Section 2.

The right to of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

General Rule: Search and seizures are unreasonable UNLESS authorized by a validly issued
search warrant or warrant of arrest

Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383

Any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search warrant is inadmissible

People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57

The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated
by private individuals

People v. Mendoza, GR 109279, Jan 18, 1999

The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of
ones person from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion. In the instant
case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by accused-appellants father-
in-law, a private citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.

People v. Bongcarawan, GR 143944, July 11, 2002

The protection against unreasonable search and seizure is against the transgression committed by
the government or its agent. In the absence of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by
the constitution cannot be invoked.

Requisites for a Valid Warrant

a. It must be issued upon PROBABLE CAUSE.
b. The existence of probable cause is determined personally by the JUDGE.
c. The judge must EXAMINE UNDER OATH the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.
d. The warrant must PARTICULARLY DESCRIBE the place to be searched and person or
things to be seized.
e. It must be in connection with One specific offense

Probable Cause:
Facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of a warrant and sufficient to induce a
cautious man to rely upon them.

Probable Cause For Arrest:

Probable cause refers to such facts and circumstances, which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.
Webb v. De Leon, GR 121234, August 23, 1995
For warrant of arrest, probable cause must point to a specific offender.

Probable Cause For Search:

Probable cause would mean such facts and circumstances, which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched.

NOTE: Probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant does NOT require that the probable
guilt of a specific offender be established, unlike in the case of a warrant of arrest. Existence of
probable cause DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE

Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800

A mere typographical error in a search warrant does not render the same invalid. In the
determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient
particularity, it has been held that the executing officers prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant. Mere unsubstantiated allegations or baseless conclusions of
law do not constitute probable cause for issuance of a search warrant

Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69

The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the Judge must, before
issuing search warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers , in
writing and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits
submitted.

Who Determines Probable Cause?

Judge determines probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant.

People v. CA, GR 126005, Jan 21, 1999

Prosecution determines probable cause for the purpose of filing an information.

Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp, GR 140946, Sept. 13, 2004

Probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or moral certainty. The standards of
judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a
full-blown trial. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No
formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of
conditions obtaining in a given situation.

Nala v. Barroso, GR 153087 Aug. 7, 2003

The failure to correctly state in the search and seizure warrant the first name of petitioner does
not invalidate the warrant because the additional description sufficiently enabled the police
officers to locate and identify the petitioner. What is prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed
party, and not one which contains a descriptio personae that will enable the officer to identify the
accused without difficulty.

Placer v. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463

Judge may rely upon the fiscals certification for the existence of probable cause and on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the judge to come out with
the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise
of judicial discretion on the part of issuing magistrate.

Lim v. Judge Fenix, 194 SCRA 292

Judge cannot solely rely on certification of prosecutor. Judge must look at the reports, affidavits,
transcripts and other supporting documents.

Gozos v. Tac-an GR 123191, Dec. 17, 1998

The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The
preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to
the expenses, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the prosecutor.

Soliven v. Makasiar, GR 8287, Nov. 14 1981

The judge is NOT required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. What the
Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause.

Kho v. Judge Makalintal, GR 94902-06, April 21, 1999

It is within the discretion of the examining judge to determine what questions to ask the
witnesses so long as the questions asked are germane to the pivot of inquiry the existence
or absence of probable cause.

Alvarez v. Court, 64 Phil 33

The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
complainant or his witnesses because the purpose is to convince the judge of the existence of
probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant the issuance of a search
warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and
affiant could be held liable for the damages caused

Borlongan v. Pena, GR 143591, Nov. 23, 2007

The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after
arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without
previously invoking his objections thereto.

People v. Mamaril, GR 147607, Jan 22 2004

The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that
the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable
cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations
are false.

People v. Veloso 48 Phil 169

A John Doe warrant can satisfy the requirement of particularity of description if it contains a
descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused

Alvarez v. CFI 64 Phil. 33

The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate,
not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence
of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search
warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and
affiant be held liable for damages caused.

Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp (2004)

No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or
fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions
obtaining in a given situation.

GENERAL WARRANT
A general warrant is one that does not allege any specific acts or omissions constituting the
offense charged in the application for the issuance of the warrant. It contravenes the explicit
demand of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described

Salazar v. Achcoso, 183 SCRA 145

It is only judges and no other who may issue warrants of arrest and search. The exception is in
cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the
Communication of Immigration may order arrest following a final order of deportation, for the
purpose of deportation.

Republic (PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA 438

PCGGs search and seizure order is not valid. Only a judge may issue a warrant.

Tron Van Nyhia v. Liway, 175 SCRA 318

What is essential in the deportation proceeding to justify the arrest is that there should be specific
charge against alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted with
the assistance of counsel , if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence.

Board of Commissioners v. Judge De La Rosa, 197 SCRA 853

The Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the
Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation.

OF WHATEVER NATURE AND FOR ANY PURPOSE

It is submitted that the phrase effectively extends the search and seizure clause to at least two
prenumbral areas. The first is the sub poena duces tecum under Rule 27 of the Rules of Court. The
second, as yet untouched by the Philippine jurisprudence is building inspection by administrative
officers.

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

GENERAL RULE: GET A SEARCH WARRANT
As a general rule, a peace officer cannot act unless he is possessed of the proper arrest or search
warrant. The exception is when a criminal offense is unfolding before him, in which case, action
is justified and necessary.

WHEN IS A SEARCH A SEARCH?

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely
a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.

Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures

People v. Sevilla 339 SCRA 625

Jurisprudence mentions the following instances under which a warrantless search and seizure
may be effected, to wit: 1. Search which is incidental to the arrest. 2. Seizure of evidence in plain
view 3. Search of moving vehicle 4 Consented warrantless search 5. Customs search 6. Stop and
frisk 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

i. Incidental to a Lawful Arrest

Two Requisites:
1. Item to be searched was within the arrestees custody or area of immediate control.
2. Search was contemporaneous with an arrest.

People v. De Lara 236 SCRA 291

A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate
vicinity where the arrest was made.

People v. Cuenco GR 128277, Nov. 16, 1998

In lawful arrest, it becomes both the duty and the right of apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only to the person of the suspect but also in the permissible area within
his reach, that point which is within the effective control of the person arrested or that which may
furnish him with the means of committing violence or escaping.

ii. Plain View

Requisites:
1. Prior valid intrusion
2. Evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
3. Illegality of the evidence is immediately apparent; and
4. Noticed without further search.

People v. Evaristo, 216 SCRA 413

Objects inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position
to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.

People v. Tabar, 222 SCRA 144 (1993)

When one voluntarily submits to a search and consent to have it made of his person or premises,
he is precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be secure from unreasonable search
may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.

Del Rosario v. People, GR 142295, May 31, 2001

The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:
(1) the law if enforcement officer is in a position where he has a clear view of a particular area or
alias prior justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer inadvertently comes across (or sees in
plain view) a piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it is, immediately apparent to such officer
that the item he sees may be evidence of a crime or a contraband or is otherwise subject to
seizure.

iii. Moving Vehicle

There must be a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity.

Hizon v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 517 (1996)

Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws
have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is
rooted on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and secured.

People v. Barros 231 SCRA 557

It not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought

iv. Consent/Waiver

Requisites:
1.It must appear that the right exists.
2. The person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of the right.
3. The person had actual intention to relinquish the right.

De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 PHIL 689

The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one,
cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly
authorized to do so in his or her behalf.

Caballes v. Court of Appeals, GR 136292, Jan 15, 2002

Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and
the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a
public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the
education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6)
the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.

v. Customs Search
Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857
The Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of
enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in possession or
control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of
Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings.

People v. Gatward, 267 SCRA 785

While no search warrant had been obtained for that purpose, when Gatward checked in his bag
as his personal luggage as a passenger of KLM Flight, he thereby agreed to the inspection
thereof in accordance with customs rules and regulations, an international practice of strict
observance, and waived any objection to a warrantless search. His subsequent arrest, although
likewise without a warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of
the heroin in his bag, or in flagrante delicto.

People v. Johnson 348 SCRA 526

Packs of "methamphetamine hydrochloride" seized during the routine frisk at the airport was
acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures and are therefore admissible in
evidence

vi. Stop and Frisk Situation

Malacat: Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the person with
whom he is dealing may be armed and that the person with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigation of this behavior he identifies himself as
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such person in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.

Malacat (1997): Probable cause is not required. However, mere suspicion or a hunch is not enough.
Rather, a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.

Posadas v. CA, GR NO. 89139, August 2, 1990

At the time the peace officers identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he
attempted to flee, they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the
offense of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. They just suspended that he was hiding
something in the bag. They did not know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not
justify an arrest without a warrant.
vii. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances

People v. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (1994)

The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be
justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that
time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby
Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas
were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted. Under
the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of
the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search.

*Drug, Alcohol and Blood Tests

Requisites to be valid:
1. It must be random, and
2. It must be suspicionless.

Laserna v. DDB, GR 158633, Nov. 3, 2008

The constitutional validity of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students
emanates primarily from the waiver of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school,
and from their voluntary submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities.
In case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random
and suspicious drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and
requirement.
However, there is no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes
punishable with at least 6 years and one day imprisonment as they are singled out and impleaded
against their will. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness and
suspicionless.

Pimentel, Jr v. COMELEC, GR 161658, November 3, 2008

The mandatory drug test requirements as a pre-condition for the validity of a certificate of
candidacy of electoral candidates not established under the Constitution, e.g. local government
positions, is valid.

Warrantless Arrests

Rule 113, Section 5. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
attempting to commit an offense;
b. When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another

A. In Flagrante Delicto
Umil v. Fidel Ramos, GR 81567, July 9, 1990
Petitioner was arrested for being a member of NPA which is an outlaw subversive organization
and subversion being a continuing offense against state, the arrest without warrant is justified
since such crime, together with rebellion, piracy are continuing offense of direct assault against
the state, requirement of warrant is not needed.

People v. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388

The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime from the
surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the
surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties.

People v. Mengote 210 SCRA 174

There was nothing to support the arresting officers suspicion other than Mengotes darting eyes
and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from
these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at
least being attempted in their presence

B. Hot Pursuit

Two Requisites:
1. An offense had just been committed.
2. The person making the arrest has probable cause to believe, based on his personal knowledge
of facts and circumstances, that the person to be arrested committed it.
*There must be immediacy between the time the offense is committed and the time of the arrest.

People v. Cubcubin, GR 136267, October 2, 2001

Police officers did not have "personal knowledge of facts" indicating that accused-appellant had
committed the crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from which they allegedly inferred
that accused-appellant was probably guilty was based entirely on what they had been told by
others, to wit: by someone who called the PNP station

People v. Burgos 144 SCRA 1

It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have
been in fact or actually have been committed first; it isnt enough to suspect a crime may have
been committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

People v. Briones 202 SCRA 708

No valid arrest was made on the accused-appellants. The police officer effected the arrest
indubitably had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed the crime. It is eyewitnesses Francisco who had such personal knowledge

C. Escaped Prisoner
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.

The forms of correspondence and communication are covered by this provision are the letters,
messages, telephone calls, telegrams, and the like

Constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure CANNOT be invoked against the
State for acts committed by PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS

An application for bail by accused is not considered a waiver of his right to assail the warrant. Any
objection must be made BEFORE ACCUSED ENTERS PLEA, otherwise, objection is deemed
waived.

Upon what grounds may a court allow intrusion = upon probable cause
Should the order particularly describe the communication or correspondence sought to be seized:
For WRITTEN CORRESPONDENCE = must particularly describe
For COMMUNICATION = not required to be particularly describe; identity of persons can
be specified

Cybercrime Law- R.A. 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012)

The State recognizes the vital role of information and communications industries such as content
production, telecommunications, broadcasting electronic commerce, and data processing, in the
nations overall social and economic development. The State also recognizes the importance of
providing an environment conducive to the development, acceleration, and rational application
and exploitation of information and communications technology (ICT) to attain free, easy, and
intelligible access to exchange and/or delivery of information; and the need to protect and
safeguard the integrity of computer, computer and communications systems, networks, and
databases, and the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and data stored therein,
from all forms of misuse, abuse, and illegal access by making punishable under the law such
conduct or conducts. In this light, the State shall adopt sufficient powers to effectively prevent and
combat such offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the
domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable international
cooperation.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 437 (1967)

The US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in electronically recording a conversation
made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to privacy and
constituted a search and seizure. Because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment extends to such area. In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was further
noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement:
first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
In the matter of the Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo I. Sabio,
GR 174340, October 17, 2006:
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person
has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion.

Briccio Pollo v. Chairperson Karina David, GR 181881, October 18, 2011

The search of petitioners computer was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting
that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being
conducted by CSC as government employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous
complaint.

Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan

Trial Court of Manila, A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520, November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA
361
Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed and courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. To constitute a valid
consent or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it must be shown
that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.

Synhumliong v. Rivera, GR 200841, June 4, 2014

Riveras text message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication since she
was speaking in response to duty to protect her own interest and not out of an intent to injure the
reputation of Syhunliong.

Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590

The law does not distinguish between a party to the private communication or a third person.
Hence, both a party and a third person could be held liable under R.A. 4200 if they commit any of
the prohibited acts under R.A. 4200.

Navarro v. CA, GR 121087, August 26, 1999

The Anti-Wiretapping Law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications. Thus, a tape recording of an altercation or verbal exchange between a policeman
and a radio reporter at a police station is admissible in evidence.

Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, AM 08-1-16-SC

Writ of Habeas Data: the remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty
or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

Alejano v. Cabuay, 468 SCRA 188

In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees
and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters
are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention
officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of
the detainees.

Gaanan v. IAC 145 SCRA 112

The use of a telephone extension to overhear a private conversation is not a violation of R.A.
4200 because it is not similar to any of the prohibited devices under the law. Also, a telephone
extension is not purposely installed for the purpose of secretly intercepting or recording private
communication.

Zulueta v. CA 253 SCRA 699

The act of the wife in forcibly obtaining documents that would incriminate her husband thereby
obtaining evidences against her husband are in violation of the private respondents right under
section 3 of the bill of rights. Intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of
them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infidelity.

Ople v. Torres 293 SCRA 141

The right to privacy, the right to be left alone, is protected by the guarantee of due process over
liberty, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to privacy of
communications, liberty of abode, the right to form associations, and the right against self
incrimination
Waterous Drug Corp v. NLRC, GR 113271, October 16, 1997

People v. Marti 193 SCRA 57

Any evidence obtained shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. However, in the
absence of governmental interference, the protection against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals. (EXCLUSIONARY RULE)

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.

What are considered protected speech:

Protected speech includes every form of expression, whether oral, written, tape or disc recorded.
It includes motion pictures as well as what is known as symbolic speech such as the wearing of an
armband as a symbol of protest. Peaceful picketing has also been included within the meaning of
speech.

Prohibitions under Section 4:

Prohibition against PRIOR RESTRAINT
Prohibition against SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
Freedom of Speech
The doctrine on freedom of speech was formulated primarily for the protection of core speech,
i.e. speech, which communicates political, social or religious ideas. These enjoy the same degree
of protection. Commercial speech, however, does not.

When is a Government control-based regulation justified?

a. It is within the constitutional power of the government;
b. It furthers an important or substantial government interest;
c. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
d. The incidental restriction is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the interest.

Content-based Regulation
Restraint is aimed at the message or idea of the expression. Apply the Strict Scrutiny Test and the
challenged act must overcome the clear and present danger rule.

Content-neutral Regulation
Restraint is aimed to regulate the time, place or manner of the expression in public place without
any restraint on the content of the expression. Apply the Intermediate Approach Test wherein a
regulation is justified if it is : within the constitutional power of government, furthers an important
or substantial government interest, government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, and the incident restriction on the alleged freedom of speech and expression is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Here, it only requires substantial
government interest for validity.

Facial Challenge Concept

A facial challenge is an exception to the rule that only persons who are directly affected by a statute
have legal standing to assail the same. This is only applicable to statutes involving free speech,
impeached on the grounds of overbreadth or vagueness. Here, the litigants are permitted to
challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a
judicial prediction or assumption that the statutes very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.

Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014

While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is
simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is
mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Overbreadth Doctrine
A ground to declare a statute void when it offends the constitutional principle that a government
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.

Tests for Valid Government Interference to Freedom of Expression

1. Clear and Present Danger Test There should be a clear and present danger that the words
when used under such circumstances are of such a nature as to create a CLEAR AND PRESENT
DANGER that they will bring about the substantive evils that the State has a right to prevent.
(Focus on CONTENT & CONTEXT)
- whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has right to
prevent

2. Dangerous Tendency Test - There should be a RATIONAL CONNECTION between the

speech and the evil apprehended. (Focus on CONTENT)
- if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency of an evil which the State has the right to
prevent, then such words are punishable. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and the probable
effect of the utterance were to bring about the substantive evil that the legislative body seeks to
prevent

3. Balancing of Interest Test - The courts should BALANCE the PUBLIC INTEREST served
by legislation on one hand and the FREEDOM OF SPEECH (or any other constitutional right)
on the other. The courts will then decide where the greater weight should be placed. (Focus on
weighing Government and Private interest)
- if on balance it appears that public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such character
that it outweighs the abridgment of freedom, then the Court will find the legislation valid

State Regulation of Different Types of Mass Media

1. Broadcast and Radio Media: It is subject to dual regulation: First, procure a legislative
franchise. Second, register and be subject to regulations set by the NTC. (Divinagracia v.
CBS, Inc GR 162272, April 7, 2009)
2. Print Media

The freedom of television and radio broadcasting is lesser in scope that the freedom accorded to
newspapers and print media. (Eastern Broadcasting Corp v. Dans Jr)

Hecklers Veto:
This involves situations in which the government attempts to ban protected speech because it might
provoke a violent response.

Prior Restraint:
Refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance
of actual publication or dissemination.

Valid Prior Restraint:

1. Movies, television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access to numerous
people.
2. Pornography
 3. False or misleading commercial statement
4. Advocacy of imminent lawless action
5. Danger to national security (Chavez v. Gonzales)

Near v. Minnesota 238 US 697

When prohibition does not apply: a. When the nation is at war. Ex: government can prevent
publication about the number/location of its troops; b. Obscene publications; c. Security of
community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence or overthrow by force of
orderly government

SWS v. COMELEC, GR 147571, May 5, 2001

The prohibition of publication of election surveys shortly before elections does not meet the last
two tests. The causal connection of expression to the asserted government interest makes such
interest related to the suppression of free expression. The regulation can be more narrowly
pursued by punishing unlawful acts rather than prohibiting speech. The COMELEC can
confiscate false survey results by virtue of its power under the Administrative Code of 1987 to
stop false election propaganda.

MTRCB v. ABS-CBN, GR 155282, January 17, 2005

Religious programs are not exempted from the jurisdiction and review power of MTRCB. The
only exceptions from the MTRCBs power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7
of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine
Government and/or its departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels.

Dennis v. US 341 US 494

There was a distinction between the mere teaching of communist philosophies and active
advocacy of those ideas. Such advocacy created a "clear and present danger" that threatened the
government.

Speech and the Electoral Process

Sanidad v. COMELEC 181 SCRA 529

Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional .
TRO made permanent due to the following reasons: 1. It has no statutory basis; 2. Form of
regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable
reason; 3. affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by
restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.

Penera v. COMELEC, GR 181613, November 25, 2009

Prior to the campaign period, even if the candidate has filed his/her certificate of candidacy,
he/she is not yet considered as a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Hence,
she cannot be guilty of premature campaigning for in the first place there is no candidate to talk
about. What she did was an exercise of her freedom of expression.

Commercial Speech
Communication which no more than proposes a commercial transaction.
To enjoy protection:
1. It must not be false or misleading; and
2. It should not propose an illegal transaction.

May be regulated if:

1. Government has a substantial interest to protect;
2. The regulation directly advances that interest; and
3. It is not more extensive than is necessary to protect that interest.

Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 US 557
The court instituted a four-step analysis for commercial speech to the Commission's arguments
in support of its ban on promotional advertising:
1. Is the expression protected by the First Amendment? For speech to come within that
provision, it must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
2. Is the asserted governmental interest substantial?
3. Does the regulation directly advance the governmental interest asserted?
4. Is the regulation more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest?

City of Ladue v. Gilleo 129 L. Ed. 2d 36

Ordinance that was blanket prohibition on signs was a content-based restriction that abridged
homeowners First Amendment rights. It was not a time, place and manner restriction because
there was no viable substitute for this unique medium of expression.

Disini v. Secretary of Justice, GR No. 203335, 2014

The Supreme Court of Philippines declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012 as unconstitutional. It held that Section 4(c)(3) violated the right to
freedom of expression by prohibiting the electronic transmission of unsolicited commercial
communications. It found Section 12 in violation of the right to privacy because it lacked
sufficient specificity and definiteness in collecting real-time computer data. It struck down
Section 19 of the Act for giving the government the authority to restrict or block access to
computer data without any judicial warrant.

Libel (Unprotected Speech)

Public, malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect
Elements:
1) Allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another
2) Publication of the charge making known to someone other than the person
to whom it has been written
3) Identity of person defamed
4) Existence of malice author is prompted by ill-will

Qualifiedly privileged communication (not malicious)

1) Person who made communication had a legal, moral, or social duty
2) Communication is addressed to an officer
3) Statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice
Libel of public officials and public figures
Constitutional guarantee that prohibits public officials from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood unless he proves the statement was made with actual malice

FAIR COMMENT (U.S. Rule). These are statements of OPINION, not of fact, and are not
considered actionable, even if the words used are neither mild nor temperate. What is important
is that the opinion is the true and honest opinion of the person. The statements are not used to
attack personalities but to give ones opinion on decisions and actions.

New York Times Co. c. Sullivan 376 US 254

The First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the
conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge
that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity).

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 403 US 254

This case was responsible for establishing the idea that the knowingly and recklessly false
standard for defamatory statements should apply to private individuals as well as public officials.

Gerts v. Robert Welch 418 US 323

States are free to establish their own standards of liability for defamatory statements made about
private individuals.

Hustler v. Magazine 485 US 46

A parody ad published in the magazine depicting televangelist and political commentator Jerry
Falwell as an incestuous drunk, was protected speech since Falwell was a public figure and the
parody could not have been reasonably considered believable. Therefore, the Court held that the
emotional distress inflicted on Falwell by the ad was not a sufficient reason to deny the First
Amendment protection to speech that is critical of public officials and public figures

In Re Jurado 243 SCRA 299

Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of
free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public
official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement and the false statement
made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.

Vasquez v. CA GR 118971 Sept. 15, 1999

Even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct,
unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

Borja v. CA GR. 126466 Jan. 14, 1999

Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in
an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general, every
discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent
until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless,
when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is
not necessarily actionable; unless it be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on facts, then it is immaterial that
the opinion happens to be mistaken as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
OPINIONS. With respect to public personalities (politicians, actors, anyone with a connection to
a newsworthy event), opinions can be aired regarding their public actuations. Comment on their
private lives, if not germane to their public personae, are not protected.

Vicario v. CA GR 124491 June 1, 1999

A person's liability for libel does not necessarily proceed from the fact that he was the original
publisher of the discreditable act. The maker of a libelous republication or repetition, although
not liable for the results of the primary publication, is liable for the consequences of a subsequent
publication which he makes or participates in making so long as the elements of libel are
satisfied. But in every case malice must be present.

Obscenity (Unprotected Speech)

Miller v. California 37 L. Ed. 2d 419

Test for obscenity: Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; Whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct, specifically defined by law;
Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.

Procedure for seizure of allegedly obscene publications:

a) Authorities must apply for issuance of search warrant.
b) Court must be convinced that the materials are obscene. Apply clear and present danger test.
c) Judge will determine whether they are in fact obscene.
d) Judge will issue a search warrant.
e) Proper action should be filed under Art. 201 of the RPC.
f) Conviction is subject to appeal.

Barnes v. Glen Theater 498 US 439

Nude dancing was a form of expressive activity. But the public indecency statute is justified
despite the incidental limitations on such expressive activity. The statute "furthers a substantial
government interest in protecting order and morality." The proscription on public nudity is
unrelated to the erotic message the dancers seek to convey.

FCC v Pacifica Foundation 438 US 726

The concept of indecent is intimately connected with the exposure of children to language that
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is
reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.

Renton v. Playtime Theater 475 US 41

The ordinance was a form of time, place, and manner regulation, not a ban on adult theaters
altogether. The Court reasoned that the law was not aimed at the content of the films shown at
adult motion picture theaters, "but rather the secondary effects of such theaters on the
surrounding community." The Court found that the ordinance was designed to serve a substantial
governmental interest in preserving the quality of life and allowed for "reasonable alternative
avenues of communication."

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 484 US 260

Public school curricular student newspapers that have not been established as forums for student
expression are subject to a lower level of First Amendment protection than independent student
expression or newspapers established (by policy or practice) as forums for student expression.

Fernando v. CA, GR 159751, December 6, 2006

As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in
pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and indecent
materials must justify the regulation or limitation.

Assembly and Petition

Rules on assembly in PRIVATE properties: Only the consent of the owner of the property or
person entitled to possession thereof is required.

JBL Reyes v. Mayor Bagatsing 125 SCRA 553

Rules on assembly in PUBLIC places: Applicant should inform the licensing authority of the
date, the public place where and the time when the assembly will take place. The application
should be filed ahead of time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there
are valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant, but in another public place. The
grant or refusal should be based on the application of the Clear and Present Danger Test. If the
public authority is of the view that there is an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil,
the applicants must be heard on the matter. The decision of the public authority, whether
favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to the applicants at the earliest opportunity so that they
may, if they so desire, have recourse to the proper judicial authority.

Malabanan v. Ramento 129 SCRA 359

Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a
rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity
taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public
disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct,
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others."

De la Cruz v. CA, GR 126183, March 25, 1999

The public school teachers in the case of the 1990 mass actions did not exercise their
constitutional rights within reasonable limits. They committed acts prejudicial to the best interest
of the service by staging the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and
refusing to go back even after they had been ordered to do so. Had the teachers availed of their
free time recess, after classes, weekends or holidays to dramatize their grievances and to
dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one not the DECS, the CSC
or even the Supreme Court could have held them liable for their participation in the mass
actions.

Bangalisan v. CA, GR 124678, July 23, 1997

The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute, public
employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.

Ruiz v. Gordon, 126 SCRA 233

The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date,
the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application
should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether
there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place.
It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger
test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.

BAYAN v. Ermita GR 169838, April 25, 2006

B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use
public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and
entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion, protesting, and influencing in of
grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally,
maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the
content of the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized
exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

GSIS v. Kapisanan, GR 170132, December 6, 2006

In the absence of statute, public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work
stoppages for any purpose.