LABOR RELATIONS - CASE DIGESTS (Additional they had posted in the separate case Dangiw Siggaao v.
d in the separate case Dangiw Siggaao v. LCMC, and apply the
Requirement)
CASE #1 - Lepanto v. Icao, GR 196047, Jan. 15, 2014
FACTS: Respondent Icao filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages
against Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation (LCMC) and its CEO
before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Icao was a formerly worked as
the Lead Miner in its underground mine in Paco, Mankayan, Benguet. The
company ordered the dismissal from employment of Icao due to breach of
trust and confidence and act of highgrading (or act of concealing, possessing
or unauthorized extraction of highgrade material/ore without proper
authority). This order when Icao allegedly had in his possession a wrapped
object containing gold bearing highgrade ores found in his skullguard upon
being apprehended by the security guards of the company. Icao denied the
charge against him and claimed that his dismissal from work was without just
or authorized cause. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Icao. It found out that
the charge of highgrading was fabricated and there was no just cause for the
dismissal of respondent--that the claim of the security guards that Icao had
inserted ores in his boots while in a standing position was not in accord with
normal human physiological functioning and that it was inconsistent with
normal human behavior for a man, who knew that he was being chased for
allegedly placing wrapped ore inside his boots, to then transfer the ore to his
skullguard, where it could be found once he was apprehended. LCMC was
ordered to pay Icao his full backwages amounting to P345, 879.45. LCMC
appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC ruled for the dismissal on the ground that
there was non-perfection of the appeal provided for under Article 223 of the
Labor Code and consequently declaring LAs decision to be final and
executory. It noted that instead of posting an appeal bond required under the
Labor Code for the perfection of an appeal, LCMC and its CEO filed a
Consolidated Motion For Release Of Cash Bond And To Apply Bond Subject
For Release As Payment For Appeal Bond (Consolidated Motion). They
requested therein that the NLRC release the cash bond of P401,610.84, which
same cash bond to their present appeal bond liability. They reasoned that since
this Court had already decided Dangiw Siggaao in their favor, and that the
ruling therein had become final and executory, the cash bond posted therein
could now be released. They also cited financial difficulty as a reason for
resorting to this course of action and prayed that, in the interest of justice, the
motion be granted. An appeal before the CA was made but to no avail, said
court affirmed the NLRCs decision of dismissal due to non-perfection of
appeal, that the posting of the appeal bond is indispensable jurisdictional
requirement. However, the CA dropped the CEO as a party to this case as it
found that no specific act was alleged in private respondents pleadings to
show that he had a hand in Icaos illegal dismissal; much less, that he acted in
bad faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner complied with the appeal bond requirement
under the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules by filing a Consolidated Motion
to release the cash bond it posted in another case, which had been decided
with finality in its favor, with a view to applying the same cash bond to the
present case.
HELD: YES. The Court reiterates the ruling in Araneta v. Rodas, where it is
said that when the law does not clearly provide a rule or norm for the tribunal
to follow in deciding a question submitted, but leaves to the tribunal the
discretion to determine the case in one way or another, the judge must decide
the question in conformity with justice, reason and equity, in view of the
circumstances of the case. Applying this doctrine, we rule that petitioner
substantially complied with the mandatory requirement of posting an appeal
bond for the reasons explained below. First, there is no question that the
appeal was filed within the 10-day reglementary period. Except for the alleged
failure to post an appeal bond, the appeal to the NLRC was therefore in order.
Second, it is also undisputed that petitioner has an unencumbered amount of
money in the form of cash in the custody of the NLRC in the separate case
Dangiw Siggaao, which was earlier decided in its favor.
Under the Rule VI, Section 6 of the 2005 NLRC Rules, "[a] cash or surety
bond shall be valid and effective from the date of deposit or posting, until the
case is finally decided, resolved or terminated, or the award satisfied." Hence,
it is clear that a bond is encumbered and bound to a case only for as long as 1)
the case has not been finally decided, resolved or terminated; or 2) the award
has not been satisfied. Therefore, once the appeal is finally decided and no
award needs to be satisfied, the bond is automatically released. Since the
money is now unencumbered, the employer who posted it should now have
unrestricted access to the cash which he may now use as he pleases as appeal
bond in another case, for instance. This is what petitioner simply did. Third,
the cash bond in the amount of P401,610.84 posted in Dangiw Siggaao is
more than enough to cover the appeal bond in the amount of P345,879.45
required in the present case. Fourth, this ruling remains faithful to the spirit
behind the appeal bond requirement which is to ensure that workers will
receive the money awarded in their favor when the employers appeal
eventually fails. There was no showing at all of any attempt on the part of
petitioner to evade the posting of the appeal bond Court found exceptional
circumstances that warranted an extraordinary exercise of its power to exempt
a party from the rules on appeal bond, there is all the more reason in the
present case to find that petitioner substantially complied with the
requirement. We emphasize that in this case we are not even exempting
petitioner from the rule, as in fact we are enforcing compliance with the
posting of an appeal bond. We are simply liberally applying the rules on what
constitutes compliance with the requirement, given the special circumstances
surrounding the case as explained above.
CASE #2 - Visayas Community v. Yballe, GR 196156, Jan. 15, 2014
FACTS: The NFL is the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-
file employees of MCCH (now VCMC). NAMA-MCCH-NFL is a local
affiliate whose union leaders proceeded to strike despite the fact that it is not a
legitimate labor organization. The respondents in this case are staff nurses and
midwives of MCCH who actively joined and were believed to have took part
in committing illegal acts during the strike. Consequently, MCCH terminated
the union leaders of NAMA-MCCH-NFL as well as the respondents. The CA,
however, found that respondents cannot be considered to have committed
illegal acts since their participation was limited to the wearing of arm bands.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not the dismissal of the employees is valid ISSUE #2:
Whether or not they are entitled to backwages. ISSUE #3: Whether or not
theyare entitled to reinstatement.
HELD#1: No. Article 263 (a)(par 3) provides that any union officer who
knowingly participated in an illegal strike and any union officer or union
member who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. Here, the
respondents merely participated in the illegal strike but did not commit any of
the illegal acts. Hence, their termination is not valid.
HELD #2: No. The principle of a fair days wage for a fair days labor
remains as the basic factor in determining the award of backwages. If there is
no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless the
laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out,
suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working. For
this exception to apply, it is required that the strike be legal. Since the strike in
this case was illegal, the respondents cannot be awarded with backwages.
HELD #3: No. Considering that strained relations ensued, the grant of
separation pay to respondents is the alternative in lieu of reinstatement.
Jurisprudence states that the alternative relief for union members who were
dismissed for having participated in an illegal strike is the payment of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement under the following circumstances: (a)
when reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the passage of a long
period of time or because of the realities of the situation; (b) reinstatement is
inimical to the employers interest; (c) reinstatement is no longer feasible; (d)
reinstatement does not serve the best interests of the parties involved; (e) the
employer is prejudiced by the workers continued employment; (f) facts that
make execution unjust or inequitable have supervened; or (g) strained
relations between the employer and employee.
CASE #3 - Grand Asian v. Galvez, GR178184, Jan. 29, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner Grand Asian Shipping Lines, Inc (GASLI) is a domestic
corporation engaged in transporting liquified petroleum gas (LPG) from
Petrons refinery in Bataan to Pasig and Cavite. Respondents are
crewmembers of one of GASLIs vessels, M/T Dorothy Uno. On January
2000, Richard Abis (vessels oiler) reported to GASLI an alleged illegal
activity being committed by respondent who would misdeclare the consume
fuel in the Engineers Voyage Reports and the save fuel oil were sold to other
vessel out at sea (at nighttime). Profits would be divided amongst themselves.
After investigation, from the period of June 30, 1999 to Feb 15, 2000 the fuel
it consumption was overrate by 6,954.3 liters amounting to 74,737.86. Acting
upon the anomaly, GASLI placed respondents under preventive suspension
and after conducting administrative hearings decided to terminate them for
breach of trust, commission of crime against employer. Respondents filed
with the NLRC separate complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal,
underpayment/nonpayment of salaries/wages, overtime pay, premium pay for
holiday and rest day, service incentive pay, tax refunds and indemnities for
damages and attorneys fees against petitioner. On August 30, 2001, the Labor
Arbiter rendered decision finding the dismissal of 21 complainants to be
illegal. Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal with Motion to Reduce Bond
before the NLRC citing economic depression, legality of termination, and
compliance with labor standards. NLRC denied petitioners motion to reduce
bond and directed an additional bond. Despite petitioners failure the pay the
bond, NLRC found the appeal meritorious and ruled for petitioners. Stating
that the dismissal was valid with the exception of Sales.
NLRC struck down the monetary awards given by the Labor Arbiter as they
were based on computations made by respondents. On appeal to the CA, the
court ruled in favor of respondent stating that the NLRCs decision had
jurisdictional error since petitioner did not comply with the additional bond.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that respondents were
illegally dismissed.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not the CA erred when it concluded petitioner were not
able to perfect the appeal of the Labor Arbitrers decision.
HELD #1: NO. The CA did not commit any error in finding that respondents
were illegally dismissed. According to the termination notice, respondents
were dismissed based on the grounds of (a) serious misconduct (b) engaging
in pilferage wile navigating at sea (c) willful breach of the trust reposed by the
company (d) commission of a crime against their employer. After examination
of the evidence, the court finds that petitioners failed to substantiate the
charges of pilferage against respondents. The quantum of proof that should be
presented is substantial evidence. Mere filing of formal charge does not
automatically make dismissal valid. The affidavit executed simply contained
accusations while allegations remained uncorroborated. Also there is no
sufficient evidence to show respondents participation in the commission of the
crime. Respondents termination due to loss of trust and confidence should
have a distinction between managerial and rank and file employees. Rank-
and-file employees require proof of involvement while managerial employees
mere existence of a basis for belief is sufficient. Given that Galvez and Gruta
have managerial positions there is some basis for the loss of employers
confidence regarding the overstatement of fuel consumption without any
evidence to the contrary. While the others, who are ordinary rank and file
employees, were not proven to have any involvement in the loss of the
vessels fuel. Rendering their dismissals illegal. The employer bears the
burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases thus the employer must first
establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal.
HELD #2: YES. The CA erred in holding that there was no compliance on the
part of petitioner regarding the appeal bonds. According to Art. 223 of the
Labor Code, the posting of a bond, either in cash or surety, must be in the
amount equivalent to them entry award. Nonetheless, the court held that rules
should not be applied in a very rigid and strict sensethe same in labor cases
were substantial merits serve the interest of justice. In this case, the petitioner
appeals from the awarding of 7,104,483.84 to respondents and only complied
with the posting of 500,000 PHP. We find this to be in substantial compliance
with the Labor Code.
CASE #4 - Intel v. NLRC, GR 200575, Feb. 5, 2014
FACTS: Cabiles was initially hired by Intel Phil. on April 16, 1997 as an
Inventory Analyst. He was subsequently promoted several times over the
years and was also assigned at Intel Arizona and Intel Chengdu. He later
applied for a position at Intel Semiconductor Limited Hong Kong (Intel HK).
He received a letter offering the position of Finance Manager by Intel HK.
Before accepting the offer, he inquired from Intel Phil., through an email the
consequences of accepting the newly presented opportunity in Hong Kong.
He asked the process he need to go through regarding the benefits and
clearances in Intel Phils and would an email notification be enough. He also
clarified whether he will receive retirement benefits considering he will be in
the service for 10 years on April 16, 2007 with Intel and should he accept the
offer of Intel HK, will the 9.5 years in the service be rounded of to 10 years.
Intel Phil., through Penny Gabronino (Gabronino), replied that he will not be
eligible to receive his retirement benefit not having reached 10 years of
service at the time he moved to Hong Kong. Further, Intel do not round up the
years of service. In case he move back to the Philippines his total tenure of
service will be computed less on the period that you are out of Intel
Philippines. On January 31, 2007, Cabiles signed the job offer. On March 8,
2007, Intel Phil. issued Cabiles his "Intel Final Pay Separation Voucher"
indicating a net payout ofP165,857.62. On March 26, 2007, Cabiles executed
a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of Intel Phil. acknowledging receipt
of P165,857.62 as full and complete settlement of all benefits due him by
reason of his separation from Intel Phil. On September 8, 2007, after seven (7)
months of employment, Cabiles resigned from Intel HK. About two years
thereafter, Cabiles filed a complaint for non-payment of retirement benefits
and for moral and exemplary damages with the NLRC. He insisted that he
was employed by Intel for 10 years and 5 months from April 1997 to
September 2007 a period which included his seven (7) month stint with Intel
HK. Thus, he believed he was qualified to avail of the benefits under the
company's retirement policy allowing an employee who served for 10 years or
more to receive retirement benefits. The LA held that Cabiles did not sever his
employment with Intel Phil. when he moved to Intel HK, similar to the
instances when he was assigned at Intel Arizona and Intel Chengdu. On
appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA decision. It determined that his decision to
move to Intel HK was not definitive proof of permanent severance of his ties
with Intel Phil. It treated his transfer to Hong Kong as akin to his overseas
assignments in Arizona and Chengdu. As to the email exchange between
Cabiles and Intel Phil., the NLRC considered the same as insufficient to
diminish his right over retirement benefits under the law. Meanwhile, the
NLRC disregarded the Waiver because at the time it was signed, the
retirement pay due him had not yet accrued. Aggrieved, Intel Phil. elevated
the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari with application for a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The application for TRO was denied. A
motion for reconsideration, was filed, but it was also denied in a Resolution,
which also dismissed the petition for certiorari. Intel Phil. filed a motion for
reconsideration. The NLRC issued a writ of execution against Intel Phil. to
pay P3,201,398.60 and P31,510.00 representing the execution fees. Intel Phil.
satisfied the judgment on by paying the amount of P3,201,398.60 which
included the applicable withholding taxes due and paid to the BIR. Cabiles
received a net amount ofP2,485,337.35, covered by a BPI Managers check.
Intel Phil. filed restitution of all the amounts paid by them pursuant to the
NLRC's writ of execution and the NLRC order. Intel filed a petition for
review, however, the CA dismissed the same, affirming the NLRC decision.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that private respondent was entitled to
retire under Intel Philippines retirement plan.
HELD: The Court of Appeals decision is reversed.
LABOR LAW Resignation
Resignation is the formal relinquishment of an office,the overt act of which is
coupled with an intent to renounce. This intent could be inferred from the acts
of the employee before and after the alleged resignation. In contemplating
whether to accept the offer from Intel HK, Cabiles wrote Intel Phil. through
Gabronino. This communication manifested two of his main concerns: a)
clearance procedures; and b) the probability of getting his retirement pay
despite the non-completion of the required 10 years of employment service.
Beyond these concerns, however, was his acceptance of the fact that he would
be ending his relationship with Intel Phil. as his employer. The words he used
- local hire, close, clearance denote nothing but his firm resolve to voluntarily
disassociate himself from Intel Phil. and take on new responsibilities with
Intel HK. His acceptance of the offer meant letting go of the retirement
benefits he now claims as he was informed through email correspondence that
his 9.5 years of service with Intel Phil. would not be rounded off in his favor.
He, thus, placed himself in this position, as he chose to be employed in a
company that would pay him more than what he could earn in Chengdu or in
the Philippines.
LABOR LAW Theory of Secondment
Cabiles views his employment in Hong Kong as an assignment or an
extension of his employment with Intel Phil. The continuity, existence or
termination of an employer-employee relationship in a typical secondment
contract or any employment contract for that matter is measured by the
following yardsticks: 1. the selection and engagement of the employee; 2. the
payment of wages; 3. the power of dismissal; and 4. the employers power to
control the employees conduct. Victorio Meteor v. Creative Creatures Inc,
G.R. No. 171275, July 13, 2009. As applied, all of the above benchmarks
ceased upon Cabiles assumption of duties with Intel HK on February 1, 2007.
Intel HK became the new employer. Undoubtedly, Cabiles decision to move to
Hong Kong required the abandonment of his permanent position with Intel
Phil. in order for him to assume a position in an entirely different company.
Clearly, the "transfer" was more than just an assignment. It constituted a
severance of Cabiles relationship with Intel Phil., for the assumption of a
position with a different employer, rank, compensation and benefits. Hence,
Cabiles theory of secondment must fail. What distinguishes Intel Chengdu and
Intel Arizona from Intel HK is the lack of intervention of Intel Phil. on the
matter. In the two previous transfers, Intel Phil. remained as the principal
employer while Cabiles was on a temporary assignment.
LABOR LAW - Release, Waiver and Quitclaim
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the
agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement,
it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a
change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was
wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement
are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the
questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the
waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and
the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction
must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. Goodrich
Manufacturing Corporation, v. Ativo, G.R. No. 188002, February 1, 2010.
Suffice it to state that nothing is clearer than the words used in the Waiver
duly signed by Cabiles - that all claims, in the present and in the future, were
waived in consideration of his receipt of the amount of P165,857.62. Because
the waiver included all present and future claims, the non-accrual of benefits
cannot be used as a basis in awarding retirement benefits to him.
LABOR LAW Retirement benefits
Cabiles is not entitled to the Retirement Benefits. Having effectively resigned
before completing his 10th year anniversary with Intel Phil. and after having
validly waived all the benefits due him, if any, Cabiles is hereby declared
ineligible to receive the retirement pay pursuant to the retirement policy of
Intel Phil. For that reason, Cabiles must return all the amounts he received
from Intel Phil. pursuant to the Writ of Execution issued by the NLRC. The
petition is granted.
CASE #5 - Garza v. Coca-Cola, GR 180972, Jan. 20, 2014
FACTS: Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI) is a
manufacturer of soft drink products, employing salesman and account
specialists to sell these products to customers and outlets. Petitioner Jonas
Michael R. Garza became a regular employee of CCBPI designated as its
Salesman in Iriga City. He then was promoted to the position of Dealer
Development Coordinator and assigned at Tabaco City. During his stint
therein, he was likewise designated as Acting District Sales Supervisor. Due
to changes in CCBPIs structure and operating systems, the position of Dealer
Development Coordinator was abolished, and petitioner was designated as
Account Specialist and assigned to the CCBPI Naga City Plant and at Iriga
City. Petitioner received a monthly salary of 29,350.00, exclusive of
commissions and allowances. Prior to his dismissal from CCBPI, petitioner
was an employee of good standing with an unblemished record. Petitioner
received a memorandum from his immediate supervisor, George C.
Macatangay (Macatangay), directing him to explain alleged past unliquidated
collections and cash shortages. Petitioner received another memorandum of
even date from Macatangay directing him. Petitioner sought verbal
clarification from Macatangay, claiming that the memorandum did not specify
the acts and transactions covered by the charge, and said that he could not
submit a written explanation unless the charges against him are specified.
Instead of furnishing details, Macatangay issued to petitioner another
memorandum, this time, petitioner confronted Macatangay and reiterated his
request for a detailed account of his alleged violations, but the latter told him
not to worry about the memorandum because it was just a scheme adopted by
local CCBPI management to cover up problems in the Naga City Plant.
Macatangay issued another memorandum informing him that he had been
placed under preventive suspension for 30 days effective and directing him to
attend a formal investigation to be conducted at the Naga City Plant.
Petitioner sought a rescheduling of the investigation, as he had to attend to his
wife and the hospital obligations, and to have time to prepare for the
investigation. Instead of rescheduling the investigation as requested, CCBPI
through its Territory Sales Manager sent a Notice of Termination. The
respondent insisted that after deliberation of pertinent document the petitioner
was found guilty from misappropriated, embezzled or fail to remit company
funds and got dismissed. After negating the basis of his termination the
respondent push for the dismissal of the petitioner. Petitioner filed a
Complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents CCBPI at National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC. In their Position Paper and Rejoinder to
Complainants Supplemental Position Paper, respondents for the first time
specified in detail the alleged violations of petitioner. They claimed that
petitioner was guilty of misappropriation of cash/check collections, kiting of
checks, and delayed remittances covering the following customer accounts.
Respondents further alleged that misappropriation/embezzlement is a
violation of CCBPIs Inter-Office Memorandum30 which defined
misappropriation, non-remittance or delayed remittance of cash/check
collections and specified outright dismissal as punishment for the first offense.
They claimed that petitioners total unremitted collections amounted to
105,653.00 and for this reason, his dismissal was necessary and proper. They
added that due to petitioners failure to attend the scheduled investigation,
CCBPI was compelled to terminate his services, after which the proper notice
was given the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Finally, they
contended that since petitioner was dismissed for just cause, he was not
entitled to reinstatement, backwages, damages, and attorneys fees. CCBPI
relied mainly on the strength of an audit conducted by its Territory Finance
Head which concluded that petitioner failed to remit cash and credit
collections covering the above accounts. On the other hand petitioner claimed
essentially that (1) his dismissal was without just cause, and (2) he was denied
due process during the proceedings leading to his dismissal petitioner
contended that: The charges against him are false; with regard to cash
collections was impossible for Salesmen/Account Specialists to commit
embezzlement. Respondent noted that he could not be committing "kiting" of
CCBPIs checks, as CCBPI claims, for the simple reason that these checks
were made payable to CCBPI specifically, and were not issued in his name.
Thus, even for CCBPI products paid for in advance through checks ("payment
upon order" or "PUO" accounts), there is no opportunity for embezzlement
because the checks are made out to CCBPI. In conclusion, petitioner argued
that the evidence showed that he did not commit the alleged embezzlement;
that CCBPI failed to prove just cause for his dismissal; and that the charges
against him were contrived and the evidence self-serving. After assessing the
facts presented by the petitioner and the respondent. Labor Arbiter favored the
petitioner and was ordered for reinstate, pay backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or his monetary equivalent, computed from the
date of his respective dismissal up to the time of his actual reinstatement,
whether physically or on payroll. Respondents appealed to the NLRC; while
the NLRC appeal was pending, petitioner was reinstated pursuant. After a
time, NLRC ordered respondents-appellants to pay complainant-appellee
Jonas Michael R. Garza his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent, to be computed from the time of his
illegal dismissal up to the promulgation of the decision, separation pay of one
(1) month for his every year of service computed from the time of his
employment up to the promulgation of the decision. Further, the NLRC
reversed the Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement, finding that relations
between the petitioner and CCBPI have been strained. Petitioner and
respondents filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which were
denied in an October 27, 2006 Resolution. Both thus went up to the CA on
certiorari, with petitioner raising only the issue of reinstatement. The CA
consolidated the two petitions. The CA ruled that petitioners dismissal was
proper. The CA held that from this, CCBPI was able to prove that petitioner
was guilty of non-remittance of the 8,160.00 collected from Asanza. With
regard to the manner in which petitioner was dismissed, the CA conceded that
the procedure observed by CCBPI was defective, but since the dismissal was
for just cause, the lack of due process did not nullify the dismissal, but merely
entitled petitioner to an award of nominal damages. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, but in the second assailed November 16, 2007
Resolution, the CA denied the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a just cause in dismissing the petitioner.
HELD: No. The Court likewise finds convincing petitioners arguments that it
was impossible for him to embezzle/not remit the other customers cash and
check payments, not only because of the existence of the abovementioned
policy, but likewise due to the sworn avowals of these customers that all their
check payments have been issued in CCBPIs name and have been duly
debited from their accounts. Certainly, petitioner could not have encashed
check payments because they were issued in the name of CCBPI; for the same
reason, he could not have engaged in kiting operations. As earlier stated, the
burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for valid cause.
Unsubstantiated accusations or baseless conclusions of the employer are
insufficient legal justifications to dismiss an employee. "The unflinching rule
in illegal dismissal cases is that the employer bears the burden of proof.
Having thus seen that petitioner is innocent of the charges leveled against him,
the Court must order his reinstatement. As a matter of course, the NLRC and
CA pronouncements inconsistent with this declaration are necessarily
rendered null and void. The Supreme Court favored the petitioners claim and
is ordered to be REINSTATED, with the modification that petitioner Jonas
Michael R. Garza is ORDERED reinstated to his former position as Account
Specialist or its equivalent, without loss of seniority, rank, emolument and
privileges, and with full backwages from the date of his illegal dismissal up to
his actual reinstatement.
CASE #6 - Unica v. Anscor, GR 184318, Feb. 12, 2014
FACTS: Respondent Anscor Swire Ship Management Corporation is a
manning agency. Petitioner was employed by respondent under various
contracts. In his last contract, petitioner was deployed for a period of nine (9)
months from January 29, 2000 to October 25, 2000. However, since the vessel
was still at sea, petitioner was only repatriated on November 14, 2000, or
twenty (20) days after the expiration of his contract of employment. Petitioner
averred that since he was allowed to stay in the vessel for another twenty (20)
days, there was an implied renewal of his contract of employment. Hence,
when he was repatriated on November 14, 2000 without a valid cause, he was
illegally dismissed. Due to the foregoing, petitioner filed a case against the
respondent for illegal dismissal, payment of retirement, disability and medical
benefits, separation and holiday pay. In its defense, respondent argued that
petitioner was hired for a fixed period, the duration of which depends upon
the mutual agreement of the parties. Petitioner's employment was, therefore,
co-terminus with the term of his contract. Hence, the claim of petitioner that
he was illegally dismissed must fail, because he was repatriated due to the
completion of the term of his contract. The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor
of petitioner. Since petitioner was not repatriated at the expiration of his
contract on October 25, 2000, and was allowed by respondent to continue
working on board its vessel up to November 14, 2000, his contract with
respondent was impliedly renewed for another nine months. The LA directed
respondent to pay petitioner his salary for the unexpired portion of his
impliedly renewed contract, his medical benefits and attorney's fees.
Respondent appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed with modification the
LA's decision. The NLRC, however, deleted the award of medical benefits
and reduced the amount of attorney's fees. Respondent filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the CA. The CA ruled that there was no implied renewal of
contract and the 20 days extension was due to the fact that the ship was still at
sea. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an implied renewal of petitioner's contract
of employment with respondent.
HELD: NO. In the case at bar, although petitioner's employment contract with
respondent ended on October 25, 2000 and he disembarked only on
November 14, 2000 or barely 20 days after the expiration of his employment
contract, such late disembarkation was not without valid reason. Respondent
could not have disembarked petitioner on the date of the termination of his
employment contract, because the vessel was still in the middle of the sea.
Clearly, it was impossible for petitioner to safely disembark immediately upon
the expiration of his contract, since he must disembark at a convenient port.
Thus, petitioner's stay in the vessel for another 20 days should not be
interpreted as an implied extension of his contract. A seaman need not
physically disembark from a vessel at the expiration of his employment
contract to have such contract considered terminated. It is a settled rule that
seafarers are considered contractual employees. Their employment is
governed by the contracts they sign every time they are rehired and their
employment is terminated when the contract expires. Their employment is
contractually fixed for a certain period of time. Thus, when petitioner's
contract ended on October 25, 2000, his employment is deemed automatically
terminated, there being no mutually-agreed renewal or extension of the
expired contract. However, petitioner is entitled to be paid his wages after the
expiration of his contract until the vessel's arrival at a convenient port. Section
19 of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of
Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels is clear on this point:
REPATRIATION. A. If the vessel is outside the Philippines upon the
expiration of the contract, the seafarer shall continue his service on board until
the vessel's arrival at a convenient port and/ or after arrival of the replacement
crew, provided that, in any case, the continuance of such service shall not
exceed three months. The seafarer shall be entitled to earned wages and
benefits as provided in his contract.
CASE #7 - Fil-Pride v. Balasta, GR 193047, Mar. 3, 2014
FACTS: Respondent Edgar A. Balasta was hired by petitioner Fil-Pride
Shipping Company and was assigned as Able Seaman onboard M/V Eagle
Pioneer. Sometime in August and September 2005, while aboard M/V Eagle
Pioneer, respondent experienced chest pains, fatigue, and shortness of breath.
He was examined by a physician in Gangyou Hospital in Tianjin, China, and
was diagnosed as having myocardial ischemia and coronary heart disease. He
was declared unfit for duty and was recommended for repatriation.
Respondent filed a claim for permanent disability benefits with petitioner but
the latter denied the same. On February 10, 2006, respondent filed against the
petitioners a complaint for the recovery of disability benefits, illness
allowance, and reimbursement of medical expenses, damages and attorneys
fees. It appears from the record that on February 24, 2006, respondent
underwent coronary artery bypass graft surgery. He then continued his
treatment with Dr. Cruz, who for his part continued to diagnose respondent
with severe coronary artery disease. Petitioners, on the other hand, stated and
argued in their Position Paper and Reply that respondent filed a labor
complaint even before the company-designated physician, Dr. Cruz, could
complete his examination and treatment of respondents condition, which thus
prompted them to deny his claim for disability benefits;
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents illness is compensable as it is work-
connected and constitutes an occupational disease under the POEA Contract
Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels.
HELD: YES. In several cases, cardiovascular disease, coronary artery
disease, as well as other heart ailments were held to be compensable.
Likewise, petitioners failed to refute respondents allegations in his Position
Paper that in the performance of his duties as Able Seaman, he inhaled, was
exposed to, and came into direct contact with various injurious and harmful
chemicals, dust, fumes/ emissions, and other irritant agents; that he performed
strenuous tasks such as lifting, pulling, pushing and/or moving equipment and
materials on board the ship; that he was constantly exposed to varying
temperatures of extreme hot and cold as the ship crossed ocean boundaries;
that he was exposed as well to harsh weather conditions; that in most
instances, he was required to perform overtime work; and that the work of an
Able Seaman is both physically and mentally stressful. It does not require
much imagination to realize or conclude that these tasks could very well cause
the illness that respondent, then already 47 years old, suffered from six
months into his employment contract with petitioners. The following
pronouncement in a recent case very well applies to respondent. His constant
exposure to hazards such as chemicals and the varying temperature, like the
heat in the kitchen of the vessel and the coldness outside, coupled by stressful
tasks in his employment caused, or at least aggravated, his illness. It is already
recognized that any kind of work or labor produces stress and strain normally
resulting in wear and tear of the human body.
Notably, it is a matter of judicial notice that an overseas worker, having to
ward off homesickness by reason of being physically separated from his
family for the entire duration of
his contract, bears a great degree of emotional strain while making an effort to
perform his work well. The strain is even greater in the case of a seaman who
is constantly subjected to the perils of the sea while at work abroad and away
from his family.
CASE #8 - Emeritus v. Maintenance, GR 204761, Apr. 2, 2014
FACTS: Dailig was employed as a security guard assigned to petitioner's
various clients, the last of which was Panasonic. On 10 December 2005, he
was relieved from his post. On 27 January 2006, he filed a complaint for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of legal and special holiday pay,
premium pay for rest day and underpayment of ECOLA before DOLE. The
hearing officer recommended the dismissal of the complaint since the claims
were already paid. On 16 June 2006, respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and payment of separation pay against petitioner before the
Conciliation and Mediation Center of NLRC. On 14 July 2006, respondent
filed another complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries and
non-payment of full backwages before the NLRC. He claimed that on various
dates, he went to petitioners office to follow-up his next assignment, but still
he was not given a new assignment. He argued that if an employee is on
floating status for more than six months, such employee is deemed illegally
dismissed. Petitioner denied dismissing respondent. It admitted that it relieved
respondent from his last assignment on 10 December 2005; however, on 27
January 2006 it sent respondent a notice requiring him to report to the head
office within 72 hours from receipt of said notice. It further alleged that it had
informed respondent that he had been absent without official leave for the
month of January 2006, and that his failure to report within 72 hours from
receipt of the notice would mean that he was no longer interested to continue
his employment. LA declared that complainant has been illegally dismissed;
ordered the company to reinstate complainant and to pay him backwages.
NLRC affirmed LAs decision; denied MR. But it pointed out that
computation of backwages should be reckoned from 10 June 2006 and not 10
Dec 2005. CA affirmed LA and NLRC but set aside the reinstatement order
and instead ordered the payment of separation pay, invoking the doctrine of
strained relations between the parties.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not Dailig was illegally dismissed by the company.
ISSUE #2: If he was, whether or not he is entitled to separation pay, instead of
reinstatement.
HELD #1: YES. Respondent was on floating status from 10 December 2005
to 16 June 2006 or more than six months. Petitioners allegation of sending
respondent a notice requiring him to report for work, is unsubstantiated, and
thus, self-serving. The Court agrees with the ruling of the LA, NLRC and CA
that a floating status of a security guard, such as respondent, for more than six
months constitutes constructive dismissal. In Nationwide Security and Allied
Services, Inc. v. Valderama, the Court that the temporary inactivity or
"floating status" of security guards should continue only for six months.
Otherwise, the security agency concerned could be liable for constructive
dismissal. The failure of petitioner to give respondent a work assignment
beyond the reasonable six-month period makes it liable for constructive
dismissal.
HELD #2: NO. Article 279 of the Labor Code of the Philippines mandates the
reinstatement of an illegally dismissed employee. Thus, reinstatement is the
general rule, while the award of separation pay is the exception. The
circumstances warranting the grant of separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement,
are laid down by the Court in Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v.
NLRC, thus: Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the
Court for denying reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law
applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the
long passage of time or because of the realities of the situation; or that it
would be inimical to the employers interest; or that reinstatement may no
longer be feasible; or, that it will not serve the best interests of the parties
involved; or that the company would be prejudiced by the workers continued
employment; or that it will not serve any prudent purpose as when
supervening facts have transpired which make execution on that score unjust
or inequitable or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of
antipathy and antagonism or strained relations or irretrievable
estrangement between the employer and the employee.
CASE #9 - Tabango v. Pilipinas Shell, GR 170007, Apr. 7, 2014
FACTS: As the current collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the
union and corporation is coming to an end, the parties started negotiations for
a new CBA. The union proposed a 20% annual across-the-board salary
increase for the next 3 years however, the company proposed a lump sum of
P80,000 yearly for the 3-year period to all covered employees. In reply to the
unions request to provide in full details the basis for its counter-proposal, the
company explained that it is based on the affordability of the corporation and
the current salary levels in the industry but the union rejected it. After another
negotiation, the company increased its offer to P88,000 but again the union
requested for justification but the company refused to give in insisting that the
financial measures were available in the refinery scorecard in the website and
shared network drives. The union charged that the company was bargaining in
bad faith while the company expressed its disagreement with the unions
manifestation and proposed the declaration of a deadlock and recommended a
third partys assistance. The union filed a Notice of Strike in the Natl.
Conciliation & Mediation Board (NCMB) alleging bad faith bargaining on the
part of the company. In the mandatory conciliation- mediation proceedings,
the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. When the company learned
of the unions unanimous vote to hold a strike, it filed a Petition for
Assumption of Jurisdiction with the Secretary of Labor & Employment under
Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code. The DOLE, finding that the strike would have
a negative impact on national interest assumed jurisdiction over the dispute
and directed the parties to submit their respective position paper and maintain
the status quo existing at the time of the Order or if the strike had commenced,
the workers were directed to return to work and the employer to readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. The
union filed a petition before the CA questioning the jurisdiction of the DOLE
as the issue raised was unfair labor practice of the company in the form of bad
faith bargaining and not the CBA deadlock citing item 8 of the CBA rules that
deadlock can only be declared upon mutual consent of both parties but where
the union did not consent. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit
declaring that the DOLE acquired jurisdiction over the dispute vested to it by
Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code. Meanwhile, the union filed a complaint against
the company in the NLRC on allegations of the companys refusal to bargain.
The NLRC finding that the case arose from the same CBA-related labor
dispute, transmitted the case to the DOLE. The DOLE, holding that there was
already deadlock and there was no showing that the company engaged in
unfair labor practice by bargaining in bad faith, decided the matter of the
wage increase and other economic issues of the new CBA, i.e. to give a lump
sum package of P95,000 per year for three years per covered employee &
retention of benefits covered by the preceding CBA. Both parties did not
appeal the DOLE decision thus, it attained finality. The union then went to the
Court via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent corporation is guilty of bargaining in bad
faith?
HELD: NO. The Court held that duty to bargain does not compel any party to
accept a proposal or to make any concession (Art. 252, Labor Code). While
the purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement between
the employer and the employees union resulting in a binding contract
between the parties, the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations
continued for a reasonable period does not mean lack of good faith. A CBA,
like any contract is a product of mutual consent and not of compulsion and the
duty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement.
Respondents unswerving position on the matter of annual lump sum payment
in lieu of wage increase did not, by itself, constitute bad faith even if such
position caused a stalemate in the negotiations. As there was no bad faith on
the part of the company in its bargaining with the union, deadlock was
possible and did occur. Fact is, that the negotiations between the union and the
company were stalled by the opposing offers of yearly wage increase by the
union, on the one hand, and annual lump sum payment by the company, on the
other hand. Each party found the others offer unacceptable and neither party
was willing to yield. The company suggested seeking the assistance of a third
party to settle the issue but the union preferred the remedy of filing a notice of
strike. The absence of the parties mutual declaration of deadlock does not
mean that there was no deadlock. This is the essence of Article 263(g) of the
Labor Code which gives the Secretary of Labor & Employment jurisdiction
over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest. The Court denied the petition
declaring that the Secretary of Labor and Employment committed no abuse of
discretion when she assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute of the union February 3 to February 28, 2000 during which the respondents were on
and the company. preventive suspension was excluded by the NLRC in the computation of the
respondents backwages. Subsequently, Wenphil moved for the reconsideration
of the NLRCs January 30, 2002 resolution, but the NLRC denied the motion
in another resolution dated September 24, 2002. Wenphil thereafter went up to
CASE #10 - Wenphil v. Abing, GR 207983, Apr. 7, 2014 the CA via a petition for certiorari to question the NLRCs January 30, 2002
and September 24, 2002 resolutions. On August 27, 2003, the CA rendered its
FACTS: This case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by the
decision reversing the NLRCs finding that the respondents had been illegally
respondents against Wenphil. On December 8, 2000, LA Geobel A. Bartolabac
dismissed. On appeal to the Supreme Court (SC) via Rule 45 (docketed as
ruled that the respondents had been illegally dismissed by Wenphil. According
G.R. No. 16244725 and dated December 27, 2006), the SC denied the
to the LA, the allegation of serious misconduct against the respondents had no
respondents petition for review on certiorari and affirmed the CAs August 27,
factual and legal basis. Consequently, LA Bartolabac ordered Wenphil to
2003 decision and February 23, 2004 resolution. The respondents did not file
immediately reinstate the respondents to their respective positions or to
any motion for reconsideration to question the SCs decision; thus, the decision
equivalent ones, whether actual or in the payroll. Also, the LA ordered
became final and executory on February 15, 2007. Sometime after the SCs
Wenphil to pay the respondents their backwages from February 3, 2000 until
decision in G.R. No. 162447 became final and executory, the respondents
the date of their actual reinstatement. Because of the unfavorable LA decision,
filed with LA Bartolabac a motion for computation and issuance of writ of
Wenphil appealed to the NLRC on April 16, 2001. In the meantime, the
execution. The respondents asserted in this motion that although the CAs
respondents moved for the immediate execution of the LAs December 8, 2000
ruling on the absence of illegal dismissal (as affirmed by the SC) was adverse
decision. On October 29, 2001, Wenphil and the respondents entered into a
to them, under the law and settled jurisprudence, they were still entitled to
compromise agreement before LA Bartolabac. They agreed to the respondents
backwages from the time of their dismissal until the NLRCs decision finding
payroll reinstatement while Wenphils appeal with the NLRC was ongoing.
them to be illegally dismissed was reversed with finality. LA Bartolabac
Wenphil also agreed to pay the accumulated salaries of the respondents for the
granted the respondents motion and directed Wenphil to pay each complainant
payroll period from April 5, 2001 until October 15, 2001. As for the remaining
their salaries on reinstatement covering the period from February 15, 2002
payroll period starting October 16, 2001, Wenphil committed itself to credit
(the date Wenphil last paid the respondents respective salaries) to November
the respective salaries of the respondents to their ATM payroll accounts until
8, 2002 (since the NLRCs decision finding the respondents illegally dismissed
such time that the questioned decision of LA Bartolabac is either modified,
became final and executory on February 28, 2002). Both parties appealed to
amended or reversed by the Honorable National Labor Relations Commission.
the NLRC to question LA Bartolabacs order. Wenphil argued that the

respondents were no longer entitled to payment of backwages in view of the

On January 30, 2002, the NLRC issued a resolution affirming LA Bartolabacs
compromise agreement they executed on October 29, 2001. According to
decision with modifications. Instead of ordering the respondents
Wenphil, the compromise agreement provided that Wenphils obligation to pay
reinstatement, the NLRC directed Wenphil to pay the respondents their
the respondents backwages should cease as soon as LA Bartolabacs decision
respective separation pay at the rate of one (1) month salary for every year of
was modified, amended or reversed by the NLRC. Since the NLRC modified
service. Also, the NLRC found that while the respondents had been illegally
the LAs ruling by ordering the payment of separation pay in lieu of
dismissed, they had not been illegally suspended. Thus, the period from
reinstatement, then the respondents, under the terms of the compromise
agreement, were entitled to backwages only up to the finality of the NLRC
decision. The respondents questioned in their appeal the determined period for
the computation of their backwages. The NLRC denied the parties respective
appeals in its decision dated March 26, 2010 and affirmed in toto the LAs
order. Both parties moved for the reconsideration of the NLRCs decision but
the NLRC denied their respective motions. The CA reversed the NLRC
rulings and prescribed a different computation period. The CA ruled that the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the LAs
computed period which was from February 15, 2002 to November 8, 2002.
ISSUE: Whether the employees should be reinstated
HELD: We resolve to DENY the petition.
LABOR LAW: order of reinstatement
An order of reinstatement is immediately executory even pending appeal. The
employer has the obligation to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed
employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. Under
Article 223 of the Labor Code, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is
concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The
employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation, or at the option of
the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The Court discussed
reason behind this legal policy in Aris v. NLRC, where it explained: In
authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision
of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, the law
itself has laid down a compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies and
enhances the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on labor and the working-
man. These provisions are the quintessence of the aspirations of the
workingman for recognition of his role in the social and economic life of the
nation, for the protection of his rights, and the promotion of his welfare These
duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so much to express
sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and meaningfully underscore
labor as a primary social and economic force, which the Constitution also
expressly affirms with equal intensity. Labor is an indispensable partner for
the nation's progress and stability. Since the decision is immediately
executory, it is the duty of the employer to comply with the order of
reinstatement, which can be done either actually or through payroll
reinstatement. As provided under Article 223 of the Labor Code, this
immediately executory nature of an order of reinstatement is not affected by
the existence of an ongoing appeal. The employer has the duty to reinstate the
employee in the interim period until a reversal is decreed by a higher court or
tribunal. In the case of payroll reinstatement, even if the employers appeal
turns the tide in its favor, the reinstated employee has no duty to return or
reimburse the salary he received during the period that the lower court or
tribunals governing decision was for the employees illegal dismissal.
Otherwise, the situation would run counter to the immediately executory
nature of an order of reinstatement. The case of Garcia v. Philippine Airlines
is enlightening on this point: Even outside the theoretical trappings of the
discussion and into the mundane realities of human experience, the refund
doctrine easily demonstrates how a favorable decision by the Labor Arbiter
could harm, more than help, a dismissed employee. The employee, to make
both ends meet, would necessarily have to use up the salaries received during
the pendency of the appeal, only to end up having to refund the sum in case of
a final unfavorable decision. It is mirage of a stop-gap leading the employee
to a risky cliff of insolvency. Advisably, the sum is better left unspent. It
becomes more logical and practical for the employee to refuse payroll
reinstatement and simply find work elsewhere in the interim, if any is
available. Notably, the option of payroll reinstatement belongs to the
employer, even if the employee is able and raring to return to work. We see
the situation discussed above to be present in the case before us as Wenphil
observed the mandate of Article 223 to immediately comply with the order of
reinstatement by the LA. On October 29, 2001, while Wenphils appeal with
the NLRC was pending, it entered into a compromise agreement with the
respondents. In this agreement, Wenphil committed to reinstate the
respondents in its payroll. However, the commitment came with a condition:
Wenphil stipulated that its obligation to pay the wages due to the respondents
would cease if the decision of the LA would be modified, amended or
reversed by the NLRC. Thus, when the NLRC rendered its decision on the
appeal affirming the LAs finding that the respondents were illegally
dismissed, but modifying the award of reinstatement to payment of separation
pay, Wenphil stopped paying the respondents wages. The reinstatement
salaries due to the respondents were, by their nature, payment of unworked
backwages. These were salaries due to the respondents because they had been
prevented from working despite the LA and the NLRC findings that they had
been illegally dismissed. We point out that reinstatement and backwages are
two separate reliefs available to an illegally dismissed employee. The normal
consequences of a finding that an employee has been illegally dismissed are:
first, that the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement to his former
position without loss of seniority rights; and second, the payment of
backwages covers the period running from his illegal dismissal up to his
actual reinstatement. These two reliefs are not inconsistent with one another
and the labor arbiter can award both simultaneously. Moreover, the relief of
separation pay may be granted in lieu of reinstatement but it cannot be a
substitute for the payment of backwages. In instances where reinstatement is
no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the
employer, separation pay should be granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed
employee should be entitled to either reinstatement if viable, or separation pay
if reinstatement is no longer be viable, plus backwages in either instance.
WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we hereby DENY the
petition.
CASE #11 - Arabit v. Jardine, GR 181719, Apr. 21, 2014
FACTS: Eugene S. Arabit et al. Were former employees of the respondent
company. They were also officers and members of MB Finance Employees
Association (Union). Jardine Pacific Finance Due to financial losses,
implemented a redundancy program among its employees. Petitioners were
among those affected by the redundancy program. Thereafter, the respondents
hired contractual employees to undertake the functions of the former
employees. The Union Filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board. They questioned the termination of the petitioners
employment. They also alleged unfair labor practice. Afterwards, both the
Union and Jardine agreed on a settlement agreement wherein petitioners will
receive redundancy pay including a separation package but the right to
question the legality of their dismissal with the NLRC is not prejudiced. A
complaint was filed with the NLRC against Jardine for illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practice. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioners. The
LA explained that the companys action was a circumvention of the right of
petitioners to security of tenure. On the allegation of unfair labor practice the
LA held that the evidence presented to prove their claim against Jardine was
insufficient. Both parties appealed the Decision but the NLRC dismissed the
appeals and affirmed the LAs decision in its entirety. Jardine sought recourse
with the CA. The CA then reversed the LA and NLRCs ruling. They claimed
that in the absence of malice or arbitrariness on the part of Jardine in
implementing its redundancy program, the Courts must not interfere with the
companys exercise of a managerial decision. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this present petition. The
petitioners maintain that the CA gravely abused its discretion. They also
argued that Jardine did not lay down any basis in choosing the petitioners for
inclusion in the redundancy program.
ISSUE: WON the CA gravely abused its discretion and that the ruling is not
in conformity with the law and jurisprudence.
HELD: The Petition is GRANTED. Jardine failed to set the required fair and
reasonable criteria in the termination of the petitioners employment leading
to the conclusion that the termination from the service was arbitrary and in
bad faith. The case of Golden Thread Knitting Industries, Inc v. NLRC laid
down the criteria in selecting employees to be dismissed due to redundancy.
Such may include but are not limited to the following: (1) Less preferred
status, (2) Efficiency and (3) Seniority. The court in the case of Asia Alcohol
Corp. v. NLRC also provided for requisites for a valid redundancy program.
(1) Written notice served on both the employees and DOLE at least a month
prior to the date of intended retrenchment; (2) Payment of separation pay
equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year
of service, whichever is higher; (3) Good faith in abolishing the redundant
positions and; (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions
are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished. Jardine complied only
with the first two guidelines stated in the Asia Alcohol case. The company
failed to explain why among all its employees whose positions were
determined to be redundant, the petitioners were the ones selected to be
dismissed from service. Lastly, the LA and NLRC also arrived at the same
conclusion that the redundancy program was not valid because Jardine hired
contractual employees as replacements, thus, contradicting underlying reasons
redundancy. The CA significantly chose to disregard these findings without
fully justifying its move. Hence, it was clear that the CA gravely abused its
discretion.
CASE #12 - Nahas v. Olarte, GR 169247, Jun. 2, 2014
FACTS: On 1999, Olarte worked a domestic helper in Saudi Arabia for a
term of 2 years. Under her contract, she was to be employed by Fahad for a
monthly salary of $200.00. Upon commencing her service to Fahad, Olarte
was not paid her salaries. It was only on December 1999 that she was given
$200.00. It was the only salary she received from the entire duration that she
worked for Fahad. In succeeding months, Olarte developed osteo-arthritis on
her legs for the lack of proper medical attention granted to her. Despite this
fact, Fahad did not allow her to return to the Philippines and continues
withholding her salaries. When she was given the chance to go to Riyadh, she
immediately sought for help from OWWA. Several months after being
repatriated, she filed for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter praying that
PETRA and Nahas be held solidary liable with Fahad for the ordeal she has
suffered. Nahas answered that she did not have any control to the deployment
of Olarte, arguing that Olarte withdrew her application. The Labor Arbiter
ruled in favor of Olarte as Nahas failed to prove the withdrawal of Olartes
application. In the appeal of Nahas before the NLRC she denied that Olarte
applied in PETRA. The NLRC denied the appeal as the facts were never
disputed to begin with. The Court of Appeals affirmed the previous decisions.
Hence, the instant petition before the SC.
ISSUE: Can PETRA/Royal Dream be held solidary liable with Fahd for
illegal dismissal?
HELD: YES. The Court ruled that Nahas inconsistent positions militate
against her case; her claim of lack of service of summons upon Royal Dream
is untenable. Recruitment agencies, as part of their bounden duty to protect
the welfare of the Filipino workers sent abroad from whom they take their
profit, should in conscience not add to the misery of maltreated and abused
Filipino workers by denying them the reparation to which they are entitled.
Instead, they must faithfully comply with their government prescribed
responsibilities and be the first to ensure the welfare of the very people upon
whose patronage their industry thrives.
CASE #13 - Takata v. Bureau, GR 196276, Jun. 4, 2014
SUMMARY: Takata Corp. filed with DOLE to cancel the certificate of union
registration of SALAMAT (Union) due to their misrepresentation, false
statements, and fraud. Takata claims that only 68 of the 119 members attended
the organizational meeting; less than 20% of 369 employees. SC held that
20% requirement does not apply to Art 234 (b) or to those who joined the org.
meeting. 20%only applies to 234 (c) or all employees in the bargaining unit.
The Pangalan ng mga Kasapi ng Unyon showed 119 names; more than 20%
of 396. No proof that members did not understand what they were signing.
The two repeated names is not a valid ground for cancellation because they do
not constitute grave misrepresentation.
FACTS: July 7, 2009 Takata Corp filed with DOLE a petition for
cancellation of Certificate of Union Registration of respondent SALAMAT
(Union). They alleged that SALAMAT was guilty of misrepresentation, false
statements, and fraud with respect to the number of those who participated in
their organizational meeting, the adoption and ratification of its Constitution
and by-laws, and in the election of its officers. Takatas contentions are the
following: In the May 1, 2009 organizational meeting, only 68 signed the
attendance sheet out of 396 rank-and-file employees. Pangalan ng mga
Kasapi ng Unyon (PKU) bore no signatures of the 119 members and that the
employees were not given sufficient information on the document they signed.
The document Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi (SPP) was not submitted
at the time of application for union registration 119 members were only 117
total number of employees as of May 1, 2009 was 470, not 396. DOLE
Director Atty. Ricardo Martinez granted petition for cancellation. 68 is less
than 20% of 396 hence, short of union registration requirement. The
attendance sheet containing the names and signatures of 68 members
contradicted list of names in the PKU. SPP was not attached to the application
for registration; only submitted in the petition for certification election.
Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino (BMP) Paralegal Officer Domingo
Mole filed an appeal on behalf of SALAMAT to BLR. Later, the counsel of
SALAMAT filed own appeal w/ BLR. Takata opposed on ground of forum
shopping. Bureau of Labor Relations reversed DOLE Director. Takata failed
to prove the deliberate and malicious misrepresentation of number of r-a-f
employees. List of employees who participated in the organizational meeting
is a separate and disctinct requirement from list of names comprising at least
20% of employees in the bargaining unit. No evidence that employees
assailed their inclusion in the list of union members.
ISSUE: (1) W/N SALAMAT committed misrepresentation, false statements,
or fraud as a ground for cancelling their registration? NO. (2) W/N
SALAMAT is guilty of forum shopping? NO.
HELD: It does not appear in Art 2342 (b) that attendees in the organizational
meeting must comprise at least 20% of the bargaining unit. Only in Art 234
(c) that requires the names of all its members comprising at least twenty
percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to
operate. Clearly, the 20% minimum requirement pertains to the employees
membership in the union and not to the list of workers who participated in the
organizational meeting. Under (b) and (c), it provides for separate
requirements. Total number of employees was 396: 20% of which is about 79.
The 119 member who signed the PKU sufficiently complied with the 20%
requirement. The 68 members who attended the org meeting was enough to
constitute a quorum to validly ratify their Constitution and its by-laws of the
union. For fraud and misrepresentation to be a grounds for cancellation under
Art 2393, nature must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate consent of a
majority of union members. No proof as to the lack of information given to
those who signed PKU. No member came forward to deny their membership
in SALAMAT. Signing the SPP show their strengthening of desire to join
union. The two repeated names cannot be considered misrepresentation absent
any showing that SALAMAT did so deliberately to increase union
membership. Even if the employees were 470, instead of 396, 117 (without
two repeated names) is still more than 20%. BMP officer Mole no longer
authorized to file appeal on behalf of Union because his services were already
terminated at that time. Such appeal considered not to have been filed at all.
Hence, no forum shopping.
CASE #14 - Mcmer v. NLRC, GR 193421, Jun. 4, 2014
FACTS: Private respondent Libunao Jr. was employed by petitioner McMer
Corporation, Inc. (McMer) as Legal Assistant and was eventually promoted as
Head of Legal Department, and concurrently, as Officer-in-Charge of
petitioner McMer' s Legal and Administrative Department. Private respondent
and petitioners, Macario D. Roque, Jr. (Roque) and Cecilia R. Alvestir
(Alvestir), McMers General Manager and President, respectively, have been
on a cold war brought often by the disagreement in the design and
implementation of company policies and procedures. The rift heightened on
July 10, 2007 when petitioner McMer started verbally and maliciously
imputing against other officers of the Logistics Department about certain
unfounded score of inefficient performance of duty. Petitioner Roque
immediately summoned private respondent to proceed to his office to discuss
administrative matters. Private respondent, sensing some unusual
development in the attitude of petitioner Roque, refused to comply out of fear
of a perceived danger to his person. He told this to Petitioner Alvestir and
asked her to go to the Roques office instead of him. Moments later, petitioner
Roque, at the height of anger, confronted private respondent and commanded
him to proceed to his office but private responded refused once again. He
elected to discontinue work that afternoon and immediately proceeded to the
Valenzuela Police Headquarters to report on the incident in the police blotter.
He then did not report for work from July 21, 2007 up to July 30, 2007. On
August 6, 2007, private respondent filed a complaint for unfair labor
practices, constructive illegal dismissal, nonpayment of 13th month pay and
separation pay, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees,
against petitioners McMer Corporation, Inc., Roque, and Alvestir. On August
18, 2007, a conciliary meeting was held inside petitioners premises to discuss
the possibility of an amicable settlement. In the end, however, private
respondent was informed verbally by petitioner Alvestir that on account of
strained relationship brought about by the institution of a labor case against
petitioners, the latter is inclined to dismiss him from office with separation
pay. Labor Arbiter ruled in his decision that there was no constructive
dismissal in the instant case since complainant voluntarily stopped reporting
for work and the fear or the danger from harm that he perceived coming
from Mr. Roque is more of a figment of his imagination and not supported by
any concrete evidence or established facts. Private respondent appealed,
NLRC reversed the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioners filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the CA. The CA, however, did not find any basis to
reverse. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA seriously erred in sustaining the NRLCs
finding that private respondent was constructively dismissed
HELD: No, evidence on record is consistent with the ruling of the NLRC, as
affirmed by the CA, that private respondent was constructively dismissed.
What transpired on July 20, 2007 was not merely an isolated outburst on the
part of petitioner Roque. The latters behaviour towards his employees shows
a clear insensibility rendering the working condition of private respondent
unbearable. Private respondent had reason to dawdle and refuse to comply
with the summon of petitioner Roque out of severe fear that he will be
physically harmed. In fact, the same was clearly manifested by his immediate
reaction to the situation by going to the Valenzuela Police to report the
incident. Moreover, after a judicious scrutiny of the records, we find that
private respondent has exhibited a strong opposition to some company
practices resulting in a severe marginal distance between him and petitioners
Roque and Alvestir at the workplace. This, together with the harassment and
intimidation displayed by petitioner Roque to his employees, became so
unbearable for private respondent to continue his employment with petitioner
McMer. How the working place is being run has caused inordinate strain on
his professional work and moral principles, even stretching to desecration of
dignity in the workplace. The allegation that all of private respondents staff
were removed one by one until finally only the latter was left alone
performing managerial and clerical duties is merely part of the greater scheme
brought forth by the insensibility of petitioners in dealing with the employees.
An employee who is forced to surrender his position through the employer's
unfair or unreasonable acts is deemed to have been illegally terminated and
such termination is deemed to be involuntary." Constructive dismissal does
not always involve forthright dismissal or diminution in rank, compensation,
benefit and privileges. There may be constructive dismissal if an act of clear
discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable
on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to
forego his continued employment. Petition is DENIED. The Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
CASE #15 - Alilin v. Petron, GR 177592, Jun. 9, 2014
FACTS: Petron is a domestic corporation engaged in the oil business. In
1968, Romualdo D. Gindang Contractor, owned and operated by Romualdo
D. Gindang, started recruiting laborers for fielding to Petrons Mandaue Bulk
Plant. When Romualdo died in 1989, his son Romeo, through Romeo D.
Gindang Services (RDG), took over and continued to provide manpower
services to Petron. Petron and RDG entered into a Contract for Services from
June 1, 2000 to May 31, 2002, to provide Petron with janitorial, maintenance,
tanker receiving, packaging and other utility services. This was extended until
Sept 30, 2002. Upon expiration, no renewal was done and workers were
dismissed. Petitioners filed an illegal dismissal complaint against Petron
alleging that they were barred from continuing their services on Oct 16, 2002.
Petitioners claim that although it was RDG who hired them and paid their
salaries, RDG is a labor-only contractor, acting as an agent of Petron, their
true employer. Claiming to be regular employees, petitioners asserted that
their dismissal allegedly in view of the expiration of the service contract
between Petron and RDG is illegal.
RDG denied liability over petitioners claim of illegal dismissal while also
corroborating petitioners claim that they are regular employees of Petron.
Petron, on the other hand, maintained that RDG is an independent contractor
and the real employer of the petitioners. It was RDG, which hired and selected
petitioners, paid their salaries and wages, and directly supervised their work.
Both Labor Arbiter and NLRC ruled that petitioners are Petrons regular
employees. CA however ruled otherwise stating that there is no employer-
employee relationship, and that RDG is in fact an independent labor
contractor with sufficient capitalization and investment. The Motion for
Reconsideration by Petitioners was dismissed, hence this petition.
ISSUE: (1) Whether RDG is a a labor-only contractor
(2) Whether Petron is liable for petitioners dismissal
RULING: (1) YES. The contractor is always presumed to be a labor-only
contractor, unless such contractor overcomes the burden of proving otherwise.
However, where the principal is the one claiming that the contractor is
legitimate, said principal (Petron) has the burden of proving so. In this case,
the presumption that RDG is a labor-only contractor stands, due to the failure
of Petron to discharge the burden of proving otherwise. The Court also found
that the works performed were directly related to Petrons business negating
further Petrons claim that RDG is independent. (2) YES. [A] finding that a
contractor is a labor- only contractor is equivalent to declaring that there is
an employer-employee relationship between the principal and the employees
of the supposed contractor. In this case, the employer-employee relationship
becomes all the more apparent due to the presence of the power of control on
the part of Petron over RDG. Petron therefore, being the principal employer
and RDG, being the labor-only contractor, are solidarily liable for petitioners
illegal dismissal and monetary claims.
CASE #16 - Deferio v. Intel, GR 202996, Jun. 18, 2014
FA C T S : I n t e l Te c h n o l o g y P h i l i p p i n e s , I n c . ( I n t e l )
employed Deoferio as a product quality and reliability
engineer. Intel assigned him to the United States as a validation engineer for a
n agreed period of 2 years. However, Deoferio was
repatriated to the Philippines after being confined at Providence St. Vincent
Medical Center for major depression with psychosis. In the Philippines,
he worked as a product engineer.
Deoferio underwent a series of medical and psychiatric treatment at Intel's exp
e n s e a f t e r h i s c o n fi n e m e n t i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
He was diagnosed by several physicians that suffering from mood
disorder, major
depression, and auditory hallucination. After several consultations, Dr. Lee iss
ued a
psychiatric report concluding and stating that Deoferio's psychotic symptoms
are not curable within a period of six months and "will negatively affect
his work and social relation with his co- worker[s]." Pursuant to
these findings, Intel issued Deoferio a notice of termination on
March 10, 2006. Deoferio responded to his termination of employment by
filing a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for money claims
against respondents Intel and Mike Wentling (respondents). He denied that he
ever had mental illness and insisted that he satisfactorily performed his duties
as a product engineer. He argued that Intel violated his statutory
right to procedural due process when it summarily issued a notice
of termination. In defense, the respondents argued that Deoferios
d i s m i s s a l w a s b a s e d o n D r. L e e ' s c e r t i fi c a t i o n t h a t : ( 1 )
his schizophrenia was not curable within a period of
six months even with proper medical treatment; and (2)
his continued employment would be prejudicial to his
and to the other employees health. The respondents
also insisted that Deoferio's presence at Intel's premises would pose an actual
harm to his co-employees as shown by his previous acts.
Deoferio emailed an Intel employee with this message: All soul's day back to
work Monday WW45.1. Then, he also cut the
mouse cables, stepped on the keyboards, and disarranged the desks of his co-
employees. The
respondents also highlighted that Deoferio incurred numerous absences from
work due to his mental condition. Deoferio also took
an administrative leave with pay from January 2005 until December 2005.
The respondents further asserted that the twin-notice requirement
in dismissals does not apply to terminations under Article 284 of the Labor
Code. They emphasized that the Labor Codes IRR only requires competent
public health authority's certification to effectively terminate the services
of an employee.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of Deferio was valid and whether the twin-
notice requirement applies in Deferios case.
HELD: YES. Intel had an authorized cause to dismiss Deoferio from
employment. The present case involves termination due to disease an
authorized cause for dismissal under Article 284 of the Labor Code. As
substantive requirements, the Labor Code and its IRR33 require the presence
of the following elements:
(1) An employer has been found to be suffering from any disease; (2) His
continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health, as
well as to the health of his co-employees; (3) A competent public health
authority certifies that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it
cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper medical
treatment. With respect to the first and second elements, the Court liberally
construed the phrase "prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his
co-employees" to mean "prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-
employees." We did not limit the scope of this phrase to contagious diseases
for the reason that this phrase is preceded by the phrase "any disease" under
Article 284 of the Labor Code, to wit: Art. 284. Disease as ground for
termination. An employer may terminate the services of an employee who
has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued
employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to
the health of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay
equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half (1/2) month salary
for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six (6)
months being considered as one (1) whole year. The third element
substantiates the contention that the employee has indeed been suffering from
a disease that: (1) is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-
employees; and (2) cannot be cured within a period of 6mos. even with proper
medical treatment. Without the medical certificate, there can be no authorized
cause for the employees dismissal. The absence of this element thus renders
the dismissal void and illegal. This requirement is not merely a procedural
requirement, but a substantive one. The certification from a competent public
health authority is precisely the substantial evidence required by law to prove
the existence of the disease itself, its non-curability within a period of 6mos.
even with proper medical treatment, and the prejudice that it would cause to
the health of the sick employee and to those of his co-employees. Dr. Lees
psychiatric report substantially proves that Deoferio was suffering from
schizophrenia, that his disease was not curable within a period of six months
even with proper medical treatment, and that his continued employment
would be prejudicial to his mental health. This conclusion is further
substantiated by the unusual and bizarre acts that Deoferio committed while at
Intels employ. The Labor Code and its IRR are silent on the procedural due
process required in terminations due to disease. Despite the seeming gap in
the law, Section 2, Rule 1, Book VI of the IRR expressly states that the
employee should be afforded procedural due process in all cases of dismissals.
From these perspectives, the CA erred in not finding that the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion when it ruled that the twin-notice requirement does not
apply to Article 284 of the Labor Code. Deoferio's claim for salary differential
is already barred by prescription. Under Article 291 of the Labor Code, all
money claims arising from employer-employee relations shall be filed within
three years from the time the cause of action accrued. In the current case,
more than four years have elapsed from the pre-termination of his assignment
to the United States until the filing of his complaint against the respondents.