GR No.
165300 Ferrer vs Diaz
FACTS: Comandante, daughter of spouses Diazs represented the latter to obtain a loan to Ferrer. The
loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract. Petitioner claims that prior to said loan,
Comandante executed an instrument in his favor entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests
Over a Real Property (Still Undivided). The Diaz, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks
issued by Comandante were dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, the
respondents failed to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of
Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diaz and Comandante.
ISSUE: Whether or not waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another by an heir for a future
inheritance valid?
HELD: No the waiver is not valid. Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides that no contract may be
entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For the
inheritance to be considered future, the succession must not have been opened at the time of the
contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the
second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur: (1)That the succession has
not yet been opened; 2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) That the
promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in
nature. In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandantes Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interest over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her
parents properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With respect to the
other two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject matter of
Comandantes waiver concededly forms part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her
parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly
purely hereditary in nature. From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered
into a contract involving the formers future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioners favor.
DECS vs. San Diego
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
Facts:
Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT (National Medical Admission Test) three times. When
he applied to take again, petitioner rejected his application based on the three-flunk-rule. He then
filed a petition before the RTC on the ground of due process and equal protection and challenging the
constitutionality of the order. The petition was granted by the RTC therefore this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the NMAT three-flunk-rule order is valid and constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated
by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method
employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that every
citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements. It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality
education as a guarantee of the Constitution but one must show that he is entitled to it because of his
preparation and promise. Petition was granted and the RTC ruling was reversed.
G.R. No. L-63419. December 18, 1986
Lozano vs Martinez
FACTS:This is a consolidated case, the petition arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses
under the BP 22 also known as Bouncing Check Law. The defendant in these case moved seasonably
to quash the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute
being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial court, except in one case,
which is the subject of G.R No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and
dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to the court for remedy. Those who
question the constitutionality of the said statute insist the following ground:
1) It offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;
2) it impairs freedom of contract;
3) it contravenes the equal protection clause;
4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and
5) its enactment is flawed in the sense that during its passage the interim Batasan violated the
constitutional provision prohibiting to a bill on Third Reading.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law is unconstitutional.RULING: No, the
enactment of the assailed statute is a valid exercise of Police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. It may be constitutionally impermissible for
the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of debt ex contractu, but certainly it is within the
prerogative of the lawmaking body to prescribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public
welfare. Acts mala in se are not only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by
society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the
community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this
in the exercise of its police power. The enactment of the said statute is a declaration by the legislature
that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public
nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
People vs. Jabinal
Facts: The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding
the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The validity of the
conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Courts ruling in People vs.
Mapa.As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5, 1964,
he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was without the
requisite license a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the
governor, and was likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the
authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as peace officer. Relying on the
Supreme Courts decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for
his aquittal.Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless
decided otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed and
subsequently abandoned in people vs. mapa.
Issue:Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and
Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and Lucero
doctrine in Mapa?
Ruling:The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.
Reason:The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of
the law, at the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was arraigned
by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine
of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the
faith thereof.
**FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ART. 11-12 OF THE CIVIL CODE In The Matter of the Petition for
Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon etc. 92 SCRA 1 July 30,
1979 Melencio-Herrera,
Facts: The surviving parters of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a petition praying that they be allowed to
continue using, in the name of their firm, the names of their partner who passed away. One of the
petitioners arguments stated that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partners
name in a professional firms name in so far as Greater Manila Area is concerned. No custom exists
which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the
firm. They also stated that the continued use of a deceased partners name in the firm name of law
partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal
profession of most countries in the world. Issue: Whether or not the law firm Ozaeta, Romulo, De
Leon, Mabanta & Reyes is allowed to sustain the name of their deceased partner, Atty. Herminio
Ozaeta, in the name of their firm.
Held: NO. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association
stated the following: The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner
whenpermissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. No local custom permits or allows the continued use of a
deceased or former partners name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under
Philippine custom, identify the more active or senior partners in a firm. Firm names in the
Philippines change and evolve when partners die, leave or a new one is added. It is questionable to
add the new name of a partner and sustain the name of the deceased one since they have never been,
technically, partners in the first place. When it comes to the arguments of the petitioners stating that
U.S. Courts grant the continued use of the deceased partners name, this is so because in the U.S., it is
a sanctioned custom as stated in the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33
N.Y.S 2d 733). This does not apply in the Philippines. The petition filed herein is denied and
petitioner is advised to drop the name OZAETA from the firm name.
National Marketing Corporation, plaintiff-appellant vs. Miguel Tecson, defendant-appellee
Facts:December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation filed a complaint, docketed as civil case no.
63701 on the same court, as successor of the Price Stabilization Corporation, against the same
defendant from 10 years ago (December 21, 1955, Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Tecson).
Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss the said complaint upon the ground lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of that and prescription of action.More than ten years have passed a year is a
period of 365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960 and 1964 were both leap years so that
when this present case was filed it was filed two days too late.The lower court, then, issued an order
of dismissal with regards the article 13 of the civil code. Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an
action upon a judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues,
the issue thus confined to the date on which ten years from December 21, 1955 had expired.However,
National Marketing Corporation insists that the same is erroneous because a year means a calendar
year. There is no question that when it is not a leap year, December 21 to December 21 of the
following year is one year. The case reached its conclusion with the appellants theory that
contravenes the explicit provision of Article 13 of the civil code.
Issues:Whether or not the term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days.
Ruling: Yes. The term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days. However, it
is said to be unrealistic and if public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the
revised administrative code, this may be done through legislative process and not by judicial decree.
Bellis vs Bellis
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom he
divorced he had five legitimate children (Edward Bellis et al), by his second wife, who survived him,
he had three legitimate children. He, however, also had three illegitimate children in the Philippines
(Maria Cristina Bellis et al). Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties
and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not
given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have been
deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of
the illegitimate children.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the said children, maria Kristina et al, are not entitled to
their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.
Diaz v. CA
Facts: On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed with the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the approval of the sound value appraisal of its property
in service.The Asian Appraisal Company valued the property and equipment of DLPC as of 12
March 1990 at One Billion One Hundred Forty One Million Seven Hundred Seventy Four Thousand
Pesos (P1,141,774,000.00). On 6 December 1992, ERB approved the application of DLPC after
deducting Fourteen Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P14,800,000.00) worth of property and
equipment which were not used by DLPC in its operation. On 6 July 1992, petitioners filed a petition
for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of ERB on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.In our resolution of
8 September 1992, the Supreme Court referred the case for proper disposition to the Court of Appeals
which subsequently dismissed the petition on the ground that (1) the filing of the petition for review
with the Supreme Court was a wrong mode of appeal, and (2) the petition did not comply with the
provisions of Supreme Court Circular 1-88 in that (a) it did not state the date when the petitioners
received notice of the ERB decision, (b) it did not state the date when the petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, and (c) it inconsistently alleged different dates when petitioners supposedly received
the denial of their motion by ERB.On 18 December 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that our resolution of 8 September 1992 was a directive for the Court of Appeals to
disregard the above circular.In its resolution of 24 March 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Issu: whether or not E.O. No. 172 is violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution
Held: Yes. Since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the advice and concurrence of the
Supreme Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it cannot be deemed to
have amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the authority of the Court of
Appeals to decide cases from the Board of Energy, now ERB, remains.
SEA COMMERCIAL COMPANY, INC., vs CA G.R. No. 122823. November 25, 1999 Facts:
In this petition for review by certiorari , SEA Commercial Company, Inc. (SEACOM), a corporation
engaged in the business of selling and distributing agricultural machinery, products, and equipment,
assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV NO. 31263 affirming in toto the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5, in Civil Case No. 122391, in favor of Jamandre
Industries, Inc. (JII) et al., SEACOMs appointed exclusive dealer in the City and Province of Iloilo, as
per dealership agreement entered by both on September 20, 1966. Tirso Jamandre, one of the
respondents herein, executed a suretyship agreement binding himself jointly and severally with JII to
pay for all obligations of JII to SEACOM. The agreement was subsequently amended to include Capiz
in the territorial coverage and to make the dealership agreement on a non-exclusive basis. In the
course of the business relationship arising from the dealership agreement, JII allegedly incurred a
balance of P18,843.85 for unpaid deliveries, and SEACOM brought action to recover said amount
plus interest and attorneys fees.
JII filed an Answer denying the obligation and interposing a counterclaim for damages representing
unrealized profits when JII sold to the Farm System Development Corporation (FSDC) twenty one
(21) units of Mitsubishi power tillers. In the counterclaim, JII alleged that as a dealer in Capiz, JII
contracted to sell in 1977 twenty-four (24) units of Mitsubishi power tillers to a group of farmers to be
financed by said corporation, which fact JII allegedly made known to petitioner, but the latter taking
advantage of said information and in bad faith, went directly to FSDC and dealt with it and sold
twenty one (21) units of said tractors, thereby depriving JII of unrealized profit of eighty-five
thousand four hundred fifteen and 61/100 pesos (P85,415.61). Both courts invoke, as basis for their
decision, Article 19 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:
"Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.
Issue: Whether or not SEACOM acted in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer as regards
the sale of farm machineries to FSDC.
Held: Yes. By appointing as a dealer of its agricultural equipment, SEACOM recognized the role and
undertaking of JII to promote and sell said equipment. Under the dealership agreement, JII was to act
as a middleman to sell SEACOMs products, in its area of operations, i.e. Iloilo and Capiz provinces,
to the exclusion of other places, to send its men to Manila for training on repair, servicing, and
installation of the items to be handled by it, and to comply with other personnel and vehicle
requirements intended for the benefit of the dealership. After being informed of the demonstrations
JII had conducted to promote the sales of SEACOM equipment, including the operations at JIIs
expense conducted for five months, and the approval of its facilities (service and parts) by FSDC,
SEACOM participated in the bidding for the said equipment at a lower price, placing itself in direct
competition with its own dealer. The actuations of SEACOM are tainted by bad faith.
Baksh vs CA
In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21
years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who was studying
medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and intimate. On Marilous account, she said that
Gashem later offered to marry her at the end of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her
parents where they expressed their intention to get married. Marilous parents then started inviting
sponsors and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for animals to slaughter for the
occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual intercourse.
But in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou. Gashem
eventually revoked his promise of marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already married to
someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be
adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar
with Filipino customs and traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of his breach
of promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:Any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit and fraud
employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise of
marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As found by the trial court,
Marilou was not a woman of loose morals. She was a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not
have surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem not promised to marry her. Gashems blatant
disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals,
good customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country and
even taking advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected to respect our traditions. Any
act contrary will render him liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts of torts and
quasi delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach complained of is not
strictly covered by existing laws. It was meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute
books such as the absence of a law penalizing a the breach of promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry was made and
there was carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be recovered (presence of moral
or criminal seduction), Except if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the
promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual damages may be recovered.
WASSMER vs.VELEZ G.R. No. L-20089
FACTS: On August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which
was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and
other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the
flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were
given and gifts received. And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then
28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding My mother
opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the
wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned
and was never heard from again.
ISSUE: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong?
HELD: Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding
and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about
to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code
TITLE: Nikko Hotel Manila vs. Reyes CITATION: GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005
FACTS: Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals
in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto
Reyes aka Amang Bisaya, an entertainment artist. There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel
was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart
invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotels former General Manager, Mr.
Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the
latters gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame
and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotels Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice
enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati
policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his
shame and humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by
the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filarts sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if
Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filarts
group. She wasnt able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone
and doesnt want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically
ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even
asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.
During the plaintiffs cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she approached
him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lims intention to relay the request only be heard by him.
It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
HELD: Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the
necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the
party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is experienced
enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages
brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
GR NO 155550 Northwest Airlines vs Chiong Case digest-none
Mendoza vs Casumpong
A Surgical Operation Is The Responsibility Of The Surgeon Performing It. He Must Personally
Ascertain That The Counts Of Instruments And Materials Used Before The Surgery And Prior To
Sewing The Patient Up Have Been Correctly Done
The Case:In February, 1993, Josephine underwent hysterectomy and myomectomy thru Dr. Mariter
Mendoza at the Iloilo Doctors Hospital. However, after the operation, Josephin experienced
recurring fever, nausea, and vomiting. Three months later, while taking a bath, she noticed a
protruding object from her genital, and tried calling Dr. Mendoza, who was not available. When she
went to see another physician (Dr. Edna Jamandre) the latter was able to extract a foul smelling,
partially expelled rolled gauze from her cervix. This prompted her to file a civil case for damages
against Dr. Mendoza. Josephine was substituted by her heirs when she died before trials end.
After trial, the RTC initially ruled in favour of the respondents, but on motion for reconsideration by
Dr. Mendoza, reversed itself. On appeal, the CA reinstated the original RTC decision, ruling that Dr.
Mendoza committed a breach of her duty as a physician when a gauze remained in her patients
body after surgery.
The Issue: Whether or not Dr. Mendoza is liable for the death of Josephine.
The Ruling: But she raises at this Courts level a question of fact when parties may raise only
questions of law before it in petitions for review on certiorari from the CA. With few exceptions, the
factual findings of the latter court are generally binding. None of those exceptions applies to this
case.1As the RTC pointed out, Josephine did not undergo any other surgical operation. And it would
be much unlikely for her or for any woman to inject a roll of gauze into her cervix. As the Court held
in Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana:2
An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until the sponges are
properly removed, and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the
wound after the incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon.
To put it simply, such act is considered so inconsistent with due care as to raise an inference of
negligence. There are even legions of authorities to the effect that such act is negligence per se.
The Court notes, however, that neither the CA nor the RTC awarded exemplary damages against Dr.
Mendoza when, under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral damages. Exemplary damages may
also be awarded in cases of gross negligence.3
A surgical operation is the responsibility of the surgeon performing it. He must personally ascertain
that the counts of instruments and materials used before the surgery and prior to sewing the patient
up have been correctly done. To provide an example to the medical profession and to stress the need
for constant vigilance in attending to a patients health, the award of exemplary damages in this case
is in order.Further, in view of Josephines death resulting from petitioners negligence, civil
indemnity under Article 22064 of the Civil Code should be given to respondents as heirs. The
amount of P50,000.00 is fixed by prevailing jurisprudence for this kind.5
The Court also deems it just and equitable under Article 2208 of the Civil Code to increase the award
of attorneys fees from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00.WHEREFORE, the Court entirely AFFIRMS the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 18, 2011 with the MODIFICATION ordering petitioner
Mariter Mendoza to pay respondents Adriano, Jennifer Adriane and John Andre, all surnamed
Casumpang, an additional P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, additional P30,000.00 as attorneys fees
and civil indemnity arising from death in the amount of P50,000.00.
Hing vs. Choachuy Art 25&26
FACTS:Picture4 Sometime in April 2005, Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (owned by
Choachuys) filed a case for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order against the Hings. The latter claimed that the Hings constructed a
fence without a valid permit and that it would destroy the walls of their building. The court denied
the application for lack of evidence. So in order to get evidences for the case, on June 2005, Choachuy
illegally set-up two video surveillance cameras facing the Hings property. Their employees even
took pictures of the said construction of the fence. The Hings then filed a case against the Choachuys
for violating their right to privacy. On October 2005, the RTC issued a order granting the application
of the Hings for TRO and directed the Choachuys to remove the two video surveillance cameras
they installed. The Choachuys appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and the RTCs decision
was annulled and set aside. The Hings then raised the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of two video surveillance cameras of Choachuys violated the
Hings right to privacy.
HELD:Such act of the Choachuys violated the right of privacy of the Hings under Article 26(1)
prohibiting the prying into the privacy of anothers residence. Although it is a business office and
not a residence, the owner has the right to exclude the public or deny them access.
PIMENTEL vs. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010 Facts: Respondent, Maria
Chrysantine Pimentel, filed an action for frustrated parricide against petitioner, Joselito R. Pimentel.
The Information for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004 and was raffled to RTC Quezon
City on 25 October 2004. The pre-trial and trial was set on 14 February 2005. She also filed on 5
November 2004, a petition, dated 4 November 2004, for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity Petitioner received
summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City on 7 February 2005, for the pre-
trial and trial of the Civil Case. He then filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the
RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question asserting that the
relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil
Case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. The
RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The Court of Appeals also denied
the petition holding that the issue in the criminal case for frustrated parricide differs from the issue in
the civil action for annulment of marriage. It ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been
committed. At the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting. Issue: Whether
or not the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants
the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide.

Ruling: The elements of a prejudicial question under Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed, were not met. Civil action must be
instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the civil case for annulment was
filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. Further, the resolution of the civil
action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There is
a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in
the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The relationship between the offender and the victim
is a key element in the crime of parricide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not
similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship
between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The
issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue
in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have
killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil
Case is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the
subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, he was still married to respondent