Civil liability arising from a crime the action was instituted.

It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's

negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the
G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942 wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's
responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs. ... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents. There is proof that he exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner. brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing
Jose G. Advincula for respondents. Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of
the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) violation
BOCOBO, J.: which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works
available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the
petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Civil Code.
Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi
driver employed by said Fausto Barredo. The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo
is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro
between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held
head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The
carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old ... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being
boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days sued for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good
later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro
First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents.
indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years In other words, The Court of Appeals insists on applying in
of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the
petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil
The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability arising
criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II
deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words
Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to
the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or
1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in commission not punishable by law.
favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of
the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time
 ... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The
liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is not a
civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the
crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in
article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in
the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring
this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him
primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil
Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains
that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his
(defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to
said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action
and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue,
we must cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many
confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes
under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-
1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because justice may
be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are distinctly
envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous
presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are
likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as
well as by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several
sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa
aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the
wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and
direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code
are as follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and
quasi-contracts, and from acts and omissions which are
unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence
intervenes.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the
Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions
in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law,
intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II,
Title XVI of this book.
xxx xxx xxx
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes
damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable
for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding
article is enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom another is
responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who
live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or
incapacitated persons subject to their authority and living
with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are
equally liable for any damages caused by their employees
while engaged in the branch of the service in which
employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.
 The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through
a special agent, but not if the damage shall have been
caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty
of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of
the next preceding article shall be applicable.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or
minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if
such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor
shall respond with their own property, excepting property
exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.

Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are person for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall
under their custody. be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may
have received.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the
persons mentioned therein prove that they are exercised all The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
damage.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government,
employees may recover from the latter what he may have or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events,
paid. whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the
authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the
REVISED PENAL CODE manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.

ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. persons using violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable
and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property
The exemption from criminal liability established in exempt from execution.
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision
4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern
civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules: keepers and proprietors of establishment. In default of
persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for
liability for acts committed by any imbecile or insane person, crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where
and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without special police regulation shall have been committed by them
discernment shall devolve upon those having such person or their employees.
under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that
there was no fault or negligence on their part. Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of
goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses lodging
therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value
 thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this
him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded."
furthermore have followed the directions which such However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the
respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing
or intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article
committed by the innkeeper's employees. 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-
delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The Code.
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies clear and unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage,
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law.
or employees in the discharge of their duties. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often
referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the
xxx xxx xxx genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code;
for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en dao
by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code.
correccional in its minimum period; if it would have According to article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations is
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los
in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed. actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o
negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning
commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and
period shall be imposed." the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:

It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil 1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only
Code seem to be broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in of private concern.
the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts
or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the responsible in civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in
criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had
merely repairs the damage. also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the
Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the
are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or
negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y
violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as neta de los hechos, todavia menos parece sostenible que
begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de
infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el
Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.) choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda la accion para
demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista
existence of quasi-delicts and the employer's primary and direct en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas
liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos
severas. La lesion causada por delito o falta en los derechos
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o
"Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says: indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma ataen al orden
publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de ordinario,
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se
diversos aspectos y comprende a diferentes personas. Asi, enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado
existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta
ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad
y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
nace de todo delito o falta."
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento y que tiene
aspects and comprises different persons. Thus, there is a otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo
civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daos o
carries with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial
a necessary consequence of the penal liability as a result of que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales
every felony or misdemeanor." de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga
que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following 128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines
case: There had been a collision between two trains belonging sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la
respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en
Norte. An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa
case, in which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily que se denomina aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes
legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo
entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de
indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es
necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo
se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir
a su modo las responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean
por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o falta, las hacen
extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio
de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter
subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de los
que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el
Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que
impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y
omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de
quienes se debe responder; personas en la enumeracion de
las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los
establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea
con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se
observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de
intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter
subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del delito,
son demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente,
cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y
formando verdadero postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la
separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de
suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos
cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder,
habiendose, por aadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio
criminal la Compaia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se
reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de
indemnizacion por los daos y perjuicios que le irrogo el
choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni
fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al
pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el
veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas
arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para
despues del proceso; pero al declararse que no existio
delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito,
materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos
juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex
lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su
cumplimiento permanece incolume, extraa a la cosa
juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the
facts, it seems less tenable that there should be res
judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on
account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains.
The title upon which the action for reparation is based cannot
be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime,
because there exists in the latter, whatever each nature,
a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise
to penal measures that are more or less severe. The injury
caused by a felony or misdemeanor upon civil rights requires
restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which, like the
penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are
ordinarily entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney;
and it is clear that if by this means the losses and damages
are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek
another relief; but this coincidence of effects does not
eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for
indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to
contractual faults which are not pertinent and belong to
another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the
Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses and
damages in which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is
unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the
civil courts without the criminal courts interfering therewith.
Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing
in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that
Code, develop and regulate the matter of civil
responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the
regime under common law, of culpa which is known
as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative precedent of
the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed
comparison between the former provisions and that
regarding the obligation to indemnify on account of
civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to
one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in
their own way the civil responsibilities among those who, for
different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor, make
such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and
establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but
with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the
wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are
criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not
coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed
by the next preceding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom another is responsible." Among the persons
enumerated are the subordinates and employees of
establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their
service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this
reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial
decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after taking part
in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil
responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and
sentenced directly and separately with regard to
the obligation, before the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the
separation between punitive justice and the civil courts being Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4,
a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have pp. 429, 430), declares that the responsibility of the employer is
different fundamental norms in different codes, as well as principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
different modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaa
del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in
the criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its
actions, it seems undeniable that the action for
indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by
the collision was not sub judice before the Tribunal del
Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained
intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if
the verdict had not been that of acquittal, it has already been
shown that such action had been legitimately reserved till
after the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration
of the non-existence of the felony and the non-existence of
the responsibility arising from the crime, which was
the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del
Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil
obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for
its enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French
Civil Code, on which the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and
whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are
similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article
1384 of the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903,
Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person
responsible (for another), without including the author of the
act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense
that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by
the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can
not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of
the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action;
the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a
principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law,
Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903
por las acciones u omisiones de aquellas personas por las
que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para
contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer
lugar, en que se funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a responsibility
se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi for the act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is
parece a primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria for one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is
contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
las faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas
que le son imputables. La responsabilidad de que tratamos Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia,
se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero no por Referentes al Codigo Civil Espaol," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la
imprudencia o de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se
dueo o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc. responde solo de su propia culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902;
Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de
citado (menores de edad, incapacitados, dependientes, aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo,
aprendices) causan un dao, la ley presume que el padre, el que motiva o razona la responsabilidad. Esta
tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden
para prevenir o evitar el dao. Esta falta es la que la ley penal, el Codigo de esta clase distingue entre menores e
castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera
sino en la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero
por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de
subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible. entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la
responsabilidad precisamente "por los actos de aquellas
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 personas de quienes se deba responder."
for the acts or omissions of those persons for who one is
responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others,
question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what because one is liable only for his own faults, this being the
the legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for
responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie
first sight; but such assertion would be contrary to justice and which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility
to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and that direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal
everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. Code distinguishes between minors and incapacitated
The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other,
a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article
the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence 19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in
of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903, the
establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the responsibility should be understood as direct, according to
persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, the tenor of that articles, for precisely it imposes
incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes any responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one
damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, should be responsible."
etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or
avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that
court has upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasi-
delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal
institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from
criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the
Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts
of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of
October 21, 1910. In that case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result
of having been run over by a street car owned by the "compaia
Electric Madrilea de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a
criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a
civil action against the street car company, paying for damages in
the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded damages;
so the company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging
violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final
judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been
declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal,
saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en
el equivocado supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al
condonar a la compaia Electrica Madrilea al pago del dao
causado con la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo,
desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia
absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el
mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido
las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos, y como la de
lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su competencia
que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por
no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no
excluye, siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo
absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no
califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo
1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras
perosnas, a los Directores de establecimientos o empresas It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
por los daos causados por sus dependientes en
determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al
conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al
condenar a la compaia recurrente a la indemnizacion del
dao causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer
los mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la
Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente
a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion
propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la
causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on
the mistaken supposition that the trial court, in sentencing
the Compaia Madrilea to the payment of the damage
caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo,
disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence of
acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account
of the same act, when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions
had taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects,
and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its
authority that the act in question did not constitute a felony
because there was no grave carelessness or negligence,
and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude
the co-existence of fault or negligence which is not qualified,
and is a source of civil obligations according to article 1902
of the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903,
among other persons, the managers of establishments or
enterprises by reason of the damages caused by employees
under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil
jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the same act in this latter
aspect and in ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay
an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its
employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation
with article 116 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly
followed the same, without invading attributes which are
beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way
contradicting the decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either (See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one
separately or with the street car company. This is precisely what above quoted.)
happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been
sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer. In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14,
1919, an action was brought against a railroad company for
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal damages because the station agent, employed by the company, had
negligence, but the Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles
exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this
qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court
Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal saying:
negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility
arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud
civil damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable de los hechos que consigna con relacion a las pruebas del
for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his pleito: 1., que las expediciones facturadas por la compaia
primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias
which he did not overcome under article 1903. Thus, there were que en su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este
two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2.,
liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; que llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se quisieron
and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe de la estacion sin
1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3., que la falta
they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting de entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas
within their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff el demandante le originaron daos y perjuicios en cantidad
choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief, because de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que
Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and era de vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de
besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in obtener al verse privado de servir los pedidos que se le
enforcing any judgment against him for damages. habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:

Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910,
the employer was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of
the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with
greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be
held liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his
taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the
conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi
driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous
criminal case while the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence
and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and
one day to two years of prision correccional.
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de
estimar los cuatro motivos que integran este recurso, porque
la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene
accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de
transporte, toda vez que no se funda en el retraso de la
llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo
contractual entre las partes contendientes, careciendo, por
tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio,
en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que
se limita a pedir la reparaction de los daos y perjuicios
producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y
dolosa negativa del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias
a su nombre consignadas, segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis
cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el supplied.)
articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la
Compaia demandada como ligada con el causante de The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act
aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that
administrativa. case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article
virtue of the facts which it declares, in relation to the 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer
evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the and not the employee who was being sued.
railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that
the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint should be Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that
when the said merchandise reached their destination, their In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7
delivery to the consignee was refused by the station agent Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the trial court awarded damages to
without justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had
the lack of delivery of these goods when they were negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the
demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of rails slid off while iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff
considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of whose leg was broken. This Court held:
wines and liquors and he failed to realize the profits when he
was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the
the receptacles: action that the necessary conclusion from these collated laws
is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible
the four assignments of error, as the original complaint did must be made primarily liable and his employer held only
not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff
a contract of transportation, because the action was not should have procured the arrest of the representative of the
based on the delay of the goods nor on any contractual company accountable for not repairing the track, and on his
relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed,
of the Code of Commerce, on which the decision appealed payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to asking for
reparation for losses and damages produced on the This r vbeasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish
patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the unjustified codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes
and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by
consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI.
carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in article 1902 of Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the
defendant company, because the latter is connected with the
person who caused the damage by relations of economic
 "A person who by an act or omission causes damage
to another when there is fault or negligence shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the
preceeding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the
persons for whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the
mother, is liable for the damages caused by the
minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise
are equally liable for the damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter may be employed or in the performance of their
duties.
xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when
the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action
it may be sufficient to point out that nowhere in our general
statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or
maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation
therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under
civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may
be a broader one. We should be reluctant, under any
conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific
codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob
some of these articles of effect, would shut out litigants
against their will from the civil courts, would make the
assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for
prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render
recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof
prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had
always stood alone, such a construction would be
unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by
the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain
(Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in
actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory
or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both
classes of action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted
jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending
the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the penal
action once started, the civil remedy should be sought
therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or
been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the
future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of
a crime that could be enforced only on private complaint, the
penal action thereunder should be extinguished. These
provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133
of our Penal Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further,
but the citation of these articles suffices to show that the civil
liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor
even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided
in the law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent
act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should
seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution
must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil
right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an
employer may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of
criminal actions against his employees only while they are in
process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the
existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and
his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the
civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of the
 injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the
been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This
provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action. This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here
whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern
survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been part of Solana Street, had to stop his auto before crossing
abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going
in force in the Philippines. along the latter street or were coming from the opposite
direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above he again started to run his auto across said Real Street and
cited in this case appears from the briefs before us to have to continue its way along Solana Street northward, he should
arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating
"fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to the until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely
comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was
of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana
employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is Street, this accident could not have occurred if the auto had
the offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence been running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the
punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and
1093. More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have
the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequence of seen the child in the act of crossing the latter street from the
which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the accident
Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are had occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run
understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties over the body of the child, and the child's body had already
of the parties to one another. But where relations already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved
formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or along a distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows
quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street from Real
articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical Street, at a high speed without the defendant having blown
application of this distinction may be found in the the horn. If these precautions had been taken by the
consequences of a railway accident due to defective defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death
machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his of the child would not have occurred.
employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that
to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have
to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing
itself. the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is
therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent
the 8 of 9-year-old child Salvador Bona brought a civil action against civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of the child, independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of
who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of
a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully
and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which
the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a
criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have
been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the
same doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban
Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-year-
old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover
damages for the child's death as a result of burns caused by the
fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10,
1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte.
Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come
from another municipality to attend the same. After the procession
the mother and the daughter with two others were passing along
Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric &
Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an
automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The little girl, who
was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the automobile
that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter
where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died
that same night from the burns. The trial courts dismissed the action
because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this
Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence,
and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who
at the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise
for the electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact
hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was led to order the
dismissal of the action because of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority
of the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge.
The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the
principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the
religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal
in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of
the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an
automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and
falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine
announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic
Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article
1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The
contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any,
does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest
sense could only result in reduction of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically
applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V.
House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple
negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable
because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded
damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the
action was for damages for the death of the plaintiff's daughter
alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in
driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of
the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes
had rented the automobile from the International Garage of Manila,
to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy,
Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as
damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed the judgment
as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised
the care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the
presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family.
He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was,
so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were
likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed
by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently
thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few
hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the
 evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant
constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear. where he is the owner or director of a business or enterprise
and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus: engaged in his master's employment as such owner.

Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and
cases of negligence, but also provides when the liability shall Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year
cease. It says: 1930). The latter case was an action for damages brought by
Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when was on his way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large
the persons mentioned therein prove that they pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath,
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco
to avoid the damage." Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant
Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This
injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over the relationship of pater familias. This theory bases the
him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and
is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs.Litonjua and Leynes
be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918],
to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and 38 Phil., 768.)
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55
is relieve from liability. Phil., 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff brought an action for damages for
the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
on his own negligence and not on that of his servant.
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly licensed captain,
vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage,
alleged that the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an and that the appellee contracted his services because of his
automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, reputation as a captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This
that said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of
This Court, applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. liability against the defendant has been overcome by the
Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that: exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family
in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines
 laid down by this court in the cases cited above, and the
defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary
liability is negatived by the six cases above set forth. He is, on the
authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in
damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil
Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the
defendant. We study first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52
Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City of
Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June
8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto
Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of damage
to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was
found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the
City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City
of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to
obtain payment, claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable.
The main defense was that the defendant had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The
lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court
held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code,
saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no
escaping the conclusion that the provisions of the Penal
Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable
language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability.
The Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil
obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be
governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The
conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under
article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was
not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not punishable by
law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the
Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In
other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the
Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal
negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of
civil negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal
Code and not to the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the
trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master to
escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the
master had exercised all diligence in the selection and
training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be
a good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not
be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated on
conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of
parenthesis, it may be said further that the statements here
made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our
deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code
should be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903
applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's
proposition, because the Court of Appeals based its decision in the
present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article
1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from
Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of
Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely
different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer
arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation
of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the
employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We
have already seen that this is a proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case
invoked by the defendant. A motorman in the employ of the Manila
Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by simple
negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of
the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to
enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and
the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either
motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil liability. But a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a
this Court held: separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this
and so hold, (1) that the exemption from civil liability case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under
established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have article 1903 of the Civil Code.
acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is not
applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should
of the Penal Code. ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we
are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
the instant case, because the action there had for its purpose the
enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only
Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles
on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case destroys the punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the
defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the principle Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very
that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons
Civil Code is different in character from his subsidiary liability under and damage to property through any degree of negligence even
the Penal Code. the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the
principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa
defendant has failed to recognize the distinction between civil aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to
liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth
Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give the importance to the rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal
latter type of civil action. meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle
of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in
327). That case need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that the articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence,
it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed. Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay
individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence
Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's
liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the
latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff
to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief.
True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a
more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct
responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil
wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant is
wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common
knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public
conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay
damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to
go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless
procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to
shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct
responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are
principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees
should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to
the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the
profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees.
It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct
for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has
said, "they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their
weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their
negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable
and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or
director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee,
and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such
selection and who used such employee because of his confidence
in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists
also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle
of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says
in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons
the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola
personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien
le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of
the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes
him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and
significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of
stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor
vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the
Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise
to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed,
and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the
action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to
seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a
crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method
is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically
useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present
case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we
believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such
practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full
rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may
no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code.
This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private
rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy,
and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not
depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his
counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant-
petitioner. PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur. vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and
Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.

Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.

Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et
al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of
defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from
defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the
occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he
was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the
son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when
criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake."

Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

1. The present action is not only against but a

violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III,
of the Revised Rules of Court;

2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is

now final and or in res-adjudicata;

3. The complaint had no cause of action against

defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as
 guardian of the other defendant through emancipation THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT
by marriage. WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.]) III

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES
reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE
above grounds that the following order was issued: INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the IV

defendants on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly
examining the arguments therein contained, the Court
finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December
8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the
dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40,
Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano,
are presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF
DEFENDANTS THAT -
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL
BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF
THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH
EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-
appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted
criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his
act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a
copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do
not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's
decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against
appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of
the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss
above-referred to.

I As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive

issues presented for Our resolution are:
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST
BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, 1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of
NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was
COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, not reversed?
RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he
II applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at
the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor,
living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already
legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a
reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and
civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly
established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In
that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly
dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in
relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with
pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the
works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own,
that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the
Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that
the same act machinist. come under both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of
the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal
action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject
of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It
is also to be noted that it was the employer and not
the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73
Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case
could have been prosecuted in a criminal case
because his negligence causing the death of the child
was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore
a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a
proper subject matter either of a criminal action with
its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of
an entirely separate and independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate
individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under
the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized,
even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted
in a criminal case and for which, after such a
conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court
specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that
although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted
for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but
also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent
civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already
invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of
this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing
doctrines that have been little understood, in the past,
it might not he inappropriate to indicate their
foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365
punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence
not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of
article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life. Death or injury to persons
and damage to property- through any degree of
negligence - even the slightest - would have to be
Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability
arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what
sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker
any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the
laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather
than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the
literal meaning of the law to smother and render
almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish
Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal
case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal
negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be made responsible in a
civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified
remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the
provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code
on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the
character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to
seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility
arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another
remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed
by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically
useless and nugatory the more expeditious and
effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa
extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked
to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it
is high time we pointed out to the harms done by such
practice and to restore the principle of responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of
the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused
the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on
its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal
Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better
safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an
ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent civil action, not depending
on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading
of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the
concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred
to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary
acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the
pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually
extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made
therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February
14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a
negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in
force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations
"which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of
Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And
it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law",
that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo
construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth,
rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will
not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost
lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved
and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code
Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is
to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia
doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely
making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil
which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the
whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the
said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under
"Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same
provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and
and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the
of the new code provides: felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific
Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by
under the preceding article is entirely separate and law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
damages twice for the same act or omission of the prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
defendant. party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
(Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by
criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an punishable by law.4
accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or
not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal
liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill,
acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be upheld.
observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article
397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)",
it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation
by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall
terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable
the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but
he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property
without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue
and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian."
which cannot be done by their minor married child without their
consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a
matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial
court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing
opinion. Costs against appellees.

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live
in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that
Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question.
Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent
on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason

behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them
from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear
implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by
marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance
of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom
to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely,
killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the
marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see
to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the
borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property
G.R. No. L-46179 January 31, 1978
CANDIDA VIRATA, TOMAS VIRATA, MANOLITO VIRATA,
EDERLINDA VIRATA, NAPOLEON VIRATA, ARACELY VIRATA,
ZENAIDA VIRATA, LUZMINDA VIRATA, PACITA VIRATA, and
EVANGELINA VIRATA, petitioners,
vs.
VICTORIO OCHOA, MAXIMO BORILLA and THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF CAVITE, 7th JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH V,
stationed at BACOOR, CAVITE, respondents.
Remulla, Estrella & Associates for petitioners
Exequil C. Masangkay for respondents.
reserved their right to institute a separate civil action; that on July
19, 1977 the heirs of Arsenio Virata, petitioners herein, commenced
Civil No. B-134 in the Court of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor,
Branch V, for damages based on quasi-delict against the driver
Maximo Borilla and the registered owner of the jeepney, Victorio
Ochoa; that on August 13, 1976 the defendants, private respondents
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is another action,
Criminal Case No. 3162-P, pending between the same parties for
the same cause; that on September 8, 1976 the Court of First
Instance of Rizal at Pasay City a decision in Criminal Case No.
3612-P acquitting the accused Maximo Borilla on the ground that he
caused an injury by name accident; and that on January 31, 1977,
the Court of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor granted the motion to
Civil Case No. B-134 for damages. 2

FERNANDEZ, J.: The principal issue is weather or not the of the Arsenio Virata, can
prosecute an action for the damages based on quasi-delict against
This is an appeal by certiorari, from the order of the Court of First Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and owner, respectively
Instance of Cavite, Branch V, in Civil Case No. B-134 granting the on the passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio Virata.
motion of the defendants to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that there is another action pending between the same parties for It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may
the same cause. 1
choose between an action under the Revised Penal Code or of
quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The record shows that on September 24, 1975 one Arsenio Virata What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the
died as a result of having been bumped while walking along Taft Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act.
Avenue, Pasay City by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo
Borilla and registered in the name Of Victoria Ochoa; that Borilla is The Supreme Court has held that:
the employer of Ochoa; that for the death of Arsenio Virata, a action
for homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted on According to the Code Commission: 'The foregoing provision (Article
September 25, 1975 against Maximo Borilla in the Court of First 2177) though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary
Instance of Rizal at Pasay City, docketed as C Case No. 3162-P of when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence.
said court; that at the hearing of the said criminal case on December The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a
12, 1975, Atty. Julio Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a 'culpa aquiliana' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had
reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against the its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal
driver on his criminal liability; that on February 19, 1976 Atty. Julio negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and 'culpa
Francisco filed a motion in said c case to withdraw the reservation to extra-contractual' or quasi-delito has been sustained by decision of
file a separate civil action; that thereafter, the private prosecutor the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and
actively participated in the trial and presented evidence on the perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist.
damages; that on June 29, 1976 the heirs of Arsenio Virata again Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an
accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or
not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a
quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double
recovery. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to
as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened
or has not been committed by the accused. Brief
stated, We hold, in reitration of Garcia, that culpa
aquilina includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law. 3

literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same

argument of Justice Bocobo about construction that The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent
upholds 'the spirit that given life' rather than that which act. Before Criminal Case No. 3162-P was decided, they manifested in
is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should said criminal case that they were filing a separate civil action for
be observed in applying the same. And considering damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney based
that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the on quasi-delict. The acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime
new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability charged in Criminal Case No. 3162-P is not a bar to the prosecution of
and independence of liability in a civil action for acts Civil Case No. B-134 for damages based on quasi-delict The source of
criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 is quasi-
delict, not an act or omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of
civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article
the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or omission
100 of the Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of
punishable by law are two different sources of obligation.
Court, under Sections 2 and 3(c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is 'more
Moreover, for the petitioners to prevail in the action for damages, Civil
congruent' with the spirit of law, equity and justice, Case No. B-134, they have only to establish their cause of action by
and more in harmony with modern progress', to preponderance of the evidence.
borrow the felicitous language in Rakes vs. Atlantic
Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. to 359, to hod as We do WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set
hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to 'fault covers aside and Civil Case No. B-134 is reinstated and remanded to the
not only acts 'not punishable by law' but also criminal lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the private
in character, whether intentional and voluntary or respondents.
consequently, a separate civil action lies against the in
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty and acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only
to the bigger award of the, two assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. In other words the
extinction of civil liability refereed to in Par. (c) of
Section 13, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas th e civil liability for the same act considered
G.R. No. 78911-25 December 11, 1987 In the meantime Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. replaced Judge
Serquina as presiding judge of Branch 105.
CHARMINA B. BANAL, petitioner,
vs. On January 8, 1987, the respondent court issued an order rejecting
THE HON. TOMAS V. TADEO, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC- the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor on
Quezon City, Branch 105 and Rosario Claudia respondents. the ground that the charge is for the violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 which does not provide for any civil liability or indemnity and
hence, "it is not a crime against property but public order."

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: The petitioner, through counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order dated 8 January 1987 on March 10, 1987.
This is a petition for certiorari to review and set aside the orders of
the respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City dated Respondent Claudio filed her opposition to the motion for
(1) 8 January 1987 which rejected the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. reconsideration on March 25, 1987.
Bustos as private prosecutor in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-40909 to Q-
40913 where respondent Rosario Claudio is the accused for In an order dated 31 March 1987, the respondent court denied
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; and (2) 31 March 1987 which petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order dated
8 January 1987; and for mandamus to allow Atty. Bustos to enter his Hence, this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Court.
appearance as private prosecutor in the aforestated criminal cases.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent Court
It appears that fifteen (15) separate informations for violation of acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed as rejecting the appearance of a private prosecutor.
Criminal Cases Nos. 40909-40913, were filed against respondent
Claudio before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and The respondents make capital of the fact that Batas Pambansa Blg.
originally assigned to Branch 84. 22 punishes the act of knowingly issuing worthless checks as an
offense against public order. As such, it is argued that it is the State
The presiding judge of Branch 84 inhibited himself when respondent and the public that are the principal complainants and, therefore, no
Claudio, through counsel, filed a petition for recuse dated May civil indemnity is provided for by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which
19,1986. a private party or prosecutor may intervene.

The cases were re-raffled and consequently assigned on June 25, On the other hand, the petitioner, relying on the legal axiom that
1986 to Branch 105 which was then presided over by Judge Johnico "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable," contends that
G. Serquina indemnity may be recovered from the offender regardless of
whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 so provides.
During these proceedings, respondent Claudio was finally arraigned
on November 20, 1986 where she pleaded not guilty to the charges. A careful study of the concept of civil liability allows a solution to the
Pre-trial was then set on January 8, 1987. issue in the case at bar.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the
fundamental postulate of our law that "Every man criminally liable is
also civilly liable" (Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying
this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person
commits a crime he offends two entities namely ( 1) the society in
which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he
had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose
person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly
injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.
However, this rather broad and general provision is among the most
complex and controversial topics in criminal procedure. It can be
misleading in its implications especially where the same act or
omission may be treated as a crime in one instance and as a tort in
another or where the law allows a separate civil action to proceed
independently of the course of the criminal prosecution with which it
is intimately intertwined. Many legal scholars treat as a
misconception or fallacy the generally accepted notion that, the civil
liability actually arises from the crime when, in the ultimate analysis,
it does not. While an act or omission is felonious because it is
punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because
it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing
things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the
civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to
repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of
his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or
not the same be punishable by law. In other words, criminal liability
will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission
results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and
proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently
the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal
actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or
omission complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not
it also causes material damage to another. (See Sangco, Philippine
Law on Torts and Damages, 1978, Revised Edition, pp. 246-247).
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides,
indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the
damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the
wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced
to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the
commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44,
citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil. 692). Every crime gives
rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty
party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of
the damage, and indemnification for the losses. (United States v.
Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265).
Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who
suffered the offenses committed against her. Not only the State but
the petitioner too is entitled to relief as a member of the public which
the law seeks to protect. She was assured that the checks were
good when she parted with money, property or services. She
suffered with the State when the checks bounced.
In Lozano v. Hon. Martinez (G.R. No. 63419, December 18, 1986)
and the cases consolidated therewith, we held that "The effects of a
worthless check transcend the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touch the interests of the community
at large." Yet, we too recognized the wrong done to the private party
defrauded when we stated therein that "The mischief it creates
is not only a wrong to the payee or the holder, but also an injury to
the public."
Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The
payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for
which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the
damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of
Batas Pambansa Big. 22 to leave the offended private party
defrauded and empty- handed by excluding the civil liability of the G.R. No. 82146 January 22, 1990
offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in EULOGIO OCCENA, petitioner,
a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so, may vs.
leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, Presiding Judge, Branch X of the
the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at Regional Trial Court Sixth Judicial Region, San Jose, Antique;
the expense of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
provide would, therefore, be brought to naught. Honorable Provincial Fiscal of Antique; and CRISTINA
VEGAFRIA, respondents.
The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases Comelec Legal Assistance Office for petitioner.
40909 to 40913 is justified not only for the protection of her interests Comelec Legal Assistance Officer for private respondent.
but also in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration FERNAN, C.J.:
of justice mandated by the Constitution (Section 16, Article III, Bill of
Rights, Constitution of 1987). A separate civil action for the purpose On May 31, 1979, herein petitioner Eulogio Occena instituted before
would only prove to be costly, burdensome, and time-consuming for the Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sibalom, San Remigio
both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. This Belison, Province of Antique, Criminal Case No. 1717, a criminal
multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioner's rights may complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against herein private
be fulIy adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort t respondent Cristina Vegafria for allegedly openly, publicly and
o a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. maliciously uttering the following insulting words and statements:
"Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus,
WHEREFORE the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent Hudas," which, freely translated, mean: "You are a foolish Barangay
court is ordered to permit the intervention of a private prosecutor in Captain, ignoramus, traitor, tyrant, Judas" and other words and
behalf of petitioner Charmina B. Banal, in the prosecution of the civil statements of similar import which caused great and irreparable
aspect of Criminasl Cases Nos. 40909 to 40913. The temporary damage and injury to his person and honor.
restraining order issued by this court a quo for further proceedings.
This decision is immediately executory. Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty.
Trial thereafter ensued, at which petitioner, without reserving his
right to file a separate civil action for damages actively intervened
thru a private prosecutor.

After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight

Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos
(P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
pay the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner in view of the
trial court's opinion that "the facts and circumstances of the case as
adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral
damages." 1
Disagreeing, petitioner sought relief from the Regional Trial Court, reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages, he
which in a decision dated March 16, 1987 disposed of petitioner's assumed the risk that in the event he failed to recover damages he
appeal as follows: cannot appeal from the decision of the lower court.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the civil aspect of the We find merit in the petition.
lower court's decision of April 20, 1981 subject of this appeal,
for lack of merit, is hereby DENIED. The issues confronting us in the instant petition is whether or not the
decision of the Second Municipal Trial Court of Sibalom, San-
After the decision shall have become final, remand the Remigio-Belison, Province of Antique constitutes the final
records of this case to the court of origin, Second Municipal adjudication on the merits of private respondent's civil liability; and
Circuit Trial Court of Sibalom, San Remigio-Belison, Antique, whether or not petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising
for the execution of its decision on the criminal aspect. from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found by the
trial court to be defamatory.
SO ORDERED. 2

The decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court as affirmed by the

Petitioner is now before us by way of a petition for review Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 1709 cannot be
on certiorari seeking to annul the RTC decision for being contrary to considered as a final adjudication on the civil liability of private
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code providing that every person respondent simply because said decision has not yet become final
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, and Article 2219 of due to the timely appeal filed by petitioner with respect to the civil
the New Civil Code providing that moral damages may be recovered liability of the accused in said case. It was only the unappealed
in libel, slander or any other form of defamation. He submits that criminal aspect of the case which has become final.
public respondent RTC erred in relying on the cases of Roa vs. de
la Cruz, 107 Phil. 10 and Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., In the case of People vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287, we categorically
91 Phil. 672 cited therein. He differentiates said cases from the case stated that from a judgment convicting the accused, two (2) appeals
at bar by saying that in the case of Roa, the decision of the trial may, accordingly, be taken. The accused may seek a review of said
court had become final before Maria C. Roa instituted a civil action judgment, as regards both civil and criminal actions; while the
for damages; whereas in the instant case, the decision of the trial complainant may appeal with respect only to the civil action, either
court has not yet become final by reason of the timely appeal because the lower court has refused to award damages or because
interposed by him and no civil action for damages has been the award made is unsatisfactory to him. The right of either to
instituted by petitioner against private respondent for the same appeal or not to appeal in the event of conviction of the accused is
cause. Tan, on the other hand, contemplates of two actions, one not dependent upon the other. Thus, private respondent's theory
criminal and one civil, and the prosecution of the criminal case had that in actively intervening in the criminal action, petitioner waived
resulted in the acquittal of the accused, which is not the situation his right to appeal from the decision that may be rendered therein, is
here where the civil aspect was impliedly instituted with the criminal incorrect and inaccurate. Petitioner may, as he did, appeal from the
action in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111, of the Rules of Court. decision on the civil aspect which is deemed instituted with the
criminal action and such appeal, timely taken, prevents the decision
Private respondent for her part argues that the decision of the trial on the civil liability from attaining finality.
court carries with it the final adjudication of her civil liability. Since
petitioner chose to actively intervene in the criminal action without
We tackle the second issue by determining the basis of civil liability
arising from crime. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses
are governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that "(E)very person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable," in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-
delict, the provisions for independent civil actions in the Chapter on
Human Relations and the provisions regulating damages, also found
in the Civil Code.
Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable is
also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a
crime has dual character: (1) as an offense against the state
because of the disturbance of the social order; and (2) as an offense
against the private person injured by the crime unless it involves the
crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others wherein
no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because
there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private
person injured by the crime. 3
In the ultimate analysis, what gives rise to the civil liability is really
the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done
intentional or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. 4
In the case at bar, private respondent was found guilty of slight oral
defamation and sentenced to a fine of P50.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, but no civil liability arising from
the felonious act of the accused was adjudged. This is erroneous.
As a general rule, a person who is found to be criminally liable
offends two (2) entities: the state or society in which he lives and the
individual member of the society or private person who was injured
or damaged by the punishable act or omission. The offense of which
private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies
where no civil liability results because either there is no offended
party or no damage was caused to a private person. There is here
an offended party, whose main contention precisely is that he
suffered damages in view of the defamatory words and statements
uttered by private respondent, in the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages and the further sum of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000) as exemplary damages.
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral
damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation
This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a
case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages
for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is
likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages.
It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown. And malice may be inferred
from the style and tone of publication subject to certain exceptions
5
which are not present in the case at bar.
Calling petitioner who was a barangay captain an ignoramus, traitor,
tyrant and Judas is clearly an imputation of defects in petitioner's
character sufficient to cause him embarrassment and social
humiliation. Petitioner testified to the feelings of shame and anguish
he suffered as a result of the incident complained of. It is patently
6
error for the trial court to overlook this vital piece of evidence and to
conclude that the "facts and circumstances of the case as adduced
by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral damages."
Having misapprehended the facts, the trial court's findings with
respect thereto is not conclusive upon us.
From the evidence presented, we rule that for the injury to his
feelings and reputation, being a barangay captain, petitioner is
entitled to moral damages in the sum of P5,000.00 and a further
sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of
the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED and private
respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as
moral damages and another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
ALFREDO P. PACIS and G.R. No. 169467 Ammunitions Store (gun store) in Baguio City. Respondent is
CLEOPATRA D. PACIS, the owner of the gun store.
Petitioners, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson, The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
BRION, On January 19, 1991, Alfred Dennis Pacis, then
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and 17 years old and a first year student at the
PEREZ, JJ. Baguio Colleges Foundation taking up BS
Computer Science, died due to a gunshot wound
JEROME JOVANNE MORALES, in the head which he sustained while he was at
Respondent. Promulgated: the Top Gun Firearm[s] and Ammunition[s]
February 25, 2010 Store located at Upper Mabini Street, Baguio
x----------------------------------------- City. The gun store was owned and operated by
---------x defendant Jerome Jovanne Morales.

DECISION With Alfred Pacis at the time of the shooting were Aristedes
Matibag and Jason Herbolario. They were sales agents of the
CARPIO, J.: defendant, and at that particular time, the caretakers of the gun
The Case store.

This petition for review[1] assails the 11 May 2005 The bullet which killed Alfred Dennis Pacis was fired from a
Decision[2] and the 19 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of gun brought in by a customer of the gun store for repair.
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60669.
The gun, an AMT Automag II Cal. 22 Rimfire Magnum with
The Facts Serial No. SN-H34194 (Exhibit Q), was left by defendant
Morales in a drawer of a table located inside the gun store.
On 17 January 1995, petitioners Alfredo P. Pacis and
Cleopatra D. Pacis (petitioners) filed with the trial court a Defendant Morales was in Manila at the time. His employee
civil case for damages against respondent Jerome Jovanne Armando Jarnague, who was the regular caretaker of the gun
Morales (respondent). Petitioners are the parents of Alfred store was also not around. He left earlier and requested sales
Dennis Pacis, Jr. (Alfred), a 17-year old student who died in a agents Matibag and Herbolario to look after the gun store while
shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and he and defendant Morales were away. Jarnague entrusted to
Matibag and Herbolario a bunch of keys used in the gun store
which included the key to the drawer where the fatal gun was
kept.
It appears that Matibag and Herbolario later
brought out the gun from the drawer and placed
it on top of the table. Attracted by the sight of the
gun, the young Alfred Dennis Pacis got hold of
the same. Matibag asked Alfred Dennis Pacis to
return the gun. The latter followed and handed
the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting
the young Alfred in the head.
A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag before
branch VII of this Court. Matibag, however, was acquitted of
the charge against him because of the exempting circumstance
of accident under Art. 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
By agreement of the parties, the evidence
adduced in the criminal case for homicide
against Matibag was reproduced and adopted by
them as part of their evidence in the instant case.
[3]
On 8 April 1998, the trial court rendered its decision in favor
of petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: The trial court held respondent civilly liable for the death of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs [Spouses
Alfredo P. Pacis and Cleopatra D. Pacis] and
against the defendant [Jerome Jovanne Morales]
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs
(1) P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
Alfred Pacis;
(2) P29,437.65 as actual damages for the hospitalization and
burial
expenses incurred by the plaintiffs;
(3) P100,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(4) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(5) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its
Decision[5] dated 11 May 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed
the trial courts Decision and absolved respondent from civil
liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.[6]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 19 August
2005.
Hence, this petition.
The Trial Courts Ruling
Alfred under Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the
Civil Code.[7] The trial court held that the accidental shooting
of Alfred which caused his death was partly due to the
negligence of respondents employee Aristedes Matibag
(Matibag). Matibag and Jason Herbolario (Herbolario) were
employees of respondent even if they were only paid on a
commission basis. Under the Civil Code, respondent is liable Negligence is best exemplified in the case of Picart vs. Smith
for the damages caused by Matibag on the occasion of the (37 Phil. 809). The test of negligence is this:
performance of his duties, unless respondent proved that he
observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage. The trial court held that respondent failed to
observe the required diligence when he left the key to the
drawer containing the loaded defective gun without
instructing his employees to be careful in handling the loaded
gun.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
The Court of Appeals held that respondent cannot be held
civilly liable since there was no employer-employee
relationship between respondent and Matibag. The Court of
Appeals found that Matibag was not under the control of
respondent with respect to the means and methods in the
performance of his work. There can be no employer-
employee relationship where the element of control is absent.
Thus, Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not apply in this
case and respondent cannot be held liable.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that even if
respondent is considered an employer of Matibag, still
respondent cannot be held liable since no negligence can be
attributed to him. As explained by the Court of Appeals:
Granting arguendo that an employer-employee
relationship existed between Aristedes Matibag
and the defendant-appellant, we find that no
negligence can be attributed to him.
x x x. Could a prudent man, in the
position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed, foresee harm
to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be
pursued? If so, the law imposes a
duty on the actor to refrain from that
course or take precaution against its
mischievous results, and the failure to
do so constitutes negligence. x x x.
Defendant-appellant maintains that he is not
guilty of negligence and lack of due care as he
did not fail to observe the diligence of a good
father of a family. He submits that he kept the
firearm in one of his table drawers, which he
locked and such is already an indication that he
took the necessary diligence and care that the
said gun would not be accessible to anyone. He
puts [sic] that his store is engaged in selling
firearms and ammunitions. Such items which
are per se dangerous are kept in a place which is
properly secured in order that the persons
coming into the gun store would not be able to
take hold of it unless it is done intentionally,
such as when a customer is interested to
purchase any of the firearms, ammunitions and
other related items, in which case, he may be
allowed to handle the same.
 We agree. Much as We sympathize with the FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL
family of the deceased, defendant-appellant is TRIAL COURT (BRANCH 59) OF BAGUIO
not to be blamed. He exercised due diligence in CITY SHOWING PETITIONERS CLEAR
keeping his loaded gun while he was on a RIGHTS TO THE AWARD OF DAMAGES.[9]
business trip in Manila. He placed it inside the
drawer and locked it. It was taken away without
his knowledge and authority. Whatever The Ruling of the Court
happened to the deceased was purely accidental.
[8]
We find the petition meritorious.
The Issues
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of
Petitioners raise the following issues: petitioners son. Under Article 1161[10] of the Civil Code,
petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the
I. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED
civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 [11] of
SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING THE
the Revised Penal Code or they may opt to file an
DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN
independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In
QUESTION IN DISREGARD OF LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE BY REVERSING THE
this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the
ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file
(BRANCH 59) OF BAGUIO CITY an independent civil action for damages against respondent
NOTWITHSTANDING CLEAR, whom they alleged was Matibags employer. Petitioners based
AUTHENTIC RECORDS AND their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the
TESTIMONIES PRESENTED DURING THE Civil Code.
TRIAL WHICH NEGATE AND
CONTRADICT ITS FINDINGS. Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article
103[12] of the Revised Penal Code,[13] the liability of the
II. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of
GRAVE, REVERSIBLE ERROR IN the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a persons own
RENDERING THE DECISION AND negligence. Article 2176 states:
RESOLUTION IN QUESTION BY
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
PROCEEDINGS THEREBY IGNORING THE
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
 contractual relation between the parties, is called
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside
a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the Policy on
Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair, a person who is
in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and
ammunition must maintain basic security and safety
requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to
Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled.[14]
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who
has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality
extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons
or substances. Such person in possession or control
of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take
exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done
thereby.[15] Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business
which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with
dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree
of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be
knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known
never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid
unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has SO ORDERED.
the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded.
Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from
ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-
access defensive use.[16] With more reason, guns accepted by
the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002]
they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge
such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly
negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it
inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded.
In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in
a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair,
respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to
prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should
never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder
or action is open and he has personally checked that the
weapon is completely unloaded.[17] For failing to insure that
the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent.
Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether
respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to
repair defective firearms to restore its original composition or
enhance or upgrade firearms.[18]
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and
diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the
degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous
weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET
ASIDE the 11 May 2005 Decision and the 19 August 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 60669. We REINSTATE the trial courts Decision
dated 8 April 1998.
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied
CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO LLAVORE the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7,
1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under
LAROYA, respondent.
Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court (Capas RTC for brevity)
DECISION of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, assailing the MCTCs Order of
[3]

CARPIO, J.:
dismissal.
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the
Resolution dated December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for The Trial Courts Ruling
[1]

certiorari and the Resolution dated August 24, 2000 denying the
[2]

motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial

Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No. 17- The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999
C (99). dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas
RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a
final order which disposes of the case and therefore the proper
remedy should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC further
The Facts
held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a
lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such
Laroya (Laroya for brevity) and the other owned by petitioner error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity) and driven by petitioner
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration
Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan for brevity), figured in an
but the Capas RTC denied the same in the Resolution of August
accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the Municipal
24, 2000.
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya
filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence Hence, this petition.
resulting in damage to property, docketed as Criminal Case No.
002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil
case against Laroya for quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. The Issue
2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil
case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one
forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. of them may think and believe that the accident was caused by
The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999
and dismissed the civil case.
the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party, believing himself to
be the aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo imprudence against the second party. On the other hand, the
insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can
second party, together with his operator, believing themselves to In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the
be the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for petition raises the legal question of whether there is forum-
quasi-delict against the first party who is the very private shopping since they filed only one action - the independent civil
action for quasi-delict against Laroya.
complainant in the criminal case. [4]

Nature of the Order of Dismissal

Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the
criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for
Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of
quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.
dismissal that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the
[5]

Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice

to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly
The Courts Ruling states it is with prejudice. Absent a declaration that the dismissal
[6]

is with prejudice, the same is deemed without prejudice. Thus,

Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a
which the MCTC dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping, dismissal without prejudice.
constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case.Casupanan and Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an order dismissing an
[7]

Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal case has a action without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the
counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule
counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They 65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the
contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party
resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly,
in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising the Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on
from the same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is
2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently erroneous.
of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was
not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on Forum-Shopping
quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits
who was not a party in the criminal case. involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.
defective as it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya further Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases
[8]

alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs
question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the sought. However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case
[9]

proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a
of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and separate civil action which can proceed independently of the
a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal. criminal action.
 Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal
Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for
damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these
two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have
different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa
criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil
case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code.These articles on culpa aquiliana
read:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he
proves, by preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered
damage because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the
private complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action
under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state Rules provided as follows:
only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these
articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity) expressly civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his right to
civil action, to wit: institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be
filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action
which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action
to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no
forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
(1985 Rules for brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing
of a separate civil action independently of the criminal action
provided the offended party reserved the right to file such civil
action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil action before
the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil
actions arising from the same act or omission were deemed
impliedly instituted in the criminal case. These civil actions
referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of
damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of damages for
violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human
Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for
quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended party had to
reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such
action. Otherwise, such civil action was deemed impliedly
instituted in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the x x x
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the (b) x x x
same act or omission of the accused.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the
institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
civil actions separately waives the others. case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this rule governing
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (Emphasis
shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its supplied)
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party
a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed
instituted with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are
the same act or omission of the accused.
no longer deemed instituted, and may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the
x x x. (Emphasis supplied) criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal
action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil
December 1, 2000 and now provides as follows: Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these
articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles
a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be civil action deemed instituted in the criminal action.[10]

deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it the option to file a separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the
action. prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is
deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover
action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the
criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply
a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
to separate civil actions arising from the same act or omission examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the
filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.[11]
criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence.
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and
decided jointly.
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a
separate civil action, if reserved in the criminal action, could not
be filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the
action. If the separate civil action was filed before the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be
commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended
pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action shall be tolled.
until final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule
applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil
actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change
which could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the
the rule that the separate civil action, filed to recover
criminal action. damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing,
Rules continues this procedure, to wit: after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil
action to recover damages ex-delicto.
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the When civil action may proceed independently
criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in the criminal case,
been entered in the criminal action. can file a separate civil action against the offended party in the
criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has follows:
already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the
The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought
merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action criminal action. (Emphasis supplied)
without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-
 Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the
amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the offended party to accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-
bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision
2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule states that any cause of action which could have been the
111, this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint)
action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no may be litigated in a separate civil action. The present Rule 111
case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice mandates the accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. action which shall proceed independently of the criminal action,
even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal
criminal action.
action can file an independent civil action for quasi-delict against
the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states Conclusion
that the offended party may bring such an action but the offended
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent
party may not recover damages twice for the same act or
civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not
omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule
deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed
111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the
separately by the offended party even without reservation. The
accused.
commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of
in Cabaero vs. Cantos where the Court held that the accused the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule
[12]

therein could validly institute a separate civil action for quasi- 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such
delict against the private complainant in the criminal civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the
case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his criminal action.
Answer with Counterclaim for malicious prosecution.At that time
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the
the Court noted the absence of clear-cut rules governing the
same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil
prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and
action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and
the necessary consequences and implications thereof. Thus,
the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on
the Court ruled that the trial court should confine itself to the
non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously
criminal aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim for
and independently of each other. The commencement or
civil liability. The Court further ruled that the accused may file a
prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action
separate civil case against the offended party after the criminal
for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party
case is terminated and/or in accordance with the new Rules
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
which may be promulgated. The Court explained that a cross-
the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no
claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will
reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover
only unnecessarily complicate the proceedings and delay the
damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In
resolution of the criminal case.
some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was filing of another case against his employer or guardians.
incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to address
 Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for
the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal
case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the
present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the
accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This is only
fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting
up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in
the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate
separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the
accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the
prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run
until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right
to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the
offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of
the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate
civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of
law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by amendment of the rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal
Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering the well-
MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is settled rule that -
erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision
of the trial court in the criminal case may vary with the decision of
the trial court in the independent civil action.This possibility has
always been recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced in
1950 the concept of an independent civil action under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the
Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter. In Azucena vs. Potenciano,
the Court declared:
[13]
x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this,
for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said
articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be
conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the
independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction
in Article 31 that this action 'may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code
introduced the concept of a civil action separate and independent
from the criminal action although arising from the same act or
omission. The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of
conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts, one hearing
the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-
delict. The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be
more apparent than real. In any event, there are sufficient
remedies under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote
possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
took effect on December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the
order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the
x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that
sense and to that extent.[14]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby
GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and
August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are
ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Reservation for civil action Sec. "J", City of Baguio. Bounded on the NE., by property of Honor
G.R. No. L-34666 October 30, 1981 Kingdoms; on the SW., by Lot 2; on the W and NW., by Public land. ...
containing an area of EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, MERCEDES AND FIFTY THREE (84,653) Square meters, more or less, ... in the
L. JAVELLANA, petitioner, names of spouses I tong Amistad and Luisa Tengdan.
vs.
ITONG AMISTAD respondent. (2) (October 11, 1965) sell, convey, transfer and deliver by way of a
deed of sale in favor of Teodoro Mat-an the remaining 42,326 square
meters of the above-described parcel of land; and
DE CASTRO, J.:
(3) (December 23, 1965) execute a supplemental deed of sale over
The legal question raised in this petition for certiorari is whether from a the entire area covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-105 in
decision of acquittal, the complainant in a criminal action for estafa, favor of vendees Ben Palispis and Teodoro Mat-an which effected the
may appeal with respect to the civil aspect of the case. issuance of two separate titles in favor of said vendees

The criminal action in this case was commenced in the Court of First knowing fully well and purposely withholding the information that on
Instance of Baguio and Benguet, under an information which reads: or about February 10, 1962, he had previously entered into an
agreement with one MERCEDES L. JAVELLANA to convey to her an
I N F O R MAT I O N area of 10,000 square meters from the above-described parcel of land
for the sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS and had already
The undersigned Acting 1st Assistant City Fiscal accuses ITONG received from her the sum of FIVE THOUSAND ( P5,000.00) PESOS,
AMISTAD of the crime of Estafa penalized under Article 316 Paragraph thereby causing damage and prejudice to said Mercedes L. Javellana in
2, of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows: the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency.
That on or about January 30, 1965, October 11, 1965, and December 23,
1965, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of All contrary to law.
this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously After trial, decision was rendered dated February 8, 1971, and
promulgated on March 18, 1971 acquitting the accused, respondent
(1) (January 30, 1965) sell, convey, transfer and deliver by way of a herein, the Court holding that "the case of the prosecution is civil in
deed of sale in favor of Ben Palispis an unsegregated portion of 42,326 nature" and that "the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond
square meters of that parcel of land described in reasonable doubt."

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE No. 0-105 From the judgment of acquittal, the complainant, the petitioner herein,
appealed to the Court of Appeals insofar as the civil liability of the
A parcel of land (Lot 1, plan Psu-203086-Amd., Civil Reservation Case accused is concerned. Without awaiting the completion of the transcript
No. 1, L.R.C. Civil Reservation Record No. 211), situated in the Res. of the stenographic notes in the case, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal merely on the legal proposition that an appeal by the Benjamin Liggayu et al., No. 8224, October 31, 1955; People vs.
complainant from a judgment of acquittal should be disallowed. Joaquin Lipana 72 Phil. 166; People vs. Florendo, 73 Phil. 679 [decided
under the new Rules of Court]; Ricafort vs. Fernan, 101 Phil. 575, 572).
The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1971, is set
forth in full as follows: Considering that the complainant is appealing from a judgment
acquitting the accused in a criminal case, her appeal should be
This refers to an appeal against the judgment of the Court of First disallowed.
Instance of Baguio, in Criminal Case No. 4205, wherein the accused
Itong Amistad who was prosecuted for the crime of estafa paragraph 2, WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby ordered dismissed. The
Article 316 R.P.C.), was acquitted. The decision was promulgated on stenographers who were required to submit their respective transcripts
March 18, 1971 and on that same day, the complainant, through of stenographic notes in this case are hereby excused therefrom. (pp. 6-
counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal from said judgment, "insofar as the 7, Brief for the Respondent, p. 78, Rollo).
civil liability of the accused is concerned." Apparently the appeal was
approved by the trial court, the records of the case were elevated to this A motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
Court, and this Court required the completion of the same. was filed but was denied on January 4, 1972. From both aforesaid
Resolutions dismissing the appeal and the order denying the Motion for
Now, while the right of the offended party to intervene in the criminal Reconsideration, the petitioner came to this Court on a petition for
action (Section 15, Rule 110, Rules) as well as to appeal from a final certiorari with prayer that the Resolution of the Court of Appeals be
judgment or ruling or from an order made after judgment affecting the reversed, and that judgment be rendered in favor of petitioner and
substantial rights of the appellant (Section 2, Rule 122, Rules) is against respondent insofar as the latter's hability is concerned
recognized, the offended party however, cannot appeal if the accused is
acquitted as matters are (People vs. Herrera 74 Phil. 21). indeed, the (a) Ordering respondent to pay to petitioner such sum as this Court
trial court in acquitting the herein defendant stated: shall adjudge to rightfully represent the value of the one hectare portion
of the land involved agreed to be conveyed to petitioner by respondent
In the mind of the court, the case of the prosecution is civil in nature. In in accordance with the Agreement to Convey Real Property (Exhibit
fact, the supervening acts of the parties after the execution of Exhibit A "A");
until the execution of Exhibit D are clear and unequivocal which
ineluctably lead this court to believe that the guilt of the accused has not (b) Ordering respondent to pay to petitioner the expenses of
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. litigation actually incurred by the latter; and

An appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance would (c) Ordering respondent to pay the costs of suit. (p.28, Brief for the
perforce require a new determination of defendant's criminal liability. Petitioner, p. 60, Rollo).
This cannot be done. Besides, the offended party has the remedy of
bringing a civil action independently of the criminal action. The sole legal question for determination as stated at the outset, is
whether an appeal by the complainant for estafa, may be allowed from a
Indeed, this question is not new. It has already been so ruled by the decision acquitting the accused of the crime charged, only insofar as the
Supreme Court in several cases (People vs. Flores, G.R. No. L-7523, latter's civil liability is concerned.
December 18, 1957, citing People vs. Velez, 77 Phil. 1026; People vs.
In support of her affirmative position on the issue above stated,
petitioner cites Section 2, Rules 122 of the Rules of Court which If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable
provides: doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to
that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or
SEC. 2. Who may appeal.The People of the Philippines can not not the acquittal is due to that ground. (p. 14, id).
appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. In
all other cases either party may appeal from a final judgment or ruling From the aforequoted provisions, petitioners contend that the remedy of
or from an order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of appeal is expressly granted to her inasmuch as the civil action for the
the appellant. (p. 12, Brief for the Petitioner, p. 60, Rollo). recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
Criminal Case No. 4205 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and
Additionally, she cites Section 3 of Rule 111, from which she quotes the Benguet, there having been no reservation to file a separate civil action
following: or a waiver of the right to file one. She had in fact hired a private
prosecutor to handle, primarily the civil aspect of the case, the
SEC. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses.In all cases prosecution of the crime remaining under the direction and control of
not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be the prosecuting Fiscal. The private prosecutor presented evidence
observed: bearing on the civil liability of the accused. In a memorandum he filed,
he also discussed extensively the civil liability of the accused, despite
xxx xxx xxx which, the trial court failed to rule on the latter's civil liability to the
complainant.
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final It is this omission, as alleged by petitioner herein, that con constitutes
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In the thrust of her first assignment of error, the only one We feel called
other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the upon to rule on, among her three assigned errors, the other two having
jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who relation to how the trial court evaluated the evidence, and the extent of
may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for damages petitioner alleges to be entitled to under such evidence, which
the damage suffered. (Rule 111, Rules of Court in the Philippines.) (pp. evidently may not be passed upon in the instant proceedings, the
13-14, Id) evidence presented during the trial not having been elevated to this
Court, nor even to the Court of Appeals, at least not fully or completely.
Finally, she cites Article 29 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
reads: Confining ourselves, therefore, to the first assigned error, We find no
ground to reverse the Resolution of the Court of Appeals on the purely
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted legal question of whether the petitioner, as complainant in Criminal
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable Case No. 4025 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, for
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be estafa, can appeal from the judgment acquitting the accused, because
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon the trial court failed to declare the latter's civil liability to the
motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a complainant, which was allegedly proven by the evidence.
bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.
The provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code relied upon by the case at bar. The Supreme Court did not permit an appeal by the offended
petitioner clearly requires the institution of a separate action by the party, the Court saying:
filing of the proper complaint. To such complaint, the accused as the
defendant therein, may file the appropriate responsive pleading, which The decision of the justice of the peace court which acquitted the
may be an answer or a motion to dismiss. In a criminal action, defendant of the charge and did not make any pronouncement holding
notwithstanding that the action for the recovery of civil liability is the defendant civilly liable put an end to the case, not only by freeing
impliedly instituted therewith, if not reserved or waived, the accused is the defendant from criminal responsibility but also by rejecting all
not afforded the same remedy. Neither is the mandatory pre-trial held as liability for damages arising from the alleged crime of malicious
is required of all civil actions. The obvious reason is that the civil mischief. The offended parties not having reserved their right to bring a
liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon separate civil action, the aforesaid decision of acquittal covered both the
conviction, because said liability arises from the offense, with respect to criminal and the civil aspects of the case under Rule 107, section l (a) of
which pre-trial is never held to obtain admission as to the commission the new Rules of Court. An appeal from that decision to the Court of
thereof, except on the occasion of arraignment. This is the kind of civil First Instance, as intended by the offended parties, would reopen the
liability involved in the civil action deemed filed simultaneously with question of defendant's civil liability arising from the alleged crime.
the filing of criminal action, unless it is reserved or waived, as so And considering that such civil liability must be based on the criminal
expressly provided in Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and as responsibility of the defendant (art. 100, Revised Penal Code), any
held in People vs. Herrera, 74 Phil. 21. review or re-examination of the question of civil liability would
perforce require a new determination of defendant's criminal liability.
If the civil liability arises from other sources than the commission of the But another trial upon defendant's criminal responsibility cannot be
offense, such as from law or contract or quasi-delict, its enforcement held, in view of his previous acquittal in the justice of the peace court.
has to be by an ordinary civil action, which, as expressly provided in So the appeal from the decision of the justice of the peace court is not
Article 29 of the Civil Code may be disposed of as a mere authorized by law.
preponderance of evidence would warrant. Then, all the defenses
available, such as prescription, lack of jurisdiction, set-off, and the other
Brought out in bold relief in the aforequoted ruling is that what is
grounds for a motion to dismiss may be availed of, as may be proper impliedly brought simultaneously with the criminal action is the civil
under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, complete with action to recover civil liability arising from the offense. Hence, the two
pre-trial after issues have been joined. Upon these considerations, it actions may rise or fall together. However, if the civil action is reserved,
becomes clear that the argument of petitioner invoking the rule against or if the ground of acquittal is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
multiplicity of action may not forcefully or convincingly be put forth. accused, a separate civil action may be filed, the complainant alleging a
cause of action independent of, and not based on, the commission of an
In the Resolution of the Court of Appeals several cases have been cited offense. Only preponderance of evidence would then be required.
which held that an appeal from the dismissal of the criminal case on
motion by the fiscal may not be taken by the offended party (People vs. The futility of petitioner's instant recourse becomes all too evident upon
Lipana 72 Phil. 168; People vs. Florendo, 73 Phil. 679). In the case of consideration of the principles enunciated, particularly in the Herrera
People vs. Herrera, et al., 74 Phil. 21, the accused was acquitted without case, since if the civil liability recoverable in a criminal action is one
the court making any pronouncement as to his civil liability, in exactly arising from the crime charged, no longer may the respondent be found
the same manner that the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet criminally liable upon a review of the evidence, after the verdict of
in Criminal Case No. 4025, was charged with a similar omission in the acquittal has been handed down by the trial court. Again, petitioner tries
to show that the cases cited by the Court of Appeals are not in point. But G.R. No. 80194 March 21, 1989
she has not cited one single case faintly supporting her position as she
has tried to maintain in the instant case. EDGAR JARANTILLA, petitioner,
vs.
Nevertheless, petitioner may not complaint, as she does of being denied COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING, respondents.
due process for disallowing her appeal. She can institute a separate civil
action if her cause of action could come under the category of quasi- Corazon Miraflores and Vicente P. Billena for petitioner.
delict or one arising from law, contract or any other known source of
civil liability, but certainly not anymore from the offense of which Manuel S. Gemarino for private respondent.
petitioner had already been acquitted. It is but fair to require petitioner
to take this course of action, not only because she would have to pay for
the lawful expenses for instituting the action to obtain the relief she REGALADO, J.:
seeks from respondent, from which she is spared in the prosecution of a
criminal case, but also for the respondent or defendant to avail of all The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-
defenses and remedies as are open to him in a separate civil action not swiped by a vehicle in the evening of July 7, 1971 in lznart Street, Iloilo
otherwise available in a criminal action that carries with it the civil City" 1 The respondent Court of Appeals concurred in the findings of
action when deemed simultaneously filed with it, to recover civil the court a quo that the said vehicle which figured in the mishap, a
liability arising from the crime charged. Volkswagen (Beetle type) car, was then driven by petitioner Edgar
Jarantilla along said street toward the direction of the provincial capitol,
For all the foregoing, the Resolution appealed from is affirmed, and the and that private respondent sustained physical injuries as a
instant petition is, accordingly, dismissed, without pronouncement as to consequence. 2
costs.
Petitioner was accordingly charged before the then City Court of Iloilo
SO ORDERED. for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence in Criminal Case
No. 47207 thereof. 3 Private respondent, as the complaining witness
therein, did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and
he intervened in the prosecution of said criminal case through a private
prosecutor. 4 Petitioner was acquitted in said criminal case "on
reasonable doubt".5

On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint against the

petitioner in the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, 6
docketed therein as Civil Case No. 9976, and which civil action
involved the same subject matter and act complained of in Criminal
Case No. 47027. 7 In his answer filed therein, the petitioner alleged as
special and affirmative detenses that the private respondent had no
cause of action and, additionally, that the latter's cause of action, if any,
is barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207 inasmuch
as when said criminal case was instituted the civil liability was also
deemed instituted since therein plaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect Prefatorily, We note that petitioner raises a collateral issue by faulting
and actively participated in the criminal case. 8 the respondent court for refusing to resolve an assignment of error in his
appeal therein, said respondent court holding that the main issue had
Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of therein defendant, the trial been passed upon by this Court in G.R. No. L-40992 hereinbefore
court issued on April 3, 1975 an order of denial, with the suggestion that mentioned. It is petitioner's position that the aforesaid two resolutions of
"(t)o enrich our jurisprudence, it is suggested that the defendant brings the Court in said case, the first dismissing the petition and the second
(sic) this ruling to the Supreme Court by certiorari or other appropriate denying the motion for reconsideration, do not constitute the "law of the
remedy, to review the ruling of the court". 9 case' which would control the subsequent proceed ings in this
controversy.
On June 17, 1975, petitioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-40992, 1. We incline favorably to petitioner's submission on this score.
10 assailing the aforesaid order of the trial court. Said petition was
dismissed for lack of merit in the Court's resolution of July 23, 1975, The "doctrine of the law of the case" has no application at the aforesaid
and a motion for reconsideration thereof was denied for the same reason posture of the proceedings when the two resolutions were handed down.
in a resolution of October 28, 1975. 11 While it may be true that G.R. No. L-40992 may have involved some of
the issues which were thereafter submitted for resolution on the merits
After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor by the two lower courts, the proceedings involved there was one for
of the herein private respondent and ordering herein petitioner to pay certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing an interlocutory order of
the former the sum of P 6,920.00 for hospitalization, medicines and so the court a quo, specifically, its order denying therein defendants motion
forth, P2,000.00 for other actual expenses, P25,000.00 for moral to dismiss. This Court, without rendering a specific opinion or
damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and costs. 12 explanation as to the legal and factual bases on which its two
resolutions were predicated, simply dismissed the special civil action on
On July 29, 1987, the respondent Court of Appeals 13 affirmed the that incident for lack of merit. It may very well be that such resolution
decision of the lower court except as to the award for moral damages was premised on the fact that the Court, at that stage and on the basis of
which it reduced from P25,000.00 to P18,000.00. A motion for the facts then presented, did not consider that the denial order of the
reconsideration was denied by respondent court on September 18, 1987. court a quo was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 15 To repeat, no
14 rationale for such resolutions having been expounded on the merits of
that action, no law of the case may be said to have been laid down in
The main issue for resolution by Us in the present recourse is whether G.R. No. L-40992 to justify the respondent court's refusal to consider
the private respondent, who was the complainant in the criminal action petitioner's claim that his former acquittal barred the separate action.
for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and who participated in
the prosecution thereof without reserving the civil action arising from 'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former
the act or omission complained of, can file a separate action for civil appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably
liability arising from the same act or omission where the herein established, as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same
petitioner was acquitted in the criminal action on reasonable doubt and parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether
no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
acquittal.
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the of the Civil Code, constitutes only a penal omen and cannot otherwise
court (21 C.J.S. 330). (Emphasis supplied). 16 be considered as a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code. And while petitioner draws attention to the
It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the court of last supposed reiteration of the Roa doctrine in the later case of Azucena vs.
resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it Potenciano, et al., 21 this time involving damage to property through
and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of that negligence as to make out a case of quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and
particular case . . . (Emphasis supplied). 17 2180 of the Civil Code, such secondary reliance is misplaced since the
therein plaintiff Azucena did not intervene in the criminal action against
It is a rule of general application that the decision of an appellate court defendant Potenciano. The citation of Roa in the later case of Azucena
in a case is the law of the case on the points presented throughout all the was, therefore, clearly obiter and affords no comfort to petitioner.
subsequent proceedings in the case in both the trial and the appellate
courts, and no question necessarily involved and decided on that appeal These are aside from the fact that there have been doctrinal, and even
will be considered on a second appeal or writ of error in the same case, statutory, 22 changes on the matter of civil actions arising from criminal
provided the facts and issues are substantially the same as those on offenses and quasi-delicts. We will reserve our discussion on the
which the first question rested and, according to some authorities, statutory aspects for another case and time and, for the nonce, We will
provided the decision is on the merits . . . 18 consider the doctrinal developments on this issue.

2. With the foregoing ancillary issue out of the way, We now In the case under consideration, private respondent participated and
consider the principal plaint of petitioner. intervened in the prosecution of the criminal suit against petitioner.
Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits
Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act or the accused on reasonable doubt, it could very well make a pronounce
omission (in this case, the negligent sideswiping of private respondent) ment on the civil liability of the accused 23 and the complainant could
can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil file a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to include such
liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. 24
negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or
tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate civil aciton after
the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code such acquittal. This is allowed under Article 29 of the Civil Code. We
that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of have ruled in the relatively recent case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi
liability. 19 Co., Inc., et al. 25 that:

We also note the reminder of petitioner that in Roa vs. De la Cruz, et al.,
20 it was held that where the offended party elected to claim damages
arising from the offense charged in the criminal case through her
intervention as a private prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein
constituted a bar to the subsequent civil action based upon the same
cause. It is meet, however, not to lose sight of the fact that the criminal
action involved therein was for serious oral defamation which, while
within the contemplation of an independent civil action under Article 33
In view of the fact that the defendant-appellee de la Cruz was acquitted
on the ground that 'his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt'
the plaintiff-appellant has the right to institute a separate civil action to
recover damages from the defendants-appellants (See Mendoza vs.
Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113). The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while
not criminally liable may still be civilly liable. 'The judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist'. (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 cited 3. That in the evening of July 7, 197l at about 7:00 o'clock, the
in People vs. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al., G.R. No. 74041, July 29, plaintiff crossed Iznart Street from his restaurant situated at 220 lznart
1987; Filomeno Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. St., Iloilo City, Philippines, on his way to a meeting of the Cantonese
72964, January 7, 1988). The ruling is based on Article 29 of the Civil Club at Aldeguer Street, Iloilo City and while he was standing on the
Code which provides: middle of the street as there were vehicles coming from the Provincial
Building towards Plazoleta Gay, Iloilo City, he was bumped and
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground sideswiped by Volkswagen car with plate No. B-2508 W which was on
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil its way from Plazoleta Gay towards the Provincial Capitol, Iloilo City,
action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such which car was being driven by the defendant in a reckless and negligent
action requires only a preponderance of evidence ... 26 manner, at an excessive rate of speed and in violation of the provisions
of the Revised Motor Vehicle (sic) as amended, in relation to the Land
Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine that Transportation and Traffic Code as well as in violation of existing city
the failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or ordinances, and by reason of his inexcusable lack of precaution and
unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a failure to act with due negligence and by failing to take into
reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and consideration (sic) his degree of intelligence, the atmospheric conditions
determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if the of the place as well as the width, traffic, visibility and other conditions
court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer of lznart Street; 29
enforceable. 27
Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent
Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the
recovered through the application of Article 29 is no longer that based criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for
on or arising from the criminal offense. There is persuasive logic in the damages. 30 The Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano vs. Hill 31
view that, under such circumstances, the acquittal of the accused that
foreclosed the civil liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code which presupposes the existence of criminal liability or requires a ... a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act
conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by such whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is also actually
hence only a civil action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted charged criminally, to recover damages on both scores; and would be
thereafter, which action can be proved by mere preponderance of entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
evidence. 28 Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
enunciates the rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111,
not precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
act or omission. Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
The allegations of the complaint filed by the private respondent declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
supports and is constitutive of a case for a quasi-delict committed by the happened or has not been committed by the accused . . .
petitioner, thus:
The aforecited case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. G.R. No. 165496 February 12, 2007
involved virtually the same factual situation. The Court, in arriving at
the conclusion hereinbefore quoted, expressly declared that the failure HUN HYUNG PARK, Petitioner,
of the therein plaintiff to reserve his right to file a separate civil case is vs.
not fatal; that his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from EUNG WON CHOI, Respondent.
filing a separate civil action for damages, especially considering that the
accused therein was acquitted because his guilt was not proved beyond DECISION
reasonable doubt; that the two cases were anchored on two different
causes of action, the criminal case being on a violation of Article 365 of
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
the Revised Penal Code while the subsequent complaint for damages
was based on a quasi-delict; and that in the judgment in the criminal
case the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved. Petitioner, Hun Hyung Park, assails the Court of Appeals (CA)
Consequently, said civil case may proceed as authorized by Article 29 Resolutions dated May 20, 20041 and September 28, 20042 in CA G.R.
of the Civil Code. CR No. 28344 dismissing his petition and denying reconsideration
thereof, respectively.
Our initial adverse observation on a portion of the decision of
respondent court aside, We hold that on the issues decisive of this case it In an Information3 dated August 31, 2000, respondent, Eung Won Choi,
did not err in sustaining the decision a quo. was charged for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known
as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing on June 28, 1999 Philippine
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby DENIED and the decision National Bank Check No. 0077133 postdated August 28, 1999 in the
of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, without costs. amount of 1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn
against insufficient funds.
SO ORDERED.
Upon arraignment, respondent, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded
"not guilty" to the offense charged. Following the pre-trial conference,
the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief.

After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for
Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached his
Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he
received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the
element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.4

By Order5 of February 27, 2003, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of

Makati, Branch 65 granted the Demurrer and dismissed the case. The
prosecutions Motion for Reconsideration was denied.6
Petitioner appealed the civil aspect7 of the case to the Regional Trial 4. Petitioners failed to implead the People of the Philippines as party-
Court (RTC) of Makati, contending that the dismissal of the criminal respondent in the petition.10
case should not include its civil aspect.
In his present petition, petitioner assails the above-stated reasons of
By Decision of September 11, 2003, Branch 60 of the RTC held that the appellate court in dismissing his petition.
while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove respondents
criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It The manner of verification for pleadings which are required to be
accordingly granted the appeal of petitioner and ordered respondent verified, such as a petition for review before the CA of an appellate
to pay him the amount of 1,875,000 with legal interest.8 judgment of the RTC,11 is prescribed by Section 4 of Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court:
Upon respondents motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set
aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC "for Sec. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law
further proceedings, so that the defendant [-respondent herein] may or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case."9 Petitioners motion affidavit.
for reconsideration of the remand of the case having been denied, he
elevated the case to the CA which, by the assailed resolutions, A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
dismissed his petition for the following reasons: pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
1. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to
the petition does not fully comply with Section 4, as amended by A.M. A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based
No. 00-2-10-SC, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Court, because it does not give on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and
the assurance that the allegations of the petition are true and correct belief," or lacks a proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned
based on authentic records. pleading.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

2. The petition is not accompanied by copies of certain pleadings and Petitioner argues that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying
other material portions of the record, (i.e., motion for leave to file disassociation and independence, hence, he chose to affirm in his
demurrer to evidence, demurrer to evidence and the opposition petition he filed before the court a quo that its contents are "true and
thereto, and the Municipal [sic] Trial Courts Order dismissing Criminal correct of my own personal knowledge,"13 and not on the basis of
Case No. 294690) as would support the allegations of the petition (Sec. authentic documents.
2, Rule 42, ibid.).
On the other hand, respondent counters that the word "or" may be
3. The Decision dated September 11, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court interpreted in a conjunctive sense and construed to mean as "and," or
attached to the petition is an uncertified and illegible mere machine vice versa, when the context of the law so warrants.
copy of the original (Sec. 2, Rule 42, ibid.).
A reading of the above-quoted Section 4 of Rule 7 indicates that a
pleading may be verified under either of the two given modes or under This Court has strictly been enforcing the requirement of verification
both. The veracity of the allegations in a pleading may be affirmed and certification and enunciating that obedience to the requirements
based on either ones own personal knowledge or on authentic of procedural rules is needed if fair results are to be expected
records, or both, as warranted. The use of the preposition "or" therefrom. Utter disregard of the rules cannot just be rationalized by
connotes that either source qualifies as a sufficient basis for verification harking on the policy of liberal construction.20 While the requirement
and, needless to state, the concurrence of both sources is more than is not jurisdictional in nature, it does not make it less a rule. A relaxed
sufficient.14 Bearing both a disjunctive and conjunctive sense, this application of the rule can only be justified by the attending
parallel legal signification avoids a construction that will exclude the circumstances of the case.21
combination of the alternatives or bar the efficacy of any one of the
alternatives standing alone.15 To sustain petitioners explanation that the basis of verification is a
matter of simple preference would trivialize the rationale and diminish
Contrary to petitioners position, the range of permutation is not left to the resoluteness of the rule. It would play on predilection and pay no
the pleaders liking, but is dependent on the surrounding nature of the heed in providing enough assurance of the correctness of the
allegations which may warrant that a verification be based either allegations.
purely on personal knowledge, or entirely on authentic records, or on
both sources. On the second reason of the CA in dismissing the petition that the
petition was not accompanied by copies of certain pleadings and other
As pointed out by respondent, "authentic records" as a basis for material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the
verification bear significance in petitions wherein the greater portions petition (i.e., Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence, Demurrer
of the allegations are based on the records of the proceedings in the to Evidence and the Opposition thereto, and the MeTC February 27,
court of origin and/or the court a quo, and not solely on the personal 2003 Order dismissing the case) petitioner contends that these
knowledge of the petitioner. To illustrate, petitioner himself could not documents are immaterial to his appeal.
have affirmed, based on his personal knowledge, the truthfulness of
the statement in his petition16 before the CA that at the pre-trial Contrary to petitioners contention, however, the materiality of those
conference respondent admitted having received the letter of demand, documents is very apparent since the civil aspect of the case, from
because he (petitioner) was not present during the conference.17 which he is appealing, was likewise dismissed by the trial court on
Hence, petitioner needed to rely on the records to confirm its veracity. account of the same Demurrer.

Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import Petitioner, nonetheless, posits that he subsequently submitted to the
must never be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or sheer CA copies of the enumerated documents, save for the MeTC February
caprice. For what is at stake is the matter of verity attested by the 27, 2003 Order, as attachments to his Motion for Reconsideration.
sanctity of an oath18 to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
pleading have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not
merely speculative.19
The Rules, however, require that the petition must "be accompanied by Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of
clearly legible duplicate original or true copies of the judgments or final cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by
orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court."22 the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in
the application of the rules, this we stress, was never intended to forge
A perusal of the petition filed before the CA shows that the only a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The
duplicate original or certified true copies attached as annexes thereto liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only
are the January 14, 2004 RTC Order granting respondents Motion for in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While
Reconsideration and the March 29, 2004 RTC Order denying it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The copy of the September 11, that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
2003 RTC Decision, which petitioner prayed to be reinstated, is not a procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.25
certified true copy and is not even legible. Petitioner later (Emphasis supplied)
recompensed though by appending to his Motion for Reconsideration a
duplicate original copy. As to the third reason for the appellate courts dismissal of his petition
failure to implead the People of the Philippines as a party in the
While petitioner averred before the CA in his Motion for petition indeed, as petitioner contends, the same is of no moment,
Reconsideration that the February 27, 2003 MeTC Order was already he having appealed only the civil aspect of the case. Passing on the
attached to his petition as Annex "G," Annex "G" bares a replicate copy dual purpose of a criminal action, this Court ruled:
of a different order, however. It was to this Court that petitioner
belatedly submitted an uncertified true copy of the said MeTC Order as Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right
an annex to his Reply to respondents Comment. to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The
This Court in fact observes that the copy of the other MeTC Order, that first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The
dated May 5, 2003, which petitioner attached to his petition before the parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the
CA is similarly uncertified as true. accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a
witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is
Since both Orders of the MeTC were adverse to him even with respect the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the
to the civil aspect of the case, petitioner was mandated to submit them plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger of the trial
in the required form.23 of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.26 (Underscoring
supplied)
In fine, petitioner fell short in his compliance with Section 2 (d) of Rule
42, the mandatory tenor of which is discernible thereunder and is well It bears recalling that the MeTC acquitted respondent.27 As a rule, a
settled.24 He has not, however, advanced any strong compelling judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the
reasons to warrant a relaxation of the Rules, hence, his petition before prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional
the CA was correctly dismissed. prohibition against double jeopardy.
Either the offended party or the accused may, however, appeal the civil In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused
aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The public may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the
prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a demurrer.34 Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of
decision acquitting the accused. The acquittal ends his work. The case the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the
is terminated as far as he is concerned. The real parties in interest in quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other words, a court
the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused.28 may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same
time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far
Technicality aside, the petition is devoid of merit. presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable
doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish
When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.
case is submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived the right to On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as
present evidence.29 At that juncture, the court is called upon to decide proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same
the case including its civil aspect, unless the enforcement of the civil evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if
liability by a separate civil action has been waived or reserved.30 the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the
case generally proceeds. The only recognized instance when an
If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or priorly acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is
instituted or the enforcement of civil liability is not waived, the trial when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil
court should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability or damages liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to
caused by the wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue. Thus this Court, in
accused by the offended party, if there is any.31 Salazar v. People,35 held:

For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case
of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the
as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares civil liability may arise did not exist.36
that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of
the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the
which the accused was acquitted.32 case without any finding that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist.
The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished
if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the Respondent did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.33 recognized that there is basis for a remand.
Indicatively, respondent stands by his defense that he merely borrowed ambiguity in the voluntariness of the waiver is frowned upon,40 hence,
1,500,000 with the remainder representing the interest, and that he courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against it.41
already made a partial payment of 1,590,000. Petitioner counters,
however, that the payments made by respondent pertained to other This Court therefore upholds respondents right to present evidence as
transactions.37 Given these conflicting claims which are factual, a reserved by his filing of leave of court to file the demurrer.
remand of the case would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties
to ventilate, and for the trial court to resolve the same. WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions,
DENIED.
Petitioner finally posits that respondent waived his right to present
evidence on the civil aspect of the case (1) when the grant of the The case is REMANDED to the court of origin, Metropolitan Trial Court
demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33,38 and (2) of Makati City, Branch 65 which is DIRECTED to forthwith set Criminal
when respondent orally opposed petitioners motion for Case No. 294690 for further proceedings only for the purpose of
reconsideration pleading that proceedings with respect to the civil receiving evidence on the civil aspect of the case.
aspect of the case continue.
Costs against petitioner.
Petitioners position is tenuous.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect.1awphi1.net
Where a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its
territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over
all issues that the law requires it to resolve.

One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the
accused arising from the crime, the governing law is the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a
civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the
suit.39

As for petitioners attribution of waiver to respondent, it cannot be

determined with certainty from the records the nature of the alleged
oral objections of respondent to petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the grant of the demurrer to evidence. Any waiver
of the right to present evidence must be positively demonstrated. Any
[G.R. No. 151931. September 23, 2003]
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
ANAMER SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, respondents. Upon arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of
DECISION not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The Evidence of the Prosecution
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Criminal Procedure of the Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court, 5th On October 15, 1996, petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of
Judicial Region, Legazpi City, Branch 5,[2] dated November 19, 2001, and rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation, through Mr. Jerson Yao. As
its Order[3] dated January 14, 2002 denying the motion for payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner gave the private
reconsideration of the decision of the said court on the civil aspect thereof complainant Check No. 067481 drawn against the Prudential Bank,
and to allow her to present evidence thereon. Legazpi City Branch, dated October 15, 1996, by one Nena Jaucian Timario
in the amount of P214,000. Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the
On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against herein petitioners assurance that it was a good check. The cavans of rice were
petitioner Anamer D. Salazar and co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario with picked up the next day by the petitioner. Upon presentment, the check was
the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as Criminal Case No. dishonored because it was drawn under a closed account (Account
7474 which reads as follows: Closed). The petitioner was informed of such dishonor. She replaced the
Prudential Bank check with Check No. 365704 drawn against the Solid
That sometime in the month of October, 1996, in the City of Legazpi, Bank, Legazpi Branch, which, however, was returned with the word DAUD
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit).
named-accused, conspiring and confederating with each other, with intent
to defraud by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did then and there Evidence with Leave of Court[5] alleging that she could not be guilty of the
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, on the part of accused NENA JAUCIAN crime as charged for the following reasons: (a) she was merely an
TIMARIO, drew and issue[d] PRUDENTIAL BANK, LEGASPI CITY BRANCH indorser of the check issued by Nena Timario, and Article 315, paragraph
CHECK NO. 067481, dated October 15, 1996, in the amount of 2(d) on estafa penalizes only the issuer of the check and not the indorser
P214,000.00 in favor of J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, thereof; (b) there is no sufficient evidence to prove that the petitioner
represented by its Branch Manager, JERSON O. YAO, and accused ANAMER conspired with the issuer of the check, Nena Jaucian Timario, in order to
D. SALAZAR endorsed and negotiated said check as payment of 300 defraud the private complainant; (c) after the first check was dishonored,
cavans of rice obtained from J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, the petitioner replaced it with a second one. The first transaction had
knowing fully well that at that time said check was issued and endorsed, therefore been effectively novated by the issuance of the second check.
Nena Jaucian Timario did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the Unfortunately, her personal check was dishonored not for insufficiency of
drawee bank to cover the amount called for therein and without informing funds, but for DAUD, which in banking parlance means drawn against
the payee of such circumstance; that when said check was presented to uncollected deposit. According to the petitioner, this means that the
the drawee bank for payment, the same was consequently dishonored and account had sufficient funds but was still restricted because the deposit,
refused payment for the reason of ACCOUNT CLOSED; that despite usually a check, had not yet been cleared.
demands, accused failed and refused and still fail and refuse to pay and/or
make arrangement for the payment of the said check, to the damage and The prosecution filed its comment/opposition to the petitioners demurrer
prejudice of said J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION. to evidence.
 SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting the action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
petitioner of the crime charged but ordering her to remit to the private from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
complainant the amount of the check as payment for her purchase. The action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
trial court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution did not establish the to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between the petitioner action.
and the issuer of the check, her co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario, for the
purpose of defrauding the private complainant. In fact, the private The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be
complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never met Nena Jaucian made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under
Timario who remained at large. As a mere indorser of the check, the circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
petitioners breach of the warranty that the check was a good one is not make such reservation.
synonymous with the fraudulent act of falsely pretending to possess credit
under Article 315(2)(d). The decretal portion of the trial courts judgment When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused
reads as follows: by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without
specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Anamer D. Salazar is fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged but is hereby held liable for the damages.
value of the 300 bags of rice. Accused Anamer D. Salazar is therefore
ordered to pay J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation the sum of Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the
P214,000.00. Costs against the accused.[6] complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by
the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Within the reglementary period therefor, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on the civil aspect of the decision with a plea that he be Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be
allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of Court. On required for actual damages.
January 14, 2002, the court issued an order denying the motion.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the
In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial court accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have
claiming that after her demurrer to evidence was granted by the trial been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
court, she was denied due process as she was not given the opportunity to
adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable to the private (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
respondent. The petitioner invokes the applicability of Rule 33 of the deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file
Rules of Civil Procedure in this case, contending that before being such civil action separately shall be allowed.
adjudged liable to the private offended party, she should have been first
accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33. Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check
The Petition Is Meritorious involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where
the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay
Procedure additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts
are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by
the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a quantum of evidence is preponderance of evidence.[9] Under Section 3,
first lien on the judgment. Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the said rules shall govern
the procedure to be observed in action, civil or criminal.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not
yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt of the
application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is accused beyond reasonable doubt but also to prove the civil liability of the
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section accused to the offended party. After the prosecution has rested its case,
2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. the accused shall adduce its evidence not only on the criminal but also on
the civil aspect of the case. At the conclusion of the trial, the court should
The last paragraph of Section 2 of the said rule provides that the render judgment not only on the criminal aspect of the case but also on
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the the civil aspect thereof:
civil action. Moreover, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment. If the judgment is of conviction, it shall
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not state (1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
exist.[7] committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the
The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
offender and indemnity to the offended party. The dominant and after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil
primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be
offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless
conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that criminal actions are the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been
primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the reserved or waived.
state and to impose the appropriate penalty for the vindication of the
disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the other hand, In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of
the action between the private complainant and the accused is intended the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
solely to indemnify the former.[8] merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case,
the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to liability might arise did not exist.[10]
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on
criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable
People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court
action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State on the declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil
criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil action arising from liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime
the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on
defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the
multiplicity of suits. criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or
The quantum of evidence on the criminal aspect of the case is proof omission imputed to him.
beyond reasonable doubt, while in the civil aspect of the action, the
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where the accused files a demurrer to
judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot evidence without leave of court, he thereby waives his right to present
appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence of
double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the the prosecution. On the other hand, if the accused is granted leave to file a
accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the demurrer to evidence, he has the right to adduce evidence not only on the
case within the period therefor. criminal aspect but also on the civil aspect of the case if his demurrer is
denied by the court.
After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option either
to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with or without leave of court under If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or to (b) accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case
adduce his evidence unless he waives the same. The aforecited rule reads: unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order or
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the
court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused to
(1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the case
heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the
without leave of court. accused to due process is thereby violated. As we held in Alonte v.
Savellano, Jr.:[11]
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the
accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution
evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives his right to provides the fundamentals.
present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically
state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
(5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt. himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
from its receipt. absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in
certiorari before the judgment. particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the nature of a (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the
motion to dismiss the case for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) (e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint
that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be
modified.
The above constitutional and jurisprudentially postulates, by now
elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case
mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution and the accused.
and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due
process cannot possibly be met without a law which hears before it In this case, the petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315,
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action arising from the
trial.[12] delict was impliedly instituted since there was no waiver by the private
offended party of the civil liability nor a reservation of the civil action.
This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the Neither did he file a civil action before the institution of the criminal
accused has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil action.
aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the
prosecution. What the trial court should do is to issue an order or partial The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence.
judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused; The court issued an order granting the demurrer on its finding that the
and set the case for continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only civil. However, the
evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private complainant to court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordered the
adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the parties may adduce petitioner to pay for her purchases from the private complainant even
their sur-rebuttal evidence as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the before the petitioner could adduce evidence thereon. Patently, therefore,
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: the petitioner was denied her right to due process.

Sec. 11. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following order: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Orders
dated November 19, 2001 and January 14, 2002 are SET ASIDE AND
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the NULLIFIED. The Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 5, is hereby
proper case, the civil liability. DIRECTED to set Criminal Case No. 7474 for the continuation of trial for
the reception of the evidence-in-chief of the petitioner on the civil aspect
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and damages, of the case and for the rebuttal evidence of the private complainant and
if any, arising from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case. the sur-rebuttal evidence of the parties if they opt to adduce any.

(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal SO ORDERED
and sur-rebuttal evidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice,
permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.

(d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be
deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs them to argue
orally or to submit written memoranda.
SAFEGUARD SECURITY G.R. NO. 165732 Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her
AGENCY, INC., and ADMER in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
PAJARILLO,
Petitioners, Lauro Tangco, Evangelines husband, together with his six minor
Present: children (respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed
PANGANIBAN, C.J.* as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch
YNARES-SANTIAGO, (Working Chairperson) 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently
CALLEJO, SR., and convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000.
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. [3]
On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with
modification as to the penalty in a Decision [4] dated July 31, 2000. Entry
LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN
LAURO TANGCO, VON LARRIE Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC,
TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint[5] for damages
and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, Promulgated: against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against
Respondents. December 14, 2006 Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a
DECISION family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard.
Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In their Answer,[6] petitioners denied the material allegations in
the complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. (Safeguard)
Evangelines death was not due to Pajarillos negligence as the latter
and Admer Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the Decision[1] dated July 16,
acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim
2004 and the Resolution[2] dated October 20, 2004issued by the Court offor moral damages and attorneys fees.
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered
Evangeline Tangco(Evangeline) went to Ecology its Decision,[7] the dispositive portion of which reads:
Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per
advise of the banks cashier as she would sign a specimen WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco,
permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security and against defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard
guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her Security Agency, Inc. ordering said defendants to pay the
firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:
 1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that
THIRTY PESOS (P157,430.00), as actual supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and
damages instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the
2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it
(P50,000.00) as death indemnity; that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16,
as moral damages; 2004, the CA issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND which reads:
PESOS (P300,000.00), as exemplary
damages; IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
(P30,000.00), as attorneys fees; and modification that Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.s civil
6. costs of suit. liability in this case is only subsidiary under Art.
103 of theRevised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to
For lack of merit, defendants counterclaim is costs.[9]
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. [8] In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA

The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It
rejected Pajarillos claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no
credence to Pajarillos bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming
around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not
made such report to the head office and the police authorities. The RTC
further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that
he should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking
Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her
instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in
Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof
negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be
jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be
conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of
its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence
to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguards evidence
held that the applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on
civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that
since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final
and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence
in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions
of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability
recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon
conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no
other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with
the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact
from which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike in
civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a
good father of a family in the employment and supervision of
employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on
crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their
employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
 Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA due diligence in the selection and supervision of employee is not
denied in a Resolution dated October 20, 2004. available to it.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only
following assignment of errors, to wit: subsidiary.

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in
finding petitioner Pajarillo liable to respondents for the
payment of damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred
when it applied Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code in
holding petitioner Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with
petitioner Pajarillo for the payment of damages and other
money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in
failing to find that petitioner Safeguard Security Agency,
Inc. exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees, hence, should be excused
from any liability.[10]
The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of
negligence in shooting Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard should be
held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to respondents.
Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is
based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176[11] of the Civil
Code, in which case, its liability is jointly and severally
with Pajarillo. However, since it has established that it had exercised
due diligence in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it should be
exonerated from civil liability.
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. - When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recov
ery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and
in fact filed the same on January 14, 1998.
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case
must be the crime of homicide, for which he had already been found
guilty of and serving sentence thereof, thus must be governed by the
Revised Penal Code.

We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that We do not agree.
respondents, in filing a separate civil action against petitioners are
limited to the recovery of damages arising from a crime or delict, in An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to
which case the liability of Safeguard as employer under Articles 102 two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil
and 103 of the Revised Penal Code is subsidiary and the defense of liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2)
[12]

independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or
omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,
intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is
granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the
criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these
liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both
causes.[13]
It is important to determine the nature of respondents cause of
action. The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged
in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. [14] The purpose of an
action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the
claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but
rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.[15]
The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the
guard assigned and posted in the Ecology
Bank Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, who was
employed and under employment of Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc. hence there is employer-employee
relationship between co-defendants.
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage to herein plaintiffs.
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing
Evangeline Tangco, who brought her firearm out of her
bag, suddenly without exercising necessary caution/care,
and in idiotic manner, with the use of his
shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline
M. Tangco, killing her instantly. x x x
xxxx
16. That defendants, being employer and the
employee are jointly and severally liable for the death of
Evangeline M. Tangco.[16]
Thus, a reading of respondents complaint shows that the latter are
invoking their right to recover damages against Safeguard for their
vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillos act of
shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code which
provides:
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions
resulting from negligence. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,[17] we held:
x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article
2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence,
but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far
back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98
[1977]), this Court already held that:
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently,
a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
 referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the
same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that
culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the
criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based
on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from crime.[18] The source of the obligation
sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or
omission punishable by law.
In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,[19] where the issue involved
was whether the civil action filed by plaintiff-appellants is founded on
crime or on quasi-delict, we held:
x x x The trial court treated the case as an action
based on a crime in view of the reservation made by the
offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No.
92944), also pending before the court, to file a separate
civil action. Said the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this
action on the assumption that
defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May
10, 1969constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot
accept the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case
No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already appeared
as complainants. While that case was pending, the
offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate
civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to file a
separate civil action for damages is reserved, such civil
action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That was
the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31,
1964.
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by
the trial court is inapplicable to the instant case x x x.
xxxx
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his
heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the
civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under
Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses
the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for
the negligent act of his employee, subject to the
employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good
father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant
was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The
fact that appellants reserved their right in the
criminal case to file an independent civil action did
not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action
for quasi-delict.[20](Emphasis supplied)
Although the judgment in the criminal case
finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is already final and executory, such
judgment has no relevance or importance to this case. [21] It would have
been entirely different if respondents cause of action was for damages
arising from a delict, in which case the CA is correct in finding
Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code.[22]
As clearly shown by the allegations in the
complaint, respondents cause of action is based on quasi-delict. Under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the master or the employer
either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision aimed the same at him, thus, acting instinctively, he shot her in self-
over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under defense.
Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
petitioners to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at
a family in the selection and supervision of their employee. a distance of about one meter or one arms length [26] he stepped
backward, loaded the chamber of his gun and shot her.[27] It is however
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was unimaginable that petitioner Pajarillo could still make such movements
negligent in shooting Evangeline. if indeed the gun was already pointed at him. Any movement could
have prompted Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot him.
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is
negligent or not is a question of fact, which, as a general rule, we cannot Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting
pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is Evangeline on his mere apprehension that Evangeline will stage a bank
limited to reviewing errors of law.[23] Generally, factual findings of the robbery. However, such claim is befuddled by his
trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be own testimony. Pajarillo testified that prior to the incident, he saw
reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was about 10 meters away
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when from the bank[28] and saw her talking to a man thereat;[29] that she left the
there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded man under the fly-over, crossed the street and approached the
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment bank.However, except for the bare testimony of Pajarillo, the records do
of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of not show that indeed Evangeline was seen roaming near the vicinity of
fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. In fact,
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions there is no evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of his head guard
of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are or the banks branch manager regarding his concerns or that he reported
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are the same to the police authorities whose outpost is just about 15 meters
based; (8) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not from the bank.
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the
a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are bank, she could have already apprised herself that Pajarillo, who was
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the posted outside the bank, was armed with a shotgun; that there were two
evidence on record. [24] guards inside the bank[30] manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite
incredible that if she really had a companion, she would leave him
A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any under the fly-over which is 10 meters far from the bank and stage a
cogent reason for us to deviate from the factual finding of the trial court bank robbery all by herself without a back-up. In fact, she would have
and affirmed by the CA that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence known, after surveying the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would
in shooting Evangeline. not ensure entrance to the bank as there were guards manning the
entrance door.
Respondents evidence established that Evangelines purpose in
going to the bank was to renew her time deposit. [25] On the other Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth
hand, Pajarillo claims that Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human We are not persuaded.
testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and
experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim
and is outside judicial cognizance.[31] that Evangeline was seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and
acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. Evangelines death
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering was merely due to Pajarillos negligence in shooting her on his imagined
the bank and was actually in the act of pulling her gun from her bag threat that Evangeline will rob the bank.
when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support from the
contentions raised in petitioners petition for review where they argued Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it
that when Evangeline approached the bank, she was seen pulling a gun had adequately shown that it had exercised the diligence required in the
from inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset by selection and supervision of its employees. It claims that it had required
fear and perceived the act as a dangerous threat, shot and killed the the guards to undergo the necessary training and to submit the requisite
deceased out of pure instinct;[32] that the act of drawing a gun is a qualifications and credentials which even the RTC found to have been
threatening act, regardless of whether or not the gun was intended to be complied with; that the RTC erroneously found that it did not exercise
used against petitioner Pajarillo;[33] that the fear that was created in the the diligence required in the supervision of its employee. Safeguard
mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun further claims that it conducts monitoring of the activities of its
from her purse was suddenly very real and the former merely reacted personnel, wherein supervisors are assigned to routinely check the
out of pure self-preservation.[34] activities of the security guards which include among others, whether or
not they are in their proper post and with proper equipment, as well as
Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline regular evaluations of the employees performances; that the fact
is absent, Pajarillos claim of self-defense cannot be that Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary to Safeguards operating
accepted specially when such claim was uncorroborated by any separate procedure is not sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty
competent evidence other than his testimony which was even of proper supervision; that it was likewise error to say that Safeguard
doubtful. Pajarillos apprehension that Evangeline will shoot him to was negligent in seeing to it that the procedures and policies were not
stage a bank robbery has no basis at all. It is therefore clear that the properly implemented by reason of one unfortunate event.
alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment
of Pajarillosimagination which caused such unfounded unlawful We are not convinced.
aggression on his part.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory
negligence. Although she was a licensed firearm holder, she had no Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article
business bringing the gun in such establishment where people would 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
react instinctively upon seeing the gun; that had Evangeline been omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
prudent, she could have warned Pajarillobefore drawing the gun and did responsible.
not conduct herself with suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of the
bank; that she should not have held the gun with the nozzle pointed xxxx
at Pajarillo who mistook the act as hold up or robbery.
 Employers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former
are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily
and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former.
Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision
of his employee by operation of law. This presumption may be
overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the
care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
the supervision of its employee.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and
service records.[35] On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision of instructions.
employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for
the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions
intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition
of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or
as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to
the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that
actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with
said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting
through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their
supervisory functions.[36] To establish these factors in a trial involving in Toyota, Safeguard had ever conducted further training
the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, of Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard a bank which has a
including documentary evidence.
We agree with the RTCs finding that Safeguard had exercised
the diligence in the selection of Pajarillo since the record shows
that Pajarillounderwent a psychological and neuro-psychiatric
evaluation conducted by the St. Martin de Porres Center where no
psychoses ideations were noted, submitted a certification on the Pre-
licensing training course for security guards, as well as police and NBI
clearances.
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the
diligence required in the supervision of its employee,
particularly Pajarillo. In this case, while Safeguard presented Capt.
James Camero, its Director for Operations, who testified on the issuance
of company rules and regulations, such as the Guidelines of Guards
Who Will Be Assigned To Banks,[37] Weapons Training,[38] Safeguard
Training Center Marksmanship Training Lesson Plan,
[39]
Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions, it had also been established
[40]
during Cameros cross-examination that Pajarillo was not aware of such
rules and regulations.[41] Notwithstanding Cameros clarification on his
re-direct examination that these company rules and regulations are
lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of the instructors during classroom
instructions and not necessary to give students copy of the same, [42] the
records do not show that Pajarillo had attended such classroom
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training
and continuous evaluation of the security guards
performance. Pajarillo had only attended an in-service training
on March 1, 1997 conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first assignment
as security guard of Safeguard, which was in collaboration with
Safeguard. It was established that the concept of such training was
purely on security of equipments to be guarded and protection of the life
of the employees.[43]
It had not been established that after Pajarillos training
different nature of business with that of Toyota. In
fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is different from
being on duty in a factory since a bank is a very sensitive area.[44]
 Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[48] we likewise awarded the amount of
Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangelines act of just one million pesos as moral damages to the parents of a third year high
depositing her firearm for safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting school student and who was also their youngest child who died in a
her, confirms that there was no training or seminar given on how to vehicular accident since the girls death left a void in their lives. Hence,
handle bank clients and on human psychology. we hold that the respondents are also entitled to the amount of one
million pesos as Evangelines death left a void in the lives of her
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there husband and minor children as they were deprived of her love and care
were inspectors who go around the bank two times a day to see the daily by her untimely demise.
performance of the security guards assigned therein, there was no record
ever presented of such daily inspections. In fact, if there was really such We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the
inspection made, the alleged suspicious act of Evangeline could have amount of P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code,
been taken noticed and reported. exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of compensatory damages.[49] It is awarded as a deterrent to socially
actual damages in the amount P157,430.00 which were the expenses deleterious actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages may be granted
incurred by respondents in connection with the burial of Evangeline if the defendant acted with gross negligence.[50]
were supported by receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
for the death of Evangeline is likewise in order. Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may
be recovered when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are
As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil awarded. Hence, we affirm the award of attorney's fees in the amount
Code provides that the spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate of P30,000.00.
descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONthat the civil liability of
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action. Its is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status
quo ante; thus it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.[45] The SO ORDERED.
intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is
proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no relation
whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender.[46]

In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering

caused by Evangelines death was so sudden causing
respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a mother to six children who were
all minors at the time of her death. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[47] we
awarded one million pesos as moral damages to the heirs of a
seventeen-year-old girl who was murdered. In Metro Manila Transit
Extinction of civil liability provincial prosecutor for preliminary investigation and the other to
suspend theproceedings before the court. Judge Segundo
[3]
B.
Paz granted the motions. Thereafter, on March 3, 1994, filed
[4]

against the appellant was this amended Information for murder: [5]

[G.R. No. 129566. October 7, 1998]

"That on or about January 5, 1991, in the evening, near
Enok Theater at Poblacion, [M]unicipality of Alaminos,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, New [sic] Republic of the
vs. NOEL NAVARRO, accused-appellant. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with
DECISION treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there,
PANGANIBAN, J.: wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot FERDINAND
RABADON @ "BOYET" several times which caused his
In rejecting this appeal, the Court reiterates the following doct instantaneous death as a consequence, to the damage
rines: (1) a retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier and prejudice of his heirs.
credible testimony; (2) the testimony of a single witness, if
positive and clear, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code." [6]

conviction, even in a charge for murder; (3) the rule on res

gestae relates to the admissibility of evidence, not to its weight
and sufficiency; (4) alleged violations of the rights against illegal
arrest and seizure are deemed waived by the appellant's failure
to assert them prior to arraignment; (5) where the killing is
qualified by treachery, which is alleged in the information, the
crime committed is murder; and (6) where the existence of the
unlicensed firearm allegedly used in the killing has not been
clearly established, the charge of illegal possession of firearm
cannot be considered an aggravating circumstance in murder.
The Case
Affirmed, on the other hand, was this Information for violation
of PD 1866:
"That on or about January 5, 1991, in the [M]unicipality of
Alaminos, [P]rovince of Pangasinan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control and custody
one short firearm without first securing the necessary
license and permit to possess the same and said firearm
was used in the killing of Ferdinand Rabadon.

On January 6, 1994, two Informations, one for murder and Contrary to P.D. 1866."
[1] [7]

the other for violation of Presidential Decree 1866, were filed at

[2]

the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan against Noel On April 5, 1994, appellant, assisted by his aforementioned
Navarro. On January 19, 1994, Navarro, through Counsel Romeo counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. He then [8]

L. Gutierrez, filed two motions, one to remand the case to the filed a petition for bail. A protracted full-blown hearing on the
matter then ensued, during which the prosecution and the
defense presented their respective witnesses and documentary
evidence. The petition was denied. The trial court adopted the
proceedings during said hearing and thereafter, rendered the
assailed 22-page Decision, the dispositive portion of which
[9]
the theater (p. 11, TSN, May 20, 1994). When he was about to go
home on board his motorcycle, he was invited by Ferdinand
Rabadon, who was drinking beer inside Adela's Restaurant, to
join him. Rabago obliged (p.12, id.).

reads: "Later, Rabadon borrowed Rabago's motorcycle which he used in

going to the bus terminal to check if his wife had already arrived
"WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing from Zamboanga (p. 13, id.) Upon his return, Rabadon invited
premises, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the Rabago to Five Doors Disco but the latter opted to go home (p.
accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of 14, id.). Rabadon, who was still on the motorcycle holding its
handle bars, offered to drive Rabago home. (id.).
[m]urder as described in the Information in Criminal Case
No. 2762-A and, therefore, he is ordered to suffer the "When Rabago was about to mount the motorcycle, he was
single and indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. The pushed by one Ming Basila, causing him to fall on his buttocks,
said accused should indemnify the heirs of the deceased after which Basila shot Rabadon twice at the back. While
in the sum of P50,000.00 as provided for by law plus Rabadon was already lying down with his leg pinned by the
another sum of P50,000.00 for actual damages that the motorcycle, appellant shot him three (3) times (pp. 14-15, id.).
mother of the victim has spent for the funeral services and
wake. "Rabago ran away, but after noticing that appellant and Basila
[had] left the scene, he returned and saw Rabadon dying and
gasping for breath (pp. 17-18, id.).
"That the illegal possession of firearm subject of the
Information in Criminal Case No. 2763-A is considered "Rabago saw Virgilio "Itlog" Rabadon, a policeman, to whom he
merely as an aggravating circumstance in the commission reported Rabadon's killing (pp. 19-20, id.). On January 6, 1991,
of the crime of murder, considering that the alleged Rabago was investigated by policeman Rolando Rabadon but he
firearm used was not recovered by the authorities and said that he did not see anything (p. 3, TSN, June 13, 1994).
never presented in court.
xxxxxxxxx "During the hearing of the case, Rabago explained that he did not
"SO ORDERED." [10] divulge the identities of the assailants for fear of his life (p. 37,
Hence, this appeal. [11] TSN, May 20, 1994). He claimed that some policemen in
The Facts According to the Prosecution Alaminos, Pangasinan [were] members of the Aguila Gang which
kill[ed] people (pp. 41-42, TSN, June 13, 1994). The gang [was]
The solicitor general narrated the People's version of the allegedly led by one Ramon Navarro, appellant's brother.
facts as follows:
"The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) interrogated Rabago
"On January 5, 1991, around 9:00 in the evening, Jose Rabago on January 3, 1994, at which time, Rabago named appellant and
went to Enoc Theater located at Poblacion, Alaminos, Ming Basila as the authors of Rabadon's killing (p. 20, TSN, June
Pangasinan to view some stationary pictures exhibited outside 13, 1994).
"Dr. Francisco Viray, who autopsied Rabadon's cadaver, found
five (5) gunshot wounds and concluded that the immediate cause
of death [was] "cardio-respiratory arrest; antecedent cause: brain
injury and underlying cause: gunshot wounds" (p. 11, TSN,
August 8, 1994)."[12]
According to the Defense
Appellant Noel Navarro denied any participation in the killing
of Rabadon in his 16-page Brief, which we quote:
[13]
"On January 5, 1991, in the evening, one Ferdinand
Rabadon was shot to death near the Enoc Theater at
Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan. Almost immediately
after the shooting incident, Jose Rabago reported the
incident to one policeman, Virgilio "Itlog" Rabadon, was
inside a restaurant near the Victory Liner Terminal that his
(Jose Rabago) companion was shot without him telling
the policeman Virgilio "Itlog" Rabadon who shot his
companion. Policeman Rabadon responded by going to
the place pointed to by Jose Rabago, but the victim was
no longer at the place of the incident as he was brought to
the hospital. Later, Jose Rabago was investigated by
policeman Rolando "Lando" Rabadon regarding the
shooting incident, but Jose Rabago, when asked, told
policeman Rolando Lando Rabadon that he did not see
[14]
anything. Considering the negative result of the police
investigation, no case was filed by the police against
anybody for the shooting to death of Ferdinand Rabadon.
"Three (3) years later, on January 5, 1994, at about 8:00
o' clock in the evening, a composite team of the National
Bureau of Investigation led by Atty. Teofilo Gallang served
a search warrant and warrant of arrest to one Ramon
Navarro, brother of accused-appellant in his residence
and failing to find Ramon Navarro, the composite team of
the NBI went to the house where accused-appellant was
staying where they saw him (Noel Navarro). Accused-
appellant was searched, but [nothing was found] in his
body. Accused-appellant was arrested right then and there
without any warrant of arrest shown to him by the NBI. In
fact, it was admitted that the NBI composite team at the
time [had] no warrant of arrest against accused-appellant.
"The NBI composite team boarded accused-appellant in a
white van and was brought to the house of now
Congressman Hernani Braganza in Alaminos,
Pangasinan. Later, the NBI composite team went to
Lucap, Alaminos, Pangasinan to fetch Fiscal Rabina and
from there, they all proceeded to the police station of
Alaminos, Pangasinan. Accused-appellant inquired from
Fiscal Rabina if there [was] a warrant for his arrest and
Fiscal Rabina simply said, sorry, my son, I cannot do
anything, okay?
"The following day, January 6, 1994, Prosecutor Rabina
filed the [I]nformation charging accused-appellant of
[m]urder, x x x for allegedly killing Ferdinand Rabadon on
January 5, 1991, three (3) years earlier, without
conducting a preliminary investigation. Also filed [was] an
[I]nformation for [violation] of P.D. 1866 x x x." [15]
The defense presented three witnesses: Jose Rabago, who
recanted his previous testimony; NBI Director Teodoro Galang,
who testified as to the circumstances surrounding the arrest of
the appellant without warrant; and Noel Navarro, the appellant
himself.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found the appellant guilty of murder, based on
Jose Rabago's testimony as a prosecution witness, which it
found to be positive, credible and sufficient to support a judgment [courts] look with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies
of conviction. It ratiocinated as follows: previously given in court. The rationale for the rule is obvious; the
retraction can easily be secured from witnesses usually through
"Jose Rabago was positive about the identity of the killers intimidation or monetary consideration." [18]

of the victim. He was just one (1) meter away from Ming In all, the trial court convicted the appellant of murder, after
Basila and he was facing Ming Basila when he fell down. finding that the killing was qualified by treachery and merely
He saw the gun firing when it was Noel Navarro's turn to aggravated by illegal possession of firearms. [19]

[shoot] the victim, and he [had] already taken three steps The Assigned Errors
to [run] away towards the Philippine Rabbit Bus Station, The appellant contends that the lower court committed the
but he claim[ed] that he looked back. following errors:
"1. In not considering the report of Prosecution Witness
"There is no doubt from his testimony that Jose Rabago Jose Rabago to policeman Virgilio "Itlog" Rabadon that
recognized Noel Navarro. He knew Noel Navarro when his companion was killed, but did not tell policeman
they were both students of the Royal Carpenter Virgilio "Itlog" Rabadon that accused-appellant and one
Academy. [In spite] of the hour of the night, he recognized Ming Basila killed the deceased, as part of the res gestae;
Noel Navarro because there were three lights x x x [h]is
distance [was] just three steps away from Noel Navarro. "2. In not considering the result of the investigation
Even assuming that he [had] his back turned toward the conducted by Policeman Rolando Lando Rabadon when
accused, because he scampered away, Jose Rabago Witness Jose Rabago was asked if he saw the assailant
testified that upon reaching the bus station, he looked at and did not mention the name of the accused-appellant
the two who lingered at the scene of the shooting. He also and one Ming Basila, but instead, answered he did not
saw them [leave] and disappear at the corner." [16] see anything, as part of the res gestae;

Rabago's recantation of his testimony as a prosecution "3. In giving credence to the testimony of witness Jose
witness was disregarded by the court a quo in this wise: Rabago despite the fact that he narrated three (3)
versions of the incident, in his report to the police
"x x x the Court cannot find any evidence or any authorities and the investigation conducted by the police
indications that Jose Rabago [had] a sinister scheme to authorities later immediately after the incident, and in his
prevaricate and therefore this Court must respect as testimony as a prosecution witness and as a defense
trustworthy, and with full faith and credence, his testimony witness;
as eyewitness for the prosecution." [17]

"4. In finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable

Citing jurisprudence, the lower court further declared that
"mere retraction by [the] prosecution witness does not doubt of the crime of murder despite serious and material
necessarily deshape the original testimony, if credible," and that " inconsistencies in the testimony of Jose Rabago, the lone
witness of the prosecution who [claimed] to have a prosecution witness, he maintained this assertion. Third, when
[witnessed] the killing of Ferdinand Rabadon." [20] presented as a defense witness, he changed his testimony and
In sum, the defense disputes the trial court's ruling identifying swore that it was not the appellant who had shot Rabadon, but a
appellant as one of the authors of the crime. To resolve the "short and stout man."
[21]

appeal fully, the following issues will bediscussed: (1) credibility The argument does not persuade. True, Rabago did not
and sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, (2) res gestae, (3) mention the name of the appellant when he reported the killing to
the defenses of denial and illegality of arrest and (4) the both SPO2 Virgilio Rabadon and Patrolman Rolando Rabadon;
characterization of the killing. In addition, the Court will discuss however, he explained that he was apprehensive about talking
[22]

the validity of the lower court's ruling that illegal possession of to the police, as he suspected that some of them were members
firearms should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance of the dreaded Aguila Gang, viz.:
in the killing.
The Court's Ruling "x x x x x x x x x
The appeal is devoid of merit. Q Mr. Witness, when you were asked by policeman Lando Rabadon
First Issue: Credibility and Sufficiency of Prosecution about what you learned of the shooting to death of Boyet
Rabadon, you told him you did not see anything, why did you
Evidence
tell policeman Lando Rabadon that you did not see anything?
In the present controversy, the judge who penned the A I was afraid, sir.
assailed Decision did not hear all the evidence presented by the Q And why were you afraid?
parties. In fact, three judges handled the case: Judge Segundo B. A I did not have confidence [in] the police.
Paz, in whose court the Informations were filed and the evidence Q Didn't you have confidence [in] the police?
of the parties was heard until August 17, 1994; Judge Leo M. A Because some policemen are members of Aguila.
Rapatalo, who took over on December 7, 1994 and resolved the Q And what is Aguila?
petition for bail; and Judge Jules A. Mejia, who presided over the xxxxxxxxx
case from February 26, 1997 onwards.Hence, the rule granting A Aguila gang, sir.
finality to the factual findings of trial courts is inapplicable to this xxxxxxxxx
case. Accordingly, the Court meticulously pored over the records, Q What is the Aguila gang?
especially the transcript of stenographic notes, but after a careful A It is killing people, sir.
study and deliberation, the Court finds no reason to disturb the x x x x x x x x x"
[23]

factual findings of Judge Mejia. He further testified to the pervasive climate of fear engulfing
his town:
Appellant contends that the testimony of Prosecution Witness "x x x x x x x x x
Jose Rabago was filled with serious and material inconsistencies, Q In your affidavit, Mr. Witness, you mentioned that there were other
allegedly because he gave three versions of the incident. First, witnesses [to] the killing. [A]ccording to you, on January 5,
he did not mention appellant's name when he reported the 1994, there were other witnesses x x x, and your answer was
incident to SPO2 Virgilio Rabadon; and when asked by "yes", but nobody there talked anymore due to fear for their
Patrolman Rolando Rabadon, he said that he did not see lives.
anything. Second, he identified the appellant as one of A Yes, sir.
Rabadon's killers only when he was questioned by agents of the xxxxxxxxx
National Bureau of Investigation three years after the incident. As
 Q And what about your statement that these other witnesses fear for It must be stressed also that Rabago's testimony was
their lives, was that not your statement in your sworn compatible with the findings of Dr. Francisco E. Viray, the [26]

statement? medicolegal officer who autopsied the victim's body. Rabago said
A Yes, sir, they are afraid. that Rabadon had been shot five times, once in the nape and four
Q And what about you, are you not afraid of the Navarros?
times in other parts of his body. Such details of his testimony as
[27]

A I am afraid, sir.
Q Are you saying, Mr. Witness, that a lot of people here in Alaminos
a prosecution witness, aside from the fact that no ill motive or
are afraid of the Navarros? bias was ascribed to him by the appellant, lends earmarks of
A Yes, sir. truth to said testimony.
x x x x x x x x x" [24]
In contrast, Rabago's testimony as a defense witness was
With regard to Rabago's recantation of his previous bereft of particulars that should have indicated, at the very least,
testimony as a prosecution witness, narrating the killing of that his testimony as a prosecution witness was false. His
Rabadon and identifying the appellant as one of the malefactors, testimony as a defense witness, albeit brief, did point out that it
suffice it to say that this earlier testimony was clear, candid and
was not the appellant but a "stout and short" man, along with
consistent, as shown hereunder: Ming Basila, who shot the victim. He claimed that he was
"x x x x x x x x x testifying anew because he was bothered by his conscience;
Q After Ming Basila shot Boyet Rabadon, what happened next? however, he did not state any reason why he had previously
A Noel Navarro followed.
identified the appellant as one of Rabadon's killers. Also suspect
Q What did Noel Navarro do after Ming Basila shot Rabadon from
behind?
was the way he parried questions regarding his appearance as a
A Boyet Rabadon was already lying down and he [shot] him. defense witness. Worth repeating is the trial court's elucidation
xxxxxxxxx on the matter:
Q You said that Noel Navarro shot Ferdinand Rabadon, how many
times did Noel Navarro shoot Boyet Rabadon? "The Court wonders why of all things, Rabago will apply for
A Thrice, sir. witness protection program of the government, if it [was] not true
xxxxxxxxx that he had witnessed the occurrence of the events as he related
Q Mr. Witness, considering that it was about nine o' clock in the them when he was presented as [a] prosecution witness.
evening when Ming Basila and Noel Navarro shot Boyet
Rabadon, how were you able to see Basila and Noel Navarro "And later on, after giving his version of the incident that
shoot Boyet Rabadon? happened as a witness for the prosecution, why of all things, will
xxxxxxxxx he come to know the date of the trial or hearing for [the] defense
A There was a light, sir. when according to him, not even the accused, not even the
xxxxxxxxx lawyer of the accused, not even the subpoena had reached him,
Q How many lights were there?
and yet, surprisingly, he was present on June 16, 1995 to given
A About three.
again his testimony in favor of the accused.
xxxxxxxxx
Q How far were you from Boyet Rabadon when Ming Basila and
Noel Navarro shot him? xxx xxx xxx
A About three steps, sir.
x x x x x x x x x" [25]
"His only reason why he [had] to testify for the defense [was] that Second Issue: Res Gestae
his conscience bothered him, but this Court cannot buy that kind The appellant contends that, in considering the statements
of explanation and believe it." [28] which Rabago gave to both SPO2 Virgilio Rabadon and
Patrolman Rolando Rabadon, the trial court erred in concluding
Because the prosecution was able to substantiate its charge that such statements were not part of res gestae. [34]

of murder against the appellant through the detailed, clear and At the outset, it must be stated that res gestae pertains to the
consistent testimony of Rabago as a prosecution witness admissibility of evidence, and not to its weight and sufficiency,
(pointing to the appellant as one of the malefactors), the defense as the Office of the Solicitor General correctly pointed out. The
[35]

should have emphatically and clearly established that such admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
testimony was false and ill-motivated. Appellant failed to do this. competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence
The Court has held in a number of cases that a recantation of already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. [36]

a testimony is exceedingly unreliable, for there is always the Res gestae is defined as follows:
probability that such recantation may later on be itself repudiated.
Courts look with disfavor upon retractions, because they can
[29]

"Statements made by a person while a startling

easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for
monetary consideration. A retraction does not necessarily
[30]
negate an earlier declaration. Where a witness who testified for
[31]
the prosecution subsequently testifies for the defense by
retracting his previous testimony, as in the present case, the test
to decide which testimony to believe is a comparison coupled
with the application of the general rules of evidence.[32]
In all, we agree with the court a quo in upholding the detailed,
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res
gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a
legal significance, may be received as part of the res
gestae." [37]

clear and straightforward testimony of Jose Rabago as a

prosecution witness and in debunking his brief and indecisive Rabago's statement to SPO2 Rabadon that someone had
recantation of such testimony. killed his companion can be considered part of the res gestae,
and is thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the
It is a legal truism that in criminal cases, the guilt of the hearsay rule. It was a spontaneous statement that was made
accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. To sustain right after a startling occurrence and that refers to such
conviction, the prosecution must stand or fall on its own occurrence. However, the same cannot be said of his statement
evidence; it cannot draw strength from the weakness of that of to Patrolman Rabadon, as it lacked the requisite spontaneity,
the defense. having been given in answer to questions propounded in an
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove the guilt investigation, a day after the incident in question.
of Appellant Noel Navarro with moral certainty. Indeed, the Court The appellant seems to imply that when Rabago reported the
has held that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and incident to SPO2 Rabadon, Rabago's silence regarding the
credible, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction, even in identity of the killers created doubt as to the appellant's culpability
a charge for murder. [33]
for such killing and, thus, should have been likewise considered
by the lower court in appellant's favor as part of the res gestae.
This proposition deserves scant consideration. Such omission
[38]
cannot be taken to mean that appellant was not the culprit. The
witness was simply silent as to the identity of the assailant. Such
omission, as has been discussed, can be attributed to Rabago's
fear of the Navarros.
The crime committed was murder. As alleged in the
Information, the trial court correctly concluded that the killing of
Ferdinand Rabadon was qualified by treachery.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the person
attacked. Treachery exists when any of the crimes against
[43]

persons is committed with the employment of means,

Witnesses' delayed reporting of what they know about a
methods or forms that tend directly and especially to insure
crime does not render their testimonies false or incredible, for the
its execution, such that the offender faces no risk that may
delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most people
arise from the defense which the offended party might make.
and their abhorrence to get involved in a criminal case. But more
In the present case, not only was the victim caught off guard by
[44]

than this, there is always the inherent fear of reprisal, which is

the unexpected attack of the appellant and Ming Basila, but the
quite understandable, especially if the accused is a man of power
testimony of Jose Rabago likewise indubitably established that
and influence in the community. In People v. Vias, it was held
[39] [40]

the appellant shot the victim when the victim was already lying
that "[t]he natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a
prostrate and defenseless. [45]

criminal case, as well as to give information to the authorities is a

Illegal Possession of Firearms
matter of judicial notice."
While we affirm the trial court's conviction of the appellant for
Third Issue: Denial and Illegal Arrest
murder, we do not agree with its disquisition finding the charge of
While the appellant denied that he killed Ferdinand Rabadon,
illegal possession of firearms to have aggravated the killing.
he did not offer any evidence to prove his assertion;
[41]

instead, his testimony focused on the circumstances To prove illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution must
surrounding his alleged illegal arrest and subsequent establish two things: first, the existence of the subject firearm;
detention. second, the fact that the accused, who owned or possessed the
firearm, did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry
Contrary to the appellant's assertion that he was denied due
the same outside his residence. [46]

process by virtue of his alleged illegal arrest, such claim is

negated by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial In the case at bar, the Information alleged that on January 5,
court, as manifested by the voluntary and counsel-assisted plea 1991, the appellant had in his possession an unlicensed firearm
he entered during arraignment and by his active participation in which he used in killing Ferdinand Rabadon. This firearm was
the trial thereafter.
[42]
allegedly recovered on January 5, 1994, when appellant was
arrested. However, said firearm was not presented in court or
Faced with the detailed, clear and consistent testimony of
offered as evidence against the appellant. Although Rabago
Jose Rabago, against whom no ill motive was imputed, Appellant
testified that he saw the appellant with a "short" firearm when the
Navarro, whom the former pointed to as one of the killers of
latter shot Rabadon on January 5, 1991, no other proof was
Ferdinand Rabadon, cannot escape conviction merely by issuing
presented to show that such gun, allegedly used on January 5,
an unsubstantiated denial and resorting to constitutional
1991, was the same one recovered on January 5, 1994. The
guarantees which he has already voluntarily waived.
prosecution was not able to establish sufficiently the existence of
Fourth Issue: The Crime the subject firearm, and this fact was not offset by SPO1 Edmund
Garcia of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit, who testified
that appellant was not a licensed firearm holder in Pangasinan. G.R. No. 72990 November 21, 1991
Since the charge of illegal possession of firearms was not
proven, the same could not be considered to have aggravated PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
the killing of Ferdinand Rabadon. vs.
MANUEL BADEO, ESPERIDION BADEO, ROGELIO BADEO (at large) and
The court a quo would have been correct in considering BONIFACIO TANGPUS (at large), defendants. MANUEL BADEO and
illegal possession of a firearm an aggravating circumstance, if ESPERIDION BADEO, defendants-appellants.
such possession had been established beyond reasonable
doubt. This is in line with RA 8294 (amending PD 1866), The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
whichregards the use of an unlicensed firearm simply as an Public Attorney's Office for Manuel Badeo.
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide. [47]

In any case, since the killing was qualified by treachery, the FERNAN, C.J.:
crime committed was murder. Whether with or without this
alleged generic aggravating circumstance, the penalty, reclusion In this appeal, father and son Esperidion and Manuel Badeo, seek the
perpetua, would still be the same, because the killing was reversal of the July 5, 1985 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Leyte,
committed in January 1991, when the imposition of the capital Branch XV at Palo, 1 the dispositive portion of which reads:
penalty was still proscribed by the Constitution, and RA 7659 had
not yet been enacted. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the two accused
Damages Manuel Badeo and Esperidion Badeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder and hereby sentences said two accused to the penalty of
While we affirm the award of P50,000 as indemnity for the
RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of Cresenciano Germanes
death of Ferdinand Rabadon, we have found no evidence in the
the sum of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
records that can support the lower court's additional award insolvency, and to pay each half of the costs.
of P50,000 as actual damages. To justify a grant of actual
damages, it is necessary to show the amount of actual loss with
It appearing that the two accused Manuel Badeo and Esperidion Badeo
the best evidence obtainable. In the present case, while Ofelia
[48]
were detained since December 4, 1984, when they were arrested by the
Rabadon testified that P25,000 was spent for the wake and burial
police authorities of Tanauan, Leyte, they should be credited with the full
of her son, she did not present receipts or any other documents
time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, if they
to substantiate such claim. agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners; other wise, they shall be credited with
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed 4/5 only of the time during which they have undergone preventive
Decision is AFFIRMED, but the award of actual damages imprisonment.
is DELETED. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED. SO ORDERED.

According to the sole prosecution eyewitness En ega Abrio (In ega Abreo),
at around six o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1981, she was walking on
her way home. Cresenciano Germanes was walking ahead of her. Near the
house of Esperidion Badeo, four men attacked Cresenciano. Being about
ten arms length away, she saw Manuel Badeo hack Cresenciano at the back 5. Stab wound, right iliac region, level of the umbilicus, 2.5 inches
with a bolo measuring around fifty-five centimeters in length. Rogelio long, 2 inches wide, 1 inch deep
Badeo then hacked Cresenciano with another long bolo also at the back.
Bonifacio Tangpus followed with a stab at the right portion of 6. Longitudinal, oblique, abrasion at left iliac region, 2.5 inches long
Cresenciano's stomach, after which Esperidion Badeo hacked
Cresenciano's back. Cresenciano fell down on his back. 2 7. Hacking wound, extending from right to left lumbar areas crossing
the vertebral column, 7 inches long, 1 inch wide, 2 inches deep
Cresenciano shouted after he had fallen. Noticing that Cresenciano was
still alive, Rogelio came back and "finished him off." 3 During the attack, 8. Hacking wound, left suprascapular region, 5 inches long, 2 inches
En ega was as near to the group at seven arms length. 4 She did not go wide, 1.5 inches deep
nearer because she was afraid. 5 Instead, she ran home taking a shortcut
through the property of a certain Adriano. She immediately informed her 9. Hacking wound, left shoulder area (deltoid portion), 7 inches long,
husband, Gregorio, about the incident. She told him, however, not to go 3 inches wide, 2 inches deep.
out anymore to inform Cresenciano's relatives about the hacking incident,
as it was already dark. She eventually told Cresenciano's relatives about
Uldarico Germanes, a nephew of Cresenciano, believed that his uncle was
his fate in the morning of the following day, Sunday. 6 killed by the four because Cresenciano was instrumental in dividing the
land being tenanted by Manuel two portions. One portion was to be
The body of Cresenciano, who was single and 42 years old when he died, retained by Manuel while the other half would be tenanted by him
was autopsied on March 23, 1981 by Dr. Lesmes C. Lumen, the municipal (Uldarico). He accompanied Cresenciano when the latter told Manuel of
health officer of Dagami, Leyte. The following findings appear on the the new arrangement. Manuel did not like the arrangement because
medical certificate (Exh. A) issued by Dr. Lumen: according to him, he could still work on the whole area. 7

1. Hacking wound on the skull, from vertex to left temporal area, 10 Manuel Badeo admitted having hacked Cresenciano but averred that he
inches long, 1 inch wide, 2 inches deep with exposure of brain substance did so in self-defense. According to him, he was at home in the afternoon
of March 21, 1981 as he was cutting the grass in his home in barangay
2. Hacking wound, left supraclavicular area, 2.5 inches long, .5 inch Katipunan. Later in the afternoon, he went to barangay Hilabago to ask for
wide, .5 ench deep kerosene from his mother arriving there at past six o'clock in the evening.

3. Hacking wound, extending from left subcostal area to the level of While he was at his mother's house, his brother-in-law, Rosito Dumpang
the third rib, 9.5 inches long, 2 inches wide, 1 inch deep and. the latter's nephew Gabriel, passed by. They invited him to go home
with them. As they were walking, they met Cresenciano Germanes behind
4. Stab wounds at the inframammary area, left the copra drier of Manuel's mother. Cresenciano asked him where he was
going. When Manuel answered that he was going home, Cresenciano held
a) 2 inches long, .5 inch wide, 2 inches deep him by his shirt and pointed a gun at him. As Manuel was about an arm's
length away, he noticed that Cresenciano was reeking with the smell of
b) .5 inch long, .5 inch wide, 2 inches deep tuba.

c) .5 inchlong, .5 inch wide, 2 inches deep While pointing the gun at him, Cresenciano threatened to kill Manuel.
After telling Cresenciano that they had nothing to fight about, Manuel
retreated to a coconut tree, went around it, drew a bolo and hacked
Cresenciano hitting him on the head. Then he stabbed Cresenciano's
stomach. Manuel ran towards Rosito and Gabriel Dumpang who, in turn, Sometime in Jurte, 1981, Esperidion and Rogelio Badeo executed a joint
"castigated" Cresenciano. Manuel told them to stop punishing Cresenciano affidavit denying participation in the killing Cresenciano. They affirmed
but the two did not heed his advice. therein that they had been in the homestead owned by Bonifacio Tangpus
since March 14, 1981 when the crime transpired. 12 Bonifacio Tangpus
Manuel did not see En ega Abreo when he hacked Cresenciano. Neither did not execute any affidavit nor surrender to the authorities. Neither was
was his father, Esperidion, around. But he noticed that when Rosito he apprehended.
hacked Cresenciano, the latter's pistol fell from his hand. Manuel picked it
up and later surrendered it to barangay captain Andrea Olimberio. When For his part, Manuel executed a counter-affidavit dated June 1, 1981
Manuel surrendered to the police authorities, he did not implicate Rosito stating that in the afternoon of March 21, 1981, as he was cutting the grass
and Gabriel Dumpang because they had threatened that should he in his lawn, Sagino Abrio (sic), the husband of In iga (En ega), approached
mention their names, they would kill him. That threat was also the reason him and intimated to him that he had a big problem because In iga and
why, together with Esperidion, he transferred his residence to Tanauan, Cresenciano were having an illicit relationship. Sagino said that the
Leyte. relationship downgraded his honor because it was known to everyone
their place. Sagino vowed that something would happen to Cresenciano.
Manuel stated in court that En ega Abreo testified against him because her
husband, Sabino (sic), was the first suspect in the killing of Cresenciano as According to the same affidavit, when Manuel arrived at his mother's
there was "bad blood" between Sabino and Cresenciano. 8 house to get kerosene, his mother, Maria Badeo, Estelita Tangpuz (sic),
Elena Borja, Cresencio (sic) Germanes and Sagino Abrio were drinking
Andrea Olimberio, who was the barangay captain of barangay Katipunan liquor. As Manuel was about to leave, Germanes forced him to drink liquor.
when the incident occurred, corroborated Manuel's claim that he After taking one glass, Manuel turned to leave but Germanes grabbed his
surrendered to her. According to Andrea, at about eleven o'clock in the shirt. Sagino then followed Germanes, hacked him "many times" while
evening of March 21, 1981, Manuel, accompanied by his wife and sister, telling Manuel that it was a problem he could handle. Upon seeing that
came to her house and told her that he had killed Cresenciano Germanes. Germanes had a firearm tucked in his waist, Sagino ordered Manuel to get
Manuel surrendered to her a pistol which he had taken from the victim. it. Manuel and Germanes grappled for possession of the firearm and as
Andrea knew that the pistol belonged to Cresenciano because the latter soon as Manuel took hold of it, Sagino told him to surrender it to the
had shown it to her when he drank liquor at police. 13
store. 9
The contents of said counter-affidavit as well as Manuel's insistence at the
Esperidion Badeo, on the other hand, denied being at the scene when the preliminary investigation that it was En ega Abrio's husband who was
killing occurred. He was then in the mountain in Saransang making a responsible for Cresenciano Germanes' killing were totally discredited by
kaingin on the land owned by Estelita Tangpus. Saransang was more than the investigating fiscal who noted that during Manuel's 20-day detention,
seven kilometers from barangay Hilabago and the distance could only be he never mentioned to the police Sagino's involvement in the crime. The
negotiated by foot through a trail used by sled-drawing carabaos. With investigating fiscal concluded that the rather belated facts revealed by
him in the mountain were Estelita, Rogelio Badeo and Bonifacio Tangpus. Manuel were
He left the place only on March 22, 1981 when his wife fetched him designed "to coerce or force En ega Abrio from becoming a witness for the
because his son Manuel had wounded somebody. He went to Hilabago but complainant." 14
he immediately left for the mountain because he was afraid that revenge
might be taken on him. 10 Estelita Rubo corroborated Esperidion's alibi On February 8, 1982, an information for murder was filed against Manuel,
claiming that Esperidion did not leave the kaingin area even after work. 11 Esperidion and Rogelio Badeo and Bonifacio Tangpus. 15 They were
charged with having conspired to kill and treacherously killing
Cresenciano. We find merit in the motion for reconsideration. Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished "by the
On September 24,1984, the assistant provincial fiscal filed a motion for death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
the issuance of an alias warrant of arrest. 16 Through the alias warrant of penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
arrest issued by the court, on December 4, 1984, Manuel Badeo and offender occurs before final judgment." In People vs. Alison, 23 the Court,
Esperidion Badeo were apprehended by the police. 17 upon the recommendation of the then Solicitor General who was required
to comment on the information that appellant Alison had died at the
On arraignment, Manuel pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide prison hospital, resolved that, there being no final judgment as yet, "the
while Esperidion pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Manuel invoked criminal and civil liability (sic) of Alison was extinguished by his death."
the mitigating circumstances of voluntary plea of guilty 18 and voluntary
surrender. However, the court ruled that a plea of guilty to a lesser offense The Alison resolution was the basis of the resolution in People vs. Satorre
demanded the conformity of the offended party. 19 Inasmuch as Catalina 24 similarly dismissing the case against the deceased appellant. In a
Germanes, the mother of the victim, was not agreeable to the plea entered separate opinion in the resolution, then Associate Justice Ramon C. Aquino
by Manuel, the court considered the plea as one of not guilty. stated that as to the personal penalties, criminal liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
After trial, the court rendered the aforementioned decision. Manuel and judgment. According to Justice Aquino, the term " pecuniary penalties"
Esperidion appealed to this Court contending that the trial court erred in (las pecuniarias) in Article 89 refers to fine and costs as distinguished
not appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-defense and the from " pecuniary liability" (responsabilidades pecunarias) in Article 38
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of Manuel, and in which include reparation and indemnity.
not giving weight and credence to the alibi of Esperidion.
As every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment
On August 10, 1990, Esperidion died of cardio-respiratory arrest of the guilty party, and also to a civil action for the restitution of the thing,
secondary to pulmonary tuberculosis at the prison hospital in Muntinlupa, repair of the damage and indemnification for the losses 25 whether the
Metro Manila. 20 Inasmuch as no final judgment had as yet been rendered, particular act or omission is done intentionally or negligently or whether
in the resolution of August 21, 1991, the case against Esperidion was or not punishable by law, 26 subsequent decisions of the Court held that
dismissed with costs de oficio and entry of judgment was made on August while the criminal liability of an appellant is extinguished by his death, his
22, 1991. 21 civil liability subsists. 27 In such case, the heirs of the deceased appellant
are substituted as parties in the criminal case and his estate shall answer
On September 17, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a motion for the for his civil liability. 28
reconsideration of said resolution alleging that while the criminal liability
of appellant Esperidion Badeo had been extinguished by his death In the light of the foregoing, we reconsider the resolution August 21, 1991
pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, his civil liability arising insofar as it considers as extinguished Esperidion Badeo's civil liability, in
from the criminal offense subsisted in accordance with Articles 1231 and order to determine whether or not such liability exist. 29
1161 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 112 of the Revised Penal Code
and the ruling in People vs. Pancho, 145 SCRA 323. Hence, as provided for Well-settled is the rule that where the accused admits having authored the
in Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, upon proper notice, the legal death of the victim and his defense is anchored on self-defense, he must
representatives of the deceased appellant should appear as substitute rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that
parties herein insofar as the deceased's civil liability for the crime is of the prosecution. 30 Otherwise his conviction is inescapable. 31
concerned. 22
Of the three requisites of self-defense as stated in Article 11 (1) of the the killers immediately after the commission of the crime, affect the
Revised Penal Code, namely: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable probative value of her testimony, specifically her positive identification of
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of Manuel as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Usually triggered by fear,
sufficient provocation on the part of person defending himself, the first such reluctance is common and has been judicially declared not to affect
requisite is indispensable 32 for without it, there is nothing to prevent or credibility. 39
repel. After a close scrutiny of the records, the Court finds that appellant
Manuel Badeo failed to prove unlawful aggression. However, we agree with the Solicitor General that the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor of
Manuel contends that he was the object of Cresenciano's unlawful Manuel. Ordinarily, where there has been actual arrest, the mitigating
aggression because the latter held his shirt and points a gun at him. His circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be invoked. 40 While it is true
testimony, however, was completely uncorroborated. He failed even to that Manuel was arrested with his father on December 4, 1981, the
present Cresenciano's gun in evidence notwithstanding his claim that he records show that Manuel did surrender: first, to the barangay captain
surrendered it to the barangay captain and later, to the police. 33 Indeed, and, in the morning of March 22, 1981, to the police of Dagami. 41 In fact,
we agree with the trial court that if there really was a gun, Cresenciano after his surrender, Manuel was detained for twenty days. 42
would have used it not only against Manuel but also against Rosito and
Gabriel Dumpang. 34 The killing of Crecenciano is qualified by treachery which is shown by the
suddenness by which he was attacked. Under Article 248 of the Revised
Moreover, the location, number and seriousness of the wounds sustained Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion temporal maximum to
by Cresenciano belie the claim of self-defense. 35 Of the nine wounds death. There being one mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposable
found on Cresenciano's body, Manuel admitted having inflicted the two shall be the minimum period. 43 Applying the indeterminate sentence law,
wounds which the physician performed the autopsy considered as fatal: proper penalty is ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
the hacking wound on the skull and the stabbing wound on the stomach. maximum as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one
36 As such, even without the concerted assistance of the other accused, (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum penalty.
Manuel could have nonetheless produced the lethal consequence: the
death of Cresenciano. Anent Esperidion Badeo's civil liability, we find that there is no basis for
its imposition in view of the absence of a clear showing that he committed
Manuel's assertion that the credibility of the sole prosecution eyewitness the crime imputed to him. 44 Esperidion could not have been at the scene
is questionable is belated if not baseless. He insists that En ega had an of the crime because the kaingin area where he had been staying since
illicit relationship with the victim and that if her testimony were true, she January 7, 1983 until he was fetched by his wife on March 22, 1985 45
would not have lost time in reporting the murder to Cresenciano's was a good five-hour hike away through a trail. 46 Alibi is generally
relatives. On the issue of credibility, we find no reason to depart from the considered a weak defense but it assumes importance where the evidence
settled rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of for the prosecution is weak and betrays concretenes on the question of
witnesses should be accorded the highest respect because it had the whether or not the accused committed the
advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and to discern if a crime. 47
witness was telling the truth. 37 The imputation of an illicit relationship
between the prosecution witness and the victim which was not shown In this case, Esperidion was implicated by the uncorroborated testimony
other than by the counter-affidavit of Manuel and which the investigating of sole prosecution eyewitness In ego Abrio. Her identification of
fiscal had even discredited, is not an acceptable evidence insofar as proof Esperidion as one of the perpetrators of the crime is, however, short of the
of improper motive on the part of En ega is concerned. 38 Neither may positiveness and reliability essential for conviction. 48 As several people
En ega's initial reluctance to denounce Manuel and his other co-accused as committed the crime, it is probable that Abrio mistook Esperidion for
another person considering that according to her, the attack was
perpetrated when it was already getting dark. This does not however,
totally discredit her entire testimony especially the portion thereof which
imputes on Manuel the authorship of the fatal hacking blows on
Cresenciano. Court may believe one part of a testimony and disbelieve
another part. 49
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed insofar as
appellant Manuel Badeo is concerned subject to the modifications that he
shall serve the penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
maximum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal maximum and indemnify the heirs of Cresenciano
Germanes in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000).
The resolution of August 21, 1991 is hereby reconsidered insofar as it
considers as extinguished Esperidion Badeo's civil liability. However,
finding that Esperidion Badeo should be acquitted as he did not commit
the crime imputed to him, no civil liability is hereby imposed on him. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio
Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof
on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending
appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to
hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering.
Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed
the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General
to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his
commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of
accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his
commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case
of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be resolved for
the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil
liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of
the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of
conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.
In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of
Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation
in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil
liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is
rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
 The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme."
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the What is "sentencia firme" under the old statute?
affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death
of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It
a consequence of the alleged crime? says:

It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition: SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por
no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part: de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto.

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is "Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite.
totally extinguished: Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it,
the crime is confirmed "en condena determinada;" or, in the words of
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes "una verdad legal." Prior
pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en
the offender occurs before final judgment; tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And,
as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final judgment
plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished. whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for
the simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view.
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is
it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the
judgment which is final and executory? Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term
"final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in
the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites: appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served,
or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal."
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the
respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a
sentencia firme. judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that
defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.
xxx xxx xxx
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For
where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not
reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring
criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, any claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention of the
1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to final
Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the
Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the However, this court ruled therein:
offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, supra. We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in
view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code.
out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a
liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and
civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby distinct from the criminal action.
we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source
thereof criminal liability does not exist. And, as was well stated in Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R. damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
criminal proceeding."
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action
Supreme Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the
al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced
Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the separately.
accused pending appeal of said cases.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
xxx xxx xxx
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and
considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction
the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison
of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises
was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil
Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the
4045); consequently, the case against him should be dismissed. extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided,
of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely
Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and
of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court sale. (Emphasis ours)
was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who died
xxx xxx xxx allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was
exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate
accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the
first and second vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a
sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based
on the laws of human relations remains." The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three
accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to his complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to
death pending appeal of his conviction. indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be
P57,048.23).
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court
relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the
Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims against the defendant criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a
whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the
Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and
continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal,
"the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case as When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before
plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased- final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be
accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants." prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the
rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had
the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives
differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336,
criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto. October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).

However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds
from this long-established principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24
was charged with and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during the
pendency of the appeal of his conviction. In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the
deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil
appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the
alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is,
against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite
this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether
heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to
appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability isasserted in
concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court). the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal.
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:
our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our
abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is
criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire totally extinguished:
appeal due to the demise of the accused.
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling. the offender occurs before final judgment;

To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the
civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective
of the latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in
Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex delicto
when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an
alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action.
In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency
of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of
Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto
treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed
under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely
a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one
which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new
and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the
filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to pinpoint the
statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in
recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in
the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of
the criminal action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably
signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi.
Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another
determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of
prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference that civil actions of the type
extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may
civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by
dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be
declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished "When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies
from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be
refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of
from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed
the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had
treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30. been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives
Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to him. It may be continued on appeal.
authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as
that contemplated under Article 30. Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of
procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main
decision: xxx xxx xxx

Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and
criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the
would be liable. 13 Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already passed
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, beyond the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional
concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate
of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal
committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed in the
pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego,
although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of should be set aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and
Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action unjustifiable.
already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We
reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions.
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to There is neither authority nor justification for its application in criminal
stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of criminal
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary conversion from
the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
offender. . . . administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or
interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator;
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from
recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an
money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against
estate of the deceased accused. him.

Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in
light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action
which in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the
are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against
14 are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to
delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,
Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied.
filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal
illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.
implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of
this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from
a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should
be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined
liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of delicto in senso strictiore."
obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is
premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced. 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a
personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or result of the same act or omission:
administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court: a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts Respondent. -- -
d) ... G.R. No. 190696
e) Quasi-delicts
Present:
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on BRION,
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced BERSAMIN,
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, *ABAD, and
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
explained above.
Promulgated:
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the August 3, 2010
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private- x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the RESOLUTION
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21
of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible BRION, J.:
privation of right by prescription. 22
We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, Philtranco
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of Service Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco) and Rolito Calang, to challenge our
appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based Resolution of February 17, 2010. Our assailed Resolution denied the petition
solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby for review on certiorari for failure to show any reversible error sufficient to
dismissed without qualification. warrant the exercise of this Courts discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs Antecedent Facts
de oficio. At around 2:00 p.m. of April 22, 1989, Rolito Calang was driving Philtranco Bus
No. 7001, owned by Philtranco along Daang Maharlika Highway in Barangay
SO ORDERED. Lambao, Sta. Margarita, Samar when its rear left side hit the front left portion
of a Sarao jeep coming from the opposite direction. As a result of the
collision, Cresencio Pinohermoso, the jeeps driver, lost control of the vehicle,
and bumped and killed Jose Mabansag, a bystander who was standing along
the highways shoulder. The jeep turned turtle three (3) times before finally
ROLITO CALANG and PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC., stopping at about 25 meters from the point of impact. Two of the jeeps
Petitioners, passengers, Armando Nablo and an unidentified woman, were instantly killed,
- versus - while the other passengers sustained serious physical injuries.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

The prosecution charged Calang with multiple homicide, multiple serious homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property thru
physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence before the reckless imprudence) before the RTC.
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Calbayog City. The RTC, in its decision
dated May 21, 2001, found Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless The petitioners likewise maintain that the courts below overlooked several
imprudence resulting to multiple homicide, multiple physical injuries and relevant facts, supported by documentary exhibits, which, if considered,
damage to property, and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of would have shown that Calang was not negligent, such as the affidavit and
thirty days of arresto menor, as minimum, to four years and two months of testimony of witness Celestina Cabriga; the testimony of witness Rodrigo
prision correccional, as maximum. The RTC ordered Calang and Philtranco, Bocaycay; the traffic accident sketch and report; and the jeepneys registration
jointly and severally, to pay P50,000.00 as death indemnity to the heirs of receipt. The petitioners also insist that the jeeps driver had the last clear
Armando; P50,000.00 as death indemnity to the heirs of Mabansag; and chance to avoid the collision.
P90,083.93 as actual damages to the private complainants.
We partly grant the motion.
The petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA),
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 25522. The CA, in its decision dated November Liability of Calang
20, 2009, affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The CA ruled that petitioner
Calang failed to exercise due care and precaution in driving the Philtranco We see no reason to overturn the lower courts finding on Calangs culpability.
bus. According to the CA, various eyewitnesses testified that the bus was The finding of negligence on his part by the trial court, affirmed by the CA, is a
traveling fast and encroached into the opposite lane when it evaded a question of fact that we cannot pass upon without going into factual matters
pushcart that was on the side of the road. In addition, he failed to slacken his touching on the finding of negligence. In petitions for review on certiorari
speed, despite admitting that he had already seen the jeep coming from the under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court is limited to reviewing
opposite direction when it was still half a kilometer away. The CA further only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are
ruled that Calang demonstrated a reckless attitude when he drove the bus, devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is
despite knowing that it was suffering from loose compression, hence, not based on a misapprehension of facts.
roadworthy.
Liability of Philtranco
The CA added that the RTC correctly held Philtranco jointly and severally
liable with petitioner Calang, for failing to prove that it had exercised the We, however, hold that the RTC and the CA both erred in holding Philtranco
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent the accident. jointly and severally liable with Calang. We emphasize that Calang was
charged criminally before the RTC. Undisputedly, Philtranco was not a direct
The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari. In our party in this case. Since the cause of action against Calang was based on
Resolution dated February 17, 2010, we denied the petition for failure to delict, both the RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and
sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed decision to warrant the severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-delict under Articles 2176[1] and
exercise of this Courts discretionary appellate jurisdiction. 2180[2] of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to
the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has
The Motion for Reconsideration committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising from
delict.
In the present motion for reconsideration, the petitioners claim that there
was no basis to hold Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang
because the former was not a party in the criminal case (for multiple
If at all, Philtrancos liability may only be subsidiary. Article 102 of the Revised pronounced, in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the
Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, tavernkeepers employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.[4]
and proprietors of establishments, as follows:
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the present motion. The Court of Appeals
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any decision that affirmed in toto the RTC decision, finding Rolito Calang guilty
other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property, is
some general or special police regulations shall have been committed by AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Philtrancos liability should only be
them or their employees. subsidiary. No costs.

Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for the restitution of goods taken by SO ORDERED.
robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the
payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit
of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the
directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them
with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall
attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeepers employees.

The foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article

103 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:

The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also
apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind
of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles 102
and 103 are deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are
applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need
not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.[3]
Nonetheless, before the employers subsidiary liability is enforced, adequate
evidence must exist establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the
convicted employees; (2) they are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) the
crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and
(4) the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency. Distinguish from a contract
The determination of these conditions may be done in the same criminal G.R. No. L-12191 October 14, 1918
action in which the employees liability, criminal and civil, has been

JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
Ramon Sotelo for appellant.
Kincaid & Hartigan for appellee.
FISHER, J.:
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the
plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad
Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived
in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located
upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily
by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked,
he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride
upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in
question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose from his seat in the
second class-car where he was riding and, making, his exit through the
door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright
guardrail with his right hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo
station there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate
gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends
along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length
of several coaches. As the train slowed down another passenger,
named Emilio Zuiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off
the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to
rise from the level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little
farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his
feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his
feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His
body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the
moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It
appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved
forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as
the railroad station was lighted dimly by a single light located some
distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred
were difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted
car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform
where the plaintiff alighted is found in the fact that it was the
customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been
brought to the station for the shipment to the market. They were
contained in numerous sacks which has been piled on the platform in a
row one upon another. The testimony shows that this row of sacks was
so placed of melons and the edge of platform; and it is clear that the
fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of
these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. His
statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily
to be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious
condition, and it appeared that the injuries which he had received were
very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in
the city of Manila where an examination was made and his arm was
amputated. The result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the
plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation
was performed and the member was again amputated higher up near
the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum
of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other
expenses in connection with the process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the
First Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages of the defendant exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of
company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of
platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa
of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the contractual.
Court of First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts
substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom his conclusion to the Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and
effect that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant by 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points out this distinction, which was
reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to also recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of Rakes vs.
obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon
plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa,
coach and was therefore precluded form recovering. Judgment was substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of
accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie"
plaintiff appealed. and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of an
obligation already existing . . . ."
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company
were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest
manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not
he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a
effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It contract.
necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the
damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's Upon this point the Court said:
own contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary
that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are
responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory applicable are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing
negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined. duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already
formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to article 1101,
defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to 1103, and 1104 of the same code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at 365.)
from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant
to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under
direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that the Spanish law, is, in certain cases imposed upon employers with
presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of their employees to
persons to whom they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in
the English Common Law, upon the principle of respondeat superior
if it were, the master would be liable in every case and unconditionally
but upon the principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code,
which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence, do
injury to another, the obligation of making good the damage caused.
One who places a powerful automobile in the hands of a servant whom
he knows to be ignorant of the method of managing such a vehicle, is
himself guilty of an act of negligence which makes him liable for all the
consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to make good the
damage arises at the very instant that the unskillful servant, while
acting within the scope of his employment causes the injury. The
liability of the master is personal and direct. But, if the master has not
been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of
the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done
within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the
servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the
master and the person injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection
and control of the servant relieves the master from liability for the
latter's acts on the contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility
has never existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising
from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or
omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or
inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all
possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration
the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties
which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal
diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is
bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by
reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their
employment, such third person suffer damage. True it is that under
article 1903 of the Civil Code the law creates a presumption that he has
been negligent in the selection or direction of his servant, but the
presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and diligence
in this respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as
found in the Porto Rico Code, has held that these articles are applicable
to cases of extra-contractual culpa exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20
Porto Rico Reports, 215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in
the case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil. rep., 624), which
was an action brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability
of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness
of his employee while acting within the scope of his employment. The
Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code,
said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is
caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or employer either in selection of the servant or employee,
or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently,
may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to
the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of his servant. This is the notable peculiarity
of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking contrast to
the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence
of the servant in conclusively the negligence of the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of
extra-contractual culpa based upon negligence, it is necessary that
there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant
personally, and that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely
establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with the
authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the
liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of
the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority
existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and the
one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the
negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts
or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact,
is not based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in
their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence
and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the
breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or
contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or
omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it
members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual,
of certain members of society to others, generally embraced in the
concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute
the measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in
character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other
members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to
willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, give rise to
an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental
distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise
from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual
obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which
creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the
vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty
assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence,
whether of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect
and our Legislature has so elected whom such an obligation is
imposed is morally culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of public
policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral
culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those
person who acts or mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others
who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over
them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit
extra-contractual liability with certain well-defined exceptions to
cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons
to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to
exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agents or
servants, or in the control of persons who, by reason of their status,
occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made
liable for their conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by
contract to render service to another, is wholly different from that to
which article 1903 relates. When the sources of the obligation upon
which plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission,
the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence if he
does not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual
undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged
that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not
necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of
the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the
defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its
nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa,
a suing creditor should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as
the only fact upon which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a
case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual
obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been
broken, it is not necessary for him to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. Spain. (Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and
8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76]). December 13, 1896.) In the decisions of November 20, 1896, it
appeared that plaintiff's action arose ex contractu, but that defendant
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a sought to avail himself of the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code
contract to show that the breach was due to the negligent conduct of as a defense. The Spanish Supreme Court rejected defendant's
defendant or of his servants, even though such be in fact the actual contention, saying:
cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant
that the negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing
breach of the contract would not constitute a defense to the action. If obligation, by fault or negligence, such as those to which article 1902 of
the negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as a means of the Civil Code relates, but of damages caused by the defendant's failure
discharging the liability arising from contract, the anomalous result to carry out the undertakings imposed by the contracts . . . .
would be that person acting through the medium of agents or servants
in the performance of their contracts, would be in a better position A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability
than those acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch to of employers for damage done by the negligent acts of their servants
watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the bailee, by a personal will show that in no case has the court ever decided that the
negligent act causes its destruction, he is unquestionably liable. Would negligence of the defendant's servants has been held to constitute a
it be logical to free him from his liability for the breach of his contract, defense to an action for damages for breach of contract.
which involves the duty to exercise due care in the preservation of the
watch, if he shows that it was his servant whose negligence caused the In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that
injury? If such a theory could be accepted, juridical persons would the owner of a carriage was not liable for the damages caused by the
enjoy practically complete immunity from damages arising from the negligence of his driver. In that case the court commented on the fact
breach of their contracts if caused by negligent acts as such juridical that no evidence had been adduced in the trial court that the
persons can of necessity only act through agents or servants, and it defendant had been negligent in the employment of the driver, or that
would no doubt be true in most instances that reasonable care had he had any knowledge of his lack of skill or carefulness.
been taken in selection and direction of such servants. If one delivers
securities to a banking corporation as collateral, and they are lost by In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6
reason of the negligence of some clerk employed by the bank, would it Phil. Rep., 215), the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages caused by
be just and reasonable to permit the bank to relieve itself of liability for the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff which was allowed to get adrift
the breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the payment of by the negligence of defendant's servants in the course of the
the debt by proving that due care had been exercised in the selection performance of a contract of towage. The court held, citing Manresa
and direction of the clerk? (vol. 8, pp. 29, 69) that if the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a
contract made between it and the plaintiff . . . we do not think that the
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to the case."
and culpa contractual as a mere incident to the performance of a
contract has frequently been recognized by the supreme court of
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively appeared that defendant had been
sued the defendant to recover damages for the personal injuries guilty of negligence in its failure to exercise proper discretion in the
caused by the negligence of defendant's chauffeur while driving direction of the servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable for the injury
defendant's automobile in which defendant was riding at the time. The suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be
court found that the damages were caused by the negligence of the regarded as constituting culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. As
driver of the automobile, but held that the master was not liable, Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether negligence occurs
although he was present at the time, saying: an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual
undertaking or its itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking
. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a length of obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is always an
time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or
and to direct the driver to desist therefrom. . . . The act complained of inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently, when the court
must be continued in the presence of the owner for such length of time holds that a defendant is liable in damages for having failed to exercise
that the owner by his acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own. due care, either directly, or in failing to exercise proper care in the
selection and direction of his servants, the practical result is identical in
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage & either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred, because
Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8), it is true that the court rested its the court held in the Yamada case that defendant was liable for the
conclusion as to the liability of the defendant upon article 1903, damages negligently caused by its servants to a person to whom it was
although the facts disclosed that the injury complaint of by plaintiff bound by contract, and made reference to the fact that the defendant
constituted a breach of the duty to him arising out of the contract of was negligent in the selection and control of its servants, that in such a
transportation. The express ground of the decision in this case was that case the court would have held that it would have been a good defense
article 1903, in dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent to the action, if presented squarely upon the theory of the breach of
acts of his servants "makes the distinction between private individuals the contract, for defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise
and public enterprise;" that as to the latter the law creates a rebuttable care in the selection and control of the servant.
presumption of negligence in the selection or direction of servants; and
that in the particular case the presumption of negligence had not been The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the
overcome. attention to the relative spheres of contractual and extra-contractual
obligations. The field of non- contractual obligation is much more
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court broader than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it does, the
treated plaintiff's action as though founded in tort rather than as based whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively
upon the breach of the contract of carriage, and an examination of the speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is
pleadings and of the briefs shows that the questions of law were in fact bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-
discussed upon this theory. Viewed from the standpoint of the contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation
defendant the practical result must have been the same in any event. exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that
The proof disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's servant was the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual
grossly negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
 believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to
implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.
of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty,
being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject
could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to is that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010)
defendant's servants. as follows:

The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even
granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an
obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual
obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains,
the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was
his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had
come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of
comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the
accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is
imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely
contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is,
therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of
negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to
a full stop before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could
not have occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many authorities in
support of the contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger
to alight from a moving train. We are not disposed to subscribe to this
doctrine in its absolute form. We are of the opinion that this
proposition is too badly stated and is at variance with the experience of
every-day life. In this particular instance, that the train was barely
moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it
came to stop within six meters from the place where he stepped from
it. Thousands of person alight from trains under these conditions every
day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its
platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty
of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that
of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an
ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the
passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the
circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to
be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man
generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use
under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson,
Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in
Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we may say that the test is this;
Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at
the time he alighted from the train which would have admonished a
person of average prudence that to get off the train under the
conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have
desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory
negligence.1awph!l.net
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a
conclusion can be drawn to the effect that plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being
able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train
was yet slowly moving. In considering the situation thus presented, it
should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of
the fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons
piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by
reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities
for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the
absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the
platform was clear. The place, as we have already stated, was dark, or
dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the
defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for
if it were by any possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks
in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of them adequately so
that their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff in this case the following circumstances are to be noted:
The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that
of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the
steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place
his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk
incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it
was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable and
even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was
possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no
means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the
same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining
the question of contributory negligence in performing such act that
is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the
age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances
necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be
considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less
capable than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the
nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the
limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to
the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this
station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with
regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or
the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is
that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train
was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and
that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was
earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has
suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that
employment. Defendant has not shown that any other gainful
occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the
standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are
of the opinion that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by him
for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also
entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for
medical attention, hospital services, and other incidental expenditures
connected with the treatment of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby
rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both
instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street and Avancea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso. that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued,
and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino
passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that
SANCHEZ, J.: Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man
[manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr.
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing
respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the the plane.3
difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of
the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with interest at the 1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the
legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus findings" 4 of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges that
P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit. respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the
issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate court's decision.
refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and
voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall
against petitioner. be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This is
The case is now before us for review on certiorari. echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the
merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of
evidence of record", are: Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly
raised before it". 7
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino
pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to
direct attack. 8 The law, however, solely insists that a decision state the
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. 9
agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and
trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, piece of evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the
plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he specify in the sentence the facts" which a party "considered as
was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental process from which the
there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so
right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So
plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary
facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold
therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for
the defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law
that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the
decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing
to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the
requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this
setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the
findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution
without taking into consideration or even mentioning the appellant's
side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony", would not
vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the
testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by,
the defeated party, it does not mean that the court has overlooked
such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal
presumptions are that official duty has been regularly performed, and
that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid before the court
and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe
defined as "the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the
court ... and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered
thereon". 16 They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to
the determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other
hand, has been declared as "one which does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by
certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is
conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of this
Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and
received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that
said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and
agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not
have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight,
although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance
of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class
ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class
seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and
discussed in its brief before the Court of Appeals under its third
assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that
plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats
on the "definite" segments of his journey, particularly that from Saigon
to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a
first-class ticket was no guarantee that the passenger to whom the
same had been issued, would be accommodated in the first-class
compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make
arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-class
reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot
understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company
could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor
at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class
tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its
employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business
that the company should know whether or riot the tickets it issues are
to be honored or not.22
 understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23
of petitioner's contention, thus:
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, difference of a few pesos in the amount refunded on Carrascoso's
there can be no question. Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the
Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a
own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower court.
testified as follows: 24 Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of
Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the assignments of
does this OK mean? error and all questions that might have been raised are to be regarded
as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment
A. That the space is confirmed. affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this
policy construction because nothing in the decision of the Court of
Q. Confirmed for first class? Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any
way at war with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169) Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those which
were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26
xxx xxx xxx
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in
Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and was specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in
issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a
confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by
testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say
evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the
belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a
plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word
reservation whatever. could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the
relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to
Altonaga testified that the reservation for a "first class" believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the
accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot ticket.
believe that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that
there are facts upon which the Court of Appeals predicated the finding
that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a
first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut
leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court
of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by
petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that
respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke
an issue". 29 And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to
see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and
because from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why,
then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if
he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages.
Petitioner's trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon
breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral damages there
must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;31 and that the decision of
the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal
allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are: xxx
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but
instead furnished plaintiff only Tourist Class accommodations from
Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has been
compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class
accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the
inconvenience and embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of
contract was forced to take a Pan American World Airways plane on his
return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
xxx xxx xxx
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class
accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff suffered inconveniences,
embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the
like injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
xxx xxx

3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a
Philippine Air Lines for a valuable consideration, the latter acting ascontract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst
general agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under which said others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was
contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at
plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant's plane during the entire Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's
duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting point up
employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation
to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... . berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist
class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety,
and from Saigon to Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It
Class accommodation but only after protestations, arguments and/or is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the
insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's employees. complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn
from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was
averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of The Court of appeals further stated
the action is put on wrongful expulsion.
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, made by the white man. Hence, if the employees of the defendant at
respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the seats had already
intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked out as the
Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation
white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence of others.
contract was presented without objection on the part of the petitioner. Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence committed by
It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is defendant's employees, the manager adopted the more drastic step of
sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat.
damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was what
evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not happened there, by the testimony of defendant's witness Rafael
even required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning of the letters "O.K."
declared: appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed
for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation Office of defendant,
compartment of the plane belonging to the defendant Air France while testified as follows:
at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only without
his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by "Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what
plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated by the reservation the passenger has arranged with you?
corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his notebook
which notation reads as follows: A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247,
June 19, 1959)
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his
will, and that the captain refused to intervene", In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has
said on this point:
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a
co-passenger. The captain of the plane who was asked by the manager Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white
of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even refused to do so. man" have a "better right" to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The
It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever contradicted record is silent. The defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay,
or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for any right on the part of the "white man" to the "First class" seat that
defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was issued a
the case, or yet to secure his disposition; but defendant did neither. 37 corresponding "first class" ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that this "white man"
Manager in Bangkok, the defendant could have easily proven it by had any "better right" to occupy the "first class" seat that the plaintiff
having taken the testimony of the said Manager by deposition, but was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding "first
defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him.40
suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of
Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, 5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its
as it does find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the
not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer,
plane if he did not give up his "first class" seat because the said must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of the witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man".38 ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted compensate the latter for the damage.
portion first transcribed did not use the term "bad faith". But can it be
doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and,
manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral
first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected damages are recoverable. 42
him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to
the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger 6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and
whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad degree from any other contractual relation. 43 And this, because of the
faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is
from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the
of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39 therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding an action for damages.
of bad faith in the judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect,
transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the extent against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses
of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on
him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that he was the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action
occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a for damages against the carrier. 44
"white man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's
check, it was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action for
its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the
check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection,
though the language used was not insulting and she was not ejected."
46 And this, because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is
"contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another case,
"Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to
collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train
was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train
reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to
destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which
justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling
him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held
the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.1awphl.nt
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and
you don't have enough leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry
that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me, "I have
recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to
me because it was recorded in French "First class passenger was
forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE

Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness
The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his because the best evidence would be the notes. Your Honor.
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner
air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper. COURT

7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
thus
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser made an entry in his notebook reading "First class passenger
purser? was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence
A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not think
help it. So one of the flight attendants approached me and requested so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident.
from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she said, "We will note Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the
that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind. best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a
That is tantamount to accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are
not going to note anything there because I am protesting to this Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the
transfer". dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still
fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys'
down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court.
the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates
mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because,
the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57
related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness
has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not
rule. It forms part of the res gestae. suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same.
Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an
employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for G.R. No. L-24837 June 27, 1968
petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really
true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could JULIAN C. SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO, plaintiffs,
have cleared up the matter. vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and SANTIAGO FREIXAS, in his
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is capacity as President of the said Bank, defendants.
admissible in evidence.
Gil B. Galang for plaintiffs.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court Aviado and Aranda for defendants.
ample power to grant exemplary damages in contracts and quasi-
contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a CONCEPCION, C.J.:
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53
The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class Appeal by plaintiffs, Julian Singson and his wife, Ramona del Castillo,
seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing their
damages.54 complaint against defendants herein, the Bank of the Philippine Islands
and Santiago Freixas.
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of
exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees. The It appears that Singson, was one of the defendants in civil case No.
least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and 23906 of the Court of First Instance, Manila, in which judgment had
equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein, namely,
faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised as it was here Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay the sum of P105,539.56
should not be disturbed. to the plaintiff therein, Philippine Milling Co. Singson and Lobregat had
seasonably appealed from said judgment, but not Villa-Abrille & Co., as
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial against which said judgment, accordingly, became final and executory.
court and the Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; In due course, a writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon the
Bank of the Philippine Islands in which the Singsons had a current the said bank took steps to verify this information and after having
account insofar as Villa-Abrille's credits against the Bank were confirmed the same, apologized to the plaintiff Julian C. Singson and
concerned. What happened thereafter is set forth in the decision wrote him a letter dated April 22, 1963, requesting him to disregard
appealed from, from which we quote: their letter of April 17, 1963, and that the action of garnishment from
his account had already been removed. A similar letter was written by
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank in the said official of the bank on April 22, 1963 to the Special Sheriff
charge of all matters of execution and garnishment, upon reading the informing him that his letter dated April 17, 1963 to the said Special
name of the plaintiff herein in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a
Sheriff was considered cancelled and that they had already removed
party defendants, without further reading the body of the said the Notice of Garnishment from plaintiff Singson's account. Thus, the
garnishment and informing himself that said garnishment was merely defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been
intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., Valentin inadvertently committed, resulting in the temporary freezing of the
Teus, Fernando F. de Villa-Abrille and Joaquin Bona, prepared a letter account of the plaintiff with the said bank for a short time.
for the signature of the President of the Bank informing the plaintiff
Julian C. Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in x x x xxx xxx
that case. Another letter was also prepared and signed by the said
President of the Bank for the Special Sheriff dated April 17, 1963. On May 8, 1963, the Singsong commenced the present action against
the Bank and its president, Santiago Freixas, for damages1 in
Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one consequence of said illegal freezing of plaintiffs' account.1wph1.t
for the amount of P383 in favor of B. M. Glass Service dated April 16,
1963 and bearing No. C-424852, and check No. C-394996 for the After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Manila
amount of P100 in favor of the Lega Corporation, and drawn against rendered judgment dismissing the complaint upon the ground that
the said Bank, were deposited by the said drawers with the said bank. plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-
Believing that the plaintiff Singson, the drawer of the check, had no delict, because the relation between the parties is contractual in
more control over the balance of his deposits in the said bank, the nature; because this case does not fall under Article 2219 of our Civil
checks were dishonored and were refused payment by the said bank. Code, upon which plaintiffs rely; and because plaintiffs have not
After the first check was returned by the bank to the B. M. Glass established the amount of damages allegedly sustained by them.
Service, the latter wrote plaintiff Julian C. Singson a letter, dated April
19, 1963, advising him that his check for P383.00 bearing No. C-424852 The lower court held that plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be based
was not honored by the bank for the reason that his account therein upon a tort or quasi-delict, their relation with the defendants being
had already been garnished. The said B. M. Glass Service further stated contractual in nature. We have repeatedly held, however, that the
in the said letter that they were constrained to close his credit account existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
with them. In view thereof, plaintiff Julian C. Singson wrote the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent
defendant bank a letter on April 19, 1963, claiming that his name was recovery of damages therefor.2 Indeed, this view has been, in effect,
not included in the Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs.
was served upon the bank. The defendant President Santiago Freixas of Carrascoso,3 involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-class
ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and Court, Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating Prudent Security Agency
compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA)
to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on account of the death of
latter's part, for, although the relation between a passenger and a Nicanor Navidad.
carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature ... the act that breaks
the contract may also be a tort". On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the
evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare). While
considering, particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito
plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized the Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad.
mistake he and his subordinate employee had committed, the Court A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently
finds that an award of nominal damages the amount of which need ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to
not be proven4 in the sum of P1,000, in addition to attorney's fees in indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the
the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights.5 first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact
moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he
another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant Bank of the was killed instantaneously.
Philippine Islands to pay to the plaintiffs said sums of P1,000, as
nominal damages, and P500, as attorney's fees, apart from the costs. It On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent
is so ordered. Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for
damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro
[G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003] Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of
her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners, vs. a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer,
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the
SECURITY AGENCY, respondents. selection and supervision of its security guards.
DECISION
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and
VITUG, J.: Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending
that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his
The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision;
of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October it adjudged:
2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled Marjorie Navidad
and Heirs of the Late Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al., which
has modified the decision of 11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
against the defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering
the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following: b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;

a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00; c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;

2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00; d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and

3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.[2]
P50,000.00;
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not
b) Moral damages of P50,000.00; have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore
had already existed when the victim entered the place where
c) Attorneys fees of P20,000; passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the
corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the
d) Costs of suit. court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the
death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin
The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established
dismissed for lack of merit. the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the
train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by
The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to
dismissed.[1] present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of
emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the
appellate court promulgated its now assailed decision exonerating The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its
Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, resolution of 10 October 2000.
instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable thusly:
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by of the appellate court; viz:
exonerating the appellants from any liability for the death of Nicanor
Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail Transit I.
Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his death and are hereby directed to
pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, the following THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY
amounts: DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT
II. passengers.[4] The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common
carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely
JR. as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
III. circumstances.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA.[3] carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
evidence and the factual findings of the trial court by holding them
liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that the presumption of Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
negligence on the part of a common carrier was not overcome. passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the formers
Petitioners would insist that Escartins assault upon Navidad, which employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the
caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that carriers.
the appellate courts conclusion on the existence of an employer-
employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis because This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that
Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
not of the LRTA. selection and supervision of their employees.

Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a
contended that a contract of carriage was deemed created from the passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other
moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the passengers or of strangers, if the common carriers employees through
premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
under a contractual relation, and that the appellate court had correctly prevented or stopped the act or omission.
held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to
exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier. The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the circumstances.[5] Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to
nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but
the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they
ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.[6] The statutory
provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown.
passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must the
b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent
strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A
due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.[7] contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act
In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and
fault or been negligent, and[8] by simple proof of injury, the passenger the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194[14] of the Civil Code can well
is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the apply.[15] In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract,
carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to where tort is that which breaches the contract.[16] Stated differently,
prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
[9] In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract
accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been
have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.[17]
[10] an exception from the general rule that negligence must be
proved.[11] Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of
the late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its of the Court of Appeals that there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the
obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its
contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x. This finding of the
of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure appellate court is not without substantial justification in our own
the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own review of the records of the case.
employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an
independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman
carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be
carriage. absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the
LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or
only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176[12] and related negligence.
provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,[13] of the Civil Code. The
premise, however, for the employers liability is negligence or fault on The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is
the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of
can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may
that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying
selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.[18] It is an established rule
can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and
that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.
[19] G.R. No. 138550

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED

with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages Present:
is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability.
No costs. PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
SO ORDERED. CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 14, 2005

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----x

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Petitioner, This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals dated April 30, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 51671, entitled, Noel
Cordero, Plaintiff-Appellee versus American Express International, Inc.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Petitioner is a foreign corporation that issues charge cards to its
- versus - customers, which the latter then use to purchase goods and services at
accredited merchants worldwide. Sometime in 1988, Nilda Cordero,
wife of respondent Noel Cordero, applied for and was issued an
American Express charge card with No. 3769-895901-010020. The
NOEL CORDERO, issuance of the charge card was covered by an Amex Cardmember
Defendant.
Agreement. As cardholder, Nilda, upon signing the back portion of the established, the card is honored and the charges are approved.
card, manifested her acceptance of the terms of the Agreement. Otherwise, the card is revoked or confiscated.[4]

An extension charge card, with No. 3769-895901-01010, was likewise When the Watsons sales clerk called up petitioners Hong Kong Office,
issued to respondent Noel Cordero which he also signed.[2] its representative said he wants to talk to respondent in order to verify
the latters identity, pursuant to the procedure observed under the
On November 29, 1991, respondent, together with his wife, Nilda, Inspect Airwarn Support System. However, respondent refused.
daughter, sisters-in-law and uncle-in-law, went on a three-day holiday Consequently, petitioners representative was unable to establish the
trip to Hong Kong. In the early evening of November 30, 1991, at about identity of the cardholder.[5] This led to the confiscation of
7:00 oclock, the group went to the Watsons Chemist Shop located at respondents card.
277C Ocean Gallery, Kowloon, Hong Kong. Noel picked up some
chocolate candies and handed to the sales clerk his American Express On March 31, 1992, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court,
extension charge card to pay for his purchases. The sales clerk verified Branch V, Manila, a complaint for damages against petitioner, docketed
the card by making a telephone call to the American Express Office in as Civil Case No. 92-60807. He prayed for the award of moral damages
Hong Kong. Moments later, Susan Chong, the store manager, emerged and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees as a result of the
from behind the counter and informed respondent that she had to humiliation he suffered.
confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut respondents American Express
card in half with a pair of scissors. This, according to respondent, The trial court found that the inexcusable failure of defendant
caused him embarrassment and humiliation considering that it was (petitioner herein) to inform plaintiff (respondent herein) of the
done in front of his family and the other customers lined up at the November 1, 1991 incident despite sufficient time was the proximate
check-out counter. Hence, Nilda had to pay for the purchases using her cause of the confiscation and cutting of plaintiffs extension card which
own American Express charge card.[3] exposed the latter to public humiliation for which defendant should be
held liable.[6] On February 20, 1995, the trial court promulgated its
When they returned to the Excelsior Hotel, Nilda called up petitioners Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Office in Hong Kong. She was able to talk to Senior Authorizer Johnny
Chen, who informed her that on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
Kong attempted to use a charge card with the same number as against the defendant, ordering the latter to pay the former the
respondents card. The Hong Kong American Express Office called up following amounts, namely:
respondent and after determining that he was in Manila and not in
Hong Kong, placed his card in the Inspect Airwarn Support System. This a) The sum of P300,000.00 as and by way of moral damages;
is the system utilized by petitioner as a protection both for the
company and the cardholders against the fraudulent use of their b) The sum of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages;
charge cards. Once a card suspected of unauthorized use is placed in
the system, the person to whom the card is tendered must verify the c) The sum of P100,000.00 as and for reasonable attorneys fees; and
identity of the holder. If the true identity of the card owner is

d) The costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision
affirming the trial courts Decision with modification in the sense that
the amounts of damages awarded were reduced, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated
February 20, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch V, in
Civil Case No. 92-60807 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to modifications
with respect to the amount of damages awarded, which are reduced as
follows:
(a) Moral damages from P300,000.00 to P150,000.00; and
While it is true that under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, this Court may review only errors of law, however, this
rule admits of well-known recognized exceptions, thus:
. . . (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both parties; (7) the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.[9]

(b) Exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00. In this case, the inference made by the courts below is manifestly
mistaken. Therefore, we are justified in reviewing the records of this
No pronouncement as to costs. case and rendering judgment based on our own findings.
SO ORDERED. In his complaint, respondent claimed that he suffered embarrassment
and humiliation because his card was unceremoniously confiscated and
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
cut in half by Susan Chong of Watsons Chemist Shop.
A. Whether the lower courts gravely erred in attributing the public
Respondent anchors his cause of action on the following provision of
humiliation allegedly suffered by Cordero to Amex.
the Civil Code:
B. Whether the lower courts gravely erred in holding Amex liable to
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
Cordero for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.[8]
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
Respondent filed his comment contending in the main that the petition between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
raises questions of fact beyond this Courts domain. provisions of this Chapter.[10]
 petitioner. If at all, the cause of respondents humiliation and
In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise, there must embarrassment was his refusal to talk to petitioners representative.
be no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. But there
are exceptions. There may be an action for quasi-delict That respondent refused to talk to petitioners representative can be
notwithstanding that there is a subsisting contract between the parties. gleaned from the testimony of Mr. Chen Heng Kun a.k.a. Johnny Chen
A liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that during the deposition in Hong Kong,[14] thus:
which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the Question No 9 : Was AEII required under its existing policies and/or
source of a quasi-delictual liability, the contract can be said to have membership agreement with its cardholders to advise said cardholders
been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.[11] of their card have been put under the support INSPECT Strictly
Question (for identification) cardmembers before approving any
Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be charge?
the proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff. Mr. Johnny Chen : Under the existing policies of AEII, we dont have to
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous inform the cardholders if they have to pass the INSPECT Strictly
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the Questions (for identification).
injury and without which the result would not have occurred.
Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed Question No 10 : If the answer to Q9 is in the negative, please explain
considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.[12] why not?
Mr. Johnny Chen : The reason why we dont have to are because, first,
According to the trial court, petitioner should have informed we are not terminating the service to the cardholder. Second, it doesnt
respondent that on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong Kong mean that we are going to limit the service to the cardholder. Third, as
attempted to use a charge card bearing similar number to that of long as the cardholder can present an identification card of his
respondents card; and that petitioners inexcusable failure to do so is membership, we allow him to use the card. He can show this by
the proximate cause of the confiscation and cutting of [respondents] telephoning the company or by presenting us his passport or travel
extension card which exposed the latter to public humiliation for which document. When Watson Company called AEII for authorization, AEII
[petitioner] should be held liable.[13] representative requested that he talk to Mr. Cordero but he refused to
talk to any representative of AEII. AEII could not prove then that he is
We cannot sustain the trial courts conclusion. really the real card holder.

As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his card upon
verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is the
authorized cardholder. This could have been accomplished had
respondent talked to petitioners representative, enabling the latter to
determine that respondent is indeed the true holder of the card.
Clearly, no negligence which breaches the contract can be attributed to
Mr. Chen Heng Kun was briefly cross-examined by respondents counsel,
thus:
Question No 10 : Question 9 is objected to since the best evidence
would be the membership agreement between plaintiffs and AEII.
Significantly, paragraph 16 of the Cardmember Agreement signed by
respondent provides: SO ORDERED.

16. THE CARD REMAINS OUR PROPERTY

The Card remains our property and we can revoke your right and the
right of ay Additional Cardmember to use it at any time, we can do this
with or without giving you notice. If we have revoked the Card without
cause, we will refund a proportion of your annual Card Account fee. We
may list revoked Cards in our Cancellation Bulletin, or otherwise inform
Establishments that the Card issued to you and, if you are the basic
Cardmember, any Additional Cards have been revoked or cancelled.
G.R. No. 120554 September 21, 1999
If we revoke the card or it expires, you must return it to us if we
request. Also, if any Establishment asks you to surrender an expired or SO PING BUN, petitioner,
revoked Card, you must do so. You may not use the Card after it has vs.
expired or after it has been revoked. COURT OF APPEALS, TEK HUA ENTERPRISES CORP. and MANUEL C.
TIONG, respondents.
The revocation, repossession or request for the return of the Card is
not, and shall not constitute any reflection of your character or credit-
worthiness and we shall not be liable in any way for any statement
made by any person requesting the return or surrender of the Card. QUISUMBING, J.:
[15]
This petition for certiorari challenges the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals dated October 10, 1994, and the Resolution 2 dated June 5,
1995, in CA-G.R. CV No. 38784. The appellate court affirmed the
To be sure, pursuant to the above stipulation, petitioner can revoke decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, except for the
respondents card without notice, as was done here. It bears reiterating award of attorney's fees, as follows:
that the subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had
respondent talked to petitioners representative and identified himself WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appeal of respondent-
as the genuine cardholder. It is thus safe to conclude that there was no appellant So Ping Bun for lack of merit is DISMISSED. The appealed
negligence on the part of petitioner and that, therefore, it cannot be decision dated April 20, 1992 of the court a quo is modified by reducing
held liable to respondent for damages. the attorney's fees awarded to plaintiff Tek Hua Enterprising
Corporation from P500,000.00 to P200,000.00. 3
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51671 is REVERSED.
The facts are as follows:
 Mr. So Ping Bun
In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co, through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, 930 Soler Street
entered into lease agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. Binondo, Manila
(DCCSI). Subjects of four (4) lease contracts were premises located at
Nos. 930, 930-Int., 924-B and 924-C, Soler Street, Binondo, Manila. Tek Dear Mr. So,
Hua used the areas to store its textiles. The contracts each had a one-
year term. They provided that should the lessee continue to occupy the Due to my closed (sic) business associate (sic) for three decades with
premises after the term, the lease shall be on a month-to-month basis. your late grandfather Mr. So Pek Giok and late father, Mr. So Chong
Bon, I allowed you temporarily to use the warehouse of Tek Hua
When the contracts expired, the parties did not renew the contracts, Enterprising Corp. for several years to generate your personal business.
but Tek Hua continued to occupy the premises. In 1976, Tek Hua
Trading Co. was dissolved. Later, the original members of Tek Hua Since I decided to go back into textile business, I need a warehouse
Trading Co. including Manuel C. Tiong, formed Tek Hua Enterprising immediately for my stocks. Therefore, please be advised to vacate all
Corp., herein respondent corporation. your stocks in Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. Warehouse. You are hereby
given 14 days to vacate the premises unless you have good reasons
So Pek Giok, managing partner of Tek Hua Trading, died in 1986. So Pek that you have the right to stay. Otherwise, I will be constrained to take
Giok's grandson, petitioner So Ping Bun, occupied the warehouse for measure to protect my interest.
his own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing.
Please give this urgent matter your preferential attention to avoid
On August 1, 1989, lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to Tek Hua inconvenience on your part.
Enterprises, informing the latter of the 25% increase in rent effective
September 1, 1989. The rent increase was later on reduced to 20% Very truly yours,
effective January 1, 1990, upon other lessees' demand. Again on (Sgd) Manuel C. Tiong
December 1, 1990, the lessor implemented a 30% rent increase. MANUEL C. TIONG
Enclosed in these letters were new lease contracts for signing. DCCSI President 4
warned that failure of the lessee to accomplish the contracts shall be
deemed as lack of interest on the lessee's part, and agreement to the Petitioner refused to vacate. On March 4, 1992, petitioner requested
termination of the lease. Private respondents did not answer any of formal contracts of lease with DCCSI in favor Trendsetter Marketing. So
these letters. Still, the lease contracts were not rescinded. Ping Bun claimed that after the death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok,
he had been occupying the premises for his textile business and
On March 1, 1991, private respondent Tiong sent a letter to petitioner religiously paid rent. DCCSI acceded to petitioner's request. The lease
which reads as follows: contracts in favor of Trendsetter were executed.

March 1, 1991
In the suit for injunction, private respondents pressed for the
nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and petitioner. They Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above decision was
also claimed damages. denied.

After trial, the trial court ruled: On appeal by So Ping Bun, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court.
On motion for reconsideration, the appellate court modified the
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered: decision by reducing the award of attorney's fees from five hundred
thousand (P500,000.00) pesos to two hundred thousand (P200,000.00)
1. Annulling the four Contracts of Lease (Exhibits A, A-1 to A-3, pesos.
inclusive) all dated March 11, 1991, between defendant So Ping Bun,
doing business under the name and style of "Trendsetter Marketing", Petitioner is now before the Court raising the following issues:
and defendant Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. over the premises located at
Nos. 924-B, 924-C, 930 and 930, Int., respectively, Soler Street, Binondo I. WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
Manila; TRIAL COURT'S DECISION FINDING SO PING BUN GUILTY OF TORTUOUS
INTERFERENCE OF CONTRACT?
2. Making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
this Court on June 21, 1991; II. WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES OF P200,000.00 IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE
3. Ordering defendant So Ping Bun to pay the aggrieved party, RESPONDENTS.
plaintiff Tek Hua Enterprising Corporation, the sum of P500,000.00, for
attorney's fees; The foregoing issues involve, essentially, the correct interpretation of
the applicable law on tortuous conduct, particularly unlawful
4. Dismissing the complaint, insofar as plaintiff Manuel C. Tiong is interference with contract. We have to begin, obviously, with certain
concerned, and the respective counterclaims of the defendant; fundamental principles on torts and damages.

5. Ordering defendant So Ping Bun to pay the costs of this lawsuit;
This judgment is without prejudice to the rights of plaintiff Tek Hua
Enterprising Corporation and defendant Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. to
negotiate for the renewal of their lease contracts over the premises
located at Nos. 930, 930-Int., 924-B and 924-C Soler Street, Binondo,
Manila, under such terms and conditions as they agree upon, provided
they are not contrary to law, public policy, public order, and morals.
SO ORDERED. 5
Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. 6 One becomes liable in an action for damages for a
nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and
enjoyment of asset if (a) the other has property rights and privileges
with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasion is
substantial, (c) the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion,
and (d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or
unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules. 7
The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful
(2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged
contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal interferer is financially interested, and such interest motivates his
justification or excuse. 8 conduct, it cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious
intermeddler. 15
A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the
property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon
upon an unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by the DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of
other of his private respondent corporation. Though petitioner took interest in the
property.9 This may pertain to a situation where a third person induces property of respondent corporation and benefited from it, nothing on
a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract. In the record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him.
case before us, petitioner's Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to
execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived Sec. 1314 of the Civil Code categorically provides also that, "Any third
respondent corporation of the latter's property right. Clearly, and as person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
correctly viewed by the appellate court, the three elements of tort damages to the other contracting party." Petitioner argues that damage
interference above-mentioned are present in the instant case. is an essential element of tort interference, and since the trial court
and the appellate court ruled that private respondents were not
Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the entitled to actual, moral or exemplary damages, it follows that he
defendant acts for the sole purpose of furthering his own financial or ought to be absolved of any liability, including attorney's fees.
economic interest. 10 One view is that, as a general rule, justification
for interfering with the business relations of another exists where the It is true that the lower courts did not award damages, but this was
actor's motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not exist only because the extent of damages was not quantifiable. We had a
where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, similar situation in Gilchrist, where it was difficult or impossible to
some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferer's determine the extent of damage and there was nothing on record to
interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that serve as basis thereof. In that case we refrained from awarding
an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not damages. We believe the same conclusion applies in this case.
merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are
negatived, for he acts in self-protection. 11 Moreover justification for While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic
protecting one's financial position should not be made to depend on a interest to intrude into existing contracts at the expense of others,
comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with that of however, we find that the conduct herein complained of did not
others. 12 It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the
business interest rather than in wrongful motives. 13 absence of any malice. The business desire is there to make some gain
to the detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice, however,
As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, 14 we held that where there was no precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal
malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one's liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones.
The respondent appellate court correctly confirmed the permanent
injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and
Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction
saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused by
petitioner's interference.
Lastly, the recovery of attorney's fees in the concept of actual or
compensatory damages, is allowed under the circumstances provided
for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. 16 One such occasion is when the
defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. 17 But we
have consistently held that the award of considerable damages should
have clear factual and legal bases. 18 In connection with attorney's
fees, the award should be commensurate to the benefits that would
have been derived from a favorable judgment. Settled is the rule that
fairness of the award of damages by the trial court calls for appellate
review such that the award if far too excessive can be reduced. 19 This
ruling applies with equal force on the award of attorney's fees. In a long
line of cases we said, "It is not sound policy to place in penalty on the
right to litigate. To compel the defeated party to pay the fees of counsel
for his successful opponent would throw wide open the door of
temptation to the opposing party and his counsel to swell the fees to
undue proportions."20
Considering that the respondent corporation's lease contract, at the
time when the cause of action accrued, ran only on a month-to-month
basis whence before it was on a yearly basis, we find even the reduced
amount of attorney's fees ordered by the Court of Appeals still
exorbitant in the light of prevailing jurisprudence. 21 Consequently, the
amount of two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) awarded by The Facts
respondent appellate court should be reduced to one hundred
thousand (P100,000.00) pesos as the reasonable award or attorney's Solidbank is a domestic banking corporation organized and existing
fees in favor of private respondent corporation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38784 are hereby
AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees is
reduced from two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) to one hundred
thousand (P100,000.00) pesos. No pronouncement as to
costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 138569. September 11, 2003]
THE CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and L.C. DIAZ and COMPANY, CPAs, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals dated 27 October 1998 and its Resolution dated 11 May 1999.
The assailed decision reversed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 8, absolving petitioner Consolidated Bank and
Trust Corporation, now known as Solidbank Corporation (Solidbank), of
any liability. The questioned resolution of the appellate court denied
the motion for reconsideration of Solidbank but modified the decision
by deleting the award of exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses
of litigation and cost of suit.
under Philippine laws. Private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company, CPAs
(L.C. Diaz), is a professional partnership engaged in the practice of
accounting.
 Corporation (PBC). This PBC check of L.C. Diaz was a check that it had
Sometime in March 1976, L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with long closed.[4] PBC subsequently dishonored the check because of
Solidbank, designated as Savings Account No. S/A 200-16872-6. insufficient funds and because the signature in the check differed from
PBCs specimen signature. Failing to get back the passbook, Macaraya
On 14 August 1991, L.C. Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya went back to her office and reported the matter to the Personnel
(Macaraya), filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip for P990 and a savings Manager of L.C. Diaz, Emmanuel Alvarez.
(checks) deposit slip for P50. Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C.
Diaz, Ismael Calapre (Calapre), to deposit the money with Solidbank. The following day, 15 August 1991, L.C. Diaz through its Chief Executive
Macaraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook. Officer, Luis C. Diaz (Diaz), called up Solidbank to stop any transaction
using the same passbook until L.C. Diaz could open a new account.[5]
Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two On the same day, Diaz formally wrote Solidbank to make the same
deposit slips and the passbook. The teller acknowledged receipt of the request. It was also on the same day that L.C. Diaz learned of the
deposit by returning to Calapre the duplicate copies of the two deposit unauthorized withdrawal the day before, 14 August 1991, of P300,000
slips. Teller No. 6 stamped the deposit slips with the words DUPLICATE from its savings account. The withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore the
and SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE. Since the transaction signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and
took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Rustico L. Murillo. The signatories, however, denied signing the
Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. Calapre then went to withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo received the P300,000.
Allied Bank. When Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve the
passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that somebody got the passbook. In an Information[6] dated 5 September 1991, L.C. Diaz charged its
[3] Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to messenger, Emerano Ilagan (Ilagan) and one Roscon Verdazola with
Macaraya. Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document. The Regional
Trial Court of Manila dismissed the criminal case after the City
Macaraya immediately prepared a deposit slip in duplicate copies with Prosecutor filed a Motion to Dismiss on 4 August 1992.
a check of P200,000. Macaraya, together with Calapre, went to
Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the deposit slip and check. The On 24 August 1992, L.C. Diaz through its counsel demanded from
teller stamped the words DUPLICATE and SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK Solidbank the return of its money. Solidbank refused.
HEAD OFFICE on the duplicate copy of the deposit slip. When Macaraya
asked for the passbook, Teller No. 6 told Macaraya that someone got On 25 August 1992, L.C. Diaz filed a Complaint[7] for Recovery of a Sum
the passbook but she could not remember to whom she gave the of Money against Solidbank with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
passbook. When Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre got the Branch 8. After trial, the trial court rendered on 28 December 1994 a
passbook, Teller No. 6 answered that someone shorter than Calapre decision absolving Solidbank and dismissing the complaint.
got the passbook. Calapre was then standing beside Macaraya.
L.C. Diaz then appealed[8] to the Court of Appeals. On 27 October
Teller No. 6 handed to Macaraya a deposit slip dated 14 August 1991 1998, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision reversing the decision of
for the deposit of a check for P90,000 drawn on Philippine Banking the trial court.
On 11 May 1999, the Court of Appeals issued its Resolution denying Another provision of the rules on savings account states that the
the motion for reconsideration of Solidbank. The appellate court, depositor must keep the passbook under lock and key.[10] When
however, modified its decision by deleting the award of exemplary another person presents the passbook for withdrawal prior to
damages and attorneys fees. Solidbanks receipt of the notice of loss of the passbook, that person is
considered as the owner of the passbook. The trial court ruled that the
The Ruling of the Trial Court passbook presented during the questioned transaction was now out of
the lock and key and presumptively ready for a business transaction.
In absolving Solidbank, the trial court applied the rules on savings [11]
account written on the passbook. The rules state that possession of this
book shall raise the presumption of ownership and any payment or Solidbank did not have any participation in the custody and care of the
payments made by the bank upon the production of the said book and passbook. The trial court believed that Solidbanks act of allowing the
entry therein of the withdrawal shall have the same effect as if made to withdrawal of P300,000 was not the direct and proximate cause of the
the depositor personally.[9] loss. The trial court held that L.C. Diazs negligence caused the
unauthorized withdrawal. Three facts establish L.C. Diazs negligence:
At the time of the withdrawal, a certain Noel Tamayo was not only in (1) the possession of the passbook by a person other than the
possession of the passbook, he also presented a withdrawal slip with depositor L.C. Diaz; (2) the presentation of a signed withdrawal receipt
the signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz. The specimen by an unauthorized person; and (3) the possession by an unauthorized
signatures of these persons were in the signature cards. The teller person of a PBC check long closed by L.C. Diaz, which check was
stamped the withdrawal slip with the words Saving Teller No. 5. The deposited on the day of the fraudulent withdrawal.
teller then passed on the withdrawal slip to Genere Manuel (Manuel)
for authentication. Manuel verified the signatures on the withdrawal The trial court debunked L.C. Diazs contention that Solidbank did not
slip. The withdrawal slip was then given to another officer who follow the precautionary procedures observed by the two parties
compared the signatures on the withdrawal slip with the specimen on whenever L.C. Diaz withdrew significant amounts from its account. L.C.
the signature cards. The trial court concluded that Solidbank acted with Diaz claimed that a letter must accompany withdrawals of more than
care and observed the rules on savings account when it allowed the P20,000. The letter must request Solidbank to allow the withdrawal
withdrawal of P300,000 from the savings account of L.C. Diaz. and convert the amount to a managers check. The bearer must also
have a letter authorizing him to withdraw the same amount. Another
The trial court pointed out that the burden of proof now shifted to L.C. person driving a car must accompany the bearer so that he would not
Diaz to prove that the signatures on the withdrawal slip were forged. walk from Solidbank to the office in making the withdrawal. The trial
The trial court admonished L.C. Diaz for not offering in evidence the court pointed out that L.C. Diaz disregarded these precautions in its
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) report on the authenticity of the past withdrawal. On 16 July 1991, L.C. Diaz withdrew P82,554 without
signatures on the withdrawal slip for P300,000. The trial court believed any separate letter of authorization or any communication with
that L.C. Diaz did not offer this evidence because it is derogatory to its Solidbank that the money be converted into a managers check.
action.
The trial court further justified the dismissal of the complaint by between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage
holding that the case was a last ditch effort of L.C. Diaz to recover incurred by the plaintiff.
P300,000 after the dismissal of the criminal case against Ilagan.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the teller of Solidbank who
The dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court reads: received the withdrawal slip for P300,000 allowed the withdrawal
without making the necessary inquiry. The appellate court stated that
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered the teller, who was not presented by Solidbank during trial, should
DISMISSING the complaint. have called up the depositor because the money to be withdrawn was
a significant amount. Had the teller called up L.C. Diaz, Solidbank would
The Court further renders judgment in favor of defendant bank have known that the withdrawal was unauthorized. The teller did not
pursuant to its counterclaim the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos even verify the identity of the impostor who made the withdrawal.
(P30,000.00) as attorneys fees. Thus, the appellate court found Solidbank liable for its negligence in
the selection and supervision of its employees.
With costs against plaintiff.
The appellate court ruled that while L.C. Diaz was also negligent in
SO ORDERED.[12] entrusting its deposits to its messenger and its messenger in leaving
the passbook with the teller, Solidbank could not escape liability
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals because of the doctrine of last clear chance. Solidbank could have
averted the injury suffered by L.C. Diaz had it called up L.C. Diaz to
The Court of Appeals ruled that Solidbanks negligence was the verify the withdrawal.
proximate cause of the unauthorized withdrawal of P300,000 from the
savings account of L.C. Diaz. The appellate court reached this The appellate court ruled that the degree of diligence required from
conclusion after applying the provision of the Civil Code on quasi-delict, Solidbank is more than that of a good father of a family. The business
to wit: and functions of banks are affected with public interest. Banks are
obligated to treat the accounts of their depositors with meticulous
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. with their clients. The Court of Appeals found Solidbank remiss in its
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation duty, violating its fiduciary relationship with L.C. Diaz.
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this chapter. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

The appellate court held that the three elements of a quasi-delict are WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
present in this case, namely: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) hereby REVERSED and a new one entered.
fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose
acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
1. Ordering defendant-appellee Consolidated Bank and Trust Solidbank seeks the review of the decision and resolution of the Court
Corporation to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of Three Hundred of Appeals on these grounds:
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00), with interest thereon at the rate of 12%
per annum from the date of filing of the complaint until paid, the sum I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER BANK
of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 as attorneys fees SHOULD SUFFER THE LOSS BECAUSE ITS TELLER SHOULD HAVE FIRST
and expenses of litigation as well as the cost of suit; and CALLED PRIVATE RESPONDENT BY TELEPHONE BEFORE IT ALLOWED
THE WITHDRAWAL OF P300,000.00 TO RESPONDENTS MESSENGER
2. Ordering the dismissal of defendant-appellees counterclaim in the EMERANO ILAGAN, SINCE THERE IS NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees. PARTIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SAVINGS ACCOUNT, NOR IS THERE
ANY BANKING LAW, WHICH MANDATES THAT A BANK TELLER SHOULD
SO ORDERED.[13] FIRST CALL UP THE DEPOSITOR BEFORE ALLOWING A WITHDRAWAL OF
A BIG AMOUNT IN A SAVINGS ACCOUNT.
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of Solidbank, the appellate
court affirmed its decision but modified the award of damages. The II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF LAST
appellate court deleted the award of exemplary damages and attorneys CLEAR CHANCE AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER BANKS TELLER HAD
fees. Invoking Article 2231[14] of the Civil Code, the appellate court THE LAST OPPORTUNITY TO WITHHOLD THE WITHDRAWAL WHEN IT IS
ruled that exemplary damages could be granted if the defendant acted UNDISPUTED THAT THE TWO SIGNATURES OF RESPONDENT ON THE
with gross negligence. Since Solidbank was guilty of simple negligence WITHDRAWAL SLIP ARE GENUINE AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
only, the award of exemplary damages was not justified. Consequently, PASSBOOK WAS DULY PRESENTED, AND CONTRARIWISE RESPONDENT
the award of attorneys fees was also disallowed pursuant to Article WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS
2208 of the Civil Code. The expenses of litigation and cost of suit were MESSENGER EMERANO ILAGAN, AND IN THE SAFEKEEPING OF ITS
also not imposed on Solidbank. CHECKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL DOCUMENTS.

The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads as follows: III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INSTANT
CASE IS A LAST DITCH EFFORT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO RECOVER
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, our decision dated October 27, ITS P300,000.00 AFTER FAILING IN ITS EFFORTS TO RECOVER THE SAME
1998 is affirmed with modification by deleting the award of exemplary FROM ITS EMPLOYEE EMERANO ILAGAN.
damages and attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and cost of suit.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT MITIGATING THE DAMAGES
SO ORDERED.[15] AWARDED AGAINST PETITIONER UNDER ARTICLE 2197 OF THE CIVIL
CODE, NOTWITHSTANDING ITS FINDING THAT PETITIONER BANKS
Hence, this petition. NEGLIGENCE WAS ONLY CONTRIBUTORY.[16]

The Issues The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious. Appeals,[20] holding that the bank is under obligation to treat the
accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind
Solidbanks Fiduciary Duty under the Law the fiduciary nature of their relationship.[21]

The rulings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals conflict on the This fiduciary relationship means that the banks obligation to observe
application of the law. The trial court pinned the liability on L.C. Diaz high standards of integrity and performance is deemed written into
based on the provisions of the rules on savings account, a recognition every deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor. The
of the contractual relationship between Solidbank and L.C. Diaz, the fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree of
latter being a depositor of the former. On the other hand, the Court of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. Article 1172 of
Appeals applied the law on quasi-delict to determine who between the the Civil Code states that the degree of diligence required of an obligor
two parties was ultimately negligent. The law on quasi-delict or culpa is that prescribed by law or contract, and absent such stipulation then
aquiliana is generally applicable when there is no pre-existing the diligence of a good father of a family.[22] Section 2 of RA 8791
contractual relationship between the parties. prescribes the statutory diligence required from banks that banks must
observe high standards of integrity and performance in servicing their
We hold that Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to depositors. Although RA 8791 took effect almost nine years after the
negligence, or culpa contractual. unauthorized withdrawal of the P300,000 from L.C. Diazs savings
account, jurisprudence[23] at the time of the withdrawal already
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the imposed on banks the same high standard of diligence required under
provisions of the Civil Code on simple loan.[17] Article 1980 of the Civil RA No. 8791.
Code expressly provides that x x x savings x x x deposits of money in
banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions However, the fiduciary nature of a bank-depositor relationship does not
concerning simple loan. There is a debtor-creditor relationship convert the contract between the bank and its depositors from a
between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the simple loan to a trust agreement, whether express or implied. Failure
depositor is the creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the by the bank to pay the depositor is failure to pay a simple loan, and not
bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. The savings deposit a breach of trust.[24] The law simply imposes on the bank a higher
agreement between the bank and the depositor is the contract that standard of integrity and performance in complying with its obligations
determines the rights and obligations of the parties. under the contract of simple loan, beyond those required of non-bank
debtors under a similar contract of simple loan.
The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary
nature of banking. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8791 (RA 8791),[18] The fiduciary nature of banking does not convert a simple loan into a
which took effect on 13 June 2000, declares that the State recognizes trust agreement because banks do not accept deposits to enrich
the fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity depositors but to earn money for themselves. The law allows banks to
and performance.[19] This new provision in the general banking law, offer the lowest possible interest rate to depositors while charging the
introduced in 2000, is a statutory affirmation of Supreme Court highest possible interest rate on their own borrowers. The interest
decisions, starting with the 1990 case of Simex International v. Court of spread or differential belongs to the bank and not to the depositors
who are not cestui que trust of banks. If depositors are cestui que trustIn culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract,
of banks, then the interest spread or income belongs to the depositors, there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent.
a situation that Congress certainly did not intend in enacting Section 2 The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or
of RA 8791. negligent. In contrast, in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that the defendant was negligent. In the present case, L.C. Diaz
Solidbanks Breach of its Contractual Obligation has established that Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to
return the passbook only to the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz.
Article 1172 of the Civil Code provides that responsibility arising from There is thus a presumption that Solidbank was at fault and its teller
negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is was negligent in not returning the passbook to Calapre. The burden
demandable. For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to was on Solidbank to prove that there was no negligence on its part or
negligence, or culpa contractual, the bank is liable to its depositor. its employees.

Calapre left the passbook with Solidbank because the transaction took
time and he had to go to Allied Bank for another transaction. The
passbook was still in the hands of the employees of Solidbank for the
processing of the deposit when Calapre left Solidbank. Solidbanks rules
on savings account require that the deposit book should be carefully
guarded by the depositor and kept under lock and key, if possible.
When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbanks tellers during
withdrawals, the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even
higher degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook.
Likewise, Solidbanks tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in
insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his
authorized representative. The tellers know, or should know, that the
rules on savings account provide that any person in possession of the
passbook is presumptively its owner. If the tellers give the passbook to
the wrong person, they would be clothing that person presumptive
ownership of the passbook, facilitating unauthorized withdrawals by
that person. For failing to return the passbook to Calapre, the
authorized representative of L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and Teller No. 6
presumptively failed to observe such high degree of diligence in
safeguarding the passbook, and in insuring its return to the party
authorized to receive the same.
Solidbank failed to discharge its burden. Solidbank did not present to
the trial court Teller No. 6, the teller with whom Calapre left the
passbook and who was supposed to return the passbook to him. The
record does not indicate that Teller No. 6 verified the identity of the
person who retrieved the passbook. Solidbank also failed to adduce in
evidence its standard procedure in verifying the identity of the person
retrieving the passbook, if there is such a procedure, and that Teller No.
6 implemented this procedure in the present case.
Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the
principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility. The
defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees is not a complete defense in culpa
contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana.[25]
The bank must not only exercise high standards of integrity and
performance, it must also insure that its employees do likewise
because this is the only way to insure that the bank will comply with its
fiduciary duty. Solidbank failed to present the teller who had the duty
to return to Calapre the passbook, and thus failed to prove that this
teller exercised the high standards of integrity and performance
required of Solidbanks employees.
Proximate Cause of the Unauthorized Withdrawal L.C. Diaz to verify the withdrawal. Solidbank did not have the duty to
call up L.C. Diaz to confirm the withdrawal. There is no arrangement
Another point of disagreement between the trial and appellate courts between Solidbank and L.C. Diaz to this effect. Even the agreement
is the proximate cause of the unauthorized withdrawal. The trial court between Solidbank and L.C. Diaz pertaining to measures that the
believed that L.C. Diazs negligence in not securing its passbook under parties must observe whenever withdrawals of large amounts are
lock and key was the proximate cause that allowed the impostor to made does not direct Solidbank to call up L.C. Diaz.
withdraw the P300,000. For the appellate court, the proximate cause
was the tellers negligence in processing the withdrawal without first There is no law mandating banks to call up their clients whenever their
verifying with L.C. Diaz. We do not agree with either court. representatives withdraw significant amounts from their accounts. L.C.
Diaz therefore had the burden to prove that it is the usual practice of
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous Solidbank to call up its clients to verify a withdrawal of a large amount
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the of money. L.C. Diaz failed to do so.
injury and without which the result would not have occurred.[26]
Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed Teller No. 5 who processed the withdrawal could not have been put on
considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.[27] guard to verify the withdrawal. Prior to the withdrawal of P300,000,
the impostor deposited with Teller No. 6 the P90,000 PBC check, which
L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the later bounced. The impostor apparently deposited a large amount of
impostor. Solidbank was in possession of the passbook while it was money to deflect suspicion from the withdrawal of a much bigger
processing the deposit. After completion of the transaction, Solidbank amount of money. The appellate court thus erred when it imposed on
had the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to Calapre, Solidbank the duty to call up L.C. Diaz to confirm the withdrawal when
the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. Solidbank failed to fulfill its no law requires this from banks and when the teller had no reason to
contractual obligation because it gave the passbook to another person. be suspicious of the transaction.

Solidbanks failure to return the passbook to Calapre made possible the Solidbank continues to foist the defense that Ilagan made the
withdrawal of the P300,000 by the impostor who took possession of withdrawal. Solidbank claims that since Ilagan was also a messenger of
the passbook. Under Solidbanks rules on savings account, mere L.C. Diaz, he was familiar with its teller so that there was no more need
possession of the passbook raises the presumption of ownership. It for the teller to verify the withdrawal. Solidbank relies on the following
was the negligent act of Solidbanks Teller No. 6 that gave the impostor statements in the Booking and Information Sheet of Emerano Ilagan:
presumptive ownership of the passbook. Had the passbook not fallen
into the hands of the impostor, the loss of P300,000 would not have xxx Ilagan also had with him (before the withdrawal) a forged check of
happened. Thus, the proximate cause of the unauthorized withdrawal PBC and indicated the amount of P90,000 which he deposited in favor
was Solidbanks negligence in not returning the passbook to Calapre. of L.C. Diaz and Company. After successfully withdrawing this large sum
of money, accused Ilagan gave alias Rey (Noel Tamayo) his share of the
We do not subscribe to the appellate courts theory that the proximate loot. Ilagan then hired a taxicab in the amount of P1,000 to transport
cause of the unauthorized withdrawal was the tellers failure to call up him (Ilagan) to his home province at Bauan, Batangas. Ilagan
extravagantly and lavishly spent his money but a big part of his loot was plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the
wasted in cockfight and horse racing. Ilagan was apprehended and defendant from liability.[31] Such contributory negligence or last clear
meekly admitted his guilt.[28] (Emphasis supplied.) chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of
damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his
L.C. Diaz refutes Solidbanks contention by pointing out that the person breach of contract.[32]
who withdrew the P300,000 was a certain Noel Tamayo. Both the trial
and appellate courts stated that this Noel Tamayo presented the Mitigated Damages
passbook with the withdrawal slip.
Under Article 1172, liability (for culpa contractual) may be regulated by
We uphold the finding of the trial and appellate courts that a certain the courts, according to the circumstances. This means that if the
Noel Tamayo withdrew the P300,000. The Court is not a trier of facts. defendant exercised the proper diligence in the selection and
We find no justifiable reason to reverse the factual finding of the trial supervision of its employee, or if the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
court and the Court of Appeals. The tellers who processed the deposit negligence, then the courts may reduce the award of damages. In this
of the P90,000 check and the withdrawal of the P300,000 were not case, L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory negligence in allowing a
presented during trial to substantiate Solidbanks claim that Ilagan withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the
deposited the check and made the questioned withdrawal. Moreover, hands of an impostor. Thus, the liability of Solidbank should be
the entry quoted by Solidbank does not categorically state that Ilagan reduced.
presented the withdrawal slip and the passbook.
In Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals,[33] where the
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Court held the depositor guilty of contributory negligence, we allocated
the damages between the depositor and the bank on a 40-60 ratio.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are Applying the same ruling to this case, we hold that L.C. Diaz must
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of shoulder 40% of the actual damages awarded by the appellate court.
the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or Solidbank must pay the other 60% of the actual damages.
negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity
to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss.[29] WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not MODIFICATION. Petitioner Solidbank Corporation shall pay private
preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening respondent L.C. Diaz and Company, CPAs only 60% of the actual
negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent damages awarded by the Court of Appeals. The remaining 40% of the
the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.[30] actual damages shall be borne by private respondent L.C. Diaz and
Company, CPAs. Proportionate costs.
We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case.
Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the SO ORDERED.
performance of its contractual obligation to L.C. Diaz. This is a case of
culpa contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of the
 the flight she was supposed to take had already departed the previous
day. She learned that her plane ticket was for the flight scheduled on
June 14, 1991. She thus called up Menor to complain.

Subsequently, Menor prevailed upon petitioner to take another tour

the British Pageant which included England, Scotland and Wales in its
itinerary. For this tour package, petitioner was asked anew to pay
US$785.00 or P20,881.00 (at the then prevailing exchange rate of
[G.R. No. 138334. August 25, 2003] P26.60). She gave respondent US$300 or P7,980.00 as partial payment
and commenced the trip in July 1991.
ESTELA L. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
CARAVAN TRAVEL & TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC., respondents. Upon petitioners return from Europe, she demanded from respondent
DECISION the reimbursement of P61,421.70, representing the difference
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: between the sum she paid for Jewels of Europe and the amount she
owed respondent for the British Pageant tour. Despite several
In May 1991, petitioner Estela L. Crisostomo contracted the services of demands, respondent company refused to reimburse the amount,
respondent Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. to arrange and contending that the same was non-refundable.[1] Petitioner was thus
facilitate her booking, ticketing and accommodation in a tour dubbed constrained to file a complaint against respondent for breach of
Jewels of Europe. The package tour included the countries of England, contract of carriage and damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
Holland, Germany, Austria, Liechstenstein, Switzerland and France at a 92-133 and raffled to Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
total cost of P74,322.70. Petitioner was given a 5% discount on the City.
amount, which included airfare, and the booking fee was also waived
because petitioners niece, Meriam Menor, was respondent companys In her complaint,[2] petitioner alleged that her failure to join Jewels of
ticketing manager. Europe was due to respondents fault since it did not clearly indicate
the departure date on the plane ticket. Respondent was also negligent
Pursuant to said contract, Menor went to her aunts residence on June in informing her of the wrong flight schedule through its employee
12, 1991 a Wednesday to deliver petitioners travel documents and Menor. She insisted that the British Pageant was merely a substitute for
plane tickets. Petitioner, in turn, gave Menor the full payment for the the Jewels of Europe tour, such that the cost of the former should be
package tour. Menor then told her to be at the Ninoy Aquino properly set-off against the sum paid for the latter.
International Airport (NAIA) on Saturday, two hours before her flight on
board British Airways. For its part, respondent company, through its Operations Manager,
Concepcion Chipeco, denied responsibility for petitioners failure to join
Without checking her travel documents, petitioner went to NAIA on the first tour. Chipeco insisted that petitioner was informed of the
Saturday, June 15, 1991, to take the flight for the first leg of her journey correct departure date, which was clearly and legibly printed on the
from Manila to Hongkong. To petitioners dismay, she discovered that plane ticket. The travel documents were given to petitioner two days
ahead of the scheduled trip. Petitioner had only herself to blame for 2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of Five
missing the flight, as she did not bother to read or confirm her flight Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos as and for reasonable attorneys fees;
schedule as printed on the ticket.
3. Dismissing the defendants counterclaim, for lack of merit; and
Respondent explained that it can no longer reimburse the amount paid
for Jewels of Europe, considering that the same had already been 4. With costs against the defendant.
remitted to its principal in Singapore, Lotus Travel Ltd., which had
already billed the same even if petitioner did not join the tour. Lotus SO ORDERED.[5]
European tour organizer, Insight International Tours Ltd., determines
the cost of a package tour based on a minimum number of projected The trial court held that respondent was negligent in erroneously
participants. For this reason, it is accepted industry practice to disallow advising petitioner of her departure date through its employee, Menor,
refund for individuals who failed to take a booked tour.[3] who was not presented as witness to rebut petitioners testimony.
However, petitioner should have verified the exact date and time of
Lastly, respondent maintained that the British Pageant was not a departure by looking at her ticket and should have simply not relied on
substitute for the package tour that petitioner missed. This tour was Menors verbal representation. The trial court thus declared that
independently procured by petitioner after realizing that she made a petitioner was guilty of contributory negligence and accordingly,
mistake in missing her flight for Jewels of Europe. Petitioner was deducted 10% from the amount being claimed as refund.
allowed to make a partial payment of only US$300.00 for the second
tour because her niece was then an employee of the travel agency. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which likewise found
Consequently, respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay the both parties to be at fault. However, the appellate court held that
balance of P12,901.00 for the British Pageant package tour. petitioner is more negligent than respondent because as a lawyer and
well-traveled person, she should have known better than to simply rely
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision,[4] the on what was told to her. This being so, she is not entitled to any form of
dispositive part of which reads: damages. Petitioner also forfeited her right to the Jewels of Europe
tour and must therefore pay respondent the balance of the price for
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as the British Pageant tour. The dispositive portion of the judgment
follows: appealed from reads as follows:

1. Ordering the defendant to return and/or refund to the plaintiff the
amount of Fifty Three Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Nine Pesos and
Forty Three Centavos (P53,989.43) with legal interest thereon at the
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum starting January 16, 1992, the
date when the complaint was filed;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court dated October 26, 1995 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A
new judgment is hereby ENTERED requiring the plaintiff-appellee to
pay to the defendant-appellant the amount of P12,901.00,
representing the balance of the price of the British Pageant Package
Tour, the same to earn legal interest at the rate of SIX PERCENT (6%)
per annum, to be computed from the time the counterclaim was filed
until the finality of this decision. After this decision becomes final and The Honorable Court erred in not granting to the petitioner the
executory, the rate of TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest per annum shall consequential damages due her as a result of breach of contract of
be additionally imposed on the total obligation until payment thereof is carriage.[8]
satisfied. The award of attorneys fees is DELETED. Costs against the
plaintiff-appellee. Petitioner contends that respondent did not observe the standard of
care required of a common carrier when it informed her wrongly of the
SO ORDERED.[6] flight schedule. She could not be deemed more negligent than
respondent since the latter is required by law to exercise extraordinary
Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration,[7] petitioner filed the diligence in the fulfillment of its obligation. If she were negligent at all,
instant petition under Rule 45 on the following grounds: the same is merely contributory and not the proximate cause of the
damage she suffered. Her loss could only be attributed to respondent
I as it was the direct consequence of its employees gross negligence.

It is respectfully submitted that the Honorable Court of Appeals Petitioners contention has no merit.
committed a reversible error in reversing and setting aside the decision
of the trial court by ruling that the petitioner is not entitled to a refund By definition, a contract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a
of the cost of unavailed Jewels of Europe tour she being equally, if not certain person or association of persons obligate themselves to
more, negligent than the private respondent, for in the contract of transport persons, things, or news from one place to another for a fixed
carriage the common carrier is obliged to observe utmost care and price.[9] Such person or association of persons are regarded as carriers
extra-ordinary diligence which is higher in degree than the ordinary and are classified as private or special carriers and common or public
diligence required of the passenger. Thus, even if the petitioner and carriers.[10] A common carrier is defined under Article 1732 of the Civil
private respondent were both negligent, the petitioner cannot be Code as persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
considered to be equally, or worse, more guilty than the private business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
respondent. At best, petitioners negligence is only contributory while land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the
the private respondent [is guilty] of gross negligence making the public.
principle of pari delicto inapplicable in the case;
It is obvious from the above definition that respondent is not an entity
II engaged in the business of transporting either passengers or goods and
is therefore, neither a private nor a common carrier. Respondent did
The Honorable Court of Appeals also erred in not ruling that the Jewels not undertake to transport petitioner from one place to another since
of Europe tour was not indivisible and the amount paid therefor its covenant with its customers is simply to make travel arrangements
refundable; in their behalf. Respondents services as a travel agency include
procuring tickets and facilitating travel permits or visas as well as
III booking customers for tours.
While petitioner concededly bought her plane ticket through the use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
efforts of respondent company, this does not mean that the latter ipso person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty
facto is a common carrier. At most, respondent acted merely as an of negligence.[13]
agent of the airline, with whom petitioner ultimately contracted for her
carriage to Europe. Respondents obligation to petitioner in this regard In the case at bar, the lower court found Menor negligent when she
was simply to see to it that petitioner was properly booked with the allegedly informed petitioner of the wrong day of departure.
airline for the appointed date and time. Her transport to the place of Petitioners testimony was accepted as indubitable evidence of Menors
destination, meanwhile, pertained directly to the airline. alleged negligent act since respondent did not call Menor to the
witness stand to refute the allegation. The lower court applied the
The object of petitioners contractual relation with respondent is the presumption under Rule 131, Section 3 (e)[14] of the Rules of Court
latters service of arranging and facilitating petitioners booking, ticketing
that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced and
and accommodation in the package tour. In contrast, the object of a thus considered petitioners uncontradicted testimony to be sufficient
contract of carriage is the transportation of passengers or goods. It is inproof of her claim.
this sense that the contract between the parties in this case was an
ordinary one for services and not one of carriage. Petitioners On the other hand, respondent has consistently denied that Menor
submission is premised on a wrong assumption. was negligent and maintains that petitioners assertion is belied by the
evidence on record. The date and time of departure was legibly written
The nature of the contractual relation between petitioner and on the plane ticket and the travel papers were delivered two days in
respondent is determinative of the degree of care required in the advance precisely so that petitioner could prepare for the trip. It
performance of the latters obligation under the contract. For reasons of performed all its obligations to enable petitioner to join the tour and
public policy, a common carrier in a contract of carriage is bound by law exercised due diligence in its dealings with the latter.
to carry passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons and with due We agree with respondent.
regard for all the circumstances.[11] As earlier stated, however,
respondent is not a common carrier but a travel agency. It is thus not Respondents failure to present Menor as witness to rebut petitioners
bound under the law to observe extraordinary diligence in the testimony could not give rise to an inference unfavorable to the former.
performance of its obligation, as petitioner claims. Menor was already working in France at the time of the filing of the
complaint,[15] thereby making it physically impossible for respondent
Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary one for services, to present her as a witness. Then too, even if it were possible for
the standard of care required of respondent is that of a good father of respondent to secure Menors testimony, the presumption under Rule
a family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code.[12] This connotes 131, Section 3(e) would still not apply. The opportunity and possibility
reasonable care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent for obtaining Menors testimony belonged to both parties, considering
person would have observed when confronted with a similar situation. that Menor was not just respondents employee, but also petitioners
The test to determine whether negligence attended the performance niece. It was thus error for the lower court to invoke the presumption
of an obligation is: did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act that respondent willfully suppressed evidence under Rule 131, Section
3(e). Said presumption would logically be inoperative if the evidence is concerns. This undoubtedly would require that she at least read the
not intentionally omitted but is simply unavailable, or when the same documents in order to assure herself of the important details regarding
could have been obtained by both parties.[16]
In sum, we do not agree with the finding of the lower court that
Menors negligence concurred with the negligence of petitioner and
resultantly caused damage to the latter. Menors negligence was not
sufficiently proved, considering that the only evidence presented on
this score was petitioners uncorroborated narration of the events. It is
well-settled that the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it
and a mere allegation cannot take the place of evidence.[17] If the
plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action,
fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts upon which he bases his
claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or
defense.[18]
Contrary to petitioners claim, the evidence on record shows that
respondent exercised due diligence in performing its obligations under
the contract and followed standard procedure in rendering its services
to petitioner. As correctly observed by the lower court, the plane
ticket[19] issued to petitioner clearly reflected the departure date and
time, contrary to petitioners contention. The travel documents,
consisting of the tour itinerary, vouchers and instructions, were likewise
delivered to petitioner two days prior to the trip. Respondent also
properly booked petitioner for the tour, prepared the necessary
documents and procured the plane tickets. It arranged petitioners hotel
accommodation as well as food, land transfers and sightseeing
excursions, in accordance with its avowed undertaking.
Therefore, it is clear that respondent performed its prestation under
the contract as well as everything else that was essential to book
petitioner for the tour. Had petitioner exercised due diligence in the
conduct of her affairs, there would have been no reason for her to miss
the flight. Needless to say, after the travel papers were delivered to
petitioner, it became incumbent upon her to take ordinary care of her
the trip.
The negligence of the obligor in the performance of the obligation
renders him liable for damages for the resulting loss suffered by the
obligee. Fault or negligence of the obligor consists in his failure to
exercise due care and prudence in the performance of the obligation as
the nature of the obligation so demands.[20] There is no fixed standard
of diligence applicable to each and every contractual obligation and
each case must be determined upon its particular facts. The degree of
diligence required depends on the circumstances of the specific
obligation and whether one has been negligent is a question of fact
that is to be determined after taking into account the particulars of
each case.[21]
The lower court declared that respondents employee was negligent.
This factual finding, however, is not supported by the evidence on
record. While factual findings below are generally conclusive upon this
court, the rule is subject to certain exceptions, as when the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances
of weight and substance which will affect the result of the case.[22]
In the case at bar, the evidence on record shows that respondent
company performed its duty diligently and did not commit any
contractual breach. Hence, petitioner cannot recover and must bear
her own damage.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51932 is AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the amount of
P12,901.00 representing the balance of the price of the British Pageant
Package Tour, with legal interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum,
to be computed from the time the counterclaim was filed until the
finality of this Decision. After this Decision becomes final and
executory, the rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed until the
obligation is fully settled, this interim period being deemed to be by
then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.[23]

SO ORDERED.