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creative retrieval of certain aspects of Aquinass thought such as the primacy of esse
(existence), the dynamic notion of substance -in-relation, and the notion of person as the fullest
expression of what it means to be as a frontier being living on the edge, on the frontier, between
The aim of this paper is to show that the human person as a frontier being can only reach
fulfillment and perfection in the resurrection of the dead as understood by Catholic theologians
such as Karl Rahner, Edward Schillebeeckx, Hans Kung and Joseph Ratzinger. To this end I will
develop Clarkes notion of the human person as grounded in his metaphysics of existential act.
Secondly, I will review the central ideas of Rahner, Schillebeeckx, Kung and Ratzinger as
Perspectives. Finally, I will argue that these perspectives on the resurrection of the dead are
compatible with Clarkes notion of the human person, and indeed demonstrate how they are a
In Living on the Edge: the Human Person as a Frontier Being and Macrocosm,
Clarke traces the development of the notion of person as a frontier being living between matter
and spirit, and time and eternity. The idea gets expressed first by Plato in the Timaeus 35A
where the human soul is described as a middle being situated between the world of pure forms
and the world of body and matter. Clarke points out that the weakness in Platos view is
twofold; first, the person is reduced to the soul only and secondly, the relationship of body and
soul is an extrinsic relationship where the soul is envisioned as a prisoner of the material body.
This Platonic idea of the person as a frontier being is transformed in a positive way when
it enters the Christian theological context of the Greek Fathers of the Church. Given the
goodness of the creation, the assuming of human nature by the Second Person of the Trinity, and
the notion of Jesus bodily resurrection, the human body is no longer looked upon as a prison of
the soul. Rather, the human body has its own value and dignity, and the whole human person,
body and soul, is the frontier being that lives between matter and spirit, and time and eternity.
St. Irenaeus expressed this vision of the grandeur and dignity of the whole person when he said:
This vision of the human person reaches its apex in Aquinass anthropology when he
writes:
In saying this, Aquinas incorporates the Christian revaluation of the body and the material
creation introduced by the Greek Fathers, but he also adds a significant anthropology of his
own -- one that overcomes the Platonic dualism and extrinsic relationship of body and soul. For
Aquinas, the relationship of body and soul is an intrinsic one. Clarke sums it up this way:
Not only does the soul need the body for the completion of its nature as a human soul; the
soul needs a particular body. There is a close fit between this soul and this body. Clarke claims
to be following the doctrine of Aquinas that an individual body is an apt fit for this soul and none
other. He argues that the human soul itself in being created by God to be joined with a
particular body is uniquely and individually commensurate by God to this particular body. . . .
So, the spiritual soul . . . is individuated in its very soul by union with the body. In other words,
ones body is ones unique mode of being-in-the-world. It is the only apt vehicle for the souls
expression in matter in this world. As such, the soul joined to a particular body begins a
distinctive history in our world, carving out its own unique place and path in human and world
history.
To sum up, for Aquinas, there is a substantial unity of body and soul, and the human
person as such is a natural unity of both worlds. The human person (body and soul) is the
frontier being in Gods creation one who lives between matter and spirit, and time and eternity.
But how does Clarke view the nature of person in the context of his metaphysics of the primacy
of esse as being?
Clarke sees the primacy of esse as being one of his central retrievals of Aquinas.
Given the essence-existence distinction in real beings, Clarke sees Aquinass achievement as
applying the Aristotelian act and potency to an ontological participation theory. Hence, all
beings participate in an act of existence, (esse) on the horizontal level, namely, in so far as they
are finite creatures. In terms of the essence-existence distinction in things, Aquinas sees the
essence as a limiting potency to the perfection of an act of existence. Hence, the act of existence
is the primary perfection of a being, and the whole created order of the material universe is like a
vast symphony on the created theme of the act of existence. There is a radical shift of the
metaphysical center of gravity from form and essence where it was in classical Greek philosophy
retrieves the Thomistic notion of substance as dynamic act, i.e., as an abiding center of activity
and being acted upon. In the Summa Contra Gentiles Aquinas claims that Each and everything
shows forth that it exists for the sake of its operation. Indeed, operation is the ultimate perfection
of each thing. In the De Potentia we read: It is the nature of every actuality to communicate
itself insofar as it is possible. Hence, every agent acts according as it exists in actuality. Finally,
being as a substance with an act of existence as its primary perfection is by virtue of the act of
has an intrinsic dynamic orientation toward self-expression and communication with other
beings. In addition to this tendency to act upon others, every being in the universe has the need
to be acted upon. He sees this as a manifestation of the both the richness and poverty of being:
poor because it lacks the fullness of existence, and so strives to enrich itself as much as its
nature allows from the richness of those around it and rich because endowed with its own
richness of existence, however slight this may be, which it tends naturally to communicate and
the kinds of relations that appear in traditional thomistic texts on metaphysics. Celestine Bittle,
for example, distinguishes kinds of relations as logical and real (metaphysical). Real or
exist where the relation abides in both terms of the relationship as for example a son related to
his father whereas a non-mutual accidental relation is one in which the relation abides in only
one term of the relation as for example when a person comes to know some piece of information
which he did not previously know. The relation abides in the knower, not in the object known.
It is obvious that for a Thomist like Bittle relations, following the Aristotelian categories, are
essentially accidental. They are accidents existing in a substance. It would seem that Thomists
like Bittle are inheritors of a distorted notion of substance that has come down to them from
modernity. First, the Cartesian self-enclosed substance; second, the Lockean inert substance as
an unknowable substratum; and third, the Humean separable substance rejected as unintelligible.
With these distortions the in-itself aspect of being was overstressed and relations became
secondary and unimportant. Secondly and more importantly, substance was viewed in a static
way instead of in its dynamic act. Consequently, Aquinass notion of being as essentially
ordered toward action and self-communication was lost. It is precisely this aspect of the inner
active dynamism of being that Clarke wants to retrieve in his notion of substance-in-relation. In
relation. In fact the universe of being is a web of relations communicating over the bridge of
in the fullest meaning of being as dynamic act of existence is for Clarke the human person. He
writes: the full dimension of what it means to be can be found only in personal being in its
interpersonal manifestation. Person, then, is not something other than the act of existence of a
human nature. Rather, it is the fullest expression of what it means to be and to exist. Clarke
explains that being naturally turns into person wherever its restricting level of essence allows it
to be intensely enough [in order to transcend] the dispersal of matter. In other words, person is
act of existence that transcends the matter which is its body and becomes not only a substance-
in-relation like rocks and trees, but an act of presence that becomes presence to and for itself
(self-consciousness), and master of its own actions (freedom) In short, the perfection of being
is esse and as esse being is dynamic relation to other beings forming a vast web of material
cosmic relationships. But when being as esse transcends its dispersion over matter, it becomes
human person as the fullest expression and perfection of what it means to be on this side of the
frontier: living between matter and spirit, time and eternity. The human person as a frontier
being, then, is a substantial unity of body and soul, matter and spirit that expresses
choice. Clarke claims that the human person expresses himself/herself by loving, in the
broadest sense of the term, to make itself the center of the widest possible web of relationships to
all things and especially to all persons through knowledge and love. But in addition to
expressing oneself in active communication with other persons the human person receives the
active communication of other persons on oneself. Clarke argues that self donation would be
incomplete without welcoming receptivity on the other side of the personal relation. Authentic
love is not complete unless it is both actively given and actively - - gracefully - - received. . . . .
The perfection of being -- and therefore of the person -- is essentially dyadic, culminating in
communion.
To sum up, human persons as substantial unities of body and soul are essentially acting
persons giving of themselves and receiving from others as real incarnate agents being-in-the-
world. Human persons, then, form a community of active presence of being to one another in
and through the communicative language of the body. That is what it means for the person to be
a frontier being.
Karl Rahner, Hans Kung and Joseph Ratzinger all maintain that what Catholic theology
means by the resurrection of the dead is twofold: first and foremost it is a resurrection of the
human person, namely, the whole man; secondly, it is the resurrection of human corporeality.
Regarding the resurrection of the person, Rahner argues that Resurrection means . . .
the termination and perfection of the whole man before God, which gives eternal life. And
although death crashes in on a person from outside and one passively undergoes it, nevertheless,
it is simultaneously an inner choice and the self actualization of the person. He argues:
personal identity.
Hence, Rahner sees ones death as the fulfillment and continuity of ones personal identity.
Likewise Hans Kung sees the resurrection of the dead as the new creation, the
transformation of the whole person by Gods life-creating Spirit. He sees that this notion of the
resurrection of the dead is preeminently Biblical and consequently overcomes the Platonic
dualism of body and soul. It is the raising up understood in the New Testament sense of the
body as soma, i.e., an identical personal reality, the same self with its entire history. Kung
resurrection of the dead. The New Testament knows no word denoting only the body as
distinguished from the soul. Rather it presupposes the undivided unity of the human person. He,
therefore, argues that the real content of Biblical hope symbolized as the resurrection of the dead
is immortality of the person, of the one creation man. He further explains as opposed to any
Greek dualism of body and soul that the awakening of the dead (not of bodies!) of which
Scripture speaks is thus conceived with the salvation of the one, undivided man, not just with the
fate of one (so far as possible secondary half of man). Schillebeeckx following along the same
line of thought argues that what is called the resurrection of the body is the resurrection of the
Having established that the resurrection of the dead is primarily the resurrection of the
human person, it now remains to delineate what exactly Schillebeeckx and the others mean by
corporeality as included in the resurrection of the dead. Schillebeeckx makes it clear that by
corporeality one does not mean the chemico-physical body left behind in death, but that
corporeality has to do with the personal corporeality in which I lived on earth. However, he
does not give us a positive account of what corporeality consists in. Joseph Ratzinger likewise
expresses the view that by corporeality one does not mean a chemico-physical body of atoms and
molecules. He argues that both John (6.53) and Paul (1 Cor 15.50) state with all possible
emphasis that the resurrection of the flesh, the resurrection of the body is not a resurrection
of physical bodies.
exclude the chemico-physical bodies we live in? First of all, it must be said that the body we
live in is ones mode of being-in-the world. It is the means by which we establish many
relationships, take the world into ourselves, and thereby give shape to ourselves as persons. It is
the body which is open to the giving and the receiving of the active presence of human persons
in interpersonal relationships. As frontier beings, persons interact in the world and actualize
themselves in and through their physical bodies. And yet in the resurrection of the dead it is not
this chemico-physical body that is included in the resurrection and the final actualization of the
person (the whole man). Nevertheless, human corporeality and personal corporeality is essential
Karl Rahner gives insight into what might be meant by corporeality by distinguishing
between body and flesh. Body is what a person has: flesh is what a person is. The resurrection
of the dead is, therefore, the destiny of the one and total person who is as such flesh. It is not the
resurrection of the body, if by that one means that some material fragment of the earthly body is
found again in the glorified body. For this kind of identity cannot even be found in the earthly
body, because of its radical metabolic processes. Secondly, what corporeality or the
resurrection of the flesh means is that what comes before God in death is ones personal history
fashioned by means of free decisions made as incarnate spirit in and through the physical body.
The human person as incarnate spirit is bodily being-in-the-world. Hence, Rahner can hold that
Resurrection of the flesh which man is does not mean resurrection of the body which man has
Hence, the most we can speculate about the corporeality of the resurrection of the dead is that
what is raised and transformed is in continuity with ones identical personal reality, the same self
with its whole history as lived out in the flesh. In other words, what is important here is not a
question of ones body as an empirical entity, but the one and total person who as such is flesh.
Joseph Ratzinger makes an interesting distinction that may help us understand this mystery more
deeply. He distinguishes between physical unit and bodiliness. Bodiliness is more than a
physical unit -- a sum of corpuscles. It is matter as drawn into the souls power of expression.
I take him to mean that bodiliness is the souls expression of itself insofar as the human person is
incarnate spirit, and the soul as form of the body can never be separated from material
expression. I think we can see what Ratzinger means by bodiliness as the souls power of
expression when we look at peoples body language or the expressions on their faces. Their
whole personality and history are written there. The face of an old embittered person looks
different than the face of a person grown old gracefully. That bodiliness, that material
of the resurrected person. It is ones unique bodiliness because as Clarke argued ones individual
body is the only apt vehicle for the souls expression. Aquinas claims that such adaptabilities
remain in the soul even after the bodies have perished. Consequently, the bodiliness we bring
into eternal life as the necessary aspect of our personal identity must be in continuity with the
physical body that was the only apt vehicle for the souls expression in matter in the world.
Hence, the resurrection of the body would mean the resurrection of ones unique bodiliness. In
short, we will all bring into eternal life that aspect of our personal identity which cannot be
separated from matter and our history of free decisions made in and through the communicate
So far we have seen that for Catholic theologians the meaning of the resurrection of the
dead is essentially the resurrection of the individual human person together with the material
component called corporeality which is essentially the souls expression as the form of a body,
namely, its bodiliness. However, the destiny of each human person becomes fully actualized
and perfected only in the resurrection of the dead on the last day. In other words, the destiny of
each person is necessarily bound up with the fulfillment of humanity as such, namely, the whole
human community. This is the universal eschatological dimension of the resurrection of the
dead. Ratzinger claims that the goal of the Christian is not private bliss but the whole. She or
he believes not just in her or his own future but in the future of the world. And this future is
Gods doing not the persons. Rahner expresses a similar idea when he claims that the glorified
body enters into free and unhampered relations with everything. In this way, the glorified body
seems to become the perfect expression of the enduring relations of the glorified person to the
person is fully realized and perfected only when human persons enter into active relationship and
communication with everybody and everything. Ronald Rolheiser in his book The Holy
Longing has an interesting interpretation of Jesus claim in Luke 20:27-40 that in the resurrection
of the dead we will no longer marry or be given in marriage. Rather we will embrace everyone
and everything in a single embrace of love. He writes about this in terms of human sexuality:
in celibacy). Both of these are ways that will eventually open our
Hence, the final resurrection of the dead is a final embrace of all persons in the body of Christ. It
is a communal act of the giving and receiving in love of all of humanity. It is the universal
embrace of everything and everybody. There is a twofold relationship of persons to one another
At the moment of death, ones personal history made in self-awareness and freedom
comes to an end. This personal identity together with ones bodiliness enters into God.
However, one is not yet complete because as Bernard Prusak argues only at the End will I
realize how I was affected by all those who came before me and how I affected, positively and
negatively, all those who came after me. Free human actions and choices made in ones
personal history have far reaching consequences and effects in the community of persons in the
ongoing process of history. Ones influence does not end at the moment of death. Rather, we
retain in death a relationship to the process of becoming in the world -- an ongoing relationship
to the history of the world. Consequently, only when the history of the world and the history of
other persons is fulfilled will our personal histories be fully actualized and consummated. For
example, St. Benedict with his teaching of the importance of lectio divina is still having his
influence on the world in every Benedictine monastery formed into Christ by means of lectio
divina and on every lay person who buys a book on lectio divina and practices it daily. The full
actualization of the person of St. Benedict, then, will be complete only when those he has
influenced have completed their personal histories because their personal histories form part of
Benedicts own ongoing history. Ratzinger writes about this mutual interdependence between
the individual and humanity: What happens in one individual has an effect upon the whole of
humanity, and what happens in humanity happens in the individual.
There is then an ongoing inter-relationship between the person, society and the worlds
ongoing history that can only be completed at the end of time in the general resurrection of the
dead when all persons become fully actualized and complete. Only then will each person
become fully complete because only then will he/she realize his/her fullest personal history and
story, namely, his/her ongoing effects, for good or for ill, on the ongoing history of the world one
left behind at ones personal death, but not without ongoing influence. My death may not have
much ongoing influence in history, but the deaths of people like St. Benedict, and I may add
Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Edith Stein, Mother Theresa, and yes, Joseph Stalin and
Bernard Prusak suggests that upon ones personal death one begins a process
when the material world and its history will have achieved
One may sum up Clarkes philosophy of the human person by the following axioms:
4. As such, persons enter into personal dialogue with each other in thought and
ones being, and receiving from one another in the poverty of ones being.
5. As frontier beings between matter and spirit, and time and eternity, human
persons grow and become more fully actualized persons in and through
the communicative language of the body. In this sense, the self needs the
self-aware and free substance in relation to other persons in and through the body to which it is
Given what has been said about the resurrection of the dead, the self as a whole man can
reach its fullest completion as a self-aware and free person in a community of frontier beings
with a history only in what Catholic theology calls the final resurrection of the dead at the end of
time. Before that final day according to Prusak there begins what he calls a particular
resurrection of the dead a process in which the person reaches a certain self-fulfillment, but one
that is not fully and completely actualized. In this process the person reaches his/her personal
fulfillment as a frontier being actively giving and receiving in a dynamic community of sharing
and receiving being. Nevertheless, only in the universal resurrection at the end of time when the
material world and its history will be achieved in its fullness will our relationships be finally
realized and integrated into our personal identity. Only then will we be fully complete as whole
persons with our bodiliness, namely, with the expression of our soul had in and through the
body.
Some may object that if souls are not fully realized until the final resurrection, wont
they be incomplete beings upon death, still longing for completion? Aquinas himself holds the
position that the soul is naturally the form of the body and, although it can know itself and
spiritual objects in heaven after death, as well as be happy in the beatific vision, the soul is in an
unnatural state, and in this condition of separation from the body it is not strictly a human
person. Hence, it is obvious that for Aquinas the soul in heaven before the final resurrection of
It is also clear from what was said in book II that the soul
the soul will not be without the body. Since, then, it persists
Hence, there in no obstacle to the idea that the human person is not a being fully
complete in ones personal death. Moreover, given the fact that ones influence in an ongoing
history of the community of persons continues after ones personal death, a person becomes fully
complete only when that person realizes his/her place in the ongoing history of the world in the
final resurrection of the dead at the end of time. That is to say, when one is in full communion
with all other persons in the final resurrection of humanity. Secondly, one becomes a fully
complete person when one is in full relationship with the cosmos as such. Clarke argues that
without the presence of the human person in the universe, the cosmos would remain totally
unconscious of the great circle of being, namely, that the material universe came from God by
way of efficient causality and is journeying back to its Source by way of God as final cause. In
short, the human person raises the material universe into consciousness and so fulfills it and
takes it back to union with God. In this way the human person becomes full and complete in the
final resurrection when at the same time the whole of the material universe reaches its conscious
completion.
Clarke claims that the human person comes into existence enveloped in a web of relations
of dependence on others even before he/she actively engages in relation to the world and other
persons. From then on, a persons whole development will consist in relating itself
appropriately, both actively and responsively, to the world around it and especially to other
persons both human and divine. This process of intercommunication with being that began
without ones awareness and choice can only reach its fulfillment after a life of self-awareness
and choice lived out in the human body in what Prusak calls the resurrection of the dead at the
end of time when the cosmos and its history will have achieved its fullness of finality and the
contributions and relations of the human person to the world are fully integrated into each
persons identity. Only in this way will the human person who is a substantial unity of body and
soul as well as an active center of existence (self-conscious and free) in communication with
other centers of existence, inanimate, animate and human be fully actualized and completed as
frontier beings. Frontier beings living between matter and spirit, and time and eternity can be
fully realized only in a final communion with all of humanity and the whole cosmos. The
resurrection of the dead as understood by Catholic theology is the logical telos to the nature of