THIRD DIVISION
MTC required the parties to submit their affidavits and other evidence
[G.R. No. 137650. April 12, 2000]
GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MARIO
FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who are not
legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live
together conjugally, may be deemed co-owners of a property acquired
during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual
contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere cohabitation without proof
of contribution will not result in a co-ownership.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the November 19, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals[1]
(CA), which reversed the October 7, 1997 Order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC).[2] The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads: Jur-is
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the questioned
orders of the court a quo dated October 7, 1997 and November 11,
1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the
court a quo dated June 5, 1997 is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against
the private respondents."[3]
The assailed Order of the RTC disposed as follows: Supr-ema
"Wherefore, the decision of this Court rendered on June 5, 1997
affirming in toto the appealed judgment of the [MTC] is hereby
reconsidered and a new one is entered reversing said decision of the
[MTC] and dismissing the complaint in the above-entitled case."[4]
Petitioner also assails the February 14, 1999 CA Resolution denying
the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts as follows:
"[Herein respondents] were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6756, an
action for ejectment filed before Branch 82 of the MTC of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila against [herein Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos, Toto
Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint dated July 5, 1996, the
said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment
building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that through tolerance they had allowed the
defendants-private respondents to occupy the apartment building for
the last seven (7) years, since 1989, without the payment of any rent;
that it was agreed upon that after a few months, defendant Guillerma
Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants
promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement
was not complied with by the said defendants; that they have demanded
several times [that] the defendants x x x vacate the premises, as they
are in need of the property for the construction of a new building; and
that they have also demanded payment of P84,000.00 from Toto and
Gina Tumlos representing rentals for seven (7) years and payment of
P143,600.00 from Guillerma Tumlos as unpaid rentals for seven (7)
years, but the said demands went unheeded. They then prayed that the
defendants be ordered to vacate the property in question and to pay the
stated unpaid rentals, as well as to jointly pay P30,000.00 in attorneys
fees.
"[Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer
to the complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no
cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject
premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that
she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with
[Respondent] Mario Fernandez. She then asked for the dismissal of the
complaint.
"After an unfruitful preliminary conference on November 15, 1996, the
on the factual issues defined in their pleadings within ten (10) days
from receipt of such order, pursuant to section 9 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. [Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos submitted her
affidavit/position paper on November 29, 1996, while the [respondents]
filed their position paper on December 5, 1996, attaching thereto their
marriage contract, letters of demand to the defendants, and the Contract
to Sell over the disputed property. The MTC thereafter promulgated its
judgment on January 22, 1997[.]Scs-daad
xxxxxxxxx
"Upon appeal to the [RTC], [petitioner and the two other] defendants
alleged in their memorandum on appeal that [Respondent] Mario
Fernandez and [Petitioner] Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and
that they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was
further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building
with their two (2) children for around ten(10) years, and that Guillerma
administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the
other apartments, until she discovered that [Respondent Mario]
deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. It was also during the
early part of 1996 when [Respondent Mario] accused her of being
unfaithful and demonstrated his baseless [jealousy].
"In the same memorandum, [petitioner and the two other] defendants
further averred that it was only recently that Toto Tumlos was
temporarily accommodated in one of the rooms of the subject premises
while Gina Tumlos acted as a nanny for the children. In short, their
presence there [was] only transient and they [were] not tenants of the
Fernandez spouses.
"On June 5, 1997, the [RTC] rendered a decision affirming in toto the
judgment of the MTC. S-daad
"The [petitioner and the two other defendants] seasonably filed a
motion for reconsideration on July 3, 1997, alleging that the decision of
affirmance by the RTC was constitutionally flawed for failing to point
out distinctly and clearly the findings of facts and law on which it was
based vis--vis the statements of issues they have raised in their
memorandum on appeal. They also averred that the Contract to Sell
presented by the plaintiffs which named the buyer as Mario P.
Fernandez, of legal age, married to Lourdes P. Fernandez, should not
be given credence as it was falsified to appear that way. According to
them, the Contract to Sell originally named Guillerma Fernandez as the
spouse of [Respondent Mario]. As found by the [RTC] in its judgment,
a new Contract to Sell was issued by the sellers naming the
[respondents] as the buyers after the latter presented their marriage
contract and requested a change in the name of the vendee-wife. Such
facts necessitate the conclusion that Guillerma was really a co-owner
thereof, and that the [respondents] manipulated the evidence in order to
deprive her of her rights to enjoy and use the property as recognized by
law. Sd-aamiso
xxxxxxxxx
"The [RTC], in determining the question of ownership in order to
resolve the issue of possession, ruled therein that the Contract to Sell
submitted by the Fernandez spouses appeared not to be authentic, as
there was an alteration in the name of the wife of [Respondent] Mario
Fernandez. Hence, the contract presented by the [respondents] cannot
be given any weight. The court further ruled that Guillerma and
[Respondent Mario] acquired the property during their cohabitation as
husband and wife, although without the benefit of marriage. From such
findings, the court concluded that [Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was a
co-owner of the subject property and could not be ejected therefrom.
"The [respondents] then filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
of reversal, but the same was denied by the [RTC]."[5]
As earlier stated, the CA reversed the RTC. Hence, this Petition filed
by Guillerma Tumlos only.[6]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA rejected petitioners claim that she and Respondent Mario
Fernandez were co-owners of the disputed property. The CA ruled:
Scnc-m
"From the inception of the instant case, the only defense presented by
private respondent Guillerma is her right as a co-owner of the subject
property[.]
xxxxxxxxx
This claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma,
as correctly held by the trial court. No other evidence was presented to
validate such claim, except for the said affidavit/position paper. As
previously stated, it was only on appeal that Guillerma alleged that she
cohabited with the petitioner-husband without the benefit of marriage,
and that she bore him two (2) children. Attached to her memorandum
on appeal are the birth certificates of the said children. Such
contentions and documents should not have been considered by the x x
x (RTC), as they were not presented in her affidavit/position paper
before the trial court (MTC).
xxxxxxxxx
"However, even if the said allegations and documents could be
considered, the claim of co-ownership must still fail. As [herein
Respondent] Mario Fernandez is validly married to [Respondent]
Lourdes Fernandez (as per Marriage Contract dated April 27, 1968, p.
45, Original Record), Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry
each other. Thus, the property relations governing their supposed
cohabitation is that found in Article 148 of Executive Order No. 209, as
amended, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines[.]
xxxxxxxxx
"It is clear that actual contribution is required by this provision, in
contrast to Article 147 of the Family Code which states that efforts in
the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry (Agapay v. Palang, 276 SCRA
340). The care given by one party [to] the home, children, and
household, or spiritual or moral inspiration provided to the other, is not
included in Article 148 (Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines by Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, 1988 ed., p. 209). Hence, if
actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-
ownership and no presumption of equal shares (Agapay, supra at p.
348, citing Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines Volume I by Arturo M. Tolentino, 1990 ed., p. 500).
"In the instant case, no proof of actual contribution by Guillerma
Tumlos in the purchase of the subject property was presented. Her only
evidence was her being named in the Contract to Sell as the wife of
[Respondent] Mario Fernandez. Since she failed to prove that she
contributed money to the purchase price of the subject apartment
building, We find no basis to justify her co-ownership with
[Respondent Mario]. The said property is thus presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership property of Mario and Lourdes Fernandez, it
being acquired during the subsistence of their marriage and there being
no other proof to the contrary (please see Article 116 of the Family
Code).
"The court a quo (RTC) also found that [Respondent Mario] has two
(2) children with Guillerma who are in her custody, and that to eject
them from the apartment building would be to run counter with the
obligation of the former to give support to his minor illegitimate
children, which indispensably includes dwelling. As previously
discussed, such finding has no leg to stand on, it being based on
evidence presented for the first time on appeal. Nc-mmis
xxxxxxxxx
"Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was validly presented,
the RTC failed to consider that the need for support cannot be
presumed. Article 203 of the Family Code expressly provides that the
obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person
who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it
shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial
demand. x x x. Nc-m
"In contrast to the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the RTC
instead presumed that Guillerma and her children needed support from
[Respondent Mario]. Worse, it relied on evidence not properly
presented before the trial court (MTC).
"With regard to the other [defendants], Gina and Toto Tumlos, a close
perusal of the records shows that they did not file any responsive
pleading. Hence, judgment may be rendered against them as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
prayed for therein, as provided for in Section 6 of the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure. There was no basis for the public respondent to
dismiss the complaint against them."[7] (emphasis in the original) Ol-
dmiso
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the
consideration of the Court:
"I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion in not
outrightly dismissing the petition for review filed by respondents.
"II. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioner is not the co-
owner of the property in litis.
"III. Corollary thereto, the Court of Appeals erred in applying Art. 148
of the Family Code in the case at bar. Man-ikan
"IV. The Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the substantive right of
support vis--vis the remedy of ejectment resorted to by respondents."[8]
In resolving this case, we shall answer two questions: (a) Is the
petitioner a co-owner of the property? (b) Can the claim for support bar
this ejectment suit? We shall also discuss these preliminary matters: (a)
whether the CA was biased in favor of respondents and (b) whether the
MTC had jurisdiction over the ejectment suit. Manik-s
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Preliminary Matters
Petitioner submits that the CA exhibited partiality in favor of herein
respondents. This bias, she argues, is manifest in the following: Man-
ikx
1. The CA considered the respondents Petition for Review[9] despite
their failure to attach several pleadings as well as the explanation for
the proof of service, despite the clear mandate of Section 11[10] of
Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court and despite the ruling in Solar
Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort.[11]
2. It allowed respondents to submit the pleadings that were not
attached.
3. It considered respondents Reply dated May 20, 1998, which had
allegedly been filed out of time. Ne-xold
4. It declared that the case was submitted for decision without first
determining whether to give due course to the Petition, pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.[12]
The CA, for its part, succinctly dismissed these arguments in this wise:
Mi-so
"It is too late in the day now to question the alleged procedural error
after we have rendered the decision. More importantly, when the
private respondent filed their comment to the petition on April 26,
1998, they failed to question such alleged procedural error. Neither
have they questioned all the resolutions issued by the Court after their
filing of such comment. They should, therefore, be now considered in
estoppel to question the same."[13]

We agree with the appellate court. Petitioner never raised these matters
before the CA. She cannot be allowed now to challenge its Decision on
grounds of alleged technicalities being belatedly raised as an
afterthought. In this light, she cannot invoke Solar[14] because she
never raised this issue before the CA. Spp-edjo
More important, we find it quite sanctimonious indeed on petitioners
part to rely, on the one hand, on these procedural technicalities to
overcome the appealed Decision and, on the other hand, assert that the
RTC may consider the new evidence she presented for the first time on
appeal. Such posturing only betrays the futility of petitioners assertion,
if not its absence of merit.
One other preliminary matter. Petitioner implies that the court of origin,
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), did not have jurisdiction over the
"nature of the case," alleging that the real question involved is one of
ownership. Since the issue of possession cannot be settled without
passing upon that of ownership, she maintains that the MTC should
have dismissed the case. Josp-ped
This contention is erroneous. The issue of ownership may be passed
upon by the MTC to settle the issue of possession.[15] Such
disposition, however, is not final insofar as the issue of ownership is
concerned,[16] which may be the subject of another proceeding
brought specifically to settle that question.
Having resolved these preliminary matters, we now move on to
petitioners substantive contentions. Spped
First Issue: Petitioner as Co-owner
Petitioners central theory and main defense against respondents action
for ejectment is her claim of co-ownership over the property with
Respondent Mario Fernandez. At the first instance before the MTC, she
presented a Contract to Sell indicating that she was his spouse. The
MTC found this document insufficient to support her claim. The RTC,
however, after considering her allegation that she had been cohabiting
with Mario Fernandez as shown by evidence presented before it,[17]
ruled in her favor. Misspped
On the other hand, the CA held that the pieces of evidence adduced
before the RTC could no longer be considered because they had not
been submitted before the MTC. Hence, the appellate court concluded
that "[t]he claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily proven x x
x."[18]
We agree with the petitioner that the RTC did not err in considering the
evidence presented before it. Nonetheless, we reject her claim that she
was a co-owner of the disputed property. Missc
Evidence Presented on Appeal Before the RTC
In ruling that the RTC erred in considering on appeal the evidence
presented by petitioner, the CA relied on the doctrine that issues not
raised during trial could not be considered for the first time during
appeal.[19]
We disagree. In the first place, there were no new matters or issues
belatedly raised during the appeal before the RTC. The defense invoked
by petitioner at the very start was that she was a co-owner. To support
her claim, she presented a Contract to Sell dated November 14, 1986,
which stated that Mario Fernandez was legally married to her. The
allegation that she was cohabiting with him was a mere elaboration of
her initial theory.
In the second place, procedural rules are generally premised on
considerations of fair play. Respondents never objected when the
assailed evidence was presented before the RTC. Thus, they cannot
claim unfair surprise or prejudice. Scmis
Petitioner Not a Co-Owner Under Article 144 of the Civil Code
Even considering the evidence presented before the MTC and the RTC,
we cannot accept petitioners submission that she is a co-owner of the
disputed property pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code.[20] As
correctly held by the CA, the applicable law is not Article 144 of the
Civil Code, but Article 148 of the Family Code which provides:
"Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article,[21] only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
"If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in
the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
"The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
parties are in bad faith." Sc
Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a
man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other,[22]
or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void[23] from the
beginning.[24] It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to
adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-
ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute
community between the man and his lawful wife.[25]
Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those submitted
by petitioner herself before the RTC, it is clear that Mario Fernandez
was incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was legally married to
Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clear that, as readily admitted by
petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in a state of concubinage.
Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code is inapplicable.
As stated above, the relationship between petitioner and Respondent
Mario Fernandez is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code.
Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy points out[26] that "[t]he Family Code
has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating in its Article 148 the property relations of couples living in a
state of adultery or concubinage." x-sc
Hence, petitioners argument -- that the Family Code is inapplicable
because the cohabitation and the acquisition of the property occurred
before its effectivity -- deserves scant consideration. Suffice it to say
that the law itself states that it can be applied retroactively if it does not
prejudice vested or acquired rights.[27] In this case, petitioner failed to
show any vested right over the property in question. Moreover, to
resolve similar issues, we have applied Article 148 of the Family Code
retroactively.[28]
No Evidence of Actual Joint Contribution
Another consideration militates against petitioners claim that she is a
co-owner of the property. In Agapay,[29] the Court ruled:
"Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. It must be stressed that the actual contribution is required
by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in
the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the
party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption
of equal shares." (emphasis ours) xl-aw
In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made
an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she
anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with
Respondent Mario Fernandez.
Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the
cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not
justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code
provides that the administration of the property amounts to a
contribution in its acquisition.
Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership. The
property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents.
Hence, the MTC and the CA were correct in ordering the ejectment of
petitioner from the premises. Sc-lex
Second Issue: Support versus Ejectment
Petitioner contends that since Respondent Mario Fernandez failed to
repudiate her claim regarding the filiation of his alleged sons, Mark Gil
and Michael Fernandez, his silence on the matter amounts to an
admission. Arguing that Mario is liable for support, she advances the
theory that the childrens right to support, which necessarily includes
shelter, prevails over the right of respondents to eject her.
We disagree. It should be emphasized that this is an ejectment suit
whereby respondents seek to exercise their possessory right over their
property. It is summary in character and deals solely with the issue of
possession of the property in dispute. Here, it has been shown that they
have a better right to possess it than does the petitioner, whose right to
possess is based merely on their tolerance. Scl-aw
Moreover, Respondent Mario Fernandez alleged failure to repudiate
petitioners claim of filiation is not relevant to the present case. Indeed,
it would be highly improper for us to rule on such issue. Besides, it was
not properly taken up below.[30] In any event, Article 298[31] of the
Civil Code requires that there should be an extrajudicial demand.[32]
None was made here. The CA was correct when it said:
"Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was validly presented,
the RTC failed to consider that the need for support cannot be
presumed. Article [298] of the [New Civil Code] expressly provides
that the obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time
the person who has a right to receive the same need it for maintenance,
but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial and extrajudicial
demand."[33]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. Rtc-spped
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 140528 December 7, 2011
MARIA TORBELA, represented by her heirs, namely: EULOGIO
TOSINO, husband and children: CLARO, MAXIMINO,
CORNELIO, OLIVIA and CALIXTA, all surnamed TOSINO,
APOLONIA TOSINO VDA. DE RAMIREZ and JULITA
TOSINO DEAN; PEDRO TORBELA, represented by his heirs,
namely: JOSE and DIONISIO, both surnamed TORBELA;
EUFROSINA TORBELA ROSARIO, represented by her heirs,
namely: ESTEBAN T. ROSARIO, MANUEL T. ROSARIO,
ROMULO T. ROSARIO and ANDREA ROSARIO-HADUCA;
LEONILA TORBELA TAMIN; FERNANDO TORBELA,
represented by his heirs, namely: SERGIO T. TORBELA,
EUTROPIA T. VELASCO, PILAR T. ZULUETA, CANDIDO T.
TORBELA, FLORENTINA T. TORBELA and PANTALEON T.
TORBELA; DOLORES TORBELA TABLADA; LEONORA
TORBELA AGUSTIN, represented by her heirs, namely:
PATRICIO, SEGUNDO, CONSUELO and FELIX, all surnamed
AGUSTIN; and SEVERINA TORBELA ILDEFONSO,
Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ANDRES T. ROSARIO and LENA DUQUE-ROSARIO
and BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 140553
LENA DUQUE-ROSARIO, Petitioner,
vs.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK,
Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Presently before the Court are two consolidated Petitions for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, both assailing the
Decision1 dated June 29, 1999 and Resolution2 dated October 22, 1999
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39770.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 140528 are siblings Maria Torbela,3 Pedro
Torbela,4 Eufrosina Torbela Rosario,5 Leonila Torbela Tamin,
Fernando Torbela,6 Dolores Torbela Tablada, Leonora Torbela
Agustin,7 and Severina Torbela Ildefonso (Torbela siblings).
The petitioner in G.R. No. 140553 is Lena Duque-Rosario (Duque-
Rosario), who was married to, but now legally separated from, Dr.
Andres T. Rosario (Dr. Rosario). Dr. Rosario is the son of Eufrosina
Torbela Rosario and the nephew of the other Torbela siblings.
The controversy began with a parcel of land, with an area of 374 square
meters, located in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan (Lot No. 356-A). It was
originally part of a larger parcel of land, known as Lot No. 356 of the
Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta, measuring 749 square meters, and
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16676,8 in the name
of Valeriano Semilla (Valeriano), married to Potenciana Acosta. Under
unexplained circumstances, Valeriano gave Lot No. 356-A to his sister
Marta Semilla, married to Eugenio Torbela (spouses Torbela). Upon
the deaths of the spouses Torbela, Lot No. 356-A was adjudicated in
equal shares among their children, the Torbela siblings, by virtue of a
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition9 dated December 3, 1962.
On December 12, 1964, the Torbela siblings executed a Deed of
Absolute Quitclaim10 over Lot No. 356-A in favor of Dr. Rosario.
According to the said Deed, the Torbela siblings "for and in
consideration of the sum of NINE PESOS (9.00) x x x transfer[red]
and convey[ed] x x x unto the said Andres T. Rosario, that undivided
portion of THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FOUR square meters of
that parcel of land embraced in Original Certificate of Title No. 16676
of the land records of Pangasinan x x x."11 Four days later, on
December 16, 1964, OCT No. 16676 in Valerianos name was partially
cancelled as to Lot No. 356-A and TCT No. 5275112 was issued in Dr.
Rosarios name covering the said property.
Another Deed of Absolute Quitclaim13 was subsequently executed on
December 28, 1964, this time by Dr. Rosario, acknowledging that he
only borrowed Lot No. 356-A from the Torbela siblings and was
already returning the same to the latter for 1.00. The Deed stated:
That for and in consideration of the sum of one peso (1.00), Philippine
Currency and the fact that I only borrowed the above described parcel
of land from MARIA TORBELA, married to Eulogio Tosino,
EUFROSINA TORBELA, married to Pedro Rosario, PEDRO
TORBELA, married to Petra Pagador, LEONILA TORBELA, married
to Fortunato Tamen, FERNANDO TORBELA, married to Victoriana
Tablada, DOLORES TORBELA, widow, LEONORA TORBELA,
married to Matias Agustin and SEVERINA TORBELA, married to
Jorge Ildefonso, x x x by these presents do hereby cede, transfer and
convey by way of this ABSOLUTE QUITCLAIM unto the said Maria,
Eufrosina, Pedro, Leonila, Fernando, Dolores, Leonora and Severina,
all surnamed Torbela the parcel of land described above.14 (Emphasis
ours.)
The aforequoted Deed was notarized, but was not immediately
annotated on TCT No. 52751.
Following the issuance of TCT No. 52751, Dr. Rosario obtained a loan
from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) on February 21,
1965 in the sum of 70,200.00, secured by a mortgage constituted on
Lot No. 356-A. The mortgage was annotated on TCT No. 52751 on
September 21, 1965 as Entry No. 243537.15 Dr. Rosario used the
proceeds of the loan for the construction of improvements on Lot No.
356-A.
On May 16, 1967, Cornelio T. Tosino (Cornelio) executed an Affidavit
of Adverse Claim,16 on behalf of the Torbela siblings. Cornelio
deposed in said Affidavit:
3. That ANDRES T. ROSARIO later quitclaimed his rights in favor of
the former owners by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim which he
executed before Notary Public Banaga, and entered in his Notarial
Registry as Dec. No. 43; Page No. 9; Book No. I; Series of 1964;
4. That it is the desire of the parties, my aforestated kins, to register
ownership over the above-described property or to perfect their title
over the same but their Deed could not be registered because the
registered owner now, ANDRES T. ROSARIO mortgaged the property
with the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, on
September 21, 1965, and for which reason, the Title is still impounded
and held by the said bank;
5. That pending payment of the obligation with the DEVELOPMENT
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES or redemption of the Title from said
bank, I, CORNELIO T. TOSINO, in behalf of my mother MARIA
TORBELA-TOSINO, and my Aunts EUFROSINA TORBELA,
LEONILA TORBELA-TAMEN, DOLORES TORBELA, LEONORA
TORBELA-AGUSTIN, SEVERINA TORBELA-ILDEFONSO, and
my Uncles PEDRO TORBELA and FERNANDO, also surnamed
TORBELA, I request the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to annotate
their adverse claim at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
52751, based on the annexed document, Deed of Absolute Quitclaim
by ANDRES T. ROSARIO, dated December 28, 1964, marked as
Annex "A" and made a part of this Affidavit, and it is also requested
that the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES be informed
accordingly.17
The very next day, on May 17, 1967, the Torbela siblings had
Cornelios Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated May 16, 1967 and Dr.
Rosarios Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964
annotated on TCT No. 52751 as Entry Nos. 27447118 and 274472,19
respectively.
The construction of a four-storey building on Lot No. 356-A was
eventually completed. The building was initially used as a hospital, but
was later converted to a commercial building. Part of the building was
leased to PT&T; and the rest to Mrs. Andrea Rosario-Haduca, Dr.
Rosarios sister, who operated the Rose Inn Hotel and Restaurant.
Dr. Rosario was able to fully pay his loan from DBP. Under Entry No.
520197 on TCT No. 5275120 dated March 6, 1981, the mortgage
appearing under Entry No. 243537 was cancelled per the Cancellation
and Discharge of Mortgage executed by DBP in favor of Dr. Rosario
and ratified before a notary public on July 11, 1980.
In the meantime, Dr. Rosario acquired another loan from the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) sometime in 1979-1981. Records do not reveal
though the original amount of the loan from PNB, but the loan
agreement was amended on March 5, 1981 and the loan amount was
increased to 450,000.00. The loan was secured by mortgages
constituted on the following properties: (1) Lot No. 356-A, covered by
TCT No. 52751 in Dr. Rosarios name; (2) Lot No. 4489, with an area
of 1,862 square meters, located in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, covered
by TCT No. 24832; and (3) Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A, with an area of
1,001 square meters, located in Nancayasan, Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
covered by TCT No. 104189.21 The amended loan agreement and
mortgage on Lot No. 356-A was annotated on TCT No. 52751 on
March 6, 1981 as Entry No. 520099.22
Five days later, on March 11, 1981, another annotation, Entry No.
520469,23 was made on TCT No. 52751, canceling the adverse claim
on Lot No. 356-A under Entry Nos. 274471-274472, on the basis of the
Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage executed by Dr. Rosario on
March 5, 1981. Entry No. 520469 consisted of both stamped and
handwritten portions, and exactly reads:
Entry No. 520469. Cancellation of Adverse Claim executed by Andres
Rosario in favor of same. The incumbrance/mortgage appearing under
Entry No. 274471-72 is now cancelled as per Cancellation and
Discharge of Mortgage Ratified before Notary Public Mauro G. Meris
on March 5, 1981: Doc. No. 215; Page No. 44; Book No. 1; Series Of
1981.
Lingayen, Pangasinan, 3-11, 19981
[Signed: Pedro dela Cruz]
Register of Deeds 24
On December 8, 1981, Dr. Rosario and his wife, Duque-Rosario
(spouses Rosario), acquired a third loan in the amount of 1,200,000.00
from Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino). To
secure said loan, the spouses Rosario again constituted mortgages on
Lot No. 356-A, Lot No. 4489, and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A. The
mortgage on Lot No. 356-A was annotated on TCT No. 52751 as Entry
No. 53328325 on December 18, 1981. Since the construction of a two-
storey commercial building on Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A was still
incomplete, the loan value thereof as collateral was deducted from the
approved loan amount. Thus, the spouses Rosario could only avail of
the maximum loan amount of 830,064.00 from Banco Filipino.
Because Banco Filipino paid the balance of Dr. Rosarios loan from
PNB, the mortgage on Lot No. 356-A in favor of PNB was cancelled
per Entry No. 53347826 on TCT No. 52751 dated December 23, 1981.
On February 13, 1986, the Torbela siblings filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, a Complaint for recovery
of ownership and possession of Lot No. 356-A, plus damages, against
the spouses Rosario, which was docketed as Civil Case No. U-4359.
On the same day, Entry Nos. 593493 and 593494 were made on TCT
No. 52751 that read as follows:
Entry No. 593494 Complaint Civil Case No. U-4359 (For:
Recovery of Ownership and Possession and Damages. (Sup. Paper).
Entry No. 593493 Notice of Lis Pendens The parcel of land
described in this title is subject to Lis Pendens executed by Liliosa B.
Rosario, CLAO, Trial Attorney dated February 13, 1986. Filed to TCT
No. 52751
February 13, 1986-1986 February 13 3:30 p.m.
(SGD.) PACIFICO M. BRAGANZA
Register of Deeds27
The spouses Rosario afterwards failed to pay their loan from Banco
Filipino. As of April 2, 1987, the spouses Rosarios outstanding
principal obligation and penalty charges amounted to 743,296.82 and
151,524.00, respectively.28
Banco Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages on Lot No.
356-A, Lot No. 4489, and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A. During the public
auction on April 2, 1987, Banco Filipino was the lone bidder for the
three foreclosed properties for the price of 1,372,387.04. The
Certificate of Sale29 dated April 2, 1987, in favor of Banco Filipino,
was annotated on TCT No. 52751 on April 14, 1987 as Entry No.
610623.30
On December 9, 1987, the Torbela siblings filed before the RTC their
Amended Complaint,31 impleading Banco Filipino as additional
defendant in Civil Case No. U-4359 and praying that the spouses
Rosario be ordered to redeem Lot No. 356-A from Banco Filipino.
The spouses Rosario instituted before the RTC on March 4, 1988 a case
for annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure and damages, with prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order,
against Banco Filipino, the Provincial Ex Officio Sheriff and his
Deputy, and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. U-4667. Another notice of lis pendens was
annotated on TCT No. 52751 on March 10, 1988 as Entry No. 627059,
viz:
Entry No. 627059 Lis Pendens Dr. Andres T. Rosario and Lena
Duque Rosario, Plaintiff versus Banco Filipino, et. al. Civil Case No.
U-4667 or Annulment of ExtraJudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage The parcel of land described in this title is subject to Notice
of Lis Pendens subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Mauro G.
Meris, as Doc. No. 21; Page No. 5; Book 111; S-1988. March 7, 1988-
1988 March 10, 1:00 p.m.
(SGD.) RUFINO M. MORENO, SR.
Register of Deeds32
The Torbela siblings intervened in Civil Case No. U-4667. Eventually,
on October 17, 1990, the RTC issued an Order33 dismissing without
prejudice Civil Case No. U-4667 due to the spouses Rosarios failure to
prosecute.
Meanwhile, the Torbela siblings tried to redeem Lot No. 356-A from
Banco Filipino, but their efforts were unsuccessful. Upon the expiration
of the one-year redemption period in April 1988, the Certificate of
Final Sale34 and Affidavit of Consolidation35 covering all three
foreclosed properties were executed on May 24, 1988 and May 25,
1988, respectively.
On June 7, 1988, new certificates of title were issued in the name of
Banco Filipino, particularly, TCT No. 165812 for Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-
B-2-A and TCT No. 165813 for Lot No. 356-A .36
The Torbela siblings thereafter filed before the RTC on August 29,
1988 a Complaint37 for annulment of the Certificate of Final Sale
dated May 24, 1988, judicial cancelation of TCT No. 165813, and
damages, against Banco Filipino, the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff, and
the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. U-4733.
On June 19, 1991, Banco Filipino filed before the RTC of Urdaneta
City a Petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. In said Petition,
docketed as Pet. Case No. U-822, Banco Filipino prayed that a writ of
possession be issued in its favor over Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and Lot
No. 356-A, plus the improvements thereon, and the spouses Rosario
and other persons presently in possession of said properties be directed
to abide by said writ.
The RTC jointly heard Civil Case Nos. U-4359 and U-4733 and Pet.
Case No. U-822. The Decision38 on these three cases was promulgated
on January 15, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the real estate mortgage over Lot 356-A covered by TCT
52751 executed by Spouses Andres Rosario in favor of Banco Filipino,
legal and valid;
2. Declaring the sheriffs sale dated April 2, 1987 over Lot 356-A
covered by TCT 52751 and subsequent final Deed of Sale dated May
14, 1988 over Lot 356-A covered by TCT No. 52751 legal and valid;
3. Declaring Banco Filipino the owner of Lot 356-A covered by TCT
No. 52751 (now TCT 165813);
4. Banco Filipino is entitled to a Writ of Possession over Lot 356-A
together with the improvements thereon (Rose Inn Building). The
Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to issue a writ of possession in
favor of Banco Filipino;
5. [The Torbela siblings] are hereby ordered to render accounting to
Banco Filipino the rental they received from tenants of Rose Inn
Building from May 14, 1988;
6. [The Torbela siblings] are hereby ordered to pay Banco Filipino the
sum of 20,000.00 as attorneys fees;
7. Banco Filipino is hereby ordered to give [the Torbela siblings] the
right of first refusal over Lot 356-A. The Register of Deeds is hereby
ordered to annotate the right of [the Torbela siblings] at the back of
TCT No. 165813 after payment of the required fees;
8. Dr. Rosario and Lena Rosario are hereby ordered to reimburse [the
Torbela siblings] the market value of Lot 356-A as of December, 1964
minus payments made by the former;
9. Dismissing the complaint of [the Torbela siblings] against Banco
Filipino, Pedro Habon and Rufino Moreno in Civil Case No. U-4733;
and against Banco Filipino in Civil Case No. U-4359.39
The RTC released an Amended Decision40 dated January 29, 1992,
adding the following paragraph to the dispositive:
Banco Filipino is entitled to a Writ of Possession over Lot-5-F-8-C-2-
[B]-2-A of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-122471, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title 104189 of the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan[.]41
The Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario appealed the foregoing RTC
judgment before the Court of Appeals. Their appeal was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 39770.
In its Decision42 dated June 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with modification. Items No. 6 and 7 of the appealed
decision are DELETED. Item No. 8 is modified requiring [Dr. Rosario]
to pay [the Torbela siblings] actual damages, in the amount of
1,200,000.00 with 6% per annum interest from finality of this
decision until fully paid. [Dr. Rosario] is further ORDERED to pay [the
Torbela siblings] the amount of 300,000.00 as moral damages;
200,000.00 as exemplary damages and 100,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Costs against [Dr. Rosario].43
The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution44 dated October 22, 1999,
denied the separate Motions for Reconsideration of the Torbela siblings
and Dr. Rosario.
The Torbela siblings come before this Court via the Petition for Review
in G.R. No. 140528, with the following assignment of errors:
First Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE REGISTRATION OF THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE QUITCLAIM EXECUTED BY [DR. ANDRES T.
ROSARIO] IN FAVOR OF THE [TORBELA SIBLINGS] DATED
DECEMBER 28, 1964 AND THE REGISTRATION OF THE
NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM EXECUTED BY THE [TORBELA
SIBLINGS], SERVE AS THE OPERATIVE ACT TO CONVEY OR
AFFECT THE LAND AND IMPROVEMENTS THEREOF IN SO
FAR AS THIRD PERSONS ARE CONCERNED.
Second Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY COVERED BY T.C.T.
NO. 52751 IS CLEAN AND FREE, DESPITE OF THE
ANNOTATION OF ENCUMBRANCES OF THE NOTICE OF
ADVERSE CLAIM AND THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE QUITCLAIM
APPEARING AT THE BACK THEREOF AS ENTRY NOS. 274471
AND 274472, RESPECTIVELY.
Third Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM OF THE
[TORBELA SIBLINGS] UNDER ENTRY NO. 274471 WAS
VALIDLY CANCELLED BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, IN THE
ABSENCE OF A PETITION DULY FILED IN COURT FOR ITS
CANCELLATION.
Fourth Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT RESPONDENT BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS
AND MORTGAGE BANK IS A MORTGAGEE IN GOOD FAITH.
Fifth Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE FILING OF A CIVIL CASE NO. U-4359
ON DECEMBER 9, 1987, IMPLEADING RESPONDENT BANCO
FILIPINO AS ADDITIONAL PARTY DEFENDANT, TOLL OR
SUSPEND THE RUNNING OF THE ONE YEAR PERIOD OF
REDEMPTION.
Sixth Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY WAS PREMATURELY CONSOLIDATED IN FAVOR
OF RESPONDENT BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND
MORTGAGE BANK.
Seventh Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AT LEAST
WORTH 1,200,000.00.45
The Torbela siblings ask of this Court:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the
[Torbela siblings] most respectfully pray that the questioned
DECISION promulgated on June 29, 1999 (Annex "A", Petition) and
the RESOLUTION dated October 22, 1999 (Annex "B", Petition) be
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and/or further MODIFIED in favor of
the [Torbela siblings], and another DECISION issue ordering, among
other reliefs, the respondent Banco Filipino to reconvey back Lot No.
356-A, covered by T.C.T. No. 52751, in favor of the [Torbela siblings]
who are the actual owners of the same.
The [Torbela siblings] likewise pray for such other reliefs and further
remedies as may be deemed just and equitable under the premises.46
Duque-Rosario, now legally separated from Dr. Rosario, avers in her
Petition for Review in G.R. No. 140553 that Lot No. 4489 and Lot No.
5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A were registered in her name, and she was unlawfully
deprived of ownership of said properties because of the following
errors of the Court of Appeals:
A residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE PERIOD TO REDEEM THE PROPERTY
HAS NOT COMMENCED, HENCE, THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE,
THE CONSOLIDATION OF OWNERSHIP BY [BANCO FILIPINO],
ARE NULL AND VOID.
B
THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REFUSING TO
RULE THAT THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT BEFORE THE
COURT A QUO BY THE [TORBELA SIBLINGS] HAD ALREADY
BEEN PRESCRIBED.47
Duque-Rosario prays that the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals be reversed and set aside, and that Lot No. 4489 and Lot No.
5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A be freed from all obligations and encumbrances and
returned to her.
Review of findings of fact by the RTC and the Court of Appeals
warranted.
A disquisition of the issues raised and/or errors assigned in the
Petitions at bar unavoidably requires a re-evaluation of the facts and
evidence presented by the parties in the court a quo.
In Republic v. Heirs of Julia Ramos,48 the Court summed up the rules
governing the power of review of the Court:
Ordinarily, this Court will not review, much less reverse, the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals, especially where such findings
coincide with those of the trial
court.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/16948
1.htm - _ftn The findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are, as a
general rule, conclusive and binding upon this Court, since this Court is
not a trier of facts and does not routinely undertake the re-examination
of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of
the case.
The above rule, however, is subject to a number of exceptions, such as
(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the
finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures;
(4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
parties; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.49
As the succeeding discussion will bear out, the first, fourth, and ninth
exceptions are extant in these case.
Barangay conciliation was not a pre-requisite to the institution of Civil
Case No. U-4359.
Dr. Rosario contends that Civil Case No. U-4359, the Complaint of the
Torbela siblings for recovery of ownership and possession of Lot No.
356-A, plus damages, should have been dismissed by the RTC because
of the failure of the Torbela siblings to comply with the prior
requirement of submitting the dispute to barangay conciliation.
The Torbela siblings instituted Civil Case No. U-4359 on February 13,
1986, when Presidential Decree No. 1508, Establishing a System of
Amicably Settling Disputes at the Barangay Level, was still in effect.50
Pertinent provisions of said issuance read:
Section 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. The Lupon of each
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually
disputes except:
1. Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof;
2. Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute
relates to the performance of his official functions;
3. Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine
exceeding 200.00;
4. Offenses where there is no private offended party;
5. Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the
interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of
Justice and the Minister of Local Government.
Section 3. Venue. Disputes between or among persons actually residing
in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before
the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents of
different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be
brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents
actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all
disputes which involved real property or any interest therein shall be
brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is
situated.
The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:
1. involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities
or municipalities, except where such barangays adjoin each other; and
2. involving real property located in different municipalities.

xxxx
Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No
complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within
the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed
or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication
unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been
reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary,
attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement
has been repudiated. x x x. (Emphases supplied.)
The Court gave the following elucidation on the jurisdiction of the
Lupong Tagapayapa in Tavora v. Hon. Veloso51 :
The foregoing provisions are quite clear. Section 2 specifies the
conditions under which the Lupon of a barangay "shall have authority"
to bring together the disputants for amicable settlement of their dispute:
The parties must be "actually residing in the same city or municipality."
At the same time, Section 3 while reiterating that the disputants
must be "actually residing in the same barangay" or in "different
barangays" within the same city or municipality unequivocably
declares that the Lupon shall have "no authority" over disputes
"involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities," except where such barangays adjoin each other.
Thus, by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall
have no jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual
residents of the same city or municipality, except where the barangays
in which they actually reside adjoin each other.
It is true that immediately after specifying the barangay whose Lupon
shall take cognizance of a given dispute, Sec. 3 of PD 1508 adds:
"However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest
therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any
part thereof is situated."
Actually, however, this added sentence is just an ordinary proviso and
should operate as such.
The operation of a proviso, as a rule, should be limited to its normal
function, which is to restrict or vary the operation of the principal
clause, rather than expand its scope, in the absence of a clear indication
to the contrary.
"The natural and appropriate office of a proviso is . . . to except
something from the enacting clause; to limit, restrict, or qualify the
statute in whole or in part; or to exclude from the scope of the statute
that which otherwise would be within its terms." (73 Am Jur 2d 467.)
Therefore, the quoted proviso should simply be deemed to restrict or
vary the rule on venue prescribed in the principal clauses of the first
paragraph of Section 3, thus: Although venue is generally determined
by the residence of the parties, disputes involving real property shall be
brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is
situated, notwithstanding that the parties reside elsewhere within the
same city/municipality.52 (Emphases supplied.)
The original parties in Civil Case No. U-4359 (the Torbela siblings and
the spouses Rosario) do not reside in the same barangay, or in different
barangays within the same city or municipality, or in different
barangays of different cities or municipalities but are adjoining each
other. Some of them reside outside Pangasinan and even outside of the
country altogether. The Torbela siblings reside separately in Barangay
Macalong, Urdaneta, Pangasinan; Barangay Consolacion, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan; Pangil, Laguna; Chicago, United States of America; and
Canada. The spouses Rosario are residents of Calle Garcia, Poblacion,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Resultantly, the Lupon had no jurisdiction over
the dispute and barangay conciliation was not a pre-condition for the
filing of Civil Case No. U-4359.
The Court now looks into the merits of Civil Case No. U-4359.
There was an express trust between the Torbela siblings and Dr.
Rosario.
There is no dispute that the Torbela sibling inherited the title to Lot No.
356-A from their parents, the Torbela spouses, who, in turn, acquired
the same from the first registered owner of Lot No. 356-A, Valeriano.
Indeed, the Torbela siblings executed a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim on
December 12, 1964 in which they transferred and conveyed Lot No.
356-A to Dr. Rosario for the consideration of 9.00. However, the
Torbela siblings explained that they only executed the Deed as an
accommodation so that Dr. Rosario could have Lot No. 356-A
registered in his name and use said property to secure a loan from DBP,
the proceeds of which would be used for building a hospital on Lot No.
356-A a claim supported by testimonial and documentary evidence,
and borne out by the sequence of events immediately following the
execution by the Torbela siblings of said Deed. On December 16, 1964,
TCT No. 52751, covering Lot No. 356-A, was already issued in Dr.
Rosarios name. On December 28, 1964, Dr. Rosario executed his own
Deed of Absolute Quitclaim, in which he expressly acknowledged that
he "only borrowed" Lot No. 356-A and was transferring and conveying
the same back to the Torbela siblings for the consideration of 1.00. On
February 21, 1965, Dr. Rosarios loan in the amount of 70,200.00,
secured by a mortgage on Lot No. 356-A, was approved by DBP. Soon
thereafter, construction of a hospital building started on Lot No. 356-A.
Among the notable evidence presented by the Torbela siblings is the
testimony of Atty. Lorenza Alcantara (Atty. Alcantara), who had no
apparent personal interest in the present case. Atty. Alcantara, when she
was still a boarder at the house of Eufrosina Torbela Rosario (Dr.
Rosarios mother), was consulted by the Torbela siblings as regards the
extrajudicial partition of Lot No. 356-A. She also witnessed the
execution of the two Deeds of Absolute Quitclaim by the Torbela
siblings and Dr. Rosario.
In contrast, Dr. Rosario presented TCT No. 52751, issued in his name,
to prove his purported title to Lot No. 356-A. In Lee Tek Sheng v.
Court of Appeals,53 the Court made a clear distinction between title
and the certificate of title:
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of
Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the
law refers to ownership which is represented by that document.
Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of
land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different
from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership
of a piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered
as conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of
title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the
real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the
certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other
parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title,
but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership
should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such
ownership although both are interchangeably used. x x x.54 (Emphases
supplied.)
Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title.
Land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what
he actually has.55 Consequently, Dr. Rosario must still prove herein his
acquisition of title to Lot No. 356-A, apart from his submission of TCT
No. 52751 in his name.
Dr. Rosario testified that he obtained Lot No. 356-A after paying the
Torbela siblings 25,000.00, pursuant to a verbal agreement with the
latter. The Court though observes that Dr. Rosarios testimony on the
execution and existence of the verbal agreement with the Torbela
siblings lacks significant details (such as the names of the parties
present, dates, places, etc.) and is not corroborated by independent
evidence.
In addition, Dr. Rosario acknowledged the execution of the two Deeds
of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 12, 1964 and December 28,
1964, even affirming his own signature on the latter Deed. The Parol
Evidence Rule provides that when the terms of the agreement have
been reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors
in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.56 Dr. Rosario may not modify, explain, or add to
the terms in the two written Deeds of Absolute Quitclaim since he did
not put in issue in his pleadings (1) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or
imperfection in the Deeds; (2) failure of the Deeds to express the true
intent and the agreement of the parties thereto; (3) the validity of the
Deeds; or (4) the existence of other terms agreed to by the Torbela
siblings and Dr. Rosario after the execution of the Deeds.57
Even if the Court considers Dr. Rosarios testimony on his alleged
verbal agreement with the Torbela siblings, the Court finds the same
unsatisfactory. Dr. Rosario averred that the two Deeds were executed
only because he was "planning to secure loan from the Development
Bank of the Philippines and Philippine National Bank and the bank
needed absolute quitclaim[.]"58 While Dr. Rosarios explanation
makes sense for the first Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December
12, 1964 executed by the Torbela siblings (which transferred Lot No.
356-A to Dr. Rosario for 9.00.00), the same could not be said for the
second Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964 executed
by Dr. Rosario. In fact, Dr. Rosarios Deed of Absolute Quitclaim (in
which he admitted that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-A and was
transferring the same to the Torbela siblings for 1.00.00) would
actually work against the approval of Dr. Rosarios loan by the banks.
Since Dr. Rosarios Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28,
1964 is a declaration against his self-interest, it must be taken as
favoring the truthfulness of the contents of said Deed.59
It can also be said that Dr. Rosario is estopped from claiming or
asserting ownership over Lot No. 356-A based on his Deed of Absolute
Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964. Dr. Rosario's admission in the
said Deed that he merely borrowed Lot No. 356-A is deemed
conclusive upon him. Under Article 1431 of the Civil Code, "[t]hrough
estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the
person relying thereon."60 That admission cannot now be denied by
Dr. Rosario as against the Torbela siblings, the latter having relied upon
his representation.
Considering the foregoing, the Court agrees with the RTC and the
Court of Appeals that Dr. Rosario only holds Lot No. 356-A in trust for
the Torbela siblings.
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title
to which is vested in another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges
the trustee to deal with the property for the benefit of the beneficiary.
Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. An
express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties,
while an implied trust comes into being by operation of law.61
Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by
some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly
evincing an intention to create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil
Code, "[n]o particular words are required for the creation of an express
trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended."62 It is possible
to create a trust without using the word "trust" or "trustee." Conversely,
the mere fact that these words are used does not necessarily indicate an
intention to create a trust. The question in each case is whether the
trustor manifested an intention to create the kind of relationship which
to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial whether or not he knows
that the relationship which he intends to create is called a trust, and
whether or not he knows the precise characteristics of the relationship
which is called a trust.63
In Tamayo v. Callejo,64 the Court recognized that a trust may have a
constructive or implied nature in the beginning, but the registered
owners subsequent express acknowledgement in a public document of
a previous sale of the property to another party, had the effect of
imparting to the aforementioned trust the nature of an express trust. The
same situation exists in this case. When Dr. Rosario was able to register
Lot No. 356-A in his name under TCT No. 52751 on December 16,
1964, an implied trust was initially established between him and the
Torbela siblings under Article 1451 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 1451. When land passes by succession to any person and he
causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is
established by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner.
Dr. Rosarios execution of the Deed of Absolute Quitclaim on
December 28, 1964, containing his express admission that he only
borrowed Lot No. 356-A from the Torbela siblings, eventually
transformed the nature of the trust to an express one. The express trust
continued despite Dr. Rosario stating in his Deed of Absolute
Quitclaim that he was already returning Lot No. 356-A to the Torbela
siblings as Lot No. 356-A remained registered in Dr. Rosarios name
under TCT No. 52751 and Dr. Rosario kept possession of said
property, together with the improvements thereon.
The right of the Torbela siblings to recover Lot No. 356-A has not yet
prescribed.
The Court extensively discussed the prescriptive period for express
trusts in the Heirs of Maximo Labanon v. Heirs of Constancio
Labanon,65 to wit:
On the issue of prescription, we had the opportunity to rule in Bueno v.
Reyes that unrepudiated written express trusts are imprescriptible:
"While there are some decisions which hold that an action upon a trust
is imprescriptible, without distinguishing between express and implied
trusts, the better rule, as laid down by this Court in other decisions, is
that prescription does supervene where the trust is merely an implied
one. The reason has been expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in J.M.
Tuason and Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 4 SCRA 84, 88, as follows:
Under Section 40 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, all actions for
recovery of real property prescribed in 10 years, excepting only actions
based on continuing or subsisting trusts that were considered by section
38 as imprescriptible. As held in the case of Diaz v. Gorricho, L-11229,
March 29, 1958, however, the continuing or subsisting trusts
contemplated in section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure referred only
to express unrepudiated trusts, and did not include constructive trusts
(that are imposed by law) where no fiduciary relation exists and the
trustee does not recognize the trust at all."
This principle was amplified in Escay v. Court of Appeals this way:
"Express trusts prescribe 10 years from the repudiation of the trust
(Manuel Diaz, et al. vs. Carmen Gorricho et al., 54 O.G. p. 8429, Sec.
40, Code of Civil Procedure)."
In the more recent case of Secuya v. De Selma, we again ruled that the
prescriptive period for the enforcement of an express trust of ten (10)
years starts upon the repudiation of the trust by the trustee.66
To apply the 10-year prescriptive period, which would bar a
beneficiarys action to recover in an express trust, the repudiation of the
trust must be proven by clear and convincing evidence and made
known to the beneficiary.67 The express trust disables the trustee from
acquiring for his own benefit the property committed to his
management or custody, at least while he does not openly repudiate the
trust, and makes such repudiation known to the beneficiary or cestui
que trust. For this reason, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190)
declared that the rules on adverse possession do not apply to
"continuing and subsisting" (i.e., unrepudiated) trusts. In an express
trust, the delay of the beneficiary is directly attributable to the trustee
who undertakes to hold the property for the former, or who is linked to
the beneficiary by confidential or fiduciary relations. The trustee's
possession is, therefore, not adverse to the beneficiary, until and unless
the latter is made aware that the trust has been repudiated.68
Dr. Rosario argues that he is deemed to have repudiated the trust on
December 16, 1964, when he registered Lot No. 356-A in his name
under TCT No. 52751, so when on February 13, 1986, the Torbela
siblings instituted before the RTC Civil Case No. U-4359, for the
recovery of ownership and possession of Lot No. 356-A from the
spouses Rosario, over 21 years had passed. Civil Case No. U-4359 was
already barred by prescription, as well as laches.
The Court already rejected a similar argument in Ringor v. Ringor69
for the following reasons:

A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for
him by another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration.
A Torrens Certificate of Title in Joses name did not vest ownership of
the land upon him. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It
only confirms and records title already existing and vested. It does not
protect a usurper from the true owner. The Torrens system was not
intended to foment betrayal in the performance of a trust. It does not
permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another. Where one does
not have a rightful claim to the property, the Torrens system of
registration can confirm or record nothing. Petitioners cannot rely on
the registration of the lands in Joses name nor in the name of the Heirs
of Jose M. Ringor, Inc., for the wrong result they seek. For Jose could
not repudiate a trust by relying on a Torrens title he held in trust for his
co-heirs. The beneficiaries are entitled to enforce the trust,
notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title. The intended
trust must be sustained.70 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the more recent case of Heirs of Tranquilino Labiste v. Heirs of Jose
Labiste,71 the Court refused to apply prescription and laches and
reiterated that:
[P]rescription and laches will run only from the time the express trust is
repudiated. The Court has held that for acquisitive prescription to bar
the action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an express trust for
the recovery of the property held in trust it must be shown that: (a) the
trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have
been made known to the cestui que trust, and (c) the evidence thereon
is clear and conclusive. Respondents cannot rely on the fact that the
Torrens title was issued in the name of Epifanio and the other heirs of
Jose. It has been held that a trustee who obtains a Torrens title over
property held in trust by him for another cannot repudiate the trust by
relying on the registration. The rule requires a clear repudiation of the
trust duly communicated to the beneficiary. The only act that can be
construed as repudiation was when respondents filed the petition for
reconstitution in October 1993. And since petitioners filed their
complaint in January 1995, their cause of action has not yet prescribed,
laches cannot be attributed to them.72 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear that under the foregoing jurisprudence, the registration of Lot
No. 356-A by Dr. Rosario in his name under TCT No. 52751 on
December 16, 1964 is not the repudiation that would have caused the
10-year prescriptive period for the enforcement of an express trust to
run.
The Court of Appeals held that Dr. Rosario repudiated the express trust
when he acquired another loan from PNB and constituted a second
mortgage on Lot No. 356-A sometime in 1979, which, unlike the first
mortgage to DBP in 1965, was without the knowledge and/or consent
of the Torbela siblings.
The Court only concurs in part with the Court of Appeals on this
matter.
For repudiation of an express trust to be effective, the unequivocal act
of repudiation had to be made known to the Torbela siblings as the
cestuis que trust and must be proven by clear and conclusive evidence.
A scrutiny of TCT No. 52751 reveals the following inscription:
Entry No. 520099
Amendment of the mortgage in favor of PNB inscribed under Entry
No. 490658 in the sense that the consideration thereof has been
increased to PHILIPPINE PESOS Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
only (450,000.00) and to secure any and all negotiations with PNB,
whether contracted before, during or after the date of this instrument,
acknowledged before Notary Public of Pangasinan Alejo M. Dato as
Doc. No. 198, Page No. 41, Book No. 11, Series of 1985.
Date of Instrument March 5, 1981
Date of Inscription March 6, 198173
Although according to Entry No. 520099, the original loan and
mortgage agreement of Lot No. 356-A between Dr. Rosario and PNB
was previously inscribed as Entry No. 490658, Entry No. 490658 does
not actually appear on TCT No. 52751 and, thus, it cannot be used as
the reckoning date for the start of the prescriptive period.
The Torbela siblings can only be charged with knowledge of the
mortgage of Lot No. 356-A to PNB on March 6, 1981 when the
amended loan and mortgage agreement was registered on TCT No.
52751 as Entry No. 520099. Entry No. 520099 is constructive notice to
the whole world74 that Lot No. 356-A was mortgaged by Dr. Rosario
to PNB as security for a loan, the amount of which was increased to
450,000.00. Hence, Dr. Rosario is deemed to have effectively
repudiated the express trust between him and the Torbela siblings on
March 6, 1981, on which day, the prescriptive period for the
enforcement of the express trust by the Torbela siblings began to run.
From March 6, 1981, when the amended loan and mortgage agreement
was registered on TCT No. 52751, to February 13, 1986, when the
Torbela siblings instituted before the RTC Civil Case No. U-4359
against the spouses Rosario, only about five years had passed. The
Torbela siblings were able to institute Civil Case No. U-4359 well
before the lapse of the 10-year prescriptive period for the enforcement
of their express trust with Dr. Rosario.
Civil Case No. U-4359 is likewise not barred by laches. Laches means
the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. As the Court
explained in the preceding paragraphs, the Torbela siblings instituted
Civil Case No. U-4359 five years after Dr. Rosarios repudiation of the
express trust, still within the 10-year prescriptive period for
enforcement of such trusts. This does not constitute an unreasonable
delay in asserting one's right. A delay within the prescriptive period is
sanctioned by law and is not considered to be a delay that would bar
relief. Laches apply only in the absence of a statutory prescriptive
period.75
Banco Filipino is not a mortgagee and buyer in good faith.
Having determined that the Torbela siblings are the true owners and Dr.
Rosario merely the trustee of Lot No. 356-A, the Court is next faced
with the issue of whether or not the Torbela siblings may still recover
Lot No. 356-A considering that Dr. Rosario had already mortgaged Lot
No. 356-A to Banco Filipino, and upon Dr. Rosarios default on his
loan obligations, Banco Filipino foreclosed the mortgage, acquired Lot
No. 356-A as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, and
consolidated title in its name under TCT No. 165813. The resolution of
this issue depends on the answer to the question of whether or not
Banco Filipino was a mortgagee in good faith.
Under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, one of the essential requisites of
the contract of mortgage is that the mortgagor should be the absolute
owner of the property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is
considered null and void. However, an exception to this rule is the
doctrine of "mortgagee in good faith." Under this doctrine, even if the
mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, the mortgage
contract and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by
reason of public policy. This principle is based on the rule that all
persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title,
as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on
the face of the title. This is the same rule that underlies the principle of
"innocent purchasers for value." The prevailing jurisprudence is that a
mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the certificate of title of
the mortgagor to the property given as security and in the absence of
any sign that might arouse suspicion, has no obligation to undertake
further investigation. Hence, even if the mortgagor is not the rightful
owner of, or does not have a valid title to, the mortgaged property, the
mortgagee in good faith is, nonetheless, entitled to protection.76
On one hand, the Torbela siblings aver that Banco Filipino is not a
mortgagee in good faith because as early as May 17, 1967, they had
already annotated Cornelios Adverse Claim dated May 16, 1967 and
Dr. Rosarios Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964 on
TCT No. 52751 as Entry Nos. 274471-274472, respectively.
On the other hand, Banco Filipino asseverates that it is a mortgagee in
good faith because per Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, the notice of
adverse claim, registered on May 17, 1967 by the Torbela siblings
under Entry Nos. 274471-274472 on TCT No. 52751, already lapsed
after 30 days or on June 16, 1967. Additionally, there was an express
cancellation of Entry Nos. 274471-274472 by Entry No. 520469 dated
March 11, 1981. So when Banco Filipino approved Dr. Rosarios loan
for 1,200,000.00 and constituted a mortgage on Lot No. 356-A
(together with two other properties) on December 8, 1981, the only
other encumbrance on TCT No. 52751 was Entry No. 520099 dated
March 6, 1981, i.e., the amended loan and mortgage agreement
between Dr. Rosario and PNB (which was eventually cancelled after it
was paid off with part of the proceeds from Dr. Rosarios loan from
Banco Filipino). Hence, Banco Filipino was not aware that the Torbela
siblings adverse claim on Lot No. 356-A still subsisted.
The Court finds that Banco Filipino is not a mortgagee in good faith.
Entry Nos. 274471-274472 were not validly cancelled, and the
improper cancellation should have been apparent to Banco Filipino and
aroused suspicion in said bank of some defect in Dr. Rosarios title.
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed
land is to apprise third persons that there is a controversy over the
ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the
adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy. It is a notice
to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed land is
subject to the outcome of the dispute.77
Adverse claims were previously governed by Section 110 of Act No.
496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, quoted in full
below:
ADVERSE CLAIM
SEC. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land
adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the
original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Act for
registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his
alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, and a
reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or
interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse
claimants residence, and designate a place at which all notices may be
served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an
adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition of any party in interest,
shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such
adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein as justice and equity
may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall
be cancelled. If in any case the court after notice and hearing shall find
that a claim thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the
adverse claimant double or treble costs in its discretion.
Construing the aforequoted provision, the Court stressed in Ty Sin Tei
v. Lee Dy Piao78 that "[t]he validity or efficaciousness of the [adverse]
claim x x x may only be determined by the Court upon petition by an
interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate
hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and equity
may warrant. And it is ONLY when such claim is found unmeritorious
that the registration thereof may be cancelled." The Court likewise
pointed out in the same case that while a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled in a number of ways, "the same is not true in a registered
adverse claim, for it may be cancelled only in one instance, i.e., after
the claim is adjudged invalid or unmeritorious by the Court x x x;" and
"if any of the registrations should be considered unnecessary or
superfluous, it would be the notice of lis pendens and not the annotation
of the adverse claim which is more permanent and cannot be cancelled
without adequate hearing and proper disposition of the claim."
With the enactment of the Property Registration Decree on June 11,
1978, Section 70 thereof now applies to adverse claims:
SEC. 70. Adverse claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in
registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to
the date of the original registrations, may, if no other provision is made
in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing
setting forth fully his alleged right, or interest, and how or under whom
acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of
the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse
claimants residence, and a place at which all notices may be served
upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse
claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for
a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of
said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon
filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided,
however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the
same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a
petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the
cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy
hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and
shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim
is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered
cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall find
that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the
claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos nor more than
five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days,
the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the
Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect. (Emphases supplied.)
In Sajonas v. Court of Appeals,79 the Court squarely interpreted
Section 70 of the Property Registration Decree, particularly, the new
30-day period not previously found in Section 110 of the Land
Registration Act, thus:
In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that every part
thereof be given effect and a construction that could render a provision
inoperative should be avoided, and inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a harmonious whole. For
taken in solitude, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite
different from the one actually intended and evident when a word or
phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. In
ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse claim,
we must read the law in its entirety. Sentence three, paragraph two of
Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides:
"The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from
the date of registration."
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the
effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days. But the above provision
cannot and should not be treated separately, but should be read in
relation to the sentence following, which reads:
"After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be
cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in
interest."
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose
force and effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have
been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete
the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been
automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have
required the party in interest to do a useless act.
A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken separately, but in its
relation to the statute's totality. Each statute must, in fact, be construed
as to harmonize it with the pre-existing body of laws. Unless clearly
repugnant, provisions of statutes must be reconciled. The printed pages
of the published Act, its history, origin, and its purposes may be
examined by the courts in their construction. x x x.
xxxx
Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent
inconsistency between the portions of the law such that the provision
on cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition would serve to
qualify the provision on the effectivity period. The law, taken together,
simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still
necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain
annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if the
adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said
period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of
cancellation would be a useless ceremony.
It should be noted that the law employs the phrase "may be cancelled,"
which obviously indicates, as inherent in its decision making power,
that the court may or may not order the cancellation of an adverse
claim, notwithstanding such provision limiting the effectivity of an
adverse claim for thirty days from the date of registration. The court
cannot be bound by such period as it would be inconsistent with the
very authority vested in it. A fortiori, the limitation on the period of
effectivity is immaterial in determining the validity or invalidity of an
adverse claim which is the principal issue to be decided in the court
hearing. It will therefore depend upon the evidence at a proper hearing
for the court to determine whether it will order the cancellation of the
adverse claim or not.
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and
without qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for
which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse
claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to
protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the
registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the
Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing
with said property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or a
better right than the registered owner thereof.
The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the validity of the
adverse claim is to be threshed out is to afford the adverse claimant an
opportunity to be heard, providing a venue where the propriety of his
claimed interest can be established or revoked, all for the purpose of
determining at last the existence of any encumbrance on the title arising
from such adverse claim. This is in line with the provision immediately
following:
"Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim
shall be registered by the same claimant."
Should the adverse claimant fail to sustain his interest in the property,
the adverse claimant will be precluded from registering a second
adverse claim based on the same ground.
It was held that "validity or efficaciousness of the claim may only be
determined by the Court upon petition by an interested party, in which
event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof and make the
proper adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And it is only
when such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration of the
adverse claim may be cancelled, thereby protecting the interest of the
adverse claimant and giving notice and warning to third parties."80
(Emphases supplied.)
Whether under Section 110 of the Land Registration Act or Section 70
of the Property Registration Decree, notice of adverse claim can only
be cancelled after a party in interest files a petition for cancellation
before the RTC wherein the property is located, and the RTC conducts
a hearing and determines the said claim to be invalid or unmeritorious.
No petition for cancellation has been filed and no hearing has been
conducted herein to determine the validity or merit of the adverse claim
of the Torbela siblings. Entry No. 520469 cancelled the adverse claim
of the Torbela siblings, annotated as Entry Nos. 274471-774472, upon
the presentation by Dr. Rosario of a mere Cancellation and Discharge
of Mortgage.
Regardless of whether or not the Register of Deeds should have
inscribed Entry No. 520469 on TCT No. 52751, Banco Filipino could
not invoke said inscription in support of its claim of good faith. There
were several things amiss in Entry No. 520469 which should have
already aroused suspicions in Banco Filipino, and compelled the bank
to look beyond TCT No. 52751 and inquire into Dr. Rosarios title.
First, Entry No. 520469 does not mention any court order as basis for
the cancellation of the adverse claim. Second, the adverse claim was
not a mortgage which could be cancelled with Dr. Rosarios
Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage. And third, the adverse claim
was against Dr. Rosario, yet it was cancelled based on a document also
executed by Dr. Rosario.
It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser or mortgagee cannot close his
eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and
then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no
defect in the title of the vendor or mortgagor. His mere refusal to
believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the
possibility of the existence of a defect in the vendor's or mortgagor's
title, will not make him an innocent purchaser or mortgagee for value,
if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it
appears that he had such notice of the defects as would have led to its
discovery had he acted with the measure of precaution which may be
required of a prudent man in a like situation.81
While the defective cancellation of Entry Nos. 274471-274472 by
Entry No. 520469 might not be evident to a private individual, the same
should have been apparent to Banco Filipino. Banco Filipino is not an
ordinary mortgagee, but is a mortgagee-bank, whose business is
impressed with public interest. In fact, in one case, 82 the Court
explicitly declared that the rule that persons dealing with registered
lands can rely solely on the certificate of title does not apply to banks.
In another case,83 the Court adjudged that unlike private individuals, a
bank is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings,
including those involving registered lands. A banking institution is
expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgage
contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of a property
offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable
part of its operations.
Banco Filipino cannot be deemed a mortgagee in good faith, much less
a purchaser in good faith at the foreclosure sale of Lot No. 356-A.
Hence, the right of the Torbela siblings over Lot No. 356-A is superior
over that of Banco Filipino; and as the true owners of Lot No. 356-A,
the Torbela siblings are entitled to a reconveyance of said property
even from Banco Filipino.
Nonetheless, the failure of Banco Filipino to comply with the due
diligence requirement was not the result of a dishonest purpose, some
moral obliquity, or breach of a known duty for some interest or ill will
that partakes of fraud that would justify damages.84
Given the reconveyance of Lot No. 356-A to the Torbela siblings, there
is no more need to address issues concerning redemption, annulment of
the foreclosure sale and certificate of sale (subject matter of Civil Case
No. U-4733), or issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Banco
Filipino (subject matter of Pet. Case No. U-822) insofar as Lot No.
356-A is concerned. Such would only be superfluous. Banco Filipino,
however, is not left without any recourse should the foreclosure and
sale of the two other mortgaged properties be insufficient to cover Dr.
Rosarios loan, for the bank may still bring a proper suit against Dr.
Rosario to collect the unpaid balance.
The rules on accession shall govern the improvements on Lot No. 356-
A and the rents thereof.
The accessory follows the principal. The right of accession is
recognized under Article 440 of the Civil Code which states that "[t]he
ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which
is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either
naturally or artificially."
There is no question that Dr. Rosario is the builder of the improvements
on Lot No. 356-A. The Torbela siblings themselves alleged that they
allowed Dr. Rosario to register Lot No. 356-A in his name so he could
obtain a loan from DBP, using said parcel of land as security; and with
the proceeds of the loan, Dr. Rosario had a building constructed on Lot
No. 356-A, initially used as a hospital, and then later for other
commercial purposes. Dr. Rosario supervised the construction of the
building, which began in 1965; fully liquidated the loan from DBP; and
maintained and administered the building, as well as collected the
rental income therefrom, until the Torbela siblings instituted Civil Case
No. U-4359 before the RTC on February 13, 1986.
When it comes to the improvements on Lot No. 356-A, both the
Torbela siblings (as landowners) and Dr. Rosario (as builder) are
deemed in bad faith. The Torbela siblings were aware of the
construction of a building by Dr. Rosario on Lot No. 356-A, while Dr.
Rosario proceeded with the said construction despite his knowledge
that Lot No. 356-A belonged to the Torbela siblings. This is the case
contemplated under Article 453 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who
built, planted or sowed on the land of another, but also on the part of
the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall be the same
as though both had acted in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner
whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition
on his part. (Emphasis supplied.)
When both the landowner and the builder are in good faith, the
following rules govern:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his
own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper
rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land
if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In
such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does
not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.
The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor;
but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has
been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith
with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the
possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses
or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired
by reason thereof.
ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be
refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he may remove the
ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it
suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does
not prefer to refund the amount expended.
Whatever is built, planted, or sown on the land of another, and the
improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land.
Where, however, the planter, builder, or sower has acted in good faith,
a conflict of rights arises between the owners and it becomes necessary
to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to
the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating what
Manresa calls a state of "forced co-ownership," the law has provided a
just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to
acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or to
oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the
proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the
option because his right is older and because, by the principle of
accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.85
The landowner has to make a choice between appropriating the
building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay
the price of the land. But even as the option lies with the landowner, the
grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He
cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to remove the
building from the land without first exercising either option. It is only if
the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to
purchase it where its value is not more than the value of the
improvements, that the owner may remove the improvements from the
land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after having
chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.86
This case then must be remanded to the RTC for the determination of
matters necessary for the proper application of Article 448, in relation
to Article 546, of the Civil Code. Such matters include the option that
the Torbela siblings will choose; the amount of indemnity that they will
pay if they decide to appropriate the improvements on Lot No. 356-A;
the value of Lot No. 356-A if they prefer to sell it to Dr. Rosario; or the
reasonable rent if they opt to sell Lot No. 356-A to Dr. Rosario but the
value of the land is considerably more than the improvements. The
determination made by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June
29, 1999 that the current value of Lot No. 356-A is 1,200,000.00 is
not supported by any evidence on record.
Should the Torbela siblings choose to appropriate the improvements on
Lot No. 356-A, the following ruling of the Court in Pecson v. Court of
Appeals87 is relevant in the determination of the amount of indemnity
under Article 546 of the Civil Code:
Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of the useful
improvements should be determined. The respondent court and the
private respondents espouse the belief that the cost of construction of
the apartment building in 1965, and not its current market value, is
sufficient reimbursement for necessary and useful improvements made
by the petitioner. This position is, however, not in consonance with
previous rulings of this Court in similar cases. In Javier vs.
Concepcion, Jr., this Court pegged the value of the useful
improvements consisting of various fruits, bamboos, a house and
camarin made of strong material based on the market value of the said
improvements. In Sarmiento vs. Agana, despite the finding that the
useful improvement, a residential house, was built in 1967 at a cost of
between eight thousand pesos (8,000.00) to ten thousand pesos
(10,000.00), the landowner was ordered to reimburse the builder in
the amount of forty thousand pesos (40,000.00), the value of the
house at the time of the trial. In the same way, the landowner was
required to pay the "present value" of the house, a useful improvement,
in the case of De Guzman vs. De la Fuente, cited by the petitioner.
The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice
between the parties involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago
stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila that the said
provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and
possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to administer complete
justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the other may
enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by this
precept, it is therefore the current market value of the improvements
which should be made the basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling
would unjustly enrich the private respondents who would otherwise be
allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-unit apartment
building for a measly amount. Consequently, the parties should
therefore be allowed to adduce evidence on the present market value of
the apartment building upon which the trial court should base its
finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the
landowner.88 (Emphases supplied.)
Still following the rules of accession, civil fruits, such as rents, belong
to the owner of the building.89 Thus, Dr. Rosario has a right to the
rents of the improvements on Lot No. 356-A and is under no obligation
to render an accounting of the same to anyone. In fact, it is the Torbela
siblings who are required to account for the rents they had collected
from the lessees of the commercial building and turn over any balance
to Dr. Rosario. Dr. Rosarios right to the rents of the improvements on
Lot No. 356-A shall continue until the Torbela siblings have chosen
their option under Article 448 of the Civil Code. And in case the
Torbela siblings decide to appropriate the improvements, Dr. Rosario
shall have the right to retain said improvements, as well as the rents
thereof, until the indemnity for the same has been paid.90
Dr. Rosario is liable for damages to the Torbela siblings.
The Court of Appeals ordered Dr. Rosario to pay the Torbela siblings
300,000.00 as moral damages; 200,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and 100,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Indeed, Dr. Rosarios deceit and bad faith is evident when, being fully
aware that he only held Lot No. 356-A in trust for the Torbela siblings,
he mortgaged said property to PNB and Banco Filipino absent the
consent of the Torbela siblings, and caused the irregular cancellation of
the Torbela siblings adverse claim on TCT No. 52751. Irrefragably,
Dr. Rosarios betrayal had caused the Torbela siblings (which included
Dr. Rosarios own mother, Eufrosina Torbela Rosario) mental anguish,
serious anxiety, and wounded feelings. Resultantly, the award of moral
damages is justified, but the amount thereof is reduced to 200,000.00.
In addition to the moral damages, exemplary damages may also be
imposed given that Dr. Rosarios wrongful acts were accompanied by
bad faith. However, judicial discretion granted to the courts in the
assessment of damages must always be exercised with balanced
restraint and measured objectivity. The circumstances of the case call
for a reduction of the award of exemplary damages to 100,000.00.
As regards attorney's fees, they may be awarded when the defendant's
act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons
or to incur expenses to protect his interest. Because of Dr. Rosarios
acts, the Torbela siblings were constrained to institute several cases
against Dr. Rosario and his spouse, Duque-Rosario, as well as Banco
Filipino, which had lasted for more than 25 years. Consequently, the
Torbela siblings are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and the
amount of 100,000.00 may be considered rational, fair, and
reasonable.
Banco Filipino is entitled to a writ of possession for Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-
B-2-A.
The Court emphasizes that Pet. Case No. U-822, instituted by Banco
Filipino for the issuance of a writ of possession before the RTC of
Urdaneta, included only Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and Lot No. 356-A
(Lot No. 4489, the third property mortgaged to secure Dr. Rosarios
loan from Banco Filipino, is located in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, and
the petition for issuance of a writ of possession for the same should be
separately filed with the RTC of Dagupan City). Since the Court has
already granted herein the reconveyance of Lot No. 356-A from Banco
Filipino to the Torbela siblings, the writ of possession now pertains
only to Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A.
To recall, the Court of Appeals affirmed the issuance by the RTC of a
writ of possession in favor of Banco Filipino. Dr. Rosario no longer
appealed from said judgment of the appellate court. Already legally
separated from Dr. Rosario, Duque-Rosario alone challenges the writ of
possession before this Court through her Petition in G.R. No. 140553.
Duque-Rosario alleges in her Petition that Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A
had been registered in her name under TCT No. 104189. Yet, without a
copy of TCT No. 104189 on record, the Court cannot give much
credence to Duque-Rosarios claim of sole ownership of Lot No. 5-F-8-
C-2-B-2-A. Also, the question of whether Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A
was the paraphernal property of Duque-Rosario or the conjugal
property of the spouses Rosario would not alter the outcome of Duque-
Rosarios Petition.
The following facts are undisputed: Banco Filipino extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage constituted on Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and
the two other properties after Dr. Rosario defaulted on the payment of
his loan; Banco Filipino was the highest bidder for all three properties
at the foreclosure sale on April 2, 1987; the Certificate of Sale dated
April 2, 1987 was registered in April 1987; and based on the Certificate
of Final Sale dated May 24, 1988 and Affidavit of Consolidation dated
May 25, 1988, the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. 104189 and
issued TCT No. 165812 in the name of Banco Filipino for Lot No. 5-F-
8-C-2-B-2-A on June 7, 1988.
The Court has consistently ruled that the one-year redemption period
should be counted not from the date of foreclosure sale, but from the
time the certificate of sale is registered with the Registry of Deeds.91
No copy of TCT No. 104189 can be found in the records of this case,
but the fact of annotation of the Certificate of Sale thereon was
admitted by the parties, only differing on the date it was made: April
14, 1987 according to Banco Filipino and April 15, 1987 as maintained
by Duque-Rosario. Even if the Court concedes that the Certificate of
Sale was annotated on TCT No. 104189 on the later date, April 15,
1987, the one-year redemption period already expired on April 14,
1988.92 The Certificate of Final Sale and Affidavit of Consolidation
were executed more than a month thereafter, on May 24, 1988 and May
25, 1988, respectively, and were clearly not premature.
It is true that the rule on redemption is liberally construed in favor of
the original owner of the property. The policy of the law is to aid rather
than to defeat him in the exercise of his right of redemption.93
However, the liberal interpretation of the rule on redemption is
inapplicable herein as neither Duque-Rosario nor Dr. Rosario had made
any attempt to redeem Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A. Duque-Rosario could
only rely on the efforts of the Torbela siblings at redemption, which
were unsuccessful. While the Torbela siblings made several offers to
redeem Lot No. 356-A, as well as the two other properties mortgaged
by Dr. Rosario, they did not make any valid tender of the redemption
price to effect a valid redemption. The general rule in redemption is
that it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem manifests his
desire to do so. The statement of intention must be accompanied by an
actual and simultaneous tender of payment. The redemption price
should either be fully offered in legal tender or else validly consigned
in court. Only by such means can the auction winner be assured that the
offer to redeem is being made in good faith.94 In case of disagreement
over the redemption price, the redemptioner may preserve his right of
redemption through judicial action, which in every case, must be filed
within the one-year period of redemption. The filing of the court action
to enforce redemption, being equivalent to a formal offer to redeem,
would have the effect of preserving his redemptive rights and
"freezing" the expiration of the one-year period.95 But no such action
was instituted by the Torbela siblings or either of the spouses Rosario.
Duque-Rosario also cannot bar the issuance of the writ of possession
over Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A in favor of Banco Filipino by invoking
the pendency of Civil Case No. U-4359, the Torbela siblings action for
recovery of ownership and possession and damages, which supposedly
tolled the period for redemption of the foreclosed properties. Without
belaboring the issue of Civil Case No. U-4359 suspending the
redemption period, the Court simply points out to Duque-Rosario that
Civil Case No. U-4359 involved Lot No. 356-A only, and the legal
consequences of the institution, pendency, and resolution of Civil Case
No. U-4359 apply to Lot No. 356-A alone.
Equally unpersuasive is Duque-Rosarios argument that the writ of
possession over Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A should not be issued given
the defects in the conduct of the foreclosure sale (i.e., lack of personal
notice to Duque-Rosario) and consolidation of title (i.e., failure to
provide Duque-Rosario with copies of the Certificate of Final Sale).
The right of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed property
becomes absolute upon the expiration of the redemption period. The
basis of this right to possession is the purchaser's ownership of the
property. After the consolidation of title in the buyer's name for failure
of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter of
right and its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is
merely a ministerial function.961avvphi1
The judge with whom an application for a writ of possession is filed
need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its
foreclosure. Any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its
foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for the refusal to issue a writ of
possession. Regardless of whether or not there is a pending suit for the
annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is
entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice, of course, to the
eventual outcome of the pending annulment case. The issuance of a
writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale is a
ministerial act and does not entail the exercise of discretion.97
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition of the Torbela
siblings in G.R. No. 140528 is GRANTED, while the Petition of Lena
Duque-Rosario in G.R. No. 140553 is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated June 29, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 39770, which affirmed with modification the Amended Decision
dated January 29, 1992 of the RTC in Civil Case Nos. U-4359 and U-
4733 and Pet. Case No. U-822, is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS, to now read as follows:
(1) Banco Filipino is ORDERED to reconvey Lot No. 356-A to the
Torbela siblings;
(2) The Register of Deeds of Pangasinan is ORDERED to cancel TCT
No. 165813 in the name of Banco Filipino and to issue a new certificate
of title in the name of the Torbela siblings for Lot No. 356-A;
(3) The case is REMANDED to the RTC for further proceedings to
determine the facts essential to the proper application of Articles 448
and 546 of the Civil Code, particularly: (a) the present fair market value
of Lot No. 356-A; (b) the present fair market value of the
improvements thereon; (c) the option of the Torbela siblings to
appropriate the improvements on Lot No. 356-A or require Dr. Rosario
to purchase Lot No. 356-A; and (d) in the event that the Torbela
siblings choose to require Dr. Rosario to purchase Lot No. 356-A but
the value thereof is considerably more than the improvements, then the
reasonable rent of Lot No. 356-A to be paid by Dr. Rosario to the
Torbela siblings;
(4) The Torbela siblings are DIRECTED to submit an accounting of the
rents of the improvements on Lot No. 356-A which they had received
and to turn over any balance thereof to Dr. Rosario;
(5) Dr. Rosario is ORDERED to pay the Torbela siblings 200,000.00
as moral damages, 100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
100,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
(6) Banco Filipino is entitled to a writ of possession over Lot-5-F-8-C-
2-B-2-A, covered by TCT No. 165812. The RTC Branch Clerk of
Court is ORDERED to issue a writ of possession for the said property
in favor of Banco Filipino.
SO ORDERED.
Article 498
1. G.R. No. L-40064 December 4, 1934
RESURRECCION TAGARAO, BUENAVENTURA TAGARAO
and SERAFIN TAGARAO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MARCOS GARCIA, ET AL., defendants.
MARGARITA GARCIA, ROSARIO GARCIA, DOLORES
RUFINO, and ELUETERIO RUFINO, appellants.
Oceeo and Alba for appellants M. Garcia, R. Garcia and D. Rufino.
Vicente T. Remitio for appellant E. Rufino.
Rafael P. Guerrero for appellees.
DIAZ, J.:
This action was brought by the brothers and sisters Resurreccion
Tagarao, Buenaventura Tagarao, and Serafin Tagarao, children of the
deceased Merced Garcia, daughter of the deceased Buenaventura
Garcia who was a brother of the defendant Marcos Garcia, against the
latter and the other defendants named Paula Tabifranca, Margarita
Garcia, Rosario Garcia, Dolores Rufino and Eleuterio Rufino, praying
that judgment be rendered against the defendants ordering them to
deliver to the plaintiffs, after executing the necessary deeds of transfer,
one-fourth of the land known as lot No. 510 of cadastral case No. 11 of
the municipality of Isabela, Occidental Negros (G. L. R. O. Cad.
Record No. 100), which was formerly covered, first by original
certificate of title No. 10009 (Exhibit M), later by transfer certificate of
title No. 3001 (Exhibit 3), and at present by transfer certificate of title
No. 8782 (Exhibit 7), all of the office of the register of deeds of said
Province of Occidental Negros.
In their amended complaint of July 29, 1931, which was reamended on
March 8, 1932, said plaintiffs prayed that should the defendants fail to
deliver to them the required portion of the land in question, the latter be
ordered to pay them the value thereof based on the assessed value of
the whole property, and that they furthermore be indemnified for the
value of 1,407 cavans of palay at the rate of P4 a cavan, alleging that
said 1,407 cavans represented their share in the products of said land
from the time the defendants took exclusive possession thereof.
Before the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on the date above
stated, the defendants Marcos Garcia, Paula Tabifranca, Margarita
Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino filed a demurrer to said
plaintiffs' original complaint, alleging that it did not state sufficient
facts to constitute a cause of action and was furthermore ambiguous,
unintelligible and uncertain. The lower court sustained said demurrer
and ordered the plaintiffs to amend their complaint within the
reglementary period.
When the plaintiffs amended their complaint in the sense expressed in
their pleading of February 13, 1929, said five defendants again filed
another demurrer alleging this time that the lower court lack
jurisdiction to try the case by reason of the subject matter involved and
the lower court overruled said demurrer ordering them to answer within
the reglementary period. In compliance therewith, the defendants on
October 28, 1929, filed their answer wherein the first two defendants,
or the spouses Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca, alleged that
although they formerly were the absolute and exclusive owners of the
land in question they already ceased to be so at that time, having sold
the half belonging to Paula Tabifranca to the defendants Margarita
Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino, and the other half
belonging to Marcos Garcia to Eleuterio Rufino. On June 9, 1931, said
two defendants filed a petition of even date stating that they had no
more interest in the case, having sold their respective participations to
the two Garcias and two Rufinos and praying in succession that they be
absolved from the complaint.
A few days later, or on July 15, 1931, said two defendants Marcos
Garcia and Paula Tabifranca filed a motion to include Eleuterio Rufino
among the defendants and on the following day the lower court,
granting the motion, ordered the inclusion of Eleuterio Rufino in the
case as one of the defendants. For this purpose the plaintiffs filed their
said amended complaint of July 29, 1931, which they reamended with a
slight addition on March 8, 1932.
The defendants Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca did not answer the
plaintiffs' last amended complaint but Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia
and Dolores Rufino jointly entered a general denial of all the
allegations contained therein, alleging as a special defense (1) that they
are the exclusive owners of one-half of the land in question; (2) that the
plaintiffs have already lost their right of action because such right, if
they ever had any, has already prescribed; and (3) said plaintiffs cannot
invoke the decision rendered in civil case No. 4091 because with
respect to them it does not constitute res judicata.
The defendant Eleuterio Rufino, answering said plaintiffs' last amended
complaint, stated in his pleading of November 19, 1931, that he denied
each and every allegation contained therein, alleging as a special
defense that one half of the land in question was sold by Marcos Garcia
and purchased by him in good faith, paying the corresponding price
therefor.
After due trial the lower court rendered judgment ordering the
defendants to deliver to the plaintiffs one fourth of the land in question
after executing the necessary deeds of transfer in favor of said plaintiffs
or, in lieu thereof, to indemnify them in the sum of P3,882 plus the
value of 1,000 cavans of palay at P3 a cavan, with costs. In said
judgment said court "declared the deeds of sale executed by Marcos
Garcia in favor of the defendant Eleuterio Rufino and by Paula
Tabifranca in favor of the defendants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia
and Dolores Rufino, null and void." The defendants Margarita Garcia,
Rosario Garcia, Dolores Rufino and Elueterio Rufino appealed but
Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca did not.1awphi1.net
In support of their appeal, the defendants Margarita Garcia, Rosario
Garcia, and Dolores Rufino contend that the lower court committed the
eight alleged errors assigned in their brief as follows:
1. The lower court erred in not sustaining the demurrer of the
defendants-appellants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores
Rufino to the second amended complaint of the plaintiffs.
2. The lower court erred in admitting, under objections of the
defendants-appellants, oral and documentary evidence tending to attack
original certificate of title No. 10009 in the name of the spouses Marcos
Garcia and Paula Tabifranca issued on May 17, 1918.
3. The lower court erred in holding that the deed of sale made
and executed by Paula Tabifranca with respect to her undivided one-
half () share of lot No. 510 of the cadastral survey of Isabela in favor
of Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino, was made
without consideration and declaring same null and void being fictitious.
4. The lower court erred in holding that the transaction made by
Paula Tabifranca in favor of Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and
Dolores Rufino had no other purpose than to deprive the plaintiffs of
their shares in lot No. 510, as legitimate heirs of Ventura Garcia and
Merced Garcia.
5. The lower court erred in condemning the defendants-
appellants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino,
jointly and severally with the other defendants to return to the plaintiffs
one-fourth () of lot No. 510 of the cadastral survey of Isabela, or in its
place, to indemnify the plaintiffs the sum of P3,882, value of said
portion.
6. The lower court erred in condemning the defendants-
appellants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino,
jointly and severally with the other defendants, to pay the plaintiffs one
thousand cavanes of palay or its value at P3 per cavan.
7. The lower court erred in holding that the right of the plaintiffs
to present this action to recover a portion of lot No. 510 of the cadastral
survey of Isabela has not prescribed.lawphil.net
8. The lower court erred in denying the petition for a new trial
of the defendants-appellants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and
Dolores Rufino.
The appellant Eleuterio Rufino also contends that said court in
rendering its judgment in question committed the four alleged errors
relied upon in his brief, which read as follows:
1. The lower court erred in admitting over the defendant's
objection oral as well as documentary evidence of the plaintiffs tending
to attack the stability of original certificate of title No. 10009 (Exhibit
5) in the name of the defendants Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca,
relative to alleged facts that took place prior to the issuance of said title.
2. The lower court erred in ordering the defendant Eleuterio
Rufino, jointly with his codefendants, to deliver to the plaintiffs one-
fourth () of said lot No. 510, or in lieu thereof to indemnify them in
the sum of P3,882 representing the value of said portion.
3. The lower court erred in holding in its judgment that the deed
(Exhibit 8) is fictitious and fraudulent and declaring it null and void.
4. The lower court erred in not absolving the defendant and
appellant Eleuterio Rufino from the complaint and in denying his
motion for a new trial.
Without losing sight of the purpose of the complaint of the plaintiffs
and appellees as expressed in the prayer of their pleadings or last
amended complaints, it is clear that the first assignment of alleged error
attributed to the lower court by the appellants is unfounded on the
ground that its purpose is not to attack the validity of the decree by
virtue of which original certificate of title No. 10009 was issued in
favor of Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca, or that under which
transfer certificates of title Nos. 3001 and 8782, were issued later, but
to compel the defendants to give them one-fourth of the land described
in said certificates and to pay them the indemnity referred to therein.
The facts which have been clearly established at the trial, according to
the record and the evidence before us, may be briefly stated as follows:
The land in question has an area of 31 hectares, 3 ares and 65 centares.
It was originally purchased with pacto de retro by the defendant Marcos
Garcia and his brother Ventura Garcia from Vidal Saravia on July 20,
1900. As the latter failed to exercise his right of repurchase the two
brothers became the absolute owners of said land and it was so held by
the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros in case No. 274 which
was instituted by Pedro Saravia, as administrator of the intestate estate
of Vidal Saravia, against said two brothers to compel the latter to resell
it to him (Exhibit L). When the two brothers purchased said land, the
defendant Marcos Garcia was yet single because he had not even been
married to his former wife, as the defendant Paula Tabifranca is only
his wife by a second marriage. Marcos Garcia had by his first wife
three children who are the defendants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia
and the deceased Catalina Garcia, mother of the defendant Dolores
Rufino. Ventura Garcia, now deceased, also had two children: Merced
Garcia who was married to Rafael Ragarao, and Claro Garcia.
While Merced Garcia was still living, or at least until June, 1914, the
defendant Marcos Garcia had been delivering to her and her brother
Claro Garcia their share of the products harvested from the land in
question. Merced Garcia who, as stated, died about the year 1914 and
was followed years later by her husband Rafael Tagarao, had three
children, the herein plaintiffs Resurreccion Tagarao, Serafin Tagarao
and Buenaventura Tagarao. When this action was brought on October
14, 1928, Resurreccion Tagarao was more than 24 years of age; Serafin
was then only 23 years, 1 month and 1 day, and Buenaventura, 18
years, 4 months and 3 days.
With the plaintiffs' grandfather, Ventura Garcia, and their mother,
Merced Garcia, already dead, the defendant Marcos Garcia claimed the
lands in question in cadastral case No. 11 of the municipality of Isabela
of the Province of Occidental Negros (G. L. R. O. Cadastral Record
No. 100), known in said case as lot No. 510, alleging in the pleading
presented by him to that effect (Exhibit I) that he had acquired it on
July 20, 1904, when he was yet unmarried to his codefendant Paula
Tabifranca. Before the original certificate of title acknowledging him to
be the owner of the land in question was issued to him, and during the
period within which any person could ask for the revision of the decree
issued to that effect, Marcos Garcia, fearing that Claro Garcia, brother
of the plaintiffs' mother, might frustrate his designs by asking for said
revision, executed in favor of Claro Garcia a document binding himself
to give to the latter four hectares of said land upon the issuance to him
of the corresponding certificate of title. In view thereof, Claro did not
ask for the revision of the decree but he later brought an action, case
No. 4091 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, against
Marcos Garcia to recover from him four hectares of said land, lot No.
510 of the cadastre of Isabela, basing his claim on the document which
Marcos Garcia executed in his favor in order to promise and bind
himself to give Claro said four hectares, because after Marcos Garcia
had obtained his certificate of title he refused to comply with his
promise; and as a result said court, on October 10, 1927, rendered
judgment against Marcos Garcia ordering him to segregate four
hectares of said land to be delivered to Claro Garcia and furthermore to
pay to the latter as indemnity 90 cavans of palay, or the value thereof in
the sum of P360.
In the certificate of title which was issued in favor of Marcos Garcia on
May 17, 1918 (original certificate of title No. 10009), by virtue of his
claim presented in said cadastral case No. 11 of the municipality of
Isabela. Occidental Negros, it was stated, as in the decree ordering the
issuance thereof, that one-half of the land therein described belonged to
him, and that the other half to his wife by a second marriage, Paula
Tabifranca.
A few years after the issuance of said certificate of title the defendant
Paula Tabifranca, second wife of the defendant Marcos Garcia, sold her
rights to the defendants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores
Rufino, her husband's daughters and granddaughter, respectively, by
his first marriage, executing the deed Exhibit N dated December 31,
1921, while the alleged purchaser Dolores Rufino was yet a minor. This
was agreed upon between her and her husband Marcos Garcia to
prevent the land, part of which belonged to her under said certificate of
title, from ever passing to her son by her first marriage named Juan
Tabigui, as she was already a widow when she contracted marriage
with said Marcos Garcia.
In the meantime the plaintiff Resurreccion Tagarao was informed that
her uncle Claro Garcia had succeeded in obtaining his share of the land
in question and, desiring to protect her rights and those of her brothers
and coplaintiffs, she negotiated with Marcos Garcia so that he might
give them their corresponding share. Marcos Garcia at first entertained
her with promises that he would see to it that she got what she wanted
but later, at her back, he sold his share of the land to the defendant
Eleuterio Rufino, brother of his son-in-law Lope Rufino, husband of
the defendant Rosario Garcia, executing in favor of Eleuterio Rufino
the deed Exhibit 8 wherein it was made to appear that the price paid to
him for only one-half of the land, lot No. 510, was P6,567.
Twelve days after Paula Tabifranca had executed said deed of transfer
Exhibit N in favor of her stepdaughters Margarita Garcia and Rosario
Garcia and of her husband Marcos Garcia's granddaughter named
Dolores Rufino, said three defendants together with Marcos Garcia
obtained transfer certificate of title No. 3001, after the cancellation of
original certificate of title No. 10009, and two days after Marcos Garcia
had executed in favor of the defendant Eleuterio Rufino the deed of
sale Exhibit 8 whereby he sold to the latter his half of the land
described in the above stated certificate of title No. 10009 (Exhibit M),
he and his daughters and granddaughter jointly with the defendant
Eleuterio Rufino succeeded in having said transfer certificate of title
No. 3001 (Exhibit 3) cancelled to be substituted, as it was in fact
substituted, by transfer certificate of title No. 8782 (Exhibit 7).
The transfer made by Paula Tabifranca in favor of her stepdaughters
Margarita and Rosario Garcia and her husband's granddaughter Dolores
Rufino, and that made by Marcos Garcia in favor of Eleuterio Rufino,
stated in said deeds Exhibits N and 8, are fictitious and feigned in view
of the following reasons inferable from the evidence of record:
Notwithstanding the fact that in the original certificate of title No.
10009 Paula Tabifranca's right to one half of the property therein
described has been acknowledged, she was conscious that she was not
entitled thereto because it belonged exclusively to her husband or, at
least, he had acquired it long before he married her. This explains the
ease with which she parted with her alleged right for a sum
disproportionate to the true value of the land sold by her. The alleged
purchasers Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino were
not in a financial position to pay her the alleged purchase price which,
according to Exhibit N, amounted to P1,500; and Dolores Rufino,
being then of tender age, could not have taken part in said contract that
she was represented by her father Lope Rufino, because it does not
appear that the latter was then the guardian of her property and it is a
fact that minors cannot give consent to any contract.
Neither was Eleuterio Rufino in a financial position to pay what he
allegedly paid to the defendant Marcos Garcia for the latter's share in
the land in question on the ground that the amount of six thousand five
hundred sixty-seven pesos (P6,567) which is the price allegedly paid by
him to Marcos Garcia is a fortune greater than the income he could
have had for several years, because his means of livelihood, according
to his own testimony, consisted simply of extracting tuba from about
200 coconut trees leased from different persons and in retailing fresh
fish bought by him for a lump sum in order to obtain a small profit. He
is a brother of the defendant Rosario Garcia's husband, and
notwithstanding that the deed Exhibit 8 was executed in his favor, the
land continues until now to be registered for taxation purposes in the
name of Marcos Garcia; and notwithstanding the alleged deed of
transfer Exhibit 8 the land in question continues to be under the Isabela
Sugar Company Inc., of Occidental Negros, as property of named
"THREE SISTERS A," "THREE SISTERS B," and
"HACIENDA GARCIA," the first portion being under the management
of Macario Torilla, husband of the defendant Margarita Garcia; the
second under the management of Lope Rufino, husband of the
defendant Rosario Garcia; and the third under that of Claro Garcia,
uncle of the plaintiffs (Exhibit D). In addition to these reasons, it may
and should be stated that Elueterio Rufino's testimony explaining how
the transaction between him and Marcos Garcia was effected, does not
agree with the text of the deed of transfer Exhibit 8. It is expressly
stated in said document that the price paid by him for the land in
question was P6,567 and that he also assumed the lien in the form of a
mortgage constituted on said land to secure the payment of Candido
Montilla of a loan in the sum of P4,675 from which it may be inferred
that the total price paid by him for said land was really P11,242.
Notwithstanding this, he testified that he paid only P1,892 to the
defendant Marcos Garcia. It should be stated furthermore that on
December 1, 1928, or scarcely two and a half months from the time he
bought said land from Marcos Garcia, Eleuterio Rufino leased it,
according to Exhibit 9, to Marcos Garcia's sons-in-law and husbands of
the defendants Margarita Garcia and Rosario Garcia, when it is natural
that as he was poor and his business of tapping tuba and reselling fishes
was not lucrative, he should have personally taken charge of the
cultivation and exploitation of the land bought by him. Furthermore, on
January 10, 1930, long after the alleged transfer of said land, Exhibit 8,
Macario Torilla and Lope Rufino, as Marcos Garcia's attorneys-in-fact,
the latter having executed in their favor the power of attorney, Exhibit
O-1, by virtue of which they mortgaged the land in question in the
name of their principal to Candido Montilla on July 7, 1928, Exhibit O,
paid to Montilla the sum of P514.25 as interest on the loan secured by
the mortgage above stated (Exhibit 4). This last fact convinces us more
that said deed of transfer Exhibit 8 is fictitious because if it were
genuine, there being as in fact there is in said document a stipulation
that the purchaser Eleuterio Rufino assumed all the lien on said
property, Eleuterio Rufino, not Marcos Garcia, personally, nor through
his sons-in-law Macario Torilla and Lope Rufino, should have paid said
interest.
The foregoing proves to our satisfaction that errors 2, 3 and 4 relied
upon by the appellants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores
Rufino in their brief are absolutely unfounded, and so is alleged error
No. 3 attributed to the lower court by the appellant Eleuterio Rufino.
It follows from the foregoing conclusions and considerations that errors
5 and 2 attributed to said court by the defendants Garcia and Eleuterio
Rufino, respectively, are likewise unfounded. If the transfers made
under the deeds which later made possible the issuance to the interested
parties of certificates of title Nos. 3001 and 8782 (Exhibits 3 and 7) are
fraudulent, it is but proper, being in accordance with law, that the
defendants execute the deeds of transfer prayed for by the plaintiffs in
their complaint in order to give them what is theirs; and this is
undoubtedly one fourth of the entire land because if one half belonged
to the plaintiffs' grandfather who, as already stated, had only two
children: Claro Garcia, the plaintiffs' uncle, and Merced Garcia, their
mother.
But the question now arises whether or not the three plaintiffs are
entitled to what they jointly pray for in their complaint. There is no
doubt but that the plaintiffs Serafin Tagarao and Buenaventura Tagarao
are entitled thereto on the ground that the former was only 23 years, 1
month and 1 day, when this action was brought, and therefore the three
years exception granted by the provisions of section 42 of Act No. 190
had not yet elapsed as to him, and because Buenaventura Tagarao, then
being only 18 years, 4 months and 3 days of age, was yet a minor and
the period of prescription as to him is extended to three years after he
was attained majority.
The plaintiff Resurreccion Tagarao, notwithstanding that she was of
legal age when this action was brought, contends that neither has her
right to seek the same relief prayed for by her brothers and coplaintiffs
prescribed, and cites in support of her contention the ruling laid down
in the case of Velazquez vs. Teodoro (46 Phil., 757). It was truly stated
in said case, citing with approval a doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Court of the State of Ohio in the case of Sturges and Anderson vs.
Longworth and Horne (1 Ohio St., 545), that:
Where the interests of two defendants are joint and inseparable, and the
rights of one are saved under the provision of the statute of limitations,
on account of his disability, such saving inures to the benefit of the
other defendant, although laboring under no disability.
As may be seen, this ruling refers to cases in which the rights of the
defendants are joint and inseparable because when they are not so, that
is, when they are joint and several at the same time, as is the case of the
plaintiffs whose rights are joint and several, the rule according to said
court, interpreting the section from which section 42 of Act No. 190
was copied, is different; and said court stated that in said cases the
disability which protects an heir from the effects of prescription is no
protection to coheirs, or in other words, using the same language of the
author of the footnotes on the decision rendered in the case of Moore
vs. Armstrong, reported in 36 Am. Dec., 63, 78, wherein the same
Supreme Court of the State of Ohio sustained the latter point of view,
"where the rights of the parties are not joint, the cases are uniform, and
hold that the disability of one will prevent the operation of the statute as
to him, but that those who are not under a disability will be barred."
The case of Moore vs. Armstrong, supra, has more points in common
with the case at bar than those of Sturges and Anderson vs. Longworth
and Horne, and Wilkins vs. Philips cited in said case of Velazquez vs.
Teodoro, supra. The question for determination in the former case was
whether or not the period of prescription runs not only against the heir
who is laboring under disability but also against his coheirs who are sui
juris. The plaintiffs, to all appearances, were the heirs of one Furgus
Moore and the heiress who seemed to be laboring under disability was
a married woman named Mrs. Fleming. The Supreme Court of Ohio
decided the question in the negative with the remark that whatever
doubt might once have been entertained on this subject, it was
conclusively settled both in Great Britain and in the United States that
the statute is saved in favor only of the person laboring under the
alleged disability, adding in succession that this is precisely the rule
with respect both to coparceners and tenants in common.
It cannot be argued that the separation of rights among the plaintiffs
was not practicable in the sense that one of them could not have
disposed of or alienate his legal portion of the thing possessed in
common without the consent of the others, because the law provides
otherwise. It says:
Every part owner shall have the absolute ownership of his part, and of
the fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and he may, therefore, sell,
assign, or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, unless personal rights are involved, but the effect of the sale
or mortgage, with respect to the other participants, shall be limited to
the share which may be allotted him in the partition upon the
dissolution of the community.
Furthermore, whosoever among said plaintiffs should have desired the
partition of the property of which he was a coowner, could have
demanded such partition inasmuch as the law then allowed and still
allows such act (article 400, Civil Code; and section 181, Act No. 190).
What particularly distinguishes the case at bar from that of Sturges and
Anderson vs. Longworth and Horne, supra, and the other cases wherein
it was established that when the rights and joint the exception which
saves one of the interested parties also inures to the benefit of the
others, is that it was assumed in the latter cases that the rights and
interests involved therein pertained to joint tenancy, not tenancy in
common, which are two distinct relations, each having its own juridical
meaning. The distinguishing feature between the one and the other, as
stated in the case of Mette vs. Feltgen (148 Ill., 357, 371), is that the
surviving coowner in joint tenancy is subrogated in the rights of the
deceased coowner immediately upon the death of the latter, by the mere
fact of said death, but this does not take place in cases of tenancy in
common which corresponds to what is known in our law as community
of property (articles 392 et seq. of the Civil Code). For this reason,
according to American jurisprudence, a coowner in joint tenancy can
not dispose of his share or interest in the property which is the subject
matter of the joint tenancy, without the consent of the other coowner
because in so doing he prejudices the other's rights and interests.
That the separation of rights and interests among the plaintiffs was
practicable is further evidenced by the fact that Claro Garcia with
whom they were entitled to one-half of the land in question could
recover his legal portion thereof from Marcos Garcia, although
certainly not in its entirety, having failed to assert his rights. This being
so, and it being known as it is in fact known that the purpose of the
statute of limitations is no other than to protect the diligent and vigilant,
not the person who sleeps on his rights, forgetting them and taking no
trouble of exercising them one way or another to show that he truly has
such rights, it is logical to conclude that the right of action of the
plaintiff Resurreccion Tagarao is barred, and the fact that that of her
brothers and coplaintiffs Serafin and Buenaventura Tagarao still
subsists does not inure to her benefit.
Although Resurreccion Tagarao could have enforced the right which
she exercised in this case on May 17, 1918, when Marcos Garcia and
Paula Tabifranca obtained original certificate of title No. 10009
(Exhibit M) or shortly afterwards, or long before, that is, from the death
of her mother Merced Garcia in 1914 or 1915, she did nothing to
protect her rights. On the contrary, she allowed said spouses to perform
acts of ownership on the land covered by said certificate, publicly,
peacefully, uninterrupted and adversely to the whole world including
herself, and from that time until the filing of her first complaint more
than ten years had elapsed. It is for this reason why it cannot be
sustained that the defendants Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca, after
it has been shown that the transfers made by them are null and void,
being fictitious and false, hold the land in question in trust, because if
they ever held it in said capacity it had been during the lifetime of the
plaintiffs' mother to whom said defendants used to give part of the
fruits thereof. But after she had died, their possession was under the
circumstances above stated and the law provides that in whatever way
the occupancy by a person claiming to be the owner of a real property
may have commenced, if said occupancy is under claim of title and is
furthermore open, continuous for ten years and adverse, it constitutes
sufficient title for the occupant thereof (sections 40 and 41 of Act No.
190), and there can be no other exception to this rule than the disability
of persons who are entitled to said property, by reason of age, some
mental defect, or imprisonment, for whom the same law provides the
exceptions contained in its section 42.
It having been established by the evidence for both the plaintiffs and
the defendants that Candido Montilla holds a lien on the land in
question, which is noted at the back of transfer certificates of title Nos.
3001 and 8782 (Exhibits 3 and 7) for a loan in the sum of P4,675 which
he granted to Marcos Garcia in the honest belief that the latter was the
true owner of the land described in certificates of title Nos. 10009
(Exhibit M), 3001 (Exhibit 3), and 8782 (Exhibit 7), it is but just that
said lien be acknowledged by the plaintiffs Serafin Tagarao and
Buenaventura Tagarao, with the necessary reservations in favor of said
two plaintiffs.
It should be stated in passing that the land in question, lot No. 510 of
cadastral case No. 11 of Isabela, Occidental Negros, is assessed at
P15,530, and therefore one-twelfth (1/12) thereof is worth P1,294.17 on
that basis.
As to the indemnity which the plaintiffs claim for the defendants, the
conclusion arrived at by the lower court in its decision and judgment is
supported by the evidence, that is, the plaintiffs' share of the crops from
1918 to 1929, including that of Resurreccion Tagarao, should be 1,000
cavans of palay. However, it being clear that Resurreccion Tagarao's
action is barred, it should be understood that only the plaintiffs Serafin
Tagarao and Buenaventura Tagarao are entitled to compel the
defendants to pay to them the value of two-thirds of the 1,000 cavans of
palay at the rate of P3 a cavan.
For all the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in so far
as it favors the plaintiffs Serafin Tagarao and Buenaventura Tagarao,
and said defendants are hereby ordered to execute in favor of said
Tagarao brothers and deed or deeds necessary to transfer to them, by
virtue of this judgment, two-twelfths (2/12) of the entire lot No. 510 of
the cadastre of Isabela, Occidental Negros, including the portion
transferred to Claro Garcia (G. L. R. O. Cad. Record No. 100); to
indemnify each of them in a sum equal to what he may pay to the
mortgage creditor Candido Montilla to free his said portion from the
lien thereof in favor of said Montilla; or likewise to pay to each of
them, upon failure of the defendants to deliver said portion and execute
the necessary deed of transfer, the sum of P1,294.17; and furthermore
to pay, as indemnity, the value of two-thirds of 1,000 cavans of palay,
at the rate of P3 a cavan, with costs against the defendants. Said
judgment is reversed as to the plaintiff Resurreccion Tagarao. So
ordered.
Street, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 56550 October 1, 1990
MARINA Z. REYES, AUGUSTO M. ZABALLERO and
SOCORRO Z. FRANCISCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALFREDO B. CONCEPCION, Presiding
Judge, CFI of Cavite, Tagaytay, Br. IV, SOCORRO MARQUEZ
VDA. DE ZABALLERO, EUGENIA Z. LUNA, LEONARDO M.
ZABALLERO, and ELENA FRONDA ZABALLERO,
respondents.
CORTS, J.:
On March 13, 1980, petitioners filed with the CFI a complaint for
injunction and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-572, seeking
to enjoin private respondents Socorro Marquez Vda. De Zaballero,
Eugenia Z. Luna and Leonardo M. Zaballero from selling to a third
party their pro-indiviso shares as co-owners in eight parcels of
registered land (covered by TCT Nos. A-1316 to A-1322) located in the
province of Cavite, with an aggregate area of about 96 hectares.
Petitioner claimed that under Article 1620 of the new Civil Code, they,
as co-owners, had a preferential right to purchase these shares from
private respondents for a reasonable price.
On March 17, 1980, respondent trial judge denied the ex parte
application for a writ of preliminary injunction, on the ground that
petitioners' registered notice of lis pendens was ample protection of
their rights.
On April 24, 1980, private respondents received the summons and
copies of the complaint. Private respondents then filed their answer
with counterclaim, praying for the partition of the subject properties.
Private respondent Elena Fronda Zaballero filed a motion for
intervention dated April 29, 1980, adopting therein her co-respondents
answer with counterclaim.
At the pre-trial hearing, the parties agreed on the following stipulation
of facts:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That the plaintiffs, the defendants and the intervenor are the
pro-indiviso co-owners of the properties cited and described in the
complaint;
2. That six and nine tenth (6-9/10) hectares of the land covered
by TCT No. T-1319; approximately twelve (12) hectares of that
covered by TCT No. T-1320; and the entire parcel of covered by TCT
No. T-1321, are subject of expropriation proceedings instituted by the
National Housing Authority (NHA) now pending before this Court in
Civil Case Nos. TG-392, TG-396 and TG-417;
3. That based on the evidence presented by the herein parties in
the aforecited expropriation cases, the current valuation of the land and
the improvements thereon is at P95,132.00 per hectare;
4. That on 16 April 1980, the plaintiffs received a written notice
from the defendants and the intervenor that the VOLCANO
SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION
had offered to buy the latter's share in the properties listed in the
complaint subject to the following terms:
1. The selling price shall be net at TWELVE & 50/100 (P12.50)
PESOS per square meter, or a total price of NINE MILLION
(P9,000,000.00) PESOS for a total area of SEVENTY TWO (72)
HECTARES ONLY;
2. A downpayment equivalent to THIRTY (30%) PERCENT of
the selling price, or a minimum downpayment of TWO MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND (P2,700,000.00) PESOS;
3. The balance of the purchase price to be payable within
THREE (3) YEARS from the date of downpayment in THREE (3)
EQUAL, ANNUAL PAYMENTS with interest at the legal rate
prevailing at the time of payment;
4. The balance shall be covered by a BANK GUARANTEE of
payments and shall not be governed by Art. 1250 of the Civil Code.
(Cf. Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer)
5. That in said letters (Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer), the
plaintiffs were requested:
a) To exercise their pre-emptive right to purchase defendants'
and intervenor's shares under the above-quoted terms; or
b) To agree to a physical partition of the properties; or
c) To sell their shares, jointly with the defendants and the
intervenor, to the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-
BUSINESS CORPORATION at the price and under the terms
aforequoted.
6. That the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-
BUSINESS CORPORATION is ready, willing and able to purchase not
only the aliquot shares of the defendants and the intervenor, but also
that of the plaintiffs, in and to all the properties subject of this case, for
and in consideration of the net amount of TWELVE and 50/100
(P12.50) PESOS per square meter and under the afore-quoted terms;
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 1-2, Rollo, pp. 43-44.]
The parties laid down their respective positions, as follows:
PLAINTIFFS
1. That the subject properties are incapable of physical partition;
2. That the price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly
excessive;
3. That they are willing to exercise their pre-emptive right for
an amount of not more that P95,132.00 per hectare, which is the fair
and reasonable value of said properties;
4. That the statutory period for exercising their pre-emptive
right was suspended upon the filing of the complaint;
DEFENDANTS AND INTERVENOR
1. That the reasonable price of the subject properties is P12.50
per square meter;
2. That plaintiffs' right of legal pre-emption had lapsed upon
their failure to exercise the same within the period prescribed in Art.
1623 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
3. That, assuming the soundness of plaintiffs' claim that the
price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly excessive, it would be to the
best interest of the plaintiffs to sell their shares to the VOLCANO
SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION,
whose sincerity, capacity and good faith is beyond question, as the
same was admitted by the parties herein;
4. That the subject properties consisting approximately 95
hectares may be physically partitioned without difficulty in the manner
suggested by them to plaintiffs, and as graphically represented in the
subdivision plan, which will be furnished in due course to plaintiffs'
counsel.
[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 44-45.]
Based on the foregoing, respondent trial judge rendered a pre-trial order
dated July 9, 1980 granting petitioners a period of ten days from receipt
of the subdivision plan to be prepared by a competent geodetic engineer
within which to express their approval or disapproval of the said plan,
or to submit within the same period, if they so desire, an alternative
subdivision plan.
On July 16, 1980, counsel for private respondents sent to the counsel
for petitioners a letter enclosed with a subdivision plan.
On August 4, 1980, petitioners filed their comment to the pre-trial
order, contending that the question of reasonable value of the subject
properties remains a contentious issue of fact ascertainable only after a
full trial. Petitioners likewise insisted on their pre- emptive right to
purchase private respondents' shares in the co-ownership after due
determination of the reasonable price thereof.
Thereafter, counsel for private respondents sent the counsel for
petitioners another subdivision plan prepared by a geodetic engineer.
Still, no definite communication was sent by petitioners signifying their
approval or disapproval to the subdivision plans.
In order to settle once and for all the controversy between the parties,
private respondents filed a motion dated December 16, 1980 requesting
that petitioners be required to formally specify which of the two options
under Article 498 of the New Civil Code they wished to avail of: that
petitioners' shares in the subject properties be sold to private
respondents, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter; or that the subject
properties be sold to a third party, VOLCANO LAKEVIEW
RESORTS, INC. (claimed to have been erroneously referred to in the
pre-trial as VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-
BUSINESS CORPORATION) and its proceeds thereof distributed
among the parties.
Finding merit in the private respondents' request, and for the purpose of
determining the applicability of Article 498 of the New Civil Code,
respondent trial judge issued an order dated February 4, 1981 which
directed the parties to signify whether or not they agree to the scheme
of allotting the subject properties to one of the co-owners, at the rate of
P12.50 per square meter, or whether or not they know of a third party
who is able and willing to buy the subject properties at terms and
conditions more favorable than that offered by VOLCANO
LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC. The order contained a series of
questions addressed to all the parties, who were thereupon required to
submit their answers thereto.
Private respondents filed a "Constancia" expressing that they were
willing to allot their shares in the subject properties to Socorro Marquez
Vda. de Zaballero, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter, and that they
did not know of any other party who was willing and able to purchase
the subject properties under more favorable conditions than that offered
by VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC.
However, instead of submitting their answers to the queries posed by
respondent trial judge, petitioners filed a motion for clarification as to
the true identity of the third party allegedly willing to purchase the
subject properties.
On February 26, 1981, respondent trial judge rejected petitioners'
motion on the ground that it was irrelevant.
Thereupon, on February 27, 1981, petitioners filed a pleading captioned
"Compliance and Motion", (1) reiterating the relevance of ascertaining
the true identity of the third party buyer, VOLCANO SECURITIES
TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION or VOLCANO
LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC., (2) expressing their view that there is
actually no bona fide and financially able third party willing to
purchase the subject properties at the rate of P12.50 per square meter,
and, (3) once again insisting on their pre-emptive right to purchase the
shares of private respondents in the co-ownership at a "reasonable
price", which is less than that computed excessively by the latter at the
rate of P12.50 per square meter. Petitioners therein prayed that further
proceedings be conducted in order to settle the factual issue regarding
the reasonable value of the subject properties.
On March 16, 1981, respondent trial judge issued an order denying
petitioners' motion. The judge ruled that petitioners did not possess a
pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents' shares in the co-
ownership. Thus, finding that the subject properties were essentially
indivisible, respondent trial judge ordered the holding of a public sale
of the subject properties pursuant to Article 498 of the New Civil Code.
A notice of sale was issued setting the date of public bidding for the
subject properties on April 13, 1981.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration from the above
order. Respondent trial judge reset the hearing on petitioners' motion
for reconsideration to April 6, 1981, and moved the scheduled public
sale to April 14, 1981.
Without awaiting resolution of their motion for reconsideration,
petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari, alleging that the
respondent trial judge acted without jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of
its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing his order
dated March 16, 1981 which denied petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive
right to purchase private respondents' pro-indiviso shares and which,
peremptorily ordered the public sale of the subject properties. On April
8, 1981, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
sale of the subject properties at public auction.
With the comment and reply, the Court considered the issues joined
and the case submitted for decision.
The Court finds no merit in the present petition.
The attack on the validity of respondent trial judge's order dated March
16, 1981 is ultimately premised on petitioners' claim that they had a
pre-emptive right to purchase the pro-indiviso shares of their co-
owners, private respondents herein, at a "reasonable price". It is this
same claim which forms the basis of their complaint for injunction and
damages filed against private respondents in the court a quo.
This claim is patently without basis. In this jurisdiction, the legal
provisions on co-ownership do not grant to any of the owners of a
property held in common a pre-emptive right to purchase the pro-
indiviso shares of his co-owners. Petitioners' reliance on Article 1620
of the New Civil Code is misplaced. Article 1620 provides:
A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person.
If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall
pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of
redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they may
respectively have in the thing owned in common [Emphasis supplied].
Article 1620 contemplates of a situation where a co-owner has
alienated his pro-indiviso shares to a stranger. By the very nature of the
right of "legal redemption", a co-owner's light to redeem is invoked
only after the shares of the other co-owners are sold to a third party or
stranger to the co-ownership [See Estrada v. Reyes, 33 Phil. 31 (1915)].
But in the case at bar, at the time petitioners filed their complaint for
injunction and damages against private respondents, no sale of the
latter's pro-indiviso shares to a third party had yet been made. Thus,
Article 1620 of the New Civil Code finds no application to the case at
bar.
There is likewise no merit to petitioners' contention that private
respondents had acknowledged the pre-emptive right of petitioners to
purchase their shares at a "reasonable price". Although it appears that
private respondents had agreed to sell their pro-indiviso shares to
petitioners, the offer was made at a fixed rate of P12.50 per square
meter [See Pre-trial Order dated July 9, 1980, Annex "C" of the
Petition; Rollo, pp. 43-45]. It cannot be said that private respondents
had agreed, without qualification, to sell their shares to petitioners.
Hence, petitioners cannot insist on a right to purchase the shares at a
price lower than the selling price of private respondents.
Neither do petitioners have the legal right to enjoin private respondents
from alienating their pro-indiviso shares to a third party. The rights of a
co-owner of a property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the New
Civil Code, thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and
of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership.
The law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or
mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common. The law
merely provides that the alienation or mortgage shall be limited only to
the portion of the property which may be allotted to him upon
termination of the co-ownership [See Mercado v. Liwanag, G.R. No. L-
14429, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 472; PNB v. The Honorable Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-34404, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 207; Go Ong v.
The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75884, September 24,
1987, 154 SCRA 270,] and, as earlier discussed, that the remaining co-
owners have the right to redeem, within a specified period, the shares
which may have been sold to the third party. [Articles 1620 and 1623
of the New Civil Code.]
Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that respondent trial judge
committed no grave abuse of discretion when he denied petitioners'
claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents' pro-
indiviso shares.
Moreover, there is no legal infirmity tainting respondent trial judge's
order for the holding of a public sale of the subject properties pursuant
to the provisions of Article 498 of the New Civil Code. After a careful
examination of the proceedings before respondent trial judge, the Court
finds that respondent trial judge's order was issued in accordance with
the laws pertaining to the legal or juridical dissolution of co-
ownerships.
It must be noted that private respondents, in their answer with
counterclaim prayed for, inter alia, the partition of the subject
properties in the event that the petitioners refused to purchase their pro-
indiviso shares at the rate of P12.50 per square meter. Unlike
petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase the other co-
owners' pro-indiviso shares, private respondents' counterclaim for the
partition of the subject properties is recognized by law, specifically
Article 494 of the New Civil Code which lays down the general rule
that no co-owner is obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Article 494
reads as follows:
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-
owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain
period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may
be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not
exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his
co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership.
None of the legal exceptions under Article 494 applies to the case at
bar. Private respondents' counterclaim for the partition of the subject
properties was therefore entirely proper. However, during the pre-trial
proceedings, petitioners adopted the position that the subject properties
were incapable of physical partition. Initially, private respondents
disputed this position. But after petitioners inexplicably refused to
abide by the pretrial order issued by respondent trial judge, and
stubbornly insisted on exercising an alleged pre-emptive right to
purchase private respondents' shares at a "reasonable price", private
respondents relented and adopted petitioner's position that the partition
of the subject properties was not economically feasible, and,
consequently, invoked the provisions of Article 498 of the New Civil
Code [Private respondents' "Motion To Allot Properties To Defendants
Or To Sell the Same Pursuant To Article 498 Of The Civil Code",
Annex "D" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 46-49].
Inasmuch as the parties were in agreement as regards the fact that the
subject properties should not be partitioned, and private respondents
continued to manifest their desire to terminate the co-ownership
arrangement between petitioners and themselves, respondent trial judge
acted within his jurisdiction when he issued his order dated February 4,
1981 requiring the parties to answer certain questions for the purpose of
determining whether or not the legal conditions for the applicability of
Article 498 of the New Civil Code were present in the case.
Art. 498 provides that:
Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot
agree that it be alloted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it
shall be sold and its proceeds distributed.
The sale of the property held in common referred to in the above article
is resorted to when (1) the right to partition the property among the co-
owners is invoked by any of them but because of the nature of the
property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision [See Article 495 of
the New Civil Code] would prejudice the interests of the co-owners
(See Section 5 of Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court) and (2) the
co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted
or assigned the entire property upon reimbursement of the shares of the
other co-owners.
Petitioners herein did not have justifiable grounds to ignore the queries
posed by respondent trial judge and to insist that hearings be conducted
in order to ascertain the reasonable price at which they could purchase
private respondents' pro-indiviso shares [Petitioners' "Compliance and
Motion" dated February 27, 1981, Annex "H" of the Petition; Rollo, pp.
57-60].
Since at this point in the case it became reasonably evident to
respondent trial judge that the parties could not agree on who among
them would be allotted the subject properties, the Court finds that
respondent trial judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the holding of a public sale for the subject properties (with the
opening bid pegged at P12.50 per square meter), and the distribution of
the proceeds thereof amongst the co-owners, as provided under Article
498 of the New Civil Code.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, there was no need for further
hearings in the case because it is apparent from the various allegations
and admissions of the parties made during the pre-trial proceedings,
and in their respective pleadings, that the legal requisites for the
application of Article 498 of the New Civil Code were present in the
case. No factual issues remained to be litigated upon.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The temporary restraining order issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179205 July 30, 2014
HEIRS OR REYNALDO DELA ROSA, Namely: TEOFISTA
DELA ROSA, JOSEPHINE SANTIAGO AND JOSEPH DELA
ROSA, Petitioners,
vs.
MARIO A. BA TONGBACAL, IRENEO BATONGBACAL,
JOCELYN BA TONGBACAL, NESTOR BATONGBACAL AND
LOURDES BA TONGBACAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 pursuant to Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, assailing the 7 December 2006 Decision2 and
8 August 2007 Resolution3 of the Fourth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64172. In its assailed Resolution, the
appellate court modified its earlier ruling and proceeded to direct
petitioners to execute the requisite Deed of Sale over the subject
property.
The Facts
The subject prope1iy consists of a 3, 750 square meter-portion of the
15,00 l square meters parcel of land situated in Barrio Saog, Marilao,
Bulacan denominated as Lot No. 1, and registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1074494 under the names of Reynaldo
Dela Rosa (Reynaldo), Eduardo Dela Rosa (Eduardo), Araceli Dela
Rosa (Araceli) and Zenaida Dela Rosa (Zenaida).
Sometime in 1984, Reynaldo offered to sell the subject property to
Guillermo Batongbacal (Guillermo) and Mario Batongbacal (Mario) for
50.00 per square meter or for a total of 187,500.00. Pursuant to the
agreement, Reynaldo received an advance payment of 31,500.00
leaving a balance of 156,000.00. As shown in the document
denominated as Resibo and signed by Reynaldo on 18 February 1987,
the parties agreed that the amount of 20,000.00 as part of the advance
payment shall be paid upon the delivery of the Special Power-of-
Attorney (SPA), which would authorize Reynaldo to alienate the
subject property on behalf of his co-owners and siblings namely,
Eduardo, Araceli and Zenaida. The balance thereon shall be paid in
10,000.00 monthly installments until the purchase price is fully
settled, to wit:
RESlBO
Tinaggap ko ngayong araw na ilo kay Engr. Guillermo A. Batongbacal,
ng Poblacion II, Marilao, Bulacan, ang halagang sampung libong piso
(10,000.00) salaping Pilipino, hilang bahaging hayad sa bahagi ng
lupang may sukal na 3,750 sq.m. na aking kabahagi sa isang (1) lagay
na lupang nasasaog, Marilao, Bulakan, sinasaklcrw ng T.C.T. No. T-
107449, ng Bulakan, na ipinagkasundo kong ipaghili sa naulil na Engr.
Guillermo A. Batongbacal sa halagang Limampung Piso (50.00)
salaping Filipino, bawat isang (1) melrong parisukal. Ang paunang
bayad na aking tinanggap ukol sa lupang nabanggil sa ilaas ay
21,500.00, nuong Abril 14-18, 1984. Ang halagang dapal pa niyang
bayaran sa akin ay P 156,000.00, na ang halagang dalawampung Ii
bong piso (20,000.00) ay babayaran niya sa akin sa arcrw na nag
power-of-attorney nina Zenaida dcla Rosa, at Enrique Magsaloc ay
aking nabigay sa nasabing Engr. Guillermo A. Batongbacal; na ang
nalalabing hahaging bayad ay kanyang habayaran sa akin ng Sampung
libong piso (P 10,000.00) salaping Filipino, bawat buwan hanggang sa
matapusan ang pagbabayad ng kabuuang halaga na Isang Daang at
Walumput Pitong libo Limang Daang Piso (187,500.00). An,g-
bahaging aking ipinagbibili ay ang Lote No. I, may sukat na 3,750
sq.m. na makikita sa nakalakip na sketch plan na aking ding nilagdaan
sa ikaliliwanag ng kasulutang ito.5
Subsequent to the execution of the said agreement, Mario and
Guillermo, on their own instance, initiated a survey to segregate the
area of 3,750 square meters from the whole area covered by TCT No.
T-107449, delineating the boundaries of the subdivided parts. As a
result, they came up with a subdivision plan specifically designating the
subject property signed by a Geodetic Engineer.6 Mario and Guillermo
thereafter made several demands from Reynaldo to deliver the SP A as
agreed upon, but such demands all went unheeded.
Consequently, Guillermo and Mario initiated an action for Specific
Performance or Rescission and Damages before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, seeking to enforce their Contract to
Sell dated 18 February 1987. In their Complaint docketed as Civil Case
No. 215-M 90,7 Mario and Guillermo asserted that they have a better
right over the subject property and alleged that the subsequent sale
thereof effected by Reynaldo to third persons is void as it was done in
bad faith. It was prayed in the Complaint that Reynaldo be directed to
deliver the SPA and, in case of its impossibility, to return the amount of
31,500.00 with legal interest and with damages in either case.
To protect their rights on the subject property, Mario and Guillermo,
after initiating Civil Case No. 215-M-90, filed a Notice of Lis Pendens
registering their claim on the certificate of title covering the entire
property.
In refuting the allegations of Mario and Guillermo in their Complaint.
Reynaldo in his Answer8 countered that the purported Contract to Sell
is void, because he never gave his consent thereto. Reynaldo insisted
that he was made to understand that the contract between him and the
Batongbacals was merely an equitable mortgage whereby it was agreed
that the latter will loan to him the amount of 3 l ,500.00 payable once
he receives his share in the proceeds of the sale of the land registered
under TCT No. T-107449.
Following the pre-trial conference without the parties reaching an
amicable settlement, trial on the merits ensued.9 Both parties proceeded
to present, in open court, documentary and testimonial evidence to
substantiate their claims.
For failure of Mario and Guillermo as plaintiffs therein to adduce
sufficient evidence to support their complaint, the RTC, in a
Decision10 dated 24 March 1999, dismissed Civil Case No. 215-M-90
and ordered Reynaldo to return to the former the sum of 28,000.00
with 12% annual interest. Reynaldo failed to convince the court a quo
that the contract he entered into with Mario was an equitable mortgage.
It was held by the trial court, however, that the supposed Contract to
Sell denominated as Resibo is unenforceable under Article 1403 of the
New Civil Code because Reynaldo cannot bind his co-owners into such
contract without an SPA authorizing him to do so. As such, Reynaldo
cannot be compelled to deliver the subject property but he was
nonetheless ordered by the court to return the amount he received as
pmi of the contract price since no one should be allowed to unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another. The RTC disposed in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby
DISMISSED.
However, [Reynaldo is] hereby ordered to return to [Mario and
Guillermoj the sum of 28,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum from
the date of this decision until fully paid.11
On appeal, the Comi of Appeals, in its Decision12 dated 7 December
2006, brushed aside the claim of equitable mortgage and held that the
sale effected by Reynaldo of his undivided share in the property is valid
and enforceable. According to the appellate court, no SPA is necessary
for Reynaldo's disposition of his undivided share as it is limited to the
portion that may be allotted to him upon the termination of the co-
ownership. The Batongbacals could have validly demanded from
Reynaldo to deliver the subject property pursuant to the Contract to Sell
but such option is no longer feasible because the entire property has
already been sold to third persons to whom a new title was issued. The
appellate court thus proceeded to rescind the contract and ordered
Reynaldo to return the amount he received as consideration thereby
restoring the parties to their situation before entering into the
agreement. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 24, 1999 is AFFIRMED with
modification that appellee is ordered to return to appellants the amount
of 31,500.00 plus 12% interest per annum from the date of decision of
the trial court until full payment thereof.
In addition, the appellee is ordered:
1. To pay appellants 50,000.00 as compensatory damages; 50,000.00
as moral damages; and 30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2. To pay attorney's fees and litigation expenses of 50,000.00; and
3. Double costs.13
In seeking modification of the appellate court's decision, Mario and
Guillermo pointed out that the title of the subject property has not yet
been transferred to third persons, and thus, Reynaldo can still be
compelled to execute a deed of conveyance over his undivided share of
the entire property.
In a Resolution14 dated 8 August 2007, the Court of Appeals granted
the Motion for Reconsideration of Mario and Guillermo and directed
Reynaldo to convey the subject property to them, viz:
WHEREFORE, [Reynaldo's] Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED
for lack of merit.
Upon the other hand, [Mario and Guillermo] Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision dated
December 7, 2006 is PARTIALLY RECONSIDERED ordering
defendant-appellee Reynaldo dela Rosa or his successor-in-interest to
execute the requisite Deed of Sale over his Y-i undivided share in the
subject property covered by TCT T-107449 and to accept the
consideration of 156,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the finality
of the decision.
In case of failure of [Reynaldo] to execute the deed of sale, the Branch
Clerk of Court of RTC Br. 16 of Malolos, Bulacan is directed to
execute the same and receive the 156,000.00 balance on the purchase
price on behalf of Reynaldo de la Rosa.15
On 9 September 2007, the appellate court was notified of the death or
Reynaldo, and his heirs sought to be substituted as party in this case.16
Petitioners Heirs of Reynaldo are now before this Court via this instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari praying that the Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution be reversed on the ground that it was rendered
not in accordance with the applicable law and jurisprudence.
Issues
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A CONTRACT OF SALE
BETWEEN REYNALDO DELA ROSA AND GUILLERMO
BATONGBACAL;
II.
ASSUMING THAT THERE IS A CONTRACT OF SALE,
WHETHER OR NOT GUILLERMO BATONGBACAL COMPLIED
WITII I IIS OBLIGATION [UNDER THE CONTRACTl;
III.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF LACHES;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT MARIO BATONGBACAL IS A PARTY TO
THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN REYNALDO DELA ROSA AND
GUILLERMO BATONGBACAL;
V.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDEN'qS] ARE ENTITLED TO AN A
WARD OF DAMAGES;
VI.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED
TO AW ARD OF DAMAGES. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT
OF APPEALS" A WARD OF DAMAGES WAS EXCESSIVE.17
The various contentions revolve on the sole issue of whether the
contract entered into by parties was a Contract to Sell or an equitable
mortgage. The Court will not delve into questions which arc factual in
nature, consistent with the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts.
The Court's Ruling
In assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution, petitioners
are unflinching in their stand that the disputed contract purporting to be
an absolute deed of sale was an equitable mortgage with the subject p
roperty as security for a loan obligation. To prove their point,
petitioners asserted that the consideration in the amount of 187,500.00
for a property consisting of 15,001 square meters is grossly inadequate
because the land valuation in Barrio Saog, Marilao, Bulacan, at the
time the transaction was entered into by the parties in 1984, was
already 80.00 to 100.00 per square meter. The gross inadequacy of
the price, the Heirs of Reynaldo argued, is telling of the intention of the
parties to mortgage and not to sell the property with the end view of
affording the mortgagor an easy opportunity to redeem the property
should his means permit him to do so.
An equitable mortgage is defined as one although lacking in some
formality, or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute,
nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property
as security for a debt, and contains nothing impossible or contrary to
law. For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise, two
requisites must concur: (1) that the parties entered into a contract
denominated as a sale; and (2) the intention was to secure an existing
debt by way of mortgage. Consequently, the non-payment of the debt
when due gives the mortgagee the right to foreclose the mortgage, sell
the property and apply the proceeds of the sale for the satisfaction of
the loan obligation.18 While there is no single test to determine
whether the deed of absolute sale on its face is really a simple loan
accommodation secured by a mortgage, the Civil Code, however,
enumerates several instances when a contract is presumed to be an
equitable mortgage, to wit:
Article 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable
mortgage, in any of the following cases:
1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually
inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another
instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period
is executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real
intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment
of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.
In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other benefit to be
received by the vendee as rent or otherwise shall be considered as
interest which shall be subject to the usury laws.
A perusal of the contract denominated as Resibo reveals the utter frailty
of petitioners' position because nothing therein suggests, even remotely,
that the subject property was given to secure a monetary obligation.
The terms of the contract set forth in no uncertain terms that the
instrument was executed with the intention of transferring the
ownership of the subject prope1iy to the buyer in exchange for the
price. Nowhere in the deed is it indicated that the transfer was merely
intended to secure a debt obligation. On the contrary, the document
clearly indicates the intent of Reynaldo to sell his share in the property.
The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract
is the intention of the parties.19 If the words of a contract appear to
contravene the evident intention of the paiiies, the latter shall prevail.20
Such intention is determined not only from the express terms of their
agreement, but also from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of
the parties.21 That the parties intended some other acts or contracts
apart from the express terms of the agreement, was not proven by
Reynaldo during the trial or by his heirs herein.22 Beyond their bare
and uncorroborated asseverations that the contract failed to express the
true intention of the parties, the record is bereft of any evidence
indicative that there was an equitable mortgage.
Neither could the allegation of gross inadequacy of the price carry the
day for the petitioners.1wphi1 It must be underscored at this point that
the subject of the Contract to Sell was limited only to '14 pro-indiviso
share of Reynaldo consisting an area of 3,750 square meter and not the
entire 15,001-square meter parcel of land. As a co-owner of the subject
property, Reynaldo's right to sell, assign or mortgage his ideal share in
the property held in common is sanctioned by law. The applicable law
is Article 493 of the New Civil Code, which spells out the rights of co-
owners over a co-owned property, to wit:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the foll ownership of his part and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership.
Pursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to alienate his proindiviso
share in the co-owned property even without the consent of his
coowners.23 This right is absolute and in accordance with the well-
settled doctrine that a co-owner has a full ownership of his pro-indiviso
share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute
another person for its enjoyment.24 In other words, the law does not
prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating, mortgaging his ideal share
in the property held in common.25
In Vaglidad v. Vaglidad, Jr., a case nearly on all fours to the present
petition, the Court upheld the right of the co-owner to alienate his
proindiviso share in the co-owned property as part of his right of
dominion. It was even pointed out that since the previous sale is valid,
the subsequent conveyance effected by the co-owner is null and void
pursuant to the principle that "no one can give what he does not have,"
nemo dat quod non habet, thus:
LORETO sold the subject property to GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986
as a co-owner. LORETO had a right, even before the partition of the
property on January 19, 1987, to transfer in whole or in part his
undivided interest in the lot even without the consent of his co-heirs.
This right is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a
co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right
to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person for its
enjoyment. Thus, what GABINO, JR. obtained by virtue of the sale on
May 12, 1986 were the same rights as the vendor LORETO had as co-
owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under
their transaction.
LORETO sold some 1,604 square meters of Lot No. 1253 to GABINO,
JR. Consequently, when LORETO purportedly sold to WILFREDO on
December 7, 1989 the same portion of the lot, he was no longer the
owner of Lot No. 1253-B. Based on the principle that "no one can give
what he does not have," LORETO could not have validly sold to
WILFREDO on December 7, 1989 what he no longer had. As correctly
pointed out by the appellate court, the sale made by LORETO in favor
of WILFREDO is void as LORETO did not have the right to transfer
the ownership of the subject property at the time of sale.26 (Emphasis
supplied).
In the same breadth, a co-owner cannot be compelled by the court to
give their consent to the sale of his share in a co-owned property. In
Arambulo v. Nolasco, the Court intimated:
The ultimate authorities in civil law, recognized as such by the Court,
agree that co-owners such as respondents have over their part, the right
of full and absolute ownership. Such right is the same as that or
individual owners which is not diminished by the fact that the entire
property is co-owned with others. That part which ideally belongs to
them, or their mental portion, may be disposed of as they please,
independent of the decision of their co-owners. So we rule in this case.
The respondents cannot be ordered to sell their portion of the co-owned
properties. In the language of Rodriguez v. Court of first Instance of
Rizal, "each party is the sole judge of what is good for him."27
(Underscoring ours).
Thus, even if the impression of the Court of Appeals were true, i.e., that
the entire property has been sold to thirds persons, such sale could not
have affected the right of Mario and Guillermo to recover the property
from Reynaldo. In view of the nature of co-ownership, the Comi of
Appeals correctly ruled that the terms in the Contract to Sell, which
limited the subject to Reynaldo's ideal share in the property held in
common is perfectly valid and binding. In fact, no authority from the
other co-owners is necessary for such disposition to be valid as he is
afforded by the law fullownership of his paii and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto. J\ condition set forth in a sale contract
requiring a co-owner to secure an authority from his co-owners for the
alienation of his share, as seemingly indicated in this case, should be
considered mere surplusage and docs not, in any way, affect the
validity or the enforceability of the contract. Nor should such a
condition indicate an intention to sell the whole because the contrary
intention has been clearly written:
x x x Ang bahaging aking ipinagbibili ay ang f,ote No. 1, may sukat na
3,750 sq.m. na makikita sa nakalakip na sketch plan na aking ding
nilagdaan sa ikaliliwanag ng kasulatang ito.28 Indeed, the intention
clearly written, settles the issue regarding the purchase price. A
contract of sale is a consensual contract, which becomes valid and
binding upon the meeting of minds of the parties on the price and the
object of the sale.29 The mere inadequacy of the price docs not affect
its validity when both parties are in a position to form an independent
judgment concerning the transaction, unless fraud, mistake or undue
influence indicative of a defect in consent is present.30 A contract may
consequently be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent and not due
to the inadequacy of the price.31 In the case at bar, however, no
evidence to prove fraud, mistake or undue influence indicative of
vitiated consent is attendant.
As the parties invoking equitable mortgage, the Heirs of Reynaldo did
not even come close to proving that the parties intended to charge the
property as security for a debt, leaving us with no other choice but to
uphold the stipulations in the contract. Basic is the rule that if the terms
of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control,32 we find
that the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for ruling, in modification
of its original judgment, that the sale effected by Reynaldo of his
undivided share in the property is valid and enforceable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 501
1. G.R. No. L-29727 December 14, 1988
PEDRO OLIVERAS, TEODORA GASPAR, MELECIO
OLIVERAS and ANICETA MINOR, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
CANDIDO LOPEZ, SEVERO LOPEZ, HIPOLITO LOPEZ,
EUGENIA LOPEZ, PRIMITIVO GASPAR, CORAZON LOPEZ,
ALEJANDRO CACAYURIN, FAUSTINA BOTUYAN,
MODESTO SALAZAR, ADORACION BOTUYAN, CLAUDIO
GANOTICE and ENONG BOTUYAN, defendants-appellants.
Venancio B. Fernando for defendants-appellants.
FERNAN, C.J.:
This case exemplifies the Filipino custom of keeping inherited property
in a prolonged juridical condition of co-owner ship.
Lorenzo Lopez owned Lot 4685 of the Cadastral survey of Villasis,
Pangasinan with an area of 69,687 square meters as evidenced by
Original Certificate of Title No. 15262.1 In December, 1931, Lorenzo
Lopez died, 2 leaving said property to his wife, Tomasa Ramos and six
(6) children. From that time on, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez did not
initiate any moves to legally partition the property.
More than twenty-one years later, or on February 11, 1953, Tomasa
Ramos and her eldest son, Candido Lopez, executed a deed of absolute
sale of the "eastern undivided four thousand two hundred and fifty
seven-square meters (4,257) more or less, of the undivided portion of
(their) interests, rights and participation" over Lot 4685, in favor of the
spouses Melecio Oliveras and Aniceta Minor, in consideration of the
amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000). 3
On the same day, Tomasa and Candido executed another deed of
absolute sale of the "undivided" four thousand two hundred and fifty-
seven (4,257) square meters of the "eastern part" of Lot 4685 in favor
of the spouses Pedro Oliveras and Teodora Gaspar, also in
consideration of P1,000. 4 Each of the said documents bear the
thumbmark of Tomasa and the signature of Candido.
In his affidavit also executed on February 11, 1953, Candido stated that
a month prior to the execution of the deed of sale in favor of Melecio
Oliveras, he offered his: "undivided portion" of Lot 4685 to his
"adjacent owners" but none of them was "in a position to purchase"
said property. 5
Since the execution of the two deeds of absolute sale, the vendees,
brothers Melecio and Pedro, had been paying the real property taxes for
their respectively purchased properties. 6 They also had been in
possession of their purchased properties which, being planted to palay
and peanuts, were segregated from the rest of Lot 4685 by dikes. 7
More than thirteen years later or on November 21, 1966, the counsel of
the Oliveras brothers wrote the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez reminding them
of the Oliverases' demands to partition the property so that they could
acquire their respective titles thereto without resorting to court action,
and that, should they fail to respond, he would be forced to file a case
in court. 8 Apparently, the Lopezes did not answer said letter since on
December 15, 1966, the Oliveras brothers and their wives filed a
complaint for partition and damages 9 in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan. 10
The Oliverases stated in their complaint that possession of the disputed
properties was delivered to them with the knowledge and consent of the
defendants; that they had been paying the real estate taxes thereon; that
prior to the sale, said properties were offered to the other co-owners for
sale but they refused to buy them; that on February 18, 1953, the
transactions were duly annotated and entered in the Memorandum of
encumbrances of OCT No. 15262 as adverse claims; and that their
desire to segregate the portions of Lot 4685 sold to them was frustrated
by defendants' adamant refusal to lend them the owner's duplicate of
OCT No. 15262 and to execute a deed of partition of the whole lot.
In claiming moral damages in the amount of P2,000.00 plaintiffs
alleged that defendants also refused to allow them to survey and
segregate the portions bought by them. Plaintiffs prayed that the court
order the defendants to partition Lot 4685 and to allow them to survey
and segregate the portions they had purchased. They also demanded
payment of P800.00 as attorney's fees and cost of the suit.
In their answer, the defendants alleged that no sale ever transpired as
the alleged vendors could not have sold specific portions of the
property; that plaintiffs' possession and occupation of specific portions
of the properties being illegal, they could not ripen into ownership; and
that they were not under any obligation to lend their copy of the
certificate of title or to accede to plaintiffs' request for the partition or
settlement of the property. As special and affirmative defenses, the
defendants contended that the deeds of sale were null and void and
hence, unenforceable against them; that the complaint did not state a
cause of action and that the cause or causes of action if any, had
prescribed.
Defendants averred in their counterclaim that despite repeated
demands, plaintiffs refused and failed to vacate the premises; that the
properties occupied by the plaintiffs yielded an average net produce in
palay and peanuts in the amount of P1,600.00 annually, and that the
complaint was filed to harass them. They prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint and the payment of P1,600.00 per year from 1953 until
plaintiffs shall have vacated the premises and P1,000.00 for attorney's
fees.
Plaintiffs filed an answer to defendants' counterclaim, denying all the
allegations therein and stating that defendants never demanded that
plaintiffs vacate the portions of Lot 4685 they had bought.
The lower court explored the possibility of an amicable settlement
between the parties without success. Hence, it set the case for trial and
thereafter, it rendered a
decision 11 declaring valid the deeds of absolute sale 12 and ordering
the defendants to allow the segregation of the sold portions of Lot 4685
by a licensed surveyor in order that the plaintiffs could obtain their
respective certificates of title over their portions of said lot.
In resolving the case, the lower court passed upon the issue of whether
the two deeds of absolute sale were what they purported to be or merely
mortgage documents. It considered as indicia of plaintiffs' absolute
dominion over the portions sold to them their actual possession thereof
without any opposition from the defendants until the filing of the
complaint, their payment of taxes thereon and their having benefited
from the produce of the land. The court ruled that the defendants'
testimonial evidence that the deeds in question were merely mortgage
documents cannot overcome the evidentiary value of the public
instruments presented by the plaintiffs.
On the issue of whether the two deeds of absolute sale were null and
void considering that the land subject thereof had not yet been
partitioned, the court observed that the total area of 8,514 square meters
sold to plaintiffs by Candido was less than his share should Lot 4685
with an area of 69,687 square meters be divided among the six children
of Lorenzo Lopez and their mother. In this connection, the lower court
also found that during his lifetime, and before Candido got married,
Lorenzo Lopez had divided Lot 4685 among his children who then took
possession of their respective shares. *
The defendants appealed said decision to this Court contending that the
lower court erred in declaring the two deeds of absolute sale as valid, in
ordering the segregation of the sold portions of Lot 4685 to enable the
plaintiffs to obtain their respective certificates of title, and in not
considering their defense of prescription.
The extrinsic validity of the two deeds of absolute sale is not in issue in
this case in view of the finding of the trial court that the defendants
admittedly do not question their due execution.13 What should pre-
occupy the Court is the intrinsic validity of said deeds insofar as they
pertain to sales of designated portions of an undivided, co-owned
property.
In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that before the partition
of a land or thing held in common, no individual co-owner can claim
title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an Ideal
or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing. 14
However, the duration of the juridical condition of co-ownership is not
limitless. Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code, co-ownership
of an estate should not exceed the period of twenty (20) years. And,
under the former article, any agreement to keep a thing or property
undivided should be for a ten-year period only. Where the parties
stipulate a definite period of in division which exceeds the maximum
allowed by law, said stipulation shall be void only as to the period
beyond such maximum.15
Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the in division of a
property for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public
policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period set by the law.
Otherwise, the 20-year limitation expressly mandated by the Civil Code
would be rendered meaningless.
In the instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez maintained the co-
ownership for more than twenty years. We hold that when Candido and
his mother (who died before the filing of the complaint for partition)
sold definite portions of Lot 4685, they validly exercised dominion
over them because, by operation of law, the co-ownership had ceased.
The filing of the complaint for partition by the Oliverases who, as
vendees, are legally considered as subrogated to the rights of Candido
over portions of Lot 4685 in their possession, 16 merely served to put a
stamp of formality on Candido's otherwise accomplished act of
terminating the co-ownership.
The action for partition has not prescribed. Although the complaint was
filed thirteen years from the execution of the deeds of sale and hence,
as contended by the defendants-appellants, prescription might have
barred its filing under the general provision of Article 1144 (a) of the
Civil Code, Article 494 specifically mandates that each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common insofar as his share is concerned. Hence, considering the
validity of the conveyances of portions of Lot 4685 in their favor and as
subrogees of Candido Lopez, the Oliverases' action for partition was
timely and properly filed. 17
We cannot write finis to this decision without commenting on the
compliance with the resolution of September 1, 1986 of counsel for
defendants-appellants. In said resolution, the court required the parties
to move in the premises "considering the length of time that this case
has remained pending in this Court and to determine whether or not
there might be supervening events which may render the case moot and
academic. 18 In his manifestation and motion dated August 12, 1987,
said counsel informed the Court that he had contacted the defendants-
appellants whom he advised "to move in the premises which is the land
in question and to maintain the status quo with respect to their actual
possession thereon" and that he had left a copy of said resolution with
the defendants-appellants" for their guidance in the compliance of their
obligations (sic) as specified in said
resolution." 19
Obviously, said counsel interpreted literally the Court's directive "to
move in the premises." For the enlightenment of said counsel and all
others of similar perception, a "move in the premises" resolution is not
a license to occupy or enter the premises subject of litigation especially
in cases involving real property. A "move in the premises" resolution
simply means what is stated therein: the parties are obliged to inform
the Court of developments pertinent to the case which may be of help
to the Court in its immediate disposition.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court insofar as it declares the
validity of the two deeds of sale and directs the partition of Lot 4685, is
AFFIRMED. The lower court is hereby ordered to facilitate with
dispatch the preparation of a project of partition which it should
thereafter approve. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., concur in the result.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 75886 August 30, 1988
CONCEPCION ROQUE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ERNESTO
ROQUE, FILOMENA OSMUNDO, CECILIA ROQUE,
MARCELA ROQUE, JOSE ROQUE and RUBEN ROQUE,
respondents.
Lorenzo J. Liwag for petitioner.
Dominador Ad Castillo for private respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
The subject of the present Petition for Review is the 31 July 1986
Decision of the former Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. CV
No. 02248 (entitled, "Concepcion Roque, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ernesto
Roque, Filomena Osmunda Cecilia Roque, Marcela Roque, Jose Roque
and Ruben Roque, defendants-appellants") which reversed and set
aside on appeal the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Branch 9.
The controversy here involves a 312 square meter parcel of land
situated in San Juan, Malolos, Bulacan and designated as Lot No. 1549
of the Cadastral Survey of Malolos. The property was registered
originally in the name of Januario Avendao, a bachelor who died
intestate and without issue on 22 October 1945.
On 21 September 1959, the intestate heirs of Januario Avendafio
executed a document entitled "Paghahati at Pagtagabuyan ng Mana sa
Labas ng Hukuman." 1 Through this instrument, extrajudicial partition
of Lot No. 1549 was effected among the intestate heirs as follows:
a. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Illuminada Avendao.
b. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Gregorio Avendafio
and Miguel Avendao.
c. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Bernardino,
Bienvenido, Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed Avendao.
d. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to respondent Emesto
Roque and Victor Roque. 2
On 28 September 1959, co-owners Illuminada, Gregorio, Miguel,
Bernardino, Bienvenido, Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed
Avendao, in consideration of the aggregate amount of P500.00,
transferred their collective and undivided threefourths (3/4) share in Lot
No. 1549 to respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque, thereby
vesting in the latter full and complete ownership of the property. The
transactions were embodied in two (2) separate deeds of sale both
entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan" 3 and both duly notarized.
Subsequently, in an unnotarized "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" 4 dated
27 November 1961, Emesto and Victor Roque purportedly sold a three-
fourths (3/4) undivided portion of Lot No. 1549 to their half-sister,
petitioner Concepcion Roque, for the same amount. The property,
however, remained registered in the name of the decedent, Januario
Avendao.
Upon the instance of petitioner Concepcion Roque and allegedly of
respondent Ernesto Roque, Lot No. 1549 was surveyed on 20
September 1975. Consequent thereto, a Subdivision Plan 5 was drawn
up by the Geodetic Engineer Identifying and delineating a one-fourth
(1/4) portion (78 square meters) of the property as belonging to
respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque (who had died on 14 April
1962), upon the one hand, and a three-fourths (3/4) portion (234 square
meters) of the same property as belonging to petitioner Concepion
Roque, upon the other hand. Petitioner claimed that preparation of the
Subdivision Plan, which was approved on 3 November 1975 by the
Land Registration Commission was a preliminary step leading
eventually to partition of Lot No. 1549, partition allegedly having been
previously agreed upon inter se by the co-owners. Respondents Ernesto
Roque and the legal heirs of Victor Roque, however, refused to
acknowledge petitioner's claim of ownership of any portion of Lot No.
1549 and rejected the plan to divide the land.
Attempts at amicable settlement having fallen through, petitioner
Concepcion Roque, on 6 December 1977, filed a Complaint for
"Partition with Specific Performance" 6 (docketed as Civil Case No.
5236-M) with Branch 2 of the then Court of First Instance of Malolos
against respondents Emesto Roque and the heirs of Victor Roque. In
her complaint, petitioner (plaintiff below) claimed legal ownership of
an undivided threefourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549, by virtue of
the 27 November 1961 "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" executed in her
favor by Emesto Roque and Victor Roque. In support of this claim,
petitioner also presented an undated and unnotarized "Kasulatang
Pagkilala sa Bilihan Patuluyan ng Bahagui at Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman at Paghahati-hati at Abuyan ng Bahagui" 7 said to have been
signed by the respondents in acknowledgment of the existence and
validity of the Bilihan in favor of petitioner. Finally, petitioner alleged
that, as a coowner of Lot No. 1549, she had a right to seek partition of
the property, that she could not be compelled to remain in the
coownership of the same.
In an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim 8 filed on 28 December
1977, respondents (defendants below) impugned the genuineness and
due execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" dated 27 November
1961 on the ground "that the signatures appearing thereon are not the
authentic signatures of the supposed signatories ...." It was also alleged
that petitioner Concepcion Roque, far from being a co-owner of Lot
No. 1549, "occupied a portion of the lot in question by mere tolerance
of the [defendants]." Respondents also refused to honor the unnotarized
Kasulatan and, additionally, denied having had any participation in the
preparation of the Subchvision Plan.
On 27 June 1983, the trial court (now Branch 9, Regional Trial Court of
Malolos) rendered a Decision, 9 the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants;
1. Ordering the heirs of the late Victor Roque namely Filomena
Osmunda his spouse, his children, Cecilia Roque, Marcela Roque, Jose
Roque and Ruben Roque and their uncle and co-defendant Emesto
Roque, to execute a deed of confirmation of the sale made by Emesto
and Victor Roque in favor of plaintiff Concepcion Roque, entitled
"Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan," executed on November 27, 1961, Exh. E,
over the 3/4 portion of the subject property;
2. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land described in par. 3
of tie complaint covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1442
Bulacan issued in the name of Januario Avendafio, in the proportion of
3/4 to pertain to Concepcion Roque, and 1/4 to pertain to Emesto
Roque and his co- defendants, his sister-in-law, nephews and nieces, in
accordance with the approved subdivision plan (LRC Psd-230726).
3. Ordering defendants,jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiff
the sum of P2,000.00 as and for attomey's fees and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The respondents appealed from this decision alleging the following
errors:
I Should the trial court find that the defendants do not dispute the status
The lower court erred when it decided and ordered
defendantsappellants to execute a confirmation of the "Bilihan Lubos at
Patuluyan," Exh. "E."
II
The lower court erred when it decided and ordered the
defendantsappellant,s to deliver unto the plaintiff [a] 3/4 share of the
land in question.
III
The lower court erred in deciding this case in favor of the plaintiff-
appellee, based on an unnotarized and forged signature of
defendantappellant Ernesto Roque.
IV
The lower court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the
plaintiff-appellee Concepcion Roque despite [its] gross inconsistencies.
10
Acting on the appeal (docketed as A.C.-G.R. CV No. 02248), the
Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision 11 dated 31 July 1986,
reversed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed both the
petitioner's complaint and the respondents' appeal. A Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner Concepcion Roque was denied.
The present Petition for Review was filed with this Court on 18
September 1986. In a resolution dated 27 July 1987, we gave due
course to the Petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda.
1. On the matter of dismissal of petitioner's complaint, the
Intermediate Appellate Court stated in its decision:
While the action filed by the plaintiff is for partition, the defendantz,
after denying plaintiff's assertion of co-ownership, asserted that they
are the exclusive and sole owners of the 314 portion of the parcel of
land claimed by the plaintiff.
Upon the issue thusjoined by the pleadings, it is obvious that the case
has become one ofownership of the disputed portion of the subject lot.
It is well settled that an action for partition will not prosper as such
from the moment an alleged co-owner asserts an adverse title. The
action that may be brought by an aggrieved co-owner is accion
reivindicatoria or action for recovery of title and possession (Jardin vs.
Hallasgo, 11 7 SCRA 532, 536, 537; Paner vs. Gaspar, 3 CA Rep. 155,
158). (Emphasis supplied)
Viewed in the light of the facts of the present case, the Intermediate
Appellate Court's decision appears to imply that from the moment
respondents (defendants below) alleged absolute and exclusive
ownership of the whole of Lot No. 1549 in their Answer, the trial court
should have immediately ordered the dismissal of the action for
partition and petitioner (plaintiff below), if she so desired, should have
refiled the case but this time as an accion reinvindicatoria. Taking this
analysis a step further should the reivindicatory action prosper i.e., a
co-ownership relation is found to have existed between the parties a
second action for partition would still have to be instituted in order to
effect division of the property among the co-owners.
We do not agree with the above view. An action for partition-which is
typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a specified
property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff
recognizes to be co-owners may be seen to present simultaneously
two principal issues. First, there is the issue of whether the plaintiff is
indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned. Second,
assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is
the secondary issue of how the property is to be divided between
plaintiff and defendant(s) i.e., what portion should go to which co-
owner.
of the plaintiff as co-owner, the court can forthwith proceed to the
actual partitioning of the property involved. In case the defendants
assert in their Answer exclusive title in themselves adversely to the
plaintiff, the court should not dismiss the plaintiffs action for partition
but, on the contrary and in the exercise of its general jurisdiction,
resolve the question of whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not. Should
the trial court find that the plaintiff was unable to sustain his claimed
status as co-owner, or that the defendants are or have become the sole
and exclusive owners of the property involved, the court will
necessarily have to dismiss the action for partition. This result would be
reached, not because the wrong action was commenced by the plaintiff,
but rather because the plaintiff having been unable to show co-
ownership rights in himself, no basis exists for requiring the defendants
to submit to partition the property at stake. If, upon the other hand, the
court after trial should find the eidstence of co-ownership among the
parties litigant, the court may and should order the partition of the
property in the same action. Judgment for one or the other party being
on the merits, the losing party (respondents in this case) may then
appeal the same. In either case, however, it is quite unnecessary to
require the plaintiff to file another action, separate and independent
from that for partition originally instituted. Functionally, an action for
partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of
coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the property involved. This is the import of our jurisprudence
on the matter. 12 and is sustained by the public policy which abhors
multiplicity of actions.
The question of prescription also needs to be addressed in this
connection. It is sometimes said that "the action for partition of the
thing owned in common (actio communi dividendo or actio familiae
erciscundae) does not prescribe." 13 This statement bears some
refinement. In the words of Article 494 of the Civil Code, "each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concemed." No matter how long the co-
ownership has lasted, a co-owner can always opt out of the co-
ownership, and provided the defendant co-owners or co-heirs have
theretofore expressly or impliedly recognized the co-ownership, they
cannot set up as a defense the prescription of the action for partition.
But if the defendants show that they had previously asserted title in
themselves adversely to the plaintiff and for the requisite period of
time, the plaintiffs right to require recognition of his status as a co-
owner will have been lost by prescription and the court cannot issue an
order requiring partition. This is precisely what happened in Jardin v.
Hallasgo, 117 SCRA 532 (1982), which the respondent appellate court
cited to support its position quoted above.
The case of Jardin involved, among others, two (2) parcels of land
which were inherited in 1920 by the brothers Catalino jardin and Galo
Jardin together with their half-brother, Sixto Hallasgo. The three (3)
held these lands in co-ownership until Sixto later (the date was not
specified) repudiated the coownership and occupied and possessed both
parcels of land, claiming the same exclusively as his own. Sometime in
1973, the heirs of Catalino and Galo instituted an action for partition of
the two (2) properties against Sixto's heirs, who had refused to
surrender any portion of the same to the former. The trial court,
assuming that prescription had started to run in that case even before
the Civil Code took effect, held that the action for partition filed by the
heirs of Catalino and Galo had already prescribed. On appeal, this
Court affirmed the trial court on this point in the following terms:
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "no co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co- ownership" and that "each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar
as his share is concerned." It also provides that 'no prescription shall
run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs
so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
While the action for the partition of the thing owned in common (actio
communi dividendo or actio familiae erciscundae) does not prescribe,
the co-ownership does not last forever since it may be repudiated by a
co-owner [i.e., Sixto]. In such a case, the action for partition does not
lie. What may be brought by the aggrieved co-owner [i.e., the heirs of
Catalino and Galo] is an accion reivindicatoria or action for recovery of
title and possession. That action may be barred by prescription.
If the co-heir or co-owner having possession of the hereditary or
community property, holds the same in his own name, that is, under
claim of exclusive ownership, he may acquire the property by
prescription if his possession meets all the other requirements of the
law, and after the expiration of the prescriptive period, his co-heir or
co-owner may lose their right to demand partition, and their action may
then be held to have prescribed (De los Santos vs. Santa Teresa, 44
Phil. 811).
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it will be seen that the
underscored portion of the Court's opinion in Jardin is actually obiter.
For there, the Court simply held the action for partition by the heirs of
Catalino and Galo had prescribed and did not require such heirs to start
a new action (which would have been quite pointless); on the other
hand, the Court remanded the case to the lower court for further
proceedings in respect of the recovery of a 350 square meter lot which
the evidence showed was owned by the plaintiffs but wrongfully
included by Sixto in the cadastral survey of his share of the adjoining
lot.
In Jardin, the claim of co-ownership asserted by the heirs of Catalino
and Galo was effectively refuted by the heirs of Sixto, who not only
claimed for themselves absolute and exclusive ownership of the
disputed properties but were also in actual and adverse possesion
thereof for a substantial length of time. The Court found, further, that
the action for partition initially available to the heirs of Catalino and
Galo had, as a result of the preceding circumstance, already prescribed.
An entirely different situation, however, obtains in the case at bar. First
of all, petitioner Concepcion Roque-the co-owner seeking partition
has been and is presently in open and continuous possession of a three-
fourths (3/4) portion of the property owned in common. The Court
notes in this respect the finding of the trial court that petitioner,
following execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at Pattlluyan" on 27
November 1961, had been in "continuous occupancy of the 3/4 portion
of the lot ... up to the present, and whereon plaintifrs house and that of
her son are erected. " 14 Respondents do not dispute this finding of
fact, although they would claim that petitioner's possession is merely
tolerated by them. Second, prior to filing in 1977 of the Complaint in
Civil Case No. 5236-M, neither of the parties involved had asserted or
manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over the whole
of Lot No. 1549 adverse to that of any of the other co-owners: in other
words, co-ownership of the property had continued to be recognized by
all the owners. Consequently, the action for partition could not have
and, as a matter of fact, had not yet prescribed at the time of institution
by Concepcion of the action below.
2. Coming now to the matter regarding dismissal of the
respondents'appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court held that
inasmuch as the attack on the validity of the "Bilihan Lubos at
Patuluyan" was predicated on fraud and no action for annulment of the
document had been brought by respondents within the four (4) year
prescriptive period provided under Article 1391 of the Civil Code, such
action had already prescribed.
We find it unnecessary to deal here with the issue of prescription
discussed by the respondent court in its assailed decision. The facts on
record clearly show that petitioner Concepcion Roque had been in
actual, open and continuous possession of a three-fourths (3/4) portion
of Lot No. 1549 ever since execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at
Patuluyan" in November of 1961. The Court notes that it was only in
their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim filed with the trial court
in December of 1977 more than sixteen (16) years later that
respondents first questioned the genuineness and authenticity of the
"Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan." Not once during those sixteen (16) years
did respondents contest petitioner's occupation of a three-fourths (3/4)
portion of Lot No. 1549. Furthermore, if indeed it is true that
respondents, as they claim, are the absolute owners of the whole of Lot
No. 1549, it is most unusual that respondents would have allowed or
tolerated such prolonged occupation by petitioner of a major portion
(3/4) of the land while they, upon the other hand, contented themselves
with occupation of only a fourth thereof. This latter circumstance,
coupled with the passage of a very substantial length of time during
which petitioner all the while remained undisturbed and uninterrupted
in her occupation and possession, places respondents here in laches:
respondents may no longer dispute the existence of the co-ownership
between petitioner and themselves nor the validity of petitioner's claim
of a threefourths (3/4) interest in Lot No. 1549, as they are deemed, by
their unreasonably long inaction, to have acquiesced in the
coow,aership. 15 In this respect, we affirm the decision of the
respondent appellate court presently under review.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated
31 July 1986 in A.C.-G.R. CV No. 02248 is SET ASIDE with respect
to that portion which orders the dismissal of the Complaint in Civil
Case No. 5236-M, but is AFFIRMED with respect to that portion
which orders the dismissal of the respondents'appeal in A.C.-G.R. CV
No. 02248. The Decision of Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos dated 27 June 1983 in Civil Case No. 5236-M is hereby
REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174727 August 12, 2013
ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY MANUEL
VILLANUEVA, TEODORA VILLANUEVA-FRANCISCO,
CAMILO FRANCISCO, ADOLFO FRANCISCO, LUCIMO
FRANCISCO, JR., MILAGROS FRANCISCO,* CELEDONIO
FRANCISCO, HERMINIGILDO FRANCISCO; RAMON
TRESVALLES, ROBERTO TAJONERA, NATIVIDAD INING-
IBEA (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY EDILBERTO IBEA,
JOSEFA IBEA, MARTHA IBEA, CARMEN IBEA, AMPARO
IBEA-FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ, EUGENIO RUIZ AND
PASTOR RUIZ; DOLORES INING-RIMON (DECEASED)
SURVIVED BY JESUS RIMON, CESARIA RIMON GONZALES
AND REMEDIOS RIMON CORDERO; AND PEDRO INING
(DECEASED) SURVIVED BY ELISA TAN INING (WIFE) AND
PEDRO INING, JR., PETITIONERS,
vs.
LEONARDO R. VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES VEGA,
RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO M. VEGA, MILBUENA
VEGA-RESTITUTO, AND LENARD VEGA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit
from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedents
property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-
ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedents heirs.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the March 14,
2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
74687 and its September 7, 2006 Resolution3 denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.4
Factual Antecedents
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner
of a 3,120-square meter parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo,
Aklan covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (24071) RO-6305
(OCT RO-630). Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was
survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria
Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and
grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both
deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and
children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-
Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.
Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children:
petitioners Natividad Ining-Ibea (Natividad), Dolores Ining-Rimon
(Dolores), Antipolo, and Pedro; Jose; and Amando. Natividad is
survived by Edilberto Ibea, Josefa Ibea, Martha Ibea, Carmen Ibea,
Amparo Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is
survived by Jesus Rimon, Cesaria Rimon Gonzales and Remedios
Rimon Cordero. Antipolo is survived by Manuel Villanueva, daughter
Teodora Villanueva-Francisco (Teodora), Camilo Francisco (Camilo),
Adolfo Francisco (Adolfo), Lucimo Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo Jr.),
Milagros Francisco, Celedonio Francisco, and Herminigildo Francisco
(Herminigildo). Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa Tan Ining and
Pedro Ining, Jr. Amando died without issue. As for Jose, it is not clear
from the records if he was made party to the proceedings, or if he is
alive at all.
In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles)
and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregorias grandchildren or
spouses thereof (Gregorias heirs).
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged
to him as Romanas surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No. 52756 for partition,
recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, against
Gregorias heirs. In his Amended Complaint,7 Leonardo alleged that on
several occasions, he demanded the partition of the property but
Gregorias heirs refused to heed his demands; that the matter reached
the level of the Lupon Tagapamayapa, which issued a certification to
file a court action sometime in 1980; that Gregorias heirs claimed sole
ownership of the property; that portions of the property were sold to
Tresvalles and Tajonera, which portions must be collated and included
as part of the portion to be awarded to Gregorias heirs; that in 1979,
Lucimo Francisco, Sr. (Lucimo Sr.), husband of herein petitioner
Teodora, illegally claimed absolute ownership of the property and
transferred in his name the tax declaration covering the property; that
from 1988, Lucimo Sr. and Teodora have deprived him (Leonardo) of
the fruits of the property estimated at 1,000.00 per year; that as a
result, he incurred expenses by way of attorneys fees and litigation
costs. Leonardo thus prayed that he be declared the owner of half of the
subject property; that the same be partitioned after collation and
determination of the portion to which he is entitled; that Gregorias
heirs be ordered to execute the necessary documents or agreements;
and that he (Leonardo) be awarded actual damages in the amount of
1,000.00 per year from 1988, attorneys fees of 50,000.00, and
lawyers appearance fees of 500.00 per hearing.
In their Answer8 with counterclaim, Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo
Jr. and Herminigildo claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action
against them; that they have become the sole owners of the subject
property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by
sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same
from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact; that they were in
continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and exclusive possession of the
property with a just title; that they have been paying the taxes on the
property; that Leonardos claim is barred by estoppel and laches; and
that they have suffered damages and were forced to litigate as a result
of Leonardos malicious suit. They prayed that Civil Case No. 5275 be
dismissed; that Leonardo be declared to be without any right to the
property; that Leonardo be ordered to surrender the certificate of title to
the property; and that they be awarded 20,000.00 as moral damages,
10,000.00 as temperate and nominal damages, 20,000.00 as
attorneys fees, and double costs.
The other Gregoria heirs, as well as Tresvalles and Tajonera were
declared in default.9
As agreed during pre-trial, the trial court commissioned Geodetic
Engineer Rafael M. Escabarte to identify the metes and bounds of the
property.10 The resulting Commissioners Report and Sketch,11 as
well as the Supplementary Commissioners Report,12 were duly
approved by the parties. The parties then submitted the following issues
for resolution of the trial court:
Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leons estate;
Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and
Whether Leonardos claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by
estoppel or laches.13
In the meantime, Leonardo passed away and was duly substituted by
his heirs, the respondents herein.14
During the course of the proceedings, the following additional relevant
facts came to light:
1. In 1995, Leonardo filed against petitioners Civil Case No. 4983 for
partition with the RTC Kalibo, but the case was dismissed and referred
to the Kalibo Municipal Trial Court (MTC), where the case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1366. However, on March 4, 1997, the
MTC dismissed Civil Case No. 1366 for lack of jurisdiction and
declared that only the RTC can take cognizance of the partition case;15
2. The property was allegedly sold by Leon to Enriquez through an
unnotarized document dated April 4, 1943.16 Enriquez in turn
allegedly sold the property to Lucimo Sr. on November 25, 1943 via
another private sale document;17
3. Petitioners were in sole possession of the property for more than 30
years, while Leonardo acquired custody of OCT RO-630;18
4. On February 9, 1979, Lucimo Sr. executed an Affidavit of
Ownership of Land19 claiming sole ownership of the property which
he utilized to secure in his name Tax Declaration No. 16414 (TD
16414) over the property and to cancel Tax Declaration No. 20102 in
Leons name;20
5. Lucimo Sr. died in 1991; and
6. The property was partitioned among the petitioners, to the exclusion
of Leonardo.21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision,22 which
decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
Dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs right of action
has long prescribed under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code;
Declaring Lot 1786 covered by OCT No. RO-630 (24071) to be the
common property of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining and by virtue
whereof, OCT No. RO-630 (24071) is ordered cancelled and the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Aklan is directed to issue a
transfer certificate of title to the heirs of Natividad Ining, one-fourth
(1/4) share; Heirs of Dolores Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of
Antipolo Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; and Heirs of Pedro Ining, one-
fourth (1/4) share.
For lack of sufficient evidence, the counterclaim is ordered dismissed.
With cost against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.23
The trial court found the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds
of sale to be spurious. It concluded that Leon never sold the property to
Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr.,
hence, the subject property remained part of Leons estate at the time of
his death in 1962. Leons siblings, Romana and Gregoria, thus
inherited the subject property in equal shares. Leonardo and the
respondents are entitled to Romanas share as the latters successors.
However, the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years from
Leons death in 1962 or up to 1992 within which to file the
partition case. Since Leonardo instituted the partition suit only in 1997,
the same was already barred by prescription. It held that under Article
1141 of the Civil Code,24 an action for partition and recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land is a real action over
immovable property which prescribes in 30 years. In addition, the trial
court held that for his long inaction, Leonardo was guilty of laches as
well. Consequently, the property should go to Gregorias heirs
exclusively.

Respondents moved for reconsideration25 but the same was denied by
the RTC in its February 7, 2002 Order.26
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Only respondents interposed an appeal with the CA. Docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 74687, the appeal questioned the propriety of the trial
courts dismissal of Civil Case No. 5275, its application of Article
1141, and the award of the property to Gregorias heirs exclusively.
On March 14, 2006, the CA issued the questioned Decision,27 which
contained the following decretal portion:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this appeal is GRANTED.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 8, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil
Case No. 5275 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof,
judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as
successors-in-interest of Romana Roldan;
2. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the defendants as
successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining;
3. Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of the portion
described in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Commissioners Report
(Supplementary) to the herein plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the cancellation of OCT No. RO-630 (24071) in the name
of Leon Roldan and the Register of Deeds of Aklan is directed to issue
transfer certificates of title to the plaintiffs in accordance with
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the sketch plan as embodied in the
Commissioners Report (Supplementary) and the remaining portion
thereof be adjudged to the defendants.
Other claims and counterclaims are dismissed.
Costs against the defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED.28
The CA held that the trial courts declaration of nullity of the April 4,
1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of Enriquez and
Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was settled by petitioners
failure to appeal the same. Proceeding from the premise that no valid
prior disposition of the property was made by its owner Leon and that
the property which remained part of his estate at the time of his death
passed on by succession to his two siblings, Romana and Gregoria,
which thus makes the parties herein who are Romanas and
Gregorias heirs co-owners of the property in equal shares, the
appellate court held that only the issues of prescription and laches were
needed to be resolved.
The CA did not agree with the trial courts pronouncement that
Leonardos action for partition was barred by prescription. The CA
declared that prescription began to run not from Leons death in 1962,
but from Lucimo Sr.s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land
in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the
property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of
the Civil Code, which provides that "[n]o prescription shall run in favor
of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership," the CA held that
it was only when Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit of Ownership of
Land in 1979 and obtained a new tax declaration over the property (TD
16414) solely in his name that a repudiation of his co-ownership with
Leonardo was made, which repudiation effectively commenced the
running of the 30-year prescriptive period under Article 1141.
The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.s sole possession of the property
for more than 30 years to the exclusion of Leonardo and the
respondents as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership either, stating
that his exclusive possession of the property and appropriation of its
fruits even his continuous payment of the taxes thereon while
adverse as against strangers, may not be deemed so as against Leonardo
in the absence of clear and conclusive evidence to the effect that the
latter was ousted or deprived of his rights as co-owner with the
intention of assuming exclusive ownership over the property, and
absent a showing that this was effectively made known to Leonardo.
Citing Bargayo v. Camumot29 and Segura v. Segura,30 the appellate
court held that as a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed
to be adverse to the other co-owners but will be held to benefit all, and
that a co-owner or co-heir is in possession of an inheritance pro-
indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-owners or co-heirs
if he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation to
deliver the same to his co-owners or co-heirs, as is the case of a
depositary, lessee or trustee.
The CA added that the payment of taxes by Lucimo Sr. and the
issuance of a new tax declaration in his name do not prove ownership;
they merely indicate a claim of ownership. Moreover, petitioners act
of partitioning the property among themselves to the exclusion of
Leonardo cannot affect the latter; nor may it be considered a
repudiation of the co-ownership as it has not been shown that the
partition was made known to Leonardo.
The CA held further that the principle of laches cannot apply as against
Leonardo and the respondents. It held that laches is controlled by
equitable considerations and it cannot be used to defeat justice or to
perpetuate fraud; it cannot be utilized to deprive the respondents of
their rightful inheritance.
On the basis of the above pronouncements, the CA granted
respondents prayer for partition, directing that the manner of
partitioning the property shall be governed by the Commissioners
Report and Sketch and the Supplementary Commissioners Report
which the parties did not contest.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration31 which the CA
denied in its assailed September 7, 2006 Resolution.32 Hence, the
present Petition.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following arguments:
I
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO FRANCISCO
REPUDIATED THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9,
1979.
II
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND
LACHES.33
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners insist in their Petition and Reply34 that Lucimo Sr.s
purchase of the property in 1943 and his possession thereof amounted
to a repudiation of the co-ownership, and that Leonardos admission
and acknowledgment of Lucimo Sr.s possession for such length of
time operated to bestow upon petitioners as Lucimo Sr.s successors-
in-interest the benefits of acquisitive prescription which proceeded
from the repudiation.
Petitioners contend that Leonardos inaction from Lucimo Sr.s
taking possession in 1943, up to 1995, when Leonardo filed Civil Case
No. 4983 for partition with the RTC Kalibo amounted to laches or
neglect. They add that during the proceedings before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa in 1980, Leonardo was informed of Lucimo Sr.s
purchase of the property in 1943; this notwithstanding, Leonardo did
not take action then against Lucimo Sr. and did so only in 1995, when
he filed Civil Case No. 4983 which was eventually dismissed and
referred to the MTC. They argue that, all this time, Leonardo did
nothing while Lucimo Sr. occupied the property and claimed all its
fruits for himself.

Respondents Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, argue in their Comment35 that
For purposes of clarity, if [sic] is respectfully submitted that eighteen
(18) legible copies has [sic] not been filed in this case for consideration
in banc [sic] and nine (9) copies in cases heard before a division in that
[sic] all copies of pleadings served to the offices concern [sic] where
said order [sic] was issued were not furnished two (2) copies each in
violation to [sic] the adverse parties [sic] to the clerk of court, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines; to the Honorable
Court of Appeals so that No [sic] action shall be taken on such
pleadings, briefs, memoranda, motions, and other papers as fail [sic] to
comply with the requisites set out in this paragraph.
The foregoing is confirmed by affidavit of MERIDON F.
OLANDESCA, the law secretary of the Petitioner [sic] who sent [sic]
by Registered mail to Court of Appeals, Twentieth Division, Cebu
City; to Counsel for Respondent [sic] and to the Clerk of Court
Supreme Court Manila [sic].
These will show that Petitioner has [sic] violated all the requirements of
furnishing two (2) copies each concerned party [sic] under the Rule of
Courts [sic].36
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long
been settled and had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal.
Thus, the property remained part of Leons estate.
One issue submitted for resolution by the parties to the trial court is
whether Leon sold the property to Lucimo Sr.1wphi1 The trial court,
examining the two deeds of sale executed in favor of Enriquez and
Lucimo Sr., found them to be spurious. It then concluded that no such
sale from Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever took place. Despite this finding,
petitioners did not appeal. Consequently, any doubts regarding this
matter should be considered settled. Thus, petitioners insistence on
Lucimo Sr.s 1943 purchase of the property to reinforce their claim
over the property must be ignored. Since no transfer from Leon to
Lucimo Sr. took place, the subject property clearly remained part of
Leons estate upon his passing in 1962.
Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in
favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-
owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have
been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof
is clear and convincing."41
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that the trial court erred
in reckoning the prescriptive period within which Leonardo may seek
partition from the death of Leon in 1962. Article 1141 and Article 494
(fifth paragraph) provide that prescription shall begin to run in favor of
a co-owner and against the other co-owners only from the time he
positively renounces the co-ownership and makes known his
repudiation to the other co-owners.
Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardos co-ownership of the property only
sometime in 1979 and 1980, when the former executed the Affidavit of
Ownership of Land, obtained a new tax declaration exclusively in his
name, and informed the latter before the Lupon Tagapamayapa of
his 1943 purchase of the property. These apparent acts of repudiation
were followed later on by Lucimo Sr.s act of withholding Leonardos
share in the fruits of the property, beginning in 1988, as Leonardo
himself claims in his Amended Complaint. Considering these facts, the
CA held that prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979
or even in 1980 when it has been made sufficiently clear to him that
Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and has claimed sole
ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded that the filing of
Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979,
is clearly within the period prescribed under Article 1141.
What escaped the trial and appellate courts notice, however, is that
while it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be
characterized as a repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not
a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is
merely Antipolos son-in-law, being married to Antipolos daughter
Teodora.42 Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the
primary basis for succession, exclude relations by affinity.
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;

Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and
Gregoria.
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and
Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares. In turn,
Romanas and Gregorias heirs the parties herein became entitled to
the property upon the sisters passing. Under Article 777 of the Civil
Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
death.
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property;
Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the
co-ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason, prescription
did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition
of the property has not been lost.

Gregorias and Romanas heirs are co-owners of the subject property.
Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and
Romana, petitioners and respondents became co-owners thereof. As co-
owners, they may use the property owned in common, provided they do
so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a
way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the
other co-owners from using it according to their rights.37 They have
the full ownership of their parts and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and may alienate, assign or mortgage them, and even substitute
another person in their enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved.38 Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.39 Finally,
no prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the
others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.40
For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner.
Likewise, petitioners argument that Leonardos admission and
acknowledgment in his pleadings that Lucimo Sr. was in possession
of the property since 1943 should be taken against him, is unavailing.
In 1943, Leon remained the rightful owner of the land, and Lucimo Sr.
knew this very well, being married to Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a
nephew of Leon. More significantly, the property, which is registered
under the Torrens system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leons
name. Leons ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his death when the
property passed on to his heirs by operation of law.
In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the
existing co-ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at
any time.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed March 14, 2006
Decision and the September 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74687are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 152658. July 29, 2005]
LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO, BEN MAURICIO P.
BRAVO,[1] ROLAND P. BRAVO, JR., OFELIA BRAVO-
QUIESTAS, HEIRS OF CORPUSINIA BRAVO-NIOR namely:
GERSON U. NIOR, MARK GERRY B. NIOR, CLIFF RICHARD
B. NIOR, BRYAN B. NIOR, WIDMARK B. NIOR, SHERRY
ANNE B. NIOR, represented by LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-
GUERRERO as their attorney-in-fact, and HONORABLE
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 139, Makati City, petitioners, vs. EDWARD P.
BRAVO, represented by his attorney-in-fact FATIMA C. BRAVO,
respondent, and DAVID B. DIAZ, JR., intervenor-respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[2] assailing the Decision[3] of
21 December 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67794.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision[4] of 11 May 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch No. 139, in Civil Case No. 97-
1379 denying respondents prayer to partition the subject properties.
Antecedent Facts
Spouses Mauricio Bravo (Mauricio) and Simona[5] Andaya Bravo
(Simona) owned two parcels of land (Properties) measuring 287 and
291 square meters and located along Evangelista Street, Makati City,
Metro Manila. The Properties are registered under TCT Nos. 58999 and
59000 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on 23 May 1958. The
Properties contain a large residential dwelling, a smaller house and
other improvements.
Mauricio and Simona had three children - Roland, Cesar and Lily, all
surnamed Bravo. Cesar died without issue. Lily Bravo married David
Diaz, and had a son, David B. Diaz, Jr. (David Jr.). Roland had six
children, namely, Lily Elizabeth Bravo-Guerrero (Elizabeth), Edward
Bravo (Edward), Roland Bravo, Jr. (Roland Jr.), Senia Bravo,
Benjamin Mauricio Bravo, and their half-sister, Ofelia Bravo (Ofelia).
Simona executed a General Power of Attorney (GPA) on 17 June 1966
appointing Mauricio as her attorney-in-fact. In the GPA, Simona
authorized Mauricio to mortgage or otherwise hypothecate, sell, assign
and dispose of any and all of my property, real, personal or mixed, of
any kind whatsoever and wheresoever situated, or any interest therein
xxx.[6] Mauricio subsequently mortgaged the Properties to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) for P10,000 and P5,000, respectively.[7]
On 25 October 1970, Mauricio executed a Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Real Estate Mortgage (Deed of Sale) conveying the
Properties to Roland A. Bravo, Ofelia A. Bravo and Elizabeth Bravo[8]
(vendees). The sale was conditioned on the payment of P1,000 and on
the assumption by the vendees of the PNB and DBP mortgages over the
Properties.
As certified by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, the Deed of Sale was notarized by Atty. Victorio Q. Guzman
on 28 October 1970 and entered in his Notarial Register.[9] However,
the Deed of Sale was not annotated on TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000.
Neither was it presented to PNB and DBP. The mortage loans and the
receipts for loan payments issued by PNB and DBP continued to be in
Mauricios name even after his death on 20 November 1973. Simona
died in 1977.
On 23 June 1997, Edward, represented by his wife, Fatima Bravo, filed
an action for the judicial partition of the Properties. Edward claimed
that he and the other grandchildren of Mauricio and Simona are co-
owners of the Properties by succession. Despite this, petitioners refused
to share with him the possession and rental income of the Properties.
Edward later amended his complaint to include a prayer to annul the
Deed of Sale, which he claimed was merely simulated to prejudice the
other heirs.
In 1999, David Jr., whose parents died in 1944 and who was
subsequently raised by Simona, moved to intervene in the case. David
Jr. filed a complaint-in-intervention impugning the validity of the Deed
of Sale and praying for the partition of the Properties among the
surviving heirs of Mauricio and Simona. The trial court allowed the
intervention in its Order dated 5 May 1999.[10]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court upheld Mauricios sale of the Properties to the vendees.
The trial court ruled that the sale did not prejudice the compulsory
heirs, as the Properties were conveyed for valuable consideration. The
trial court also noted that the Deed of Sale was duly notarized and was
in existence for many years without question about its validity.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision of 11 May 2000
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby DENIES the
JUDICIAL PARTITION of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 58999
and 59000 registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Dissatisfied, Edward and David Jr. (respondents) filed a joint appeal to
the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing Article 166 of the Civil Code (Article 166), the Court of Appeals
declared the Deed of Sale void for lack of Simonas consent. The
appellate court held that the GPA executed by Simona in 1966 was not
sufficient to authorize Mauricio to sell the Properties because Article
1878 of the Civil Code (Article 1878) requires a special power of
attorney for such transactions. The appellate court reasoned that the
GPA was executed merely to enable Mauricio to mortgage the
Properties, not to sell them.
The Court of Appeals also found that there was insufficient proof that
the vendees made the mortgage payments on the Properties, since the
PNB and DBP receipts were issued in Mauricios name. The appellate
court opined that the rental income of the Properties, which the vendees
never shared with respondents, was sufficient to cover the mortgage
payments to PNB and DBP.
The Court of Appeals declared the Deed of Sale void and ordered the
partition of the Properties in its Decision of 21 December 2001 (CA
Decision), as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Metro-Manila, Branch 13[9] dated 11 May 2000[,] review of
which is sought in these proceedings[,] is REVERSED.
1. The Deed of Sale with Assumption of Real Estate Mortgage (Exh. 4)
dated 28 October 1970 is hereby declared null and void;
2. Judicial Partition on the questioned properties is hereby GRANTED
in the following manner:
A. In representation of his deceased mother, LILY BRAVO-DIAZ,
intervenor DAVID DIAZ, JR., is entitled to one-half (1/2) interest of
the subject properties;
B. Plaintiff-appellant EDWARD BRAVO and the rest of the five
siblings, namely: LILY ELIZABETH, EDWARD, ROLAND, JR.,
SENIA, BENJAMIN and OFELIA are entitled to one-sixth (1/6)
representing the other half portion of the subject properties;
C. Plaintiff-appellant Edward Bravo, intervenor DAVID DIAZ, JR.,
SENIA and BENJAMIN shall reimburse the defendant-appellees LILY
ELIZABETH, OFELIA and ROLAND the sum of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) PESOS representing the consideration paid on the
questioned deed of sale with assumption of mortgage with interest of
six (6) percent per annum effective 28 October 1970 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The Issues
Petitioners seek a reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
raising these issues:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE
DEED OF SALE WITH ASSUMPTION OF MORTGAGE.
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING
THE PARTITION OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION.[13]
At the least, petitioners argue that the subject sale is valid as to
Mauricios share in the Properties.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that they are co-owners of the
Properties by succession. Respondents argue that the sale of the
conjugal Properties is void because: (1) Mauricio executed the Deed of
Sale without Simonas consent; and (2) the sale was merely simulated,
as shown by the grossly inadequate consideration Mauricio received for
the Properties.
While this case was pending, Leonida Andaya Lolong (Leonida), David
Jr.s aunt, and Atty. Cendaa, respondents counsel, informed the Court
that David Jr. died on 14 September 2004. Afterwards, Leonida and
Elizabeth wrote separate letters asking for the resolution of this case.
Atty. Cendaa later filed an urgent motion to annotate attorneys lien on
TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000. In its Resolution dated 10 November
2004,[14] the Court noted the notice of David Jr.s death, the letters
written by Leonida and Elizabeth, and granted the motion to annotate
attorneys lien on TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
The questions of whether Simona consented to the Deed of Sale and
whether the subject sale was simulated are factual in nature. The rule is
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court.
However, there are exceptions, such as when the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory, or when the
evidence on record does not support the factual findings.[15] Because
these exceptions obtain in the present case, the Court will consider
these issues.
On the Requirement of the Wifes Consent
We hold that the Court of Appeals erred when it declared the Deed of
Sale void based on Article 166, which states:
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium,
the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. If she refuses
unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the
same.
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal
partnerships before the effective date of this Code.
Article 166 expressly applies only to properties acquired by the
conjugal partnership after the effectivity of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Civil Code). The Civil Code came into force on 30 August
1950.[16] Although there is no dispute that the Properties were
conjugal properties of Mauricio and Simona, the records do not show,
and the parties did not stipulate, when the Properties were acquired.[17]
Under Article 1413 of the old Spanish Civil Code, the husband could
alienate conjugal partnership property for valuable consideration
without the wifes consent.[18]
Even under the present Civil Code, however, the Deed of Sale is not
void. It is well-settled that contracts alienating conjugal real property
without the wifes consent are merely voidable under the Civil Code that
is, binding on the parties unless annulled by a competent court and not
void ab initio.[19]
Article 166 must be read in conjunction with Article 173 of the Civil
Code (Article 173). The latter prescribes certain conditions before a
sale of conjugal property can be annulled for lack of the wifes consent,
as follows:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from
the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property.
Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Code, only the wife can ask to annul a contract that
disposes of conjugal real property without her consent. The wife must
file the action for annulment during the marriage and within ten years
from the questioned transaction. Article 173 is explicit on the remedies
available if the wife fails to exercise this right within the specified
period. In such case, the wife or her heirs can only demand the value of
the property provided they prove that the husband fraudulently
alienated the property. Fraud is never presumed, but must be
established by clear and convincing evidence.[20]
Respondents action to annul the Deed of Sale based on Article 166
must fail for having been filed out of time. The marriage of Mauricio
and Simona was dissolved when Mauricio died in 1973. More than ten
years have passed since the execution of the Deed of Sale.
Further, respondents, who are Simonas heirs, are not the parties who
can invoke Article 166. Article 173 reserves that remedy to the wife
alone. Only Simona had the right to have the sale of the Properties
annulled on the ground that Mauricio sold the Properties without her
consent.
Simona, however, did not assail the Deed of Sale during her marriage
or even after Mauricios death. The records are bereft of any indication
that Simona questioned the sale of the Properties at any time. Simona
did not even attempt to take possession of or reside on the Properties
after Mauricios death. David Jr., who was raised by Simona, testified
that he and Simona continued to live in Pasay City after Mauricios
death, while her children and other grandchildren resided on the
Properties.[21]
We also agree with the trial court that Simona authorized Mauricio to
dispose of the Properties when she executed the GPA. True, Article
1878 requires a special power of attorney for an agent to execute a
contract that transfers the ownership of an immovable. However, the
Court has clarified that Article 1878 refers to the nature of the
authorization, not to its form.[22] Even if a document is titled as a
general power of attorney, the requirement of a special power of
attorney is met if there is a clear mandate from the principal
specifically authorizing the performance of the act.[23]
In Veloso v. Court of Appeals,[24] the Court explained that a general
power of attorney could contain a special power to sell that satisfies the
requirement of Article 1878, thus:
An examination of the records showed that the assailed power of
attorney was valid and regular on its face. It was notarized and as such,
it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its
due execution. While it is true that it was denominated as a general
power of attorney, a perusal thereof revealed that it stated an authority
to sell, to wit:
2. To buy or sell, hire or lease, mortgage or otherwise hypothecate
lands, tenements and hereditaments or other forms of real property,
more specifically TCT No. 49138, upon such terms and conditions and
under such covenants as my said attorney shall deem fit and proper.
Thus, there was no need to execute a separate and special power of
attorney since the general power of attorney had expressly authorized
the agent or attorney in fact the power to sell the subject property. The
special power of attorney can be included in the general power when it
is specified therein the act or transaction for which the special power is
required. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, Simona expressly authorized Mauricio in the GPA to sell,
assign and dispose of any and all of my property, real, personal or
mixed, of any kind whatsoever and wheresoever situated, or any
interest therein xxx as well as to act as my general representative and
agent, with full authority to buy, sell, negotiate and contract for me and
in my behalf.[25] Taken together, these provisions constitute a clear
and specific mandate to Mauricio to sell the Properties. Even if it is
called a general power of attorney, the specific provisions in the GPA
are sufficient for the purposes of Article 1878. These provisions in the
GPA likewise indicate that Simona consented to the sale of the
Properties.
Whether the Sale of the Properties was Simulated
or is Void for Gross Inadequacy of Price
We point out that the law on legitime does not bar the disposition of
property for valuable consideration to descendants or compulsory heirs.
In a sale, cash of equivalent value replaces the property taken from the
estate.[26] There is no diminution of the estate but merely a
substitution in values. Donations and other dispositions by gratuitous
title, on the other hand, must be included in the computation of
legitimes.[27]
Respondents, however, contend that the sale of the Properties was
merely simulated. As proof, respondents point to the consideration of
P1,000 in the Deed of Sale, which respondents claim is grossly
inadequate compared to the actual value of the Properties.
Simulation of contract and gross inadequacy of price are distinct legal
concepts, with different effects. When the parties to an alleged contract
do not really intend to be bound by it, the contract is simulated and
void.[28] A simulated or fictitious contract has no legal effect
whatsoever[29] because there is no real agreement between the parties.
In contrast, a contract with inadequate consideration may nevertheless
embody a true agreement between the parties. A contract of sale is a
consensual contract, which becomes valid and binding upon the
meeting of minds of the parties on the price and the object of the
sale.[30] The concept of a simulated sale is thus incompatible with
inadequacy of price. When the parties agree on a price as the actual
consideration, the sale is not simulated despite the inadequacy of the
price.[31]
Gross inadequacy of price by itself will not result in a void contract.
Gross inadequacy of price does not even affect the validity of a contract
of sale, unless it signifies a defect in the consent or that the parties
actually intended a donation or some other contract.[32] Inadequacy of
cause will not invalidate a contract unless there has been fraud, mistake
or undue influence.[33] In this case, respondents have not proved any
of the instances that would invalidate the Deed of Sale.
Respondents even failed to establish that the consideration paid by the
vendees for the Properties was grossly inadequate. As the trial court
pointed out, the Deed of Sale stipulates that, in addition to the payment
of P1,000, the vendees should assume the mortgage loans from PNB
and DBP. The consideration for the sale of the Properties was thus
P1,000 in cash and the assumption of the P15,000 mortgage.
Respondents argue that P16,000 is still far below the actual value of the
Properties. To bolster their claim, respondents presented the following:
(1) Tax Declarations No. A-001-00905[34] and A-001-00906[35] for
the year 1979, which placed the assessed value of the Properties at
P70,020 and their approximate market value at P244,290; and (2) a
certified copy of the Department of Finances Department Order No. 62-
97[36] dated 6 June 1997 and attached guidelines[37] which
established the zonal value of the properties along Evangelista Street at
P15,000 per square meter.
The subject Deed of Sale, however, was executed in 1970. The
valuation of the Properties in 1979 or 1997 is of little relevance to the
issue of whether P16,000 was a grossly inadequate price to pay for the
Properties in 1970. Certainly, there is nothing surprising in the sharp
increase in the value of the Properties nine or twenty-seven years after
the sale, particularly when we consider that the Properties are located in
the City of Makati.
More pertinent are Tax Declarations No. 15812[38] and No. 15813,[39]
both issued in 1967, presented by petitioners. These tax declarations
placed the assessed value of both Properties at P16,160. Compared to
this, the price of P16,000 cannot be considered grossly inadequate,
much less so shocking to the conscience[40] as to justify the setting
aside of the Deed of Sale.
Respondents next contend that the vendees did not make the mortgage
payments on the Properties. Respondents allege that the rents paid by
the tenants leasing portions of the Properties were sufficient to cover
the mortgage payments to DBP and PNB.
Again, this argument does not help respondents cause. Assuming that
the vendees failed to pay the full price stated in the Deed of Sale, such
partial failure would not render the sale void. In Buenaventura v. Court
of Appeals,[41] the Court held:
xxx If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the
contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the
breach of that manner of payment. xxx
It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a
contract of sale. Payment of the price has nothing to do with the
perfection of the contract. Payment of the price goes into the
performance of the contract. Failure to pay the consideration is
different from lack of consideration. The former results in a right to
demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an
existing valid contract while the latter prevents the existence of a valid
contract. (Emphasis supplied.)
Neither was it shown that the rentals from tenants were sufficient to
cover the mortgage payments. The parties to this case stipulated to only
one tenant, a certain Federico M. Puno, who supposedly leased a room
on the Properties for P300 per month from 1992 to 1994.[42] This is
hardly significant, when we consider that the mortgage was fully paid
by 1974. Indeed, the fact that the Properties were mortgaged to DBP
and PNB indicates that the conjugal partnership, or at least Mauricio,
was short of funds.
Petitioners point out that they were duly employed and had the
financial capacity to buy the Properties in 1970. Respondents did not
refute this. Petitioners presented 72 receipts[43] showing the mortgage
payments made to PNB and DBP, and the Release of the Real Estate
Mortgage[44] (Mortgage Release) dated 5 April 1974. True, these
documents all bear Mauricios name. However, this tends to support,
rather than detract from, petitioner-vendees explanation that they
initially gave the mortgage payments directly to Mauricio, and then
later directly to the banks, without formally advising the bank of the
sale. The last 3 mortgage receipts and the Mortgage Release were all
issued in Mauricios name even after his death in 1970. Obviously,
Mauricio could not have secured the Mortgage Release and made these
last payments.
Presumption of Regularity and Burden of Proof
The Deed of Sale was notarized and, as certified by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, entered in the notarial books submitted to that court.
As a document acknowledged before a notary public, the Deed of Sale
enjoys the presumption of regularity[45] and due execution.[46] Absent
evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant,
the presumption must be upheld.[47]
Respondents evidence in this case is not even preponderant.
Respondents allegations, testimony and bare denials cannot prevail
over the documentary evidence presented by petitioners. These
documents the Deed of Sale and the GPA which are both notarized, the
receipts, the Mortgage Release and the 1967 tax declarations over the
Properties support petitioners account of the sale.
As the parties challenging the regularity of the Deed of Sale and
alleging its simulation, respondents had the burden of proving these
charges.[48] Respondents failed to discharge this burden.
Consequentially, the Deed of Sale stands.
On the Partition of the Property
Nevertheless, this Court finds it proper to grant the partition of the
Properties, subject to modification.
Petitioners have consistently claimed that their father is one of the
vendees who bought the Properties. Vendees Elizabeth and Ofelia both
testified that the Roland A. Bravo in the Deed of Sale is their
father,[49] although their brother, Roland Bravo, Jr., made some of the
mortgage payments. Petitioners counsel, Atty. Paggao, made the same
clarification before the trial court.[50]
As Roland Bravo, Sr. is also the father of respondent Edward Bravo,
Edward is thus a compulsory heir of Roland Bravo, and entitled to a
share, along with his brothers and sisters, in his fathers portion of the
Properties. In short, Edward and petitioners are co-owners of the
Properties.
As such, Edward can rightfully ask for the partition of the Properties.
Any co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common
property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership.[51] This
action for partition does not prescribe and is not subject to laches.[52]
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Decision of 21 December 2001 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67794. We REINSTATE the
Decision of 11 May 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch No. 139, in Civil Case No. 97-137, declaring VALID the Deed
of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage dated 28 October 1970, with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1. We GRANT judicial partition of the subject Properties in the
following manner:
a. Petitioner LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO is entitled to
one-third (1/3) of the Properties;
b. Petitioner OFELIA BRAVO-QUIESTAS is entitled to one-third
(1/3) of the Properties; and
c. The remaining one-third (1/3) portion of the Properties should be
divided equally between the children of ROLAND BRAVO.
2. The other heirs of ROLAND BRAVO must reimburse ROLAND
BRAVO, JR. for whatever expenses the latter incurred in paying for
and securing the release of the mortgage on the Properties.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-55225 September 30, 1982
HEIRS OF CATALINO JARDIN, namely, RUSTICA,
CEFERINA, VICTORINA, REMEDIOS, ELSIE, CIRILA,
PURIFICACION, and VIRGINIA, all surnamed JARDIN, and
WALDERICO Z. JARDIN, as Heir of Galo Jardin, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
HEIRS OF SIXTO HALLASGO, namely, PAZ, CORAZON,
NERIO, and ELIODORA, all surnamed HALLASGO, defendants-
appellees.
Galdino B. Jardin for plaintiffs-appellants.
Bernardo Semine for defendants-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the enforcement in 1973 of a 1920 partition of
certain unregistered lands. The following is a summary of the
allegations in the complaint filed in 1973 by the heirs of Catalino Jardin
and Galo Jardin against the heirs of Sixto Hallasgo in the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental in Civil Case No. 4234:
The spouses Braulio Jardin and Maura Hallasgo were survived by their
two children named Catalino and Galo and by Sixto Hallasgo,
apparently Maura's child by her first husband.
In 1920, Catalino, Galo and Sixto partitioned in a private document the
following properties inherited from the Jardin spouses:
(1) A residential lot in the poblacion of Jasaan, now Lower
Jasaan, Misamis Oriental, with an assessed value of P1,000. Catalino
and Galo each received as their share 495 square meters and seven
coconut trees. The remainder of the lot and seven coconut trees were
allotted to Sixto.
(2) A parcel of cornland located at Barrio Camposanto planted to
2-1/2 gantas with an assessed value of P500. An area planted to five
gantas was given to Sixto while the remainder was adjudicated to Galo
and Catalino.
(3) A parcel of land located at Barrio Cabagtucan planted to 21/2
gantas with an assessed value of P200 was assigned to Galo and
Catalino.
(4) A parcel of cornland located at Barrio Canajawan planted to
fourteen gantas was assigned to Sixto.
(5) A parcel of land also located at Barrio Canajawan planted to
thirteen gantas with an assessed value of P500 was assigned to Galo
and Catalino.
(6) A parcel of riceland located at Barrio Sagpolon planted to ten
gantas was assigned to Galo and Catalino.
(7) A parcel of riceland located at Barrio Mandagisiao planted to
five gantas was assigned to Sixto.
(8) A parcel of riceland located at Barrio Calabugon planted to
six gantas was divided equally among the three heirs.
(9) A parcel of land located at Barrio Mingomon, Claveria,
Bukidnon, plus one cow, was assigned to Sixto in exchange for a house
of strong materials located at the poblacion.
Galo later ceded to Catalino his share of 495 square meters in the lot at
the poblacion of Jasaan in exchange for Catalino's one-half share of the
riceland in Barrio Sagpolon (No. 6). Catalino became the owner of 990
square meters of the poblacion lot. Galo became the sole owner of the
riceland at Sagpolon.
In 1963, Sixto was allowed by Catalino's children to use as a garden an
area of 350 square meters which is a part of the 990 square meters
owned by them. However, in 1964 Sixto fraudulently and without the
knowledge of Catalino's children (Sixto's nephews and nieces) included
said portion in the cadastral survey of his share of the poblacion lot.
Sixto and his children refused to reconvey the said 350-square-meter
portion to Catalino's children.
Allegedly taking advantage of the minority of the children of Catalino
and Galo, who both died after the war, Sixto occupied the parcels of
land adjudicated to Galo and Catalino in the 1920 deed of partition
including the house of strong materials. Sixto used those lands after the
death of Galo and Catalino and did not give to their heirs any share of
the harvests.
It was only in the early part of 1973 that the children of Galo and
Catalino came to know of the 1920 deed of partition which was shown
to them by Corazon Hallasgo during a confrontation in the provincial
commander's office at Camp Alagar when they sought to recover the
said portion of 350 square meters from the Hallasgos.
On that occasion, the children of Galo and Catalino came to know that
the shares of Galo and Catalino in that partition allegedly had been in
the possession of Sixto and his children "for a long time". In spite of
earnest efforts, Sixto's heirsrefused to settle the case amicably with the
heirs of Galo and Catalino.
The heirs of Galo and Catalino prayed in their 1973 complaint that
Sixto's heirs be ordered to reconvey to them the lands allocated to their
parents in the 1920 partition and the portion of 350 square meters in the
poblacion lot appropriated by Sixto. The plaintiffs also prayed for
damages.
Defendants Hallasgo filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court in a
minute order dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription,
citing Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857. The plaintiffs appealed.
They contend that their action had not prescribed and that its dismissal
had no factual basis. The defendants did not file any brief.
Incidentally, plaintiffs-appellants also contend for the first time that
defendants' motion to dismiss, which was filed on August 22, 1973 and
set for hearing on September 27, 1973, was a mere scrap of paper. That
contention is devoid of merit. The plaintiffs interposed a written
opposition to that motion. They were heard before it was granted by the
trial court.
The appellants invoke the rule that the action for partition among co-
heirs does not prescribe and that a co-owner's possession of the
community property is not deemed adverse to the other co-owners.
They argue that the 1920 handwritten partition signifies that Sixto
recognized the existence of the co-ownership.
We find these contentions to be flimsy and untenable. The poorly
drafted complaint is vitiated by grave deficiencies and loose ends. Its
draftsman had not thoroughly studied the facts and the law involved in
the action.
There are no allegations as to the specific dates when Galo and
Catalino died (it was merely alleged that they died "after the war") and
when Sixto died; when the heirs of Galo and Catalino became of age;
the date when Sixto allegedly usurped the lands allocated to Galo and
Catalino; what lands are in the possession of Galo and Catalino's heirs
and why they did not sue Sixto during his lifetime to recover what
pertained to them.
The document of partition itself shows that it was already implemented
in 1920. Under that partition, the land located at Barrio Cabagtucan
planted to 2- gantas, the land located at Barrio Canajawan and the
land located at Barrio Sagpolon planted to ten gantas (Nos. 3, 5 and 6)
were definitely adjudicated to Galo and Catalino. Sixto could not have
usurped those lands for if he did so his uterine brothers Galo and
Catalino would have resisted the usurpation. There was no co-
ownership as to these lands.
If the co-heir or co-owner, having possession of the hereditary or
community property, holds the same in his own name, that is, under
claim of exclusive ownership, he may acquire the property by
prescription if his possession meets all the other requirements of the
law, and after the expiration of the prescriptive period, his co-heir or
co-owner may lose their right to demand partition, and their action may
then be held to have prescribed. (De los Santos vs. Santa Teresa, 44
Phil. 811).
In the instant case, as the partition was made in 1920 and the plaintiffs
did not specify when Sixto Hallasgo repudiated the co-ownership of the
lands in Composanto and Calabugon, the trial court assumed that
prescription started to run even before the Civil Code took effect,
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, a period of ten years was the
maximum period for acquisitive and extinctive prescription. Hence, the
trial court concluded that the 1973 action was barred by prescription.
With respect to the portion of 350 square meters of the poblacion lot,
the same is governed by other legal rules. That portion was loaned to
Sixto by his nephews and nieces by way of commodatum or precanum
(Art. 1947, Civil Code). In grievous violation of the trust, he allegedly
included it in the cadastral survey of his share of the poblacion lot.
(Whether he obtained a Torrens title for it is not specified.)
The action of Catalino's children for the recovery of that 350-square-
meter portion from Sixto's heirs has not yet prescribed. The trial court
erred in dismissing that part of plaintiffs' complaint.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the
modification that the plaintiffs' action for the recovery of the 350-
square-meter portion of the poblacion lot may be maintained. The
defendants-appellees should answer that part of the complaint referring
to that lot. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

That the 1920 partition among the three heirs was implemented is
shown in the allegations of the complaint with respect to the poblacion
lot. As already stated, Galo and Catalino were each given 495 square
meters and seven coconut trees out of the poblacion lot. The remainder
of the lot and seven coconut trees were given to Sixto.

That partition of the poblacion lot shows that the 1920 agreement was
actually enforced. There was no co-ownership as to the poblacion lot. If
the 1920 partition was enforced as to the poblacion lot, there would be
no reason why it would not have been implemented with respect to the
other lands.

The only lands held in co-ownership under the 1920 partition were the
Camposanto cornland planted to 7- gantas and the Calabugon
riceland planted to six gantas (Nos. 2 and 8). But it was not alleged
with particularity when Sixto repudiated the co-ownership as to those
lands and claimed them as his own.

Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "no co-owner shag be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership" and that "each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar
as his share is concerned". It also provides that "no prescription shall
run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs
so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."

While the action for the partition of the thing owned in common (actio
communi dividendo or actio familiae erciscundae) does not prescribe,
the co-ownership does not last forever since it may be repudiated by a
co-owner. In such a case, the action for partition does not lie. What
may be brought by the aggrieved co-owner is an accion reivindicatoria
or action for recovery of title and possession. That action may be barred
by prescription.