CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview of Protective Relays

Protective relays greatly impact power systems. Protective relays are used
to detect any abnormalities in a power system and isolate the faulty part of the
system in the shortest time. Protective relays are designed to maintain high
degree of service continuity and limit equipment damage in the power systems.
Severe disruption to the normal routine of modern society such as power outages
is likely to increase the emphasis on reliability and security of supply electrical
energy to consumers [1].The expanding of power systems such as intense
increase of transmission line capacity and increase of grids looping degree will
increase the complexity of power system. This will cause the protection
operation to become more difficult [2]. The protective relays encounter several
problems as revealed in [2]. The present protection technique used is unable to
ensure selectivity and speedily operation for the faults appearing on the entire
protected line. Numerical relays are able to improve the performance of the
protection operation considerably. Numerical relay are embedded with
specialized digital signal processor (DSP) as the computational hardware.
By using DSP as the relays processor, the relay is capable of meeting the
fundamental protective requirements such as reliability, sensitivity, selectivity
and speed [3][4]. Therefore, the use of numerical relays will soon replace
previous relays technology such as digital relays, static relays or even
electromechanical relays. The processing of numerical relays using DSP is also
optimized for real-time signal processing applications [1]. As a result, the relay
is capable of performing complex digital signal processing to detect fault faster

1
and more accurately compared to previous relay technology. As a result, the
reliability of the relay also increases. Furthermore, the usage of the numerical
relays is not limited for protection only. This high performance relays is also
enabled with advanced communication, self-supervision, ability to control,
metering and also event recording [2], [5]. Numerical relays provide a wide
range of protection functions such as over current, directional over current, under
voltage, overvoltage and also other types of protection [6].

1.2 Phase (II) in Dr. Mahmud Sharif Power Station

Phase-II, in Dr. M. Sharif has two steam turbines generator (STG) which
capable rating each with an installed capacity of 11kV, 60MW, 50Hz. Each
generator unit is directly connected to the step-up transformer through isolated
type bus duct and through a generator circuit breaker. The High voltage side of
the Generator Transformer (Gen. TR) will be connected by mean of overhead
line to the 110kV national grid. Two unit auxiliary transformers (UAT) are
connected to steam turbine generator (STG) via an isolated type bus duct tapped-
off from the main bus duct. These two UAT are stepped down to the utility level
6.6kV to cater to 6.6kV unit board which has two incomers and one bus coupler
(Double ended system). Under normal operation condition, both incomer
breakers will be closed with bus coupler opened. Under outage of any one of
incomers, the bus coupler will be closed to feed the whole switchboard through
other healthy incomer which is controlled operated by Auto Bus Transfer System
(ABTS).

1.3 Problem Statement

Electromechanical relays that used in Dr. M.Sharif power station

involve many problems such as:

2
 i. Operation of such relay affected by transient.
ii. Electromechanical relays have a higher burden on instrument (that is
current transformers (CTs) and voltage transformers (VTs)).
iii. Higher operating time due to the inertia of moving parts.
iv. Requires frequent maintenance.
v. Dust in the contact can prevent relay from tripping.
vi. Electromechanical relays function is just clearing the fault but cannot
give you any information about this fault (in any phase, time of beginning,
time of clearing).

1.4 Objectives
i. Improve dependability.
ii. Solve transient problems.
iii. Minimize burden.
iv. Minimize maintenance.
v. Minimize clearing time.
vi. Avoid mal-operation.
vii. Obtain full information about any fault occur (recorder).

1.5 Methodology

The first stage of this thesis; numeric relays from AREVA techniques used
to obtain full protection in phase II. This full protection include: generator unit
using MICOM P344 which protect generator from seventeen abnormal
conditions, transformer unit using MICOM P632 which protect transformer from
three abnormal conditions and differential protection of generator transformer
unit achieved using MICOM P633.

On second stage C.Ts and V.Ts ratio selected, and then setting calculated
According to IEEE Standers and AREVA Technical guides.

3
 On third stage single line diagram of phase II including full protection
illustrated for: generator unit, transformer unit, generator transformer unit and
all these units together with their back up protection.

On final stage phase II numeric protection compared with phase III numeric
protection.

1.6 Thesis Outlines

This thesis including five chapters as follow: Chapter one is
introduction including overview about protective relays, main information
about phase (II) in Dr. M Sharif power station, problem statement,
objective and methodology; while chapter two is literature review about
relay technology improvement. Chapter three is generator protection
including setting calculations. Chapter four is main and auxiliary
transformer protection with their setting calculations. Chapter five is
conclusion and recommendations.

4
 CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction
The last thirty years have seen enormous changes in relay technology. The
electromechanical relay in all of its different forms has been replaced
successively by static digital and numerical relays, each change bringing with it
reductions and size and improvements in functionality At the same time,
reliability levels have been maintained or even improved and availability
significantly increased due to techniques not available with older relay types.
This represents a tremendous achievement for all those involved in relay design
and manufacture.

2.2 ELECTROMECHANICAL RELAYS

These relays were the earliest forms of relay used for the protection of
power systems, and they date back nearly 100 years. They work on the principle
of a mechanical force causing operation of a relay contact in response to a
stimulus. The mechanical force is generated through current flow in one or more
windings on a magnetic core or cores, hence the term electromechanical relay.
The principle advantage of such relays is that they provide galvanic isolation
between the inputs and outputs in a simple, cheap and reliable form therefore
for simple on/off switching functions where the output contacts have to carry
substantial currents, they are still used. Electromechanical relays can be
classified into several different types as follows:
1-Attracted armature.
2- Moving coil.
3- Induction.

5
4- Thermal.
5-Mechanical.
However, only attracted armature types have significant application at this time,
all other types having been superseded by more modern equivalents.

2.3 Static Relay

The term static implies that the relay has no moving parts. This is not
strictly the case for a static relay, as the output contacts are still generally
attracted armature relays. In a protection relay, the term static refers to the
absence of moving parts to create the relay characteristic.
Introduction of static relays began in the early 1960s. Their design is
based on the use of analogue electronic devices instead of coils and magnets to
create the relay characteristic. Early versions used discrete devices such as
transistors and diodes in conjunction with resistors, capacitors, inductors, etc.,
but advances in electronics enabled the use of linear and digital integrated
circuits in later versions for signal processing and implementation of logic
functions. While basic circuits may be common to a number of relays, the
packaging was still essentially restricted to a single protection function per case,
while complex functions required several cases of hardware suitably
interconnected. They therefore can be viewed in simple terms as an analogue
electronic replacement for electromechanical relays, with some additional
flexibility in settings and some saving in space requirements.

2.4 DIGITAL RELAY

Digital protection relays introduced a step change in technology.
Microprocessors and microcontrollers replaced analogue circuits used in static
relays to use in static relays to implement relay functions. Early examples began
to be introduced into service around 1980, and, with improvements in processing
capacity, can still be regarded as current technology for many relay applications.
6
Compared to static relays, digital relays introduce A/D conversion of all
measured analogue quantities and use microprocessor to implement the
protection algorithm.
2.5 NUMERICAL RELAYS
The distinction between digital and numerical relay rests on points of fine
technical detail, and is rarely found in areas other than Protection. They can be
viewed as natural developments of digital relays as a result of advances in
technology. Typically, they use a specialized digital signal processor (DSP) as
the computational hardware, together with the associated software tools. The
input analogue signals are converted into a digital representation and processed
according to the appropriate mathematical algorithm. Processing is carried out
using a specialized microprocessor that is optimized for signal processing
applications, known as a digital signal processor or DSP for short. Digital
processing of signals in real time requires a very high power microprocessor. In
addition, the continuing reduction in the cost of microprocessors and related
digital devices (memory, I/O) naturally leads to an approach where a single item
of hardware is used to provide a range of functions (one-box solution
approach). By using multiple microprocessors to provide the necessary
computational performance, a large number of functions previously implemented
in separate items of hardware can now be included within a single item.
2.5.1 Hardware Architecture
The typical architecture of a numerical relay is shown in Figure 2.1 it consists
of :
viii. Filter: it's necessary to limit the effects of noise and unwanted
components of frequencies. It is designed to remove any frequencies
existing on the input signal which are greater than half the sampling
frequency.

7
ix. Analog-to-digital conversion (ADC): Because digital processors can
process numerical or logical data only, the waveforms of inputs must be
sampled at discrete times. To achieve this, each analog signal is passed
through a sample- and-hold module, and conveyed, one at a time, to an
Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC).
x. Relay algorithm and trip logic: After microprocessor calculates the
phasor representing the inputs, acquires the status of the switches,
performs protective relay calculations, and finally provides outputs for
controlling the circuit breakers, the result of the algorithm transported to
the control part of the relay where the results is compared with the settings
of the relay and trip signal may be generated.
xi. Digital signal processor (DSP): A software algorithm implemented in the
(DSP) which estimates the amplitude and phase of the waveforms
provided to the relay.

S&H: Sample and Hold, A/D: Analogue to digital convertor

Figure 2.1: Block diagram of a typical numerical relay

8
 CHAPTER THREE

GENERATOR PROTECTION

3.1 Introduction

A generator is the heart of an electrical power system, as it converts

mechanical energy into its electrical equivalent, which is further distributed at
various voltages. The protection of generator is much complex for the following
reason:

i. High voltage level of generators.

ii. Generator is connected to various equipment such as: prime mover,
cooling system, voltage regulator and excitation system.

For generator protection MICOM P344 multifunction relay from AREVA

Company used; which provide seventeen functions as shown on table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Function conversion for generator protection (P344)

Function Abbreviation AREVA

No Description Function
Code
NEUTRALVOLTAGE
50N NVDP DISPLACEMENT 59N
PROTECTION
LOSS OF FIELD
40 LOFD RPOTECTION 40
REVERESE POWER
32 RPP PROTECTION 32R

9
 STATOR EARTH FAULT
51N STFP PROTECTION 51N
ROTOR EARTH
64F RTFP FAULTPROTECTION -
FREQUENCY
81 FRCP PROTECTION 81U/81O
OVER-FLUX
24 OCFP PROTECTION 24
OVERVOLTAGE
59 OVVP RELAY 59

UNDERVOLTAGE
27 UVVP RELAY 27
NEGATIVE SEQUENCE
46 NSQP RPOTECTION 46OC
MINIMUM IMPEDANCE
21 MIP PROTECTION 21
OVERCURRENT
51V OCCV COMBINED WITH 51V/27
+UVVP UNDERVOLATAGE
PROTECTION
DIFFERENTIAL
87G DGP GENERATOR 87
PROTECTION
POLE SLIPPING
78 PSP PROTECTION 78
- 50BF BREAKER FAILURE 50BF

- TCS Trip circuit supervision -

10
 Such relay provides protective and non-protective features .non protective
features such as:

BREAKER FAILURE (50BF):

Backup protection must be provided for the case where a breaker fails to
operate when required to trip (breaker failure). This protection consists of a
current detector, in conjunction with a timer initiated by any of the protective
relays in the generator zone. Should the detector show that the breaker has not
opened by the time the specified time delay has passed, the breaker failure relay
will initiate tripping of the backup breakers.

Trip circuit supervision (TCS):

The trip circuit in most protective schemes extends beyond the

relay enclosure and passes through components such as fuses, links,
relay contacts, auxiliary switches and other terminal boards. This
complex arrangement coupled of importance of the trip circuit has led
circuit to dedicated schemes for supervision.

3.2 Abnormal Conditions and Setting Calculations

Seventeenth abnormal condition with their setting calculations and details

for generator obtained bellow:

3.2.1 Loss of Field Protection (LOFP, 40)

A. Reason of loss of field

The source of excitation for a generator can be completely or partially

removed through such incidents as accidental tripping of a field breaker, field
open circuit, field short circuit (flashover of the slip rings), voltage regulation
11
system failure, or the loss of supply to the excitation system. Whatever the cause,
a loss of excitation can present serious operating conditions for both the
generator and the system.

B. Effect of loss of field

When the excitation of a synchronous generator fails, its internal e.m.f. will
decay. This results in the active power output of the machine falling and in an
increasing level of reactive power being drawn from the power system.

As the active power output falls, the mechanical drive can accelerate the
machine so that it will gently pole slip and run at a super synchronous speed.
This results in slip frequency currents being induced in the rotor body, damper
windings and in the field windings.

C. Operating principle

The most widely applied method for detecting a generator loss of field is
the use of distance relays to sense the variation of impedance as viewed from the
generator terminals. It has been shown that when a generator loses excitation
while operating at various levels of loading, the variation of impedance as
viewed at the machine terminals will have the characteristics shown on the right
R-X diagram on Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1 Loss-of-excitation characteristics for generator

12
 The curve (a): shows the variation of impedance with the machine
operating initially at or near full load. The initial load point is at C and the
impedance locus follows the path-D.
The curve (b): illustrates the case in which a machine is initially operating
at 30% load and under excited. In this case, the impedance locus follows
the path E F G and will oscillate in the region between points F and G.The
dashed curve (D-L) for a loss of field at no load, the impedance as viewed
from the machine terminals will vary between the direct and quadrature
axis synchronous reactance (Xd, Xq). In general, for any machine loading,
the impedance viewed from the machine terminals will terminate on or
vary.
D. Setting guidelines
Accordance with IEEE Std. C37.101 and AREVA Technical guide.
Figure 3.2 shows field failure protection characteristics.

i. Impedance element 1
Negative reactance offset setting: FFail1-Xa1 = 0.5 Xd
Diameter setting of circular impedance: FFail1-Xb1 = Xd
Time delay: FFail1 Time Delay = 0.5s
Where:
Xd: transient direct axis reactance.
Xd: direct axis reactance.
ii. Impedance element 2
Negative reactance offset setting: FFail2-Xa2 = 0.5 Xd
Diameter setting of circular impedance: FFail2-Xb2 = kV2/MVA
Time delay: FFail2 Time Delay = 0s

13
 Figure 3.2: Field failure protection characteristics

E. Setting calculation
[System data]
Generator rating: 50Hz, 60MW, 0.8 PF: Xd =1.40 pu, Xd = 0.3 pu (at
75MVA base)
AC Sequence : Gen. stator neutral side CT (4000/1A) , 11kV Bus side VT
(11/0.11kV)
[Calculation for field failure protection]
Impedance converting per unit value to ohm value is as follows:

Zb = x = x = 64.53 Ohms

Where, Zb= Base impedance of the machine.

Xd(Ohms) = Xd(pu) x Zb = 0.3 x 64.53 = 19.36 Ohms

Xd (Ohms) = Xd (pu) x Zb = 1.4 x 64.53 = 90.34 Ohms
Impedance element 1
FFail1-Xa1 = 0.5 Xd = 0.5 x 19.36 = 9.68 Ohms 9.5 Ohms
FFail1-Xb1 = Xd = 90.34 Ohms 90 Ohms
FFail1 Time Delay = 0.5s 0.5 s
14
Impedance element 2
FFail2-Xa2 = 0.5 Xd = 0.5 x 19.36 = 9.68 Ohms 9.5 Ohms
FFail2-Xb2 = kV2/MVA = 64.53 Ohms 65 Ohms
FFail2 Time Delay = 0s 0 s
3.2.2 Reverse Power Protection (RPP, 32)
A. Reason of reverse power flow
This device function provides backup protection for the prime mover rather
than for protection of the generator. It detects the reverse flow of power (watts)
that would occur should the prime mover lose its input energy, that is, throttle
valve closes, without the accompanying trip of the generator feeder breaker.
B. Effect of reverse power flow
Under such conditions the generator would start to motor, drawing real
power from the system. A steam turbine could overheat due to the loss of the
cooling effect provided by the steam.
C. Setting guidelines
Accordance with IEEE Std. C37.101 and AREVA Technical guide,
Reverse power pick-up setting: -P>1 = 50% of max. Motoring power
Time delay: Time Delay = 10s (Normal value)

Where, -P>1 maximum motoring power setting.

D. Setting calculation
[System data]
Generator rating: 50Hz, 60MW, 0.8 PF: Xd = 1.40 pu, Xd = 0.3 pu (at
75MVA base)
AC Sequence: Gen. Stator neutral side CT (4000/1A) : 11kV Bus side VT
(11/0.11kV)
[Calculation for reverse power protection]
Generator rating (P1st) converting to CT&VT second value (P2nd) is as follow:
15
P1st = Generator rating = 60MW

P2nd = = =150 watt

-P>1 = 50% x 3% x P2nd

= 0.5 x 0.03 x 150 = 2.25W 2.2 W
Time Delay = 8s 8 s
Even if normal time delay is 10s, existing value 8s should be considered.

3.2.3 Stator Earth Fault Protection (STFP, 51N)

A. Operating principle
It is common for high voltage generators to be connected to earth via
impedance. This impedance may be fitted on the secondary side of a distribution
transformer earthling arrangement. For earth faults close to the generator neutral,
the driving voltage will below, and hence the value of fault current will be
severely reduced. In practice, approximately 95% of the stator winding can be
protected. For faults in the last 5% of the winding, the earth fault current is so
low that it cannot be detected by this type of earth fault protection. Figure 3.3
shows effective coverage of stator earth fault protection.

Figure 3.3 Effective coverage of stator earth fault protection

16
 In case of large generators, 100% stator earth fault protection is commonly
specified to cover all winding earth faults. Therefore above conventional method
should be complement with 3rd harmonic voltage method. Most generators will
produce third harmonic voltage to some degree due to nonlinearities in the
magnetic circuits of the generator design. Under normal operating conditions the
distribution of the third harmonic voltage along the stator windings corresponds
to figure3.4a. For a stator earth fault at the star point as shown in Figure 3.4b,the
amplitude of the third harmonic in the voltage at the terminals is approximately
doubled both when the generator is off load prior the fault (UTE) and when it is
fully loaded (UTE). The same third harmonic values can be measured in the star
point voltages UNE and UNE for an earth fault at the generator terminals, as
shown in figure 3.4C.

N : Generator start point, T : Generator terminal

17
Figure 3.4: Distribution of the 3rd harmonic component along the stator winding
of large generator, (a) normal operation, (b) stator earth fault at the star point,(c)
stator earth fault at the terminals
B. Setting guidelines
Accordance with IEEE Std. C37.101 and AREVA Technical guide, the
earth fault current setting: IN1>1 Current Set = 5% of limited E/F current The
3rd harmonic voltage: 100% St. EF VN3H = 1% of input voltage.
C. Setting calculation
[System data]
Generator rating: 50Hz, 60MW, 0.8 PF: Xd = 1.40 pu, Xd = 0.3 pu (at
75MVA base)
AC Sequence: Gen. Neutral transformer (11000/240V, 15kVA): Gen.
neutral transformer secondary side CT (300/1A, 5P10, 10VA): Gen.
neutral transformer secondary side resistor (0.5 Ohms)
[Calculation for stator earth fault protection]
The maximum generator neutral transformer secondary voltage;
Vmax = x = 138.56 V

For 95% protection of the windings, the relay should be set as follows;

IN1>1 Current = 0.05 x x =0.046 A 0.05 A

Time Delay = 0.5s 0.5 s

Where IN1>1 Current: earth fault current setting
[Calculation for 100% stator earth fault protection, 3rd harmonic method]
100% St. EF VN3H = 1% of input voltage
= 0.01 x 138.56 V= 1.3856 V 1.4 V
Time Delay = 1 s 1 s
Existing value 1s should be considered.
3.2.4 Rotor Earth Fault Protection (RTFP, 64F)
18
 A. Effect of rotor earth fault
The field circuit of a generator is an ungrounded system. As such, a single
ground fault will not generally affect the operation of a generator. If a second
ground fault occurs, a portion of the field winding will be short-circuited,
thereby producing unbalanced air gap fluxes in the machine.
These unbalanced fluxes may cause rotor vibration that can quickly
damage the machine; also, unbalanced rotor winding and rotor body
temperatures caused by uneven rotor winding currents can cause similar
damaging vibrations.
B. Operating principle
Rotor ground fault protection is used to detect ground faults in the
excitation circuit of synchronous generator. The rotor ground resistance is
measured using an external P391 (The low frequency square wave injection,
coupling and measurement unit) connected to the rotor circuit. The measurement
of the rotor resistance is passed to the P344 via a current loop output (0~20mA)
on the P391 connected to Analog Current Loop Input (CLIO) on the Generator
Protective Relay (P344).
3.2.5 Frequency Protection (FRCP, 81U/81O)
A. Reason of under/over frequency
Under frequency operation of a generator will occur when the power
system load exceeds the prime mover capability of an islanded generator or
group of generators. Power system overloading can arise when a power system
becomes split, with load left connected to a set of islanded generators that is in
excess of their capacity. Over frequency running of a generator arises when the
mechanical power input to the alternator is in excess of the electrical load and
mechanical losses. The most common occurrence of over frequency is after
substantial loss of load.
B. Effect of under/over frequency
19
 An under frequency condition, at nominal voltage, may result in some over
fluxing of generator and its associated electrical plant. The more critical
considerations would-be in relation to blade stresses being incurred with high-
speed turbine generators; especially steam-driven sets. When not running at
nominal frequency, abnormal blade resonances can be set up that, if prolonged,
could lead to turbine disc component fractures.
Over frequency protection may be required as a back-up protection function to
cater for governor or throttle control failure following loss of load or during
unsynchronized running. Moderate over frequency operation of a generator is not
as potentially threatening to the generator and other electrical plant as under
frequency running.
C. Setting guidelines
Four stage under frequency/load shedding can be provided as per exist
operating scheme. The final stage of under frequency protection should be used
to trip the generator.
D. Under frequency protection
First stage under frequency element: F<1 Setting = 45 ~ 65Hz in step
0.01Hz
First stage time delay: F<1 Time Delay = 0 ~ 100s in step 0.01s
Second stage under frequency element: F<2 Setting = 45 ~ 65Hz in step 0.01Hz
Second stage time delay: F<2 Time Delay = 0 ~ 100s in step 0.01s
Third stage under frequency element: F<3 Setting = 45 ~ 65Hz in step 0.01Hz
Third stage time delay: F<3 Time Delay = 0 ~ 100s in step 0.01s

Fourth stage under frequency element: F<4 Setting = 45 ~ 65Hz in step 0.01Hz
Fourth stage time delay: F<4 Time Delay = 0 ~ 100s in step 0.01s
E. Setting calculation

20
 Under/Over frequency protection should be set as per Off-frequency turbine
limit but general typical data are considered in this report also these values can
be changed as follow customer requirement.
F. Under Frequency Protection
F<1 Setting 48.0 Hz
Time Delay 10 s
F<2 Setting 47.0 Hz
Time Delay 3 s
F<3 Setting 46.0 Hz
Time Delay 2 s
F<4 Setting 45.5 Hz
Time Delay 0.1 s
G. Over Frequency Protection
F<1 Setting 52.0 Hz
Time Delay 5 s
F<2 Setting 53.0 Hz
Time Delay 1 s
3.2.6 Over Fluxing Protection (OVFP, 24)
A. Reason of over fluxing
Over fluxing is most likely to occur during machine start up or shut down
whilst the generator is not connected to the system. Failures in the automatic
control of the excitation system, or errors in the manual control of the machine
field circuit, could allow excessive voltage to be generated. It is also possible for
over fluxing to occur during parallel operation when the generator has been
synchronized with the local supply network. Sudden loss of load could cause an
overvoltage condition, in such circumstances, if the generator excitation system
does not respond correctly.

21
 B. Effect of over fluxing
Over fluxing or over excitation of a generator connected to the terminals
of a generator, can occur if the ratio of voltage to frequency exceeds certain
limits. High voltage or low frequency, causing a rise in the V/Hz ratio, will
produce high flux densities in the magnetic core of the generator.
This could cause the core of the generator or transformer to saturate and stray
flux to be induced in un-laminated components that have not been designed to
carry flux. The resulting eddy currents in solid components (for example core
bolts and clamps) and end of core laminations can cause rapid overheating and
damage.
C. Setting guidelines
The P344 relays provide a four stage over fluxing element. One stage can
be set to operate with a definite time or inverse time delay (IDMT), this stage
can be used to provide the protection trip output. There are also 3 other definite
time stages which can be combined with the inverse time characteristic to create
a combined multi-stage
V/Hz trip operating characteristic using Programmable Scheme Logic (PSL).
V/Hz element should be set as per Permissible shot-time over excitation of
generator.
First stage V/Hz element: V/Hz>1 Set = 1.5 ~ 3.5 V/Hz in step 0.01 V/Hz
First stage time delay: V/Hz>1 Trip TMS or DT

Operating time t =

Where, M = V/f / (V/f Trip setting)

V = Measured voltage
F = Measured frequency
DT = Definite time
Second stage V/Hz element: V/Hz>2 Set = 1.5 ~ 3.5 V/Hz in step 0.01 V/Hz

22
Second stage time delay: V/Hz>2 Trip Delay = 0 ~ 600s in step 0.01s
Third stage V/Hz element: V/Hz>3 Set = 1.5 ~ 3.5 V/Hz in step 0.01 V/Hz
Third stage time delay: V/Hz>3 Trip Delay = 0 ~ 600s in step 0.01s
Fourth stage V/Hz element: V/Hz>4 Set = 1.5 ~ 3.5 V/Hz in step 0.01 V/Hz
Fourth stage time delay: V/Hz>4 Trip Delay = 0 ~ 600s in step 0.01s

D. Setting calculation
[System data]
AC Sequence: 11kV Bus side VT (11/0.11kV)
[Calculation for over fluxing protection]
1p.u V/Hz setting = 11000 x 110/11000 / 50Hz = 2.2 V/Hz
V/Hz Alarm Set = 2.2 V/Hz x 1.1 = 2.42 V/Hz 2.4 V/Hz
Time Delay = 0.5s 0.5 s (for alarm)

V/Hz>1 Set = 2.2 V/Hz x 1.1 = 2.42 V/Hz 2.4 V/Hz

Time Delay = 45s 45 s (DT)
V/Hz>2 Set = 2.2 V/Hz x 1.15 = 2.53 V/Hz 2.5 V/Hz
Time Delay = 6s 6 s
V/Hz>3 Set = 2.2 V/Hz x 1.2 = 2.64 V/Hz 2.6 V/Hz
Time Delay = 2s 2 s
V/Hz>4 Set = 2.2 V/Hz x 1.25 = 2.75 V/Hz 2.7 V/Hz
Time Delay = 1s 1 s
3.2.7 Overvoltage Protection (OVVP, 59)
A. Reason of overvoltage
A generator terminal overvoltage condition could arise when the generator
is running but not connected to a power system, or where a generator is
providing power to an islanded power system. Such an over voltage could arise

23
in the event of a fault with automatic voltage regulating equipment or if the
voltage regulator is set for manual control and an operator error is made.
B. Setting guidelines
Overvoltage protection should be set to prevent possible damage to
generator insulation, prolonged over fluxing of the generating plant, or damage
to power system loads.
Accordance with IEEE Std. C37.102 and AREVA Technical guide,
Overvoltage element: V>1 Voltage Set = 115% of input voltage
Time delay: V>1 TMS = 2s at 120% of tap setting voltage
Where V>1 : maximum voltage Setting

Operating time t =

TMS K= (M 1) x t
Where, K= Time multiplier setting (TMS)
M= Measured voltage / Setting voltage
Overvoltage element: V>2 Voltage Set = 150% of input voltage
Time delay: V>2 Time Delay = 0.1s

C. Setting calculation
[System data]
AC Sequence: 11kV Bus side VT (11/0.11kV)
[Calculation for overvoltage protection]
V>1 Voltage Set = 1.15 x 110 = 126.5 V 126 V
V>1 TMS = (1.2 1 ) x 2 = 0.4 0.4 (IDMT)
V>2 Voltage Set = 1.5 x 110 = 165 V 165 V
V>2 Time delay = 0.1s 0.1 s
3.2.8 Under Voltage Protection (UVVP, 27)
A. Reason of under voltage

24
 One reason would be failure of automatic voltage regulation (AVR)
equipment. Where an auxiliary transformer is used to supply generator ancillary
equipment, such as boiler-feed pumps, air-blowers, lubrication pumps etc., and a
prolonged under voltage condition could adversely affect the performance of the
machine. Under voltage protection is not a commonly specified requirement for
generator protection schemes. However, under voltage elements are sometimes
used as interlocking elements for other types of protection, such as field failure.

B. Setting guidelines
Accordance with IEEE Std. C37.102 and AREVA Technical guide,
Under voltage element: V<1 Voltage Set = 80% of input voltage (For alarm
used)
Time delay: V<1 Time Delay = 3s
Under voltage element: V<2 Voltage Set = 70% of input voltage
Time delay: V<2 Time Delay = 2s
C. Setting calculation
[System data]
- AC Sequence: 11kV Bus side VT (11/0.11kV)
[Calculation for under voltage protection]
V<1 Voltage Set = 0.8 x 110 = 88 V 88 V
V<1 TMS = 3 s 3 s (for alarm)
V<2 Voltage Set = 0.7 x 110 = 77 V 77 V
V<2 Time delay = 2 s 2 s

3.2.9 Negative Sequence Protection (NSQP, 46)

A. Reason of negative sequence current
The unbalanced loads, unbalanced system faults, open conductors, or other
25
Unsymmetrical operating conditions result in an unbalance of the generator
phase voltages.
B. Effect of negative sequence current
The resulting unbalanced (negative sequence) currents induce double system
Frequency currents in the rotor that quickly cause rotor overheating. Serious
damage to the generator will occur if the unbalanced condition is allowed to
persist indefinitely.

C. Setting guidelines
The ability of a generator to withstand these negative sequence currents is
defined by ANSI C50.13-1977 as I22t = K .Table 3.2 show negative sequence
constants for various types of machines.
Table 3.2: Negative sequence constants for various types of machines
Type of machine Permissible I22t
Salient-pole generator 40
Synchronous condenser 30
Cylindrical-rotor generator Indirectly cooled( air) 30
Directly cooled (H2) 10

Accordance with IEEE Std. C37.102 and the existing Protection report
NPS thermal alarm: I2therm>1 Set = 60% of I2 continuous withstand*
Time delay: I2therm>1 Delay = 2s
NPS thermal trip: I2therm>2 Set = 70% of I2 continuous withstand*
Time delay: I2therm>2 K = 15 (Exist. value)
*Manufacture tender value for I2 continuous withstand (10%) .
D. Setting calculation
[System data]
Generator rating: 50Hz, 60MW, 0.8 PF
26
 Full load current (FLC) = 60 x 1000 / (3 x 11 x 0.8) = 3936A
AC Sequence: Gen. Stator neutral side CT (4000/1A):11kV Bus side VT
(11/0.11kV)
[Calculation for negative sequence protection]
I2therm>1 Set = 0.6 x 0.1 x 3936 x (1/4000) = 0.059 A 0.06 A
I2therm>1 Delay = 2s 2 s (for alarm)

I2therm>2 Set = 0.7 x 0.1 x 3936 x (1/4000) = 0.068 A 0.07 A

I2therm>2 K = 15 15
I2therm>tmax= 15 / 0.12 = 1500s 1500 s
I2therm>tmin = 5s 5 s
3.2.10 Minimum Impedance Protection (MIP, 21)
A. Reason of backup protection
If a fault has not been cleared by main protection the fault shall be isolated
by the action of a non-directional three phase impedance measuring relay with a
circular characteristic on the resistance/reactance diagram figure 3.5.
The under impedance protection has two stages of impedance protection. For
generator transformer applications one stage could be used to reach into
The step-up transformer and one stage to reach further into the power system to
provide two zones of protection.

Figure 3.5: Under impedance element tripping characteristics

27
 B. Setting guidelines
Accordance with AREVA Technical guide,
First under impedance setting: Z<1 Setting = 70% impedance of 120% O/L
generator output
First time setting: Z<1 Time Delay = 2.5s (Considering Zone-2 fault)
Second under impedance setting: Z<2 Setting = 60% of Impedance of [Gen.TR]
Second time setting: Z<2 Time Delay = 0.7s
[System data]
- Generator rating: 50Hz, 60MW, 0.8 PF: Xd = 1.40 pu, Xd = 0.3 pu (at
75MVA base)
FLC = = 3936A

Generator transformer : 110/11kV 75MVA, %Z = 11.05

AC Sequence : Gen. stator neutral side CT (4000/1A):11kV Bus side VT
(11/0.11kV)
Where, %Z: percentage impedance.

[Calculation for minimum impedance protection]

Z<1 Setting = x 0.7 x x

= x 0.7 x x = 65.2 Ohm 65 Ohm

Z<1 Time Delay = 2.5s (Considering Zone-2 fault) 2.5 s

Z<2 Setting = (0.6 x Transformer %Z) x Zb x (CT Ratio/VT Ratio)
0.6 x 0.1105 x x = 4.28 Ohm 4 Ohm

Z<2 Time Delay = 0.7s 0.7 s

3.2.11Overcurrent combined with under voltage protection
(OCCV+UVVP, 51V/27)
A. Reason of backup protection
28
 If the voltage regulator is set to manual control or no boost circuit exists,
the fault current can be severely restricted, leading to slow operation of back-up
protection for system faults. In the worst case the fault current will fall below the
full load rating of the machine, so simple over current protection with a setting
above full load current, cannot operate.

B. Setting guidelines
Accordance with IEEE Std. 242 and AREVA Technical guide, Voltage
restrained O/C setting: V Dep OC >1 Set = 150% of generator rating
Time setting: V Dep OC Delay = 2.5s (for Backup)
Under voltage setting: V Dep OC V<1 Set = 70% of rated voltage
Where V Dep OC > 1: over current combined with under voltage maximum
setting.
V Dep OC > 1: over current combined with under voltage minimum setting.

This function should be not used for backup protection, because already
minimum impedance (21) function will be selected for backup protection.
3.2.12 Generator Differential Protection (DGP, 87G)
A. Operating principle
The circulating current differential protection operates on the principle that
current entering and leaving a zone of protection will be equal. Any difference
between these currents is indicative of a fault being present in the zone as shown
in figure 3.6.

29
 Figure 3.6: Principle of circulating current differential protection

It can be seen that current flowing through the zone of protection will
cause current to circulate around the secondary wiring. If the CTs are of the same
ratio and have identical magnetizing characteristics they will produce identical
secondary currents and hence zero current will flow through the relay. If a fault
exists within the zone of protection there will be a difference between the outputs
from each CT; this difference flowing through the relay causing it to operate.
The calculation is performed on a per phase basis. The differential current is the
vector sum of the phase currents measured at either end of the generator. The
mean bias current (Ibias) is the scalar mean of the magnitude of these currents.
Figure 3.7shows biased differential protection operating characteristic

30
 Figure 3.7: Biased differential protection operating characteristic

For example about operating condition will be as follow; In case of external

earth fault: I2 = -I1
Idiff = |I1 + I2| = |I1 I1| = 0 (Vector sum)
Ibias=[ |I1| + |I2|]/2 = [|I1| + |I1|]/2 = |I1| (Scalar sum)
Idiff<Ibias (No trip)
In case of internal earth fault: I2 = I1
Idiff = |I1 + I2| = |I1 + I1| = 2 |I1| (Vector sum)
Ibias=[ |I1| + |I2|]/2 = [|I1| + |I1|]/2 = |I1| (Scalar sum)
Idiff>Irest (trip accordance with tripping characteristic)
Where, Idiff: A tripping effect current bias: A restraining current
B. Setting guidelines
Accordance with IEEE Std. 242 and AREVA Technical guide,
The differential current setting: Gen Diff Is1 = 0.05In, Gen Diff Is2 = 1.2In
The initial bias slope setting: Gen Diff k1 = 5%, Gen Diff k2 = 150%
C. Setting calculation
[System data]
Generator rating: 50Hz, 60MW, 0.8 PF

31
 FLC = = 3936A

AC Sequence: Gen. Stator neutral side CT (4000/1A):11kV Bus side CT

(4000/1A)
[Calculation for generator differential protection]
Gen Diff Is1 = 0.1 x 3936 x (1/4000) = 0.09 A 0.1 A
Gen Diff Is2 = 1.2 x 3936 x (1/4000) = 1.18 A 1.2 A
Gen Diff k1 = 10% (IEEE Std. 242 recommendation) 10 %
Gen Diff k1 = 150% (Manufacture recommendation) 150%

3.2.13 Pole Slipping Protection (PSP, 78)

A. Reason of pole slipping
Sudden changes or shocks in an electrical power system such as line
switching operations, large jumps in load or faults may lead to power system
oscillations which appear as regular variations of the currents, voltages and
angular separation between systems. This phenomenon is referred to as a power
swing. Pole slipping occurs when the prime mover input power of a generator
exceeds the electrical power absorbed by the system. The condition results from
the mismatch in the operating frequencies of two or more machines.
During pole slipping the machine produces alternatively generating and motoring
torque of high magnitudes with corresponding current peaks and voltage dips.
During normal system operation the following events can lead to the generator
pole slipping condition.
A transient system fault such as the failure of the generator governor, the
failure of the generator excitation control (asynchronous running) and the
reconnection of an 'islanded' system without synchronization.
The transient change in the system requirements of real and reactive
power components sets the generator rotor to oscillate around the new
equilibrium point.
32
 If the initial transient disturbance is severe enough and for a sufficiently
long duration the rotor swing may exceed the maximum stability limit
causing the generator to slip poles.
For a weak system switching transients may also result in pole slipping.
B. Setting guidelines
Forward impedance reaches setting: PslipZa Forward = Impedance of [Gen.TR +
XL]
Reverse impedance reach setting: PslipZb Reverse = Impedance of 2 timesofXd
Forward impedance Reach.Line :PslipZc = 90% of Gen.TR reactance
Lens angle setting: Lens Angle () = 180deg 2 x tan-1[1.54xRLmin/(Za+Zb)]
RLmin should be at least 130% of lens width
Blinder angle setting: Blinder Angle () = System impedance angle
Where, XL: System impedance
RLmin: Min. load resistance
It is recommendation that the pole slipping protection (78) should be not used in
this power plant because it was not applied exist protection system and our
national power company (KOPEC) is not used below 345kV power system.
3.2.14 Neutral Voltage Displacement Protection (NVDP, 59N)
A. Operating principle
On a healthy three-phase power system, the addition of each of the three-
phase to earth voltages is nominally zero, as it is the vector addition of three
balanced vector sat 120 to one another. However, when an earth fault occurs on
the primary system this balance is upset and a residual voltage is produced.
This could be measured, for example, at the secondary terminals of a voltage
transformer having a broken delta secondary connection. Hence, a residual
voltage measuring relay can be used to offer earth fault protection on such a
system.
B. Setting guidelines
33
 Accordance with AREVA Technical guide and the existing Protection
report.
Neural O/V element: VN>1 Voltage Set = 20% of max. Zero sequence voltage
Time delay: VN>1 TMS = 1.5s at 500% of tap setting voltage

Operating time t =

TMS K= (M 1) x t
Where, K= Time multiplier setting (TMS)
M= Measured voltage / Setting voltage
VN>1: maximum zero sequence voltage setting.
C. Setting calculation
[System data]
AC Sequence: 11kV Bus side VT 3rd winding (11/3 / 0.11/3 / 0.11/3
kV)
[Calculation for Neutral Voltage Displacement Protection]
VN>1 Voltage Set = 0.2 x 110 = 22 V 22 V
VN>1 TMS = (5 1) x 1.5 = 6 6 (IDMT)

3.3 generator single line diagram

Full protection single line diagram of generator unit illustrated in figure 3.8

34
 Figure 3.8: generator protection single line diagram

CHAPTER FOUR

TRANSFORMER PROTECTION

4.1 Introduction

35
 The transformers are static devices without having any rotating part and
are totally enclosed. Hence the changes of faults occurring in transformers are
much rare as compared to the faults occurring on generators. Similarly
possibilities of running on abnormal conditions are also less in transformers
compared to generators. But thought the fault possibility is rare, if fault occurs,
the transformer must be quickly disconnected from the system. the rare faults if
not cleared quickly can get developed into the major faults which may be very
serious for the transformers. Hence the protection must be provided to the
transformers against possible faults.

The use of series fuses is very common in case of small distribution

transformers instead of circuit breakers. Hence it is not necessary to install any
automatic protective relaying equipment with the distribution transformers. But
the power transformers having large ratings like that on Dr. M. Sharif thermal
power station always need some type of automatic protective relaying
equipment, to give protection against the possible faults. Generally transformer
protection can be divided into two main types:

(i)-Self-Protection: this is already installed in transformer such as temperature

detector, pressure detector, gas detector and current detector.

(ii)-Relay Protection: this is installed outside transformer such as differential

protection, overcurrent protection, restricted earth fault protection relay, over
current relay and phase/earth Overcurrent Protection

For transformer protection (MICOM P632 -from ARREVA) was used;

which provide four functions as shown on table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Function conversion for transformer protection (P633)

36
 AREVA
FUNC.
Function Abbreviation Description
Code
No.

TRANDFORMER
DIFFERENTIAL
87GT TDP DIFF
PROTECTION

RESTRICTED EARTH
FAULT PROTECTION
64REF REFP REF

PHASE
OVERCURRENT
50/51 OCP IDMT
PROTECTION
DTOC

EARTH
OVERCURRENT
50/51N EFP IDMT
PROTECTION

4.2Transformer Differential Protection (TDP, 87GT)

With generator Differential protection we saw that we compared the

current entering the bus, with that leaving the bus, in order to detect a fault. With
Transformer Differential Protection we use the same principle. However, we
must make a few changes to adapt that principle for use on transformers:

i. The C.T. ratios on the transformer primary and secondary sides must be
chosen to match the transformer ratio.
ii. The C.T. secondary windings are usually delta connected for a star
connected transformer winding, and star connected for a delta connected
winding. This is to accommodate the primary to secondary phase shift.
37
 (This is not necessary with microprocessor-based relays; transformer
winding configuration is programmed into the relay)
iii. Some accommodation must be made for the transformer tap changer,
which, of course changes the primary to secondary ratio of the
transformer.
iv. Some accommodation must also be made for the magnetizing inrush
current which flows when the transformer is energized. This inrush current
can be as high as ten times the full load current of then transformer, and
flows into the transformer, but not out.

The transformer differential relay is designed especially to accommodate this

mismatch in the primary and secondary C.T. currents. The transformer
differential relay has both restraint (and Bias) coils, and operate coils, as shown
above. The differential current flows through the operate coil to make the relay
pick up, and the through current flows through the restraint or bias coils and
tends to make the relay restrain. If there is an out of zone fault when the tap
changer is away from the neutral tap, then the through C.T. secondary current
flowing through the restraint coils will overcome the tendency for the relay to
operate by the spill current flowing through the operate coil. The differential
relay will not operate for this out-of zone fault condition. For the In-Zone fault
shown the current through the operate coil is very high and the net restraining
current is low. The differential relay will operate for this In-Zone fault. When
a transformer is energized, there is a magnetizing inrush current, which can be as
high as ten times the full load current of the transformer. This high inrush current
Last s for only a few cycles. However, it can cause the differential relay to
operate because it has the appearance of an internal fault (current flows into but
not out of the transformer).

38
 Microprocessor-based transformer differential relays the restraint for
magnetizing inrush is achieved in a different way. The shape of the waveform is
analyzed by the microprocessor to determine if magnetizing inrush current is
present.

4.2.1 Setting guidelines

Setting for amplitude matching factor; the reference currents and matching
factors shall be within their permissible ranges. Therefore, the following
conditions shall be satisfied.

The matching factor must always be 16.

The value of the lower matching factor shall be 0.5.

Iref secondary (110KV) = = 0.394kA

Iref primary (11KV) = = 3.937kA

Kam secondary = = = 1.015 16

Kam primary = = = 1.013 16

Where

Iref: reference current

Inom: primary nominal current of the main CT

Kam: amplitude matching factor

4.2.2 Setting for tripping characteristics according to IEEE and

AREVA recommendations

39
 Basic threshold value Idiff >

% error = 10 %( CT) + 5 %( Relay) + 3 %( TR excitation current) + 5 %(

Margin)

Setting: Idiff > = 0.3 Iref

Rapid high set Idiff>>

To avoid the mal-operation by the magnetizing inrush current

Setting: Idiff>> = 13 Iref

Unrestraint high set Idiff>>>

Considering CT saturation under external fault and safety margin,

Setting: Idiff>>> = 20 Iref

Gradient of the tripping characteristic, m1

%error = 10 %( CT) + 5 %( Relay) + 10 %( Tap) + 5 %( margin)

Setting: Slope m1 = 0.3

Gradient of the tripping characteristic, m2

Setting at relay manufacturers recommendation

Setting: Slope m2 = 0.7

Second knee point, IR, m2

Where

IR: margin current for relay stability

Setting at the relay manufacturers recommendation

40
Setting: IR, m2 = 4 Iref

Inrush stabilization (harmonic restraint), I(2f0)/I(f0)

Setting at the relay manufacturers recommendation

Setting: I (2f0)/I (f0) = 20%

Where

I (f0): fundamental current.

I (2f0): second harmonic current.

Over fluxing restraint I(5f0)/I(f0)

Considering a security margin, 35% fifth harmonic setting is adequate to block

the percentage differential element during over excitation conditions.

Recommended over fluxing restraint setting according to AREVA

recommendation

Setting: I (5f0)/I (f0) = 35%

Where

I (5f0): fifth harmonic current.

4.3Restricted Earth Fault Protection (REFP, 64REF)

Ground-fault protection for each of the windings of a transformer can be

provided by connecting the C.T.s as shown above for delta and star (or wye)
connected transformer windings. This system uses the differential principle to
detect ground faults within the transformer.

Setting guidelines
41
Setting for amplitude matching factor according to AREVA recommendation

Iref.N.secondary =

Where:

Sref: reference power

Iref. N: reference current of the ground differential protection

Vnom: nominal voltage

Iref.N.secondary = = 0.394 kA

Kam.N.secondary =

Kam.Y.secondary =

Where

Inom: primary nominal current of the main CT.

Inom.Y: primary nominal current of CT in the neutral point to ground

connection

Kam.N & Kam.Y: amplitude matching factor

The reference currents and matching factors shall be within their permissible
ranges. Therefore, the following conditions shall be satisfied.

The matching factor must always be 16

The value of the lower matching factor shall be 0.5

Kam.N.secondary = = 1.015

42
Kam.Y.secondary = = 2.198

Figure 4.1: Setting for tripping characteristic

First stage setting at the same value in case of 87TG according to AREVA
recommendation

Setting: Idiff> = 0.3 Iref

Second stage setting, consider CT saturation at external fault and safety

margin

Setting: Idiff>>> = 20 Iref

Setting: Slope m1 = 0.3

Setting: Slope m2 = 1.5

Setting: IR & m2 = 1.0 Iref

Where
43
IR: margin current for relay stability as illustrated in figure 4.1.

Slope m1 set at the same value in case of 87TG,

Slope m2 & IR, m2 are set to the manufacturers recommendation

4.4 Phase/Earth Overcurrent Protection (OCP, EFP)

It is desirable to set the relays as sensitive as possible. However, they must

not operate for any tolerable condition such as magnetizing inrush, cold load
pick-up, or any emergency operating condition.
Over current relays must protect the transformer against damage from through
faults. The settings should be coordinated with the transformer damage curves,
and with the relay settings on the adjacent elements.
Where transformers are operated in parallel it is not possible to adequately apply
over current protection for each transformer, and also provide the necessary
selectivity.
The over current protection for both transformers can operate for a fault on
the low voltage (L.V) bus of one of the transformers. It is usual practice to apply
differential protection where transformers are operated in parallel.
If over current is used as backup protection on transformers operating in parallel,
emergency overload conditions must be taken into account when determining the
minimum pickup setting.
When one transformer trips, the total load is then carried by the
transformer remaining in service. This can result in emergency overloading of
this transformer of, say, 150%. It may be possible for the transformer to tolerate
this emergency condition for about two to three hours, providing a winding
temperature of 105C is not exceeded. During this emergency overload period
load shedding or load transfers can take place to bring the transformer load down
to the nameplate rating, before the windings become overheated. An over current
44
pickup setting of twice full-load is often used to allow for this emergency
situation.
Setting guidelines According to AREVA Recommendation:
Time over-current (51)

Setting at 150% of the transformer rated current.

Time multiplier setting shall be coordinated with transformer through fault

withstand curve.

Instantaneous over-current (50)

Setting at 200% of the maximum through fault current at the transformer

secondary side.

Earth fault protection (51N)

Setting at 30% of transformer rated current.

4.5 Overall Differential Protection (DOP, 87GT)

Since there is not normally a circuit breaker between the generator

and its output transformer, a set of differential protection is usually
provided, especially on large generators, to include the generator and the
transformer, as shown in figure 4.2. This arrangement has three sets of
differential protection, covering different parts of the generator and
transformer zone. It provides duplication such that any fault will be detected by
two of the three protections.

45
 Figure 4.2: Overall Differential Protection

4.5.1 Operating principle

Principle of transformer differential protection is same as generator

differential protection. For over all differential protection (MICOM P633-from
AREVA) was used.

4.5.2 Setting guidelines According to AREVA Recommendations

Setting for amplitude matching factor;

The reference currents and matching factors shall be within their permissible
ranges. Therefore, the following conditions shall be satisfied.

The matching factor must always be 16.

The value of the lower matching factor shall be 0.5.

Irefsecondary of main TR (110KV) = =0.394KA

46
Irefprimary of main TR (11KV) = = 3.937kA

Irefprimary of AUX TR = = 0.735kA

Kam secondary of main TR = = = 1.015 16

Kam primary of main TR = = = 1.013 16

Kam primary of AUX TR = = = 5.427 16

Where:

Iref: reference current

Inom: primary nominal current of the main CT

Kam: amplitude matching factor

Figure 4.3: Setting for tripping characteristics

Basic threshold value Idiff >

47
% error = 10 %( CT) + 5 %( Relay) + 3 %( TR excitation current) + 5 %(
Margin)

Setting: Idiff > = 0.3 Iref

Rapid high set Idiff>>

To avoid the mal-operation by the magnetizing inrush current

Setting: Idiff>> = 13 Iref

Unrestraint high set Idiff>>>

Considering CT saturation under external fault and safety margin,

Setting: Idiff>>> = 20 Iref

Gradient of the tripping characteristic, m1

%error = 10 %( CT) + 5 %( Relay) + 10 %( Tap) + 5 %( margin)

Setting: Slope m1 = 0.3

Gradient of the tripping characteristic, m2

Setting at relay manufacturers recommendation

Setting: Slope m2 = 0.7

Second knee point, IR, m2

Setting at the relay manufacturers recommendation

Setting: IR, m2 = 4 Iref

Inrush stabilization (harmonic restraint), I(2f0)/I(f0)

Setting at the relay manufacturers recommendation

48
Setting: I (2f0)/I (f0) = 20%

Over fluxing restraint I(5f0)/I(f0)

Considering a security margin, 35% fifth harmonic setting is adequate to block

the percentage differential element during over excitation conditions.

Recommended over fluxing restraint setting,

Setting: I (5f0)/I (f0) = 35%

4.6 Transformer Protection Single Line Diagram

Full protection of transformer and over all differential protection of

generator transformer unit illustrated in figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4: transformer unit and generator- transformer unit protection single line
diagram

49
 CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1Conclusion

This thesis presents multifunction numeric protection of phase (II) in Dr.

Mahmud Sharif power station. These multifunction numeric relays are presently
available to provide highly reliable protection for generators and transformers.
These units utilize the latest digital signal processing technology to accomplish
many relaying functions simultaneously. By appropriate use of multiple
multifunction numeric relays, or by using multifunction digital relays in
combination with single-function relays. This Numeric protection includes
generator unit, transformer unit and generator -transformer unit protection with
their setting guidelines and calculations.

Multifunction numeric relays from AREVA techniques are used.

Generator protected using MICOM P344 which provides seventeenth functions,
and then transformer unit protected using MICOM P632 and MICOM P633 for
over all differential protection for generator transformer unit.

A comprehensive data bank for setting calculation has been constructed

for phase (II); this data has been collected for generator, main and auxiliary
transformers. Setting calculated cross ponds to IEEE standards and AREVA
recommendations guidelines.

Single line diagram including full protection illustrated for generator unit,
transformer unit and generator- transformer unit. Also main and back up
protection illustrated in one single line diagram.

50
5.2 Recommendations

The following suggested for future studies in this field:

i. Outgoing and 6.6KV busbars sides must be protected using numeric

relays; instead of electromechanical relays.
ii. According to numeric relays features we recommended to install
numeric protection in whole national grid, especially at high voltage
sides to ensure high readability and security of the national grid.

51