on a void ab initio marriage will not prosper because there is no
need for a judicial decree to establish that a void ab initio marriage is invalid;[66] and (b) a marriage
declared void ab initio has retroactive legal effect such that there would be no first valid marriage to
speak of after all, which renders the elements of bigamy incomplete. [67]
Both principles, however, run contrary to the new provision of the Family Code, which was
promulgated by the late President Corazon C. Aquino in 1987, a few years before respondent's
subsequent marriage was celebrated in 1991.
The specific provision, which reads:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
was exhaustively discussed in Mercado,[68] where this Court settled the "conflicting" jurisprudence
on "the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage." After establishing that
Article 40 is a new provision expressly requiring a judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage
and examining a long line of cases,[69] this Court, concluded, in essence, that under the Family Code a
subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case
because, by then, the crime had already been consummated. Otherwise stated, this Court declared
that a person, who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous one, is guilty of bigamy.[70]
Notably, Morigo, was indeed promulgated years after Mercado. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the
Order dated 6 December 2007 of the trial court, which maintained that Morigo has already
superseded Mercado. In fact, in Morigo, this Court clearly distinguished the two (2) cases from one
another, and explained:
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case,
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second
168
marriage was already celebrated. xxx
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized xxx. Ostensibly,
at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their
own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage
and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless
he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. [71]
The application of Mercado to the cases following Morigo even reinforces the position of this Court
to give full meaning to Article 40 of the Family Code. Thus, in 2004, this Court ruled in Tenebro v.
Court of Appeals:[72]
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between
the spouses is concerned, xxx said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that
children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. xxx.[73] (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, in Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico,[74] this
Court pronounced:
In a catena of cases,[75] the Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. xxx
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the
purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an
offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in
his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations
in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of
evidence.
All considered, we find that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when, in so quashing
the Information in Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM, it considered an evidence introduced to prove a
fact not alleged thereat disregarding the settled rules that a motion to quash is a hypothetical
admission of the facts stated in the information; and that facts not alleged thereat may be
appreciated only under exceptional circumstances, none of which is obtaining in the instant
petition.
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated 20 September 2007 and 6 December 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 115, Pasay City as well as the Resolutions dated 29 April 2008 and 18 July 2008 of the
Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM is REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting, while still being married to
Hilda Villareyes, a second marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro argues that
since his second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void ab initio on the ground of
the latters psychological incapacity, he should be acquitted for the crime of bigamy.
The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. 1 Bigamy
presupposes a valid prior marriage and a subsequent marriage, contracted during the subsistence of
the prior union, which would have been binding were it not for its being bigamous.
Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its judicial
declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a party
or both parties to the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained),
the answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and
no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity. 2 As early as the case of People vs. Aragon3 this
Court has underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does not, unlike the rule then
prevailing in Spain, require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before
it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law contemplated
otherwise, said the Court, an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in
the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation of
penal statutes. In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and,
therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were contracted prior to the
decree of annulment)4 the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being
void ab initioand legally inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy.
It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a person may be convicted of
bigamy although the first marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second
marriage is contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage. 5 I
maintain strong reservations to this ruling. Article 40 of the Family Code reads:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
It is only for purpose of remarriage that the law has expressed that the absolute nullity of the
previous marriage may be invoked on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. It may not be amiss to state that under the regime of the Civil Code of 1950, the
Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge Sempio-Diy,6 has held that a subsequent marriage of one of the
spouses of a prior void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it were contracted before
a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage. Although this pronouncement has been
abandoned in a later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of Appeals,7 the Family Code, however has
seen it fit to adopt the Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is just to say that the
subsequent marriage shall itself be considered void. There is no clear indication to conclude that the
Family Code has amended or intended to amend the Revised penal Code or to abandon the settled
and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.8
169
 A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The provision has been
from Canon law primarily to reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with those
of church laws.9 The psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations of the
spouses is completely distinct from other grounds for nullity which are confined to the essential or
formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or disqualification of the contracting
parties, want of consent, absence of a marriage license, or the like.
The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties thereto
may be said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid
until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the Family Code considers children
conceived or born of such a void marriage before its judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate
similar to the rule on a voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to assume, that the
spouses rights and obligations, property regime and successional rights would continue unaffected,
as if it were a voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially declared void for
basically two reasons: First, psychological incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity of a
marriage under the Family Code, breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of a
valid marriages;10 and second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e.,
relationship, minority of the parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the parties)
which are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity, however, being
a mental state, may not so readily be as evident. 11 It would have been logical for the Family Code
to consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it were not for apparent attempt
to make it closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and nomenclature.
Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to merely differ from a
voidable marriage in that, unlike the latter, it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or
prescription. It might be recalled that prior to republic Act No. 8533, further amending the Family
Code, an action or defense of absolute nullity of marriage falling under Article 36, celebrated before
the effectivity of the Code, could prescribe in ten years following the effectivity of the Family Code.
The initial provision of the ten-year period of prescription seems to betray a real consciousness by
the framers that marriages falling under Article 36 are truly meant to be inexistent.
Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a void marriage due to
psychological incapacity remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until
judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been declared a nullity (or
otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning
the validity of the first marriage would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same way that a civil
case assailing a prior voidable marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial
question to the prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy.
In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first
marriage, this Court has declared in a line of cases that no crime of bigamy is committed.12 The
Court has explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs only,
be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the essential elements of a valid
marriage, were it not for the subsisting first union. Hence, where it is established that the second
marriage has been contracted without the necessary license and thus void, 13 or that the accused is
merely forced to enter into the second (voidable) marriage, 14 no criminal liability for the crime of
bigamy can attach. In both and like instances, however, the lapses refers to the elements required
for contracting a valid marriage. If, then, all the requisites for the perfection of the contract
marriage, freely and voluntarily entered into, are shown to be extant, the criminal liability for
bigamy can unassailably arise.
Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an infirmity in
the elements, either essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of
nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more, would be
inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it
does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of
nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the
perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of the offender who
had entered into it.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March
2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-
existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged
that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three
children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a
customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamins family. In December 1981,
Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together
as husband and wife. Sallys father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to
appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a
purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of
their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names
of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin,
married to Sally;
170
 (3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783
registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a
single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice
and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in
turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it
lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition
of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his
appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the
declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties
became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties
enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court
denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to
present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of
Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February
2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and
28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her
evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave
weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was
confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for
the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to
Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamins
subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial
court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not
committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice
and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sallys claim for
spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support
for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named
in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was
not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by
Benjamins parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance
inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married
to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamins civil status in the title. As regards the two lots
under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using
his own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry
in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by
TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782
and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two
condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that
the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of
the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamins right to dispute
his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was
married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sallys share in
the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while
Benjamins share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at
Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared
NONEXISTENT.
Respondents claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT
Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949,
188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627,
194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638,
194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan
and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of
Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these
thirty-seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties
acquired from petitioners money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are
properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the
administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her
collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from
notice hereof to turn over and surrender control and possession of these properties including the
documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-
ownership of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared
FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner
shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and
distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No.
02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-
10.
171
Respondents claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack
of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General
and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its
Order dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial courts
decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted
that there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of
evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would
be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her
evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed
despite the presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamins action was based on
his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or
dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamins marriage to Sally null and void.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that
would show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from
the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision
and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring
TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely
owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and
common and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the
conjugal partnership under his first marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue
to her. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. In its 14 March 2012
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial
courts ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;

The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial
Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the
courts decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by
initio and non-existent; and
them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with
modification the trial courts decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the
Sally.
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him
exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
The Ruling of this Court
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782
and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamins actual The petition has no merit.
contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing
marriage with Azucena while Sallys share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and
convincing proof of bad faith. Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts ruling that she waived her
right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and

172
Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right
but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sallys presentation of evidence was
scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4
and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at
Sallys instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally
that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the
date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on
presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sallys counsel insisted that the
trial court could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial
courts prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she
had been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the postponements were at her
instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she
still fail to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed
to have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sallys continued
failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of
interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case because she
was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial courts
denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any
temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to
protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that
trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties. 10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin
because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally
further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she would have proven her
marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in
acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that
Benjamin was the informant in their childrens birth certificates where he stated that he was their
father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally
claims that there was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally
further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with
Azucena.
First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial
court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally
entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena
was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer
II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to
Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were
issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series
issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue
Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar
is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance,
the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. 11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and
Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license.12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of
record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the
Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts; 14 and
Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office.15 The
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and
Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in
jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected
social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents seen as
Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a
proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the
informant in Bernices birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8
March 198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentleys birth certificate which also stated that
Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married
on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio
and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized
without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void
from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without
a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage
License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar
of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article
3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also
non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the
Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the
beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial courts ruling that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all
aspects the trial courts decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands." 22 While the Court of
Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the
decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial
courts discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1wphi1 The trial
court stated:
On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be
null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid,
there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face
of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of
the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was
173
contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be
Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30
was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to
petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by
a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena. 23
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing
the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for
further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision,
validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. 24 In this case, there was really no subsequent
showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license.
The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic
evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which
may be inferred from the decision or order itself.32 In this case, we have sufficiently explained that
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sallys continued refusal to
present her evidence.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed
by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used
uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for his
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or voluntary inhibition.
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
credit.

SO ORDERED
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue
to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015 - LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. Respondent.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired
by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by
Benjamins father to his children as advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the petition before the
trial court even admitted that "Benjamins late father himself conveyed a number of properties to
his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x."25
FIRST DIVISION

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more
G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015
in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered
in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally 28 with the descriptive title "married
to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the
DECISION
name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name
of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. 29 Such words do not
SERENO, C.J.:

174
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for five
Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 72322 convicting her of years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively
bigamy. rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.

THE FACTS The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11redarclaw

Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and
Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded not guilty, while her
putative husband escaped the criminal suit.5redarclaw
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June
1974,6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow then, married
Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she
wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was without responsibility. 7redarclaw
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime
of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married.
She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be
proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the
lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which
occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation
and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already
married Santos.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court
to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court can not do.
The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment
of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these
proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known
of the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses narration. It likewise
disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply
stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question.
Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12redarclaw
THE ISSUES

THE RTC RULING Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because
she was not aware of Santoss previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond
his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already reasonable doubt.
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the
affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was Citing People v. De Lara,13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of
incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos. 8redarclaw a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages
exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, her marriage was celebrated husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records that she married
without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the five-year
admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage.9 Thus, the requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.
trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 10redarclaw
In the Comment14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond husbands subsequent marriage. As regards petitioners denial of any knowledge of Santoss first
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the
Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.
Prision Correctional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
No pronouncement as to costs.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which proceedings.
provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived
175
 Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla21 holds that the second spouse, if
In Montaez v. Cipriano,15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B.
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that a person, whether man or woman, who
knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary an accomplice in the crime of bigamy.22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage accomplice to the crime.
has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of
is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the
the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the
would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied) penalty next lower in degree,23prision correccional, which has a duration of six months and one day
to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and
Jr.16 instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v. two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 24 petitioner shall be
Archilla17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouses existing entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which
prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes has a duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.
her responsible as an accomplice.
The criminal liability of petitioner
The Ruling of the Court resulting from her marriage to
Santos
The penalty for bigamy and petitioners
knowledge of Santoss first marriage Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of
other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26 In this case, petitioner has
in Nepomuceno:18redarclaw consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages
celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.28redarclaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not
the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his pass judgment on the validity of the marriage. The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved her union with Santos was in vain.
marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis
supplied) On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and given
that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now resolves to
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioners knowledge of Santoss marriage to correct the error of the courts a quo.
Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality
of the following circumstances:19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place
of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their
person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family
witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly Code. The provision reads as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of
Santos. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.
the RTC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized
courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained
opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.
trial.20redarclaw
Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a marriage
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was license had they cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years before their
validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts imposition of the marriage.31redarclaw
principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty
within the range of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum. Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February
199632 and that after six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any

176
objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages, 44 petitioner married Santos while
Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was knowing fully well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement
residing in the house of her in-laws,34and her children from her previous marriage disliked under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to
him.35 On cross-examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets. 36redarclaw
The applicability of People v. De Lara
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for
only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the
five years prior to their marriage. ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found
that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage
records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of
Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented bigamy.
that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other.
Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in which the Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract
solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage,
was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore,
unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as
The legal effects in a criminal case innocent of the crime.
of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the
marriage No less than the present Constitution provides that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 45 It must be safeguarded from the
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation whims and caprices of the contracting parties.46|||In keeping therefore with this fundamental policy,
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy.
anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions
of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago
cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566
contract. is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision
effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an correccional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses.38In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
States penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
G.R. No. 183805 July 3, 2013
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER,
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioners illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in vs.
the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS.
the sanctity of marriage.40redarclaw
DECISION
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded.41If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a PERALTA, J.:
transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42As a result, litigants
shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43redarclaw
reversal of the Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of
bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage
license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by The factual antecedents are as follows:
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their

177
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said
marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter.
Contrary to law.3
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil
case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla
Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him
from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the
second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing
of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient
invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a
subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the
beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage
between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioners Manifestation and Motion
to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated
December 1, 2004 had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch
72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P. Capili and
Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity of marriage) nullifying the second marriage
between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that the
issues raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-
captioned case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not determine whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court is of
the humble opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it appears
that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had already been
nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared "the voidness,
non-existent or incipient invalidity" of the said second marriage. As such, this Court submits that
there is no more bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision. The
fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied in
a Resolution[7] dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO
REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING
THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS
THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF
THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE
PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY
G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO
BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE,
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A
GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH
RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID
DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE.
THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN
EXCEPTION TO EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND
THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION
178
 OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF
THE FAMILY CODE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY
RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS
THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES
WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND
UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND
DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE
OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage
is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2)
the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the
Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted
on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla
Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared
the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the
subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar
the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of
bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the
first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accuseds conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of
bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior
to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners
assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could
simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as
a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.11
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what
makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held
as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission
of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by
law.13 It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he
contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioners second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge
for bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008
and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 180863 : September 8, 2009]
ANGELITA VALDEZ, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac dated November 12, 2007
179
dismissing petitioner Angelita Valdez's petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her
husband, Sofio Polborosa (Sofio).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December 13, 1971, petitioner
gave birth to the spouses' only child, Nancy. According to petitioner, she and Sofio argued constantly
because the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, Sofio left
their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner and their child waited for him to return but, finally, in May 1972,
petitioner decided to go back to her parents' home in Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. Three years
passed without any word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed up at Bancay 1st. He and
petitioner talked for several hours and they agreed to separate. They executed a document to that
effect.1 That was the last time petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didn't hear any news of
Sofio, his whereabouts or even if he was alive or not.2
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20,
1985.3Subsequently, however, Virgilio's application for naturalization filed with the United States
Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioner's marriage to Sofio was
subsisting.4 Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac
seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
The RTC rendered its Decision5 on November 12, 2007, dismissing the Petition for lack of merit. The
RTC held that Angelita "was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her husband Sofio
Polborosa was already dead." It said that under Article 41 of the Family Code, the present spouse is
burdened to prove that her spouse has been absent and that she has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. This
belief, the RTC said, must be the result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse.
The RTC found that, by petitioner's own admission, she did not try to find her husband anymore in
light of their mutual agreement to live separately. Likewise, petitioner's daughter testified that her
mother prevented her from looking for her father. The RTC also said there is a strong possibility
that Sofio is still alive, considering that he would have been only 61 years old by then, and people
who have reached their 60s have not become increasingly low in health and spirits, and, even
assuming as true petitioner's testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a drunkard, there is no
evidence that he continues to drink and smoke until now.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.6 She argued that it is the Civil Code that applies in this
case and not the Family Code since petitioner's marriage to Sofio was celebrated on January 11,
1971, long before the Family Code took effect. Petitioner further argued that she had acquired a
vested right under the provisions of the Civil Code and the stricter provisions of the Family Code
should not be applied against her because Title XIV of the Civil Code, where Articles 384 and 390 on
declaration of absence and presumption of death, respectively, can be found, was not expressly
repealed by the Family Code. To apply the stricter provisions of the Family Code will impair the
rights petitioner had acquired under the Civil Code.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 10, 2007.7
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the RTC Decision and Motion for
Reconsideration.
In its Manifestation and Motion,8 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended that the
Court set aside the assailed RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio presumptively dead.
The OSG argues that the requirement of "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code is
not applicable to the instant case. It said that petitioner could not be expected to comply with this
requirement because it was not yet in existence during her marriage to Virgilio Reyes in 1985. The
OSG further argues that before the effectivity of the Family Code, petitioner already acquired a
vested right as to the validity of her marriage to Virgilio Reyes based on the presumed death of Sofio
under the Civil Code. This vested right and the presumption of Sofio's death, the OSG posits, could
not be affected by the obligations created under the Family Code. 9
Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not repealed by Article 41 of the
Family Code.10 Title XIV of the Civil Code, the OSG said, was not one of those expressly repealed by
the Family Code. Moreover, Article 256 of the Family Code provides that its provisions shall not be
retroactively applied if they will prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. 11
The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed. However, we must state that we
are denying the Petition on grounds different from those cited in the RTC Decision.
Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this
Court from a decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one
hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; on the other
hand, a question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the
alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely relates to the correct
application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts. 12
The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding that petitioner needed to
prove a "well-founded belief" that Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the Family
Code, to wit:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on January 11,
1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse
of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
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(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he
has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any
of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
Article 390 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives,
he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years
shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-quoted provision in this wise:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law
only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that
such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of
the celebration of the marriage.13
Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court proceedings
independent of the settlement of the absentee's estate.
In re Szatraw14 is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted marriage with a Polish national in
1937. They lived together as husband and wife for three years. Sometime in 1940, the husband, on
the pretext of visiting some friends, left the conjugal abode with their child and never returned.
After inquiring from friends, petitioner found that her husband went to Shanghai, China. However,
friends who came from Shanghai told her that the husband was not seen there. In 1948, petitioner
filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband arguing that since the latter
had been absent for more than seven years and she had not heard any news from him and about her
child, she believes that he is dead. In deciding the case, the Court said:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear that
he possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property during his
married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which
permits the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard
from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in
a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for
decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the
presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special
proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the
petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his
right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for
the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for
a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there
is any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension
cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the
petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial
pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption
only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial
pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which
a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or
determine finally the right or status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which
certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final
judgment, or such right or status determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree,
then the judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party
or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except
in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration
that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or
become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard from
in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined.rbl r l l lbrr
If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been heard from in
seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period
within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject
to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of
no benefit to the petitioner.15
In Lukban v. Republic,16 petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian
on December 10, 1933. A few days later, on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent
quarrel. She did not hear from him after that day. Her diligent search, inquiries from his parents and
friends, and search in his last known address, proved futile. Believing her husband was already dead
since he had been absent for more than twenty years, petitioner filed a petition in 1956 for a
declaration that she is a widow of her husband who is presumed to be dead and has no legal
impediment to contract a subsequent marriage. On the other hand, the antecedents in Gue v.
Republic17 are similar to Szatraw. On January 5, 1946, Angelina Gue's husband left Manila where
they were residing and went to Shanghai, China. From that day on, he had not been heard of, had not
written to her, nor in anyway communicated with her as to his whereabouts. Despite her efforts and
diligence, she failed to locate him. After 11 years, she asked the court for a declaration of the
presumption of death of Willian Gue, pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that a petition for judicial declaration
that petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized
by law.18
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is
established by law19 and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is
presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, 20 Sofio is to be presumed dead
starting October 1982.
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Consequently, at the time of petitioner's marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to
petitioner's capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil
Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of "well-founded belief" is not
required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family
Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code
in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states:
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit "well-
founded belief" will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at
the time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go against the objectives
that the Family Code wishes to achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofio's
death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law.
However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage
was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
.R. No. 184621 December 10, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The petition for review on certiorari1 before us assails the decision2 dated August 27, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01558-MIN which affirmed be order3 dated December 15,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, in SP Proc. Case
No. 313-25, declaring Jerry F. Cantor, respondent Maria Fe Espinosa Cantors husband,
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Factual Antecedents
The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband
and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in
January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondents inability to
reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerrys
expression of animosity toward the respondents father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent
ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about
his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerrys disappearance, the
respondent filed before the RTC a petition4for her husbands declaration of presumptive death,
docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was
already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her
sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she
also allegedly made it a point to check the patients directory whenever she went to a hospital. All
these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in
court.
The Ruling of the RTC
After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondents petition and declaring
Jerry presumptively dead. It concluded that the respondent had a well-founded belief that her
husband was already dead since more than four (4) years had passed without the former receiving
any news about the latter or his whereabouts. The dispositive portion of the order dated December
15, 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared that respondent Jerry F. Cantor is
presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines without prejudice
to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse Jerry F. Cantor. 5
The Ruling of the CA
The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari6filed by the petitioner, Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its August 27, 2008 decision, the CA
dismissed the petitioners petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the RTCs part, and,
accordingly, fully affirmed the latters order, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
Order dated December 15, 2006 declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby AFFIRMED
in toto.7
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court. The Petition The
petitioner contends that certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial
courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Rule 41 of the
Family Code. It maintains that although judgments of trial courts in summary judicial proceedings,
including presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately final and executory (hence, not appeal
able under Article 247 of the Family Code), this rule does not mean that they are not subject to
review on certiorari.
The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to justify the
declaration of her husbands presumptive death. It claims that the respondent failed to conduct the
182
requisite diligent search for her missing husband. Likewise, the petitioner invites this Courts
attention to the attendant circumstances surrounding the case, particularly, the degree of search
conducted and the respondents resultant failure to meet the strict standard under Article 41 of the
Family Code.
The Issues
With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no longer subject to an appeal, the
dispositions and conclusions therein having become immutable and unalterable not only as against
the parties but even as against the courts.8 Modification of the courts ruling, no matter how
erroneous is no longer permissible. The final and executory nature of this summary proceeding thus
prohibits the resort to appeal. As explained in Republic of the Phils. v. Bermudez-Lorino,9 the right to
appeal is not granted to parties because of the express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, to
wit:

The petition poses to us the following issues:

(1) Whether certiorarilies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial
courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article
41 of the Family Code; and
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within
which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision
of [Article] 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory." It was erroneous,
therefore, on the part of the RTCto give due course to the Republics appeal and order the
transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.

(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead. An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law,
is immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, "the right to appeal is not
a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege." Since, by express
The Courts Ruling
mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings
in Family Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to appeal was not granted to any of
We grant the petition. the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of
presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of
November 7, 2001. [emphases ours; italics supplied]
a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy

Certiorari Lies to Challenge the

Courts Judgment in the Judicial
Decisions, Judgments or Final
Proceedings for Declaration of
Orders of Trial Courts in a Summary
Presumptive Death Is Final and
Proceeding for the Declaration of Presumptive
Executory, Hence, Unappealable
Death Under the Family Code

The Family Code was explicit that the courts judgment in summary proceedings, such as the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be
immediately final and executory.
Article 41,in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. [underscores ours]
A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy. While
jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial court's judgment, an aggrieved
party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question
any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired.
As held in Delos Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,10 the fact that a decision has become final does not
automatically negate the original action of the CA to issue certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in
connection with orders or processes issued by the trial court. Certiorari may be availed of where a
court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and where the
ordinary remedy of appeal is not available. Such a procedure finds support in the case of Republic v.
Tango,11 wherein we held that:
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in
summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions
thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY
LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:

183
"ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in death of the absentee.12
an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules."
The Present Spouse Has the Burden
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and of Proof to Show that All the
three of the same title. It states: Requisites Under Article 41 of the
Family Code Are Present
"ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites under Article 41 of
applicable."(Emphasis supplied.) the Family Code are present. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of
presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the
burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
allegation is not evidence.13

"ART.247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory."
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be Imposes a Stricter Standard
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the
trial court's judgment ina summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief " that the absentee is
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. We have had
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of
occasion to make the same observation in Republic v. Nolasco,14 where we noted the crucial
Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is
differences between Article 41 of the Family Code and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit:
concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not
sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. [emphasis ours]
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4)
years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse
Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioners resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil
Court to question the RTCs order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was proper.
Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is
still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse
b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon
the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
The Essential Requisites for the
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any news that
such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under the
Civil Code would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior
Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief
requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and
that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4)
honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouses whereabouts but,
essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.15

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of
each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to
comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouseis already
dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).

184
To illustrate this degree of "diligent and reasonable search" required by the law, an analysis of the
following relevant cases is warranted:
i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.)16
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),17 the Court ruled that the present
spouse failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his absent spouse was already dead
before he filed his petition. His efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly consisted of the following:
(1) He went to his in-laws house to look for her;
(2) He sought the barangay captains aid to locate her;
(3) He went to her friends houses to find her and inquired about her whereabouts among
his friends;
(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her in malls
during his free time;
(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and
(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.
Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled against the present spouse. The Court
found that he failed to present the persons from whom he allegedly made inquiries and only
reported his wifes absence after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded
belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code:
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still
alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death
of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the
inquiries made by [the] present spouse.18
ii. Republic v. Granada19
Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove her "well-founded
belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the petition. In this case, the
present spouse alleged that her brother had made inquiries from their relatives regarding the
absent spouses whereabouts. The present spouse did not report to the police nor seek the aid of the
mass media. Applying the standards in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth
Div.),20 the Court ruled against the present spouse, as follows:
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda
did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio
testified to having inquiredabout the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters relatives, these
relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony. In short, respondent was
allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would
have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government
agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she
did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
iii.Republic v. Nolasco21
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife, who
had been missing for more than four years. He testified that his efforts to find her consisted of:
(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;
(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and
(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless.
The Court ruled that the present spouses investigations were too sketchy to form a basis
that his wife was already dead and ruled that the pieces of evidence only proved that his
wife had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she
was dead.
iv.The present case
In the case at bar, the respondents "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest
efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:
(1) She made inquiries about Jerrys whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and
friends; and
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients
directory, hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband.1wphi1 It can be inferred from
the records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients directory therein
were unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her
hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus considers
these attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerrys absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to
look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which
the present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present
185
spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic
his/her absence to the police. state policy:

Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerrys relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made autonomous social institution.
inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present spouses bare assertion that he
inquired from his friends about his absent spouses whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the
Strict Standard Prescribed Under
friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor presented as
Article 41 of the Family Code
witnesses.
Is for the Present Spouses Benefit

Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondents claim that she
The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and consequently, the
conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-
application of a stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the present spouse's benefit. It is
founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her
intended to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
husbands whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a
Penal Code which might come into play if he/she would prematurely remarry sans the court's
"passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and
declaration.
friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a
well-founded belief that her husband was already dead. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals (Tenth Div.),22 "[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the present
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many spouse's good faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively established. The decision of the
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the natureand competent court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good faith and his/her criminal intent in case
extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse." of remarriage is effectively negated.28 Thus, for purposes of remarriage, it is necessary to strictly
comply with the stringent standard and have the absent spouse judicially declared presumptively
dead.
Strict Standard Approach Is
Consistent with the States Policy
to Protect and Strengthen Marriage Final Word

In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their
marriage, has consistently applied the "strictstandard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to
conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should
ensure that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. In Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),23 we emphasized that:
As a final word, it has not escaped this Court's attention that the strict standard required in petitions
for declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only
to cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage
and reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify
this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict standard this Court requires
in cases under Article 41 of the Family Code.

In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of
declaration of presumptive death of ones spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Appeals, which affirmed the order dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
Court in the above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly Koronadal City, South Cotabato, declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED
complied with. There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by and SET ASIDE.
parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well.
It is even possible that those who cannot have their marriages xxx declared null and void under
SO ORDERED.
Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the xxx
summary nature of its proceedings.
G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the States
policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. 24 Since marriage serves as the familys REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JOSE B. SAREOGON, JR., Respondent.
foundation25 and since it is the states policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution,26 marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In
DECISION
interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the underlying rationale to uphold the sanctity of
marriage. Arroyo, Jr.v. Court of Appeals27 reflected this sentiment when we stressed:
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
[The]protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of
which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most
186
A petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to challenge Court.
a trial court''s declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of The Family Code of the
Philippines1(Family Code).2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary In its Decision29 of October 24, 2011, the CA held that the Republic used the wrong recourse by
instituting a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA perceived no
This Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assails the October 24, 2011 Decision4 of the Court of Appeals error at all in the RTC''s judgment granting Jose''s Petition for the declaration of the presumptive
(CA) in CA-GR. SP No. 04158-MIN dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Republic death of his wife, Netchie. The CA thus held in effect that the Republic''s appeal sought to correct or
of the Philippines (Republic). review the RTC''s alleged misappreciation of evidence which could not translate into excess or lack
of jurisdiction amounting to grave abuse of discretion. 30 The CA noted that the RTC properly caused
Factual Antecedents the publication of the Order setting the case for initial hearing. 31 The CA essentially ruled that, "[a]
writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower court''s evaluation of the evidence and factual
On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition5 before the Regional findings. In other words, it is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible by an
Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamiz6 City-Branch 15 the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, appeal,"32 The CAthendisposed of the case in this wise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Netchie S.7Sareogon (Netchie).8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.

In an Amended Order dated Februrary 11, 2009, the RTC set the Petition for initial hearing on April SO ORDERED.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
16, 2009. It likewise directed the publication of said Order in a newspaper of general circulation in Issues
the cities of Tangub, Ozamiz and Oroquieta, all in the province of Misamis Occidental. Nobody
opposed the Petition.9 Trial then followed.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The Republic filed the instant Petition34 raising the following issues:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN ITS ASSAILED
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991, 11 They later became DECISION BECAUSE:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
sweethearts and on August 10,1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila City
Hall.12 However, they lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to work as I
a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. 13 For three months, he did not
receive any communication from Netchie.14 He likewise had no idea about her whereabouts.15 While THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN DISMISSING
still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie''s parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin, THE REPUBLIC''S PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, ON THE GROUND
Misamis Occidental.16 He returned home after his contract expired.17 He then inquired from THAT THE PROPER REMEDY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO APPEAL THE RTC DECISION, BECAUSE
Netchie''s relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know where she IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS OR DECISIONS ARE NOT APPEALABLE
was.18 Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. 19 He filed the UNDER THE EXPRESS PROVISION OF LAW.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petition before the RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family
Code.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
II
Jose''s testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareogon, and by Netchie''s aunt,
THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT IN LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY
Consuelo Sande.21 These two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as husband and
SUPPORT A "WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF" THAT RESPONDENT''S ABSENT WIFE X X X IS PROBABLY
wife only for one month prior to their leaving the Philippines for separate destinations
DEAD.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
abroad.22 These two added that they had no information regarding Netchie''s
Petitioner''s Arguments
location.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Republic insists that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is the
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
proper remedy to challenge an RTC''s immediately final and executory Decision on a presumptive
death.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In its Decision24 dated January 31,2011 in Spec. Proc. No. 045-08, the RTC held that Jose had
established by preponderance of evidence that he is entitled to the relief prayed for under Article 41
The Republic claims that based on jurisprudence, Jose''s alleged efforts in locating Netchie did not
of the Family Code.25 The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years, reason
engender or generate a well-founded belief that the latter is probably dead.37 It maintains that even
enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead. 26 The dispositive portion of the
as Jose avowedly averred that he exerted efforts to locate Netchie, Jose inexplicably failed to enlist
Decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
the assistance of the relevant government agencies like the Philippine National Police, the National
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Bureau of Immigration, the
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring respondent Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, or the Overseas Workers Welfare
presumptively dead for purposes of remarriage of petitioner. Administration.38 It likewise points out that Jose did not present any disinterested person to
corroborate his allegations that the latter was indeed missing and could not be found. 39 It also
SO ORDERED.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary contends that Jose did not advert to circumstances, events, occasions, or situations that would prove
that he did in fact make a comprehensive search for Netchie. 40 The Republic makes the plea that
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
courts should ever be vigilant and wary about the propensity of some erring spouses in resorting to
Article 41 of the Family Code for the purpose of terminating their
On April 19,2011, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), elevated the
marriage.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
judgment of the RTC to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari28, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of

187
Finally, the Republic submits that Jose did not categorically assert that he wanted to have Netchie
declared presumptively dead because he intends to get married again, an essential premise of
Article 41 of the Family Code.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent''s Arguments
Jose counters that the CA properly dismissed the Republic''s Petition because the latter''s petition is
erected upon the ground that the CA did not correctly weigh or calibrate the evidence on record, or
assigned to the evidence its due worth, import or significance; and that such a ground does not avail
in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.43 Jose also contends that the
Republic should have instead filed a motion for reconsideration44 of the RTC''s Decision of January
31, 2011, reasoning out that a motion for reconsideration is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
law. Jose furthermore submits that the RTC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in granting his
petition because it even dutifully complied with the publication requirement. 45 He moreover argues
that to sustain the present petition would allow the executive branch to unduly make inroads into
judicial territory.46 Finally, he insists that the trial court''s factual findings are entitled to great
weight and respect as these were arrived after due deliberation. 47chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of
Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court''s original jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence
does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, x x x 52 (Citation omitted;
Underscoring supplied)
"In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. From the Decision of the C A, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court."53chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In fact, in Republic v. Narceda,54 we held that the OSG availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a
notice of appeal under Rule 42 with the CA to question the RTCs Decision declaring the presumptive
death of Marina B. Narceda.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This Court''s Ruling Above all, this Court''s ruling in Republic v. Cantor56 made it crystal clear that the OSG properly
availed of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to challenge the RTCs Order therein declaring Jerry
This Court finds the Republic''s petition meritorious. Cantor as presumptively dead.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to question the Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the Republic correctly availed of certiorari under Rule 65 of
RTC''s Decision in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death the Revised Rules of Court in assailing before the CA the aforesaid RTCs Decision.

In the 2005 case of Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,48 we held that the RTC''s Decision on a Petition for The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is complied with only
declaration of presumptive death pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code is immediately final and upon a showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made to ascertain
executory. Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to entertain a notice of appeal pertaining to such whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead
judgment.49 Concurring in the result, Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban further therein
pointed out that the correct remedy to challenge the RTC Decision was to institute a petition We now proceed to determine whether the RTC properly granted Jose''s Petition. Article 41 of the
for certiorari under Rule 65, and not a petition for review under Rule Family Code pertinently provides that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
45.50chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
We expounded on this appellate procedure in Republic v. Tango:51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
thereon, years shall be sufficient.

Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
Code:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all spouse. (83a)
cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in In Republic v. Cantor,57 we further held that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief
three of the same title. It states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if
(Emphasis supplied.) the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Article 391 of the Civil Code;
ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the
trial court''s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and,

188
 policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as the family''s
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of foundation and since it is the state''s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
the absentee.58 (Underscoring supplied) institution, marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties. xxx
With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element that in this case invites extended
discussion), the holding is that the - xxx [I]t has not escaped this Court''s attention that the strict standard required in petitions for
mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), or lack of news that such declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only to
absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the absentee spouse or invocation of the] general cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage and
presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify this
premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict standard this Court requires in
additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief which can only be discharged cases under Article 41 of the Family Code." (Citations omitted) 62chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
upon a due showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the Given the Court''s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of presumptive death
absent spouse''s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC''s
is already dead. finding that Jose''s Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code, in
reference to the "well-founded belief standard. If anything, Jose''s pathetically anemic efforts to
xxxx locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed
by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged friends and
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of relatives as to Netchie''s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or
each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing
comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent government agencies as
diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these well as the media, Nor did he show mat he undertook a thorough, determined and unflagging search
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years were), and naming the particular
dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). 59 (Emphasis omitted; places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the
underscoring supplied) specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose 1ms "well-founded belief that Netchie was already dead
upon the following grounds: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, The Decision dated October 24, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 04158-MN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The respondent''s Petition in
(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie''s parents while he was still out of the country, but did not said Spec. Proc. No. 045-08 is accordingly DISMISSED.
reach them as they had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental;
SO ORDERED.
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already dead because when he returned home, he was
not able to obtain any information that Netchie was still alive from Netchie''s relatives and friends;
G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016
(3) Jose''s testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer alive, hence must be presumed dead, was
corroborated by Jose''s older brother, and by Netchie''s aunt, both of whom testified that he (Jose) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. NILDA B. TAMPUS, Respondent.
and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one month and that after this, there had
been no information as to Netchie''s whereabouts.
DECISION
In the above-cited case of Republic v. Cantor,60 this Court held that the present spouse (Maria Fe
Espinosa Cantor) merely conducted a "passive search" because she simply made unsubstantiated PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
inquiries from her in-laws, from neighbors and friends. For that reason, this Court stressed that the
degree of diligence and reasonable search required by law is not met (1) when there is failure to
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 17, 2013 and the
present the persons from whom the present spouse allegedly made inquiries especially the absent
Resolution3 dated September 2, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
spouse''s relatives, neighbors, and friends, (2) when there is failure to report the missing spouse''s
04588, which affirmed the Decision4 dated July 29, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu
purported disappearance or death to the police or mass media, and (3) when the present spouse''s
City, Branch 54 (RTC) declaring respondent's spouse, Dante L. Del Mundo, as presumptively dead.
evidence might or would only show that the absent spouse chose not to communicate, but not
necessarily that the latter was indeed dead.61 The rationale for this palpably stringent or rigorous
requirement has been marked out thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary The Facts
xxx [T]he Court fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their marriage, has
consistently applied the "strict standard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for declaration
of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently Respondent Nilda B. Tampus (Nilda) was married to Dante L. Del Mundo (Dante) on November 29,
circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the 1975 in Cordova, Cebu. The marriage ceremony was solemnized by Municipal Judge Julian B. Pogoy
stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. xxx of Cordova, Cebu.5 Three days thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), left respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the State''s couple had no children.6

189
Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante,. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts
proved futile.7 Thus, on April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a petition8 to declare Dante as
presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33)
years without any kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.9
Due to the absence of any oppositor, Nilda was allowed to present her evidence ex parte. She
testified on the allegations in her petition, affirming that she exerted efforts to find Dante by
inquiring from his parents, relatives, and neighbors, who, unfortunately, were also not aware of his
whereabouts. She averred that she intends to remarry and move on with her life. 10
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision11 dated July 29, 2009, the RTC granted Nilda's petition and declared Dante as
presumptively dead for all legal purposes, without prejudice to the effect of his reappearance. It
found that Dante left the conjugal dwelling sometime in 1975 and from then on, Nilda never heard
from him again despite diligent efforts to locate him. In this light, she believes that he had passed
away especially since his last assignment was a combat mission. Moreover, the RTC found that the
absence of thirty-three (33) years was sufficient to give rise to the presumption of death. 12
Dissatisfied, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), filed a petition for certiorari13 before the CA assailing the RTC Decision.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision14 dated June 17, 2013, the CA denied the OSG's petition and affirmed the RTC Decision
declaring Dante as presumptively dead. The CA gave credence to the RTC's findings that Nilda had
exerted efforts to find her husband by inquiring from his parents, relatives, and neighbors, who
likewise had no knowledge of his whereabouts. Further, the lapse of thirty-three (33) years, coupled
with the fact that Dante had been sent on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu, gave rise to Nilda's well-
founded belief that her husband is already dead.15
Moreover, the CA opined that if Dante were still alive after many years, it would have been easy for
him to communicate with Nilda, taking into consideration the fact that Dante was only 25 years old
when he left and, therefore, would have been still physically able to get in touch with his wife.
However, because neither Nilda nor his own family has heard from him for several years, it can be
reasonably concluded that Dante is already dead.16
The OSG's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated September 2, 2014; hence,
this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC
Decision declaring Dante as presumptively dead.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has merit.
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded
beliefthat the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive
death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2)
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to
remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4)
that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.20
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the foregoing requisites under
Article 41 of the Family Code exist. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of
presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the
burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.21
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere absence of
the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is
still alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would
not suffice.22 The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the
burden of complying with the stringent requirement of "well-founded belief which can only be
discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not
only the absent spouse's whereabouts, but more importantly, whether the latter is still alive or is
already dead.23
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making
inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they
also did not know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no
further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to
request information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the
authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was
sent by the AFP on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she could have
inquired from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP who were
assigned thereto. To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing
husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and
friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence required to create a "well-founded
belief of his death.
Furthermore, Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives, or neighbors as witnesses who could
have corroborated her asseverations that she earnestly looked for Dante. These resource persons
were not even named. In Republic v. Nolasco,24 it was held that the present spouse's bare assertion
that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse's whereabouts was found insufficient as
the names of said friends were not identified in the testimony nor presented as
witnesses.25cralawred
Finally, other than Nilda's bare testimony, no other corroborative evidence had been offered to
support her allegation that she exerted efforts to find him but was unsuccessful. What appears from
the facts as established in this case was that Nilda simply allowed the passage of time without
actively and diligently searching for her husband, which the Court cannot accept as constituting a
190
"well-founded belief that her husband is dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well- On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960 and
founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great a retiree pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died.11
many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
nature and extent of the inquiries made by the present spouse.26
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted P12,00012 by the SSS.
In fine, having fallen short of the stringent standard and degree of due diligence required by
jurisprudence to support her claim of a "well-founded belief that her husband Dante is already dead, Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits 13 which was also granted
the instant petition must be granted.chanrobleslaw by the SSS on April 6, 1998.14

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 17, 2013 and the
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa)
Resolution dated September 2, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04588 are
contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition of respondent Nilda B. Tampus to have her
that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her
husband, Dante L. Del Mundo, declared presumptively dead is DENIED.
mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her
siblings, paid for Bailons medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by
SO ORDERED.
respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are spurious.

G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006

In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit
dated February 13, 199915 averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner, cohabited as husband and wife as early as 1958; and they were reserving their right to file the
vs. necessary court action to contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they personally
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent. know that Alice is "still very much alive."16

DECISION In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian
of "Aliz P. Diaz," filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailons death, 17 he
further attesting in a sworn statement18 that it was Norma who defrayed Bailons funeral expenses.
CARPIO MORALES,J.:

The Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 23, 20042 and Resolution dated September 28,
20043 reversing the Resolution dated April 2, 20034 and Order dated June 4, 20035 of the Social
Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15149-01 are challenged in the present petition for
review on certiorari.
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in
Barcelona, Sorsogon.6
More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Sorsogon a petition7 to declare Alice presumptively dead.
Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims for death benefits as Bailons
beneficiaries before the SSS.20
Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga City recommended the
cancellation of payment of death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order for the
refund of the amount paid to her from February 1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits; the
denial of the claim of Alice on the ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for support
during his lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension to Bailons
beneficiaries according to the order of preference provided under the law, after the amount
erroneously paid to respondent has been collected. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum
read:

By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition notwithstanding the publication
of the Notice of Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is hereby
declared to [sic] all legal intents and purposes, except for those of succession, presumptively dead.
SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)
1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been misled by
misrepresentation in declaring the first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as presumptively dead.
xxxx
x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz Presumptively Dead," did
not become final. The presence of Aliz [sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.

Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon xxxx
contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon.10

191
 3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz. He, being in bad
faith, and is the deserting spouse, his remarriage is void, being bigamous.
xxxx
In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting spouse and who remarried, thus his
marriage to Teresita Jarque, for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To require affidavit of
reappearance to terminate the second marriage is not necessary as there is no disappearance of Aliz
[sic] Diaz, the first wife, and a voidable marriage [sic], to speak of. 21 (Underscoring supplied)
In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000, 22 advised respondent that
as Cecilia and Norma were the ones who defrayed Bailons funeral expenses, she should return
the P12,000 paid to her.
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999,23 the SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of her
monthly pension for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her
marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted while the latters marriage with Alice was still
subsisting; and the December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not
become final, her "presence" being "contrary proof" against the validity of the order. It thus
requested respondent to return the amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly
pension she had received from the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.
Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits by letter to the SSS
dated October 12, 1999.24 In a subsequent letter dated November 27, 199925 to the SSC, she
reiterated her request for the release of her monthly pension, asserting that her marriage with
Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained
valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his
beneficiary.
The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000,26 maintained the denial of her
claim for and the discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her, however, that she
was not deprived of her right to file a petition with the SSC.
Respondent thus filed a petition27 against the SSS before the SSC for the restoration to her of her
entitlement to monthly pension.
In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning, under protest, the amount
of P12,000 representing the funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her siblings
"forcibly and coercively prevented her from spending any amount during Bailons wake."28
After the SSS filed its Answer29 to respondents petition, and the parties filed their respective
Position Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit 30 dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga
Branch attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the petition
filed by Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon could
have easily located her, she having stayed at her parents residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she
found out that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even after their
separation.
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void
and, therefore, she was "just a common-law-wife." Accordingly it disposed as follows,
quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the
legitimate spouse and primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.
Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS the amount of P24,000.00
representing the death benefit she received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May 1999
as well as P12,000.00 representing the funeral benefit.
The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising
from the demise of SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e) and (k) as well as
Section 13 of the SS Law, as amended, and its prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this
Commission of its compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)
In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.
After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this Commission comes to the inevitable
conclusion that the petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.
xxxx
There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to the declaration of the then CFI of
Sorsogon (10th Judicial District), the first wife never disappeared as the deceased member
represented in bad faith. This Commission accords credence to the findings of the SSS contained in
its Memorandum dated August 9, 1999,32revealing that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona,
Sorsogon, after her separation from Clemente Bailon x x x.
As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the deceased member using artifice and
by exerting fraud upon the unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving the
deceased member the right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the marriage to the petitioner is
void, considering that the first marriage on April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously annulled,
invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of the parties thereto. x x x as determined
through the investigation conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning spouse, not
Alice Diaz Bailon.
xxxx
It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the petitioner was just a common-law
wife of the deceased member, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary beneficiary,
to the latters death benefit. x x x
xxxx
192
It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the legitimate surviving spouse and primary latters death. Neither is there a second marriage to terminate because the second marriage was
beneficiary of Clemente Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death benefit she likewise dissolved by the death of Clemente Bailon.
received from the SSS for the period from February 1998 until May 1999 pursuant to the principle
of solutio indebiti x x x
However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance
with the Civil Registry where parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile, the
Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually defrayed the cost of the wake and respondent SSS has now the authority to review the decision of the RTC and consequently declare
burial of Clemente Bailon, she must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to her the second marriage null and void.36(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
by the SSS as funeral benefit.33(Underscoring supplied)
The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration37 which were both denied for
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration34 having been denied by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a lack of merit.
petition for review35 before the Court of Appeals (CA).
Hence, the SSS present petition for review on certiorari 38 anchored on the following grounds:
By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2, 2003 Resolution and June 4,
2003 Order of the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits due her.
I
Held the CA:

THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of whether or not the decision of the
then CFI, now RTC, declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but, more
importantly, whether or not the respondents SSS and Commission can validly re-evaluate the II
findings of the RTC, and on its own, declare the latters decision to be bereft of any basis. On similar
import, can respondents SSS and Commission validly declare the first marriage subsisting and the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
second marriage null and void?
OF JURISDICTION.39

xxxx
x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person presumptively dead never attains finality as
the finding that "the person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris tantum," the
second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the
competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and
upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed. Nowhere
does the law contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly declare the second
marriage null and void on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare that the decision of
the RTC declaring one to be presumptively dead is without basis.
The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the findings of facts of the SSC on the
prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the SSC to
determine to whom, between Alice and respondent, the death benefits should be awarded pursuant
to Section 540 of the Social Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give respondent due
process or ample opportunity to present evidence in her behalf.
The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to the CFI proceedings are of no
moment to the present controversy, as the same may be considered only as obiter dicta in view of
the SSCs finding of the existence of a prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice by
virtue of which Alice has a better right to the death benefits."41

Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the decision of the regular
The petition fails.
courts under the pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members.
Notwithstanding its opinion as to the soundness of the findings of the RTC, it should extend due
credence to the decision of the RTC absent of [sic] any judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x x x That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage, benefits and
contributions, there is no doubt. In so exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less
reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in the case at bar when it declared that the
x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually possesses the authority to declare the
December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded the same,
decision of the RTC to be without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the principle of
making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and Alices marriage on the one hand
fair play and thus its findings are of doubtful quality considering that petitioner Teresita was not
and the invalidity of Bailon and respondents marriage on the other.
given ample opportunity to present evidence for and her behalf.

In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as an appellate court. The
xxxx
law does not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the exercise
of its authority to determine the beneficiaries of the SSS.
Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil
Registry is no longer practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first marriage to restore
as the marital bond between Alice Diaz and Clemente Bailon was already terminated upon the

193
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
1988 of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is
the law in effect at the time of their celebration.42 a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse
of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the
fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
the Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage. 49
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
affidavit or by court action, such absentees mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and
contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared
inspite of the spouses physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded
null and void by a competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.51

Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by
lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or
judicial declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:
dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the
marriage under any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid "until declared null and void by a
competent court." It follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of
second marriage.44 dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be
raised, because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in
a direct action for annulment.52(Underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years 45 when Bailon
sought the declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a
requirement then for purposes of remarriage.46 Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:

Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented: In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83,
paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife
having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the
dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons
validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second
involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for
marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first
annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And
marriage, for it must also be shown that it had not ended when the second marriage was
furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such
contracted. The presumption in favor of the innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of
voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of life of the
spouse," as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation with such first spouse.47 (Underscoring
proceeding.54 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
supplied)

It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,48 it is terminated by final judgment of
proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in
not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
the subsequent marriage.
marriage had been perfectly valid.55 Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached,
and is made good ab initio.56
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus
Article 42 thereof provides:

194
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailons and respondents Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.12chanrobleslaw
marriage prior to the formers death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-
beneficiary of Bailon. Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she
could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate
remedies.13chanrobleslaw
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised has been rendered
unnecessary.
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment 14 before the Court of
Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the
court that she was a resident of Tarlac City.15 According to Celerina, her true residence was in
Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. 16 This residence had been her and Ricardo's
No costs.
conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008. 17 As a result of Ricardo's
misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition
SO ORDERED. declaring her presumptively dead.18chanrobleslaw

Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic
G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014
helper abroad.20 Neither did she go to an employment agency in February 1995. 21 She also claimed
that it was not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left
CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent. their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City.22 It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to
cohabit with another woman.23 Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to
support her contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his petition.24chanrobleslaw
DECISION
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it
LEONEN, J.: had never been published in a newspaper.25 She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition. 26chanrobleslaw
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition
action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the
for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy. 27 According to the Court of Appeals,
person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.
the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her
reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code. 28chanrobleslaw
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the Court of Appeals'
resolutions dated November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' resolution dated November 28,
petition for the annulment of the trial court's judgment declaring her presumptively dead.
2008.29 The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in the resolution dated March 5,
2009.30chanrobleslaw
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos
(Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed
a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June Hence, this petition was filed.
15, 2007.1 Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.2chanrobleslaw
The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina
presumptive death.
rented an apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten married on June
18, 1980.3 After a year, they moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged in the buy and sell
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code is
business.4chanrobleslaw
appropriate only when the spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of
presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouse's death.31 She added that it
Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper.5 As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow
would be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the first
her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong.6 Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's
place.32 She insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is proper when the declaration of
insistence, he allowed her to work abroad.7 She allegedly applied in an employment agency in
presumptive death is obtained fraudulently.33chanrobleslaw
Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from
again.8chanrobleslaw
Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code
would not be a sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. 9 He went to Celerina's parents in
declaring her presumptive death.34chanrobleslaw
Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts.10 He also inquired
about her from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information. 11chanrobleslaw
In Ricardo's comment,35 he argued that a petition for annulment of judgment is not the proper
remedy because it cannot be availed when there are other remedies available. Celerina could always
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since
195
file an affidavit of reappearance to terminate the subsequent marriage. Ricardo iterated the Court of
Appeals' ruling that the remedy afforded to Celerina under Article 42 of the Family Code is the
appropriate remedy.
The petition is meritorious.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or
resolution has become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner." 36chanrobleslaw
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. 37 This court
defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi:38chanrobleslaw
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic
when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts
constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant
commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a parly from having a real contest, or from presenting
all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was fraud when Ricardo
deliberately made false allegations in the court with respect to her residence. 40 Ricardo also falsely
claimed that she was absent for 12 years. There was also no publication of the notice of hearing of
Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of general circulation.41 Celerina claimed that because of these,
she was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's petition to declare her
presumptively dead.42chanrobleslaw
Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for declaration of presumptive death
were false.43 Celerina further claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of
the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of Ricardo's
petition.44chanrobleslaw
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her petition with
the Court of Appeals sufficient ground/s for annulment of judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment 45 on November 17, 2008. This was less than
two years from the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a month
from her discovery of the decision in October 2008. The petition was, therefore, filed within the
four-year period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred by laches,
which is the period allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction. 46chanrobleslaw
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her discovery of the
fraud perpetrated on her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions,
presumptions, and conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years,
coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead,
that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another
marriage.47chanrobleslaw
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the
presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact
of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of
terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or
her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or
presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent
marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of
the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and
circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact
of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the
subsequent marriage's termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will
cause the termination of the subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the
Family Code are present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively dead spouse's
reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if
the sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent
spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of
reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming,
such fact of reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This
presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with the first
spouse.48 The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid. 49 The burden of proof to
show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of
the second marriage.50chanrobleslaw
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the
subsequent marriage in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon.51 This court noted52 that mere
reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent
marriage were notified if there was "no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either
by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]"53 "Since the second marriage has been
contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as
legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law."54chanrobleslaw
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the status of the
second marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse
196
was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent marriage
may be considered valid when the following are present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.55
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of
presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief56 that the spouse is already dead.
The first marriage will not be considered as. validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the
valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and void.57 Only a
subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from
an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against
marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still applies. 58chanrobleslaw
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her
presumptively dead and when he contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be
considered void for being bigamous under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is because the
circumstances lack the element of "well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is
essential for the exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to apply.59chanrobleslaw
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of the
subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from
availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent
marriage may also be terminated by filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent
marriage."60chanrobleslaw
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the
subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a
sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects
of the declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is
valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the
property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages." 61 If it is
terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the
termination shall still be considered legitimate.62 Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive
death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy.63chanrobleslaw
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify
the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the
prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or wife."64 This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be
benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage, 65 this remedy is not
available to her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying
the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an
affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of
judgment will, therefore, lie.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of
extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011
ALAIN M. DIO , Petitioner,
vs.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision2 and the 12 March
2007 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No.
LP-01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and
sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996,
petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married
before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent,
citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that
respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her
responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her
friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful,
and would at times become violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the
petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons,
respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later
learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner,
which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that
on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
197
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of
collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing
that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in
her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondents disorder was long-
lasting and by nature, incurable.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD
L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the
beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
celebration of the marriage.

Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the
The Decision of the Trial Court
City Prosecutor of Las Pias City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information
and guidance.5
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish
respondents psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayags
Hence, the petition before this Court.
psychological report, the allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand, clearly
made out a case of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that
respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and The Issue
that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her under Article 68
of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner when she
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute
obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.
nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
The Ruling of this Court
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
The petition has merit.
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD
L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
beginning; and
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property. Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply
to Article 147 of the Family Code.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with
Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. We agree with petitioner.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the
City Prosecutor, Las Pias City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.4
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of
its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either
by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.

Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute
community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code. Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18 October
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
2006 Decision as follows:
198
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in
thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
household.

Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already
the termination of their cohabitation.
provided for such matters.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver
judgment.
by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the
value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
considered as advances on their legitime.

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void. 9
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the
Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared
void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting
for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
contracted.1avvphilUnder Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void." Thus we ruled:
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be
not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the
free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.11
Rule provides:

Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44
shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages
which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for
annulment.12 In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by
absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of gains14 unless the parties agree to a
complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since
the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a
decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 15 of the Family
Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that
the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. 16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the
properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-
199
ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by agreement between the demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these stipulations. After paying the 5 million
parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the earnest money as partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the property in
spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage. September 1993. On 6 September 1993, the Agreement was annotated on TCT No. 5357.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree Meanwhile, on 29 June 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a decision6 in the legal separation case, the
of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without dispositive portion of which reads:
waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal separation between petitioner and
respondent. Accordingly, petitioner Elvira Robles Gozon is entitled to live separately from
SO ORDERED. respondent Alfredo Gozon without dissolution of their marriage bond. The conjugal partnership of
gains of the spouses is hereby declared DISSOLVED and LIQUIDATED. Being the offending spouse,
respondent is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to their child
G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010
Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to petitioner.

MARIO SIOCHI, Petitioner,

Furthermore, said parties are required to mutually support their child Winifred R. Gozon as her
vs.
needs arises.
ALFREDO GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON, GIL TABIJE, INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., and
ELVIRA GOZON, Respondents.
SO ORDERED.7
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
As regards the property, the Cavite RTC held that it is deemed conjugal property.
G.R. No. 169977
On 22 August 1994, Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their
daughter, Winifred Gozon (Winifred). The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Gil Tabije, cancelled TCT
INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., Petitioner,
No. 5357 and issued TCT No. M-105088 in the name of Winifred, without annotating the Agreement
vs.
and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. M-10508.
MARIO SIOCHI, ELVIRA GOZON, ALFREDO GOZON, and WINIFRED GOZON, Respondents.

On 26 October 1994, Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney 9 executed in his favor by
RESOLUTION
Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for 18 million.10 IDRI paid
Alfredo 18 million, representing full payment for the property. 11 Subsequently, the Register of
CARPIO, J.: Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-1097612 to IDRI.

This is a consolidation of two separate petitions for review, 1 assailing the 7 July 2005 Decision2 and Mario then filed with the Malabon Regional Trial Court (Malabon RTC) a complaint for Specific
the 30 September 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74447. Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (property) covered by TCT No. 5357. 4 The property
is situated in Malabon, Metro Manila and is registered in the name of "Alfredo Gozon (Alfredo), On 3 April 2001, the Malabon RTC rendered a decision,13 the dispositive portion of which reads:
married to Elvira Gozon (Elvira)."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite City Regional Trial Court (Cavite RTC) a petition
for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. On 2 January 1992, Elvira filed a notice of lis
01. On the preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction:
pendens, which was then annotated on TCT No. 5357.

1.1 The same is hereby made permanent by:

On 31 August 1993, while the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi
(Mario) entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell5 (Agreement) involving the property for the
price of 18 million. Among the stipulations in the Agreement were that Alfredo would: (1) secure 1.1.1 Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Inter-
an Affidavit from Elvira that the property is Alfredos exclusive property and to annotate the Dimensional Realty, Inc. and Gil Tabije, their agents, representatives
Agreement at the back of TCT No. 5357; (2) secure the approval of the Cavite RTC to exclude the and all persons acting in their behalf from any attempt of
property from the legal separation case; and (3) secure the removal of the notice of lis commission or continuance of their wrongful acts of further
pendens pertaining to the said case and annotated on TCT No. 5357. However, despite repeated alienating or disposing of the subject property;
200
 1.1.2. Enjoining defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. from 11.1 Two Million Pesos (2,000,000.00) as actual and compensatory damages;
entering and fencing the property;
11.2 One Million Pesos (1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
1.1.3. Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. to respect plaintiffs possession of the
11.3 Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (500,000.00) as exemplary damages;
property.

11.4 Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (400,000.00) as attorneys fees; and

02. The Agreement to Buy and Sell dated 31 August 1993, between plaintiff and
defendant Alfredo Gozon is hereby approved, excluding the property and rights of
defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal property 11.5 One Hundred Thousand Pesos (100,000.00) as litigation expenses.
subject of this case.
11.6 The above awards are subject to set off of plaintiffs obligation in
03. The Deed of Donation dated 22 August 1994, entered into by and between defendants paragraph 9 hereof.
Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon is hereby nullified and voided.
12. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay Inter-
04. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 October 1994, executed by defendant Winifred Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly and severally the following:
Gozon, through defendant Alfredo Gozon, in favor of defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty,
Inc. is hereby nullified and voided.
12.1 Eighteen Million Pesos (18,000,000.00) which constitute the amount the
former received from the latter pursuant to their Deed of Absolute Sale dated
05. Defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. is hereby ordered to deliver its Transfer 26 October 1994, with legal interest therefrom;
Certificate of Title No. M-10976 to the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila.
12.2 One Million Pesos (1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
06. The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila is hereby ordered to cancel
Certificate of Title Nos. 10508 "in the name of Winifred Gozon" and M-10976 "in the
12.3 Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (500,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
name of Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc.," and to restore Transfer Certificate of Title No.
5357 "in the name of Alfredo Gozon, married to Elvira Robles" with the Agreement to Buy
and Sell dated 31 August 1993 fully annotated therein is hereby ordered. 12.4 One Hundred Thousand Pesos (100,000.00) as attorneys fees.

07. Defendant Alfredo Gozon is hereby ordered to deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor 13. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay costs of
of plaintiff over his one-half undivided share in the subject property and to comply with suit.
all the requirements for registering such deed.
SO ORDERED.14
08. Ordering defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon to sit with plaintiff to agree on the selling
price of her undivided one-half share in the subject property, thereafter, to execute and
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Malabon RTCs decision with modification. The
deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same in favor of the plaintiff and to comply with
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 7 July 2005 reads:
all the requirements for registering such deed, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of
this DECISION.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated April 3, 2001 of the RTC, Branch 74,
Malabon is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, as follows:
09. Thereafter, plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay defendant Alfredo Gozon the balance of
Four Million Pesos (4,000,000.00) in his one-half undivided share in the property to be
set off by the award of damages in plaintiffs favor. 1. The sale of the subject land by defendant Alfredo Gozon to plaintiff-appellant Siochi is
declared null and void for the following reasons:
10. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon the price they
had agreed upon for the sale of her one-half undivided share in the subject property. a) The conveyance was done without the consent of defendant-appellee Elvira
Gozon;
11. Defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon and Gil Tabije are hereby ordered to pay
the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the following: b) Defendant Alfredo Gozons one-half () undivided share has been forfeited
in favor of his daughter, defendant Winifred Gozon, by virtue of the decision in
the legal separation case rendered by the RTC, Branch 16, Cavite;
201
 2. Defendant Alfredo Gozon shall return/deliver to plaintiff-appellant Siochi the amount
of 5 Million which the latter paid as earnest money in consideration for the sale of the
subject land;
3. Defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon and Gil Tabije are hereby ordered to pay
plaintiff-appellant Siochi jointly and severally, the following:
a) 100,000.00 as moral damages;
b) 100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) 50,000.00 as attorneys fees;
d) 20,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
e) The awards of actual and compensatory damages are hereby ordered
deleted for lack of basis.
4. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay defendant-
appellant IDRI jointly and severally the following:
a) 100,000.00 as moral damages;
b) 100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
c) 50,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Defendant Winifred Gozon, whom the undivided one-half share of defendant Alfredo Gozon was
awarded, is hereby given the option whether or not to dispose of her undivided share in the subject
land.
The rest of the decision not inconsistent with this ruling stands.
SO ORDERED.15
Only Mario and IDRI appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals. In his petition, Mario alleges that
the Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of
the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elviras conduct signified her acquiescence to
the sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale
over the property upon his payment of 9 million to Elvira.
On the other hand, IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value. Thus, IDRI prays that
the Court should uphold the validity of IDRIs TCT No. M-10976 over the property.
We find the petitions without merit.
This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the property
occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code. Article 124 of
the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to the
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall
be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by
the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo
was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property.
However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the
written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is
void.16 The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the
portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. 17Even if the other
spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouses written
consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity.18 The Agreement entered into by Alfredo
and Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As
regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by
Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently
donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already
withdrawn.
However, we disagree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the one-half undivided share of
Alfredo in the property was already forfeited in favor of his daughter Winifred, based on the ruling
of the Cavite RTC in the legal separation case. The Court of Appeals misconstrued the ruling of the
Cavite RTC that Alfredo, being the offending spouse, is deprived of his share in the net profits and
the same is awarded to Winifred.
The Cavite RTC ruling finds support in the following provisions of the Family Code:
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage
bonds shall not be severed;
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and
liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net
profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall
be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2);
202
 (3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to
the provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and
The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate
succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent
spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
Nevertheless, we find it proper to reinstate the order of the Malabon RTC for the reimbursement of
the 18 million paid by IDRI for the property, which was inadvertently omitted in the dispositive
portion of the Court of Appeals decision.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. We AFFIRM the 7 July 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74447 with the following MODIFICATIONS:

Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall
produce the following effects:
xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share
of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous
marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse; (Emphasis supplied)
(1) We DELETE the portions regarding the forfeiture of Alfredo Gozons one-half
undivided share in favor of Winifred Gozon and the grant of option to Winifred Gozon
whether or not to dispose of her undivided share in the property; and
(2) We ORDER Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon to pay Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc.
jointly and severally the Eighteen Million Pesos (18,000,000) which was the amount
paid by Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. for the property, with legal interest computed from
the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved
and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned
by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of
Winifred. Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that "[f]or purposes of computing the net
profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits
shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of
the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution." Clearly, what is
forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership property but merely
in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.

With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI is not a buyer in good
faith. As found by the RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious person to make further inquiries about the
vendors title to the property. The representative of IDRI testified that he knew about the existence
of the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 5357 and the legal separation case filed before the Cavite
RTC. Thus, IDRI could not feign ignorance of the Cavite RTC decision declaring the property as
conjugal.

Furthermore, if IDRI made further inquiries, it would have known that the cancellation of the notice
of lis pendens was highly irregular. Under Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, 19 the notice
of lis pendens may be cancelled (a) upon order of the court, or (b) by the Register of Deeds upon
verified petition of the party who caused the registration of the lis pendens. In this case, the lis
pendens was cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon the request of Alfredo. There was no court
order for the cancellation of the lis pendens. Neither did Elvira, the party who caused the registration
of the lis pendens, file a verified petition for its cancellation.

Besides, had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would have discovered that
Alfredos donation of the property to Winifred was without the consent of Elvira. Under Article
12520 of the Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent
of the other spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a buyer in good faith.1avvphi1

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