TORTS AND DAMAGES
Carol Ann S. Morales
NEGLIGENCE
(1)PICART vs SMITH
FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over
said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from
the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge
he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach.
He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more
successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before
him was not observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However,
being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the
approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side
of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this
was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other
side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant
assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the
pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right
while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach
directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten
quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the
other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to
escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close
proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across
the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its
rider was thrown off with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse
died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart
has appealed.
ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done
HELD: YES.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is
not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute the
conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved
in the particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a
result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to
take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the
proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is
this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of
the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we
think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the
position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the
course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore
have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of
that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the
duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he
was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of
the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such
case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties
were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under
these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance
to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
(2) CIVIL AERONAUTICS vs Court of Appeals
Facts: Ernest E. Simke, a naturalized Filipino citizen, was Honorary Consul
General of Israel in the Philippines. He went to Manila International Airport
to meet his future son-in-law. As the plane was landing, he and his
companions went to the viewing deck to watch the arrival of the plane. While
walking, Simke slipped on an elevation 4 inches high and fell on his back,
breaking his thigh bone in the process. He underwent a 3-hour operation and
after recovery he filed a claim for damages against the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA), which was the government entity in charge of the
airport.
ISSUE: Whether or not CAA was negligent
HELD: CAA contended that the elevation in question "had a legitimate
purpose for being on the terrace and was never intended to trip down people
and injure them. It was there for no other purpose but to drain water on the
floor area of the terrace."
But upon ocular inspection by the trial court, it was found that the terrace
was in poor condition. Under RA 776, the CAA is charged with the duty of
planning, designing, constructing, equipping, expanding, maintenance...etc.
of the Manila International Airport.
Responsibility of CAA
The SC held that pursuant to Art. 1173, "the fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of
the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the
time, and of the place." Here, the obligation of the CAA in maintaining the
viewing deck, a facility open to the public, requires that CAA insure the safety
of the viewers using it. As these people come to look to where the planes and
the incoming passengers are and not to look down on the floor or pavement
of the viewing deck, the CAA should have thus made sure that no dangerous
obstructions or elevations exist on the floor of the deck to prevent any undue
harm to the public.
Contributory Negligence
Under Art. 2179, contributory negligence contemplates a negligent act or
omission on the part of the plaintiff, which although not the proximate cause
of his injury, CONTRIBUTED to his own damage. The Court found no
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, considering the following
test formulated in the early case of Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918):
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent man would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty
of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be
supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman
law. The existence of the negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him.
The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the
man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a
given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human
experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract
speculations cannot be here of much value but this much can be profitably
said: Reasonable men-overn their conduct by the circumstances which are
before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be
omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when
there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a
prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued' If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions
to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.... [Picart v. Smith, supra, p. 813]
The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before the lower
court, could not have reasonably foreseen the harm that would befall him,
considering the attendant factual circumstances. Even if the private
respondent had been looking where he was going, the step in question could
not easily be noticed because of its construction.
"WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Petition for review on certiorari
is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51172-R is
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
away from the tracks and that while there he saw the jeep coming towards
the Base. He said that said jeep slowed down before reaching the crossing,
that it made a brief stop but that it did not stop dead stop. Elaborating, he
declared that while it was slowing down, Corliss, Jr. shifted into first gear and
that was what he meant by a brief stop. He also testified that he could see
the train coming from the direction of San Fernando and that he heard a
warning but that it was not sufficient enough to avoid the accident."
Virgilio de la Paz, another witness of the plaintiff, testified that on the night
of February 21, 1957, he was at the Balibago checkpoint and saw the train
coming from Angeles and a jeep going towards the direction of Clark Field.
He stated that he heard the whistle of the locomotive and saw the collision.
The jeep, which caught fire, was pushed forward. He helped the P. C. soldier.
He stated that he saw the jeep running fast and heard the tooting of the horn.
It did not stop at the railroad crossing, according to him.
Issue:

(3)CORLISS vs MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

Facts: Ralph W. Corliss, was, at the tender age of twenty-one, the victim of a
grim tragedy, when the jeep he was driving collided with a locomotive of
defendant-appellee Manila Railroad Company, close to midnight on the
Held:
evening of February 21, 1957, at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles,
Pampanga, in front of the Clark Air Force Base. In the decision appealed from,
the lower court, after summarizing the evidence, concluded that the
deceased "in his eagerness to beat, so to speak, the on-coming locomotive,
took the risk and attempted to reach the other side, but unfortunately he
became the victim of his own mis-calculation."

The negligence imputed to defendant-appellee was thus ruled out by the

lower court, satisfactory proof to that effect, in its opinion, being lacking.
Hence this appeal direct to us, the amount sought in the concept of damages
reaching the sum a P282,065.40. An examination of the evidence of record
fails to yield a basis for a reversal of the decision appealed from. We affirm.

Ronald J. Ennis, a witness of the plaintiff, substantially declared in his

deposition, * * *, that at the time of the accident, he was awaiting
transportation at the entrance of Clark Field, which was about 40 to 50 yards

(4) TAYLOR vs MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD COMPANY
Facts: David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at
sea; he was also able to learn some principles of mechanical engineering and
mechanical drawing from his dads office (his dad was a mechanical
engineer); he was also employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a
day all said, Taylor was mature well beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila
Electric power plant where they found 20-30 blasting caps which they took
home. In an effort to explode the said caps, Taylor experimented until he
succeeded in opening the caps and then he lighted it using a match which
resulted to the explosion of the caps causing severe injuries to his companion
and to Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps
exposed to children, they are liable for damages due to the companys
negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some
person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the
damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing
off the caps which they used for the power plant, and that said caps caused
damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection between the companys
negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct
acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as he even, in various
experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from
said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature
both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to
sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman
thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout
that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of record
leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the
cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by
him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His
attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts
to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors
brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show
clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable
doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be
dangerous.
The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him
through his own fault, and that he cannot demand reparation therefor from
another.
(5) YLARDE vs AQUINO
Facts: Soriano is the school principal; Aquino and Banez were teachers in this
school. Novelito Ylarde is a student [deceased] & Federico is his father.
Gabaldon Primary School, an academic school, was littered with several huge
concrete blocks [around one ton each] which were remnants of an old school
shop which was destroyed in WWII. Banez [teacher] realized that these
stones were huge hazards so he started burying them, and he was able to
bury 10 blocks by himself. A fellow teacher Aquino decided to help, so he
gathered 18 students and ordered them to dig a hole where a 1-ton stone
could be buried. The following day, he called 4 of these students to continue
digging. When the hole was 1m 40cm deep, Aquino alone continued digging
while the students remained inside the pit, throwing out loose soil. They got
out of the hole when the depth was right. Aquino left the children to level the
loose soil around the hole because he went to see Banez (who was 30 meters
away) to get a key to the school workroom to get rope. He allegedly told the
children not to touch the stone.
 After Aquino left, 3/4 kids jumped inside the pit, Ylarde included. The
remaining kid jumped on top of the block, causing it to slide downwards. 2
were able to get out but Ylarde wasnt able to do so, and so the block pinned
him to the wall in a standing position. He sustained injuries and three days
later, Ylarde died. His parents filed a suit for damages against Aquino and
Soriano [principal], but the RTC dismissed the complaint for the following
reasons:
Digging done is in line with Work Education subject
Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person
Ylardes death was due to his own reckless imprudence
CA affirmed RTC. Petitioners base their action against Aquino [teacher] on
NCC 2176 for his alleged negligence that caused Ylardes death, while the
action against the principal was based on NCC 2180.
Issue: WON both can be held liable for damages.
Failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized
his pupils to make an excavation near a 1 ton concrete stone which he knew
to be a hazardous task
Required the children to remain inside the pit even after they finished
digging, knowing that the block was nearby
Ordered them to level the soil when it was apparent that the stone was on
the brink of falling
Went to a place where he would not be able to check on the students safety
Left the children close to the excavation, an attractive nuisance
Its totally ridiculous how the lower court found Aquino to have exercised
utmost diligence of a very cautious person. The simple warning not to touch
the stone is of no use, considering the age of these children. He should have
made sure that the children are protected from all harm while they are in his
company, since he stands in loco parentis to his students.

Held: NO, ONLY AQUINO [TEACHER] IS LIABLE. Also ridiculous is the claim that the digging work is part of Work Education.
For one, Aquino himself said that the principal made no instructions requiring
The principal cannot be held liable because he is a head of an academic
what students were to do. Also, its not in the lesson plan, since Aquino
school, not a school of arts and trade. SC cited Amadora v. CA wherein it was
decided all by himself to help Banez. Also, this activity should not be placed
held NCC 2180 says that in an academic school, it is only the teacher who
alongside relatively lighter (!) activities such as school gardening, tree
should be answerable for torts committed by their students, and in a school
planting [which could be legitimately part of the Work Education subject]
of arts and trades, it is only the school head who can be held liable. [LegMeth
because these do not expose the children to such risk!
lesson: reddendo singula singulis refers only to the last]. Also, as
admitted by Aquino himself, the principal did not give any instruction SC does not agree with lower court that the injuries which led to Ylardes
regarding the digging. death were caused by his own reckless imprudence. The degree of care
required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person
Now, heres the twist: Aquino can be held liable under NCC 2180 as the
endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same
teacher-in-charge. HOWEVER, petitioners base Aquinos alleged liability on
degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the
NCC 2176. Therefore, the question is WON there were acts and omissions on
average conduct of persons his age and experience. (Left by themselves and
Aquinos part amounting to fault or negligence which have direct causal
tired from the strenuous digging, it was natural that they would play around.
relation to Ylardes death, and the answer is YES. Ylarde would not have died
Also note that it was not only Ylarde who jumped into the hole.) Hence, Ylarde
were it not for the unsafe situation created by Aquino. He acted with fault
cannot be charged with reckless imprudence.
and gross negligence when he:
(6) JARCO MARKETING CORP vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Petitioner is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City.
Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch
manager, operations manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private
respondents Conrado and Criselda Aguilar are spouses and the parents of
Zhieneth Aguilar.
On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the department store.
Criselda was signing her credit card slip when she heard a loud thud. She
looked behind her and beheld her daughter pinned beneath the gift-
wrapping counter structure. She was crying and shouting for help. He was
brought to Makati Medical Center, where she died after 14 days. She was 6
years old.
Private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the
hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which they had
incurred. Petitioners refused to pay. Consequently, private respondents filed
a complaint for damages wherein they sought the payment of P157,522.86
for actual damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorney's fees
and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages. The
trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the proximate cause of the fall
of the counter was Zhieneths act of clinging to it. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court. It found that petitioners were
negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. The counter was
defective, unstable and dangerous. It also ruled that the child was absolutely
incapable of negligence or tort. Petitioners now seek for the reversal of this
decision.
Issues:
(1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to
negligence
(2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to
private respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and
ZHIENETH for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the
store premises
Held:
(1) An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or
negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event
or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if
happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens."
On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate
the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is "the failure to
observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury." The test in determining the
existence of negligence is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent
act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that
ZHIENETH's death could only be attributed to negligence.
(2) It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and
statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and
admissions. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae
is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before
the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by
the person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus described, it
is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain,
to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord
credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no
act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their
negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter's base.
Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were
personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet,
neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the
safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary
prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation
petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good
father of a family. Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the
conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that
they are incapable of contributory negligence. Even if we attribute
contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the
counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that
the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year
old could not have caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis of
the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the
evidence on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped
like an inverted "L," the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with
formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not
secured. CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence.
Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand.
CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she
signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and
usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was
pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and
the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. The
time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and
did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even
admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do
anything; the counter just fell on her.
(7) FRANCISCO vs CHEMICAL BULK CARRIERS
Facts: Francisco was the owner and manager of a Caltex station in Teresa,
Rizal. Sometime in March 1993, four persons, including Gregorio Bacsa
(Bacsa), came to Francisco's Caltex station and introduced themselves as
employees of CBCI. Bacsa offered to sell to Francisco a certain quantity of
CBCI's diesel fuel.
After checking Bacsa's identification card, Francisco agreed to purchase
CBCI's diesel fuel. Francisco imposed the following conditions for the
purchase: (1) that Petron Corporation (Petron) should deliver the diesel fuel
to Francisco at his business address which should be properly indicated in
Petron's invoice; (2) that the delivery tank is sealed; and (3) that Bacsa should
issue a separate receipt to Francisco.
The deliveries started on 5 April 1993 and lasted for ten months, or up to 25
January 1994. There were 17 deliveries to Francisco and all his conditions
were complied with.
In February 1996, CBCI sent a demand letter to Francisco regarding the diesel
fuel delivered to him but which had been paid for by CBCI.[6] CBCI demanded
that Francisco pay CBCI P1,053,527 for the diesel fuel or CBCI would file a
complaint against him in court. Francisco rejected CBCI's demand.
CBCI filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against Francisco and
other unnamed defendants. According to CBCI, Petron, on various dates, sold
diesel fuel to CBCI but these were delivered to and received by Francisco.
Francisco then sold the diesel fuel to third persons from whom he received
payment. CBCI alleged that Francisco acquired possession of the diesel fuel
without authority from CBCI and deprived CBCI of the use of the diesel fuel it
had paid for. CBCI demanded payment from Francisco but he refused to pay.
CBCI argued that Francisco should have known that since only Petron, Shell
and Caltex are authorized to sell and distribute petroleum products in the
Philippines, the diesel fuel came from illegitimate, if not illegal or criminal,
acts. CBCI asserted that Francisco violated Articles 19, 20, 21, and 22 of the
Civil Code and that he should be held liable. In the alternative, CBCI claimed
that Francisco, in receiving CBCI's diesel fuel, entered into an innominate
contract of do ut des (I give and you give) with CBCI for which Francisco is
obligated to pay CBCI P1,119,905, the value of the diesel fuel. CBCI also
prayed for exemplary damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of
litigation.
Francisco explained that he operates the Caltex station with the help of his
family because, in February 1978, he completely lost his eyesight due to
sickness. Francisco claimed that he asked Jovito, his son, to look into and
verify the identity of Bacsa, who introduced himself as a radio operator and
confidential secretary of a certain Mr. Inawat (Inawat), CBCI's manager for
operations. Francisco said he was satisfied with the proof presented by Bacsa.
When asked to explain why CBCI was selling its fuel, Bacsa allegedly replied
that CBCI was in immediate need of cash for the salary of its daily paid
workers and for petty cash. Francisco maintained that Bacsa assured him that
the diesel fuel was not stolen property and that CBCI enjoyed a big credit line
with Petron.
RTCin favor of Francisco and dismissed the CBCIs complaint
Francisco was not liable for damages in favor of CBCI because the 17
deliveries were covered by original and genuine invoices. The trial
court declared that Bacsa, as confidential secretary of Inawat, was
CBCI's authorized representative who received Francisco's full
payment for the diesel fuel. The trial court stated that if Bacsa was
not authorized, CBCI should have sued Bacsa and not Francisco. The
trial court also considered Francisco a buyer in good faith who paid
in full for the merchandise without notice that some other person
had a right to or interest in such diesel fuel. The trial court pointed
out that good faith affords protection to a purchaser for value.
Finally, since CBCI was bound by the acts of Bacsa, the trial court
ruled that CBCI is liable to pay damages to Francisco.
CAreversed the decision of the trial court
Francisco had been in the business of selling petroleum products for
a considerable number of years, his blindness was not a hindrance
for him to transact business with other people. With his condition
and experience, Francisco should have verified whether CBCI was
indeed selling diesel fuel and if it had given Bacsa authority to do so.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals stated that Francisco cannot feign
good faith since he had doubts as to the authority of Bacsa yet he did
not seek confirmation from CBCI and contented himself with an
improvised receipt. Francisco's failure to verify Bacsa's authority
showed that he had an ulterior motive. The receipts issued by Bacsa
also showed his lack of authority because it was on a plain sheet of
bond paper with no letterhead or any indication that it came from
CBCI. The Court of Appeals ruled that Francisco cannot invoke
estoppel because he was at fault for choosing to ignore the tell-tale
signs of petroleum diversion and for not exercising prudence.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Francisco exercised the required diligence.
Held: No, Francisco failed to exercise the diligence required by law. The
court note that Francisco, despite being blind, had been managing and
operating the Caltex station for 15 years and this was not a hindrance for him
to transact business until this time. In this instance, however, the court ruled
that Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct expected of a
reasonable person who is blind. First, Francisco merely relied on the
identification card of Bacsa to determine if he was authorized by CBCI.
Francisco did not do any other background check on the identity and
authority of Bacsa. Second, Francisco already expressed his misgivings about
the diesel fuel, fearing that they might be stolen property, yet he did not
verify with CBCI the authority of Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel. Third, Francisco
relied on the receipts issued by Bacsa which were typewritten on a half sheet
of plain bond paper. If Francisco exercised reasonable diligence, he should
have asked for an official receipt issued by CBCI. Fourth, the delivery to
Francisco, as indicated in Petron's invoice, does not show that CBCI
authorized Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel to Francisco. Clearly, Francisco failed
to exercise the standard of conduct expected of a reasonable person who is
blind.
(8) UNITED STATES vs BONIFACIO
Facts: Eligio Castillo, a deaf-mute, was run down and killed, while attempting
to cross the railroad track in the barrio of Santa Rita, Batangas, by an engine
on which the accused was employed as engineer. The deaf-mute stepped out
on the track from an adjoining field shortly before the accident, walked along
one side of the track for some little distance and was killed as he attempted,
for some unknown reason, to cross over to the other side.
When the accused engineer first saw the deceased, he was walking near the
track, in the same direction as that in which the train was running. The train,
a heavy freight train, had just rounded a curve, and the man in front was
about 175 meters ahead of the engine. The engineer immediately blew his
whistle twice, and noticing, a few moments afterwards, that the man in front
did not respond to the warning by stepping aside from the track, he tried to
slow down the engine, but did not succeed in stopping in time to avoid
running down the pedestrian. He did not attempt to stop his engine when he
first saw the man walking along the side of the track; but he claims that he
did all in his power to slow down a few moments afterwards, that is to say
after he had blown his whistle without apparently attracting the attention of
the pedestrian, who, about that time, turned and attempted to cross the
track.
 precautions to avoid accident, by looking and listening for the approach of
The only evidence as to the rate of speed at which the train was running at trains, and stepping out of the way of danger when their attention is directed
the time of the accident was the testimony of the accused himself, who said to an oncoming train.
that his indicator showed that he was travelling at the rate of 35 kilometers
an hour, the maximum speed permitted under the railroad regulations for Any other rule would render it impracticable to operate railroads so as to
freight trains on that road. secure the expeditious transportation of passengers and freight which the
public interest demands. If engine drivers were required to slow down or stop
We think that the meter statement of facts, as disclosed by the undisputed
their trains every time they see a pedestrian on or near the track of the
evidence of record, sufficiently and conclusive demonstrates that the death
railroad it might well become impossible for them to maintain a reasonable
of the deaf-mute was the result of a regrettable accident, which was
rate of speed. As a result the general traveling public would be exposed to
unavoidable so far as this accused was concerned.
great inconvenience and delay which may be, and is readily avoided by
requiring all persons approaching a railroad track, to take reasonable
It has been suggested that, had the accused applied his brakes when he first
precautions against danger from trains running at high speed.
saw the man walking near the track, after his engine rounded the curve, he
might have stopped the train in time to have avoided the accident, as it is
There was nothing in the appearance or conduct of the victim of the accident
admitted that the distance from the curve to the point where the accident
in the cast at bar which would have warned the accused engine driver that
occurred was about 175 meters.
the man walking along the side of the tract was a deaf-mute, and that despite
the blowing of the whistle and the noise of the engine he was unconscious of
But there is no obligation on an engine driver to stop, or even to slow down
his danger. It was not until the pedestrian attempted to cross the track, just
his engine, when he sees an adult pedestrian standing or walking on or near
in front of the train, that the accused had any reason to believe that his
the track, unless there is something in the appearance or conduct of the
warning signals had not been heard, and by that time it was too late to avoid
person on foot which would cause a prudent man to anticipate the possibility
the accident. Under all the circumstances, we are satisfied that the accused
that such person could not, or would not avoid the possibility of danger by
was without fault; and that the accident must be attributed wholly to the
stepping aside. Ordinarily, all that may properly be required of an engine
reckless negligence of the deaf-mute, in walking on the track without taking
driver under such circumstances is that he give warning of his approach, by
the necessary precautions to avoid danger from a train approaching him
blowing his whistle or ringing his bell until he is assured that the attention
from behind.
of the pedestrian has been attracted to the oncoming train.
Trial Judgeaccused was not guilty of reckless imprudence but homicide
Of course it is the duty of an engine driver to adopt every measure in his
through simple negligence
power to avoid the infliction of injury upon any person who may happen to
be on the track in front of his engine, and to slow down, or stop altogether if
Issue: WON the respondent was liable.
that be necessary, should he have reason to believe that only by doing so can
an accident be averted.
Held: No, the respondent was not held liable.
Art. 568 provides that:
But an engine driver may fairly assume that all persons walking or standing
Any person who, while violating any regulation, shall, by any act of
on or near the railroad track, except children of tender years, are aware of
imprudence or negligence not amounting to reckless imprudence,
the danger to which they are exposed; and that they will take reasonable
 commit an offense, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum degrees.

This does not mean that in every case in which one accidentally injures or kills
another he is criminally liable therefor, if at the moment he happens to be
guilty of a violation of some petty regulation (reglamento). The injury or
death must have resulted from some "imprudence or negligence"
(imprudencia o negligencia) on his part. True it need only be slight negligence,
if accompanied by a violation of the regulations, but the relation of cause and
effect must exist between the negligence or imprudence of the accused and
the injury inflicted. If it appears that the injury in no wise resulted from the
violation of the regulations, or the negligent conduct of the accused, he incurs
no criminal liability under the provisions of this article.
Doubtless a presumption of negligence will frequently arise from the very fact
that an accident occurred at the time when the accused was violating a
regulation; especially if the regulation has for its object the avoidance of such
an accident. But this presumption may, of course, be rebutted in criminal as
well as in civil cases by competent evidence. In the Federal Court of the
United States the rule is stated as follows:

Where a ship at the time of collision is in actual violation of a statutory rule

intended to prevent collisions the burden is upon her of showing that her
fault could not have been a contributory cause of the collision. (7 Cyc., 370
and numerous other cases there cited.)

The evidence of record in the case at bar clearly and satisfactorily discloses
that even if the train was running at a speed slightly in excess of the maximum
speed prescribed in the regulations, that fact had no causal relation to the
accident and in no wise contributed to it.