Epistemic Cognition and Development PDF

EPISTEMIC COGNITION
AND DEVELOPMENT
The Psychology of Justification
Downloaded by 202.92.128.112 at 05:57 31 August 2017
and Truth
David Moshman
First published 2015
by Psychology Press
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2015 Taylor & Francis
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without intent to infringe.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Moshman, David.
Epistemic cognition and development : the psychology of truth and
justification / David Moshman. 1st Edition.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Cognition. 2. Developmental psychology. I. Title.
BF311.M63476 2015
153dc23
2014026525
ISBN: 978-1-84872-513-3 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-84872-514-0 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-88468-4 (ebk)
Typeset in Bembo
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
For Sara, in true love and justified belief

CONTENTS
Foreword by Deanna Kuhn xi

Preface xiv
PART I
Epistemology and Cognition 1
1 The Perils of Pluto 3

Pluto in Peril 3
Three Epistemologies 4
Planetary Problems 7
Overview of the Book 8
2 The Study of Truth and Justification 10

Epistemology: The Theory of Knowledge 10
Knowledge as Justified True Belief 11
Justification, Truth, and Skepticism 13
Distinguishing Types of Knowledge 15
Philosophy and Psychology 16
Piagets Developmental Epistemology 18
Conclusion 19
3 Cognition and Metacognition 21

Cognition: Knowledge and Inference 21
Metacognition and Self-Regulation 23
viii Contents
Three Conceptions of Rationality 24

Inferences Everywhere 25
Dual Processing 27
Cognitive Development 29
Conclusion 30
PART II
Epistemic Cognition and Development 33
4 Epistemic Cognition 35
Perry and Beyond 36
Three Literatures of Child Development 37
Two Literatures of Education 39
Too Many Domains 42
Conclusion 44
5 Epistemic Development in Childhood 45

The Discovery of False Belief 46
Preschool Theories of Mind 47
Constructivist Theories of Mind 49
Processes of Epistemic Development 52
Conclusion 54
6 Epistemic Development Beyond Childhood 55

Perry on College Students 56
King and Kitchener on Reflection 58
Mansfield and Clinchy on Objectivity and Subjectivity 60
Chandler on Adolescence 62
Kuhn on Reasoning 64
Patterns of Epistemic Development 66
Conclusion 68
PART III
Epistemic Domains 71
7 Epistemologies of Science and Logic 73

Metalogical Understanding 74
Development of Metalogical Understanding 75
Contents ix
The Construction of Metalogical Understanding 78

The Epistemology of Science 79
Developing Epistemologies of Science 80
Logical and Scientific Reasoning 83
Conclusion 85
8 Epistemologies of Morality and Convention 86

Moral Epistemology 86
Moral Development 88
Principled Moral Reasoning 92

The Rationality of Social Conventions 94
Precedent-Based Reasoning 95
Constitutional Reasoning 97
Conclusion 99
9 Epistemologies of History and Identity 100

The Perils of Proliferation 100
The Epistemology of History 101
Is History a Science? 104
The Epistemology of Identity 106
The Rational Construction of Epistemic Domains 108
Conclusion 109
PART IV
The Truth About Truth 111
10 Theoretical Conclusions 113

A Developmental Theory of Epistemic Cognition 113
Ten Concepts 115
Cognition and Development 116
Epistemic Cognition and Development 117
Conclusion 122
11 Epistemology in Practice 124

Applied Epistemology 124
Creation, Evolution, and Science Education 125
Identity, History, and Morality 129
Deliberation and Democracy 131
Conclusion 133
x Contents
12 Prospects for Research 134

The Scope of Epistemology 134
Metacognition 136
Knowledge About Sources of Knowledge 139
Knowledge About Epistemic Domains 141
Epistemic Virtue and Rational Identity 142
Conclusion 143
Glossary 144
References 148
Author Index 161
Subject Index 165
FOREWORD
As soon as I knew this book was in the works, I looked forward to seeing it and
having the opportunity to comment on it, as I knew David Moshman would
get to the heart of the matter and impose a solid framework on what has been
a wide-ranging, variable literature. Empirical studies have accumulated in con-
siderable number reporting on how different groups respond to a wide range of
questions that relate at least loosely to how people know. Badly needed has been
a conceptual framework of what underlies their answers. Simply adding up scores
on seemingly pertinent items as a way to identify epistemological types doesnt
get us there. Moshman is not the first to take on this challenge, but he fulfills it
elegantly and, I think, the most comprehensively and astutely.
Even though I dont agree with him on every point, as usual in my estimation,
Moshman gets it pretty much right. The two key strengths of his treatment are
first of all a keen analytical orientation that doesnt allow for muddiness or loose
terminology. Moshman rigorously identifies the essence of epistemological think-
ing and goes on to establish its boundaries, as well as its place in relation to other
key and difficult-to-define constructs such as thinking, reasoning, inference, and
metacognition. Yet, this strength doesnt make his analyses pedantic; to the con-
trary he maintains a focus on the big picture.
Another critical virtue of Moshmans analysis is its developmental focus. Epis-
temological understanding, he rightly tells readers, can only be understood in
the framework of its development. From its early roots in the childs recognizing
others beliefs, children become capable of regulating their thinking on the basis
of epistemological considerations of truth and justification, but only very grad-
ually. Truth is initially understood as perceived directly, without mediation by
human minds; later, in an about face, the human mind becomes the only source of
knowing and subjectivism reigns, until there occurs the critical transition toward a
xii Foreword
more serviceable, mature epistemologythe recognition that subjectivity can be

constrained through rational processes, as Moshman puts it.
This is not to say the evolution occurs as a single, unitary process. Mosh-
man addresses the domain question that has preoccupied so many working on
this topic, emphasizing that an individuals epistemology may contain pieces of
all three stances. This does not invalidate the sequence, which remains invariant,
reflecting the gradual coordination of the objective and subjective elements of
knowing; but different domains pose different challenges. A major challenge in
social domains is to conquer the view that human interpretation plays an unman-
ageable, overpowering role, in the form of bias. In natural science, in contrast,
this is of relatively little concern and the major challenge instead is to recognize
that human interpretation plays any role at all in scientific knowledge. Thus, in
natural science, one must struggle to move beyond the objectivist understanding
that reality can be perceived directly and to acknowledge human knowing as a
critical intermediary. In social domains, on the other hand, it can long remain a
struggle to move beyond a subjectivist stance and readmit any objective standards
for knowing, which is the rationalists accomplishment.
Beyond imposing order on a challenging, often misunderstood topic, the major
contribution of Moshmans offering is to emphasize the centrality and significance
of epistemological understanding to human thinking and its evolution. Indeed, as
he notes, cognition remains automatic and intuitive much of the time through-
out the human life cycle. But its the gradually developing overlay of effortful,
non-intuitive thinking that needs to be nurtured, precisely because it contributes
so essentially to human progress, both individually and collectively. As Moshman
stresses, a rationalist epistemology underlies the intellectual freedom central to
deliberative democracy.
I would question Moshmans claim that to have an epistemology is to see
the need to explain knowledge in general. Here he perhaps goes a bit too far,
in expecting all of us to undertake the kind of explicit contemplation that is
the specialty of philosophers. We all draw on epistemological understanding in
making the countless judgments and decisions we do every day, even though to
explain knowledge in general doesnt worry us much. Every time we make a
claim we believe to be justified, we draw on our epistemological understanding of
how claims can be justified, although rarely aware that we are doing so. Justified
claims are arguments, and they are ubiquitous from early childhood on (Mercier &
Sperber, 2011; Mercier, 2011; Kuhn, Hemberger, & Khait, 2014), often central to
the things we care about most. Yet, some arguments are indeed better justified
than others, and at the root of such differences lie differences in epistemological
understanding of what makes a claim justified. The epistemological standards that
underlie what we believe and say to be true matter greatly in many arenas of
human activity, for example in peoples roles as jurors or as teachersto cite just
two cases where such connections have been empirically demonstrated. How
certain can one be? is an epistemological question every juror addresses implicitly.
Foreword xiii
Of all the factors that stand to influence epistemological understanding, educa-

tion appears to be key. Hence, it is well worth our studying the more specific kinds
of experiences that stand to foster development in epistemological understanding.
Moshmans welcome book lays much needed groundwork for this effort.
Deanna Kuhn
June 2014
References
Kuhn, D., Hemberger, L., & Khait, V. (2014). Argue with me: Argument as a path to developing
students thinking and writing. Bronxville, NY: Wessex Press.

Mercier, H. (2011). Reasoning serves argumentation in children. Cognitive Development, 26,
177191.
Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumenta-
tive theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34, 57111.
PREFACE
I have been studying the development of epistemic cognition since the 1970s but
didnt know it until the 1990s. In my defense let me point out that no one ever
heard of epistemic cognition until the 1980s (Kitchener, 1983). But I have to
admit it took me another decade to realize thats what I was studying.
Since then I have come to see that many people are studying many aspects
of epistemic cognition and its development without being aware of each others
work. Part of the problem is that not all those who study epistemic cognition use
that term. Another part of the problem is that those who do use epistemological
terminology study a variety of metacognitive phenomena, not all of which are
equally epistemological.
Over the past decade, I have attempted to coordinate the diverse literatures
of epistemic cognition in a series of publications defining the term, identifying
relevant theories and programs of research, and moving toward an integrative
psychological account of how people understand justification and truth and how
such understanding develops. I am grateful to Psychology Press and to my editor
Georgette Enriquez for the opportunity to bring this work to fruition.
Many individuals over many years have contributed to my understanding of
cognition, development, and epistemology. I appreciate the input of four anony-
mous reviewers on the initial proposal for this book. For detailed and helpful feed-
back on various portions of the manuscript I thank a theoretically diverse group
of psychologists and philosophers: Sarit Barzilai, Michael Chandler, Frank Edler,
Matt McCrudden, Harvey Siegel, Les Smith, Pina Tarricone, and Anat Zohar.
What follows does not necessarily represent their views. On the contrary, they
often disagreed with me and with each other. The book is better as a result of their
input, and I look forward to continuing debates.
Preface xv
Finally, I thank Deanna Kuhn for her gracious and thoughtful foreword. I dont
suppose anyone gets to have the last word in whatever debates are provoked by this
book, but Im delighted that she got the first.
David Moshman
June 2014
Reference
Kitchener, K. S. (1983). Cognition, metacognition, and epistemic cognition: A three-level
model of cognitive processing. Human Development, 26, 222232.
PART I
Epistemology and Cognition

Epistemic cognition is a topic in cognitive psychology that concerns peoples

knowledge about matters of epistemology, a topic in philosophy. This introduc-
tory section provides the background necessary to get all readers on the same page
(literally the first page of Part II) regardless of prior knowledge of philosophy and
psychology.
Chapter 1 introduces a variety of epistemological concerns and concepts
through an extended discussion of the number of planets in the solar system. It
concludes with an overview of the book.
Chapter 2 presents epistemology as the branch of philosophy concerned with
knowledge, especially its normative aspects, and thus with the truth and justifica-
tion of beliefs. It summarizes philosophical controversies regarding the definition
of knowledge, the basis for and possibility of justification and truth, and potential
distinctions among diverse forms of knowledge. Introducing the psychological
study of epistemic cognition, I suggest that empirical research is necessary for a full
understanding of epistemological matters but cannot simply replace philosophical
epistemology.
Chapter 3 presents cognition as knowledge, including associated processes of
inference, thinking, and reasoning, and highlights metacognition, the subset of
cognition concerning knowledge about knowledge. I focus especially on epistemic
cognition, the subset of metacognition concerning knowledge about the norma-
tive nature of knowledge, including fundamental issues of truth and justification
central to reasoning. This account is then embedded in a broad overview of dual
processing and cognitive development.
1
THE PERILS OF PLUTO
In the late 19th century there were eight known planets in our solar system. The
existence of Neptune, the eighth from the sun and eighth to be discovered, had
been predicted on the basis of perturbations in the orbit of Uranus. By the turn
of the 20th century, however, most scientists believed that Neptune was not suf-
ficient to explain the perturbations. The search for a ninth planet was initiated by
Percival Lowell in 1906. Pluto was discovered in early 1930 by Clyde Tombaugh
and immediately recognized as the ninth planet in our solar system.
The universe is a dangerous place, however. Plutos story had just begun.
Pluto in Peril
On August 24, 2006, a starship appeared at the edge of our solar system. Suddenly,
without warning or explanation, it blasted poor Pluto out of existence. Fortu-
nately the alien ship soon disappeared and was not heard from again. We may
never know whether it came from elsewhere in our galaxy, from another galaxy,
or from the future, but Pluto is gone, so our solar system now has eight planets.
Dont remember that? Actually, its not quite accurate. Pluto was not blasted
out of existence that day but simply out of orbit, and it was an asteroid, not a star-
ship, that did it. The asteroid hit at a force and angle that loosed Pluto forever from
the suns gravity, leaving our solar system with eight planets.
Dont remember that either? Do you remember the internal geological catas-
trophe that reduced Pluto to a tiny speck, leaving the sun with just eight planets?
Okay, none of that happened. Pluto was not destroyed or knocked out of orbit
and it did not implode. But if youre old enough you do remember when there
were nine planets in the solar system. Thats what I learned as a child, and there
was no doubt about that number. As I grew older I came to understand that
there was a time when not all the planets were yet known, and I learned that Pluto
4 Epistemology and Cognition
was the ninth to be discovered. But I didnt doubt that scientists had discovered
nine planets. Maybe they would discover one or more additional planets, though
that seemed unlikely, but there were certainly no fewer than nine.
But now there are only eight planets. How did that happen? The answer is that
after years of contentious debate among astronomers and others the definition
of planet was changed in such a way that Pluto no longer qualified as a planet,
though all the other planets still did. Pluto was not the victim of an alien starship,
an errant meteor, or a geological implosion. It was a victim of redefinition.
Not that Pluto minded. Pluto itself continued on its vast elliptic course around
the sun, sublimely oblivious to the astrolexical brouhaha surrounding its conceptu-
alization by a primate species on the third planet. What happened to Pluto didnt
happen way out there beyond Neptune. It happened right here on Earth. To under-
stand why there are no longer nine planets we need to look into our own minds.
But how can that be? Is the world a function of our minds? Could we redefine
planet again next year such that there are only, say, six planets? Could we promote
our own status by redefining planet in such a way that only Earth qualifies as a
true planet? Or, in a more magnanimous vein, could we loosen the definition of
planet such that dozens, or hundreds, or perhaps even thousands of the various
objects in our solar system qualify as planets? If we can define planet any way we
want, then we can have as many planets as we desire, or as few, and anything can
be a planet, or not, as we choose.
It appears, then, that even basic facts such as the number of planets in our solar
system or the planetary status of particular astronomical objects are ultimately sub-
jective because they are simply the products of our definitional choices. But this
raises some problems, to say the least. Is there any true answer to the question of
whether Pluto, or any other astronomical object, is a planet? Is it true to say there
are eight planets? Is it false to say there are nine, or any other number? Are we
justified in what we believe about the status of Pluto and the number of planets?
Were scientists previously justified in holding prior beliefs? Can beliefs ever be
justified? If so, how? Can beliefs ever be true? Can we know they are true? How
can we possibly know that? What do we even mean by truth and justification?
These are not problems of astronomy, geology, or galactic violence, nor are they
problems of how our minds work. They are problems of epistemology (Mosh-
man, 2008b). They are not physics questions about what happened to Pluto as a
physical object in space, nor are they psychological questions about the causes of
our various beliefs. Rather, they are normative questions about the basic nature of
knowledge, about the justification and truth of beliefs. They are questions about
what we ought to believe, and on what rational basis, not what we happen to
believe and how we came to believe it.
Three Epistemologies
Part of our knowledge is knowledge about knowledge, including knowledge
about normative matters of truth and justification that concern what we ought
The Perils of Pluto 5
to believe. As we will see throughout this book, such knowledge is constructed

by developing children and often continues to develop long beyond childhood.
Epistemic cognition is multifaceted and the developmental patterns are com-
plex. As we will see, there are multiple domains of knowledge with distinct episte-
mologies. Children show evidence of developing epistemic cognition long before
the emergence of more abstract epistemologies in adolescence. People of all ages
beyond early childhood deploy a variety of epistemic insights and perspectives.
For a start, however, it is useful to distinguish three general epistemologies.
Although all three have deep philosophical roots, the three-way distinction I make
here is most directly seen in the psychological literature on epistemic development
in adolescence and early adulthood. The terminology varies, however. I will refer
throughout this book to objectivist, subjectivist, and rationalist epistemologies; or
simply to objectivism, subjectivism, and rationalism; and will sometimes refer to
individuals as objectivists, subjectivists, or rationalists. It should be kept in mind
that each of these terms refers to a family of epistemologies and that individuals
deploy multiple epistemologies and do not fit neatly into the categories. For now, I
will introduce each epistemology by considering how an individual applying that
epistemology would address the perils of Pluto.
An objectivist might be troubled by the reclassification of Pluto and the associ-
ated change in the number of planets. Objectivism roots knowledge in facts and
logic. Either Pluto is a planet or it isnt. The number of planets, it would seem, is
simply a matter of fact. If we had learned something new about Pluto such that
it no longer qualified as a planet we could correct our mistake about the number
of planets without raising deep epistemological issues. If instead a new planet had
been discovered, bringing the total number to ten, that would have been exciting
for astronomers but of little interest to epistemologists. If Pluto had been blasted
out of existence by an alien starship, that would have been astronomically and psy-
chologically dramatic but also of no interest to epistemologists. Nor would episte-
mologists take note of Plutos trajectory or concern themselves with its implosion.
What makes the new status of Pluto and the decrease in the number of planets
epistemologically noteworthy is that Pluto is still there and is still Pluto. The
change is a matter of definition. As an objectivist you see facts as the foundation
of knowledge. If we cant rely on the facts, what can we rely on?
Maintaining your objectivism, you might respond as follows: Fortunately, we
generally can rely on the facts. Sometimes we make mistakes, but this is a psycho-
logical observation irrelevant to the truth of objectivism. Even experts can make
mistakes in their definitions and conclusions. But we see the scientific nature of
astronomy in the fact that astronomers were able to recognize and correct their
mistaken definition of planet and realize that there are actually eight planets,
not nine. We all make mistakes but over the long run we can and do determine
the truth.
A subjectivist would consider the objectivist analysis naive and might respond
as follows: Many things are a matter of definition, not just what counts as a planet.
If even basic facts of science are matters of definition it appears that knowledge
in general is just a matter of definition. Knowledge is relative to the definitions

imposed by the knower, and thus always reflects the conceptual structures of the
knower. Facts, if we even call them that, are determined by our concepts and
definitions. Nothing is really true or false. Under one definition there are nine
planets; under another there are eight. If we wanted to double the new number,
we could come up with a set of criteria for planethood that would hold for
16 astronomical objects in our solar system, or any other number that struck our
fancy. If enough of us feel sentimental about Pluto we could advocate a definition
that would restore its planetary status. But what if we decide that Pluto is a puny
upstart unworthy of being classed with Jupiter? No problem. Definitions of planet
that include Jupiter but not Pluto are easy to come by, varying in which other
astronomical objects join Jupiter as a planet and which fall into whatever other
categories we come up with.
Planethood, a subjectivist would argue, is just a matter of definition, and so
is everything else. Some people may prefer one definition to another but such
choices have no rational basis. Truth and falsity cannot be sharply distinguished.
Knowledge, if we even call it that, is always a matter of opinion, and opinions are
just personal preferencesultimately a matter of taste.
A rationalist would agree with the subjectivist up to a point. The classification
of Pluto and the number of planets, the rationalist would acknowledge, do indeed
depend on the definition of planet. Definitions are matters of conventional usage,
rather than empirical claims, and thus cannot be evaluated as true or false. No
definition is the one true definition. The question of whether Pluto is a planet has
no simple objective answer, nor is there one true answer to the question of how
many planets there are in our solar system.
The rationalist would insist, however, that we need not abandon all hope of
objectivity. There is no reason to assume that any answer is as defensible as any
other. Some definitions, and thus some conclusions about planethood, are more
justifiable than others. When the definition of planet was changed on August 24,
2006 (never mind about the violent starship), scientists were taking into account
new discoveries about the variety of astronomical objects in our solar system. Given
the accumulating evidence, there was no basis for classifying Pluto as a planet while
excluding asteroids at least as large that did not differ in any characteristic that
could reasonably be deemed relevant to planethood. Any definition that included
all nine traditional planets would include additional objects, some already known
and perhaps others yet to be discovered, for a total of at least 12 planets.
What actually happened on August 24, 2006, is that the International Astro-
nomical Union adopted a reasonable and parsimonious definition of planet based
on considerations of orbit, size, and gravitation. This definition encompassed the
first eight of the traditional nine planets but did not include Pluto or any other
astronomical object in our solar system, nor was it likely there remained any such
objects yet to be discovered. The official adoption of this definition did not make
it the one true definition in any objective sense and thus does not justify an
The Perils of Pluto 7
objectivist conclusion that we used to mistakenly believe there were nine planets
but now know there to be eight. The subjectivity of the definition, however, does
not justify a subjectivist conclusion that all definitions are equally good, or equally
arbitrary. There are objective constraints on what can be a planet and on the pos-
sible numbers of planets in the solar system.
Yes, a rationalist would acknowledge, we could define planet as any astronomi-
cal object that either (a) meets the 2006 criteria for planet or (b) has the same
name as Mickey Mouses dog. If we adopt that definition then Pluto is a planet
and there are nine planets. Alternatively, we can add to any definition of planet
that any astronomical object with a five-letter name beginning with P is also a
planet or we can grant planethood to any astronomical object discovered in 1930

by Clyde Tombaugh and then add any object we choose to the category by com-
ing up with a unique description of it. Such definitions are not false. They are
not self-contradictory, nor are they inconsistent with evidence. Their arbitrariness,
however, renders them less justifiable than more parsimonious definitions based
on some conjunction of relevant criteria. Given what we know about our solar
system we can reasonably conclude that there are eight planets or that there are at
least 12, but there is no rational basis for concluding that there are precisely nine.
The 2006 definition of planet is a subjective choice within objective constraints.
The resulting knowledge of our solar system is both subjective and objective.
Rationalism, then, recognizes and coordinates the insights of both objectivism
and subjectivism. It recognizes that the absolute objectivity of objectivism cannot
be attained because knowledge is inherently subjective. Rather than retreat into
subjectivism, however, it maintains that (subjective) reflection on subjectivity can
generate a metasubjective objectivity.
There is good reason I have presented objectivist, subjectivist, and rationalist
epistemologies in that order. In addition to their natural conceptual ordering,
there is extensive research showing strong developmental trends from objectivism
to subjectivism to rationalism. But the patterns are complex. They do not support
a simplistic picture of a single sequence of three general epistemological stages
with the third representing a state of maturity attained at some advanced age. We
will address the developmental patterning of epistemic cognition throughout this
book, especially in Chapters 5 and 6.
Before turning to our minds, however, lets take one more look at our solar
system.
Planetary Problems
Pluto, as we have seen, was the ninth planet to be discovered and the first to cease
to be a planet. But the perils of Pluto are just the start.
What was the sixth planet to be discovered? Think about it. Take your time.
Close the book a moment and come back when you have an answer. Feel free to
check on the ordering of planets.
Okay, ready? What was the sixth planet to be discovered? Raise your hand if
you said Saturn.
Thats a good answer. It seems reasonable to surmise that the sixth planet to be
discovered would be the sixth from the sun. But Saturn, the sixth planet from the
sun, was not the sixth to be discovered. Saturn is one of the classic five planets that
have been known at least since the time of the ancient Greeks more than 20 cen-
turies ago. Those planets are Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn.
The sixth planet to be discovered was the planet Earth, which was discovered
by Nicolaus Copernicus in the early 1500s. Copernicus determined that the five
known planets all orbited the sun and that the Earth did as well, thus making it a
planet and bringing the total number to six.

But wait. Is this some kind of trick? The Earth was known to people long
before Copernicus. So how can he have discovered it?
But this is no trick. The Earth as we know it is the planet Earth. And the planet
Earth was indeed unknown prior to its discovery by Copernicus. Humans lived
on Earth for many thousands of years without understanding that they were living
on a planet. Fish still dont understand that they live in the water. But in the past
five centuries we humans have come to see our planet as a planet.
Reconceptualization is not just a peril to Pluto. It can change our relation
to everything, even the ground beneath our feet. As we have seen, we need not
accept the implication that all ideas are equally good, or bad, or justified, or not.
We may sometimes have good reason for some beliefs, including the belief that
we are making progress toward truth, even if we will never reach it. But neither
truth nor justification is simple, or readily within our grasp. And so we turn to
epistemology.
Overview of the Book

Who, exactly, must turn to epistemology? To study epistemic cognition, readers of
this book must turn to epistemology, and we will do so in the next chapter. But it
is not just those of us who study epistemic cognition who must turn to epistemol-
ogy. Those we study have already turned to epistemology, which is what makes it
possible to study their epistemic cognition and development.
This book is organized in four parts with three chapters each. In the remaining
two chapters of this first part, I provide the philosophical and psychological basis
for the study of epistemic cognition and its development. Along the way I provide
several perspectives on the relation of psychology and philosophy. I conclude that
the psychological study of epistemic cognition can inform and enrich philosophi-
cal epistemology but cannot replace it.
In the second part of the book I provide a theoretical account of epistemic
cognition and its development. I propose that epistemic cognition can only be
understood developmentally. Thus the study of epistemic development explains
epistemic cognition. But how can we study epistemic development if we dont
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EPISTEMIC COGNITION

utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now

For Sara, in true love and justified belief

Foreword by Deanna Kuhn xi

1 The Perils of Pluto 3

2 The Study of Truth and Justification 10

3 Cognition and Metacognition 21

Three Conceptions of Rationality 24

5 Epistemic Development in Childhood 45

6 Epistemic Development Beyond Childhood 55

7 Epistemologies of Science and Logic 73

The Construction of Metalogical Understanding 78

8 Epistemologies of Morality and Convention 86

Principled Moral Reasoning 92

9 Epistemologies of History and Identity 100

10 Theoretical Conclusions 113

11 Epistemology in Practice 124

12 Prospects for Research 134

more serviceable, mature epistemologythe recognition that subjectivity can be

Of all the factors that stand to influence epistemological understanding, educa-

students thinking and writing. Bronxville, NY: Wessex Press.

Epistemology and Cognition

Epistemic cognition is a topic in cognitive psychology that concerns peoples

to believe. As we will see throughout this book, such knowledge is constructed

in general is just a matter of definition. Knowledge is relative to the definitions

planet or we can grant planethood to any astronomical object discovered in 1930

planet and bringing the total number to six.

Overview of the Book

Broughton, J. M. (1978). Development of concepts of self, mind, reality, and knowledge. In

Haidt, 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hewitson, M. (2014). History and causality. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Research, 67, 88140.

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Lalonde, C. E., & Chandler, M. J. (2002). Childrens understanding of interpretation. New

Moshman, D. (1998). Cognitive development beyond childhood. In W. Damon (Series

(pp. 183206). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

persons inductive inferences and guesses. Cognitive Development, 27, 299313.

Sandoval, W. A., & Reiser, B. J. (2004). Explanation-driven inquiry: Integrating conceptual

Schwanenflugel, P. J., Fabricius, W. V., & Alexander, J. (1994). Developing theories of

Smith, L. (1993). Necessary knowledge: Piagetian perspectives on constructivism. Hillsdale, NJ:

Witherington, D. C. (2011). Taking emergence seriously: The centrality of circular causal-

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