| | | | | CHAPTER ONE Al-Maturidi’s View of Causality NAZIF MUHTAROGLU 1.1 Introduction Abi Mansiir al-Maturidi (853-944), the founder of the Maturidi School, was the originator of an independent strand in the Islamic kalam and influenced many people in Central Asia and the old Ottoman world. Nonetheless, West- ern scholarship directed its attention to al-Maturidi’s ideas only after the first half of the twentieth century. His main kalam work, the Book of Monothe- ism (Kitab al-Tawhid), was discovered in 1950.' Fathalla Kholeif edited the manuscript first in 1970, albeit with some mistakes.? Bekir Topaloglu and Muhammed Aruci introduced a much more reliable edition in 2002. In comparison to the other prominent schools of the kaldm, such as the Mu'tazila and the Ash‘ariyya, scholarly works have shown that al-Maturidi’s ideas cannot be easily classified under either school. In this chapter, I explore al-Maturidr’s metaphysics in his Book of Monotheism (Kitab al-Tawhid), fo- cusing on his view of the causal relationship between God and the universe, and comparing it to the views of the abovementioned schools. Al-Maturidi’s view of causality has been subject to diverse interpreta- tions. Mustafa Ceric considers him an atomist and a believer in continuous creation. Thus, for Ceric, al-Maturidi was among the majority of the Mus- lim mutakallimun.+ Yet it is not clear whether by the phrase “the majority of the Muslim mutakallimiin” Ceric refers only to the Ash‘arites or to both the Ash‘arites and Mu'tazilites, since both groups were atomists and held that God continues to create the world, though they disagreed on the details of continuous creation. The term “continuous creation” is ambiguous, falling somewhere between occasionalism and conservation with secondary cau- sality. While occasionalists deny any kind of secondary causality and af- firm only divine agency, some believers in divine conservation ascribe causalOCCASIONALISM IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION powers to finite beings. powers to finite beings. Richard Frank focuses on al- Maturidr’s idea of natures (faba’i) and argues that al-Maturidt ascribed cau- sality to natures but did not treat them as the naturalists did.’ Ulrich Rudolph neither accepts Frank’s interpretation of natures nor affirms that al-Maturidi totally rejected secondary causes in the universe. For Rudolph, occasionalism, the hallmark of the Ash‘arites, has no role in al-Maturidi’s thought.‘ J. Meric Pessagno examines al-Maturidi’s ideas on the human will and comes to the conclusion that al-Maturidi affirmed the causal agency of human beings.” Al- Maturidi’s treatment of the human will is generally considered to be a reason for his being closer to the Mu'tazilites than to the Ash‘arites. As we see from these interpretations, nobody has argued clearly that al- Maturidi accepts occasionalism. In the discussion that follows, ] argue that a careful study of the Book of Monotheism shows that al-Maturidi holds an oc- casionalist position. Nonetheless, his occasionalism is not exactly the same as that of the Ash‘arites and carries some elements of Mu'tazilite ideas. In order to understand al-Maturidi’s view of causality properly, first, I briefly present the metaphysical systems of Abii al-Hudhayl al-‘Allaf (752~841), a significant Muttazilite scholar, and al-Ash‘ari (874-936), the founder of the Ash‘arite School. Second, in comparison to these metaphysical systems, I examine al- Maturidi’s metaphysics in terms of its implications for causality. 1.2 Mu'tazilites and Ash‘arites Although there are various strands of thought associated with the Mu‘tazilites, their mainstream metaphysical view is atomism. Al-Ash‘ari was formerly a Muttazilite, but he rejected a significant portion of Mu'tazilite ideas later and established his own school, known as the Ash‘arite School. Nonetheless, he continued to hold to a belief in atomism. One of the detailed accounts of Muttazilite atomism belongs to Aba al-Hudhayl al-‘Allaf, who lived before al-Ash‘ari. I will present the atomistic systems of both scholars and compare them in terms of their causal conclusions. Abi al-Hudhayl accepts that the universe is made up of indivisible par- ticles (al-juz’ alladbi la yatajazza’). He analyzes these particles in terms of two ontological categories: substrate (maball) and accident (‘arad). An atom may be identified with the substrate, which is the fundamental entity in which attributes and properties (in other words, accidents) inhere. Yet an atom can never exist independently of accidents. According to Abi al-Hudhayl, not even God can strip atoms completely of accidents.* Richard M. Frank clarifies this point: “The atom has no actuality, in one sense, apart from accidents.”? The atom-accident distinction is a conceptual one, and substrates or atoms always exist with some accidents that inhere in them. 4AL-MATURIDI’S VIEW OF CAUSALITY Abi al-Hudhayl does not give a general definition of accidents, but merely talks about their species. As Alnoor Dhanani notes, the mutakallimiin typically considered accidents as transient phenomena. However, the duration of their transience is disputed.'? In terms of their duration, Abii al-Hudhay! formulates two types of accident. The first kind cannot exist for more than one moment. An example in this category is motion (al-haraka). Motion, understood in this way, has no endurance and ceases to exist at the next instant after its coming to be. The second kind of accident has an extended duration. Rest, tastes, odors, the accident of life, and the autonomous power of action are instances of this type. Atoms also have an extended duration (baqa’), which is explained by the following divine command assumed to be given to the things in which accidents of duration inhere: “Continue to exist!” (“ibga!”)."' It is not clear whether Abii al-Hudhay! means that God issues this command just once or at every moment, Dhanani thinks, according to Abii al-Hudhayl, that God com- mands it just once, for the following reasons: First, only in this way can his position be differentiated from that of the Baghdadi Mu'tazilite scholars, who believed that God re-creates at each moment the accident of duration (baqa’) in enduring things.'* Second, Aba al-Hudhay! holds that the annihilation of enduring atoms takes place by another command of God: “Cease to exist!” (“ifna!”).? Dhanani rightly reasons, if the annihilation in question happens in accordance with a distinct divine command, then it is not simply that things are annihilated as a result of God’s withholding the command “Continue to exist!” '* Thus, if things are not annihilated as a result of withholding the ini- tial command, then it is not plausible to hold that God constantly commands things to exist. On the basis of this interpretation, we must conclude that God initiates the duration of something with one command and finishes it with another command but does nothing else in between, apart from creating non- enduring accidents. Moreover, atoms and enduring accidents continue to exist on their own without relying on divine power. That is to say, they cause their own future states. Thus, Abii al-Hudhayl’s metaphysics allows for causality in the created realm and presupposes that God is not the only causal agent. This implicit idea becomes apparent when he comes to analyze human acts. Aba al-Hudhay! divides human acts into two categories: voluntary and involuntary. Involuntary, or unintentional, actions, such as trembling, are caused by divine power. Human beings own only voluntary acts, which are freely determined by their will (ir@da) and performed by their own powers. Human beings use their powers to initiate actions in accordance with choices (ikhtiyDr), and their powers are related to a set of contraries (i.e. perform- ing a specific act and leaving it undone).'’ Human power as the cause of an act always precedes the act (al-istita‘a qabl al-fil).'* However, the power inOCCASIONALISM IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION question does not necessitate the action.'? Moreover, the effect of human power is limited to only those acts that are known by the agent.'* On the one hand, Aba al-Hudhay! does not accept that human beings can produce life, bodies, bodily strength, fear, courage, taste, scent, perception, and under- standing, because he believes that the nature of these things is not epistemi- cally accessible to human beings.'? Here, Abii al-Hudhayl seems to presup- pose that one can causally affect only what one knows. On the other hand, he thinks that human beings can initiate motion and rest, and can cause some accidents resulting from (tatwallada‘an) these, because he believes that humans know these accidents.*° Although Abi al-Hudhayl ascribes causal power to human beings, he does not consider the activity of this cause to be creation (khalq). However, some later Mu‘tazilite scholars hold that human beings create their own acts. For example, according to Abi ‘Alt al-Jubba’i (849-916), a human being is the author of an act by “creating and produc- ing new being” (kbalqan wa ibda‘an), although God creates the potential to create an act. Like Aba al-Hudhayl, al-Ash‘ari admits the existence of particles that have no further division (al-juz’ la yankasam).** Al-Ash‘ari holds to two basic ideas. First, atoms are homogeneous, and differences in the universe arise from the accidents inhering in atoms.*} Second, none of the accidents can continue to exist for an extended duration, whereas atoms and bodies can endure, but merely due to the re-creation of the accident of duration (baqa’) in them at each moment. The accident of duration cannot continue to exist save by God?s re-creation of it. That is to say, al-Ash‘ari clearly rejects the enduring accidents postulated in Abi al-Hudhayl’s metaphysics. In the final analysis, neither atoms nor accidents can endure by themselves, but only by continuous divine action. Therefore, in brief, no being in the universe can endure by itself. As a result, if nothing in the universe can sustain its own existence into the next moment, it cannot cause the existence of anything at the next moment. Ergo, in al-Ash‘ari’s view, diachronic causation, causation between created beings at different times, is impossible. For example, consider a stone that ex- ists at a given time, ¢z. Its existence at tz cannot causally sustain its existence ata later time, t2. Neither can it causally affect another thing at t2 because the stone at £1 does not exist at t2. Nonetheless, al-Ash‘art’s view on duration does not completely rule out the possibility that there is a causal link between synchronic events, namely, events existing at the same time. For example, the stone at tr may seem to causally influence another thing at the same time, that is, tr. However, al- Ash‘ari thinks that God constantly creates every accident and atom out of nothing. Since God creates every aspect of reality, nothing is left to creatures 6AL-MATURIDI’S VIEW OF CAUSALITY to influence causally. In fact, al-Ash‘art expresses this idea explicitly. He points out that there are no real differences among the various terms in Arabic that are usually associated with causality. He gives “creating” (kbalaqa), “doing” (faala),5 “generating” (akdatha), and “constructing” (inshaa) as examples, and claims that all of these terms come to mean creation, which must be as- cribed to God.** As we can see from this point, al-Ash‘ari rejects synchronic causality among finite beings as well: he considers God to be the only causal agent and thus affirms the occasionalist position. In analyzing the voluntary actions of human beings, in contrast to Abi al-Hudhayl, al-Ash‘ari postulates a certain power (al-istita a; qudra, quwwa) that exists in human beings simultaneously with their actions (al-istita‘a ma ‘al fil). Human beings acquire or appropriate their actions by virtue of this pow- er, but God creates the action. Thus, the human role in voluntary actions is only one of acquisition (iktisab, kasb). This power postulated to coexist with voluntary actions has no causal relation to the actions but functions as a marker that differentiates voluntary deeds from involuntary ones. Al-Ash‘ari does not explain further how human beings acquire their deeds. His theory of acquisition remains a blind spot in his general metaphysics. *7 As we have seen, although both Abii al-Hudhayl and al-Ash‘ari are atom- ists, they do not hold the same view of causality. While Abi al-Hudhayl ac- cepts secondary causality within the universe in addition to divine causality, al-Ash‘ari completely denies the existence of secondary causality and affirms occasionalism. 1.3 Al-Maturidi’s Metaphysics In this section, I present the general features of al-Maturidi’s metaphysical system and its implications for causality. I show that al-Maturidi takes an oc- casionalist stand concerning divine causality and discuss his view of natures and the human will in relation to occasionalism. 1.3.1 Basic Ontology Although some of al-Maturidi’s theses are similar to those of the atomists, his metaphysics does not depend on atomism. Nowhere in the Book of Mono- theism (Kitab al-Tawhid) does he argue for indivisible particles, Al-Maturidi does in fact refer to indivisible particles (ajza’ mimma la yatajazza’) where he discusses some Mu'tazilite ideas, but plainly he does not accept them.** He of- ten uses the term jawhar which means “substance” or “substrate”, and which atomists use to refer to atoms. Ceric translates this term both as “substance” and “atom”, and claims that al-Maturid?’s occasional statements bearing on this notion indicate his atomism.*? Nonetheless, by using the term jawhar,OCCASIONALISM IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION al-Maturidi makes no explicit statement intended to refer to atoms, name- ly, indivisible particles.’° He divides things in the observable world into two kinds: physical objects (zyn) and accidents (sifab).+' He describes the quiddity of a physical object (ym) as having the properties of a “body” (jism). Bodies are things that have three-dimensions and aspects (jibat). In addition, they are limited entities made up (mu ‘allaf) of some parts. They also accept ac- cidents.** In the Book of Monotheism, al-Maturidi uses ‘ayn interchangeably with jawhar many times, in the sense of an entity in which accidents inhere. The second category is accidents.33 Al-Maturidi often uses the term sifah to refer to accidents and uses it sometimes interchangeably with ‘rad, which is used by the Mu'tazilite and the Ash‘arite mutakallimian. For al-Maturidi, the former term is a better choice if we consider the Qur’anic usage of ‘arad. In the Qur'an, this term refers to the property of the world (arad al-dunya), in the sense of physical objects rather than their attributes.>+ Like the Ash‘arites, al-Maturidi holds that no accident can exist on its own, and thus, any accident needs a substrate in which to inhere. Moreover, acci- dents cannot endure (/@ yabqa) by themselves. In order to endure, they need an external agent that constantly sustains them.* Al-Maturidi ascribes endurance (baqa’) to bodies but adds that their en- durance stems from the recreation of duration-accidents in them.*” Thus, nei- ther can the substrates of accidents (e.g. bodies, physical objects) endure on their own. This view is similar to that of al-Ash‘ari. Thus, for both scholars, no created being could cause something else at different times. That is to say, diachronic causality among finite beings is impossible. Yet, as previously pointed out, this conclusion does not clearly rule out the possibility of syn- chronic causality, causality between finite beings at the same time. However, a careful examination of al-Maturidi’s metaphysics reveals that any kind of secondary causality among phenomena is impossible. This point becomes apparent when we focus on his explication of the concept of coming into being (pudith). Al-Maturidi holds that accidents come constantly out of nothing and cease to exist at the next moment. For why accidents come out of nothing, al-Maturidi offers the following explanation. He conceives of accidents with their opposites, such as motion in relation to rest, and com- position in relation to decomposition. We observe phenomena in one form of such opposite accident pairs. For example, an object is either in motion or at rest. Since accidents cannot exist together with their opposites at the same time, they must follow each other, and thus, they begin to exist at a certain time.’* This explanation shows that accidents come into existence and are therefore not eternal. However, it does not clearly demonstrate why accidents cannot endure. Al-Maturidi does not explain in detail why he holds 8a. AL-MATURIDI’S VIEW OF CAUSALITY that accidents cannot endure, except by saying the following: anything that can cease to exist (a yabtamil al-fana‘) cannot sustain its endurance on its own but can be sustained only by an external agent.}? According to this state- ment, he seems to think that any state of contingent beings is also contingent and thus requires the same account to explain the contingency. Note that this remark applies not only to accidents but also to physical objects. Al-Maturidi draws attention to the contingency of objects by reasoning as follows: since accidents must inhere in substrates, which cannot exist separately from ac- cidents, substrates must also be coming out of nothing, like their accidents.*° Let me uncover this point in a more detailed way. Imagine that you have a car. When you purchased it, it was white. Then you painted it, and it became blue. Later you sold it to someone who changed its color to red. The car in this example seems to persist through the change of the colors. Although the colors of white, blue, and red seem to be coming into being and going out of being, the car’s existence seems to be independent of these changes. However, according to al-Maturidi’s perspective, the car is in a different existential state in each change. The car is also changing as its color changes. In reality, we cannot separate the car from its color. The difference between the car and its color, or between the physical object and its accidents is only conceptual. What persists through change is not a real entity but our conceptual abstrac- tion of a car from the given observation. Thus, each physical object that receives accidents changes accordingly. As accidents are renewed constantly, the physical objects as their loci are in new existential states at each moment. Since the appearance of accidents is maintained by a constant causal influ- ence, the physical objects that receive them are also under the same causal influence. Let us now assume that each accident and its locus—the physical object— come into being. Is it not possible that the physical objects and their accidents—though coming into being separately—in totality form an infinite series without a beginning? Al-Maturidi considers this option to be impossible and argues that the universe in totality cannot exist eternally and must have a beginning. To be more precise, al-Maturidi does not accept an infinite series of objects or their states back in time but accepts such an infinite series to- ward future. He gives the following analogy to show the asymmetry between going back in time and going forward. We are talking about things that come into being, things that are in different (new) existential states. These things are dependent upon something else to become existent. Now consider the following two sentences: (1) “Do not eat anything unless you eat something else!” (2) “When you eat something, eat something else!” If we obey the first order, we can never eat something because the condition for eating something 9OCCASIONALISM IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION is eating something else before, which can never be done unless an initial eat- ing is granted. The first order does not allow you to have an initial eating by prescribing eating as its precondition. If we want to follow the second order, we can eat something—because nothing prevents it—and if we eat something we must have continue to eat ad infinitum. Counting in time resembles these two cases. If we want to count things from the past to now, we have to start from something. Otherwise we cannot get to today by counting. If we want to count things from now to the future, we can start from today and go on by adding indefinitely without ending.*' In other words, al-Maturidi seems to exemplify the difference between actual infinity and potential infinity. When we count indefinitely without stopping we are potentially going to infinity. That is potential infinity, which resembles going to the future from now. If we have an infinite number of objects definitely identified, this is actual infinity. Actual infinity cannot be counted. If the past is assumed to be eternal, we must accept the idea of actual infinity because infinitely many things and events must have happened. Yet al-Maturidi’s perspective implies, as many other philosophers explicitly state, an actual infinity is impossible and an eternal past cannot be traversed. What we must derive from these statements is that anything in the universe— either an accident or a physical object—comes out of nothing (hadith) at each moment, and the causal action that brings about anything must be creation. Al-Maturid? summarizes these points by saying that the whole universe in every respect is coming out of nothing (padith),** and the causal agent who is respon- sible for its existence is an eternal (qadim) being.*} After considering the order in the universe and artistic creation, al-Maturidi ascribes to the creator various attributes such as wisdom and will, and then begins to call him God (Allah). Note that all this reasoning shares a presupposition: everything that comes into being requires a cause (muhdith). Al-Maturidi sometimes exemplifies this prin- ciple by saying that a written work could not exist without a writer or that a ship cannot come into existence without a causal agent.45 Yet he does not discuss this principle in detail. Rather, he simply takes it for granted, perhaps because its truth seems so obvious to him. Al-Maturidi explicitly states that there is just one causal agent of every- thing, who is also responsible for the order of the universe.‘* This is the clear conclusion of the abovementioned metaphysical reasoning. Since God creates every aspect of the universe out of nothing (hadith), there is no aspect of real- ity that is open to the causal influence of something else. That is to say, noth- ing in the universe could be the object of the causal action of anything other than God. Thus, according to al-Maturidi, God is the sole causal agent, as the occasionalists postulate. 10a AL-MATURIDI’S VIEW OF CAUSALITY Al-Maturidi’s emphasis on the eternity of God shows that he sees a cat- egorical difference between the creator and created reality. Coming into being or changing (udath) is a mark of creatures. If God exemplified such qualities, He would be another creature that must be caused by another agent. Since God is the creator, as an eternal being, He is categorically different from | all creatures. Al-Maturidi states this point by saying that coming into being (hudath) and being created (khalq) are due to being other than God (ghayri- yyat Allah). That is to say, whatever is other than God is created.*” By extend- ing this consideration, al-Maturidi distances himself from the Mu'tazilites, who claim that the universe came into existence by an originated will rather than the eternal will of God. For the latter, God has an originated will that has brought the universe into existence. In response, al-Maturidi states that once Divine Will is regarded as originated, it becomes a part of the universe.** Let me point out an important corollary to al-Maturidi’s conceiving of created reality as something other than God. Recall that I drew attention to al-Maturidi’s following reasoning: since accidents cannot exist alone, and they are constantly renewed phenomena, they must inhere in physical objects, and thus physical objects must be re-created as well. Now, if physical objects were modifications of God, then God would be changing as well because of the constant renewal of the former. Yet God must be eternal and beyond any change. Therefore, God cannot be regarded as the ultimate substrate of created reality. God is ontologically independent from His creatures, though they causally depend upon divine power. In this regard, being other than God also connotes that created reality is not some kind of modification of God. Thus, al-Maturidi’s view of reality is incompatible with monism. In brief, as Mustafa Ceric has pointed out, with these ideas, al-Maturidi believes in continuous creation by God.*? To be more precise; however, we should add that al-Maturidi also adopts occasionalism. 1.3.2 Natures In contrast to the Ash‘arite and the Mu'tazilite mutakalliman, al-Maturidi postulates natures (taba’i‘) in his metaphysical system. He notes that the foundation (asl) of the universe (‘la) and the foundation of the human be- ing, which is a microcosm of the universe, are constructed out of divergent natures (taba’i).5° We find the terms “nature” (tab) and “natures” (taba’i) in many passages within the Book of Monotheism. Most of the mutakallimin understand this term to mean a potency to produce an object’s own action according to its determined structure, and they reject it explicitly. Instead, they use the term “divine custom” (Sunnat Allah) to refer to the regularities in the universe. IrOCCASIONALISM IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION Richard Frank argues that al-Maturidi’s concept of nature involves the idea of causal efficacy. According to Frank, al-Maturidi associates natures with “the natural action of the material constituents of bodies; i.e. their spe- cific behavior, active and passive, as it is determined by and directly flows from the nature of their materiality”.s' The most prominent aspect of this characterization is that natures have their own effective power and action. The action in question does not depend on free choice. Al-Maturidi uses the term ‘mal to refer to natural action, not the term fi7, which is used for an action coming from an agent that has free will.* Frank, however, suggests that al-Maturidi “limits if not eliminates altogether the role of natures in the material world”.s3 The role of natures is limited because God maintains the order of the universe by modifying and arranging natures that tend to act in an irregular and chaotic way. In Frank’s opinion, with his reference to God as a superior ruler ordering the natures, al-Maturidt departs from the naturalists (ashab al-taba’i'), who tend to explain everything by the action of natures alone.s+ On the other hand, by assigning a limited role to the orderly action of natures, al-Maturidi differs from many mutakallimiin who hold that all kinds of regularity in the universe are due to the custom (Suznat) of God in the created realm.5s Clearly, al-Maturidi’s conception of nature (tab) is quite different from Frank’s interpretation. As we have seen, al-Maturidi’s metaphysical system implies the denial of secondary causality among natural phenomena. Al- Maturidt’s concept of natures is not excluded from this general maxim. Frank relies on a common understanding of natures, though with some modifica- tion, without showing clearly that al-Maturidi approves this conception. As we have seen, al-Maturtdi analyzes everything in the universe in terms of physical objects and accidents. He applies the same analysis to natures and states, asserting that natures are either physical objects or accidents.’ If they are accidents, it is impossible for them to come into existence and maintain their existence in time by themselves. This point becomes apparent when we consider his assumption that accidents cannot endure. For in order to endure, they need an external agent who constantly sustains them.*? If they are physical objects, they are always found with accidents, as is clear from their separation from, or their conjunction with, each other. Both separation and conjunction are accidents. As accidents, they change from one state to another. The fact that physical objects are substrates of accidents shows that objects are created.5* Recall that al-Maturidi explains the continu- ity of physical objects by the re-creation of the duration-accidents in them. As a result, neither accidents nor physical objects can sustain their existence and endurance on their own. From this analysis of al-Maturtdt, we can arrive at 12AL-MATURIDI’S VIEW OF CAUSALITY the following conclusion: if natures belong to either category, they are con- stantly coming into being and cannot have their own causal powers to sustain their endurance and influence other beings. On the other hand, natures could be interpreted differently. As Ulrich Ru- dolph has noted, in the Book of Monotheism, al-Maturidt conceives of na- tures as certain regularities rather than ontological entities.5? In a context in which al-Maturidt criticizes naturalists, he says that they have not observed that natures govern (tadbir) anything. Then he gives examples about what is observable in the universe; for example, fast motion increases heat. Next, he comes to the following conclusion: on the basis of observation, it is better to hold that natures have emerged out of different states of the universe than that the universe has appeared out of natures. Thus, according to al-Maturidi, natures represent some regular actions in the universe, but this regularity does not enable one to infer that they have causal powers. On the basis of this pas- sage, Rudolph criticizes Frank’s interpretation of natures, but does not accept that al-Maturidt is an occasionalist. However, Rudolph ignores al-Maturidi’s other considerations, which affirm occasionalism, and thus goes wrong in saying that “occasionalism plays no role in al-Maturidi’s thought”.* On the basis of al-Maturidi’s metaphysics, we could say that the term “nature” refers to regularities that we observe in the universe. One might wonder why al-Maturidi endorses the concept of natures (taba’i) so ardently, despite the connotation of causal powers commonly as- sociated with them. The reason lies in his method of argumentation for the existence of God. Unlike many mutakallimiin, he treats regularities also as crucial elements in his arguments for the existence of God. If he called them “God’s custom” (Sunnat Allah) before proving the existence of God, his argu- ments would be circular. One of al-Maturidi’s arguments for the existence of God refers to divergent and opposing natures. Such natures tend to go away from each other. Howev- er, as we observe, they coexist in some physical objects. This coexistence can- not happen solely on the part of the objects. There must be an external agent that brings them together despite their opposing natures. Thus, the universe cannot be constructed out of the action of divergent natures save by one being who governs them.* Al-Maturidi draws attention to the complex order in the universe that appears after the combination of divergent natures. Every object functions properly in this ordered whole. In addition, he stresses, these objects do not know the general order in which they participate and cannot by their own natures cause the proper functions they need in order to be consonant with this order. The ignorance and poverty of natural objects cannot explain the order in the universe; it can be justified only by the workings of a wise and 13OCCASIONALISM IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION powerful creator.‘ This argument basically appeals to the order and design in the universe, and interprets the orderly combination of divergent regularities as evidence for the existence of a creator. Thus, natures play a significant role in al-Maturidi’s arguments for the existence of God. In al-Maturidi’s system, natures are causally inert if they are interpreted as ontological items. Yet there are indications in the Book of Monotheism that natures play an epistemologi- cal role as crucial steps in inferring the existence of God from the universe. Thus, in either interpretation, al-Maturidi’s postulation of natures is compat- ible with his occasionalism. 1.3.3 Human Will Al-Maturidi’s analysis of our voluntary actions involves both Mu'tazilite and Ash‘arite elements. Like al-Ash‘ari, al-Maturidi postulates a kind of power (qutwwa) that exists simultaneously with voluntary human actions and distin- guishes voluntary acts from non-voluntary ones.“ Al-Maturidi considers this power to be created and to be a necessary condition for the human capacity to act.* If this power did not exist, the acts could not be ascribed to humans.** Like al-Ash‘ari, al-Maturidi holds that voluntary human acts belong to God in terms of creation (kbalg) and to humans in terms of acquisition (kasb). As regards the created aspect of human acts, al-Maturidi refers to their onto- logical status, which he analyses in terms of transitory motion and rest. Like everything else in the universe, they owe their existence to divine power. When he comes to analyze human acquisition, he exemplifies the role of the human in human actions by mentioning the decision between moving toward something forbidden or permitted by God and not moving toward it.” Al- though our voluntary actions are not limited to what God forbids and orders, the example he gives is telling. Roughly speaking, the function of the human power in question is not to bring about the action. Rather, the human power involves the ethical character of the action if the action belongs to the ethical category. The same action may be moral under certain conditions but im- moral under others. For instance, consider the act of sexual intercourse. God forbids fornication but encourages sexual intercourse for a married couple. Since it is the same ontological act, the human power does not play a role in its coming into being. Rather, the human role with respect to actions having the same ontological status lies in choosing the conditions under which they are performed. This role does not affect the ontological structure of the action but specifies its ethical character. As we have seen, choosing between different options plays a significant role in al-Maturidi’s view of human acquisition. At this point, he departs from the Ash‘arite scholars, who usually ignore the role of choosing and 14eel AL-MATURIDI’S VIEW OF CAUSALITY formulate different powers for each action and its contrary. In contrast, like the Mu'tazilite mutakalliman, al-Maturidi draws attention to the importance of human will and postulates a single power related to an action and its op- posite. Only by assuming the availability of human power for an act and its opposite, al-Maturidi thinks, can the act in question be treated as voluntary.7° According to al-Maturidi, human beings are under the determination of di vine power, both in their acts and powers. However, he constantly emphasiz- es that this determination does not abolish human responsibility with regard to voluntary actions. For him, human beings know consciously that they are free (mukbtar) in their voluntary acts.”' In explaining the detailed mechanism of human acquisition, al-Maturidt appeals to the notion of will but differentiates its various aspects. He talks about several faculties in human beings, according to which the human power to act is created or exterminated: desire (hirs), inclination (mail), and choice (ikbtiyar). According to al-Maturidi, free will (irada) is a condition for vol- untary human actions (fi1 al-ikbtiyar) but not for involuntary ones (fi7 al- idtirar).’* He takes free will (ir@da) as a condition devoid of compulsion (al- ghalaba) and unintentional action (al-sabwa). He identifies free will (irada) with choice (ikbtiyar) but with neither desire nor inclination.’ Thus, in the last analysis, the freedom of voluntary human acts consists in choosing. Meric Pessagno argues that, according to al-Maturidi, human chi caused by the human power, and thus, human beings have their own efficient causality. Let me now summarize Pessagno’s interpretation and show how he misinterprets al-Maturidi. Pessagno elaborates on al-Maturidi’s concept of will in relation to ac- tion.’* Al-Maturidi states that “wish” is one of the connotations of the term “will” (irada). For Pessagno, will, in the sense of wishing, is an ineffective desire for action.?5 He adds that power (qudra or istita‘), which is created by God in humans, elevates wishing to the level of free choice (fil al-ikbtiyar) and exists simultaneously with the act of free choice. It is this power in hu- mans that “functions as the created efficient cause of the existence of their act of free choice”.”* In ascribing causal efficacy to the human power, Pes- sagno cites the following statement from the Book of Monotheism: “la yitjaz wujtidubai bibali illa wa yaqa'u bihi'l fil indama yaqa'u ma‘aba” (“it [the hu- man power] cannot exist except under the condition that when it exists with the act [human voluntary act], the act exists through it (because of it)”).77 In this statement, the possessive pronouns hi (his/its) and ha (his/its) refer to an accident (ma ‘na) that is identified with the human power, and fi (action) is specified as the voluntary act (fil al-ikbtiyar) in the text.’* Thus, Pessagno seems to treat the proposition bi (with/through/because of) as having a causal e is 15OCCASIONALISM IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION connotation and interprets the voluntary act as if it comes to exist through the human power. Pessagno’s interpretation above is quite weak and does not fit in well with the general metaphysical considerations we have presented so far. In the Book of Monotheism, al-Maturidi does not clearly ascribe causal efficacy to the human power. Although he calls it “power” (quvwa, qudra, istitaa), he points out that there is no way to completely understand the nature of this power through a definition.” The utterance of the terms quwwa, qudra, istita‘’a does not automatically connote causal efficacy; thus, one must pro- vide an extra argument for this additional meaning. Probably for this reason, Pessagno tries to justify his interpretation by referring to the statement that illa wa yaqa‘u bibi'l fil indama yaqa‘x ma‘aba. Yet we can interpret this statement in different ways. It does not necessarily imply that the human power brings about an act through its causal efficacy. The participle bi at- tached to the possessive pronoun hi—namely, the human power—does not necessarily suggest that the act takes place through its causal efficacy. Recall al-Maturid?’s statement: “When it [the human power] exists with the act [i.e. the voluntary act], the act exists through it (because of it).” In this statement, the human power might be regarded as the reason why the act should be considered voluntary. As we have seen, for al-Maturidi, the human power is a necessary condition for voluntary acts. If there were no power, the act would be non-voluntary. The quoted statement likely suggests that volun- tary acts always take place with the human power, which distinguishes them from non-voluntary ones. Here, al-Maturidi does not necessarily formulate a causal link between the human act and the human power but points out a correlation between them. With this interpretation, compatible with his metaphysical considerations that nullify the causal action of created beings, we get an internally consistent picture of al-Maturidi’s ideas in the Book of Monotheism. In conclusion, for al-Maturidi, humans are free in their choices but they do not cause their choices or actions. As Saim Yeprem points out, neither does al-Maturidi explicitly describe human choice as created." However, some other considerations of al-Maturidi suggest that human will is created. As we have seen, according to him, whatever is other than God is created. If so, human will, as something other than God, must have been created, and thus, it is under the causal influence of God. This consideration seems to threaten the freedom of human will. Later Maturidites tried to solve this tension and developed highly original approaches. They introduced new ontological cat- egories such as the categories of relational or relative states (amr itibari, amr izafi). Whatever falls under these categories is neither under causal influence 16AL-MATURIDI’S VIEW OF CAUSALITY nor can it causally affect something. Human will, understood as choice be- tween alternative states, belongs to these categories; it is not subject to cre- ation and does not have causal influence on anything.** Mehmet Seyyid Bey (1873-1925) summarizes what he takes to be the mainstream Maturidite po- sition on human will as follows: God is the Creator of everything. There is no creator apart from God. How- ever, the human will (irdde-i ciia’iye) is not a “thing” (sey) because the term “thing” refers to something existent (emr-i mevaiid). In Arabic language, “sey” [the Ottoman counterpart for the term shay] means existent. The human will is a quality that originates from the human being at an indivisible moment without taking time. This is understood as a circumstance (hal) of the kind of relational states (umiir-u itibariye) and thus it is not existent. Therefore, it does not need a creator; creation does not apply to In conclusion, in time, the Maturidites came to consider human will not to be created, and thus not to fall under divine influence, because they con- sidered it to be a relational or relative state that is not something really exis- tent. Therefore, human will is not something created or causally influenced. Yet this assumption does not contradict their occasionalist outlook, because human beings use their will without causing anything. Thus, in order to solve the problem of human freedom within an occasionalist framework, the Maturidites introduced a new ontological category of relational or relative states to which causality does not apply. 1.4 Conclusion In this chapter, I have shown that al-Maturidi’s metaphysical considerations in the Book of Monotheism imply that God is the sole causal agent in the universe. Thus, he is an occasionalist like al-Ash‘ari. Yet the metaphysical systems of both mutakallimiin are not the same. Some significant differences concern the existence of atoms, the appeal to the idea of natures in describing the universe, and the mechanism of human acquisition. In his metaphysical articulation of human will and action, al-Maturidi approaches the ideas of Aba Hudhayl al-‘Allaf, a prominent Mu'tazilite scholar, although he never departs from his occasionalist stance. Later the Maturidites introduced an original account of the human will, holding that it is neither created nor ca- pable of causally influencing something. Thus, al-Maturidi’s view of causality shows that Islamic occasionalism is not restricted to the Ash‘arite School on the one hand and does not necessarily depend upon atomism on the other. On this basis, the Maturidites developed a rigorous view of human will that is compatible with occasionalism but does not boil down to fatalism. 17OCCASIONALISM IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION NOTES x. For the original copy in Cambridge Library, ms. Add. No. 3651. See also Joseph Schacht, “New Sources for the History of Muhammadan Theology,” Studia Islamica t (1953): 23-42. 2 Aba Mansar al-Maturidi, Kitab al-Tawhid, ed. Fathalla Kholeif (Bei- rut: Dar al-Machreq, 1970). For the authenticity of the manuscript, see also Sait Ozervarh, “The Authenticity of the Manuscript of al-Maturidi’s Kitab al- Tawhid: A Reexamination,” islam Arastirmalart Dergisi (1997): 19-29- 3 Abi Mansiir al-Maturidi, Kitab al-Tawhid (Book of Monotheism), ed. Bekir Topaloglu and Muhammed Aruci (Ankara: isam Yayinlari, 2002). 4 Mustafa Ceric, Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islam: A Study of the The- ology of Abu Mansur Al-Maturidi (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Is- lamic Thought and Civilization, 1995), 109-110. 5 Richard M. Frank, “Notes and Remarks on the taba’i‘ in the Teaching of al-Maturidi,” in Melanges d’islamologie a la memoire d’Armand Abel, ed. P. Salmon (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974). 6 Ulrich Rudolph, Al-Maturidi and Sunnitische Theologie in Samarkand (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 283-89. 7 J. Meric Pessagno, “Irada, Ihktiyar, Kudra, Kasb, the View of Abu Mansur al-Maturidi,” Journal of American Oriential Society 104, no. x (1984): 177-91- 8 Abi al-Hasan al-Ash‘ari, Maqalat al-Islamin wa ikbtilaf al-Musallin, ed. H. Ritter (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1963), 312. 9 Richard M. Frank, The Metaphysics of Created Being According to Abit L-Hudbayl Al-‘Allaf, (Istanbul: Netherlands Historische-Archeologisch Instituut, 1966), 43. zo Alnoor Dhanani, The Physical Theory of Kalam: Atoms, Space, and Void in Basrian Mu tazili Cosmology (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994), 43- tr Al-Ash‘ari, Magalat, 358-59. x2 Dhanani, The Physical Theory of Kalam, 45. According to Dhanani, Aba al-Hudhayl’s position should be differentiated from Baghdadi Mu‘tazilis for the following reason. Al-Ash‘ari, in his Maqalat, reserved a separate section for the latter as different from that of Abi al-Hudhayl and explicitly reported that the latter held that God constantly recreates the accident of baa’ to maintain the continuity of objects, while there is no explicit remark on Abii al-Hudhayl’s view on this point. However, since their views are treated separately, Abii al- Hudhayl’s view should be different. 13 Dhanani reports this from an unknown commentator on Ibn Matt- awayh’s Tadhkira, see Dhanani, The Physical Theory of Kalam, 45. 14 Ibid., 45-46. 8PEE AL-MATURIDI’S VIEW OF CAUSALITY x5 Abii al-Husayn al-Khayyat, Kitab al-Intisar, ed. A. Nader (Beirut: Edi- tions Les Lettres Orientales, 1957), 11-14, 17, 20. 16 Al-Ash‘ari, Magalat, 232, 418. 17 Ibid., 415. 18 Ibid., 402. x9 Ibid., 402. 20 Ibid., 402. a1 Al-Shahrastani, Kitab al-Milal wa al-Nibal, ed. M. Badran (Cairo: Matba‘at al-Azhar, 1955), 120. 22 Abi al-Hasan al-Ash‘ari, A Vindication of the Science of Kalam [Risala ft Istibsan al-Khawd fi ilm al-Kalam], in The Theology of al-Asb ari, ed. Richard J. McCarthy (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1953), 127 (in English translation): 92 (in Arabic text). 23 Ibn Farak, Mujarrad Magalat al-Ash‘ari, ed. Daniel Gimaret (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq Editeurs Sarl, 1987), 208. Majid Fahkry uses the term “substance” to refer to the atoms in the Ash‘arite metaphysics. (See Majid Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism and Its Critique by Averroes and Aquinas (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1958], 42.) I consider his choice of the word “substance” instead of “atom” to be quite misleading, especially because it may implicate the Aris- totelian powers and capacities associated with the atom, whereas the case is just the opposite. 24 Ibn Farak, Mujarrad, 237. 25 This is the term generally used for human actions. 26 Ibn Farak, Mujarrad, 91. 27 For a more extensive exposition and analysis of al-Ash‘ari’s view on hu- man will and action, see my dissertation (pp. 32-34): Muhtaroglu, Nazif. Islamic and Cartesian Roots of Occasionalism. Unpublished Dissertation. University of Kentucky, 2072. 28 Al-Maturidi, Kitab al-Tawhid, 141. 29 Ceric, Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islam, 116. 30 Note that, later Maturidites embraced atomism. See, for example, Aba al-Mu‘n al-Nasafi, Tabsirat al-Adilla fi Usal al-Din, ed. Claude Salamé, 2 vols. (Damascus: Institut Francais de Damas, 1990), 1:55—56. 31 Al-Maturidi, Kitab al-Tawhid, 65. 32 Ibid., 62-64, 67. 33. Ibid., 65. 34 Ibid., 33. 35. Ibid., 417. 36 Ibid., 218. 37. Ibid., 30. 9OCCASIONALISM IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION 38 Ibid. 27-28. 39 Ibid., 417. 40 Ibid.,163. 41 Ibid., 29-30. 42 “Ma kana gayra labu hadithun min jami‘ al-wajhi”, Ibid., 45. 43. Ibid., 48. 44 Ibid., 4o~43. 45. Ibid., 31, 36. 46 “Mudabbir al-kulli wa muhdathabu wahidun”, Ibid., 50. 47 Ibid., 9x. 48 Ibid. 32. 49 Ceric, Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islam, 134. so Al-Maturidi, Kitab al-Tawhid, 6. 5 Frank, “Notes and Remarks,” 138. 2 Al-Maturidi, Kitab al-Tawhid, 70-71, 231. 53. Frank, “Notes and Remarks,” 147. 54 Ibid., 140-43. 55 Ibid., 147-48. 56 Al-Maturidi, Kitab al-Tawhtd, 217. 57 Ibid., 218. 58 Ibid., 218. 59 Rudolph, Al-Maturidi, 283-85. Alnoor Dhanani argues that al-Maturid’’s critique of natures aims to establish only the temporality of the world, not to deny the agency of natures. In addition, according to Dhanani, al-Maturidi does not purport to discuss the agency of natures. In his interpretation, Dhanani ig- nores the passages on the nominalist interpretation of natures cited by Rudolph. Neither does Dhanani analyze natures in relation to al-Maturidi’s metaphysi- cal assumptions on accidents and physical objects. See Alnoor Dhanani, “Al- Maturidi’s and Al-Nasafi on Atomism and the Tab‘at” in Biiyitk Tiirk Bilgini Imam Maturidi ve Maturidilik (istanbul: [FAV, 2009), 69-72. 60 Al-Maturidi, Kitab al-Tawhid, 221. 61 Rudolph, Al-Maturidi, 289. 62 Ibid., 218. 63 Ibid., 50. 64 Ibid., 411. Al-Maturidi mentions another type of power that refers to the general capacity of the human body and its healthy condition. This general capacity exists before human action. This kind of power is different from that which distinguishes voluntary acts from non-voluntary acts. (See pages 410- 411.) Thus, I ignore this kind of power and focus solely on the one that simulta- neously exists with the voluntary act. 20AL-MATURIDI’S VIEW OF CAUSALITY 65 Al-Maturidi accepts that this power (quwwa) cannot be defined and un- derstood completely. (See Al-Maturidi, Kitab al-Tawhid, 381, 411, 418.) Never- theless, like al-Ash‘ari, he thinks that this power must be formulated in order to account for voluntary human actions. 66 Ibid., 423. 67 Ibid., 358-59. 68 Ibid., 368. 69 Ibid., 365. yo Ibid., 421. 71 Ibid., 360, 38r. 72 Ibid., 466. 73. Ibid., 484. 74 Pessagno, “Irada,” 186. 75 Ibid., 186. 76 Ibid., 185. 77 ~Al-Maturidi, Kitab al-Tawhid, 236. 78 Ibid., 236. See also Pessagno, “Irada,” 190. 79 Al-Maturidi, Kitab al-Tawhid, 411. 80 Saim Yeprem, frade Hiirriyeti ve imam Matiiridi (istanbul: Marmara Uni- versitesi [lahiyat Fakiiltesi Vakfi Yayinlant, 1997), 300. Mustafa Said Yazicioglu claims that al-Maturidi considered human will not to be created, but Yazicioglu does not give any reference to support this claim. See Mustafa Said Yazcioflu, “Matiiridi Kelaminda insan Hiirriyeti Meselesi,” Ankara Universitesi labiyat Fakiiltesi Dergisi 30 (1988): 166. 81 The Maturidite views on human will call for detailed studies, which are almost overlooked in the literature. For an introductory essay on this issue, see my “An Occasionalist Defense of Free Will,” in Classic Issues in Islamic Philoso- phy and Theology, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka and Nazif Muhtaroglu (Dor- drecht: Springer, 2010), 45-62. 82 Mehmed Seyyid, Uswl-u Frkth Dersleri (istanbul: Igik Yayinlani, 2011), 108. My translation. I would like to acknowledge the financial support of Tubitak Bidep 2232 Pro- gram in completing this chapter. 2r