[TYPE THE COMPANY NAME]

Somalis security situation and the effort by

the AMISOM and Somali National Army
Charles Sturt University -Canberra

Ahmed Tohow
8/19/2017
Table of Contents

Abstract ...................................................................................................................... 2

Efforts by African Mission In Somalia and Somali National Army ............................... 3

Lack of strong government, weak institutions, and lack of peace and reconciliation

between the Somali tribes .......................................................................................... 7

Free movement of the people and lack of security ................................................. 9

References ............................................................................................................... 12
Abstract

The objective of this paper is to discuss the efforts of AMISOM to eradicate Al-
Shabaab and other terrorist groups like ISIS from Somalia and East African region.
Since AMISOM has captured numerous strongholds of al-Shabaab, it has resulted in
a significant damage to the income of the group. . The state security is very marginal
in most of the countries of this region which has resulted in lack of security on the
borders. Additionally, United Nations has also enforced different kinds of sanctions on
Somalia since 1992 but in 2010, the UN officially sanctioned a list of al-Shabaab
associates and its followers which subjected to a assets freeze, travel ban, and
targeted weapons restraint that was pursuant to the Security Council Resolution of
1844. As East Africa has suffered from severe inter-state struggles that combined with
fragile governance, discipline and statelessness especially in case of Somalia have
resulted in instability, volatility, poverty, and political segregation from rest of the world.
These aspects play a significant role in vulnerability of the region in terrorist
manipulation and exploitation.
Efforts by African Mission In Somalia and Somali National Army
The efforts by African Mission In Somalia and Somali National Army to counter Al-
Shabaab and ISIS terrorists in Somalia and East Africa will be highlighted in this paper
and will also discuss the lack of strong government, weak constitution/institutions,
corruption, and lack of peace and reconciliation between the Somali tribes since the
start of civil war 1990, as these factors have made it very difficult to restore the peace
and security most of the southern part of Somalia. Although the roots of Al-Shabaab
are murky, it is safe to say that this militant group was first noticed by the world in
2002. It was established by four Somalians namely, Ibrahim Haji Jamaa al-Afghani,
Ayro (Abu Muhsen alAnsari), Godane (Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubayr), and Sheikh
Mukhtar Robow Ali (Abu Mansur). Out of these four, three of them are still leading the
group (Hull Wiklund, 2013).
Al-Shabaab became the strongest force in Somalia in no time and pinned down
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in which was being protected by the troops of
the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The African Mission was founded five years
after the emergence of Al-Shabaab and was mandated to safeguard the latest
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which was being led by the ex-leader of the
ICU, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Since the TFG was in shambles due to weak
leadership, ineffectiveness and corruption, the general public of Somalia did not have
any faith in the organization (Bu and Tang, 2010). Observing this situation, al-Shabaab
initiated a deadlock in the South of Somalia and also in Mogadishu. In the meantime,
AMISOM and TFG ineptly hung on in a very small reserve in the city. It should also be
noted that Al-Qa`idas association with al-Shabaab in Somalia can be dated back to
as far as 1992. It was the time when the American government made arrangements
for sending troops to Somalia so that humanitarian corridors can be opened in the
region and the starving Somalians can be provided sustenance. This operation was
known as Unified Task Force (Choi and Piazza, 2014).
On the 11th of July in 2010, two bomb blasts ripped the crowd apart that has gathered
at a restaurant in Kampala, Uganda to watch the World Cup final at a rugby club. As
the news of 70 people being killed came in, al-Shabaab claimed the responsibility for
the blasts and stated that it was their retribution for the support Uganda was providing
for AMISOM mission. This incident caught the attention of different nations of the world
and pointed towards the level of danger such a sophisticated global extremist
operation was posing that was completely established out of Somalia (UGANDA: Al
Shabaab Bombs Kampala, 2010). Eventually, AMISOM had to break out of their
enclave in Mogadishu so that they can tackle the extremist group that had formed their
base in Somalia. Thus, al-Shabaab AMISOM broke out from its enclave in Mogadishu,
and al-Shabaab started to swiftly lose their ground in Somalia (Fisher, 2014). As
AMISOM has been tracking down the militant group aggressively, the number of their
followers has deteriorated but many are thought to have taken shelter in the Northern
hilly region of the country and in forests of Lower Juba. But it is still hard to tell the
level of damage their forces have sustained or how severely their resources have been
tarnished, it is still quite clear that they still have a substantial number of militants in
their establishment as the group has a core force of approximately 5000 fighters who
are still untouched by the AMISOM. Having such a huge number of fighters at their
disposal makes them quite capable of carrying out terrorist attacks (Asal et al., 2016).
On the other hand, having lost a huge portion of their forces and assets has result in
making the Somalis believe that the militant group is no longer worth tolerating
anymore. A substantial portion of defectors have abandoned the militant group after
the losses they sustained in their recent territorial clashes with the government; this is
the greatest display of the fact that al-Shabaab is losing its stronghold in Somalia
thanks to AMISOM (Botha and Abdile, n.d.).
Since AMISOM has captured numerous strongholds of al-Shabaab, it has resulted in
a significant damage to the income of the group. As the group is no longer in a position
to depend on the similar levels of taxes as before, from Mogadishus Bakara Market
and Kismayos port, it has become quite difficult for the leaders of the group to provide
the same level of monetary assistances to their fighters which inspired them to join the
group in the first place. Loss of financial assets has result in even more defections
which has proven to be major setback for al-Shabaab. Apart from losing its financial
assets and militants, al-Shabaab has also sustained considerable loses in terms of
infrastructure that was being used by the group for communicating propagandas of
different kinds and natures. As the most important source of transmission for the group
has been the radio stations, AMISOM has successfully taken down majority of them
to effectively damage their most effective source of communication. While the number
of insurgents being killed by the Somali coalition is not confirmed, one thing is for sure;
the militant group has sustained huge damages on hands of AMISOM (Jones, 2013).
Additionally, the American military forces have also worked rigorously to counter the
threats posed by militant groups like al-Qaida, ISIS and al-Shabaab. Though the
number of occasions is quite limited where the US military forces took direct action
against these militant groups and their members, the steps taken by US military played
its part in weakening and damaging the groups assets significantly. Moreover, the US
government has also provide aid to the Somali government for countering the terrorist
attacks that were being undertaken by ISIS and al-Shabaab by providing at least eight
unarmed Ravens to the AMISOM forces so as to help them in collecting intelligence
on these groups on Somali soil (Botha, 2014). Reports have surfaced recently that
claim Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has a fully functional and operational base in
Mogadishu that is working with AMISOM for eradication of the militant groups like ISIS
and al-Shabaab in Somalia. Targeted killings of high-level militants belonging to these
groups have also been reported which includes Aden Hashi Ayro, one of the
masterminds of al-Shabaab, was exterminated in a targeted airstrike in May, 2008. An
ICU leader, Sheikh Muhyadin Omar, was also taken down by the US military forces in
that airstrike which claimed the life of Ayro. An al-Qaeda leader who gained control of
East Africa, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, was also killed by the US military forces. He was
responsible for blasting an Israeli hotel in 2002. He was also thought to have been a
ringleader in attacking and blasting American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in
the year 1998. Another high-level militant belonging to one of these militant groups
was Bilal al-Barjawi who was suspected to have been the suspected instigator of
Kampala bombings 2010. Quantification of the affects these exterminations had on
the terrorist groups is quite difficult but Somalis have stated that losing so many high-
level leaders has resulted in lowering the morale and confidence of the fighters that
belong to al-Shabaab (Mohamed and Duale, 2015).
The global community has stressed on sanctioning the members of al-Shabaab,
including the countries and the people who support and provide funding to these
groups. Under Executive Order (EO) 13224, in 2008, the USA the U.S. formally titled
al-Shabaab as a terrorist group which resulted in opening the militant group to
numerous sanctions. This was repeated again in the year 2010 when President
Obama termed al-Shabaab as a body that should be sanctioned all over the world
(Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2009). Many noteworthy leaders like Hassan Dahir
Aweys, Ahmed Abdi Godane, and Fuad Mohamed Khalaf and many others were
named in this sanction and also included any person who threatened the stability,
peace and security of Somalia. Subsequently, another executive order was sanctioned
which included any person that was involved in Somali charcoal trade as this was one
of the major revenue generators of al-Shabaab in Somalia (Murithi, 2008).
Additionally, United Nations has also enforced different kinds of sanctions on Somalia
since 1992 but in 2010, the UN officially sanctioned a list of al-Shabaab associates
and its followers which subjected to a assets freeze, travel ban, and targeted weapons
restraint that was pursuant to the Security Council Resolution of 1844. But then again,
as al-Shabaab has so many funding partners, it is not possible to wholly quantify or
calculate the effects of the sanctions put in place by different welfare organizations of
the world as the sanctions imposed by the USA are comparatively new and those
sanctions have yet to show some substantial results. Nonetheless, it can be easily
assumed that the impacts of these sanctions are not non-existent as the sanctions
regimes of the USA are quite daunting. But UN objected to the sanctions imposed by
the US as those sanctions were regularly and openly violated by a multitude of nations
and individuals that were involved in trafficking different weapons into the country. The
initial report of the American sanctions may not be very encouraging, the authorities
are still very hopeful about the toll it will take on the group and its followers. Moreover,
Saudi Arabia announced in October 2012 that they will discontinue their import of
charcoal from Somalia as this industry is a major supporter of al-Shabaab, but then
again a recent report by UN has claimed that the charcoal industry of Somali is still
thriving and that Saudi Arabia continues to be one of the major importers for the
unlawful product (Wtzel, 2017).
As all of these actions taken by the world organizations and Somalia have succeeded
in cornering the militant group, it has regressed to guerrilla strategies and schemes
and the too by necessity, and not by choice. Most of the problems that al-Shabaab is
facing are due to the mistakes they committed themselves, principally its callousness,
its Salafism and dependence on foreign armed forces, as well as their internal strife,
not to mention the destructive AMISOM offensive that the militant group has not been
able to resist. Al-Shabaab has many able and accomplished insurrectionaries and
insurgents, and in order to ensure that the group does not regain power in Somalia,
the forces of AMISOM has to devise a well-organized and comprehensible
counterinsurgency operation that supports the new administrations state-building
development plan. But there are some alarming indications that point towards the fact
that not only they do not have a complete counterinsurgency strategy, but some of the
component nations of the coalition are interested in their own state benefits only and
are grinding down the goodwill and favour the association has accumulated by
eradicating al-Shabaab, to some extent, from Somalia (Turbiville, Meservey and
Forest, 2014).
As the grasp of al-Shabaab weakened in Somalia, ISIS made their first ever first open
offer to Al-Shabaab in 2015 in an online message where they called the al-Shabaab
their brothers. The announcement insisted Al-Shabaab to pledge loyalty to ISIS, and
argued that their earlier Bayah to the other militant group Al-Qaeda was a commitment
to the noble cause of jihad as well as the Caliphate, and not to a solitary establishment
(Berger, 2016). The message also comprised of guidelines directing the al-Shabaab
on the way they should proclaim their loyalty to ISIS. This pledge does not have any
significant effects on the Somali government or people as the conditions on the Somali
soil are still very fluid and can change at any moment. It is now the responsivity of the
government run by Shaykh Sharif to demonstrate that they have the ability to
assemble most of the Somali people to its more reasonable plan. Re-establishment of
security is the first and foremost task for the present government. The answer to this
problem, according to the Western nations is an extension of African Union. Although
extension of the coalition will be quite useful is making sure the airport and sea port of
Mogadishu remains under control of the government, the most important task for the
Somali government is to build a force that can combat the new-found affiliation
between ISIS and al-Shabaab (Bryden, 2015).

Lack of strong government, weak institutions, and lack of peace and

reconciliation between the Somali tribes

As East Africa has suffered from severe inter-state struggles that combined with fragile
governance, discipline and statelessness especially in case of Somalia have resulted
in instability, volatility, poverty, and political segregation from rest of the world. These
aspects play a significant role in vulnerability of the region in terrorist manipulation and
exploitation. Ethiopia, for example, is at the same time at war with many rebellious
groups as well as Eritrea. The most common causes of conflict are the disputes
caused by borders between different countries, not to mention the personal issues
Prime Ministers of Ethiopia and Eritrea has had. In addition to this, Ethiopia has been
accusing Eritrea of aiding the religious radical groups that are affiliated to al-Qaida, for
example, Al-Shabaab, which further intensifies the military objectives of Ethiopia.
These disputes have resulted in hundreds of thousands of loses on both sides.
Similarly, in Uganda, the insurgent groups like Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF)
and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) have been resisting the government which have
resulted in more than 5000 deaths all across the country. This shows the situation of
peace and stability in East Africa. The government seems to have very little control
over the insurgents which has caused losses in terms of manpower and monetary
assets alike. Weak governess has caused these insurgent groups to flourish and
create strongholds form them in East Africa as the government does not seem to have
an effective stragtey for tacking the situation of peace in the region. Although, in 2004,
the government of Sudan succeeded in signing the Naivasha-Machakos Accords
which resulted in creating Government of National Unity (GNU). This helped in ending
the insurgency led by the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM), the
country was divided into ethnic and religious groups as Northen part was dominated
by Muslims and Southern part was dominated by non-Muslims. However, the support
provided to Arabic mercenaries known as the Janjaweed by the Sudanese
government led to the attack on indigenous tribes in Darfur: the Zaghawa, Fur, and
Massaleit. This incident resulted in a substantial humanitarian catastrophe that
included mass dislocation of people, strife and death (Busher, 2014).
Furthermore, Southern Somalia has been fighting the civil war in their country for at
least last two decades. After Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991, Somalia has not had
a stable and well-functioning government and has made it the most insecure and
unstable part of the nation. Chieftains governed this part of the country and these
governments were mostly clan-based. Nut in 2006, Islamic Courts Union (ICU)
overtook Mogadishu after overcoming the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and
Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT). Nevertheless, the sovereignty of ICU lived on for a very
short duration of time as it was overthrown by Ethiopians who invaded this part of the
region in December 2006. This change in governance put Somali Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) back in control in Mogadishu. Though Eritrea did not support TFG
as their government was accused of supporting militant groups operating in Somalia,
but nations like USA, Ethiopia and other neighbouring governments were in favour of
TFG (Parker, 2007). Nonetheless Somalia had to go through an extensive period of
statelessness due to poor conditions of security in the country which was mainly
caused due to the insurgent activities of different militant organizations like ISIS, al-
Qaeda and al-Shabaab. Lack of strategic interventions and their implementation is
also another driving force for poor and weak governance in the region. Ex deputy
prime minister of the country, Adan Abdi Salam, has stated that the support required
for transitional governance is not received from the Somalis which has resulted in a
power vacuum in the nations poor state of affairs, both nationally and internationally
as this form of statelessness gives opportunity to the foreign powers to interfere in the
countrys affairs for their own benefit. A state of anarchy was created due to the
conflicts between different indigenous tribes and activities of the insurgent groups
(Williams, 2009).

Free movement of the people and lack of security

Porous borders have created a major issue in terms of stability and security for
governments of all countries of East Africa. The state security is very marginal in most
of the countries of this region which has resulted in lack of security on the borders.
This demonstrates the inability of the state governments to implement the territorial
restrictions of their country. The poor state of affairs on the border has made it quite
easy for the people to cross borders legally or illegally as there is little to no check and
balance. Illegal trade is also on the rise on the perforated borders, especially on the
Somalia - Kenya border. Easy flow of weaponry and terrorists can also be attributed
to these perforations as the government do not have any control over the influx or
outflow of people and trade on these borders. Lack of precise intelligence is another
reason for these perforations and influx as operating sophisticated intelligence gears
is not possible in Southern and Central Somalia as the groups like Hizb Islam, ISIS
and al-Shabaab are very active in those areas (Piazza, 2011). Although some custom
check points are set up by the government at some of the main entry points on Kenyan
border, majority of the border is still not being patrolled by the government officials
who have created the perfect opportunity for the militants to infiltrate the region and
trade their weapons without any difficulty. This state of security has been a worrisome
for the government for a long time but the degree of corruption and poor governance
has made it impossible to come up with an effective strategy to remedy this issue
(Busher, 2014).
As the Indian Ocean is most vulnerable to piracy around the globe, it is also touching
the Eastern part of Africa. This is another reason for poor security and high levels of
smuggling activities in this part of Africa. In 2008, 293 piracy attacks were reported
by ICC International Maritime Bureau out of which, 19 took place on the coasts of
Somalia. Hovered, the following year, the total number of piracy attacks reported were
410 while, 80 of these attacks took place on the coasts of Somalia (Diaz, 2013).
Additionally, as counter-piracy activities increased and surveillance by the
international agencies increased, the number of attacks decreased globally but
increased locally for Somalia as 139 attacks were reported on coasts of Somalia while
the total number of attacks was 192 in the year 2010. These attacks were favoured by
the militant groups as the pirates provide weaponry to the groups and the groups; in
turn provide assistance in capturing ships for the pirates and other assets (Pandya,
2012).
Ideological enmity over the insinuation of Islam in this region establishes itself as a
brawl and tussle amongst the conventional Sufi Islam, the Wahhabis and the Salafists
understandings of the religion. The regions where the people belonging to the
Wahhabi sect have established settlements, people belonging to Sufism have been
demolished and substituted by conventional Wahhabi customs and practices (Ghatak
and Gold, 2015). This shows the degree of conflicts and dissonance different tribes
and sects of the same religion has amongst each other. Weak governance, coupled
with lack of security and stability has played a major role in uprising of the militant
groups as they feed on such issues and recruit new fighters to increase the number of
militants and create a stronghold for them in the region (Williams, 2011).
As far as countering the terrorism created by these groups is concerned, it has been
recognised by many nations that the use of military forces is counterproductive as it
causes civilian casualties and makes the military forces seem similar to the terrorist
groups. This also creates doubts in the minds of the people against the military forces
as the local people are often displaced and their homes are destroyed by these
operations against the extremist groups. It also undermines the strategies being used
by the military forces against the terrorist groups that are working in the region to
destabilize the country and its government. It is very import to give the local
government a chance to create a fully functioning coalition comprising of the local
people so that they can play their part for the betterment of their country. But this can
only be possible after strong governance is established in the country which is devoid
of corruption and works for safety and security of the country and its people sincerely
and with complete loyalty (Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev, 2011). Prime Minister
Sharmarke has proclaimed that he is ready to hold talks with the militant groups like
ISIS and al-Shabaab even though the leaders of these groups are continuously
opposing the Prime Minister and his regime. It is also high time the foreign forces leave
the Somalis to deal with their problems internally so that the local authorities as well
as the people can start trusting their government again (Dias, 2011).
In conclusion, Al-Shabaab is a militant group which was established by four Somalians
namely, Ibrahim Haji Jamaa al-Afghani, Ayro (Abu Muhsen alAnsari), Godane (Sheikh
Mukhtar Abu Zubayr), and Sheikh Mukhtar Robow Ali (Abu Mansur). Out of these four,
three of them are still leading the group.
Al-Shabaab became the strongest force in Somalia in no time and pinned down
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in which was being protected by the troops of
the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The African Mission was founded five years
after the emergence of Al-Shabaab and was mandated to safeguard the latest
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which was being led by the ex-leader of the
ICU, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Since the TFG was in shambles due to weak
leadership, ineffectiveness and corruption, the general public of Somalia did not have
any faith in the organization. Observing this situation, al-Shabaab initiated a deadlock
in the South of Somalia and also in Mogadishu. In the meantime, AMISOM and TFG
ineptly hung on in a very small reserve in the city. It should also be noted that Al-
Qa`idas association with al-Shabaab in Somalia can be dated back to as far as 1992.
It was the time when the American government made arrangements for sending troops
to Somalia so that humanitarian corridors can be opened in the region and the starving
Somalians can be provided sustenance. This operation was known as Unified Task
Force. As all of the actions taken by the world organizations and Somalia have
succeeded in cornering the militant group, it has regressed to guerrilla strategies and
schemes and the too by necessity, and not by choice. Most of the problems that al-
Shabaab is facing are due to the mistakes they committed themselves, principally its
callousness, its Salafism and dependence on foreign armed forces, as well as their
internal strife, not to mention the destructive AMISOM offensive that the militant group
has not been able to resist.
As East Africa has suffered from severe inter-state struggles that combined with fragile
governance, discipline and statelessness especially in case of Somalia have resulted
in instability, volatility, poverty, and political segregation from rest of the world. These
aspects play a significant role in vulnerability of the region in terrorist manipulation and
exploitation. Ethiopia, for example, is at the same time at war with many rebellious
 groups as well as Eritrea. Porous borders have created a major issue in terms of
stability and security for governments of all countries of East Africa. The state security
is very marginal in most of the countries of this region which has resulted in lack of
security on the borders. This demonstrates the inability of the state governments to
implement the territorial restrictions of their country.

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