PEOPLE VS. GACOTT, JR.

G.R. No. 116049 | July 13, 1995

242 SCRA 515
By: Karen P. Lustica

FACTS:
A complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108) was filed by Asst. City
Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes.

Accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending that the power to
prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act No. 1130,
hence, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or authority to file the
same.

Prosecution filed an opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already
been abolished by Letter of Implementation (LOI) No. 2, Series of 1972.

Despite the opposition, Gacott granted the motion espousing the position that the Letter
Of Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the law contemplated in Article
7 of the New Civil Code which can repeal another law such as R.A. 1130.

Rebuffed by this Court through the annulment of his order dismissing Criminal
Case No. 11529 of the court a quo, complemented with a reprimand and a fine of
P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law (for failure to read LOI No. 2),
respondent Gacott, Jr. has filed a motion for reconsideration. He also begged
with humility not to spread his Decision.

ISSUE:
WON a letter of instruction (LOI) can repeal a law?

HELD:
YES.

RATIO:
The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the
light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish
the Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in the
aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite
P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI
No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2
was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. . . .
Obviously, respondent judge did not even bother to read the text of the cited LOI;
otherwise, he would have readily acknowledged the validity of the argument advanced
by the prosecution. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, Presidential
Decrees, such as P.D. No. 1, issued by the former President Marcos under his martial
law powers have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As held
by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued or
done by the former President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain
valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by
subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the
President.

LOI No. 2 is one such legal order issued by former President Marcos in the
exercise of his martial law powers to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither
P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly or impliedly revoked or repealed,
both continue to have the force and effect of law.

DISPOSITIVE:
The basic and supplemental motions for reconsideration of the judgment in the case at
bar are hereby DENIED. Resolution is immediately final and executory.

NOTE:

With regards to his plead not to spread his Decision. The Court denied his motion and
held that,

The spreading of the decision on the personal record of a respondent is an official

procedure and requirement which, incredibly, respondent judge would want this very
Court to violate and forego, in suppression of facts which must appear in official
documents.