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    Coerced!!! I say

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    Coerced!!! I say

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    12 Ansichten12 Seiten

    Coerced Moral Agents

    Hochgeladen von

    Peter Zhang
    Coerced!!! I say

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Als PDF herunterladen oder online auf Scribd lesen
    Markieren Sie unangemessene Inhalte
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    The Journal of Political Philosophy EDITORIAL STATEMENT he own Poli Phiopyianineaionaloe deve tea of Heres ree toa aad pote! ie Kwesi fn, wok caring a0 “IREy Gf ncplnaycocems/anong employ, ology, economic pales ene nd io jot pte aos wo ecorge aw speci adding nei ited stent tl poses nd maa Marine nd srenmee deny wand tenes cl el se decal ace de ad ae a to bloga! sed anoplgeal apres fo pli so wekomes wrk inthe ‘atypical ea ch uss ge plrophcl pan and worn he pospy ‘Rou ees nd ape etc ith oar pole! mpl ty desing eu ayo the wrt of sorphonophers and pines nd ofthe aay and uterine lines Te Joma of Pte Pheropy hopes to rove a fu for ba raneestpea non who nay ee fo tet wn spate oon Tht lb otc Ihuaed toh gr see Sey Are! ad Debs Te Jounal Pola Pierpy rons ore oy, oa ot pia pit of view ld calyconmimens wero anlien ogpr ae who ng EDITORS Robert E. Goodin (Pilesopy, ANU) ‘Chandran Kulathas (Pbtics, ADFA, Canberra) (Debates 8 Sueveys) ASSOCIATE EDITORS Cale ema (oS, UCLA) om Crgal am,ANU Php Pec Ploy, ANU) Tory ides Pol Sl ANU) ‘ne Pips Pl Sey London Gal Gao Oe ol Sec, Hambol U ein) Jeremy Waten Law, Clb Geotcey Bresnan (Econ, ANU EDITORIAL BOARD sinne Babar (Phi, Pais Xb Partha Dasgupta (Economies, Cambridge) Patrick Dunleavy (Gov't, ISE) [Nancy ease (Pol Sci New School) Moin Gavens (Phil U Sydney) ‘Amy Guumann (Pls, Peinceton) Bob Jesop (Soc. Lancaster) Perey Leng (Public Admin, Erasmus) Dsvid Mille (Pots, Oxford) ‘Susan Okin (Pol. Si, Stanford) 1.G.A, Posock (icy, Johns Hopkins) ‘Alan Ryan (Plies, Oxford) (Quentin Skinner (History, Cembridge C.L. Ten (Phil, Monash Ie Marion Young (Pai, U Piusburgh) Bruce Ackexman (Lae, Yl Brian Barry (Gor's LSE) Jolin Deyek (Pol. Sey Metbourn) Jon Elter (ol Se, ColumbialOslo) Michael Freeden (Politics, Oxford) David Gautier (Pi, Petsburh) Rosell Hain (Plies, NYU) Serge-Chrstopte Kolm (Econ, Pais) Jane Mansbridge Pol Sci Harvard) Richard Mulgan (Pl. Six ANU) (nora O'Neil (Phil, Cambridge! Andeew Reeve (Paliiss, U Warwick) Wojciech Sadurch (Law, rdoey) Cas Sunstein (Law/Pol Se, Chisago) Philippe Var Pass (PhiL/Econ., Louvain) ‘The Journa! of Political Philosophy: Volume 6, Number 2, 1998, pp. 171-189 Coerced Moral Agents? Individual Responsibility for Military Service* DAVID R. MAPEL Political Science, University of Colorado, Boulder Ago account of how we should distribute individual moral responsi bility for war should address three issues: 1) civilians’ responsibility for supporting or opposing a war; 2) civilians’ responsibilty for volunteering ot allowing themselves tobe conscripted as soldiers; and 3) soldiers’ responsiblity for the manner in which they fight usin Belo). For reasons of space, this paper examines only the second issue: moral responsibilty for becoming a soldier." In particular I focus on Michael Walzer’s argument that ordinary citizens normally beat’ no moral responsibility for serving in the military. In Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer claims to be explaining the deepest reasons that underlie the “war convention,” which he defines as “the set of articulated norms, customs, professional codes, legal precepts, religious and philosophical principles, and reciprocal arrangements that shape our judgment of military conduct.”? The war convention is “necessarily imperfect,” according to Walzer, because it is adapted tothe practices of modern wa. Ie sets the terms of a moral condition that comes into existence only when armies of victims ‘eet... The convention accepts that victimization or at least assumes it and starts {from there (emphasis added).”® In other words, Walzer argues that modern just war thinking rests on che view that individuals are not responsible for freely choosing to become soldiers but rather are forced to fight by thei states, Soldiers are, in Walzer’s phrase, “coerced moral agents.™* “Isyoud lke co thank Pte Digeser, Jackie Colby, Bren Picket, Noam Zohar, Seven Wiener and Horst Mewes for comments onan eather version of this essay preiented athe 199 Annual Mating (ofthe American Poiial Science Association, Special thanks are Gut fo A Stemp for dscusion of ‘ang empl suds of rat raze and ane ° hl et "For eatons of space, I wil also leave aside how the problem of responsiblity for becoming a solider looks if one ejects the legitimacy of war altogether or fone accep te legitimacy of ligouy, inder certain circumstances they may nevertheless be judged culpably negligent for choosing o allowing themselves to made int olirs | Walzer does not discuss how this issue might presen itself in 3 pecfest democracy, bt he does dsuss how i arises in are imperfect represenatie democracies and his reasoning is meant to extend to other ki however, be thought a master of invidsl voles wheter parca ae Ream aed parece wr Cale eer have ng ued at {hey ought ror o volunteer, ought no ose ally they know the Warf be a ve But the knowledge required by Catholic doctrine is hard to come be an Cte dea aes te he sinner aes ms A nes notatle and aught no: vay to ender reasons fr the war this sbi nd if the sbjeuts cent sere in the war enospt hey are Rit eid oF, the sate would falling grave peri? . nt Walzer then appears to go on to adopt something like de Vitoria’s positior ce of couse, most princes work hard sister subjects ofthe jst “ey ona ne onsen oun thse reasons ot to doube thm in pubes and 30 ong as they are ony Moe ane vee te spony of evince hn reo pnd enw 1 ee a a Se ere arson who docs wrong 25 a result of some culpably acquieed incapacity 7 aly oral epee Ei neane einai cece nse neh rh Sour kare Seana ee ey Shite Sate cape wry oe Ree itll bases eae esi ct rs cui edict bce en be er nal omy ote len ne ‘eer one a ele nde pee war die’s oly ‘the "berughting act” of joining the army, mab more fa as scp oe Sneha lela he rece mera Rare oese eter rn UE te ply edwin expos ig a dency i ia cee a ee a Sl srogertor Minn en nate RESPONSIBILITY FOR MILITARY SERVICE 17s doubted, most men will be persuaded (by arguments something like Vitoria’) to fight... Their routine habits of law-abidingness, their fear, che pattiotism, theis ‘oral investment i the state, all favor that course. Or alternatively, they are 90 tecribly young when the disciplinary system of che state catches them up and sends ‘hem into war that they can hardly be said to make a moral decision at all... And then how can we blame them for (what we perceive to be) the wrongful character of cheit war The fact that individuals cannot escape going into the army forms half of Walzer’s analysis of the coercion of ordinary soldiers.1” The other half of his analysis centers on the fact that once individuals are on the battlefield, chey can exercise very little choice about the form of theit participation. The first half of ‘Walzer’s analysis focuses on the nature of the modern state's efforts to recruit for war, while the second half focuses on the nature of modern war itself. There have always been political organizations capable of forcibly receuiting soldiers, but in earlier times the ability of political organizations to marshal and drive an army id nor matter so much as there was often little military discipline onthe field and it was usually possible and sometimes even considered permissible to choose to ‘un away from particular battles. In such circumstances, “Those men who don’t ‘run away, but stand and fight, do so not because of the necessities oftheir case, but freely, as a matter of choice.” But now soldiers can no longer shape theit ‘own battles and they are often slaughtered and replaced at a staggering tate. In modern wars, soldiers fight without consent in two different ways: not only do they often fal to exercise meaningful or informed consent in joining an army. bur they often have no possibilty of consenting or dissenting to the kind of battle that an army makes them fight: Napoleon is said to have boasted to Metternich thar he could lose 30,000 men a month. Soldiers might agree to such losses in a war forced upon them by the remy, a war of national defense, but notin the sorts of wars that Napoleon fought. ‘The need to setk their consent (whatever the form in which it was sought and given ‘oF not given) would surely limit the occasions of war... This is the sort of consent I have in ming Political sel determination isnot, judging from the rwentith century, an adequate substitute, though i isn’t easy to think of one that would be beter, In ‘any case, itis when individval consent fails that...war tends to escalate. beyond 'Walues 1977, p39, IDespi the coercive factors emphasized by Walzer, evidence from the Viena era suggest that ltaty scrice particulary fo wats widely perceived tbe unjust) nay aot be tha alkene comprehensive crud of Viewamn era draft resisance, Lawrence Basi and Willows Stoo 5, B7) claim that, “Avoidance was availabe to everyone:" Although eflenng socioeese ae. fackerounds tgs diferen methods and success ne, any determined lnidul coald coe of damaging social o legal consequences, Despite patoote felings and voce Ordinary citizens may be intensely patriotic, but this is a popular sort of patriotism that simply assumes that military service is the best way of expressing love of country, not a philosophical sore of patriotism that calls into question the popular equation of love of country and military service. For these reasons, Walzer is probably right that ordinary citizens are not in a {good position to evaluate their government's general claims to be obeyed. To this ‘we might add thatthe claim of actual states to some kind of special allegiance is philosophically debatable anyway. Thus if we expect citizens to reflect about becoming soldiers, we should expect them to decide about joining the military on ‘grounds that are much simpler and more obvious. If questions about the extent and justification of a citizen’s political obligations are necessarily speculative, the general nature of serving in a standing army is not, One of the things that a citizen certainly is capable of knowing in advance is, that military discipline is designed to convert him from a moral agent into a human instrament who more of less automatically carties out the commands of those in authority. Without indulging in too great a caricature of military training, it is fair to say that military discipline aims at routinizing actions, that is, at organizing the chain of command so that there is little opportunity to raise questions. Once a person is in the army, it will become more difficult for him t0 think about the justice of a war in advance and in many cases it will become harder to get reliable. impartial information about a war (indeed, soldiers may be systematically deceived). Obviously, a citizen knows in advance that more of les severe sanctions will be attached to disobedience. He also knows of should be expected to know that he will be systematically desensitized to violence and that in the heat of battle he therefore runs an increased risk of committing atrocities. Finally, as Jeff McMahan observes, “there is something else he can know with litle reflection, which is that most wars in which people fight are unjust. This follows from the assumption that a war can be just on at most one side, though it can be unjust on both. Even if this formal assumption is unwarranted, it does seem true as a contingent fact that...as Anscombe puts it ‘human pride, malice and eruelty are so usual that... wars have mostly been mere wickedness on both sides.'”®5 McMahan then asks how it can ever be morally permissible for someone to join the army, knowing these general truths about the nature of military service and war. Social pressures might sometimes be strong enough to excuse a decision to join, but otherwise “following one's superiors into an unjust SSE tty te prey eer mor! eats obey he a bathe tes ty en be precy genera moreso obey the Law bt whee tees any cours neat val 10 eh he aa sth ta yan special pla ligation of BEER Pacer For ar noel stack soa of he oan eats of pla cbigasen, we Se 1978 ica dem p07 Mase WenauMti SPUR MUIR SERVIUE: 13s war is roughly analogous to committing a crime while drunk: one may not be responsible for one's action given one's condition atthe rime, but one’s conduct nevertheless remains culpable because of one's responsibility for getting oneself into a condition of diminished responsibility.” Citizens thinking about joining a standing army can and should be expected ro be aware ofall of these unpleacane general truths, Pace MeMahan, they are also rightly apt to be rather unimpressed by them, Whatever the statistical odds of being asked ro fight an unjust wa, the real issues concern the knowledge a citizen tay be expected to have about the specific nature of military discipline in his society and the odds of being asked to fight an unjust war given his country’s particular miliary record and eurcent security needs. Ordinary ciizens are certainly capable of knowing something about the specific character of their own rilitary service. In Israel, for example, a citizen can be expected to know that the army has long stressed both the idea of “purty of arms” and a “follow me” policy among officers for seting a good example of moral responsibilty, The general dangers of routinization are therefore somewhat diminished, at least relative to many other armies. While an Israeli cannot know exactly what the penalties willbe for refusing to serve in a parcicular conflict he can know in advance that che penalties are likely to be relaively ight” During the lst few years of the Intifada, for example, most refusers got two weeks to a month in prison and almost half of them were later reinstated in their reserve unit. Such rowldge i cbiouty relevant to asesing the moral rks of Becoming + OF course, the most celevant factor is the milt a MeMahan observes, the likelihood that a soldier eee as to fight an unjust war is a lor lower in Switerland chan isin the United States.* Yet here Walzer is probably correct in thinking that we can expect ordinary citizens to lack reliable knowiedge, General truths about the nature of war and the military ae available to anyone who wants to think fora few minutes about ‘whats involved in joining a standing army. But specific judgments about the past use of force by a particular country are much more uncertain and controversial. ‘Most ordinary soldiers and offers in the US army are likely to argue that US cites 1940 9.217, ough ii i tl rom te wt MeMahan es ke she view tar oral espns i eanatve tha cate, tating are espns bo ft thir apal ignorance ad forte acto hey petri at sa of soins spp ‘not 14 thre at reatons for ekg he ferent ew tat nuns se saponin Sete of elaile ignorance, but nt forthe sean they perm in tat Ste Toe tater soe OUR Eeaay of Unie ance tery of US daft resstnce during the Vitam wa far sugges ha fer of lel gues eas oie en adsl exter seni ost wa, Mere than 0000 men commited ndcabe eaelaw voto during the Veta wate ely 2 of ‘hose cares were prosecuted and only 35% of the indictments ended in conviction. More thaa half of thowe coved gid nt receive pron sete, The majonty of tote who tectved prion tine sergio an yearn ptm ered oes 3, pA *MeMahan'1994a, 207, force has generally been used justly, for example, while many critics outside the nilitary vehemently disagree. One might try co argue that itis wrong to volunteer for the US army, given the moral risks of soldiering on the one hand, and the ‘extreme unlikelihood of a genuine threat to the physical security of the nation on the other. Yet having no standing army would radically dectease national security, which leads to a kind of reductio ad absurdum. There are rare cases where the military record of a country appears to be unambiguously evil. We right think that ordinary Iraqis should be capable of understanding the grave ‘moral risks of serving in their own army, for example, given the recent ute ofthe Iraqi army against Iran, Kuwait, the UN Alliance, the Kurds and the Shiites. Given this history, perhaps volunteering to join the Iraqi army should be considered a form of culpable negligence. The Iragi cate is an extreme one, however, and complicated by a different cultural understanding of the nature of ‘war. Thus, service in a standing army may always be morally problematical, but conly in a few cases does it appear to be clearly wrong or dishonorable. Both volunteering and allowing oneself to be conscripted into a standing army should bbe considered permissible or blameless unless the state has a clear cecord of using force unjustly. When the moral risks of becoming a soldier aze significantly ‘outweighed by political obligations to support the state, volunteering for a standing army may even be morally required. During the years of chronic war in Iseael, for example, it would have been morally risky not to have served. Serving in a particular war ‘The assessment of moral rick ve political obligation changes when citizens are not simply thinking about prospective moral risks but about the known or suspected injustice of a particular conflict. Contra Walzer, there is clearly a duty not to volunteer and indeed a duty to resist conscription when one knows a war is unjust? Legal forms of protest and civil disobedience such as selective conscientious objection or draft resistance may be morally required even at vvery high personal cost.*? As Walzer observes, this is Catholic doctrine, but it is algo a view adopted by many Kantians. Consider, for example, the case of Karl Jogerstatter, as described by Alan Donagan: “Although Walzer revises bis postion in Just and Unjust Wars, be appears to advocate wervice resistance on moral grounds on atleast one occasion in his eevee worm, In "The Obligation (o Disobey," Walzer says, men have 2 prima face obligation to honor engagemens they hare ‘explcly made, to defend the groups and upbold the ideale fo which they have commited themeloes, even against the sare, x long as thei disobedience of laws or legally authored commands dors tot thveaten the exintcoce ofthe larger society or endanger the lives of is chizens Sometimes iit ‘obedience tothe state, when one has « duty to disobey, which must be justified” (Walzer 1970, Pp. 16-17, emphasis added). According to ths earher view, estan fo seevice in an unjust war ‘would seem to be morally requied in many eats “Draft evasion in an unjust war Would appear co be the motel minimum, but itis morally problematical unles accompanied by some postive efforts to sop the wat Iris worth neting that in Some cases both evasion and refusal might be polcallycounterproduetve, since miitary veterans at later able to speak out agains a war more etecively,baving demonstrated ther personal cova, pular pation bona fies, and first-hand knowledge RESPONSIBILITY FOR MILITARY SERVICE 18s By 1943 it oust have been difcule for any intel ficult for any intelligent Catholic in Germany who fed the newipapes to have beens any debe st thar Peay ey

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