Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty Entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the UP

College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court Rule
10.2 | March 8, 2011 & June 7, 2011 | Villarama, J; De Castro, J

Nature of Case: Administrative Matter in the SC

Petitioner: Supreme Court

Respondent: UP Law Faculty

SUMMARY: Shortly after the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary, the counsel for the petitioners therein filed, 1) a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating the
fundamental responsibility of states in protecting its citizens human rights specifically pertaining to jus
cogens norms; and, 2) a supplement thereto asserting that the Vinuya decision was plagiarized from
different sources and that the true intents of the plagiarized sources were twisted by the ponente to suit
the arguments laid down in said decision. Thereafter, an ethics committee tasked to investigate the
veracity of the alleged plagiarism, the authors who were purportedly plagiarized sent their respective
letters to the Supreme Court.Due to this, the faculty of UP College of Law came up with a statement
(Restoring Integrity Statement), which alleged plagiarism against Justice del Castillo, treating the same
not only as an established fact, but as a truth. Said statement was posted online and at the Colleges
bulletin board and was submitted to the Supreme Court. Thus, the Supreme Court issued a Show Cause
Resolution directing respondents to show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the
Bar for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

DOCTRINE: The right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally
primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or
interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has
repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the
courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment
and common decency.

FACTS:

Shortly after the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (the
Vinuya decision), the case involving the Filipino comfort women during the Japanese occupation, the
counsel for the petitioners therein filed, first, a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating the fundamental
responsibility of states in protecting its citizens human rights specifically pertaining to jus cogens norms
and, second, a supplement thereto asserting that the Vinuya decision was plagiarized from different
sources and that the true intents of the plagiarized sources were twisted by the ponente, Justice
Mariano del

Castillo (Justice del Castillo), to suit the arguments laid down in said decision.

Vis-a-vis the Courts formation of an ethics committee tasked to investigate the veracity of the alleged
plagiarism, the authors who were purportedly plagiarized sent their respective letters to the Supreme
Court, noting the misreading and/or misrepresentation of their articles. Hence, in their articles, they
argue that the crimes of rape, torture and sexual slavery can be classified as crimes against humanity,
thus attaining the jus cogens status; consequently, it shall be obligatory upon the State to seek remedies
on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. However, the Vinuya decision cited them to support the contrary
stand.

In response to this controversy, the faculty of UP College of Law came up with a statement entitled
Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on
the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court (Restoring Integrity
Statement), which statement alleged plagiarism against Justice del Castillo, treating the same not only as
an established fact, but as a truth. Said statement was posted online and at the Colleges bulletin board
and was submitted to the Supreme Court.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a
reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The authors
also not only assumed that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism, they went further by directly
accusing the Court of perpetrating extraordinary injustice by dismissing the petition of the comfort
women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. They further attempt to educate this Court on how to go about
the review of the case. The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of polluted sources, the
Courts alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern
of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.

The manner in presenting the arguments and the language used therein, the Court believed, were
inappropriate considering its signatories are lawyers. Thus, the Supreme Court issued a Show Cause
Resolution directing respondents to show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the
Bar for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Conversely, compliance to such resolution
was unsatisfactory, except for one respondent.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON the Show Cause Resolution denies respondents their freedom of expression

NO A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact that
respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its members of
plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious
language by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed
their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for the proper disposition and
consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly
enumerated the statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled for under the
circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP Law
facultys Restoring Integrity Statement.
The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. Thus,
proscribed are the uses of unnecessary language, which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or
promotes distrust in judicial administration, or tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of people
in the integrity of the members of the Court. In other words, while a lawyer is entitled to present his
case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

A long line of cases shows that the Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial
officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary
be protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but
members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline
lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial,
have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.

2. WON the Show Cause Resolution violates respondents academic freedom as law professors

NO. There is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject matter
they can teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of
academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for
contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending
case, without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.

Respondents cannot successfully invoke academic freedom in this case. The constitutional right to
freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to
give due respect to the courts and to uphold the publics faith in the legal profession and the justice
system. The Court believes that the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case
of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors. The Court reiterates
that lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in
other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to
uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be
measured against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the
Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.

RULING: PETITION DISMISSED.

DISSENTING OPINION:

Sereno, J:

Ordering the 37 respondent members of the UP Law Faculty to show cause in this indirect contempt
case is like ordering the little boy who exclaimed that the emperor has no clothes to explain why he
should not be crucified for his public observation. The subject UP Law Faculty members have been
prematurely adjudged guilty and asked to explain why such prejudgment should be reversed simply for
expressing what they believed was the truth. There may have been exaggeration in the UP Law Faculty's
process of expression, but this tempest is nothing that the Supreme Court has not similarly weathered in
the past and faced with equanimity. With all due respect to my colleagues, it is not the place of the
Court to seek revenge against those who, in their wish to see reform in the judiciary, have the courage
to say what is wrong with it.

Indirect contempt is committed in any of the acts enumerated in Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court. The majority Resolution, which is the written charge required by said rule, fails to cite which
particular mode of committing indirect contempt appears to have been violated. It is axiomatic to due
process that the accused be informed specifically of the charge against them. A proceeding for indirect
contempt is criminal in nature; adherence to due process is more stringently required of this Court. One
can infer from a reading of the majority Resolution which portions of the text the UP Law Faculty
Statement draw the charge of direct contempt, i.e. (a) the accusation that an extraordinary act of
injustice has been committed against the brave Filipinas who suffered abuse during a time of war; (b)
the casting of the decision as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest
Court of the land; (c) the further attempt to educate the Court on how to go about the review of the
case; (d) imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the Vinuya case; (e) the dismissal of the
petition on the basis of polluted sources; (f) alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners; (g) the
supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of
decency and respect, but it must still identify the specific paragraph of Section 3, Rule 71 of which the
UP Law Faculty appears guilty.

This Court, as complaining party, must state plainly how its ability to view the motion for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision can be affected in any way by the UP Law Faculty's statement. It
must also state plainly how its ability to enforce its future orders would be eroded by the release of the
UP Law Faculty Statement. The second paragraph of the text clearly indicate the Facultys passionate
desire to see the torch of justice carried with honor and dignity by the highest court of the land, its steps
unfaltering from moral or professional weakness.

The timing of the show cause order; the implication in the related Decision that the complainants in
the plagiarism charge against Justice del Castillo are hypocrites; the needling over a small matter such
as submission of a dummy vis--vis the original signed copies; and the apparent effect that the
submission of the Statement had on the Court all of these betray a Court that is bent on seeing itself
redeemed not by hard and honest work, with the undertaking of proper remedial actions for when a
member is in breach of ethics, but by showing who, in the land of lawyers, has power.

Carpio, J:

I find the Compliance of the 37 legal scholars satisfactory and therefore see no need to admonish or
warn them for supposed use of disrespectful language in their statement commenting on a public issue
involving the official conduct of a member of this Court. The majoritys action impermissibly expands the
Courts administrative powers and, more importantly, abridges constitutionally protected speech on
public conduct guaranteed to all, including members of the bar.

It appears that the evil consequences the UP law faculty statement will supposedly spawn are (1) the
slurring of this Courts dignity and (2) the impairment of its judicial independence vis--vis the resolution
of the plagiarism complaint in Vinuya. Both are absent here. On the matter of institutional degradation,
the 12-paragraph, 1,553-word statement of the UP law faculty, taken as a whole, does not exhibit that
"irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy the courts and their members"
typical of unprotected judicial criticism. On the contrary, the statement, taken as a whole, seeks to
uphold the bedrock democratic value of keeping judicial processes free of any taint of dishonesty or
misrepresentation. Thus, the UP law faculty statement is far removed from speech the Court has rightly
sanctioned for proffering no useful social value, solely crafted to vilify its members and threaten its very
existence.

The conclusion that the UP law faculty statement disrespects the Court and its members is valid only if
the statement is taken apart, its dismembered parts separately scrutinized to isolate and highlight
perceived offensive phrases and words. This approach defies common sense and departs from this
Courts established practice in scrutinizing speech critical of the judiciary. People v. Godoy instructs that
speech critical of judges must be "read with contextual care," making sure that disparaging statements
are not "taken out of context." Using this approach, and applying the clear and present danger test, the
Court in Godoy cleared a columnist and a publisher of liability despite the presence in the assailed news
article of derogatory yet isolated statements about a judge. We can do no less to the statement of the
members of the UP law faculty, who, after all, were impelled by nothing but their sense of professional
obligation to "speak out on a matter of public concern and one that is of vital interest to them."

The academic bar, which the UP law faculty represents, is the judiciarys partner in a perpetual
intellectual conversation to promote the rule of law and build democratic institutions. It serves the
interest of sustaining this vital relationship for the Court to constructively respond to the academics
criticism. Instead of heeding the UP law facultys call for the Court to "ensur[e] that not only the
content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are credible and beyond
question," the majority dismisses their suggestion as useless calumny and brands their constitutionally
protected speech as "unbecoming of lawyers and law professors." The Constitution, logic, common
sense and a humble awareness of this Courts role in the larger project of dispensing justice in a
democracy revolt against such response.